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Expert article 905 Baltic Rim Economies, 21.12.2011 Quarterly Review 5�2011
Six more years with Vladimir Putin
By Lena Jonson
On 24 September 2011 it was clearly demonstrated that Dmitry
Medvedev’s presidency had come to an end. He declared that
he steps back in favour of the candidacy of Vladimir Putin in
the March 2012 presidential elections. Medvedev’s decision
was perceived by most independent observers as the end of
the 2009 modernization campaign and its embedded promises
of political reform. Domestic critics regard the return of Putin as
president a catastrophe for the country.
The serious problems described by Medvedev in his article
“Russia, Go!” and in which he motivated the “modernization”
campaign still exist. What Medvedev described as illnesses of
a system, such as widespread corruption, lack of transparency,
of democracy and rule of law, are as serious, or even more
serious, today. How will Putin, during a third term as president,
respond to these challenges? According to most Western
observers and many Russian analysts, the Russian political
system is highly obsolete in the context of the complexities of
contemporary society. If Putin understood the scope of this
challenge, his programme would be expected to include
political reform.
Putin’s critics do not expect political reform. In their
analysis, Putin is both the creator of the present power system
and its prisoner. He is at the top of a system created to
guarantee him full control and stability. The power vertical, the
large percentage of siloviki in state administration, and the
Putin clan control of economic life are backbones of the
system. At the same time corruption, which spreads due to
lack of transparency and rule of law, undermines the very
system and prevents control and management from above.
What Putin needs is to transfuse new blood into the
system, blood which could help vitalise and modernize the
system without revising its foundation. Yet, as pointed out by
his critics, Putin has consummated a system where channels
from below for demands, requests, and new ideas have been
closed. Political alternatives are prevented by laws,
regulations, and practices from above which make it utterly
difficult for all efforts of independent political mobilization.
The United Russia party today constitutes the major
channel for the communication of ideas upwards. Major career
paths run through pro-Putin youth organizations. Although time
has changed and no parallels should be made with the Soviet
Communist Party nomenklatura, there are similarities with the
way that alternative communication channels have been
closed under Putin. The present system provides new faces
but sorts out new ideas from reaching the official political
discourse and agenda. Medvedev recently launched a website
called “large government” to encourage new political ideas
within the framework of United Russia’s discourse. Yet, as long
as there are no political mechanisms for introducing new ideas,
except through the party of power, and no political institutions
to be held accountable, “large government” innovations remain
an illusion.
Putin has demonstrated, ever since he came to power in
2000 that his instincts as well as the instincts of the large
contingent of siloviki in state decision-making positions, are to
guarantee that the right of free speech, meetings, and
demonstrations will remain highly restricted. As returning
president he needs to try at least some piecemeal political
reform during the years to come. Otherwise, six more years of
restrictions postponing political reform could be highly
counterproductive for his regime and for society at large.
According to sociological research, Russian society is
undergoing deep changes. During the last more than one and
a half years we have witnessed a trend of reduced support for
the United Russia party, and for Medvedev and Putin. United
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Russia is, however, guaranteed a majority in the State Duma,
and Putin can be sure of being elected next March. Research
shows that the strongest critics live in the large cities and
belong to the middle class, individuals who have no party to
articulate their demands. Some sociologists talk in terms of a
“crisis in political confidence”. Civic grass-root movements
have mobilized people on specific issues and there are reports
of spontaneous and temporary organizations and
manifestations around the country by wider social groups in
society on issues such as benefits, housing and employment.
The use of laughter, irony and satire as political weapons by
the democratic opposition during the last autumn are signs of a
new political atmosphere in society.
Thus, the future President will meet a completely new
situation with regard to the mood of the population. However,
as pointed out by several analysts, the new situation includes
not only discontent from the democratic opposition. Far
stronger are the ultra-right nationalists fed by frustrated
discontent and xenophobia. Putin seems more receptive to the
mood and arguments from this constituency. He might have
been taken by surprise by the mass manifestation of the
almost 10.000 frustrated xenophobic young men at the
Manezh Square in December 2010. He knows the strength of
these moods, and he has on several occasions demonstrated
his will to play the nationalist card. Therefore, he also
cautiously prevents the nationalists from creating any
independent organization outside or within the official party
system.
With an economy highly dependent upon the export on oil
and gas, and a state budget based on expectations on high
world market prices on energy, Russia is vulnerable to
fluctuations. The budget adopted recently for the period 2012-
2014 with cuts of means to the social sector and increases to
defence and internal security give small margins in case
popular discontent would explode.
The issue of political reform will, whether he wants it or not,
haunt Putin during the coming years. As he is basically
unwilling to respond to such demands, Putin will take on
measures to prevent them from spreading. But this may
instead give nourishment for the opposition to grow. While the
parties of the democratic opposition are viewed as no
alternative for most people as demonstrated by opinion polls, a
new generation of democratic leaders may appear from the
civic grass-root movements. People like Alexei Navalnyi,
Evgeniya Chirikova and Ilya Yasin may be among a future
generation of leaders. However, if a reform movement is to
succeed, a major role must be played by reform-minded
groups already within the political elite. So far, there are no
signs of this. The Putin elite seems united so far.
The changes in the Russian political atmosphere during
the last one and a half years may be the faint sign of
something new in the making, so far mainly hidden under the
surface. Although this new popular energy may not materialize
in the short run, at the end of the day it may become important,
perhaps decisive, for political reform and modernization. This
is something that a Putin 2.0 needs to take into account.
Lena Jonson
PhD, Head of Russia Research Program
Swedish Institute of International Affairs
Sweden
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