The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World
JCS-JOE-2035
JCS-JOE-2035
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Exclusion <strong>in</strong> order to enforce open <strong>and</strong> free use of the seas, air, space, <strong>and</strong> electromagnetic<br />
spectrum <strong>and</strong> compel the recognition of U.S. favored norms <strong>and</strong> rules with<strong>in</strong> them. This will likely<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude multi-doma<strong>in</strong> offensive operations us<strong>in</strong>g coord<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>and</strong> simultaneous electronic, cyber,<br />
space, <strong>and</strong> k<strong>in</strong>etic actions to eradicate adversary capabilities that can <strong>in</strong>fluence or affect the<br />
commons. Concurrently, the <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> may launch operations to force the withdrawal of<br />
adversaries from the commons by damag<strong>in</strong>g critical assets <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g attacks on launch facilities;<br />
economic <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial nodes; position, navigation <strong>and</strong> tim<strong>in</strong>g satellites; naval vessels; <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong>based<br />
aerial strike assets. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> must also protect the commons <strong>and</strong> enforce U.S.<br />
preferred norms through a range of convoy operations, <strong>in</strong>tegrated air <strong>and</strong> missile defenses,<br />
maritime m<strong>in</strong>e warfare, <strong>and</strong> subsurface combat.<br />
Cyberspace provides an avenue to <strong>in</strong>flict severe damage on the United States by manipulat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
networks, the mach<strong>in</strong>es connected to networks, <strong>and</strong> the ideas transmitted over them. In many cases,<br />
the use of cyber coercion aga<strong>in</strong>st the United States will be <strong>in</strong>tolerable. <strong>The</strong>refore, the <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
must be prepared to conduct Cyberspace Control to elim<strong>in</strong>ate an adversary's ability to def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong><br />
defend their <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> cyberspace <strong>and</strong> force them to recognize U.S. views on its use. Cyberspace<br />
control operations will frequently <strong>in</strong>tegrate cyber <strong>and</strong> non-cyber capabilities. In coord<strong>in</strong>ation with<br />
law enforcement agencies, offensive operations may be required to identify, target, <strong>and</strong> capture or<br />
kill adversary cyber operatives. Offensive operations will also be used to eradicate an adversary’s<br />
cyber <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>and</strong> capabilities, which might <strong>in</strong>clude an array of k<strong>in</strong>etic strikes comb<strong>in</strong>ed with<br />
simultaneous electronic, cyber, <strong>and</strong> space warfare actions. F<strong>in</strong>ally, the <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> may impose<br />
cyber-military governance, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>troduction of U.S. cyber rules <strong>and</strong> laws on captured<br />
adversary networks to <strong>in</strong>clude the control of doma<strong>in</strong> names, access <strong>and</strong> registration, <strong>and</strong><br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istration of key systems.<br />
<strong>The</strong> consequences of state or regional failure may be so dire that the United States decides to<br />
impose an endur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> stable order. Consequently, the <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> must be prepared to conduct<br />
Peace Enforcement <strong>and</strong> Military Governance to destroy an <strong>in</strong>surgent force resist<strong>in</strong>g a legitimate<br />
government or to compel an external adversary to recognize the <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>and</strong> authority of a<br />
particular state. This might <strong>in</strong>clude counter<strong>in</strong>surgency operations to elim<strong>in</strong>ate local resistance to<br />
state authority, tak<strong>in</strong>g advantage of advanced biometric capabilities, big data pattern recognition,<br />
<strong>and</strong> persistent ISR to support the separation of combatants from noncombatants. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong><br />
may also conduct peace enforcement operations to term<strong>in</strong>ate a conflict <strong>and</strong> impose compliance<br />
with an <strong>in</strong>ternationally recognized settlement. Both counter<strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>and</strong> peace enforcement will<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude stability operations, <strong>and</strong> perhaps limited military governance, to restore the political<br />
authority of a state or multiple states. Above all, the <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> should have the capacity to deploy<br />
a historically-grounded ratio of forces to governed populations if called upon to decisively restore<br />
a failed or fail<strong>in</strong>g state, or develop capabilities that effectively replicate these ratios (for example,<br />
remotely piloted or autonomous <strong>in</strong>fantry/patrol robotic systems).<br />
Summary<br />
This section described a range of evolv<strong>in</strong>g missions that the future <strong>Jo<strong>in</strong>t</strong> <strong>Force</strong> may be required to<br />
conduct <strong>in</strong> 2035. <strong>The</strong> missions presented at the <strong>in</strong>tersection of U.S. strategic goals with the<br />
disparate Contexts of Future Conflict should not be viewed as a clearly def<strong>in</strong>ed, precise, <strong>and</strong><br />
discrete set. Rather, they should be viewed as a potential vocabulary for the <strong>in</strong>evitable strategic<br />
dialogue that must occur between future military planners <strong>and</strong> their political leadership.<br />
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