Empowering citizens Engaging governments Rebuilding communities

Even with the insecurity and growing
threats, significant reductions or
elimination of operations in neighborhoods
and districts were rare, and IRD
remained committed to the project
People had learned to trust us
In 2006, the final year of ICAP’s initial program and the
beginning of CSP, staff turnover exceeded 25 percent.
The costs of recruiting, hiring, and training new workers,
in addition to operating without a full staff, were high.
During one two-month period, ICAP lost six of its seven
monitoring and evaluation officers as well as its top
three finance officers. Many staff members were called
upon to help launch CSP, but the insecurity drove many
others away. When CSP became operational, staff turnover
and emotional distress became even larger issues.
For one reason, CSP was nationwide, not just Baghdad,
which, despite the insecurity, was still safer than many
of the country’s other cities and provinces.
IRD management continued to work to minimize risk by
adjusting protocol and activities, and, despite protests
from staff in some instances, canceling projects
or ceasing operations in certain areas. When IRD
stopped working in the Makasib region of the Rashid
district after the staff kidnappings, more than a dozen
home reconstruction projects had been completed and
staff had to abandon a good working relationship with
community members because one or two community
members were conspiring with insurgents against IRD.
Even with the insecurity and growing threats, significant
reductions or elimination of operations in neighborhoods
and districts were rare, and IRD remained
committed to the project. “When I talk about that
time, I compare IRD to the UN or Red Cross,” said
Vigeen Dola, an Iraqi national who joined IRD as a
monitoring and evaluation manager after CSP started
up. Before that, he worked for the Red Cross while his
wife was working with the UN. Both were stationed
in Iraq. On August 19, 2003, Dola’s wife was at work
when a suicide bomber drove a cement mixer into the
side of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing 23,
wounding more than 100, and collapsing three floors
of the facility. 7 His wife was only wounded.
Following the attack, the UN withdrew most of its
Baghdad staff. After another attack in October left
12 more workers dead, the UN pulled out of Baghdad
completely. “The UN dropped everything and left,” Dola
said. “They had no obvious activities in the conflictzone
areas. They had activities in the peaceful areas,
in the north. But people in these conflict zones didn’t
even have drinking water; they didn’t have electricity.
Two months later, the Red Cross was bombed, and
they did the same thing; they pulled out. I was there,
working with them. I was not only confused, but angry.”
Iqbal al-Juboori, who had not yet joined IRD’s staff
and was working for the UN, was among the 50 or so
UN employees who remained in Baghdad after the
first attack. All UN operations had been suspended,
and she had to work from home, conducting business
through email correspondence. Al-Juboori said she
understood why the UN had to pull out: “It was not
a light decision for them to withdraw from Baghdad.
A lot of people had died.” However, like Dola, she
said the UN needed to at least maintain some kind
of public presence in Baghdad to send a message to
the Iraqi people “as well as to those who intended
to do them harm.” IRD, due in some combination to
its size, flexibility, and organizational commitment,
stuck around, even if it had to adjust operations.
To local Iraqis and other aid professionals, such as
Dola and al-Juboori, this commitment helped set IRD
apart in the eyes of citizens who might be naturally
disinclined to trust outsiders. “I joined IRD in 2005,
and I’ve seen some really bad days,” al-Juboori said.
“But whenever we encountered tragedy or trouble, IRD
would become more fixed and determined, no matter
what the obstacles or the challenges were. And there
were great, great challenges. But people had learned
to trust us.”
IRD’s close working relationship with the community
continued throughout the evolution of ICAP, which
was extended and which not only ran concurrently
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Building community trust
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