Romanian Military Thinking

Opinions • Arguments • Certitudes • Perspectives
to be pinpointed; these two key figures,
which must be studied and compared, are
of topical interest and this emerges clearly
from the comparison that has been drawn
above. Without any doubts, some concepts
that have been formulated by Clausewitz,
such as his strong anti-dogmatism and his
assertion that war is a chameleon and
a social phenomenon, are of highly topical
interest; however, he is not the only one
to find the relationship between politics
and war and his strong spiritualism does
not match a highly technological war – which
aims to keep the losses to a minimum
without making use of mass and conscript
armies – that Western societies must fight
in the 21st century. Even in the two World
Wars of the 20 th
century the winners
were those who had
many more weapons
and supplies, as it had
happened in the
American Civil War
during the period
1861-1865.
For all these reasons, Jomini’s theories,
despite their dogmatism and the claim
to make war a rational phenomenon
conforming to well-defined rules, match
the western modern wars very well, where
equipment and technology have a dominant
and even excessive role because they tend
to replace men. It is no coincidence that
Jomini has had a strong influence in the US
from the American Civil War up to now
and has inspired the theories of the famous
American Admiral Arthur Thayer Mahan
and of the Italian Giulio Douhet. This
influence – whether it was unconscious
or not – still lasts in the West for the simple
reason that the current joint employment
“What is needed is the
constant and deep study
of the real situation of each
conflict and in that respect
both Jomini and Clausewitz
give us precious material”
of powerful and complex forces, which
belong to different armed forces
of different countries, and their logistical
support require different training, which
is neither easy nor brief, and meticulous
advance planning that must keep the
unexpected to a minimum. Consequently,
they also require the important work of the
General Staff whereas the Leader’s genius,
which is exalted by Clausewitz, has very
little room for manoeuvre.
In addition, we should consider that the
regular armed forces of any state have
always needed strict and complete doctrinal
rules based on principles. For example,
Jomini’s principle of the concentration
of forces at a crucial point that, although
it does not assume the
categorical and absolute
significance of the past,
applies even to the
terrorist organizations
which operate in the
«asymmetric war»,
whose success depends
on their ability to concentrate the forces
at the most convenient points rapidly,
taking the enemy by surprise and then
breaking up. On the other hand, the
negative aspects of Jomini’s thought are
the excessive historicism that has given
substance to the accusation that the
General Staffs of the 20 th century were
preparing wars like in the past, to the
excessive schematism and ordeliness
showing attention to details. These aspects
are not only typical of the French General
Staff. The «line Maginot» originated from
this school of thought and it was wrongly
seen by the French army between the two
World Wars as a sort of philosopher’s stone
to win – cheaply and without strategic
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