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Expert article 878 Baltic Rim Economies, 21.12.2011 Quarterly Review 5�2011
Russian intelligence services can help domestic nanotechnology – by keeping
at arm’s length
By Fredrik Westerlund
Since 2007, Russia has been committed to a major effort to
develop its domestic nanotechnology and industry as a means
to modernize the Russian economy and society. There are
many ways to boost national science and technology (S&T)
and industry, and each state tends to combine a number of
options. Increased spending on domestic research and
development (R&D) is one way. Intensifying and deepening
international cooperation is another. A third way is to create a
domestic environment conducive to innovation and research.
Furthermore, national intelligence and security services
can supply foreign know-how and technology through
espionage as well as providing protection from foreign
industrial espionage. This is particularly tempting for countries
wanting to leap ahead without making the necessary
fundamental institutional changes in order to become more
innovation-friendly.
Russian nanotechnology initiatives: little and late
The Russian Government entered the nanotechnology race
late, but has devoted substantial sums to developing domestic
science and industry. Over 100 bn RUR has been allocated up
to 2015 and it was the leading government investor in 2009.
However, since private and foreign investments are only
modest and the infrastructure is underdeveloped, Russia has
been losing ground in both nanotechnology research and
patenting. Russia also lags behind in international evaluations
of the innovation and business climate. Its main advantage in
nanotechnology is its relatively strong position in international
research and patenting collaboration.
Intelligence service support: a promising short cut …
Official Russian documents and reports from foreign
intelligence services as well as assessments by scholars and
former Russian intelligence officers suggest that the Russian
intelligence services are collecting S&T intelligence abroad. In
the Soviet era, a clandestine organization was created to
collect intelligence for the biological weapons programme. It is
reported to have survived and could be used to support R&D in
the area of nano-biotechnology. The Soviet nuclear weapons
programme was accelerated by intelligence-gathering abroad.
The nuclear weapon research organization’s successor, the
Kurchatov Institute, enjoys a central position in the Russian
nanotechnology effort.
The Russian security services can also support Russian
nanotechnology by providing protection from foreign
intelligence services and corporations. Safeguarding Russian
science and industry has been one of the tasks of the Federal
Security Service (FSB) since its creation in 1995. As late as
December 2008, the head of the FSB directorate for the
Saratov region singled out Russian nanotechnology projects
as being of particular interest to foreign special services.
… or a dead end for Russian nanotechnology?
Intelligence service support could be a tempting short cut when
other avenues to developing Russian nanotechnology science
and industry are uncertain. It could, however, prove to be a
dead end. First, the Russian intelligence services are not as
efficient as their predecessors. They cannot rely on assistance
from allied intelligence services or on ideologically motivated
spies as they could in Soviet times. Furthermore, corruption
within the services takes its toll on their efficiency.
Second, extensive collection of S&T intelligence abroad
does not automatically imply dividends for domestic science
31
and industry. A successful transfer of foreign technology is
dependent on the capacity of the recipients to make use of the
information they receive. Russian nanoscience lags behind in
several areas and the domestic nano-industry faces severe
challenges in converting scientific advances into competitive
mass-produced products.
There are also several risks connected with intelligence
service support. Reliance on intelligence may dull the edge of
science by making it reactive and dependent on foreign
findings. Furthermore, the security mindset of intelligence
services, with its emphasis on risk reduction, is in many ways
the opposite of a climate conducive to research and
innovation.
The most important aspect of intelligence support to
Russian nanotechnology is its potentially negative impact on
cross-border cooperation. If the security services in other
countries suspect that Russia is spying, the flow of knowledge
into Russia could suffer. Foreign companies and research
institutions will be alerted to the risk of espionage, and access
to state-of-the-art science abroad could become restricted for
Russian researchers and engineers. Moreover, over-zealous
security service officers could harm Russian nanotechnology.
In 2007, several charges of espionage were brought against
Russian academics. In January 2010, a Russian Academy of
Sciences institute director complained over the close attention
the security services were paying to Russian scientists and
over trumped-up charges of espionage. Such activities could
result in scientists refusing to take part in international
research projects or declining funding from abroad.
In an era of technological globalization, international
cooperation is of the utmost importance for scientific and
technological progress. As mentioned above, Russia’s primary
strength in nanotechnology research and patenting is its
comparatively good position concerning international
collaboration. Intelligence support efforts could undermine
Russia’s main advantage in the field of nanotechnology.
Indeed, the Russian intelligence services would perhaps serve
domestic nanotechnology best by keeping a distance.
Note: The views expressed in this article are the personal
opinions of Fredrik Westerlund. They may not reflect the views
of the Swedish Defence Research Agency nor Swedish
Government policy.
Fredrik Westerlund
Senior scientist at the Department
for Security Policy & Strategic
Studies
Swedish Defence Research Agency
(FOI)
Sweden
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