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<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 62 (<strong>2017</strong>) | Issue <strong>12</strong> ı December<br />

Analysis of the In-Vessel Phase of SAM<br />

Strategy for a Korean 1000 MWe PWR<br />

Sung-Min Cho, Seung-Jong Oh and Aya Diab<br />

1 Introduction Severe accident mitigation is an important design feature for new nuclear power plants<br />

(NPPs). Unlike design basis accidents (DBAs), both scenario variations and phenomenological uncertainties are important<br />

in severe accidents. To remedy uncertainty issues, Theofanous developed Risk Oriented Accident Analysis Methodology<br />

(ROAAM). ROAAM is a consensus approach to resolve phenomenological uncertainties using bounding scenarios.<br />

However, the bounding scenario concept has its limitation in the Severe Accident Management (SAM) evaluation since<br />

the various severe accident phenomena should be considered in SAM.<br />

As an extension of ROAAM, ROAAM+<br />

framework was proposed and used<br />

in the SAM evaluation of the Nordic<br />

Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) conducted<br />

by the Royal Institute of Technology<br />

(KTH) in Sweden. The processes<br />

involved in severe accidents<br />

were divided into in-vessel and exvessel<br />

phases. The analysis considered<br />

epistemic (phenomena) and aleatory<br />

(scenarios) uncertainties.<br />

In this paper, ROAAM+ framework<br />

is used to examine the in-vessel phase<br />

of SAM strategy for 1000 MWe PWR.<br />

Specifically, we aim to derive i) the<br />

successful strategies for maintaining<br />

the integrity of the reactor vessel;<br />

ii) the core melting and relocation<br />

information under this condition.<br />

Globally, there has been a growing<br />

interest to have 1000 MWe range<br />

nuclear power plants (NPPs) with<br />

better severe accident mitigation<br />

capabilities. Examples are 1000 MWe<br />

range NPPs such as AP-1000 [1],<br />

VVER-1000 [2] and ATMEA1 [3]. In<br />

this study, we envision a Korean<br />

1000MWe Pressurized Water Reactor<br />

(PWR) based on the proven OPR1000<br />

design with APR1400's safety systems<br />

as an advanced NPP.<br />

This paper examines the evolution<br />

of plant behavior with SAM strategy of<br />

reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurization<br />

and water injection into<br />

the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The<br />

event of station blackout (SBO) is<br />

chosen as the reference case based on<br />

the APR1400 probabilistic risk assessment<br />

(PRA) results [4]. The RCS depressurization<br />

is performed by opening<br />

the pilot-operated safety relief<br />

valves (POSRVs). For the RPV injection,<br />

an external pump is assumed<br />

available since all NPPs in Korea have<br />

implemented the diverse and flexible<br />

coping strategies (FLEX) in the wake<br />

of the Fukushima accident.<br />

To consider the scenario variation<br />

effect on SAM, the open timing of<br />

POSRVs and the external injection<br />

flow rate and timing are varied. For<br />

the phenomenological uncertainties,<br />

two parameters are considered:<br />

EPSCUT, which is the cutoff porosity<br />

below which the flow area and the<br />

hydraulic diameter of a core node are<br />

zero, and TCLMAX, which is the temperature<br />

that will lead to cladding<br />

rupture. These two parameters are<br />

selected for as the basis for the sensitivity<br />

analysis because they affect the<br />

core melting and relocation process,<br />

which is an important phenomenon<br />

for the evaluation of the in-vessel<br />

phase of SAM. In this process, information<br />

on core melting and relocation<br />

is derived, and this information can be<br />

used as an initial con dition for the<br />

next phase of SAM evaluation such as<br />

ERVC and the ex-vessel phase in the<br />

future. The computer code used in this<br />

paper is MAAP5.<br />

2 Analysis methodology<br />

The analysis of this paper is based<br />

on the following information and<br />

assumptions.<br />

2.1 Target plant<br />

The plant is a 1000 MWe PWR based<br />

on the proven OPR1000 design. It<br />

is envisioned that the latest safety<br />

systems of APR1400, including severe<br />

accident mitigation features [5] are<br />

implemented. New design feature<br />

improvements such as no-leakage<br />

Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal [6]<br />

and FLEX equipment are assumed to<br />

be adopted as well.<br />

| | Fig. 1.<br />

ROAAM+ framework for Nordic BWR [13].<br />

2.2 ROAAM+ framework<br />

The Royal Institute of Technology<br />

(KTH) in Sweden has developed<br />

Risk Oriented Accident Analysis Methodology<br />

(ROAAM+) framework and<br />

applied it to the Nordic Boiling Water<br />

Reactors (BWR) SAM evaluation.<br />

The original ROAAM was developed<br />

for assessment and management<br />

of rare and high consequence hazards<br />

[6]for example severe accident issues<br />

related to early containment failure<br />

such as steam explosion [7] and invessel<br />

retention [8].<br />

On the other hand, the bounding<br />

scenario concept is of limited value in<br />

the Severe Accident Management<br />

(SAM) evaluation. The various severe<br />

accident phenomena, such as core<br />

relocation [9], vessel failure [10],<br />

melt ejection, ex-vessel debris coolability<br />

[11], and ex-vessel steam<br />

explosion [<strong>12</strong>] should be considered<br />

as shown in the top layer of the<br />

ROAAM+ framework for the Nordic<br />

BWR shown in Figure 1.<br />

The ROAAM+ approach, which is<br />

an extension of the original ROAAM<br />

framework, decomposes severe accident<br />

progression into a set of causal<br />

relationships represented by respective<br />

surrogate models and connected<br />

through initial conditions. It can<br />

provide an overall frame of SAM<br />

evaluation that allows determination<br />

of whether an adequate level of safety<br />

has been achieved for a plant [13].<br />

Deterministic and probabilistic analyses<br />

are integrated in ROAAM+<br />

747<br />

ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY<br />

Environment and Safety<br />

Analysis of the In-Vessel Phase of SAM Strategy for a Korean 1000 MWe PWR ı Sung-Min Cho, Seung-Jong Oh and Aya Diab

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