Digital Forensics in Small Devices: RFID Tag Investigation

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Figure 4.57: Analyzing the image copy of POS RAM with EnCase The notable evidence of the malicious transaction was also uncovered in the POS RAM image along with the tag ID, date and timestamp (as shown in the Figure 4.56). However, unlike the evidence found in analyzing reader‟s memory; the analysis result of POS RAM provided the malicious (SQL poisoning) code in addition to fake tag ID, date and timestamp of when the attack was initiated to compromise the backend server of RFID based retail system. 4.3.3 Analysis of SQL Server Artefacts As previous stated in the report of collected data (Section 4.2.3), some of the collected SQL Server artefacts could be analyzed by using a text viewer, but others 125
could not. Hence, the artefacts could not be analyzed by using simple text viewers were put into a database of a forensic test-station, on which the SQL Server 2005 was also installed, for analysis. However, the significant findings related to malicious attack after analyzing all acquired SQL artefacts (see Appendix 24) were stated as follow: Table statistics were useful for comparing against the present state of data within a table to identify the values that have been changed or updated, as stated in Section 4.2.3.4.4. Hence, the last updated time of the table statistics was critical during the forensic data acquisition. However, according to the statistic information findings from the results of acquired Histogram (actual data values that were taken when the last statistics updated) against RFID Tag (Figure 4.34), Value (Figure 4.35) and Date (Figure 4.36) columns of the compromised database (RFID_test.mdf) in Section 4.2.3.4.4; the table statistics were updated before the time of investigation. Hence, the notable result of acquired current table data of the stock management database (Figure 4.37) showed that all the SI values were $600 and confirmed the database was obviously compromised. Moreover, the acquisition results of current table data of log file - RFID_test_log.ldf (see Figure 4.41) showed the significant evidence of the attack in which the malicious SQL poisoning code was found and the SI (Tag IDs starting with E004) were updated to the values $600 at 06:39:48pm on the 12 October 2010. 4.3.4 Analysis of the Physical Drive Image The analysis of the physical drive image was not actually required during the investigation. The image of POS/Server TEST-STATION physical drive was acquired (Section 4.2.4) was acquired only for the purpose of preservation. 4.3.5 Analysis of RFID Tags in the Repository The fictitious tag could be found along with other tags in the repository if the investigation was started before the tags from the sold items in the retail shop were not reused or re-written with the new values within a certain period of time due to the policy of the retail shop. For instance, the tags from the sold items today should not 126
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Digital Forensics in Small Devices:
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iii Acknowledgements This thesis wa
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v Abstract Read/Write Radio Frequen
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vii Table of Contents (Volume 1) De
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ix 3.2.2.2 The POS Entity Security
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xi 4.3.4 Analysis of the Physical D
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xiii List of Tables Table 2.1 Chara
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Figure 4.3: Error encountered durin
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xvii Figure 4.53: Acquisitions of a
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LF Low Frequency xix LLRP Low Level
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process (see Chalasani, Boppana, &
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of potential evidence after an even
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investigation. Likewise, all the re
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practices concerned with the forens
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defines different types of malware
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2.1.1 RFID Transponders or Tags The
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Table 2.1: Characteristics and Clas
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Moreover, depending on the complexi
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However, according to EPCglobal (El
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According to Harmon (2006, pp. 45-4
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2.2.1 Memory Technologies for RFID
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y the reader as the tag‟s address
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wavelength long and depends on the
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Karygiannis et al., (2007, pp. 2-15
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attacker can perform eavesdropping
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2.5 RFID STOCK MANAGEMENT SECURITY
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Figure 2.15: RFID Business System S
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3.0 INTRODUCTION Chapter 3 - Resear
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etrieve data to an external data so
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firstly affect the back-end RFID mi
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Figure 3.2: Scenario 1 illustration
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Unlike SQL Server forensics, the tr
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forensic workstation must be prepar
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Then, the researcher verified the S
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within the affected records”. In
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can also be found not only in the d
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Likewise, Relevancy is related to t
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3.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN In the prev
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e investigated for evidence of the
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3.2.2 Review of Problem Areas in RF
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participants, the Information Syste
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3.2.3 Case Study The researcher int
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3.2.6 Research Question As stated i
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3.2.8 Data Map Figure 3.9: Data Map
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software (see Appendix 4) that can
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and Deng (2007) illustrated two eff
Page 93 and 94: system of the target machine (Jones
Page 95 and 96: other collected evidence data by us
Page 97 and 98: SQL Server artefacts (for the purpo
Page 99 and 100: presence of digital evidence after
Page 101 and 102: 4.0 INTRODUCTION Chapter 4 - Resear
Page 103 and 104: Figure 4.1: Error encountered durin
Page 105 and 106: server (Figure 4.6) due to the user
Page 107 and 108: Section 4.2 include the snippets of
Page 109 and 110: 4.2.2 Live Extraction of Binaries R
Page 111 and 112: 4.2.3.1 Automated Artefact Collecti
Page 113 and 114: 4.2.3.2 Ad Hoc Artefact Collection
Page 115 and 116: 4.2.3.3.1 Active VLF Data After gat
Page 117 and 118: The acquisition result of ring buff
Page 119 and 120: Depending on the version of the vic
Page 121 and 122: syntax was used to acquire a server
Page 123 and 124: :out E:\SystemDatabaseRoleMembers.t
Page 125 and 126: However, according to Fowler (2009,
Page 127 and 128: After collecting the table statisti
Page 129 and 130: Thus, the result of the current tab
Page 131 and 132: 4.2.3.4.6 Data Page Allocation Arte
Page 133 and 134: components of database were enabled
Page 135 and 136: The record of shutting down the ser
Page 137 and 138: “application logic and extend the
Page 139 and 140: 4.2.3.6.5 SQL Server Error Logs Usu
Page 141 and 142: 4.2.4 Physical Disk Drive Finally,
Page 143: Figure 4.56: Analyzing the image co
Page 147 and 148: 5.0 INTRODUCTION Chapter 5 - Resear
Page 149 and 150: the laboratory to simulate a RFID t
Page 151 and 152: and confirmed the database was obvi
Page 153 and 154: SUMMARY: After analysing all the ac
Page 155 and 156: all the collected digital evidence
Page 157 and 158: Table 5.5: Secondary Research Quest
Page 159 and 160: write blocker (Tableau Forensic USB
Page 161 and 162: collected digital evidence files (b
Page 163 and 164: 5.2.3 Discussion of Conducted Attac
Page 165 and 166: forensic work-station (Appendix 10)
Page 167 and 168: forensic test-station for the inves
Page 169 and 170: the trusted forensic toolkits. In a
Page 171 and 172: 6.0 INTRODUCTION Chapter 6 - Conclu
Page 173 and 174: Table 6.1: Specific forensic tools
Page 175 and 176: the evidential data are the importa
Page 177 and 178: (Chapter 5; Section 5.3) for both d
Page 179 and 180: Bolan, C. (2007). A single channel
Page 181 and 182: El-Said, M. M., & Woodring, I. (200
Page 183 and 184: Hunt, V. D., Puglia, A., & Puglia,
Page 185 and 186: Kou, D., Zhao, K., Tao, Y., & Kou,
Page 187 and 188: Notes in Computer Science 5379(2009
Page 189 and 190: Tripwire, Inc. (2010a). Tripwire Ma
Page 191 and 192: Digital Forensics in Small Devices:
Page 193 and 194: Appendix 1: Volatile and Non-volati
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3 Activity Endpoints* ● md5deep N
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Appendix 2: Steps for Creating Radi
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14. Gather the latest versions of W
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The following is the detail record
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COMPLETE 'Logins.txt' (md5=A2993744
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(md5=A2993744A56BA83ADE52948062C968
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'Schemas.htm' (md5=30BB65A20F1381D7
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22:02:26: Hashing 'wft_cfg.txt' (md
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Record any checksum(s) below to lat
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22. Although the extended version o
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Appendix 3: Source Code of the Deve
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{ } else { MessageBox.Show("No read
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} } btnConnect.Enabled = true; btnD
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MessageBox.Show(this, "Connection t
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} } } dwNumEntries = usbRFID.GetNum
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add it to the list box LogItem.szID
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if(fdialog.FileName != "") { FileSt
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private string constr = @"Data Sour
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} } else { } catch (Exception ex) {
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} } } } insertTagtoDB(TagID, TagVal
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} break; case ("Protection"): { uiB
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} } } //this.Cursor = Cursors.Defau
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} } btnReadTag.Enabled = false; tmr
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private void insertTagtoDB(string T
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} } } private void btnLOGload_Click
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Step 4: Then, the Tripwire will per
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Similarly, Tripwire user account sh
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Figure A5.5: Installation of the Tr
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Appendix 6: An Example of the Condu
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Sync” allowing the users to confi
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Figure A6.8: RFID Sync Application
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Figure A6.10: Screenshot of writing
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Step 3: Configure the reader’s Ta
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Step 8: Edit the Tripwire configura
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Step 12: Record of the fictitious l
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Step 16: Similarly, check whether t
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Step 20: Check the primary database
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Appendix 7: Steps taken before the
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insert into rfid_log ( Tag, User_da
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Figure A7.3: Pre-keyed data in the
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Figure A7.7: Pre-keyed data in the
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Figure A7.11: Screenshot of Tripwir
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Step 10: Once Tripwire database was
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Appendix 8: Steps taken after the S
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Step 3: The integrity check was ini
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Figure A8.8: Screenshot of the Trip
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Figure A8.12: Screenshot of the bac
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Figure A9.3: Network Interface Card
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Figure A9.7: Enterprise Version of
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Appendix 10: Screenshots of Forensi
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Appendix 11: Forensically Sterilizi
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Figure A11. 4: Wiping all the secto
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Appendix 12: Steps for Copying and
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Figure A12.6: Acquiring the forensi
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12. However, the acquisition was ca
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15. Then, the original evidence dri
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18. Then, a bad signature file was
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Appendix 13: Artefacts Collected by
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Figure A13.5: Acquired backend SQL
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SQL SERVER - DATABASE SERVER INFORM
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Figure A13.15: Fragment of the acqu
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Figure A13.18: Result of the Acquir
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Figure A13.23: Result of the Acquir
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72CBADAE0A1F9FF34D4A35A9AB26BDB8 Au
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2428169B31C96FE4A767215000AA0008 in
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Appendix 15: WFT Tool Log during th
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06:31:36: Verifying 'sql\runsql.bat
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(md5=A7A43C52521F85BDD6683D9E0E4A00
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(md5=AB700D66945BBC9FBFA34002A808A2
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[DB Configuration] (md5=F416BF7233E
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(md5=FEDD1E9DF1B76C877B8027B62E401B
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06:32:21: Verifying 'xp\mem.exe' OK
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06:32:22: Verifying 'sysinternals\p
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'uptime.htm' (md5=B7456D103CBF5E49F
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'netlgrp.txt' (md5=E6D74D46AECD9692
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06:32:26: Verifying 'cygwin\cygwin1
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'cmdline.txt' (md5=B44C85C704337F00
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06:32:32: Verifying 'netlatency\ser
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06:32:35: Verifying 'diamondcs\ipli
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(md5=BB5127D25439D1B50A305B1CF865FE
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(md5=647578D95B7F3B11B6CCF833E29670
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06:32:41: Verifying 'perl\re.dll' O
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(md5=C4DA0F6D85F641B3E5A0F065AEDB27
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06:33:15: Verifying '2k\res_kit\dum
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[FILE SYSTEM] (md5=E9D558E387FC2208
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06:33:19: Running 'tools\xp\cmd.exe
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06:33:20: Verifying 'tools\xp\cmd.e
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'sys_ini.txt' (md5=B143A6852C9EF93E
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06:33:22: Running 'xp\at.exe' [#132
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06:33:24: Verifying 'microsoft\reg.
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(md5=4380D8F2014A5C35BF59DF30D079F0
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06:34:09: Running 'xp\gpresult.exe'
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06:34:15: Verifying 'microsoft\regd
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06:34:16: Running 'microsoft\reg.ex
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[DONE] SKIPPED (via '-nowrite' para
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'mail.gif' (md5=38477E98FB3ED60B829
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Step 3: The SQL poisoning attack wa
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Appendix 17: Live Acquisition of Ph
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The problem issue was clearly state
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Figure A17.9: Evidence item informa
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Figure A17.13: Successful creation
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Physical Drive Acquisition Report b
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Figure A18.2: Screenshot of the Acq
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Figure A18.4: Screenshots of the Ac
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Figure A19.2b: Screenshot of the In
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Figure A19.5: Screenshot of the lau
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Figure A19.10: Choosing the OS path
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Figure A19.16: Avoiding the tools t
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Figure A19.21a: WFT tool in action
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Figure A19.22b: The acquisition of
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Appendix 20: Extended wftSQL Batchf
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SET /P USERQUESTION=Use currently l
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Appendix 21_Screenshots of Hashing
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Appendix 22: Hash Values Comparison
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DBO_RFIDlog_tblStat_Date.txt Text 4
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IDE_Image.E06 EnCase Image eaa9522a
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Endpoints.htm Web Page d23eef6404ca
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PSLIST.HTM Web Page 79dbea76b982972
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IPXROUTE.HTM Web Page 97d4e1dd9621b
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PSFILE.HTM Web Page d6d58ad5914ef24
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HKLM_RS.HTM Web Page f756a379df8579
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MDM.HTM Web Page a5e04ce095305295ae
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WFT_CFG.TXT Text 1d378b80f8e0e7ea4f
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PCLIP.TXT Text 037130bf88e524d8f61a
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TLIST_V.TXT Text cdf2d49e302522e370
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HUNT.TXT Text 99553ccd8e14cae6db789
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C_hidden.txt Text 5f45b5367c7ed8852
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HKCU_R.TXT Text 9e7b99199b2931e811a
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ARKAR_US.B BASIC Source Code .E01 e
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CollationAndDataType.txt Text 37a07
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RFID_test.md5 45c0868ea943c2171ff35
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errorlog_4.md5 3f7f86d69760b535bd82
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Appendix 23: Analysis of Acquired S
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2010-10-25 12:37:05.56 Server Serve
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2010-10-05 01:22:55.53 Server Detec
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2010-10-07 15:20:54.21 Server Serve
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2010-10-25 12:17:39.26 Server Serve
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2010-10-03 00:59:55.96 Server Dedic
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2010-10-02 00:11:57.85 Server -d C:
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2010-10-02 02:40:05.35 Server SQL S
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2010-10-01 23:20:15.28 Server Dedic
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2010-10-01 23:14:19.50 Server Using
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2010-10-01 23:20:12.40 Server The S
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2010-10-01 23:12:03.65 spid4s Recov
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processed. Likewise, the acquired r
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Figure 24A.3: There is no record in
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