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126<br />
Much of the media missed the event that triggered the collapse:<br />
the crash of Carlyle Capital, a huge Hedge fund, and<br />
offshoot of the Carlyle Group, that was overleveraged with<br />
borrowed money and connected to prominent politicians,<br />
wealthy investors all over the world including the Middle East.<br />
It claimed to control $22 Billion on a capital base of under $700<br />
million. As Lorretta Napoleoni reports in her Rogue Economics,<br />
“the crash of Carlyle Capital, dragged Bear Stearns, its major<br />
creditor, into insolvency.” Many of the superstars of the Globalization<br />
elite took a big hit, but their names and positions<br />
escaped media scrutiny.<br />
Most of the news focus was on the firm’s larger than life,<br />
bridge playing CEO Jimmy Cayne because he was a mediagenic<br />
character. His personality seemed to overhang the story even<br />
if he was personally playing at a bridge competition when his<br />
good ship Bear [BS] went down.<br />
According to William Cohan’s book on Bear’s rise and fall,<br />
House of Cards, Bear’s behavior mirrored and set the standard<br />
for what was going on on “The Street.”<br />
The leaders of Wall Street affirmatively made decisions year<br />
after year that made their firms extraordinarily highly leveraged<br />
and risky enterprises. They created a 24x7 production<br />
line that manufactured and sold hundreds of billions of dollars<br />
worth of mortgage-backed, and other asset-backed, securities<br />
placing them with investors all over the globe who were<br />
seduced by their high yields and their phony AAA ratings.<br />
Their reward was huge eight-figure bonuses year after year.<br />
What a great business! Over time, as the market choked on<br />
what they were selling, firms like Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill<br />
Lynch and Citigroup, had to lard more and more of these<br />
securities on their exploding balance sheets, all supported by<br />
an increasingly smaller and smaller slice of equity.<br />
What brought the whole proverbial house of cards to its present<br />
calamitous state was the further decision these firms<br />
made to use the risky securities on their balance sheets