ISSUE 91 : Nov/Dec - 1991 - Australian Defence Force Journal

18 M S| KM IAN 1)111 AC 1 KiR( 1 l()l RN M NO Dl NOW MB1 R DFC I MBI R I'NI
reinforce personal prejudices and longings, such as a
need to belong, a need to identify an enemy and a
desire to see issues in a simple light. The widespread
use of stereotypes, lying, repetition, biassed selection
of material and substitution of names are commonplace
in the art of psychological warfare. We might
therefore wonder whether such practices serve to
emasculate the mind of the soldier as a weapon of
war.
However, most experts remain unconvinced of
the efficacy of psychological attack. According to
J.A.C. Brown, propaganda can often change attitudes
but rarely change behaviour; and of brainwashing
he concludes 'it is largely eyewash'." Others
point to the various methods of countering psychological
warfare. Group loyalty is cited as one such
example; its effectiveness demonstrated in the
resilience of German troops in WW1. Moreover,
there are instances whereby attempts to influence
the minds of soldiers have brought unpredictable
and even disastrous consequences. For instance,
attempts to discredit the image of the Japanese
soldier in WWII only served to reinforce fears in
allied troops.
The psychological element is also much in evidence
in Fuller's concept of the 'indirect approach'.
Here it is believed the 'real target in war should be
the mind of the commander' 14 and the Principle of
Surprise is used to create doubt and confusion in the
minds of leaders. T.E. Lawrence was a great advocate
of psychological strategy and believed it could lead
to a dislocation and eventual break-up in an enemy.
The success of the Germans in France in 1940 and
the defeat of the British Indian Army in Malaya in
1940 are heralded as examples of the effectiveness of
this strategy. But the lack of success of the Chindits
in Burma in 1944 is indicative of its obvious
limitations.
Therefore, we might conclude that psychological
warfare in its various forms is at best of limited
benefit. However, the mere fact that the soldier is in
some way vulnerable to such a form of attack is to
suggest that on the battlefield, his mind is anything
but invincible.
Mind and Technology
Technology is already a feature of modern conflict.
Harnessing this technology has afforded the soldier
greater influence, lethality and efficiency over the
conduct of warfare. In addition, new developments
such as artificial intelligence and particle beam
theory are set to further increase the soldier's
fighting capacity. This apparent inexorable march
of science begs the question: can and will military
technology eventually replace man as the primary
determinant in war? Has the passage of time
superceded the teachings of Mao Tse Tung who 'put
men above machines' and is the Orwellian era of the
'Great God Computer'now upon us? If so, we might
reasonably acclaim technology as being the soldier's
most important weapon.
However, the view that 'tools and weapons . . .
form 999c of victory'as initially espoused by Fuller,
is not widely held. 15 In the eyes of many, the human
spirit is still the ultimate arbiter in war. Griffiths
argues that the outcome of battle is decided in close
combat, not by technology, and supports S.L.A.
Marshall's view that 'push-button war is fundamentally
a fallacy'. 16 The German Sturmstruppen of
WWII are a good example of the pre-eminence of the
human spirit, even in modern warfare.
Nor does Bellamy's portrayal of a future automated
battlefield imply the eventual triumph of
technology over the mind of the soldier." De Bono
may be correct in predicting a future 'thinking'
computer and Dinter may be justified in saying
'technology will increasingly determine the way of
thinking'; nevertheless, war is essentially a human
experience, with the soldier as its main orchestrator.
Technology is just one of the many instruments
within the orchestra. Or, as Hudson says, 'man wins
battles with the aid of technology; the commander
giving direction to the one and purpose to the
other'."* It is therefore axiomatic that the mind of the
soldier will always be the master and not the servant
of military technology; the soldier providing militarytechnology
with its overall sense of legitimacy.
A Mind to the Future
The character of human conflict is in a state of
perpetual change. According to some analysts, the
image of future conflict is to be seen in a more
hostile, lonely and impersonal battlefield. Van
Crefeld paints a vivid picture when he writes:
'here and there a target appearing, being engaged
by an anti-tank weapon perhaps, or a laser
designator, and then a flash far off and an
explosion as an invisible artillery shell plummets
precisely into its target. rw
Some suggest that war will be likened to a rapier:
fought by small, specialised forces in a state of high
tempo. 4 " Others envisage a future war of attrition