Empowering citizens Engaging governments Rebuilding communities

“
A cash-for-work jobs program gives
people something productive to do
other than plant IEDs, and it also gives
some sense of hope for the future”
—James Kunder
and essential services work, which required unskilled
labor on quick-impact projects such as trash collection
and rubble removal. CSP supported scores of
these quick-impact projects during the program’s
first year. By the middle of the second year, however,
IRD began to transfer oversight of those projects
back to municipal governments. If local governments
were willing to support the continuation of some of
these services, IRD would continue its involvement
in cleanup activities on a limited basis. But the lack
of concern or unwillingness of many municipalities to
devote resources to basic services like timely trash
removal beyond IRD’s work worsened public opinion
in many cities. Still, the short lead time needed to
initiate service projects allowed cleanup and rubble
removal to serve as a kind of spearhead for CSP as it
expanded. “The trash pickup campaigns were critical
for establishing CSP, not just because they were cleaning
the streets but because they were labor-intensive
projects that covered entire neighborhoods,” said Alaa
Ismael, the head of program management for CIES
activities. “I have no doubt the cleanup activities were
needed for the stabilization program to work in Iraq.”
In Ramadi, as previously noted, IRD launched a
large-scale cleanup program directly on the heels of
military action to remove insurgents. The goal was
not only to provide immediate employment but also
to restore frayed relations between local community
leaders, tribal leaders, and the citizenry. The cleaning
campaign was implemented through a local contractor
responsible for providing laborers with equipment,
organizing debris removal, and paying daily wages. For
the Ramadi cleaning campaign, laborers earned $10 a
day, which was the standard payment for CSP cleaning
campaigns.
Throughout Iraq, approximately 1,600 CIES projects
generated more than 525,000 person-months of
short-term employment—20 percent above the target.
Given the high value placed on providing some kind
of job to as many Iraqi men as possible, as fast as
possible, “person-months employment” was a critical
indicator of immediate impact. By this calculation,
CSP exceeded its target in every year of operation. In
addition, IRD found a great deal of qualitative evidence
from interviews with local beneficiaries, media
coverage, staff assessments, and final reports that
the increase in short-term employment helped reduce
violent incidents in some of the most unstable areas,
such as Howija in Kirkuk.
“The early projects had a rapid, highly visible, and
tangible impact greatly appreciated by the local
government,” said Alice Willard, formerly a senior
monitoring and evaluation officer with IRD. “The same
programs helped validate CSP to local authorities and
opened the door to more diversified collaboration in
a short amount of time.” That collaboration helped
lead to widespread infrastructure rehabilitation, which,
in contrast to essential service projects, relied on
semiskilled and skilled laborers to help with rebuilding
and construction projects relevant to local citizens,
such as school restoration, hospital and health clinic
refurbishment, irrigation canal restoration for agribusiness,
and the rebuilding or enhancing of electricity,
sewage, and water delivery services. These projects
were undertaken with joint input from local community
leaders, US military personnel, and PRTs. As IRD transitioned
cleanup campaigns to local municipalities in
the program’s second year, the focus of CIES component
work shifted primarily to infrastructure projects.
In many instances, a single project encompassed both
the cleanup and rehabilitation phases of CIES. One
example is the Mosul Social Club for Families. Before
the war, the club was a popular gathering spot for
dining, entertainment, and community celebrations—
with on average more than 340 events a year. But as
insurgent violence swallowed up Mosul, public socialization
became too risky for most, and the number of club
events plummeted to a few dozen. Before long, a lack of
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Successes and setbacks
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