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58 NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN SEPTEMBER 2003<br />
MT watch keeping requirements<br />
needed to:<br />
a. safely sail an FFG in cruising<br />
watches, and<br />
b. maintain ship safety and<br />
preparedness whilst the ship<br />
is alongside.<br />
The review needed to consider all<br />
likely situations that a watch<br />
keeper would face whilst carrying<br />
out their normal duties. These<br />
included plant failure, damage<br />
control incidents and operation of<br />
the engineering plant whilst in<br />
redundant modes. The effect of<br />
such on the rest of the ship’s<br />
capability was also examined.<br />
Finally, other peripheral issues<br />
were considered including what<br />
effect the proposed changes in<br />
watch keeping practices may<br />
have on current training.<br />
The scope allowed for both<br />
hardware and routine based<br />
solutions.<br />
Finally, one of the drivers for this<br />
study was a need to increase<br />
retention of personnel and so a<br />
broad license was given to<br />
consider any areas associated<br />
with the topic that may improve<br />
the workplace leading to a<br />
reduction in personnel wastage.<br />
The Analysis and Optimisation<br />
Process<br />
The approach for this Study was<br />
carried out mindful of what we<br />
viewed as the root requirement.<br />
That is, to keep a Defence Asset<br />
(the Ship) at a stated level of<br />
preparedness in order to either<br />
complete a mission or to be<br />
available on a stated level of<br />
standby to carry out a mission if<br />
required. Keeping this in mind,<br />
the Study attempted to link each<br />
watch keeping task needing to be<br />
performed back to this root<br />
requirement.<br />
Within the FFG Class context, the<br />
broad functions listed below were<br />
considered as making up the<br />
perceived need for personnel to<br />
keep continuous watches at sea.<br />
Attached to each of the functions<br />
listed below would be a list of<br />
tasks carried out by an<br />
engineering cruising watch<br />
keeper. These functions were:<br />
a. plant operation to provide<br />
control for navigational,<br />
operational or safety<br />
reasons,<br />
b. manual recording of<br />
machinery and other<br />
operating data,<br />
c. performing low-level, high<br />
frequency maintenance<br />
tasks,<br />
d. safety examinations (via<br />
visual inspection) of<br />
engineering and, during<br />
transit, other spaces<br />
throughout the ship,<br />
e. to provide a ready and alert<br />
team that can:<br />
i. respond quickly to<br />
engineering plant failures<br />
or critical problems,<br />
ii. respond quickly to<br />
emergencies such as fire,<br />
toxic hazards or floods,<br />
and<br />
iii. operate the plant in<br />
redundant modes should<br />
a normal operating mode<br />
fail,<br />
f. to provide timely and flexible<br />
services such as being part<br />
of the helicopter or boat<br />
refuelling team, and<br />
g. to provide expert and<br />
immediate advice on<br />
engineering matters to<br />
Command or other<br />
functional areas of the ship<br />
as required.<br />
Alongside watch keeping routines<br />
were broken down into the<br />
following functions:<br />
a. maintaining preparedness,<br />
b. emergency and hazard<br />
monitoring,<br />
c. specialist and general<br />
response to above incidents<br />
(within given constraints),<br />
and<br />
d. ship security.<br />
The task listings were developed<br />
using a three tiered breakdown<br />
structure underneath the<br />
functions listed above. This<br />
approach ensured all tasks likely<br />
to be carried out as part of the<br />
current practices were captured<br />
for analysis.<br />
Using a risk-based approach,<br />
each task was considered with a<br />
view to removing the task from<br />
the duties of the watch keeper. If<br />
removal was not an option, other<br />
alternatives were explored. The<br />
risk analysis was carried out<br />
using an adaptation of the<br />
RELeGEN’s BASELINE CIRAS<br />
(Critical Item Risk Assessment<br />
System). In short, the four<br />
decision collection points were:<br />
a. omit without further action if<br />
HRA =/> 18,<br />
b. omit with alterations/<br />
contingencies placed on<br />
other tasks,<br />
c. modify task to reduce<br />
frequency, complexity or<br />
duration, and<br />
d. retain in current form.<br />
From this exercise, 421 raw tasks<br />
were identified. Examples of<br />
these tasks at the lowest level<br />
would be ‘Start Gas Turbine in<br />
Manual Mode’ or ‘Respond to<br />
loss of lube oil pressure on Ship<br />
Service Diesel Generator at local<br />
operating position’. For various<br />
reasons there was a considerable<br />
difference in some operator work<br />
practices and procedures across<br />
the Class. In order to ensure all<br />
tasks would be included for later<br />
analysis, task lists were<br />
developed from first principles<br />
using information contained in