Download - Royal Australian Navy
Download - Royal Australian Navy
Download - Royal Australian Navy
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Training<br />
FFG MT console operator training<br />
is currently being carried out<br />
ashore at the FFG Propulsion<br />
Control System (PCS) Trainer. An<br />
excellent asset, however, its use is<br />
mainly for basic console<br />
operation and limited currency<br />
training. The remainder of training<br />
for propulsion and auxiliary<br />
system operation and monitoring<br />
and all assessment is carried out<br />
at sea. The usual approach (and I<br />
apologise for my gender specific<br />
term in advance) is a ‘Father-to-<br />
Son’ apprenticeship that is<br />
resource intensive in both<br />
personnel and equipment use.<br />
The repatriation and formalising<br />
of this training ashore would<br />
markedly reduce the considerable<br />
training overhead on the ships<br />
senior engineering personnel. It<br />
would also improve the<br />
consistency of training to ensure<br />
a common standard is achieved<br />
but not overshot. Completion of<br />
the majority of training ashore<br />
would then only require<br />
consolidation, final assessment<br />
and some currency training to be<br />
carried out at sea.<br />
Harbour Watch Keeping<br />
Harbour watch keeping involves<br />
mainly a presence in CCS to<br />
oversee plant and damage<br />
control monitoring systems.<br />
Rounds of engineering spaces<br />
and running machinery also<br />
continues to be carried out whilst<br />
the ship is alongside. CIRAS was<br />
again used to determine if these<br />
activities could be removed or<br />
modified to an optimum level<br />
whilst still maintaining the<br />
required level of plant oversight.<br />
Unfortunately the analysis<br />
showed that, whilst two other<br />
locations showed potential, the<br />
ships hardware was the limiting<br />
factor as none of the alternate<br />
positions provided the level of<br />
monitoring available in CCS. The<br />
next favourable location would<br />
have been the ship’s gangway as<br />
watch keepers were also present<br />
on a 24 hour basis. However, this<br />
position provided only very<br />
limited damage control and no<br />
machinery monitoring.<br />
Active Alarm Monitoring System<br />
As part of this Study, the Active<br />
Alarm Monitoring System (AAMS)<br />
was developed to concept stage.<br />
This would allow an extension of<br />
the plant and damage control<br />
monitoring systems at a remote<br />
location and repeated in a form<br />
easily understood by nonengineering<br />
personnel allowing<br />
action to be taken should an<br />
incident occur. This system would<br />
remove the need for watch<br />
keepers to be present in CCS<br />
whilst in harbour without<br />
increasing the risk to the ship or<br />
the duty watch personnel. As<br />
seen in the diagram, the system<br />
could be couple via flexible cable<br />
to other like configured ships and<br />
allow monitoring of multiple ships<br />
alarm monitoring systems by one<br />
gangway station. Monitoring from<br />
a shore facility is also possible<br />
with this system. A basic<br />
schematic of the system is shown<br />
below with items in blue showing<br />
existing hardware and red as new<br />
installation.<br />
Harbour Rounds<br />
Whilst the ship is alongside in<br />
harbour, a considerable amount<br />
of machinery continues to run.<br />
This potentially raises the risks<br />
within the machinery spaces to<br />
that above the ship’s background<br />
level. Examination of a number of<br />
these items shows that the<br />
systems could be shut down and<br />
secured removing many of the<br />
risks associated with their<br />
operation. A systematic approach<br />
to this process would reduce the<br />
risks within the engineering<br />
spaces to the ship’s background<br />
level and remove the need for<br />
specialist engineering personnel<br />
to conduct rounds through these<br />
spaces. Any person with sufficient<br />
ship knowledge could carry out<br />
rounds through the machinery<br />
spaces.<br />
NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN SEPTEMBER 2003<br />
The above situation opens up the<br />
possibility of having a whole ship<br />
rounds routine that would remove<br />
many of the concurrently<br />
conducted departmental and<br />
security rounds that are now<br />
carried out. The benefits of having<br />
a reduced rounds frequency<br />
would be enjoyed by the entire<br />
ships duty watch.<br />
Conclusion<br />
This Study has shown that with a<br />
systematic risk-based approach<br />
and judicious use of cost<br />
effective modern technology,<br />
significant efficiency gains can<br />
still be achieved in what is<br />
essentially an area seen as being<br />
limited by the existing hardware.<br />
The systems based approach<br />
(and technology based solutions)<br />
outlined in this article can be<br />
used on any platform to optimise<br />
watch keeping procedures. The<br />
refined practices open up a<br />
considerable number of options<br />
for engineering managers to<br />
redeploy their personnel into<br />
more worthy activities.<br />
Editor’s Note:<br />
RELeGEN has been involved in a<br />
number of other recent <strong>Navy</strong><br />
Projects, including:<br />
a. The development of a<br />
barcode scanning audit tool<br />
that loads data from AMPS<br />
and the RAN’s new<br />
Configuration Management<br />
Tool– BASELINE Audit;<br />
b. Software to develop the<br />
RAN’s CMC code –<br />
BASELINE Connect;<br />
c. Software and hardware tools<br />
to collect watchkeeping data<br />
collected onboard –<br />
BASELINE Check;<br />
d. ISL data management<br />
software – BASELINE ILS;<br />
e. a critical item risk<br />
assessment system –<br />
BASELINE CIRAS.<br />
61