atw 2017-12
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<strong>atw</strong> Vol. 62 (<strong>2017</strong>) | Issue <strong>12</strong> ı December<br />
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 748<br />
| | Fig. 2.<br />
Core nodalization.<br />
| | Fig. 3.<br />
Event Tree for the Representative Sequence.<br />
framework in addressing the uncertainties<br />
associated with both phenomena<br />
(epistemic) and scenarios<br />
(aleatory). In this paper, we use<br />
similar approach to the in-vessel<br />
phase of SAM evaluation.<br />
2.3 MAAP model and<br />
nodalization<br />
The Modular Accident Analysis<br />
Program (MAAP) has been used to<br />
simulate the various severe accident<br />
phenomena including actions taken as<br />
part of the Severe Accident Management<br />
Guidelines (SAMGs). MAAP5,<br />
and its predecessor MAAP4, have<br />
been used widely by the nuclear<br />
industry throughout the world. In<br />
this study, MAAP5 version 5.04<br />
released in 2016 is used [15].<br />
The RCS for the target plant was<br />
simulated with the nodalization for<br />
CE type plants already provided in<br />
MAAP5. The core model is modeled<br />
using 7 rings (channels) and 13 rows<br />
as shown in Figure 2.<br />
2.4 Initial Event and<br />
Representative Sequence<br />
The initial event and scenario is based<br />
on the PSA results of APR1400 [4]<br />
because it is assumed that the target<br />
plant has all of the latest safety<br />
systems in APR1400. SBO is selected<br />
as the initial event with the highest<br />
cumulative CDF as shown in Table 1<br />
[4].<br />
With a SBO as the initiating event,<br />
a conservative accident sequence has<br />
been set assuming that all safety related<br />
functions fail. Thus, the representative<br />
sequence considers the failure of<br />
alternative alternating current (AAC)<br />
power source, the failure of secondary<br />
heat removal with Turbine-Driven<br />
Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps (TDAF<br />
WPs), no RCP seal leakage, and the<br />
failure of offsite power recovery<br />
within 72 hours as shown in Figure 3.<br />
It should be noted that the Westinghouse's<br />
KSB type F RCP seal has<br />
been commercialized recently. It is<br />
designed to maintain the integrity for<br />
72 hours even in a high-temperature<br />
and high-pressure environment of<br />
573 K (572 F) and 16 MPa (2335 psia),<br />
respectively. This seal has been applied<br />
to the latest APR1400 design<br />
[14] and it is therefore assumed that<br />
this RCP seal is applied to the target<br />
NPP and as such no RCP seal leakage<br />
is assumed in this analysis.<br />
An analysis was performed to<br />
obtain the baseline information of<br />
the accident progress for the representative<br />
sequence. Figure 4 shows<br />
the RCS pressure and core exit temperature<br />
for the representative case<br />
without implementation of any SAM<br />
actions. As shown in the figure, the<br />
SAM phase starts at 2.5 hours. The<br />
SAM entry condition is activated<br />
when the core exit temperature is<br />
higher than 922 K (<strong>12</strong>00 F) in accordance<br />
with the SAMG of APR1400 [15].<br />
According to the model the first relocation,<br />
a phenomenon in which the<br />
melt inside the core slumped to the<br />
lower plenum of RPV, occurs at<br />
4.8 hours, and the failure of the reactor<br />
pressure vessel (RPV) is predicted<br />
to occur at 5.3 hours.<br />
2.5 Model assumptions<br />
and case studies<br />
Following the SAM strategy, RCS<br />
depressurization is first implemented<br />
followed by in-vessel injection. RCS<br />
depressurization is achieved by the<br />
opening of POSRVs [16]. For the<br />
representative scenario, the battery<br />
can be used for 16 hours, and the<br />
power cannot be recovered until<br />
72 hours. Therefore, it is assumed that<br />
the primary side injection is achieved<br />
by the external injection using the<br />
FLEX portable pumps [16].<br />
Through the above SAM strategy<br />
and assumptions, the effect of depressurization<br />
timing is analyzed. The<br />
strategy for in-vessel external injection<br />
is examined with respect to the<br />
injection flow rate and timing.<br />
Furthermore, in terms of in-vessel<br />
phase of SAM, key parameters affecting<br />
the core relocation, EPSCUT and<br />
TCLMAX, are selected. The sensitivity<br />
analyses are performed to examine<br />
the effect for the variation of those<br />
parameters on the results.<br />
2.5.1 Impact of<br />
depressurization timing<br />
The depressurization timing is varied<br />
on a 30 minutes time interval, starting<br />
from 3 hours. The impact of depressurization<br />
timing is assessed by analyzing<br />
a total of six cases (A01 to A06)<br />
as shown in Table 2.<br />
2.5.2 Impact of injection timing<br />
and flow rate<br />
The injection timing may be started<br />
from the SAM entry point all the<br />
Initiator<br />
Frequency<br />
(/year)<br />
Percent<br />
Contribution<br />
(%)<br />
Station BlackOut (SBO) +<br />
Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP )<br />
Total Loss Of Component Cooling Water (TLOCCW) +<br />
TLOESW (Total Loss Of Essential Service Water)<br />
5.11×10 -7 39.4<br />
1.58×10 -7 <strong>12</strong>.2<br />
Medium Loss Of Coolant Accident (MLOCA) 1.23×10 -7 9.5<br />
Partial Loss Of Component Cooling Water (PLOCCW) 1.22×10 -7 9.4<br />
| | Fig. 4.<br />
Pressure and Core exit temperature for the representative case without<br />
SAM actions.<br />
Partial Loss Of Essential Service Water (PLOESW) 7.04×10 -8 5.4<br />
| | Tab. 1.<br />
CDF Contribution by Initiating Events (APR1400) [4].<br />
Environment and Safety<br />
Analysis of the In-Vessel Phase of SAM Strategy for a Korean 1000 MWe PWR ı Sung-Min Cho, Seung-Jong Oh and Aya Diab