Empowering citizens Engaging governments Rebuilding communities

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“ There were no similar programs. CSP was historic from the first day. The scale, the ability, the necessity to work with the military in a kinetic environment” —Dar Warmke 2 A complete stabilization package partner with experience doing this kind of work and a host of other criteria as well, including a willingness to work with the military, rapid-start capability, and flexibility to manage a project that was expected to grow significantly over its life. On May 29, 2006, it chose IRD. USAID looked specifically at two key IRD credentials— its successful operation of ICAP in Baghdad, where CSP would be headquartered and where IRD already had established relationships with local councils and community leaders; and IRD’s work in Serbia and Montenegro under the CRDA program. However, Serbia and Montenegro were not the same as Iraq. The mission was not remotely on the same scale, and it was not the same model. IRD’s work in the Balkans took place in a postwar setting. Iraq, by contrast, was in full insurrection, and IRD was to work alongside the US military to provide relief and to help mitigate the conflict itself. “There were no similar programs,” said Dar Warmke, who ran CSP operations for IRD in Basra and, later, Mosul. “CSP was historic from the first day. The scale, the ability, the necessity to work with the military in a kinetic environment. . . . I worked through the whole Bosnian war, with another organization, but we were not trying to do stability work at the same time. There was no clear and hold.” CSP was unprecedented in its design, and the result was a stabilization program widely credited by military and diplomatic leaders for meeting its primary goals— creating jobs and helping make some of Iraq’s most devastated communities safer. It also stretched IRD’s capacity, wound down in controversy, and left many of the organization’s staff simultaneously praising it for its successes and criticizing it for its missteps. Ultimately, it offered a blueprint for civilian participation in COIN operations, and a case study of the complexities inherent in assisting the military and militarizing assistance. Breaking down CSP’s design As CSP was being designed, a consensus emerged that high unemployment contributed to citizens’ negative perception of local and national government capacity. CSP focused primarily on males ages 17–35 years because that group made up the highest percentage of the unemployed, marginalized, and disaffected and because they were most vulnerable to joining insurgent groups. By reaching the most-at-risk members of the population, CSP reasoned, violence would be mitigated. “At the end of the day,” said Michele Lemmon, an IRD senior program officer, “it was all about one thing: jobs, jobs, jobs. It wasn’t to do charity work, and it wasn’t to give handouts. It was to help people get back to what they were doing before.” Jessica Cho, an IRD field program coordinator, conducted a series of postprogram interviews with CSP beneficiaries and local staff. Cho said one of the clearest takeaways was a basic sense of appreciation for the “number of jobs that were created in some of these circumstances.” In most cities, Cho said, CSP was “truly successful in combining nonskill public works projects with rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, then using those successes to promote businesses development and vocational training. Together, it all led to longer term jobs and to some sense of stability.” CSP’s four core programmatic components—infrastructure and services, vocational training, business development, and youth engagement—closely resembled traditional development strategy. Yet the underlying goal in three of the four areas was that employment generation intended to: • Create short-term (fewer than 90 days) jobs through community infrastructure and essential services projects,such as rehabilitation of schools, streets, health clinics, public gardens, soccer fields, 26
“ At the end of the day, it was all about one thing: jobs, jobs, jobs. It was to help people get back to what they were doing before” —Michele Lemmon sewage and drainage canals, and water treatment plants for safe drinking water. These projects were the fastest to get off the ground and showed the quickest results, and they included the trash cleanup campaigns that were a hallmark of the early part of the program. Internally, this component was known as CIES. • Generate long-term (more than three months) jobs by establishing vocational training and employment service centers,particularly for young and unemployed Iraqi males. Other groups considered high risk for recruitment into insurgency, such as widowed women, were also targeted. Training was given for construction and nonconstruction trades, as well as in courses such as sewing and cosmetology intended to bring in women. Apprenticeships and follow-up employment assistance services were also offered. • Encourage business development and local ownership through management training courses and grants to new or current businesses in agriculture, industry, manufacturing, and trade services. These business development grants, which ranged from $500 to $100,000 and were in the form of equipment and materials, were based on the potential for job creation, higher incomes, positive impact on the community, and the grantee’s own contribution. Some of the most visible examples of these grants are the hundreds of shops that were rebuilt after being destroyed or damaged in violent market attacks. • Mitigate conflict by engaging Iraqis socially and culturally.Young men (and to a lesser extent women) were the intended targets, but IRD aimed higher, hoping its activities would also contribute to bringing together citizens from different religious, ethnic, and political backgrounds. In coordination with local community leaders and civic groups, IRD sponsored community programs, such as athletic events, art programs, computer training, and healthy living courses. Successful implementation depended on the ability of IRD’s program team to work with the provincial councils, neighborhood advisory councils, and district advisory councils to establish component-specific strategies. Although the partners varied between cities, CSP consistently worked through all levels of local government leaders to identify and implement projects. The councils were formed after the Coalition Provisional Authority took over administration of the Iraqi government, and they served as a primary governing body in many localities before eventually becoming part of the provincial government. A balance between military strategy and community need Although many IRD staff recalled extreme challenges while working with council members, including personal threats and bribe requests, the councils were necessary to the implementation process, especially during the first year. “CSP didn’t select the projects,” said Awni Quandour, who left ICAP to become a transitional chief of party for CSP. “They were strictly the choice of council members.” Quandour made regular visits to city officials in Baghdad to try and overcome one of the program’s earliest challenges—the city’s deep religious divides. Projects in Sunni neighborhoods still had to get approval from the Shia council members, and vice versa. “CSP tried to be as fair as possible,” Quandour said, but in some cases “it wasn’t fair; it was politics.” Because of the pressure IRD applied on local leaders to ensure the program moved forward, Quandour said they were able to proceed without alienating Sunni or Shia neighborhoods. “IRD always talks about its focus on communitybased, or community-led, development work, and I think that’s where it made the big difference,” said 2 A complete stabilization package 27
Page 1: Empowering citizens Engaging govern
Page 4 and 5: Copyright © by International Relie
Page 6 and 7: In memory of Awni Quandour, whose r
Page 8 and 9: Overview General David Petraeus, co
Page 10 and 11: what made CSP stand out was the clo
Page 12 and 13: By the end of the program, the busi
Page 14 and 15: 1 Building community trust through
Page 16 and 17: “ The community believed in what
Page 18 and 19: Community action groups stood at th
Page 20 and 21: “ Many colleagues have told me th
Page 22 and 23: IRD’s health advisor referred Oma
Page 24 and 25: IRD placed a premium on diversity
Page 26 and 27: Whenever harm befell a community ac
Page 28 and 29: Scheduled to wind down in 2012 afte
Page 30 and 31: 2 A complete stabilization package
Page 32 and 33: As planning for CSP unfolded, the s
Page 36 and 37: the most successful projects were t
Page 38 and 39: “ You are the future of Ramadi. Y
Page 40 and 41: “[Colonel John Charlton] was the
Page 42 and 43: 3 Successes and setbacks in a count
Page 44 and 45: CSP helped create a sense of normal
Page 46 and 47: the renovation of the Mosul Social
Page 48 and 49: By combining his personal savings w
Page 50 and 51: Ninety-eight percent of grantee bus
Page 52 and 53: Dr. Noor Abdul Aziz Baqir’s grant
Page 54 and 55: all the training centers renovated
Page 56 and 57: IRD embarked on its own job placeme
Page 58 and 59: CSP’s youth activities component
Page 60: most Iraqi citizens had an overwhel
Page 63 and 64: “We had challenges, but with the
Page 65 and 66: CSP was unprecedented in scale, but
Page 67 and 68: “ Without security, there is no d
Page 69 and 70: IRD’s staffing woes could be brok
Page 71 and 72: Many key tactical lessons have alre
Page 74 and 75: Epilogue
Page 76 and 77: Acronyms ACV CAG Assistance to Civi
Page 80: This report details IRD’s impleme

Empowering citizens Engaging governments Rebuilding communities

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