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Training<br />

FFG MT console operator training<br />

is currently being carried out<br />

ashore at the FFG Propulsion<br />

Control System (PCS) Trainer. An<br />

excellent asset, however, its use is<br />

mainly for basic console<br />

operation and limited currency<br />

training. The remainder of training<br />

for propulsion and auxiliary<br />

system operation and monitoring<br />

and all assessment is carried out<br />

at sea. The usual approach (and I<br />

apologise for my gender specific<br />

term in advance) is a ‘Father-to-<br />

Son’ apprenticeship that is<br />

resource intensive in both<br />

personnel and equipment use.<br />

The repatriation and formalising<br />

of this training ashore would<br />

markedly reduce the considerable<br />

training overhead on the ships<br />

senior engineering personnel. It<br />

would also improve the<br />

consistency of training to ensure<br />

a common standard is achieved<br />

but not overshot. Completion of<br />

the majority of training ashore<br />

would then only require<br />

consolidation, final assessment<br />

and some currency training to be<br />

carried out at sea.<br />

Harbour Watch Keeping<br />

Harbour watch keeping involves<br />

mainly a presence in CCS to<br />

oversee plant and damage<br />

control monitoring systems.<br />

Rounds of engineering spaces<br />

and running machinery also<br />

continues to be carried out whilst<br />

the ship is alongside. CIRAS was<br />

again used to determine if these<br />

activities could be removed or<br />

modified to an optimum level<br />

whilst still maintaining the<br />

required level of plant oversight.<br />

Unfortunately the analysis<br />

showed that, whilst two other<br />

locations showed potential, the<br />

ships hardware was the limiting<br />

factor as none of the alternate<br />

positions provided the level of<br />

monitoring available in CCS. The<br />

next favourable location would<br />

have been the ship’s gangway as<br />

watch keepers were also present<br />

on a 24 hour basis. However, this<br />

position provided only very<br />

limited damage control and no<br />

machinery monitoring.<br />

Active Alarm Monitoring System<br />

As part of this Study, the Active<br />

Alarm Monitoring System (AAMS)<br />

was developed to concept stage.<br />

This would allow an extension of<br />

the plant and damage control<br />

monitoring systems at a remote<br />

location and repeated in a form<br />

easily understood by nonengineering<br />

personnel allowing<br />

action to be taken should an<br />

incident occur. This system would<br />

remove the need for watch<br />

keepers to be present in CCS<br />

whilst in harbour without<br />

increasing the risk to the ship or<br />

the duty watch personnel. As<br />

seen in the diagram, the system<br />

could be couple via flexible cable<br />

to other like configured ships and<br />

allow monitoring of multiple ships<br />

alarm monitoring systems by one<br />

gangway station. Monitoring from<br />

a shore facility is also possible<br />

with this system. A basic<br />

schematic of the system is shown<br />

below with items in blue showing<br />

existing hardware and red as new<br />

installation.<br />

Harbour Rounds<br />

Whilst the ship is alongside in<br />

harbour, a considerable amount<br />

of machinery continues to run.<br />

This potentially raises the risks<br />

within the machinery spaces to<br />

that above the ship’s background<br />

level. Examination of a number of<br />

these items shows that the<br />

systems could be shut down and<br />

secured removing many of the<br />

risks associated with their<br />

operation. A systematic approach<br />

to this process would reduce the<br />

risks within the engineering<br />

spaces to the ship’s background<br />

level and remove the need for<br />

specialist engineering personnel<br />

to conduct rounds through these<br />

spaces. Any person with sufficient<br />

ship knowledge could carry out<br />

rounds through the machinery<br />

spaces.<br />

NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN SEPTEMBER 2003<br />

The above situation opens up the<br />

possibility of having a whole ship<br />

rounds routine that would remove<br />

many of the concurrently<br />

conducted departmental and<br />

security rounds that are now<br />

carried out. The benefits of having<br />

a reduced rounds frequency<br />

would be enjoyed by the entire<br />

ships duty watch.<br />

Conclusion<br />

This Study has shown that with a<br />

systematic risk-based approach<br />

and judicious use of cost<br />

effective modern technology,<br />

significant efficiency gains can<br />

still be achieved in what is<br />

essentially an area seen as being<br />

limited by the existing hardware.<br />

The systems based approach<br />

(and technology based solutions)<br />

outlined in this article can be<br />

used on any platform to optimise<br />

watch keeping procedures. The<br />

refined practices open up a<br />

considerable number of options<br />

for engineering managers to<br />

redeploy their personnel into<br />

more worthy activities.<br />

Editor’s Note:<br />

RELeGEN has been involved in a<br />

number of other recent <strong>Navy</strong><br />

Projects, including:<br />

a. The development of a<br />

barcode scanning audit tool<br />

that loads data from AMPS<br />

and the RAN’s new<br />

Configuration Management<br />

Tool– BASELINE Audit;<br />

b. Software to develop the<br />

RAN’s CMC code –<br />

BASELINE Connect;<br />

c. Software and hardware tools<br />

to collect watchkeeping data<br />

collected onboard –<br />

BASELINE Check;<br />

d. ISL data management<br />

software – BASELINE ILS;<br />

e. a critical item risk<br />

assessment system –<br />

BASELINE CIRAS.<br />

61

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