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Empowering citizens Engaging governments Rebuilding communities

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“The ultimate goal was to engage people for two or three<br />

years, but in many cases, we made a successful transition to<br />

keep activities going on. And that was evident across all the<br />

program components. CSP created jobs. CSP engaged youth.<br />

But at the local level, it really achieved something special.”<br />

— Barzan Ismaeel<br />

CSP was originally known as the “Focused Stabilization<br />

in Strategic Cities” program, which was descriptive<br />

of the COIN philosophy of quick-impact relief and<br />

reconstruction with short, targeted missions. Unlike<br />

traditional development programs, CSP was fluid,<br />

scaling up or down in response to evolving priorities<br />

in the most insecure areas of key cities like Basra,<br />

Kirkuk, and Mosul. But as CSP evolved from concept<br />

to implementation, “focused stabilization” began to<br />

mean more than geography. IRD’s broader mission<br />

of trying to establish a wholly integrated stabilization<br />

program with discernible short- and long-term benefits<br />

led to a system of “checks and balances.” Individual<br />

program components were afforded flexibility to meet<br />

their goals, but they also maintained a focus on adherence<br />

to the complete package model. As CSP rapidly<br />

scaled up, this tightly integrated approach proved<br />

important.<br />

The initial cooperative agreement was for $265 million<br />

and six months of activities in Baghdad. Expansion<br />

was expected, but funding increased rapidly in<br />

response to Department of Defense and USAID needs<br />

to add cities to the program. These changes eventually<br />

pushed the total obligation to $644 million. At<br />

the height of the program, CSP had 1,800 staff and<br />

was spending an average of $21 million a month.<br />

Program operations easily could have spiraled out of<br />

control, but the overall design didn’t allow it. “When<br />

we started expanding to other cities, the initial processes<br />

and procedures were taken to those cities,”<br />

Michele Lemmon said. “But they had to be adapted,<br />

because each city had its own circumstances, different<br />

<strong>communities</strong>, and a different acceptance of the<br />

program. Remember, we were doing what the Iraqis<br />

wanted to do. All the programs were designed by the<br />

Iraqi staff, with a helping hand from us. Now, consider<br />

going from one city, Baghdad, to 15 cities in a matter<br />

of months. That’s how large we became. Really, the<br />

success we had in those circumstances is owed to the<br />

strong program design. It kept CSP focused almost by<br />

default.”<br />

Community infrastructure and essential<br />

services: CSP’s entry point<br />

CSP categorized employment as either short term<br />

(fewer than three months) or long term (more than<br />

three months). By traditional labor standards in a<br />

modernized country’s economy, three months would<br />

hardly seem long term. In an environment like Iraq,<br />

however, that measure helped differentiate between<br />

jobs created by traditional development tools such as<br />

35

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