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Abuse of Economic Dependence - The Centre for European Policy ...

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In this book we are focusing on the lenient intervention, where the<br />

Commission by not being able to apply Article 82 to the anti-competitive<br />

conduct <strong>of</strong> the non-dominant firm in the market, will not safeguard<br />

consumer welfare, which is the objective <strong>of</strong> Article 82. Thus, the<br />

Commission will not ensure that this firm bears its responsibility not to<br />

interfere and distort the competitive process <strong>of</strong> entry into the market.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Commission has stated that:<br />

[A]n undertaking that is capable <strong>of</strong> substantially increasing prices above<br />

the competitive level <strong>for</strong> a significant period <strong>of</strong> time holds substantial<br />

market power and possesses the requisite ability to act to an appreciable<br />

extent independently <strong>of</strong> competitors, customers and consumers. 56<br />

It has further added that:<br />

<strong>The</strong> Gap in the Application <strong>of</strong> Article 82 63<br />

[T]he fact that an undertaking is compelled by the pressure <strong>of</strong> its<br />

competitors’ price reductions to lower its own prices is in general incompatible<br />

with the independent conduct which is the hallmark <strong>of</strong> a dominant<br />

position. 57<br />

In these passages the Commission uses the ‘substantial market power’<br />

concept to indicate when an undertaking is dominant. As illustrated above,<br />

in a differentiated products market more than one firm can have the ability<br />

to increase prices above the competitive level <strong>for</strong> a significant period <strong>of</strong><br />

time. Thus, more than one firm can induce consumer harm, by adopting<br />

anti-competitive conduct. Notwithstanding the use <strong>of</strong> the term substantial<br />

market power in the Discussion Paper, and the fact that this term can<br />

encompass more than one firm in differentiated product markets, the case<br />

law has illustrated the apparent inability <strong>of</strong> the Commission to apply<br />

Article 82 to the anti-competitive conduct <strong>of</strong> non-dominant firms in a<br />

differentiated products market.<br />

<strong>The</strong> gap in the application <strong>of</strong> Article 82 relates both to exploitative and<br />

exclusionary abuses by non-dominant firms. Although the concept <strong>of</strong> abuse<br />

<strong>of</strong> superior bargaining position/abuse <strong>of</strong> economic dependence addresses<br />

anti-competitive conduct towards other firms, it does not seem to have<br />

addressed to date anti-competitive conduct towards consumers. As the<br />

above analysis illustrated, the wording <strong>of</strong> the concept <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> economic<br />

dependence in some <strong>of</strong> the jurisdictions implies that in principle such<br />

concepts can capture exploitative abuses, but the vast majority <strong>of</strong> the case<br />

law in these countries relates to exclusionary conduct. In some other jurisdictions,<br />

the scope <strong>of</strong> the concept <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> economic dependence is even<br />

56 Discussion Paper Report, § 24.<br />

57 Discussion Paper Report, § 27.

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