Empowering citizens Engaging governments Rebuilding communities

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As planning for CSP unfolded, the security situation in Iraq worsened, including the deadly bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra in February 2006. USAID had to move quickly, and it needed an experienced implementation partner 2 A complete stabilization package a new voice in the administration, Peter D. Feaver,” a special adviser to the National Security Council and a political scientist who had studied and written extensively on civilian-military relations. The US government recognized its objectives could not be accomplished through security interventions alone. Shortly thereafter, USAID released its Iraq Transition Strategy Plan (2006–08), which outlined three objectives in support of the administration’s security-political-economic delineation. The first of these objectives called for the “stabilization of strategic cities and the improvement of local governments’ ability to provide services” through short- and long-term job creation programs and through close working association with provincial councils. “Linking stability with development will reduce incentives for violence and integrate key cities into longer term development initiatives,” the plan stated. Out of this strategy, CSP was born (box 4). From the beginning, CSP differed from most international development programs and particularly from USAID programs. The scope of work said that: “Rather than focusing on traditional long-term sustainable development, CSP is a short-term COIN program” with a concentration on “employing or engaging mass numbers of at-risk, unemployed males.” Designed to be run “in close coordination with the [US] military, provincial reconstruction teams, and with local civilian counterparts,” CSP brought into one program the US government’s most comprehensive postwar strategy plan to date, as well as the military’s emerging outlook on civ-mil partnerships for carrying out COIN strategies. In January 2007, the president announced the stabilization plan during an internationally televised address, detailing how the embedded PRTs would place development experts inside brigade combat teams, the “civilian surge” to accompany the military surge of 20,000 troops. Initially, there was a struggle within the administration as to which department or agency would take the lead in civilian-led stabilization and reconstruction. Should it be housed at the Pentagon? Implementation cells could be placed within the combatant command responsible for Iraq, but concern was expressed over how much flexibility the civilian workers would have. Should it be housed at the State Department? At the time, the department did not have any scalable programmatic capability for stabilization—the Civilian Response Corps was still a few years away. But some high-ranking State Department officials pushed for it, arguing that the department was already overseeing democracy building and programs for internally displaced persons, and that those programs could be transitioned into stabilization activities. USAID, without a Cabinet-level voice, lacked the influence of other departments, but its mission practices offered an obvious alignment with CSP’s programming requirements. Not everyone in the administration agreed, of course. But after prolonged discussion, administration officials decided to house the program at USAID. “The reconstruction activities that were put forward for USAID to implement focused on the areas where the government believed it could get the best goodwill from Iraqi citizens, the best places where we could engage Iraqis in a constructive manner so they’re not taking up arms,” explained a senior IRD official. In the context of government decisionmaking, CSP was moving forward rapidly, despite the jockeying for oversight. Momentum for focused stabilization had been building, but as early planning for CSP unfolded, the security situation in Iraq worsened. The al-Askari Mosque bombing in Samarra in February 2006 led to an estimated 1,300 deaths, ignited ethnic tensions, and plunged Iraq into a spiral of violence. USAID had to move quickly, and it needed an implementation 24
IRD oversaw CSP operations in 15 cities nationwide, reaching millions of Iraqis through employment, training, business development, and youth projects Box 4 CSP: At a glance 2 Awarded to IRD by USAID in 2006, CSP grew into a $644 million delivery mechanism for quick-impact projects, a “nonlethal, counterinsurgency program that reduces the incentives for participation in violent conflict by employing or engaging at risk youth between the ages of 17 and 35,” according to the contract’s scope of work. In short, CSP was designed to address the root cause of the insurgency through a four-pronged strategy that focused on: • Assisting the government of Iraq at all levels in fulfilling its duties, thus improving citizens’ perceptions of government efficacy and legitimacy. • Mitigating the major economic factors contributing to the insurgency. • Stimulating preconditions for economic stability. • Facilitating constructive dialogue and peaceful interactions through civic education and community-oriented activities. A complete stabilization package To implement this strategy, IRD focused on activities intended to create jobs and rebuild relationships among young Iraqis from different ethnic backgrounds. Projects were closely coordinated with the military and local PRTs. In addition, CSP staff, the vast majority native Iraqis, collaborated with local and ministry CSP operations by city Kirkuk Nov 06–Mar 09 officials as part of a larger effort Mosul/Tal Afar to legitimize the government Nov 06–Sep 09 and establish lines of trust and Beiji Feb 08–Jun 09 communication between leaders Haditha Tikrit Oct 07–Jan 09 Feb 08–Jun 09 and citizens. This community Samarra interaction played a critical role Feb 08–Jun 09 Al Qaim Nov 06–Jan 09 in building CSP. The years IRD Baquba Jul 07–Sep 09 had spent cultivating relationships at the grassroots through Baghdad Hit Oct 07–Jan 09 May 06–Jun 09 ICAP allowed it to leverage its Babil Ramadi Jan 08–Mar 09 resources and local standing Nov 06–Mar 09 into a quick start in Baghdad, Habbaniyah Oct 07–Jan 09 enabling a nationwide rollout of CSP within six months. Fallujah Nov 06–Mar 09 Basra Nov 06–Jul 09 Altogether, IRD oversaw CSP operations in 15 cities nationwide, reaching millions of Iraqis through employment, training, business development, and youth projects. Although IRD used the same program design in each of the cities, the funding and length of engagement varied widely based on a number of factors, primarily local need and level of local security. 25
Page 1: Empowering citizens Engaging govern
Page 4 and 5: Copyright © by International Relie
Page 6 and 7: In memory of Awni Quandour, whose r
Page 8 and 9: Overview General David Petraeus, co
Page 10 and 11: what made CSP stand out was the clo
Page 12 and 13: By the end of the program, the busi
Page 14 and 15: 1 Building community trust through
Page 16 and 17: “ The community believed in what
Page 18 and 19: Community action groups stood at th
Page 20 and 21: “ Many colleagues have told me th
Page 22 and 23: IRD’s health advisor referred Oma
Page 24 and 25: IRD placed a premium on diversity
Page 26 and 27: Whenever harm befell a community ac
Page 28 and 29: Scheduled to wind down in 2012 afte
Page 30 and 31: 2 A complete stabilization package
Page 34 and 35: “ There were no similar programs.
Page 36 and 37: the most successful projects were t
Page 38 and 39: “ You are the future of Ramadi. Y
Page 40 and 41: “[Colonel John Charlton] was the
Page 42 and 43: 3 Successes and setbacks in a count
Page 44 and 45: CSP helped create a sense of normal
Page 46 and 47: the renovation of the Mosul Social
Page 48 and 49: By combining his personal savings w
Page 50 and 51: Ninety-eight percent of grantee bus
Page 52 and 53: Dr. Noor Abdul Aziz Baqir’s grant
Page 54 and 55: all the training centers renovated
Page 56 and 57: IRD embarked on its own job placeme
Page 58 and 59: CSP’s youth activities component
Page 60: most Iraqi citizens had an overwhel
Page 63 and 64: “We had challenges, but with the
Page 65 and 66: CSP was unprecedented in scale, but
Page 67 and 68: “ Without security, there is no d
Page 69 and 70: IRD’s staffing woes could be brok
Page 71 and 72: Many key tactical lessons have alre
Page 74 and 75: Epilogue
Page 76 and 77: Acronyms ACV CAG Assistance to Civi
Page 80: This report details IRD’s impleme

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