Abuse of Economic Dependence - The Centre for European Policy ...
Abuse of Economic Dependence - The Centre for European Policy ...
Abuse of Economic Dependence - The Centre for European Policy ...
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74 A Gap in the En<strong>for</strong>cement <strong>of</strong> Article 82<br />
involving commerce with <strong>for</strong>eign nations (other than import commerce)<br />
unless—<br />
(A) such methods <strong>of</strong> competition have a direct, substantial, and<br />
reasonably <strong>for</strong>eseeable effect—<br />
(i) on commerce which is not commerce with <strong>for</strong>eign nations, or<br />
on import commerce with <strong>for</strong>eign nations; or<br />
(ii) on export commerce with <strong>for</strong>eign nations, <strong>of</strong> a person<br />
engaged in such commerce in the United States; and<br />
(B) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions <strong>of</strong> this<br />
subsection, other than this paragraph. If this subsection applies to<br />
such methods <strong>of</strong> competition only because <strong>of</strong> the operation <strong>of</strong><br />
subparagraph (A)(ii), this subsection shall apply to such conduct<br />
only <strong>for</strong> injury to export business in the United States.<br />
Commissioner Leibowitz (2008) mentions that Senator Cummins <strong>of</strong> Iowa,<br />
one <strong>of</strong> the main proponents <strong>of</strong> the FTC Act, emphasized that the reason <strong>for</strong><br />
the law was, ‘to go further and make some things <strong>of</strong>fenses’ that were not<br />
condemned by the antitrust laws. He added that ‘the only purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
Section 5 [is] to make some things punishable, to prevent some things, that<br />
cannot be punished or prevented under antitrust law.’ 78 And Leibowitz<br />
(2008) adds that Congress could have simply given the Commission the<br />
ability to en<strong>for</strong>ce the Sherman Act. But it didn’t. Instead, the plain text <strong>of</strong><br />
the statute makes it clear that Congress intended to create an agency with<br />
authority that extended well beyond the limits <strong>of</strong> the antitrust laws.<br />
<strong>The</strong> US courts in cases such as Keppel Brothers, 79 FTC v Brown Shoe<br />
Company 80 and FTC v Motion Picture Advertising Service Company, 81<br />
have affirmed the ability <strong>of</strong> the FTC to apply the FTC Act.<br />
In FTC v Sperry & Hutchinson, Justice White speaking <strong>for</strong> a unanimous<br />
view <strong>of</strong> the court posed and answered two questions:<br />
<strong>The</strong> question [<strong>of</strong> the reach <strong>of</strong> Section 5] is a double one: first, does<br />
Section 5 empower the Commission to define and proscribe an unfair<br />
competitive practice, even though the practice does not infringe either<br />
the letter or the spirit <strong>of</strong> the antitrust laws. Second, does Section 5<br />
empower the Commission to proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive in<br />
their effect upon consumers regardless <strong>of</strong> their nature or quality as<br />
competition? We think the statute, its legislative history and prior cases<br />
compel an affirmative answer to both questions.<br />
78 J Leibowitz, ‘Tales from the Crypt’, FTC Workshop on Section 5, 17 October 2008,<br />
www.ftc.gov.<br />
79 FTC v RF Keppel & Bros Inc 291 US 304, 310 (1934).<br />
80 FTC v Brown Shoe Co, 384 US 316, 321 (1966).<br />
81 Federal Trade Commission v Motion Picture Advertising Service Co 344 US 392 (1953).