The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World
JCS-JOE-2035
JCS-JOE-2035
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chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. In these cases, the <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> may be<br />
required to mitigate the effects of WMD use <strong>in</strong> the midst of a civil or <strong>in</strong>ternational conflict.<br />
Manage Antagonism <strong>and</strong> Impose Costs<br />
<strong>The</strong>re will be <strong>in</strong>stances when the United States will resolve to oppose the<br />
aggressive activities of state <strong>and</strong> non-state actors – whether overt, covert,<br />
or a hybrid mix. In these cases, the <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will be required to more<br />
actively <strong>and</strong> forcefully resist adversaries <strong>and</strong> discourage unfavorable<br />
changes to the security environment. When the United States decides to<br />
manage an antagonistic competitor or impose costs on adversary courses<br />
of action, the military tasks associated with this endur<strong>in</strong>g strategic goal are:<br />
Deter. To employ the <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> to prevent or discourage adversary<br />
action.<br />
Deny. To employ the <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> to refuse adversary use of an already<br />
seized or controlled objective.<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> must be prepared to protect <strong>and</strong> defend key U.S. <strong>in</strong>terests<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st adversaries who attempt to shape or otherwise alter the security<br />
environment at the expense of the United States or its allies. Consequently,<br />
the future <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> will conduct missions to deter or deny adversaries<br />
from engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> coercive strategies or benefit<strong>in</strong>g from conflict <strong>and</strong> war by<br />
rais<strong>in</strong>g the potential costs of their actions above what they are prepared to<br />
bear. Figure 7 illustrates the potential missions the future <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> may<br />
conduct to deter or deny.<br />
Figure 7. Missions<br />
to Deter or Deny<br />
Evolv<strong>in</strong>g Missions to Deter or Deny<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> must be prepared to conduct Defense aga<strong>in</strong>st Subversion. <strong>The</strong>se missions will<br />
discourage both state <strong>and</strong> non-state ideological networks from tak<strong>in</strong>g political <strong>and</strong> military actions<br />
to underm<strong>in</strong>e the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of the United<br />
States, its allies <strong>and</strong> partners. <strong>The</strong>y will feature an <strong>in</strong>tegrated mix of global activities <strong>and</strong> local<br />
operations to strengthen <strong>and</strong> protect the stability <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity of key foreign partners. Initially,<br />
<strong>in</strong>formation operations designed to weaken adversary <strong>in</strong>itiatives by encourag<strong>in</strong>g local competition<br />
among exist<strong>in</strong>g ideological networks will simultaneously motivate local resistance to competitor<br />
networks. Furthermore, to counter the wide rang<strong>in</strong>g subversive efforts of states <strong>and</strong> terrorist<br />
groups, the <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> may conduct synchronized <strong>and</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ated Foreign Internal Defense,<br />
Security <strong>Force</strong> Assistance, <strong>and</strong> potentially unconventional warfare across several threatened states<br />
<strong>and</strong> jurisdictions. This mission should focus on deny<strong>in</strong>g adversaries visible victories <strong>and</strong><br />
demonstrat<strong>in</strong>g the capacity to reject their desired objectives.<br />
<strong>The</strong> foundation for U.S. survival <strong>in</strong> a world of nuclear states is the credible capability to hold other<br />
nuclear great powers at risk, which will be complicated by the emergence of more capable,<br />
survivable, <strong>and</strong> numerous competitor nuclear forces. <strong>The</strong>refore, the future <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> must be<br />
prepared to conduct National Strategic Deterrence. This <strong>in</strong>cludes leverag<strong>in</strong>g layered missile<br />
defenses to complicate adversary nuclear plann<strong>in</strong>g; field<strong>in</strong>g U.S. nuclear forces capable of<br />
threaten<strong>in</strong>g the leadership, military forces, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustrial <strong>and</strong> economic assets of potential<br />
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