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Lee A. Bygrave (red.) YULEX 2002 - Universitetet i Oslo

Lee A. Bygrave (red.) YULEX 2002 - Universitetet i Oslo

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The Schengen Information System in Austria 97<br />

thority prepare an EKIS (national system for criminal investigation) document<br />

for entry into the national criminal system. The document is then<br />

transmitted to a data station (DASTA), which is a second level security authority<br />

(Sicherheitsdirektion). At the DASTA, the data is ente<strong>red</strong> online by<br />

the staff into EKIS. If the EKIS document contains a special indicator for SISrelevant<br />

data, special software filters the data set from the EKIS file and<br />

communicates it to a specific file of NSIS, which is then communicated by<br />

special software to CSIS. Where the SIS data set is relevant to Article 95 (extradition)<br />

or Article 99 (discreet surveillance), it is first communicated to<br />

SIRENE and from there onto CSIS. CSIS, after indexing the data, distributes<br />

it to NSIS in all Schengen countries, including the NSIS in the reporting country.<br />

Once distributed, the data is searchable. The whole process takes only 3<br />

minutes to complete, which means, therefore, that SIS is very up to date. The<br />

same search query is sent both to SIS and the national system in Austria. This<br />

is because a national search is not only a SIS search, it also involves a search<br />

in the national system. The explanation given was that if this were not the<br />

case, persons not registe<strong>red</strong> in SIS might escape detection because a negative<br />

hit in SIS does not necessarily mean that a person is ’clean’. Searching the<br />

national system may reveal other information, as a person may be registe<strong>red</strong><br />

in the national system but not in SIS.<br />

As shown in the diagram, NSIS, SIRENE and NIS are all different technical<br />

and organisational units (see 5.2 below). Personnel working with these<br />

systems are different and the systems are located in different buildings. I had<br />

to travel to different locations and buildings to interview representatives of<br />

the different systems. As regards data protection and data security, keeping<br />

the systems separate is desirable so that any data protection problem affecting<br />

one system may not necessarily spill over to the other systems.<br />

3.4 Access to Data in the System<br />

Access to data in SIS has also been a contentious issue. The Schengen Convention<br />

does not set limits to the number of persons with access authority,<br />

instead leaving access regulation to the national laws of the Contracting Parties.<br />

Consequently, the list of persons with access differs considerably among<br />

the Contracting Parties. The question relating to access to data in SIS was<br />

therefore aimed at establishing a clear picture of who has access, how many<br />

persons have access and how access is controlled in Austria.<br />

According to the Schengen Convention, data in SIS can be searched and<br />

accessed by authorities designated by the Contracting Parties for the purposes<br />

of border checks and controls, and other police and customs checks, when<br />

carried out inside the country in accordance with national law (Articles 92 &

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