atw 2017-12
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<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 62 (<strong>2017</strong>) | Issue <strong>12</strong> ı December<br />
Analysis of the In-Vessel Phase of SAM<br />
Strategy for a Korean 1000 MWe PWR<br />
Sung-Min Cho, Seung-Jong Oh and Aya Diab<br />
1 Introduction Severe accident mitigation is an important design feature for new nuclear power plants<br />
(NPPs). Unlike design basis accidents (DBAs), both scenario variations and phenomenological uncertainties are important<br />
in severe accidents. To remedy uncertainty issues, Theofanous developed Risk Oriented Accident Analysis Methodology<br />
(ROAAM). ROAAM is a consensus approach to resolve phenomenological uncertainties using bounding scenarios.<br />
However, the bounding scenario concept has its limitation in the Severe Accident Management (SAM) evaluation since<br />
the various severe accident phenomena should be considered in SAM.<br />
As an extension of ROAAM, ROAAM+<br />
framework was proposed and used<br />
in the SAM evaluation of the Nordic<br />
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) conducted<br />
by the Royal Institute of Technology<br />
(KTH) in Sweden. The processes<br />
involved in severe accidents<br />
were divided into in-vessel and exvessel<br />
phases. The analysis considered<br />
epistemic (phenomena) and aleatory<br />
(scenarios) uncertainties.<br />
In this paper, ROAAM+ framework<br />
is used to examine the in-vessel phase<br />
of SAM strategy for 1000 MWe PWR.<br />
Specifically, we aim to derive i) the<br />
successful strategies for maintaining<br />
the integrity of the reactor vessel;<br />
ii) the core melting and relocation<br />
information under this condition.<br />
Globally, there has been a growing<br />
interest to have 1000 MWe range<br />
nuclear power plants (NPPs) with<br />
better severe accident mitigation<br />
capabilities. Examples are 1000 MWe<br />
range NPPs such as AP-1000 [1],<br />
VVER-1000 [2] and ATMEA1 [3]. In<br />
this study, we envision a Korean<br />
1000MWe Pressurized Water Reactor<br />
(PWR) based on the proven OPR1000<br />
design with APR1400's safety systems<br />
as an advanced NPP.<br />
This paper examines the evolution<br />
of plant behavior with SAM strategy of<br />
reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurization<br />
and water injection into<br />
the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The<br />
event of station blackout (SBO) is<br />
chosen as the reference case based on<br />
the APR1400 probabilistic risk assessment<br />
(PRA) results [4]. The RCS depressurization<br />
is performed by opening<br />
the pilot-operated safety relief<br />
valves (POSRVs). For the RPV injection,<br />
an external pump is assumed<br />
available since all NPPs in Korea have<br />
implemented the diverse and flexible<br />
coping strategies (FLEX) in the wake<br />
of the Fukushima accident.<br />
To consider the scenario variation<br />
effect on SAM, the open timing of<br />
POSRVs and the external injection<br />
flow rate and timing are varied. For<br />
the phenomenological uncertainties,<br />
two parameters are considered:<br />
EPSCUT, which is the cutoff porosity<br />
below which the flow area and the<br />
hydraulic diameter of a core node are<br />
zero, and TCLMAX, which is the temperature<br />
that will lead to cladding<br />
rupture. These two parameters are<br />
selected for as the basis for the sensitivity<br />
analysis because they affect the<br />
core melting and relocation process,<br />
which is an important phenomenon<br />
for the evaluation of the in-vessel<br />
phase of SAM. In this process, information<br />
on core melting and relocation<br />
is derived, and this information can be<br />
used as an initial con dition for the<br />
next phase of SAM evaluation such as<br />
ERVC and the ex-vessel phase in the<br />
future. The computer code used in this<br />
paper is MAAP5.<br />
2 Analysis methodology<br />
The analysis of this paper is based<br />
on the following information and<br />
assumptions.<br />
2.1 Target plant<br />
The plant is a 1000 MWe PWR based<br />
on the proven OPR1000 design. It<br />
is envisioned that the latest safety<br />
systems of APR1400, including severe<br />
accident mitigation features [5] are<br />
implemented. New design feature<br />
improvements such as no-leakage<br />
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal [6]<br />
and FLEX equipment are assumed to<br />
be adopted as well.<br />
| | Fig. 1.<br />
ROAAM+ framework for Nordic BWR [13].<br />
2.2 ROAAM+ framework<br />
The Royal Institute of Technology<br />
(KTH) in Sweden has developed<br />
Risk Oriented Accident Analysis Methodology<br />
(ROAAM+) framework and<br />
applied it to the Nordic Boiling Water<br />
Reactors (BWR) SAM evaluation.<br />
The original ROAAM was developed<br />
for assessment and management<br />
of rare and high consequence hazards<br />
[6]for example severe accident issues<br />
related to early containment failure<br />
such as steam explosion [7] and invessel<br />
retention [8].<br />
On the other hand, the bounding<br />
scenario concept is of limited value in<br />
the Severe Accident Management<br />
(SAM) evaluation. The various severe<br />
accident phenomena, such as core<br />
relocation [9], vessel failure [10],<br />
melt ejection, ex-vessel debris coolability<br />
[11], and ex-vessel steam<br />
explosion [<strong>12</strong>] should be considered<br />
as shown in the top layer of the<br />
ROAAM+ framework for the Nordic<br />
BWR shown in Figure 1.<br />
The ROAAM+ approach, which is<br />
an extension of the original ROAAM<br />
framework, decomposes severe accident<br />
progression into a set of causal<br />
relationships represented by respective<br />
surrogate models and connected<br />
through initial conditions. It can<br />
provide an overall frame of SAM<br />
evaluation that allows determination<br />
of whether an adequate level of safety<br />
has been achieved for a plant [13].<br />
Deterministic and probabilistic analyses<br />
are integrated in ROAAM+<br />
747<br />
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY<br />
Environment and Safety<br />
Analysis of the In-Vessel Phase of SAM Strategy for a Korean 1000 MWe PWR ı Sung-Min Cho, Seung-Jong Oh and Aya Diab