The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World

est of the world. For example, a new draft Chinese cyber law “is formulated…to preserve
cyberspace sovereignty, national security and societal public interest.” 36 Here, military cyber
forces will assist national authorities to delineate and defend “national” borders in cyberspace, and
to construct and enforce the protocols and rules governing its operation and use at home.
Ultimately, the more active control of cyberspace by authoritarian powers may provide them a
distinct military advantage.
The cyber forces and activities of many states will also likely be used to stress or fracture the social
and political cohesion of competitors. Some adversaries will develop cyber strategies and
information-related capabilities designed to influence the perceptions and decision calculations of
their opponents. Proficiency in cyber operations will provide states a rather precise set of
capabilities to potentially affect the attitudes, behaviors, and capabilities of other states at great
distance, persistently, and relatively cheaply. Furthermore, cyber activities by foreign states and
hacker groups are likely to be extremely personal as adversaries attempt to influence key U.S.
political, business, and military leaders through targeted information warfare.
Military Competitive Space
“Cyber power projection…refers to the capability of a government to intimidate other
nations and implement policy by means of force from cyber actions or the threat thereof.” 37
The intersection of cyberspace and sovereignty will lead to new modes of conflict. Dependence
on a range of capabilities in this domain coupled with the vulnerability of cyber-enabled systems
to exploitation presents an assailable flank which competitors are likely to probe, infiltrate, and
potentially attack. This contest for cyberspace will involve any digital, code-enabled system that
can communicate, emit, connect, or sense. States will likely use cyber operations to safeguard their
own critical national infrastructure while simultaneously attempting to influence, disrupt, degrade,
or perhaps even destroy that of their competitors.
A growing number of states will have extensive offensive cyber forces at their disposal to disrupt
the smooth and efficient functioning of cyber-connected systems. In the future, state military and
security organizations will increasingly use cross-border network and web-site disruptions to cause
social unrest. Attacks will work to undermine the trust and data integrity that are central to
advanced societies, particularly financial, legal, and technical infrastructure. This competition may
also feature strategic surveillance as well as industrial and scientific espionage. Additionally, the
competition may involve disrupting data, networks, and the physical systems of competitors to
gain economic, military, and political advantages.
Adversaries may also attempt to conduct a strategic cyber campaign directly against the U.S.
homeland focused on degrading critical systems and assets. The Joint Force will likely have a role
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Draft Cybersecurity Law (China). This law asserts the need to maintain cyberspace sovereignty through national
measures such as real name registration for domestic cyberspace users, “support and assistance” to the government
for dealing with criminal investigations, review of cybersecurity practices of key telecommunication operators by
the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), and the collection and storage of user data within China.
See also, Council on Foreign Relations: http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/07/08/chinas-new-cybersecurity-law/.
37
Kevin Coleman, “Aggression in Cyberspace,” in Jasper (Ed.) Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons,
p. 110.
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