Rapport Védrine_ENG_GERMAN - Ministère de la Défense

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Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 3 and his staff in Brussels, than by Washington, even though the United States (and the United Kingdom) would like to see wider use of Article 4: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” The arguments invoked for the launch of Smart Defence by NATO at the Chicago Summit in May 2012 included budget cuts and growing American reluctance to make up for European lack of capabilities in the name of "burden sharing". Smart Defence means making better use of limited resources by rationalising use through multinational capability cooperation initiatives between Allies tailored to each task so that the Alliance can maintain its military strength. Of the 150 Smart Defence projects listed in order of maturity, 24 have been launched since the Chicago Summit. France has participated in 14 of these projects. French industry has identified 27 of the 150 Smart Defence projects where it would like to see a greater involvement for France because of the economic implications. Some of the projects could set standards for the future and become a vector for American equipment to break into the European market. Multinational capability solutions may produce savings, improve operational effectiveness and enhance interoperability, but this approach could also reinforce the centralising power of NATO and may require more integration, such as common funding and making capabilities available to NATO. The other two initial aspects of Smart Defence are specialisation and prioritisation. They have not had any practical consequences yet, precisely because they could jeopardise the sovereignty of the member countries. Some European and French leaders stress that the Smart Defence initiative is a response to the comparable European “Pooling and Sharing” initiative launched by the European Union a few weeks earlier and implemented by the European Defence Agency. The division of projects between the European Union and NATO in strategic matters is now a prominent issue. Discussions are also under way at NATO on greater use of "common funding for capability programmes”. 3 In recent years the Secretaries General of NATO have been Spanish, with Javier Solana from December 1995 to October 1999; British, with Georges Robertson from October 1999 to December 2003; Dutch, with Jaap de Hoop Scheffer from January 2004 to August 2009; and Danish, with Anders Fogh Rasmussen, since August 2009. 12
B. EUROPEAN VISIONS OF THE ALLIANCE The European Union’s official conception of security per se is that of complementarity with the Alliance. In reality, Europeans are deeply attached to the Alliance, starting with the countries that France thinks of first, each time that she attempts to revive the Europe of Defence, namely the United Kingdom and Germany. For Poland and the Baltic countries, the obligations of the United States under Article 5 are still the only serious guarantee against any resurgence of the Russian threat. All of the Allies approved of or called for the enlargement of the Alliance and agreed to or urged the development of a ballistic missile defence. They agreed to external interventions (except for Germany in the case of Libya), but did not go so far as to respond favourably to the Americans’ calls for better burden sharing and increased capabilities, since they were actually cutting their defence budgets. Just because they may also be "acting French” in calling for a fairer division of responsibilities, it does not mean that are really seeking one. It just means that domestic political, economic and social priorities are much more compelling and they hope that the United States will remain under an obligation to ensure the security of the European continent. They do not see any contradiction between maintaining their slavish or passive positions at NATO and paying lip service to developing a Europe of Defence, which is an abstract goal that they support as long as it does not entail any risk of redundancy with NATO’s action. This attitude is consistent with the vision in which the European Union, which does not need to become a world power, will manage to set the pace or protect its interests on the strength of its soft power and its normative power. C. AMERICAN VISION OF THE ALLIANCE’S FUTURE First of all, the Americans are once again looking at the world in strategic terms, much more than they did during their triumphant years as a hyperpower in the nineteen-nineties. Not one American leader or expert has ever questioned the Washington Treaty, yet. The commitment of the Allies, starting with the United States, to the 1949 Atlantic Alliance Treaty is reaffirmed at each Summit. Before the Chicago Summit, President Obama declared: “With no other group of nations do we have such a close alignment of values, capabilities and goals. NATO is not simply the foundation of our trans-Atlantic relationships, it is the cornerstone of American engagement with the world." The American government also denies that the repositioning of its forces to Asia, the “pivot to Asia”, where one third of the US Navy ships with be concentrated as of 2020, as Hillary Clinton explained in her article entitled “America’s Pacific Century”, and that the withdrawal of two of the four combat brigades stationed in Europe (7,000 troops out of 81,000) signal the abandonment of Europe, which would be unthinkable anyway for the world's leading power, if it wants to maintain its global role. It cannot be denied that the European theatre is not a priority for the United States, that there is no direct military threat to Europe, nor any specific threat at this time, except the economic crisis, that capabilities in Europe are steadily diminishing, that there is little desire to take military risks, and that the Americans do not see their European partner as indispensible at the global level, even though it may be invaluable in certain theatres of action. However, NATO is still seen as helpful for enhancing American influence, since it is the only European organisation that has the United States as a member. But what Americans really think was probably said best on 10 June 2011 by Robert Gates, George W. Bush’s Secretary of Defence, who agreed to keep his post until 2011 under President Obama. Noting that Europeans' defence spending had declined by 15% since 11 September 2011; that only three 13
Seite 1 und 2: Hubert Védrine REPORT FOR THE PRES
Seite 3 und 4: I. EVALUATION 1. HISTORY OF RELATIO
Seite 5 und 6: two reasons: the failed implementat
Seite 7 und 8: allistic missile defence capability
Seite 9 und 10: C. DIPLOMATIC EFFECTS Whether they
Seite 11: In 2011, its total common-funded bu
Seite 15 und 16: under Title V of the Maastricht Tre
Seite 17 und 18: missions under way, and only one of
Seite 19 und 20: III. RECOMMENDATIONS France’s def
Seite 21 und 22: of "off-the-shelf" products seeking
Seite 23 und 24: In the case of Germany, this means
Seite 25 und 26: TABLE OF CONTENTS I EVALUATION 3 1-
Seite 27 und 28: Hubert V drine BERICHT BERICHT AN A
Seite 29 und 30: I. ANALYSE 1. KURZER ABRISS DER GES
Seite 31 und 32: Gründung bewirkt hatten, nicht meh
Seite 33 und 34: A. DER EINFLUSS FRANKREICHS IN DER
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Seite 39 und 40: Was die Einsätze betrifft: Seit 20
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Seite 55: Der Präsident der Republik Sehr ge

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