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After the casualty
NRS Feøy AS is a subsidiary of Norway Royal
Salmon ASA. At the time of the casualty, NRS
Feøy had 41 permanent employees distributed
across six different locations and operated four
catamarans of between 13,5 and 14,99 metres in
length which were similar to Målfrid.
After the casualty, Målfrid was raised and
repaired. Subsequently, the company has secured
the inspection hatches by welding on both Målfrid
and a sister ship. Furthermore, a routine has been
established whereby the crew confers with the local
operations manager before determining how to
remove a rope from the propeller.
As a result of the casualty, the company
realised that they needed to work even harder to
translate requirements and intentions of the safety
management system into established practices.
Among the measures taken was a conversion of an
administrative position in NRS Feøy into a HR/
HR Coordinator position with reponsibility for
safety throughout the company.
After the repair, the vessel has been checked
and approved and issued with a vessel instruction
by an approved company.
assessments had been carried out. These
were assessments in respect of, among
other things, lines entangled in the
propeller, crane operations and open
valves, waterproof bulkheads and
inspection hatches. However, the report
claims that the company was still unaware
of the risks associated with using the
inspection hatch during operation, and
continues:
“The casualty proves that the crew did
not have a sufficiently comprehensive
understanding of which mechanisms were
triggered when they started to lift the
bottom ring while the inspection hatch was
open. This is probably due to both
insufficient ship technical expertise and
inadequate training program within the
company.”
COMPETENCE
On the day of the casualty, the vessel was
manned by two persons who were
permanently employed in the fish farm
company; one an operating technician, the
other a trainee. They had both completed a
number of courses, such as VHF and
safety courses, in addition to the
in-company training. They had also
undergone training in the use of boats and
machines.
AIBN points out that for cargo vessels,
including tugs, of less than 15 metres in
overall length, no special requirements for
a certificate of competence have been
specified. Therefore, there are no
regulatory certification requirements for the
crew of vessels like Målfrid. According to
the Ship Safety and Security Act, it is up
to the company to set competence
requirements for the type of assignments
performed by such vessels.
It is the opionion of the AIBN that the
casualty shows that the crew did not have a
sufficiently comprehensive understanding
of which mechanisms were introduced
when they started to lift the bottom ring
while the inspection hatch was open.
According to the AIBN›s report, the
reason for this was both insufficient ship
technical expertise and an inadequate
training program within the company.
Safety recommendation
The investigation of the workboat Målfrid
casualty has revealed an area in which the
Accident Investigation Board Norway considers it
necessary to issue a safety recommendation with
the purpose of improving safety at sea.
Safety recommendation MARINE No.
2018/06T
During work at a fish farm north of Karmøy on12
May 2017, the crew on the workboat Maalfrid used
the vessel’s crane while the inspection hatch over the
starboard propeller was open. This led to the water
flowing freely into the starboard hull and the vessel
foundered. The combination of the company›s lack of
specification of the competence of their employees and
the varying skills of those who undertook the training
of the employees did not ensure that the crew had
necessary skills to safely carry out the vessel operation.
The Accident Investigation Board Norway
recommends Norway Royal Salmon ASA to carry out
a survey of the competence needed for their employees
in vessel operations and take the necessary measures to
meet the competence needs.
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