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28 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN SEPTEMBER 2003
BY CAPTAIN ANDREW CAWLEY,
COMMANDING OFFICER,
HMAS CRESWELL
About the author: Andrew Cawley joined
the RAN in 1982, undertaking general
Junior Officer training as a Sub-Lieutenant
in HMAS VAMPIRE from October. In August
1983, he joined HMAS PERTH as a
Systems Engineer Officer. Promoted to
Lieutenant in April 1984, he posted to
HMAS CERBERUS for Weapons Engineer
specialist training in late 1984. He
returned to sea in HMAS HOBART in early
1985 and later HMAS BRISBANE as a
Systems Engineer Officer.
Captain Cawley joined the Navy Office
Directorate of Fleet Engineering Policy at
the end of 1985 as the Systems Engineer
for non-USN weapons systems.
Moving to Perth in early 1989, he joined
the small team building up commercial
refitting practices for Navy in Western
Australia. He joined HMAS STUART as
Weapons Electrical Engineering Officer
(WEEO) in October 1989 and was
promoted Lieutenant Commander in mid
1990. When STUART decommissioned
from the RAN in May 1991, he returned to
Navy Office in Canberra as the Staff Officer
for Engineer Officer career management in
the Directorate of Naval Officers’ Postings.
In June 1993, Captain Cawley returned to
sea as WEEO of HMAS PERTH, which
included the milestone of passing
management of high power generation and
distribution in Navy to the Marine Engineer
in August 1994. Selected for promotion in
December 1994, he left HMAS PERTH to
undertake a five month project with Naval
Support Command to establish
engineering support models and processes
in preparation for the full
commercialisation of Australian Defence
Industries (ADI) and the dockyards. In May
1995, Captain Cawley then posted as OIC
of the Navy’s Technical Training Centre at
HMAS CERBERUS. Seconded to the Joint
Education and Training Executive in May
1997, Captain Cawley undertook the
Defence Efficiency Review related study
into ADF Technical Training Rationalisation.
The Report was tendered in February
1998.
Before joining Maritime Command in June
1999, Captain Cawley completed a
Masters of Engineering Management,
specialising in Systems Engineering, at the
University of Technology, Sydney.
On 01 July 2000, Captain Cawley was
promoted to his current rank. He was
posted to HMAS CRESWELL in October
2000 where he takes up his dual role as
Commanding Officer, HMAS CRESWELL
and Training Authority, Initial Training
Leadership and Management. Captain
Cawley is married to Anna Glynne and lives
at HMAS CRESWELL in Jervis Bay.
A Risk—Is It Really?
Over the last few years, the culture of carefully considering risk in our
decision making has taken hold. People are well attuned to querying
what risks are associated with an evolution and it is commonplace for
people to do an “HRA”. But, is it really a risk or is it something else?
The process of an Hazard Risk
Assessment is well documented
in the NAVSAFE Manual, ABR
6303. Risk is calculated
according to the Australian
Standard, AS4360. Most people
can tell you that you calculate
risk as the product of
consequence and probability. The
issue I’d like to raise in this brief
article is, what do you really know
about the probability of an event
occurring?
Many times I have heard people
say ‘the probability of that
occurring is very low’. That sort of
an answer is either a fact or a
guess, and too often it is a guess.
How many people do you think
say that because they have a ‘gut
feeling’ it does not happen very
often, or because they
themselves have never witnessed
such an event? How many times
have you heard people offer such
a judgement about something
they actually have no expertise
in?
In 1992, Brian Wynne, a UK
academic working in the field of
environmental risk, developed
what he called his Taxonomy 1 of
Risk. The first level is where we
know about the behaviour of a
system 2 and we can model the
probability of something
happening. That is to say we can
determine a mathematical
probability, 0.0 < p < 1.0. If we
know about consequence, then
we can calculate risk and use this
to guide our decision making.
If we possess specification about
system design (variables) and
operation, we can claim we know
something about system
behaviour, but we cannot simply
extend that claim to say we know
about the probability distribution
of various events occurring. There
must be specific, objective
knowledge about event
probability. If we do not know
about the probability distribution
of events, we are not able to
assign a mathematical value to
probability and we therefore
cannot calculate risk. This is
uncertainty.
But it does not end there, Wynne
takes the issue two steps further.
People can generally accept they
do not understand something
about a system that lies before
them because they do not have
the expertise to work something
out. But regardless of whether you
are an expert or a novice, there is
always the unknown. What
decision makers need to
remember is there may be events
(probability) or hazards
(consequences) we simply do not
know about. The issue for
decision-makers is to be careful
of ignorance, be careful of people
who say they have worked it all
out and the (∑) risk is known
and acceptable.
The next level in Wynne’s
taxonomy is the unknowable.
Given time and effort, we may
discover new information about a
system and convert the unknown
into the known. In the context of
risk management, the ‘known’ will
become a calculable risk if we
understand its probability
distribution (and consequence) or
it will become uncertainty.
However, when ‘causal chains and
networks are open’, there is
always the unknowable.
In short, Wynne has usefully
distinguished a taxonomy:
• Risk—where you know the
probability distribution
• Uncertainty—where you do not
know the probability distribution
• Unknown; and
• Unknowable.
So, what is the point of this. Next
time someone says ‘the
probability of that occurring is
very low’, test them about what
they really know about the
probability distribution. If they are
just guessing, then tell them it is
not risk, it is uncertainty! While
that might be a play on words,
what is important is you know the
difference between guesswork
and science and base you
decisions accordingly.
1 Taxonomy:- Classification, especially in
relation to its general laws and principles, a
systematic classification.
2 Meaning in the broadest sense of the
word system, not simply electro-mechanical
devices.
References:
Wynne, B., 1992. Uncertainty and
environmental learning: reconceiving
science and policy in the preventative
paradigm, Global Environmental Change
2(2), 111-127.
Irish, J., 1998. Risk, Uncertainty, Ignorance
and Indeterminancy, University of
Technology, Sydney.