The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World

harm and outcomes between the concepts of war and peace—with important consequences
for national and international security…” 34
Within this context, conflict and war are likely to occur as states struggle to define and credibly
protect sovereignty in cyberspace. Defining the boundaries that exist between sovereign and nonsovereign
areas has always been difficult, contentious, and usually resolved through war. In each
of the terrestrial domains (land, sea, and air), the delineation of boundaries, rights, and
responsibilities took time to fully establish, was (and continues to be) contested, and eventually
required the creation of basic and mutually acceptable rules and norms governing their use. The
Treaty of Westphalia, which defined the modern notion of the nation-state and “national
sovereignty,” was explicitly designed to lower the risk of violence and war. Ultimately, it took
violence out of the hands of individuals, privateers, militias, and mercenaries, and imposed
reciprocal responsibilities on states to recognize one another’s borders and internal autonomy.
Rules and norms are poorly established in cyberspace. Thus, the same dynamic of states defining
and defending sovereignty in cyberspace is likely to play out over the next several decades
Although frequently referred to as part of the global commons, few Americans believe that
government and DoD systems, corporate networks, or personal banking and financial accounts are
“owned by none, accessible to all” according to the classic definition of what constitutes a
commons. 35 The reflex to think of cyberspace as a commons is perhaps reflective of the design
philosophy underpinning the Internet which is based on shared standards, an open exchange of
information, and accessibility.
Today, the cyber domain is so integral to the basic infrastructure of the United States and the larger
global economy that actions to deny, degrade, or destroy parts of it have the potential to create
intolerable security problems. The contest in cyberspace will continue to be fraught with
misperception and miscommunication, particularly with regard to the proportionality of damage
caused by cyber-attacks and equivalent consequences in the other domains. By 2035, international
norms might be created and adopted that define what is sovereign versus what is common in
cyberspace. As a result, a range of cyber activities will be increasingly and more comprehensively
linked with national security strategies.
Nature of Potential Adversaries
The United States and other states will certainly wish to survive and thrive in cyberspace.
However, in an environment where the difference between national and “common” cyberspace is
ill-defined, there will be a greater degree of ambiguity, friction, conflict, and war with a wide range
of cyber-capable actors. Not all states will take the same approach to cyberspace control. However,
many competitor states, reacting to the growth of the information-rich and uncontrolled global
Internet, will continue to develop cyber-security organizations and install barriers such as China’s
“Great Firewall” to protect their critical cyber infrastructure, monitor domestic opponents, and
control the flow of information within their borders.
In many places, the next few decades will see the development of cyberspace with more
authoritarian characteristics focused on limiting access, connections, and compatibility with the
34
Lucas Kello, “The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution,” International Security, (2012).
35
See “Context 4: Disrupted Global Commons” above.
34