atw - International Journal for Nuclear Power | 10.2020

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 484 subject of nuclear in decarbonization there are mixed signals in Brussels. On the negative side there is the Council position on the Just Transition Fund as part of the Green Deal that shall alleviate negative economic consequences of transitions in the energy sector on a regional level. Here the Council explicitly excludes even nuclear decommissioning, not to mention any positive nuclear activity, despite the possible consideration that transferring employees from the coal sector to nuclear by e.g. nuclear new build might be an apt and smooth way of restructuring in both coal regions and the electricity sector as a whole. On the positive side there was the addition of so called “low carbon” hydrogen in the EU Hydrogen Strategy adopted by the Commission in July, generally understood as an opening for nuclear in a possible future hydrogen economy. Evaluation of nuclear by the Joint Research Centre Most importantly though, the Commission decided to appoint the Joint Research Centre (JRC) as the group of experts to assess nuclear under the sustainable finance taxonomy. The assessment shall be scientifically rigorous, transparent, balanced and technology-neutral. The JRC is supposed to draft a technical report on the DNSH evaluation of nuclear power. This report is then to be reviewed by radiation protection and waste management experts, as well as by experts on environmental impacts. On this basis the Commission will decide whether nuclear will be included in the taxonomy for sustainable finance. The problem is that the report will not be finalized before 2021 and thus be late for being considered for the delegated acts relating to climate mitigation due at the end of 2020. In this situation it might be wise to postpone the evaluation of the energy sector until the JRC report and the assessment of nuclear by the Commission, the Platform and the Member State Expert Group in order to avoid market distortions. After all this might not even cause a delay to the coming into force of the delegated acts in 2022. The alternative to possibly revise the delegated acts almost immediately after establishing them to eventually introduce nuclear does not sound convincing in comparison and might give rise to numerous allegations of a special treatment of nuclear by the Commission. It might be worth mentioning here, that the obvious and logical decision to have nuclear evaluated by the Commissions own experts in the JRC was promptly followed by accusations of being “ absurd” and that the JRC could not possibly make objective decisions on the matter as articulated in a letter of the Chairwoman of the Bundestag Committee on Environmental Protection, Nature Conservation and nuclear Safety addressed to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Vice-President Frans Timmermans and the German ministers Svenja Schulze (Environment) and Anja Karliczek (Research and Education). Stake-holders and civil society In terms of civil society activities next to participation in the consultation processes from the side of associations, nuclear societies, pro-nuclear initiatives, companies and individuals there have been two open letter initiatives directed to the Commission, one from the nuclear societies on initiative of the Czech Nuclear Society in April and one from industry and nuclear associations also addressing the Council and the European Parliament. Both emphasized the important role of nuclear in the current low carbon generation portfolio in the EU and its future significance for decarbonization policies and demanded inclusion of the nuclear sector in the taxonomy. They were also addressing other subjects, such as enabling cost competitive nuclear power with an appropriate regulatory framework. This is in line with recommendations of the Sustainable Development Scenario of the International Energy Agency (IEA) of building at least 15 GW new nuclear per year globally and a recent study of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD on cost reductions for nuclear projects as well as with the IPCC Special Report on a global warming of 1.5 °C from 2018 that included a substantial role for nuclear in most mitigation scenarios. The NEA also published a new study “Management and Disposal of High Level Radioactive Waste: Global Progress and Solutions” in 2020 that is of direct relevance for the dis cussion of the DNSH-principle with regard to nuclear in the EU as pointed out by NEA Director-General William D. Magwood, IV during a NEA webinar in July on nuclear financing. Conclusion Summarizing it might be said that there is currently reasonable hope to have the very unlucky position of the taxonomy TEG on nuclear revised in the end, but that it still is an uphill battle as so often with nuclear. The future role of nuclear in the sustainable finance framework of the EU is a very important indicator for the general attitude of the European Union towards nuclear. The discussion of climate change mitigation vs. DNSH-principle needs to take account of the fact that nuclear in general has very good properties when it comes to reconcile environmental concerns with economic and social concerns being not just low carbon, but low pollution, resource efficient and low footprint too as well as reliable and efficient. The future of nuclear is also an important test for cohesion and solidarity within the Union in broader terms. If the pro active anti-nuclear states in the European Union cannot overcome their hostility and intolerance towards the quite significant number of member states that want to pursue climate policies with an important role for nuclear power, then it seems highly unlikely that there will be a truly coherent and cooperative climate and decarbonization policy in the EU in the long run. Author Nicolas Wendler Head of Media Relations and Political Affairs nicolas.wendler@kernd.de KernD (Kerntechnik Deutschland e.V.) Robert-Koch-Platz 4 10115 Berlin, Germany Energy Policy, Economy and Law Sustainable Finance Initiative of the EU and Taxonomy – How Green Is Nuclear? ı Nicolas Wendler
atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October Nuclear Energy in the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement Henrique Schneider Introduction: The 1.5 °C Goal in the Paris Agreement and Nuclear Energy According to its article 2, the Paris Agreement PA aims at, inter alia, “Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre industrial levels…” [1]. Paragraph 21 of the Decision, the document that explains the general thinking of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC as they adopted the PA in 2015, “ Invites the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] to provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways.” [2]. This special report, the most recent issued by the IPCC, is called “Global warming of 1.5 °C” and was released during the UNFCCC meeting in Katowice, Poland, in December 2018. In its second chapter, it states: “By mid-century, the majority of primary energy comes from non-fossil fuels (i.e., renewables and nuclear energy) in most 1.5 °C pathways (p.130).” And: “Nuclear power increases its share in most 1.5 °C pathways with no or limited overshoot by 2050, but in some pathways both the absolute capacity and share of power from nuclear generators decrease. There are large differences in nuclear power between models and across pathways [Kim et al., 2014; Rogelj et al., 2018]. One of the reasons for this variation is that the future deployment of nuclear can be constrained by societal preferences assumed in narratives underlying the pathways [O’Neill et al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017b] (p.131)” [3]. In any case and according to the IPCC, capping the global temperature increase to 1.5 °C requires a fast transition to electricity for energy end use. The resulting higher electricity demand has to be met by low-carbon generation, including nuclear. Nuclear generation increases, on average by around 2.5 times by 2050 in the 89 mitigation scenarios considered by the panel; in some scenarios, it increases sevenfold [3]. Based on these considerations, there is a place for nuclear energy in the PA. The question is, which place? This paper shows one possible, yet unexplored place for nuclear energy. Parties to the PA could use nuclear energy to cooperate and even to increase their nationally determined contributions NDC under Article 6 PA. Under Article 6 Paragraph 2 PA, short 6.2, nuclear energy could be used in generating internationally transferred mitigation outcomes; or as an integrated, holistic and balanced nonmarket approach under 6.8. While it also could be part of the mechanism under 6.4, this paper interprets nuclear energy as more compatible with the spirit of Article 6.2 and 6.8 due to their focus on national preferences allowing for differentiation (see below for a more complete explanation of Article 6). The remainder of this text is organized as thus: First, a brief overview of the PA is provided. Then, the basic provisions of article 6 as well as the current state of negotiations is explained. Based on the logic of the Paris Agreement, this paper develops operationalization criteria for incorporating nuclear energy under the different paragraphs of Article 6 PA. A conclusion summarizes the findings of this discussion. In terms of novelty, two insights are developed here. At the same time, this paper offers a way forward in the substantiation of article 6 and a different way of incorporating nuclear energy into the Paris Agreement – different from an approach under the technology mechanism. The issues identified here can be used for Party or non-Party submissions to the ongoing negotiations. The Paris Agreement in a nutshell The most general and relevant provisions of PA to nuclear energy are [1]: p Long-term temperature goal (Art. 2) limiting global temperature increase to well below 2 °C, while pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 °C. p Global peaking and “climate neutrality” (Art. 4). p Mitigation (Art. 4) establishing binding commitments by all Parties to prepare, communicate and maintain a nationally determined contribution (NDC) and to pursue domestic measures to achieve them. p Voluntary cooperation/marketand non-market-based approaches (Art. 6). p Adaptation (Art. 7) enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change. p Loss and damage (Art. 8) averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events. p Finance, technology, and capacitybuilding support (Art. 9, 10 and 11). The work undertaken so far, has related nuclear energy to finance, technology, and capacity building; at times, it is seen as an instrument of mitigation, and at times of adaptation [4]. The advantages of treating nuclear as such are straightforward. As a technology, it needs research, deployment, and finance. Electrification reduces emissions of greenhouse gases but also helps adapting to climatic conditions [5]. The disadvantages of such a treatment of nuclear energy are less obvious, but important, nonetheless. First, the addressees of these articles are the Parties to the Agreement, i.e. sovereign countries. They, however, do not research, implement, and deploy technology. Second, because of the considerable private sector involvement in nuclear energy, there are issues of intellectual property IP. IP remains, however, a contentious issue, especially in relationship to Article 10 PA, since this article entails transference and sharing of technology. Third, the impact of nuclear energy as a technology and its outcomes on climate action can only be measured with great difficulty. ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 485 Energy Policy, Economy and Law Nuclear Energy in the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement ı Henrique Schneider
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atw - International Journal for Nuclear Power | 10.2020

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