ISSUE 91 : Nov/Dec - 1991 - Australian Defence Force Journal

WHAT A HELL OF A MINE 33
Availability of Air Support
Manoeuvre in the Gulf of Siam
Phillips requested from Air Vice Marshal Pulford.
Air Officer Commanding Far East Command air
reconnaissance 100 miles ahead of the fleet during
daylight hours on 9 December, air reconnaissance
up to 10 miles off the coast between Kota Bharu and
Singora, commencing at dawn on 10 December and
lighter cover over the fleet from dawn on 10
December. Pulford advised Phillips that fighter
cover would most likely be impossible since the
northern airfields were untenable due to Japanese
action and the range of the Buffalo too limited to
operate from southern bases. Reconnaissance would
be provided on the 9 December but was most
unlikely on the 10 December. As the fleet passed
Chang) Signal station, Rear Admiral Palliser
(Phillips'Chief of Staff who remained in Singapore)
confirmed that "fighter protection was impossible".
Phillips shrugged his shoulders and said, "Well, we
must get on without it" and did not modify his plans
to "surprise and sink enemy transports and warships
before air attack could develop" 5
During the evening of the 9 December, despite
observing at least three Japanese reconnaissance
aircraft. Phillips sailed further into the Gulf of Siam.
However, after a flare was dropped by an enemy
aircraft in the vicinity of the fleet at about 2000 hrs.
Phillips decided that surprise, essential to the success
of his plan, had been lost and he abandoned the
operation. The fleet retired SSE towards the
Anambas Islands. HMS Tenedos, due to low fuel
state, had earlier been detached to return independently
with the instruction to transmit a
message, on behalf of Phillips, at 0800 on 10
December (when well clear and unlikely to compromise
the position of the fleet) indicating that the
fleet would be off the Anambas on return to
Singapore near earlier than 0600, 11 December.
This message was received in Singapore.
A Fatal Diversion
Deployment of Force 'Z'
At 2355. 9 December, a signal was received from
Brooke-Popham's office that advised "Enemy
reported landing Kuantan . . .". Kuantan. approximately
120 miles SS W of Force Z and not far off the
return track to Singapore, was considered a key
military position which every effort must be made to
defend, for, ensconced there, the Japanese would
command the eastern terminus of the only viable
east-west road on the peninsula. Controlling this
road, the enemy could isolate all British ground
forces to the north. Also, from Kuantan airfield, one
of the best in eastern Malaya, they would have an
excellent base within short range of Singapore.
Phillips decided that he could achieve surprise at
Kuantan and that the risk was justifiable. At 0052,
10 December he altered course SW for Kuantan and
advised the fleet that he was going to attack this new
landing force. Radio silence was maintained and
Singapore was not aware of his revised plan.
As the ships approached the coast at dawn on 10
December an enemy reconnaissance aircraft was
observed. From that time on at least. Phillips could
be certain that the Japanese knew his fleet's position
and that some form of air attack was probable. Yet
he remained in the area. At 0930, after sighting
nothing of the expected invasion force, Phillips
headed NNE to investigate a small ship and three
barges that had been spotted earlier. Deploying a