ISSUE 91 : Nov/Dec - 1991 - Australian Defence Force Journal

14 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 91 NOVEMBER DECEMBER 1991
instinctive appeals towards self survival. Moran
identifies 'character' as being one such commodity.
He argues along traditional lines, that the development
of character (the daily choice between right
and wrong) forms the foundation of courage. This
may in fact be so, and history provides many
examples of where strength of character has supplanted
any recourse towards self-centredness.
Captain Oates and Lieutenant Colonel 'H' Jones are
two such illustrations. However, too literal an
interpretation of Moran's views might suggest that
only those of moral rectitude are capable of fortitude
in war. Others maintain that courage is not the sole
preserve of men of principle. Instead, it is suggested
that with the benefit of high morale, most men are
capable of some display of courage.
The pre-requisites for high morale will be as
numerous and varied as the soldiers that populate
the battlefield. Physical factors such as food, rest
and sleep will clearly have an influence. Similarly,
mental factors will be of significance. Bidwell writes
that 'man has a soul as well as a cerebral cortex' 7 and
accordingly, a sense of purpose will be central to his
performance in battle. Patriotism, religion and
cultural norms might provide the necessary support
in some, as shown by the Samurais' adherence to the
precepts of 'bushido'. Cromwell applauded the
soldier 'who knew what he was fighting for and
loved what he knew'. s Equally, it might come from a
deep hatred of the enemy; a trait apparent in Soviet
attitudes during WWII. However, for the majority,
where the futility of war presents a powerful image,
motivation is likely to come from a 'willingness to
fight for friends, to stay alive and for an end to the
conflict'. As S.L.A. Marshall so perceptively writes:
'I hold to be one of the simplest truths of war, that
the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep
going with his weapon is the near presence or
presumed presence of a comrade'.'
This state of high morale might be attributed to
other, more tangible factors such as sound leadership,
training, esprit de corps and discipline. Even
the lure of financial reward, drugs and alcohol can
exert some temporary influence. The benefits and
power of high morale are to be seen in the
Worcester's' performance at Gheluvelt in October
1914 and Chamberlain's men at Gettysburg in 1863.
However, we should also recognise the finite
nature of human courage. This is germane to our
understanding of the influence of the soldier's state
of mind on the outcome of battle. We learn from
Moran that there is a limit to any man's courage in
war. He draws a parallel between human courage
and a bank account; continually drawing on the
account can eventually lead to it being overdrawn.
F.M. Lord Slim agrees, insisting that trained men
should not draw too heavily on their stock of
courage; 10 the consequences are to be seen in the
British defeat by Rommel at Ga/ala in 1942.
Courage will therefore vary according to time and
circumstances. As Sun Tzu states, 'Courage or
cowardice depends on circumstances'" and accordingly
the state of mind of the trained soldier will be a
key variable in the equation of human conflict.
Paradoxically, it can be a source of strength and
weakness. As to its overall significance, Moran
provides us with a good indication when he writes 'a
man's will to fight is the ultimate arbiter of war' 12 , or
as Xenophon proclaimed: "whichever army goes
into battle stronger in soul, their enemies gradually
cannot withstand them"."
A Mind to Lead
Liddell Hart states that it is in the 'mind of the
commander that the issue of battle is really
decided'. 14 In the past, hardness of character, akin to
Zhukov and Model, might have been the only asset
required in a commander. This strength of character,
or 'ahimsa' ls might refer to a determination to drive
others to battle (Caesar), in not showing despair
(Foch) or in a decisiveness even in times of adversity
(Napoleon). Yet as Moran points out, the secret to
success in war is success. Therefore with the complexity
of modern warfare, are we now correct in
assuming that the mind of the commander is
capable of delivering military success? Concerns
over the intellectual capacity of the military mind
can cast doubts.
Intellect is defined as the capacity for understanding,
thinking and reasoning. In the military context,
this might refer to an understanding of the profession
of arms, a creative originality or mental agility and
speed of mind. It is not difficult to appreciate the
value of such a gift in a commander. Rommel's
clarity of mind, Guderian's concepts of armoured
warfare and the principles of Auftragstacktik are
expressions of this intellectual dimension in human
conflict. In the words of Clausewitz; 'the maximum
use of force is not incompatible with the maximum
use of intellect.' 16 However, according to critics such
as Bidwell, the military have neither the inclination
nor ability to fully utilise the potential of the
intellectual mind.
It is suggested that the military fight shy of an
intellectual approach to warfare; 'war is still a game;