ISSUE 91 : Nov/Dec - 1991 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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2S AUSTRALIAN DFFENCF FORCE JOURNAL NO. 91 NOVEMBER DECEMBER 1991
Functional Analysis: POL Refinery
i PUMPING
| STATION
PUMPING
STATION
| FRACTIONATING
L; TOWERS
OPERATIONS
CENTRE
| POWER
*~*L^
PUMPING
STATION '
i PORT
1 FACILITIES' OIL TANKER
the precision guided munitions in destroying the oil
lines and pumping stations.
Physical Vulnerability Analysis
Having determined the key elements of the target
system, their vulnerability to damage mechanisms
such as blast, fragmentation, incendiary and cratering
devices must then be assessed. This is achieved
by analysing target element dimensions, construction
materials, the equipment or personnel operating
inside and the enemy's damage repair capability. A
process of elimination reduces the list of target
elements to only those that are vital and which can
be attacked with a high probability of success using
the weapon systems available.
In the refinery example, intelligence reports might
suggest that the enemy has a very capable damage
control system for the POL storage tanks and the
network of pumping stations may be too widespread
and the oil too easily re-routed to be effectively
disabled in a single raid. Consequently, a target
analyst might recommend the destruction of the
main electrical power supply and, or the factionating
towers as an effective way to halt production at the
refinery for the required six month period.
Unitary targets can be similarly analysed to
identify elements that can be attacked to achieve
specific types of kills depending on the effort that
can be afforded. Total destruction in itself is rarely
the aim of any air operation and indiscriminate
damage does not necessarily constitute an advantage.
Attacking only the tread links of an enemy tank is
easier than destroying it outright and this may
immobilise it long enough for the friendly forces to
continue with the next tactical phase; it is easier to
reduce a warship to non-combatant status by
attacking the weapon systems onboard instead of
expending the large effort required to sink it; a single
Wild-Weasal aircraft attacking the fire-control radar
may be just as effective against a SAM threat as a
wing of B-52 bombers carpet bombing the entire air
defence system.
Sources of Pre-attack Information
Information for pre-attack analysis comes from a
wide variety of sources limited only by the resourcefulness
of those looking for it. For instance, Saddam
Hussein's fortified underground command bunkers
and hardened aircraft shelters were analysed during
information supplied b\ the I'uropean consultants
responsible for their construction. In our example,
oil refinery technology can be assumed to be similar
all over the world such that friendly oil company
consultants could be asked for information about oil