ISSUE 91 : Nov/Dec - 1991 - Australian Defence Force Journal

34 AUSTRALIAN DEFFNCF FORCE .IOURNA1 NO. 91 NOVEMBFR DECFMBFR 1991
A Mitsubishi G3M2 Nell Bomber.
battleship, battle cruiser and three destroyers to
ascertain the identity of such an insignificant force
(which his embarked Walrus seaplane could have
easily conducted) was ludicrous. Phillips loitered off
Kuantan continuing to show no concern for an air
attack. At 1100, 10 December, the inevitable attack
by Japanese Nell and Betty bomber torpedo aircraft
began. Repulse sank at 1233 and Prince of Wales
went down at 1320.
No 453 Squadron
Meanwhile, eleven aircraft of No 453 Squadron
were on alert to provide air cover for the fleet, when
in range, on return to Singapore. The first and only
indication that the movement of the fleet was not in
accordance with the plan transmitted from HMS
Tenedos was an emergency report at 1204 from
Captain Tennant (Repulse) that the fleet was under
attack. Phillips did not signal for assistance until
virtually sinking. The 453 Squadron Brewster
Buffalos departed RAF Sembawang at 1215 and
arrived on the scene as the last of the Japanese
attackers was departing.
The loss of Prime of Wales and Repulse dealt the
Allied forces an enormous moral and physical
defeat while contributing to Japan's record of
stunning air power victories. This calamity was
directly attributable to Admiral Phillips'decision to
maintain radio silence and not advise authorities in
Singapore of his change in plans nor signal for
fighter protection as soon as he knew air attack was
imminent off Kuantan. His cavalier attitude to air
power generally and the capability of the Japanese
Navy Air Force specifically also contributed to his
"Waterloo". 453 Squadron, tasked with providing
air cover to the Fleet when in range of Singapore,
was never afforded the opportunity to assist. Even
though the performance of the Buffalo was indeed
modest, the Japanese bombers had no fighter
protection and were vulnerable. If 453 Squadron
had been alerted to the perilous predicament confronting
the fleet, they may very well have generated
enough havoc to save Phillips and his fleet. The
destruction of these two capital ships marked the
end of the era of sea power epitomised by Nelson
and the teachings of Mahan. 6