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58 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN SEPTEMBER 2003<br />

MT watch keeping requirements<br />

needed to:<br />

a. safely sail an FFG in cruising<br />

watches, and<br />

b. maintain ship safety and<br />

preparedness whilst the ship<br />

is alongside.<br />

The review needed to consider all<br />

likely situations that a watch<br />

keeper would face whilst carrying<br />

out their normal duties. These<br />

included plant failure, damage<br />

control incidents and operation of<br />

the engineering plant whilst in<br />

redundant modes. The effect of<br />

such on the rest of the ship’s<br />

capability was also examined.<br />

Finally, other peripheral issues<br />

were considered including what<br />

effect the proposed changes in<br />

watch keeping practices may<br />

have on current training.<br />

The scope allowed for both<br />

hardware and routine based<br />

solutions.<br />

Finally, one of the drivers for this<br />

study was a need to increase<br />

retention of personnel and so a<br />

broad license was given to<br />

consider any areas associated<br />

with the topic that may improve<br />

the workplace leading to a<br />

reduction in personnel wastage.<br />

The Analysis and Optimisation<br />

Process<br />

The approach for this Study was<br />

carried out mindful of what we<br />

viewed as the root requirement.<br />

That is, to keep a Defence Asset<br />

(the Ship) at a stated level of<br />

preparedness in order to either<br />

complete a mission or to be<br />

available on a stated level of<br />

standby to carry out a mission if<br />

required. Keeping this in mind,<br />

the Study attempted to link each<br />

watch keeping task needing to be<br />

performed back to this root<br />

requirement.<br />

Within the FFG Class context, the<br />

broad functions listed below were<br />

considered as making up the<br />

perceived need for personnel to<br />

keep continuous watches at sea.<br />

Attached to each of the functions<br />

listed below would be a list of<br />

tasks carried out by an<br />

engineering cruising watch<br />

keeper. These functions were:<br />

a. plant operation to provide<br />

control for navigational,<br />

operational or safety<br />

reasons,<br />

b. manual recording of<br />

machinery and other<br />

operating data,<br />

c. performing low-level, high<br />

frequency maintenance<br />

tasks,<br />

d. safety examinations (via<br />

visual inspection) of<br />

engineering and, during<br />

transit, other spaces<br />

throughout the ship,<br />

e. to provide a ready and alert<br />

team that can:<br />

i. respond quickly to<br />

engineering plant failures<br />

or critical problems,<br />

ii. respond quickly to<br />

emergencies such as fire,<br />

toxic hazards or floods,<br />

and<br />

iii. operate the plant in<br />

redundant modes should<br />

a normal operating mode<br />

fail,<br />

f. to provide timely and flexible<br />

services such as being part<br />

of the helicopter or boat<br />

refuelling team, and<br />

g. to provide expert and<br />

immediate advice on<br />

engineering matters to<br />

Command or other<br />

functional areas of the ship<br />

as required.<br />

Alongside watch keeping routines<br />

were broken down into the<br />

following functions:<br />

a. maintaining preparedness,<br />

b. emergency and hazard<br />

monitoring,<br />

c. specialist and general<br />

response to above incidents<br />

(within given constraints),<br />

and<br />

d. ship security.<br />

The task listings were developed<br />

using a three tiered breakdown<br />

structure underneath the<br />

functions listed above. This<br />

approach ensured all tasks likely<br />

to be carried out as part of the<br />

current practices were captured<br />

for analysis.<br />

Using a risk-based approach,<br />

each task was considered with a<br />

view to removing the task from<br />

the duties of the watch keeper. If<br />

removal was not an option, other<br />

alternatives were explored. The<br />

risk analysis was carried out<br />

using an adaptation of the<br />

RELeGEN’s BASELINE CIRAS<br />

(Critical Item Risk Assessment<br />

System). In short, the four<br />

decision collection points were:<br />

a. omit without further action if<br />

HRA =/> 18,<br />

b. omit with alterations/<br />

contingencies placed on<br />

other tasks,<br />

c. modify task to reduce<br />

frequency, complexity or<br />

duration, and<br />

d. retain in current form.<br />

From this exercise, 421 raw tasks<br />

were identified. Examples of<br />

these tasks at the lowest level<br />

would be ‘Start Gas Turbine in<br />

Manual Mode’ or ‘Respond to<br />

loss of lube oil pressure on Ship<br />

Service Diesel Generator at local<br />

operating position’. For various<br />

reasons there was a considerable<br />

difference in some operator work<br />

practices and procedures across<br />

the Class. In order to ensure all<br />

tasks would be included for later<br />

analysis, task lists were<br />

developed from first principles<br />

using information contained in

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