Romanian Military Thinking

Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • Perspectives
possible. He makes logistics a real science
of detail or of General Staff and divides it
into 18 branches among which – as well as
the branches that today we consider
as included in the field of logistics – the
organization of reconnaissance and security,
the issue of orders and other things.
In addition, as «old» Official of General
Staff he says that leadership skills are
not sufficient: a Commander needs
to count on capable and loyal soldiers,
on a well-prepared and efficient Command,
on armed and well-trained troops and a good
logistical organization. He also considers
geography extremely important.
In particular, he thinks that the study
of the characteristics of the theatre of war
and the battlefield and the study of the
enemy devices enable us to find the key
point at which forces must be concentrated
and show how they must be moved and
fuelled rapidly and precisely.
Before the Napoleonic Wars, the wars
of Frederick II provided him with a good
model because they were rapid, decisive
and conducted by small volunteer armies
without bothering the civilians: for this
reason he considered the probable
occurrence of bloody Napoleonic Wars
in future, which would originate from
the French Revolution and be based on
compulsory military service, as a misfortune.
He also highlighted
the negative aspects
of the system of the
Napoleonic French
armies and of those
of the Revolution which
had aroused the public
hostility because of
extortion and robbery,
in wide, sparsely
Napoleon inciting the troops
populated or poor geographical areas
(for example, Russia, Sweden and Poland)
leaving them without any provisions;
therefore, it is necessary to be able to exploit
the resources of the countries that have
been invaded sensibly and moderately.
According to Jomini, the activities
of guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency
cannot be included in the system of
principles which he formulated. However,
referring to the considerable difficulties
that the French Armies encountered in the
Spanish guerrilla warfare during the period
1808-1813, he observed that «in these
kinds of wars it is difficult to subdue people
without separating them from each other;
if soldiers join each other in the fighting,
they will be likely to lose the provinces that
have been conquered. The only solution
is to have an army that leads campaigns
and some independent Divisions that
organize the zones behind the front line.
These Divisions must be commanded by
well-educated Generals who are good
administrators and resolute and fair people
in order that their soldiers can subdue,
with the force of arms, the provinces that
have been assigned to them». In addition,
he emphasizes the positive aspects of an
army (like the English Army in the war of
Spain) that can be provided with supplies
by sea.
Both Jomini and
Clausewitz are real
interpreters of the
Napoleonic model and
both of them consider
the strategies as
dependent on politics:
whereas Clausewitz
sees war as an art,
Jomini regards it as
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