PDF file: History - Advanced Higher - Germany - Education Scotland

All his ‘actions’ from the Dawes Plan to the Young Plan must be seen in this light.
Moreover Stressemann never forgot that he would have to satisfy French demands for
security to achieve his goals. With his death in 1929 there is no doubt that successive
Chancellors, namely Bruning, von Papen and Schleicher adopted a more assertive and
aggressive foreign policy.
SECTION 3: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE THIRD REICH - 1970S-2000
Over fifty years after its collapse, the legacy of the Third Reich continues to haunt the
German people and the German historical profession. It is even debatable if they will
ever be able to master the Nazi past – the so-called Vergangenheitsbewaltigung (See
Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 1993, p.1). Some historians believe that the
academic and intellectual tools of the historian are simply inadequate to deal with a
phenomenon that was largely irrational. They see it as impossible to give an adequate
explanation of Nazism. It is certainly true that the history of Germany between 1933
and 1939, and indeed up to 1945, is more a matter of contentious and heated debate
amongst historians than the history of Germany between 1918 and 1933.
The issue of continuity and change continues to be a dominant theme when placing
the Third Reich in a wider historical context in German history. Historians still argue
over the extent to which Hitler and his movement was the logical culmination of
German history extending back beyond the Weimar years into the nineteenth century
and even into the more distant past. A consensus view largely prevails that the rise of
Nazism can be placed in a short-term (for example the effects of World War I, the
weaknesses of the Weimar Republic, and the effects of the Great Depression) and
long-term (for example the effects of industrialisation and the political legacy of
Bismarck) context linked to the political machinations which, in December 1932 and
January 1933, brought the Chancellorship to Hitler. Disagreements continue to
manifest themselves away from this bigger picture. It is highly unlikely that the issue
of continuity and change will go away. Historians continue to be fascinated and
intrigued by this topic. This continuing fascination is discussed at some length in a
recent study by Richard Evans (Rethinking German History, 1990). The pioneering
work of Fritz Fischer (Germany’s Aims in the First World War 1966 and also War of
Illusions, 1973) continues to influence German historical scholarship in the field of
continuity and change. The continuing relevance and topicality of his work was
reflected in the translation into English, by an Australian historian Roger Fletcher, of
his famous polemical essay Bundnis der Eliten (From Kaiserreich to Third Reich
Elements of Continuity in German History 1871-1945, 1986).
The place of Hitler in the history of the Third Reich continues to dominate much
historical scholarship on the period between 1933 and 1945. The question is
continually asked how important is Adolf Hitler to an understanding of the history of
the Third Reich? The last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed the debate
between the ‘intentionalist’ and ‘structuralist’ historians as to the central importance
or otherwise of Hitler. The ‘intentionalists’ argued that as an individual Hitler was
pivotal to an understanding of the history of the Third Reich. Thus Klaus Hildebrand
argued that Hitler’s pathological anti-Semitism led to the annihilation of European
Jewry because it was his ultimate ‘intention’ to exterminate the Jews. (See also G. L.
Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, 1964). In terms of foreign policy Hitler’s
ideological goals, outlined in Mein Kampf and elsewhere, in the early 1920s, shaped
his actions in the 1930s and 1940s.
History: Germany: Versailles to the Outbreak of World War II - 1918-1939 (AH) 45