Download - Royal Australian Navy

equipment technical manuals,
system drawings, Standard
Operating Procedures, various
policy and directive documents
and Standing Orders.
The only items considered as
rigid constraints on our analysis
were the ship’s hardware, the
capability to be delivered and
generic personnel training (such
as Initial and Advanced Technical
Training). The remainder of
associated topics were
considered as potential for
variation.
The raw tasks were analysed
using CIRAS to produce the first
refinement of the task lists.
Reasons for task removal or
modification included duplication
of records and parameter
monitoring, alternate (or more
practical) operating means and
more functionally efficient work
practices.
The next step was to breakdown,
within the functions, tasks that
were tied to an operating station.
This step determined that, due to
hardware constraints, personnel
would be required on standby
both inside and external to CCS
to provide an initial response to
casualty and emergency
situations. The analysis showed
that all initial plant actions could
be controlled from within CCS
with other personnel able to
attend the plant or scene at short
notice. This confirmed the need
for an as yet undefined number
of watch keepers to be present
whilst equipment was
operational.
At this stage it was decided to
determine the workflows based
on a need to either stay within
CCS or have the ability to move
about the ship. To summarise the
process, the following steps were
taken:
a. allocate tasks based on the
need to be present in CCS
or elsewhere;
b. divide tasks based into onoccurrence
(only requiring a
time allocation if the
situation occurs. For
example, responding to a
fire or plant casualty) or a
cyclic time requirement
(checking the oil level on an
air compressor);
c. subdivide tasks based on
operator skill levels as
proposed by DNPR(E&L);
and
d. further divide tasks on timebased
labour division into
manageable work packages
based on personnel physical
constraints.
Our initial findings were that the
typical workload that would be
experienced during a watch could
be easily handled by one watch
keeper at the MSC level in CCS
and one MST roving external to
CCS monitoring and operating the
propulsion and auxiliary systems.
The Study also found that whilst
the MCS would need to maintain
a four-hour watch routine, the
MST and MSM were no longer
tied to this routine. The MST
would be free to work in a routine
similar to an alongside duty
watch where they complete
rounds as required and can
complete other working activities
providing they are available
immediately should an incident
occur. The MSM was entirely ‘on
call’. Therefore, a watch period
extending beyond the current
four-hour cycle for the MSM and
MST was available as an option.
Our proposed cruising watch
composition was risk tested
against what we saw as worst
case and probable scenarios for
the watch keeping team. These
scenarios were:
a. a fire in Auxiliary Machinery
Room (AMR) 2 as this would
have severe ramifications on
the ships propulsion, power
generation and auxiliary
systems as well as requiring
NAVY ENGINEERING BULLETIN SEPTEMBER 2003
considerable damage
control activity, and
b. a propulsion system
casualty during a period of
increased navigational risk
requiring an immediate
reconfiguration of the plant
as this would exceed the
skills of the MSC and
require assistance from the
MSM.
The scenarios were tested against
a fully operational plant and also
a plant carrying automatic control
system defects. We found that the
plant fully operational could be
safely operated by the MSC and
MST during a fire in AMR2.
However, depending on the
defect, there may be a
requirement for a separate
operator for the Electric Plant
Control Console to reduce
operator stress, human error and
complete the required actions in
a timely manner. As situations
such as the AMR2 fire are
random, there would be a
requirement for a second watch
keeper in CCS to operate the
electric plant whenever the
system was carrying control
system defects.
Discussions with senior
navigation personnel indicated
that there are likely to be varying
levels of navigational risk of which
some will require immediate
response to a propulsion system
casualty. Therefore, the propulsion
system operator in CCS will need
to vary between the MSC and
MSM depending on this
navigation risk. Although difficult
to quantify, it is envisaged that
the majority of steaming time will
only require the MSC to be
present in CCS.
Watch Keepers Required
Our analysis had reached a stage
where the number and type of
personnel required to watch keep
at sea at cruising stations had
been determined. It had shown
that the original work force
directly involved in sea watch
59