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Romanian Military Thinking

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UNITED UNITED NATIONS NATIONS RAPID<br />

RAPID<br />

REACTION REACTION CAPABILITIES<br />

CAPABILITIES<br />

Captain Dorel BU{E, PhD<br />

~ Lecturer, the National Defence University “Carol I” ~<br />

2nd Lieutenant Alexandru-Ovidiu BELEA<br />

~ “Blue Scorpions” Battalion, Craiova ~<br />

The authors present the concept<br />

of “stand-by arrangements” – the<br />

United Nations Stand-by Arrangements<br />

System (UNSAS) – which was first<br />

introduced in the “Agenda for Peace”<br />

on January 31, 1992 and came as a<br />

result of the fact that the United Nations<br />

response time in dealing with diverse<br />

situations was not always adapted to<br />

their dynamics. In 1994, after the idea<br />

had been launched through the<br />

“Agenda for Peace”, a special team,<br />

destined to monitor UNSAS, was<br />

created within the Department<br />

of Peacekeeping Operations.<br />

Then, they mention the “Supplement<br />

to the Agenda for Peace” published<br />

in 1995, when the Secretary-General<br />

asked for the creation of a “Rapid<br />

Deployment Force”, established in 1996<br />

under the form of the Multinational<br />

United Nations Stand-by Forces<br />

High-Readiness Brigade, also known<br />

as the Stand-by High-Readiness Brigade<br />

– SHIRBRIG.<br />

To conclude, the authors mention<br />

the recommendations made in regard<br />

to the use and improvement of<br />

UNSAS, as provided by the “Study on<br />

the United Nations Peace Operations”,<br />

August 2000, known as the “Brahimi<br />

Report”, which determined the evolution<br />

of the arrangement system.<br />

132<br />

T<br />

he ability of intervening at the most short<br />

notice after the arms stopped represents<br />

one of the compulsory conditions for any<br />

peace operation’s success. The Report of the Panel<br />

on UN Peace Operations in 2000 estimated that “the<br />

first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord<br />

were often the most critical ones for establishing both a<br />

stable peace and the credibility of a new operation.<br />

Opportunities lost during that period were hard to regain”.<br />

In addition to the quickness of the response reaction,<br />

the deployed forces also have to meet efficiency criteria.<br />

Therefore, the intention of the international community<br />

as such to deploy forces in the field is not sufficient,<br />

as these must be well trained and properly equipped.<br />

In this respect, considering that the Troop-Contributing<br />

Countries ~ TCC were, most of them, developing<br />

countries, one noticed the fact that the deployed troops<br />

did not have proper training and equipment<br />

in accordance with their interposing mission. In this<br />

context, it followed the necessity for some forces<br />

in standby position, trained and equipped, and with<br />

almost immediate deploy availability to exist.<br />

Not a long time ago, the idea to associate Rapid<br />

Reaction with the United Nations was something that<br />

might have seemed incongruent or utopian. However,<br />

since the establishment, the United Nations have<br />

recognised, through the provisions of Chapter VII

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