The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World

following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a growing economy, a system of alliances coupled with
a formidable global basing network, and the very visible display of U.S. military power in the first
Gulf War induced a significant amount of caution in competitors wishing to challenge the United
States, its allies, partners, interests, and overall global position.
Over the next two decades, the United States will likely maintain its position as the single most
powerful actor on the world stage. However, while no power or coalition of powers has yet
emerged to openly oppose U.S. global influence and reach, the United States will operate in a
world in which its overall economic and military power, and that of its allies and partners, may not
grow as quickly as potential competitors. The rise of economic near-peer competitors outside of
the U.S. alliance system is critically important because “economic might is the foundation of
military power…and a reliable way to gain a military advantage over rivals.” 22
As some states fully emerge as leading actors in the globalized economy, they are likely to gain a
new sense of power and confidence with each scientific, economic, and social achievement.
Inevitably, this success will encourage them to advocate their own ideas about how economic and
strategic relations with other states should be governed. The United States will encounter powerful
states reaching for regional supremacy, rearranging borders, and constructing new economic and
political arrangements. They will attempt to hinder the ability of the United States and its allies to
work together and actively try to isolate key alliance members. Further, they might encourage or
coerce them to leave the alliance structure altogether.
Nature of Potential Adversaries
For the foreseeable future, the rising economic and cultural power of some Asian countries,
particularly China, is breeding new and more expansive political and geostrategic ambitions
backed by growing military power. In other areas, the historical logic of imperialism, sometimes
accelerated by economic and demographic decline, is leading to reactive aggression designed to
blunt or erode U.S. influence regionally. Examples include Russia’s renewed political/military
aggression in Europe, the Caucuses, and Central Asia; Iran’s cultural/religious bid for hegemony
in the Middle East; and North Korea’s ongoing efforts to detach U.S. political and military support
to the Republic of Korea.
Revisionist states will be increasingly dissatisfied with the current Western-derived notion of
international order. For example, Vladimir Putin noted that in the Russian view, uncontested
Western leadership means an international environment in which “no one feel(s) safe, because no
one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that can protect them.” 23 In these cases, states
may use military power to establish (or reestablish) local spheres of influence, create buffer states
or regions which are subordinate and/or dependent on the local hegemon, and disconnect
neighboring states from the broader global economic and political system.
Major state competitors will try to weaken traditional U.S. alliances or take advantage of perceived
fractures to expand their regional power. Although seemingly insignificant today, organizations
such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union could grow as
22
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2014) p. 142.
23
Vladimir Putin, as quoted in Robert Kagan, “The End of the End of History: Why the 21st Century will look like
the Nineteenth,” The New Republic, (April 23 2008).
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