Empowering citizens Engaging governments Rebuilding communities

“[Colonel John Charlton] was the first
person who bought into what CSP was
intended to do. And that has to be stressed,
that the military must buy into it”
—Travis Gartner
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A complete stabilization package
would set up a smaller area of operations with a joint
security station. The area could be as small as five
city blocks, its total coverage often dictated by the
military presence needed to clear and hold it. “The
military’s idea was that you’d take over an abandoned
house or compound, turn it into your safe house,
secure it, and then start doing missions,” Wilson said.
“But we also had to build relationships with the local
leaders. We prioritized different quick-reaction projects,
stabilization, COIN-type spending. We did a lot of
that in the early days, like the trash cleanup. But you
know, right after fighting, we didn’t have the capacity
to do it on the right level, or with a local face. We filled
the gap until a better option came along. That’s when
CSP came into the mix.”
By November 2006, the Marines had seized a multistory,
dilapidated building at a key vantage point in
Ramadi. Dubbed the 17th Street Security Station, the
building became a critical outpost for US and Iraqi security
forces. With an operational security base established
for the military to hold the surrounding area,
the exact window of opportunity CSP was designed for
opened up. The CSP team and local Iraqi leaders came
together to implement a joint revitalization project to
clean streets, reconstruct buildings, and repair sewage
and electrical lines. The $2.1 million infrastructure
project filled holes in the road and repaved sidewalks. It
created hundreds of local construction jobs. While that
was ongoing, IRD moved quickly to award more than 60
business grants to local entrepreneurs to encourage
investment in the rebuilt market and create longer term
employment. “CSP was looked at by the military as a
great partner,” Wilson said, “because they were willing
to take risks and make things happen. If they had
slowed down and said, ‘Hey we can’t do this because of
X, Y, and Z,’ I don’t think you would’ve seen the drastic
turnaround you saw in Ramadi.”
Colonel John Charlton, commander of the 1st Brigade
of the 3rd Infantry Division, headquartered in Ramadi,
was a vocal advocate for COIN-style community stabilization.
In the 2008 Washington Post examination
of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program
(CERP) funds and revenue for reconstruction, Charlton
reiterated the need “to win [Iraqi] trust” and the
importance of investing in communities in tandem with
securing the communities. “He was the first person
who bought into what CSP was intended to do,”
Gartner said. “And that has to be stressed, that the
military must buy into it.”
IRD’s strong local ties in Baghdad, and the organization’s
adeptness at establishing community rapport,
clearly played in CSP’s favor. “The IRD network in
Baghdad and in the other provinces, especially in
the very critical years of 2006 and 2007, was a
difference-maker,” said Alaa Ismael, who oversaw
CSP’s infrastructure and essential activities. “In
some of the districts we were working in, in which so
many violent incidents happened, sometimes even
the military found it very hard to work there. . . .
Through our local networks, we were able to move
into very dangerous communities. We were able to
face those challenges because our staff was there
on the ground.”
The heart of the insurgency was in Al-Anbar, and
employing many people right away was the only option,
Gartner said, to hold gains as they were made in
places like Ramadi. “The military is about to clear, and
we’ve got resources, and they understand that we’re
going to work with the municipalities and that we’re
going to employ Iraqis,” he said. “So they buy into
this, because they know it has to happen, and then
they don’t have to do it. Colonel Charlton kept asking,
‘Where are your expats?’ Well there were no expats.
There was me and $60 million in CSP funds. And I
kept stressing to him point number one: that I would
work with the Iraqis, and that we were gonna employ
a lot of people, local people.” According to Wilson, the
military “loved what CSP and Gartner were doing. They
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