Romanian Military Thinking

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Romanian Military Thinking ~ 4/2007
The The The The The strategy strategy strategy strategy strategy of of of of of the the the the the single single single single single party party party party party regarding regarding regarding regarding regarding exercising exercising exercising exercising exercising
absolute absolute absolute absolute absolute political political political political political control control control control control over over over over over the the the the the Armed Armed Armed Armed Armed Forces Forces Forces Forces Forces
The centre of gravity of the conceptual, structural and actional changes within the
Romanian military body used to be situated, with a consistency that was almost didactic,
around the necessity, recognised by the party, to change the specific and general profile
of the Romanian Armed Forces, process that was carried out essentially through its
political subordination to the totalitarian communist institution.
An important direction of this process, whose consequences cannot be evaluated
if one does not organically detach from the contents of the events, was represented by
the radical changes made among the cadres of the Army, the Romanian Armed Forces
being practically deprived of their most representative personalities. What counted in
making this policy operational was the unconditioned attachment to the new power, the
communist one, while the manifest neutrality towards the political leadership – sign of
the moral and professional verticality of the Romanian officer – was destructively
assimilated to a state of hostility and, subsequently, to the incompatibility with the status
of a member of the new army. Subsumed under the general framework of politicising
and unconditionally subduing the entire society, the content of the activities carried out
within the Armed Forces aimed, unequivocally, at the political enrolment of the national
military institution, which happened, mainly, through 3 : • the establishment, in 1945, of
the Superior Directorate for Education, Culture and Propaganda, which later became
the Armed Forces General Inspectorate for Education, Culture and Propaganda,
institution directly subordinated to the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist
Party; • the inclusion of the educative activity, which had an obvious political-ideological
character, into the general military education; • the employment of the above-mentioned
political apparatus in carrying out exclusively mass-political work, being complementary
to the party institutional framework; • the reassessment of the permanent personnel
corps having in view only the political criterion; • the establishment of the party schools
that trained officers to fill the positions of political instructors for all the echelons starting
with a company, officers that came from the members of the proletariat, who were
unconditionally devoted to the totalitarian political regime; • the regime of equivocally
subordination of the political instructors who, in time, had the right to validate or invalidate
commanders’ decisions; • the promotion of the single party members, considering
exclusively the political criterion and totally ignoring the professional one, in decision-making
positions at all the echelons of military representations; • the political and state
responsibilities, outside the political institution, for a large number of officers that filled
important positions in the armed forces organisation.
At the same time, the counterintelligence surveillance proved to be very “efficient”
in absolutely controlling the military institution. It was exercised by the personnel of the
3 Gheorghe Ion, Soare Corneliu, Doctrina militar` româneasc`. 1968-1989, Editura Militar`,
Bucure[ti, 1999, pp. 37-62.