The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World

adversaries; and demonstrating the readiness of these forces through exercises and other flexible
deterrent operations. The Joint Force must also deter state and non-state adversaries from pursuing
terrorist attacks against the homeland. This will likely feature intelligence and data collection with
domestic agencies and international partners to identify and track domestic terrorists combined
with the use of punitive strikes and raids to disconnect them from their sources of foreign support.
As a number of states seek to extend their power and influence more broadly, they are likely to
threaten U.S. global interests and commitments around the world. The Joint Force must be
prepared to conduct Extended Deterrence to assure allies and partners and to raise the cost to
adversaries who threaten critical national interests. Assurance and deterrence in a world of many
capable regional powers will require the Joint Force to apply active and passive security measures,
including the development of credible expeditionary and power projection capabilities, protected
forward basing, joint nuclear assurance missions, and a range of fixed and deployable military
presence postures. In the future, the Joint Force should be capable of reducing the likelihood or
impact of coercive diplomacy that seeks to exclude U.S. influence or access. Specifically, the force
should be prepared to cooperate with allies to preempt competitor initiatives or prevent threats
from expanding through combined Foreign Internal Defense, Security Force Assistance,
unconventional warfare, and show of force operations directed against an aggressive adversary.
The Joint Force must be prepared to conduct Global Commons Stabilization to deter adversaries
from contesting free use of the seas, air, space, and electromagnetic spectrum. These missions will
hinge on a Joint Force capable of conducting intelligence operations with allies and partners to
develop awareness of competitor activities in the commons including establishing a common
operating picture, but also identifying and analyzing trends with advanced pattern recognition
capabilities to better understand the difference between regular traffic and impending military
closure or interdiction. Furthermore, the Joint Force must be capable of protecting national
objectives in the global commons despite the use of asymmetric, unconventional, and hybrid
approaches by competitors to assert new claims and exercise more control in the commons. This
will require operations that impose costs on adversaries who impede free use of the commons,
such as targeted electromagnetic and space denial measures, the enforcement of sanctions, or the
establishment of electromagnetic exclusion zones.
As more devices, systems, and national infrastructure are connected to cyberspace, critical systems
will be targeted by adversary cyber weapons. In order to deter adversaries from violating U.S.
interests in cyberspace and deny their ability to interdict critical U.S. cyber systems, the future
Joint Force must be prepared to conduct national and allied Network Defense. These missions will
require steady-state information operations in support of national cyber deterrence strategies that
communicate the resiliency of critical U.S. systems and infrastructure, while protecting their
vulnerabilities. Key actions may include the development of a Department of Defense cyber
umbrella; the creation of a national “cyber border patrol;” more comprehensive intelligence
sharing efforts; contributions to national level cyber exercises; the development of hardened
networks; and reinforced coordination with domestic law enforcement.
The future security environment will feature adversaries undermining the integrity of states or
taking advantage of a state that is failing. The Joint Force must be prepared to conduct Military
Support to Foreign Partners to bolster or reinforce the government of a failing state. During these
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