Abuse of Economic Dependence - The Centre for European Policy ...
Abuse of Economic Dependence - The Centre for European Policy ...
Abuse of Economic Dependence - The Centre for European Policy ...
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In this book we are focusing on the lenient intervention, where the<br />
Commission by not being able to apply Article 82 to the anti-competitive<br />
conduct <strong>of</strong> the non-dominant firm in the market, will not safeguard<br />
consumer welfare, which is the objective <strong>of</strong> Article 82. Thus, the<br />
Commission will not ensure that this firm bears its responsibility not to<br />
interfere and distort the competitive process <strong>of</strong> entry into the market.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Commission has stated that:<br />
[A]n undertaking that is capable <strong>of</strong> substantially increasing prices above<br />
the competitive level <strong>for</strong> a significant period <strong>of</strong> time holds substantial<br />
market power and possesses the requisite ability to act to an appreciable<br />
extent independently <strong>of</strong> competitors, customers and consumers. 56<br />
It has further added that:<br />
<strong>The</strong> Gap in the Application <strong>of</strong> Article 82 63<br />
[T]he fact that an undertaking is compelled by the pressure <strong>of</strong> its<br />
competitors’ price reductions to lower its own prices is in general incompatible<br />
with the independent conduct which is the hallmark <strong>of</strong> a dominant<br />
position. 57<br />
In these passages the Commission uses the ‘substantial market power’<br />
concept to indicate when an undertaking is dominant. As illustrated above,<br />
in a differentiated products market more than one firm can have the ability<br />
to increase prices above the competitive level <strong>for</strong> a significant period <strong>of</strong><br />
time. Thus, more than one firm can induce consumer harm, by adopting<br />
anti-competitive conduct. Notwithstanding the use <strong>of</strong> the term substantial<br />
market power in the Discussion Paper, and the fact that this term can<br />
encompass more than one firm in differentiated product markets, the case<br />
law has illustrated the apparent inability <strong>of</strong> the Commission to apply<br />
Article 82 to the anti-competitive conduct <strong>of</strong> non-dominant firms in a<br />
differentiated products market.<br />
<strong>The</strong> gap in the application <strong>of</strong> Article 82 relates both to exploitative and<br />
exclusionary abuses by non-dominant firms. Although the concept <strong>of</strong> abuse<br />
<strong>of</strong> superior bargaining position/abuse <strong>of</strong> economic dependence addresses<br />
anti-competitive conduct towards other firms, it does not seem to have<br />
addressed to date anti-competitive conduct towards consumers. As the<br />
above analysis illustrated, the wording <strong>of</strong> the concept <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> economic<br />
dependence in some <strong>of</strong> the jurisdictions implies that in principle such<br />
concepts can capture exploitative abuses, but the vast majority <strong>of</strong> the case<br />
law in these countries relates to exclusionary conduct. In some other jurisdictions,<br />
the scope <strong>of</strong> the concept <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> economic dependence is even<br />
56 Discussion Paper Report, § 24.<br />
57 Discussion Paper Report, § 27.