YEARBOOK 2009 / I - AIPPI

ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE
POUR LA PROTECTION
DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE PROTECTION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INTERNATIONALE VEREINIGUNG
FÜR DEN SCHUTZ DES
GEISTIGEN EIGENTUMS
YEARBOOK 2009 / I
MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Buenos Aires 2009 (OCTOBER 11-14)
Q194: The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property
Rights on their Exploitation
Q209: Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement,
other Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
WORKING GUIDELINES, GROUP REPORTS,
SUMMARY REPORTS, RESOLUTIONS
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The reports and the summaries from the National and Regional Groups are normally reproduced
without alteration in content, style and spelling.
Dans le cas normal, les rapports et les résumés des Groupes nationaux et régionaux sont publiés
sans corrections du contenu, du style et de l’orthographie.
Die Berichte und Zusammenfassungen der Landes- und Regionalgruppen werden im Normalfall
ohne Korrekturen von Inhalt, Stil und Orthographie wiedergegeben.
AIPPI General Secretariat
© AIPPI, Zurich 2011
Edited in the name of AIPPI by the AIPPI General Secretariat, Zurich (Switzerland)
Price CHF 30.–; for AIPPI members free of charge
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MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Buenos Aires, 11 – 14 October 2009
THE QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA
QUESTION Q194, Q209
WORKING GUIDELINES
GROUP REPORTS
SUMMARY REPORTS
RESOLUTIONS
RÉUNION DU COMITÉ EXÉCUTIF
Buenos Aires, 11 – 14 Octobre 2009
LES QUESTIONS A L’ORDRE DU JOUR
QUESTION Q194, Q209
ORIENTATIONS DE TRAVAIL
RAPPORTS DES GROUPES
RAPPORTS DE SYNTHESE
RESOLUTIONS
ZUSAMMENKUNFT DES GESCHÄFTSFÜHRENDEN AUSSCHUSSES
Buenos Aires, 11. – 14. Oktober 2009
DIE FRAGEN DER TAGESORDNUNG
FRAGE Q194, Q209
ARBEITSRICHTLINIEN
BERICHTE DER LANDESGRUPPEN
ZUSAMMENFASSENDE BERICHTE
ENTSCHLIESSUNGEN
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I.
THE QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA
LES QUESTIONS A L’ORDRE DU JOUR
DIE FRAGEN DER TAGESORDNUNG
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The Questions on the Agenda
On the basis of a proposal from the Programme Committee, the Executive Committee decided to
put the following Questions on the Agenda for the Executive Committee Meeting 2009 in Buenos
Aires:
Q194
Q208
Q209
Q210
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights on their Exploitation
Border Measures and other Measures of Customs Intervention against Infringers
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other Patentability Criteria and
Scope of Protection
Protection of Major Sports Events and associated commercial activities through Trademarks
and other IPR
Les Questions à l’ordre du jour
Le Comité exécutif a décidé, sur proposition de la Commission des Programmes, de mettre à l’ordre
du jour pour le Comité exécutif 2009 à Buenos Aires les questions suivantes:
Q194
Q208
Q209
Q210
L’infl uence de la copropriété des Droits de Propriété Intellectuelle sur leur Exploitation
Les mesures frontalières et d’autres moyens d’intervention de douanes à l’encontre des
contrefacteurs
Les Inventions de sélection – le critère d’activité inventive, autres conditions de brevetabilité
et étendue de la protection
La protection de grands évènements sportifs et des activités commerciales associées par
les marques et les droits correspondants de propriété intellectuelle
Die Fragen der Tagesordnung
Der Geschäftsführende Ausschuss hat auf Vorschlag des Programmausschusses beschlossen, die
folgenden Fragen auf die Tagesordnung des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses 2009 in Buenos
Aires zu setzen:
Q194
Q208
Der Einfl uss der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums auf deren
Verwertung
Grenzbeschlagnahme und andere Eingriffsmöglichkeiten der Zollbehörden gegen
Verletzer
Q209 Auswahlerfindungen – das Erfordernis der erfinderischen Tätigkeit, andere
Patentierungsvoraussetzungen und Schutzbereich
Q210
Der Schutz bedeutender Sportereignisse und damit zusammenhängender wirtschaftlicher
Aktivitäten durch Marken und sonstige Rechte des Geistigen Eigentums
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I.
QUESTION Q194
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual
Property Rights on their Exploitation
QUESTION Q194
L’infl uence de la copropriété des Droits de Propriété
Intellectuelle sur leur Exploitation
FRAGE Q194
Der Einfl uss der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des Geistigen
Eigentums auf deren Verwertung
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Working Guidelines
by Jochen E. BüHLING, Reporter General
Dariusz SZLEPER and Thierry CALAME, Deputy Reporters General
Nicolai LINDGREEN, Nicola DAGG and Shoichi OKUYAMA
Assistants to the Reporter General
Question Q194
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Introduction
During the ExCo 2007 in Singapore, the question Q194: “The impact of co-ownership of intellectual
property rights on their exploitation” gave place to the adoption of the resolution which treated
several issues discussed in the working guidelines and in national group reports in relation to this
question.
And some harmonised positions have been achieved on the issues like:
– the freedom to organise the co-ownership of intellectual property rights,
– the role of the legal rules applicable to co-ownership,
– the regulations of the right to exploit the co-owned IP rights by the co-owners
– and the right to start a legal action to enforce those rights.
The resolution also gave the recommendations in relation to the renewal or maintaining of coowned
IP rights.
However, several other questions which were also discussed in the initial working guidelines, as well
as in the group reports, seemed to be too complicated to achieve a consensus within the AIPPI.
And therefore, the Working Committee proposed to the ExCo to continue the study on other aspects
of the co-ownership of IP rights.
The objective of the present working guidelines is to, without necessary repeating the issues which
were already resolved in the group reports answering the previous first working guidelines of
November 2006, open the discussion on the questions which were not initially tackled or which
were not discussed in the previous working guidelines or the Groups reports in sufficient detail.
As usual, the present working guidelines are divided into two parts:
– the first one is intended to present the scope of the current rules in various countries,
– and the second contains the questions related to the eventual future harmonisation.
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
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the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
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In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
Note:
It will be helpful and appreciated if the Groups follow the order of the questions in their Reports and
use the questions and numbers for each answer.
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Orientations de travail
De Jochen E. BÜHLING, Rapporteur Général,
Dariusz SZLEPER et Thierry CALAME, Suppléants du Rapporteur Général,
Nicolai LINDGREEN, Nicola DAGG et Shoichi OKUYAMA, Assistants du Rapporteur Général
Question Q194
L’influence de la copropriété des Droits de Propriété Intellectuelle
sur leur Exploitation
Introduction
Lors de l’ExCo 2007 à Singapour, la question Q 194 : « L’influence de la copropriété des droits de
propriété intellectuelle sur leur exploitation » a donné lieu à l’adoption de la résolution qui traitait
de plusieurs problèmes discutés dans les orientations de travail et dans les rapports des groupes
nationaux relatifs à cette question.
De même, certaines positions ont pu être harmonisées, à savoir :
– la liberté d’organiser la copropriété des droits de propriété intellectuelle,
– le rôle des règles légales applicables à la copropriété,
– les régimes du droit d’exploitation des droits de propriété intellectuels détenus en copropriété
par les copropriétaires, et
– le droit d’introduire une action en justice pour exercer ces droits.
La résolution comportait également des recommandations relatives au renouvellement ou au
maintien des droits de propriété intellectuelle détenus en copropriété.
Cependant, plusieurs autres questions qui avaient aussi été évoquées dans les premières orientations
de travail, ainsi que dans les rapports des groupes, semblaient être trop complexes pour trouver
un consensus au sein de l’AIPPI.
C’est pourquoi, la Commission de Travail a proposé à l’ExCo de poursuivre l’étude sur d’autres
aspects de la copropriété des droits de propriété intellectuelle.
Le but des présentes orientations de travail est, sans nécessairement reprendre les problèmes qui
ont déjà été résolus dans les rapports des groupes répondant aux précédentes orientations de
travail de Novembre 2006, d’ouvrir la discussion sur les questions qui n’ont pas été initialement
abordées ou qui n’ont pas été débattues dans les précédentes orientations de travail ou dans les
rapports des groupes de façon suffisamment détaillée.
Comme d’habitude, les présentes orientations de travail sont divisées en deux parties :
– la première a pour objectif de présenter le champ d’application des règles actuelles dans
différents pays, et
– la seconde contient les questions liées à l’éventuelle harmonisation future.
Discussion et Questions
I) Analyse de la loi substantielle actuelle
1) Le régime de la copropriété peut dépendre de l’origine de la copropriété
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Il peut être considéré que, dans le cas où l’objet d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle (esthétique,
technique ou commercial) est créé conjointement par deux ou plusieurs personnes, les règles
applicables à une telle situation peuvent être différentes de celles applicables à la situation
dans laquelle la copropriété résulte de la division d’un même droit entre différentes personnes
comme étant la conséquence, par exemple, d’un héritage ou d’une scission d’une société.
De même, il peut y avoir des situations dans lesquelles la copropriété est en fait imposée
par une partie à l’autre dans le cas d’une création technique (par exemple dans le cas de
l’amélioration ou de la modification de créations antérieures n’aboutissant pas toujours à un
droit indépendant).
Par conséquent, les groupes sont invités à indiquer si, dans leur loi nationale, les règles relatives
à la copropriété des droits de PI font une distinction dans le cadre des règles applicables à la
copropriété d’un droit de PI si l’origine de la copropriété des droits n’est pas volontaire mais
qu’elle résulte d’autres situations, incluant la division d’un droit dans le cas d’un héritage.
Dans ce contexte, les groupes peuvent également indiquer s’il y a des définitions légales de
la copropriété des droits de PI adoptées dans leurs pays et quelles sont ces définitions.
2) La notion d’exploitation d’un droit de PI a fait l’objet de vifs débats au cours de l’ExCo de
Singapour
Plus spécifiquement, les groupes étaient très divisés au sujet de l’externalisation ou de la soustraitance
de l’exploitation d’un droit de PI.
Cette question, particulièrement importante en matière de brevets, est liée en particulier au
problème de la sous-traitance lorsque le copropriétaire d’un brevet, qui, en principe, et du
moins selon la position exprimée par l’AIPPI dans sa résolution de Singapour de 2007, a le
droit personnel d’exploiter sa propre quote-part du brevet, en particulier de fabriquer et de
vendre les produits ou les procédés couverts par le brevet, doit sous-traiter partiellement ou
totalement la fabrication du produit couvert par le brevet.
Aucune position commune n’a été trouvée par l’ExCo de Singapour de 2007 sur la question de
savoir si le droit d’exploiter le brevet devait aussi couvrir le droit de sous-traiter, en particulier
la fabrication de tout ou partie de l’invention, objet du brevet.
Dès lors, les groupes sont invités à présenter les solutions offertes par leur législation nationale
sur ce point spécifique.
3) Les orientations de travail qui ont été établies pour l’ExCo de Singapour contenaient également
la question liée à la possibilité pour le copropriétaire d’un droit de PI de donner en licence
son droit à un tiers.
Aucune distinction n’avait cependant été faite, dans ce contexte, entre une licence nonexclusive
et une licence exclusive.
Aucune différenciation n’avait également été faite sur le nombre de licences qui auraient pu
être accordées par un copropriétaire dans le cas où la concession de licence non-exclusive
aurait été autorisée par la loi nationale.
Et si l’AIPPI a adopté une résolution sur les conditions de concession de la licence, il est
également apparu au cours des débats à l’ExCo que des solutions différentes ou plus précises
auraient pu être dégagées, si la Commission de Travail avait établi une distinction selon la
nature de la licence.
Dès lors, et afin d’améliorer le travail de l’ExCo, les groupes sont invités à indiquer en quoi
les différents types de licences (non-exclusive ou exclusive) ont une incidence sur les solutions
de leurs lois nationales en matière de concession de licence par un copropriétaire d’un droit
de PI.
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4) Une des questions les plus difficiles qui est apparue au cours des discussions à l’ExCo de
Singapour était celle de la possibilité de transférer ou de céder une quote-part de copropriété
d’un droit de PI.
Mais le problème semblait si complexe que la Commission de Travail a finalement décidé de
retirer sa proposition de résolution sur ce point.
En fait, les débats ont montré que les solutions sur le droit de transfert ou de cession pouvaient
différer en raison de la très grande variété de situations liées aux transferts des quotes-parts
de copropriété.
Notamment, on peut imaginer que le transfert est opéré sur la totalité de la quote-part
de copropriété du droit de PI, mais également qu’il peut simplement s’agir de la cession
d’une partie de la quote-part de copropriété, créant ainsi un copropriétaire d’un droit de PI
supplémentaire.
Et ce transfert d’une partie d’une quote-part d’un droit de PI pourrait être utilisé pour contourner
des limitations qui existeraient à la concession de licences par les copropriétaires.
Les groupes sont donc invités à préciser leur position sur la question du transfert ou de
la cession d’une quote-part de copropriété d’un droit de PI, en prenant en considération
les différentes situations qui peuvent survenir (le transfert de la totalité d’une quote-part
de copropriété d’un droit de PI ou le transfert d’une partie seulement d’une quote-part de
copropriété d’un droit de PI).
5) L’exercice d’un droit de PI détenu en copropriété par deux ou plusieurs copropriétaires, sur
lequel chacun a en principe le droit d’exercer son droit d’exploiter son droit de copropriété,
peut également faire naître des difficultés du point de vue des règles de concurrence.
Les droits de PI en copropriété peuvent conférer aux copropriétaires une position dominante
sur le marché et leur accord sur les droits de PI en copropriété (quand par exemple il vise
à interdire de concéder des licences), peut également être considéré comme de nature à
éliminer les concurrents du marché.
Les groupes sont donc invités à expliquer si leur droit national a eu à traiter de telles situations
et quelles sont les solutions qui ont été adoptées dans de tels cas.
6) Les groupes sont invités à s’interroger une fois de plus sur la question de la loi applicable qui
pourrait être utilisée pour régir la copropriété de divers droits qui coexistent dans différents
pays.
Ce point a été laissé de côté dans l’attente d’une étude plus approfondie au paragraphe 9
de la résolution adoptée à Singapour.
Et plus particulièrement, les groupes sont priés d’indiquer si leur droit national accepte
qu’un droit de PI détenu en copropriété, même en l’absence d’accord contractuel entre les
copropriétaires, puisse être soumis au droit national du pays qui présente les liens les plus
étroits avec le droit de PI.
Si tel est le cas, quels seront, selon l’avis des groupes, les éléments à prendre en considération
pour déterminer l’existence de ces liens ?
Il est demandé dans ce contexte aux groupes des pays de l’Union européenne d’indiquer
s’ils considèrent que le règlement du Conseil du 17 juin 2008 (No 593/2008), également
appelé « Rome I », peut s’appliquer aux accords de copropriété.
7) Enfin, les groupes sont également invités à présenter tous les autres problèmes qui apparaissent
comme pertinents au regard de la présente question et qui n’auraient été discutés ni dans
les présentes orientations de travail, ni dans les précédentes pour l’ExCo de Singapour de
2007.
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II)
Proposition pour une future harmonisation
Les groupes sont invités à présenter toute recommandation qui peut être suivie dans le cadre
d’une harmonisation future des droits nationaux dans le contexte de la copropriété, en
particulier sur les points soulevés par les orientations de travail ci-dessus en lien avec l’état
actuel de leurs droits nationaux.
Note :
Merci de suivre l’ordre de questions et d’utiliser les numéros des questions dans vos réponses.
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Arbeitsrichtlinien*
von Jochen E. BüHLING, Generalberichterstatter
Dariusz SZLEPER und Thierry CALAME, Stellvertreter des Generalberichterstatters
Nicolai LINDGREEN, Nicola DAGG und Shoichi OKUYAMA
Assistenten des Generalberichterstatters
Frage Q194
Der Einfluss der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des
Geistigen Eigentums auf deren Verwertung
Einführung
Während der Tagung des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Singapur bot die Frage Q194: „Der
Einfluss der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums auf deren Verwertung“ Raum für
die Annahme der Entschliessung, welche mehrere der in den Arbeitsrichtlinien und in Berichten der
Landesgruppen bezüglich dieser Frage diskutierte Themen behandelte.
Einige harmonisierte Positionen sind dabei erreicht worden zu Themen wie:
– der Freiheit, die Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums zu regeln,
– der Rolle der auf Mitinhaberschaft anwendbaren Rechtsvorschriften,
– den Regelungen betreffend das Recht, die gemeinschaftlich gehaltenen Rechte des Geistigen
Eigentums durch die Mitinhaber zu verwerten,
– und dem Recht, den Rechtsweg zu beschreiten, um diese Rechte durchzusetzen.
Die Entschliessung gab ebenfalls Empfehlungen in Bezug auf die Erneuerung oder Aufrechterhaltung
von gemeinschaftlich gehaltenen Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums.
Jedoch schienen mehrere Fragen, welche sowohl in den anfänglichen Arbeitsrichtlinien, als auch in
den Gruppenberichten diskutiert wurden, zu kompliziert zu sein, um einen Konsens innerhalb der
AIPPI zu erreichen.
Daher schlug der Arbeitsausschuss dem Geschäftsführenden Ausschuss vor, die Studien von
weiteren Aspekten der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums fortzusetzen.
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeitsrichtlinien ist es, die Diskussion über die Fragen zu eröffnen, welche
anfänglich nicht in Angriff genommen wurden oder welche in den vorherigen Arbeitsrichtlinien oder
den Gruppenberichten nicht ausreichend detailliert diskutiert wurden, ohne notwendigerweise die
Themen zu wiederholen, welche bereits in den Gruppenberichten als Antwort auf die vorherigen
ersten Arbeitsrichtlinien von November 2006 gelöst wurden.
Wie üblich sind die vorliegenden Arbeitsrichtlinien in zwei Teile geteilt:
– der erste Teil beabsichtigt, den Umfang der gegenwärtigen Regelungen in verschiedenen
Ländern darzustellen,
– der zweite Teil enthält die Fragen bezogen auf die mögliche zukünftige Harmonisierung.
* Übersetzt von Peter PAWLOY – Sonn & Partner PAe., Österreich
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Diskussion und Fragen
I) Analyse des gegenwärtigen materiellen Rechts
1) Die Regelung der Mitinhaberschaft kann vom Ursprung der Mitinhaberschaft abhängen.
Es mag erwogen werden, dass in dem Fall, in dem der Gegenstand eines Rechts des
Geistigen Eigentums (ästhetisch, technisch oder kommerziell) gemeinsam durch zwei oder
mehrere Personen erschaffen wird, die auf eine derartige Situation anwendbaren Regeln sich
von jenen unterscheiden können, welche auf Situationen anwendbar sind, in denen sich die
Mitinhaberschaft aus der Aufteilung des gleichen Rechts unter verschiedene Personen ergibt,
z.B. als Folge einer Erbschaft oder der Teilung eines Unternehmens.
Auch kann es Situationen geben, in denen die Mitinhaberschaft einer Partei durch die andere
tatsächlich auferlegt wird, etwa im Falle einer technischen Schöpfung (zum Beispiel bei der
Verbesserung oder Modifizierung der vorherigen Schöpfungen, welche nicht immer ein
unabhängiges Recht ergeben müssen).
Daher werden die Gruppen gebeten aufzuzeigen, ob in ihren nationalen Rechtsordnungen
die Regeln bezogen auf die Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums eine
Unter-scheidung bei den anwendbaren Regeln bezüglich der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten
des Geistigen Eigentums machen, falls der Ursprung der Rechte der Mitinhaberschaft nicht
freiwillig ist, sondern sich aus anderen Situationen ergibt, einschliesslich der Aufteilung eines
Rechts im Fall einer Erbschaft.
In diesem Zusammenhang können die Gruppen auch aufzeigen, ob es irgendwelche in ihren
Ländern angenommene rechtliche Definitionen der Mitinhaberschaft an den Rechten des
Geistigen Eigentums gibt und wie diese Definitionen lauten.
2) Während der Sitzung des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Singapur fand eine grosse
Diskussion über die Auffassung bezüglich der Verwertung eines Rechts des Geistigen
Eigentums statt.
Insbesondere waren die Gruppen zum Thema Outsourcing der Verwertung eines Rechts des
Geistigen Eigentums oder der Verwertung durch einen Subunternehmer stark gespalten.
Diese im Fall von Patenten besonders wichtige Frage betrifft insbesondere das Problem des
Subunternehmers, wenn ein Mitinhaber des Patents, der im Prinzip und zumindest gemäss der
durch AIPPI in ihrer Singapur-Entschliessung 2007 ausgedrückten Position das persönliche
Recht hat, seinen eigenen Teil des Patents speziell durch Herstellen und Verkaufen von Waren
oder Verfahren, welche durch das Patent abgedeckt sind, zu verwerten, die Herstellung
des durch das Patent umfassten Produkts teilweise oder insgesamt durch Vergabe an einen
Subunternehmer regeln muss.
Es konnte durch den Geschäftsführenden Ausschuss in Singapur 2007 keine gemeinsame
Position zu der Frage erzielt werden, ob das Recht, das Patent zu verwerten, auch das
Recht abdecken sollte einen Subunternehmer einzuschalten, insbesonder in Bezug auf die
Herstellung der gesamten oder eines Teils der Erfindung, welche Gegenstand des Patents
ist.
Daher sind die Gruppen gebeten, die Lösungen ihrer nationalen Rechtsordnungen zu diesem
spezifischen Punkt zu präsentieren.
3) Die für die Sitzung des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Singapur erstellten Arbeitsrichtlinien
enthielten auch die Frage bezüglich der Möglichkeit des Mitinhabers an einem Recht des
Geistigen Eigentums, Dritten eine Lizenz für dieses Recht zu erteilen.
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018-021_WG_Q194_BA_DE.indd 19 28/01/2011 12:21:51

Es wurde in diesem Zusammenhang jedoch keine Unterscheidung zwischen einer nichtexklusiven
Lizenz und einer ausschliesslichen Lizenz gemacht.
Es wurde auch keine Differenzierung bezüglich der Anzahl an Lizenzen vorgenommen,
welche durch einen Mitinhaber erteilt werden könnten, falls die nicht-exklusive Lizenz durch
das nationale Recht erlaubt wäre.
Als AIPPI die Entschliessung hinsichtlich der Bedingungen der Gewährung einer Lizenz annahm,
schien es auch während der Diskussion des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses so, dass andere
oder genauere Lösungen hätten erzielt werden können, wenn der Arbeitsausschuss einen
Unterschied zwischen der Art der Lizenz gemacht hätte.
Um die Arbeit des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses zu verbessern, sind daher die Gruppen
gebeten zu spezifizieren, wie die Unterschiede in der Art der Lizenzen (nicht-exklusiv oder
ausschliesslich) die Lösung der nationalen Rechte bezüglich des Rechts beeinflussen, die
Lizenz durch einen Mitinhaber eines Rechts des Geistigen Eigentumss zu gewähren.
4) Eine der schwierigsten Fragen, welche während der Diskussion des Geschäftsführenden
Ausschusses in Singapur aufkam, war die Möglichkeit, einen gemeinschaftlich gehaltenen
Anteil an einem Recht des Geistigen Eigentumss zu übertragen oder zu veräussern.
Das Problem erschien derart kompliziert, dass sich der Arbeitsausschuss schliesslich entschloss,
seinen Vorschlag für eine Resolution in diesem Punkt zurückzuziehen.
Tatsächlich zeigte die Diskussion, dass die Lösungen bezüglich des Rechts zur Übertragen
oder Veräusserung variieren können, da es eine grosse Vielfalt an Situationen bezogen auf
die Übertragungen des gemeinschaftlich gehaltenen Anteils gibt.
Besonders könnte man sich vorstellen, dass die Übertragung für den gesamten Anteil des
gemeinschaftlich gehaltenen Rechts des Geistigen Eigentums vorgenommen wird. Es könnte
aber auch einfach eine Vergabe eines Teils des gemeinschaftlich gehaltenen Anteils in
Betracht kommen, was daher einen zusätzlichen Mitinhaber an einem Recht des Geistigen
Eigentums schaffen würde.
Eine solche Übertragung eines Teils eines Anteils an einem Recht des Geistigen Eigentums
könnte verwendet werden, um die Beschränkung zu überwinden, welche möglicherweise
bezüglich der Gewährung von Lizenzen durch die Mitinhaber besteht.
Die Gruppen sind daher gebeten, ihre Position zur Frage der Übertragung oder Veräusserung
eines Anteils des gemeinschaftlich gehaltenen Rechts des Geistigen Eigentums zu präzisieren,
wobei sie die verschiedenen Situationen berücksichtigen, welche auftreten können (die
Übertragung des gesamten Anteils eines gemeinschaftlich gehaltenen Rechts des Geistigen
Eigentums oder die Übertragung nur des Teils des Anteils des gemeinschaftlich gehaltenen
Rechts des Geistigen Eigentums).
5) Die Ausübung eines Rechts des Geistigen Eigentums, welches durch zwei oder mehr
Mitinhaber gemeinschaftlich gehalten wird, von denen jeder im Prinzip das Recht hat, das
gemeinschaftlich gehaltene Recht zu verwerten, kann auch aus der Sicht der Wettbewerbsregeln
Schwierigkeiten bereiten.
Die gemeinschaftlich gehaltenen Rechte des Geistigen Eigentums können den Mitinhabern
die marktbeherrschende Stellung verschaffen, und ihr Abkommen zu den gemeinschaftlich
gehaltenen Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums (wenn es zum Beispiel die Lizenzierung untersagt)
kann auch als Verdrängung der Wettbewerber aus dem Markt gesehen werden.
Die Gruppen sind daher gebeten zu erklären, ob ihre nationalen Rechte solche Situationen
behandeln mussten und was die in diesen Fällen angenommenen Lösungen waren.
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6) Die Gruppen sind gebeten, noch einmal die Frage des anwendbaren Rechts zu untersuchen,
das die Mitinhaberschaft an verschiedenen Rechten, die in unterschiedlichen Ländern
koexistieren, regeln könnte.
Dieser Punkt wurde durch Paragraph 9 der in Singapur angenommenen Entschliessung zur
weiteren Untersuchung belassen.
Spezieller werden die Gruppen gebeten aufzuzeigen, ob ihre nationalen Rechte akzeptieren,
dass die Mitinhaberschaft an einem Recht des Geistigen Eigentums, selbst wenn es keine
vertragliche Vereinbarung zwischen den Mitinhabern gibt, durch das Recht des Landes
geregelt werden kann, welches die engste Verbindung mit dem Recht des Geistigen Eigentums
aufweist.
Falls dies der Fall ist, was wären dann nach Meinung der Gruppen die zu berücksichtigen
Elemente, um diese Verbindung zu bewerten?
Die Gruppen der EU-Länder werden in diesem Zusammenhang gebeten aufzuzeigen, ob
sie erwägen, dass die Verordnung des Rats vom 17 Juni 2008 (Nr. 593/2008), „Rom I“
genannt, auf die Vereinbarungen über die Mitinhaberschaft anwendbar sein kann.
7) Schliesslich sind die Gruppen ebenfalls gebeten, alle übrigen Punkte vorzubringen, welche
für die Frage relevant erscheinen, und welche weder in diesen Arbeitsrichtlinien, noch in den
vorherigen für den Geschäftsführenden Ausschuss 2007 in Singapur diskutiert wurden.
II)
Vorschläge für die zukünftige Harmonisierung
Die Gruppen sind aufgefordert, jede Empfehlung vorzubringen, der im Hinblick auf die
weitere Harmonisierung von nationalen Rechten im Zusammenhang mit der Mitinhaberschaft
gefolgt werden kann, speziell zu den Punkten, welche durch die Arbeitsrichtlinien oben in
Bezug auf den gegenwärtigen Zustand ihrer nationalen Rechte aufgeworfen werden.
Anmerkung:
Es wird hilfreich sein und geschätzt werden, wenn die Gruppen der Reihenfolge der Fragen in ihren
Berichten folgen und die Fragen und Nummern für jede Antwort verwenden.
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Argentina
Argentine
Argentinien
Report Q194
in the name of the Argentine Group
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
There is no distinction established by Argentine law regarding co ownership resulting from
voluntary or non voluntary reasons.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
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Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
Based on the freedom of contract principle admitted by argentine law, the right to subcontract
the manufacturing of all or part of the invention being covered by a patent by one
of the co-owners will be admitted, provided no prohibition to license exists contractually
established by the co-owners.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
According to our laws the differences in the nature of the license (non-exclusive or exclusive)
have no relevance with regard to the ability of the co-owners to grant exclusive or nonexclusive
licenses.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
In principle, our Trademark Law does not allow the co-owners of a registration to transfer their
share to third parties, but the transfer can be performed if the rest of the co-owners authorize
to do so. Regarding other IP Rights, the co-owners are free to transfer their shares as there is
no prohibition specifically established in our laws to date.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
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The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
Our Law does not treat this specific aspect of IP and Competition Law.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
In the absence of an agreement between the co-owners establishing that the co-ownership of
an IP granted in Argentina and other countries will be ruled by a foreign legislation, then the
matter of the co-ownership of the IP right granted in Argentina will be ruled by its laws.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
No further comments.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
Freedom of contract should apply in the context of co-ownership but in the absence of
contracts, national laws should apply. In the case of transfer or licensing of partial shares,
such acts should be admitted only with the prior authorization of co-owner. Also, co-owners
should be allowed to contractually choose the applicable laws that will govern matters related
to use, licensing and exploitation. If no agreement exists, then the law of the country in which
the IP right is granted should prevail.
Summary
There are no specific regulations in Argentina regarding the matters raised in the guidelines.
Nevertheless, a general principle admitted by our laws recognizes that most rights can be exploited
or used by any co-owner without having to compensate to the other co-owner. Notwithstanding, the
Argentine group favours that limited restrictions should be established not only to the transfer of the
co-owned rights but also to the licensing of same.
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Résumé
En Argentine, il existe des régulations non spécifiques concernant la même matière de fond dans
les directives. Un principe géneral admis par nos lois reconnait que, jamais, la plupart des droits
peut être exploité ni utilisé par aucun co-proprietaire sans en compenser l’autre Non obstant, le
groupe argentin privilegie que les limites des restrictions devraient être établis non seulement sur le
transfert des droits de co-propriété mais aussi la licence de celui-ci.
Zusammenfassung
In Argentinien gibt es keine spezifische Bestimmungen hinsichtlich des in den Richtlinien
aufgeworfenen Gegenstands. Ungeachtet dessen erlaubt ein von unseren Gesetzen anerkannter
allgemeiner Grundsatz, dass die meisten Rechte seitens jedweden Miteigentümers ausgeübt oder
genutzt werden dürfen, ohne den anderen Miteigentümer dafür entschädigen zu müssen. Trotzdem
befürwortet die argentinische Gruppe die Festlegung von begrenzten Einschränkungen nicht nur
bei der Übertragung von gemeinsam gehaltenen Rechten, sondern auch bei der Lizenzvergabe
bezüglich derselben.
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Austria
Autriche
Österreich
Report Q194
in the name of the Austrian Group
by Christian Gassauer–Fleissner
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
The national rules do not provide for a distinction between co–ownership created voluntarily
or involuntarily. There do not exist specific legal definitions for co–ownership of IP rights.
Basically the provisions of the General Civil Code apply. The General Civil Code is the
statutory basis for several concepts of “legal communities”, amongst them the co–owner
community and the civil law association. As to provisions dealing specifically with IP rights it
is essential whether these provisions are to be qualified as leges speciales to the provisions of
the General Civil Code regulating co–ownership or to the provisions governing the civil law
association. Unfortunately the delimitation of these two legal concepts is rather complicated.
Article 1175 of the General Civil Code basically stipulates that a civil law association is being
established when two or more persons contractually agree to join labour or property for joint
benefit. The contribution of the respective associates may therefore consist in any kind of
labour, physical or monetary assets or rights such as for instance intellectual property rights.
According to prevailing doctrine and case law the civil law association is not an association
having separate legal personality. The property of the civil law association is therefore co–
owned by its associates.
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According to Article 825 of the General Civil Code a co–owner community exists when
several persons share the property of the same item or share the same right. It can result from
coincidence, contract, transaction inter vivos and mortis causa or it can be mandated by law.
The property right is shared, not the physical item. Co–ownership means that the property
right is divided in a sense that each co–owner may only dispose of his share and only all
co–owners together may dispose of the whole. The rules apply to co–ownership in property.
They apply to the law of obligations only analogously.
Co–owned property has to be distinguished from its specific embodiment of jointly owned
property. As to assets owned in joint ownership the joint owners can not dispose of their
property share individually but all joint–owners need to act jointly. The joint–owners have an
identical interest in the undivided whole. According to prevailing doctrine and case law the
General Civil Code does not know the concept of joint property. It is therefore not surprising
that prevailing doctrine holds that the property of civil law associations is co–owned and not
jointly owned by its associates. At any rate the concept of joint ownership found its way into
the Austrian legal system by means of special statutes (which are referenced under 4)).
As soon as – based on the facts of the specific case – it is evident whether a “legal community”
subsists in the form of a co–owner community or in the form of a civil law association it can
be analysed which legal rules apply to the exploitation of co–owned IP rights.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
Subcontracting is a specific form of licensing which in turn is exploitation. Accordingly the
rules set forth under 4) related to exploitation of IP rights apply.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
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Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The difference in the nature of licenses has no influence in this respect.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
At first in each case it has to be looked at whether or not the IP right was transferred to an
association, namely a civil law association in which case the rules governing such association
apply.
The following comments assume that no such transfer has taken place.
As regards assignment of either the whole share or a part of a share Austrian law does not
make a difference. Either both is possible or none of the two alternatives.
The various laws governing IP rights provide for different rules. Trademark law does not
contain specific regulations as to co–ownership. Even co–owners not having established a
civil law association may apply for trademark protection. Some authors argue that Article 27
(3) of the Austrian Patent Act should be applied analogously and therefore are of the opinion
that co–owners of a trademark are to be qualified as (close to) joint owners. However, there
is no convincing reason to draw such analogy. The rules of co–ownership apply and the
assignment of shares is permitted according to the provisions of civil law (Article 829 of the
General Civil Code).
Unlike trademark law the Austrian Patent Act contains specific provisions dealing with
co–ownership. However, in the beginning, in this context, too, it has to be assessed whether
the co–owners have established a civil law association or not (see 1)). If the co–owners did
not establish such association the Articles 27 and 33 of the Patent Code are to be qualified
as leges speciales in comparison to the General Civil Code.
Article 27 of the Austrian Patent Code specifies the mutual relationship between the
co–owners of patents:
1) A patent applied for by several persons as joint partners of the same invention shall be
granted to them without determination of the proportion attributable to each.
2) The legal relationship of the partners in a patent to each other shall be governed by civil
law.
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3) In case of doubt the right to allow third persons the use of the invention devolves on the
joint partners jointly; each one of them is, however, entitled to seek legal regress against
infringement of the patent.
From section (1) of this provision it can not be concluded that the co–owners of the patent
are to be regarded as joint owners. In addition doctrine says that this section (1) only applies
in case the applicants do not request the registration of specific rates of ownership. Section
(3) mandates that – as opposed to the applicable statutes in the General Civil Code – the
co–owners may not dispose of their property share individually but all joint–owners need to
act jointly. The right to grant licenses (Article 35 of the Austrian Patent Code) can therefore be
exercised only jointly. It shall be mentioned though that a joint decision in this sense actually
means a majority decision (due to the fact that Article 833 of the General Civil Code – which
regulates the voting process – is still applicable).
If the co–owners established a civil law association the respective provisions of the General
Civil Code apply. The result is not much different as the provisions governing the civil law
association refer to Article 833 of General Civil Code.
As to utility models and designs the provisions regulating co–ownership are similar to patent
law.
As regards copyright there is case law and uniform doctrine that co–ownership subsists in the
form of a particular embodiment of joint ownership. The wording of the applicable Article 11
(2) of the Austrian Copyright Act is clearly stronger as in Article 27 (3) of the Austrian Patent
Act which is legitimate as the modification of a copyrighted work by a co–author would
interfere with the interest of the other authors, which is not so much the case with patents. In
those cases in which a civil law association is not established the co–authors are joint owners
in a sense that they can not dispose of their property share individually but all joint–owners in
fact need to act together. In cases in which a civil law association is established the provisions
of the Civil Code prevail. The consequences may be substantial. For instance the provisions
regarding the decision making process would prevail over Article 11 (2) of the Copyright
Code.
The question of whether or not the assignment of parts of a co–ownership share to a third
party may extend the number of persons entitled to exploit the IP–right until now was not
addressed by Austrian courts.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
Neither case law nor doctrine is available on this subject. However, the cases addressed in
these questions would be treated along the lines drawn between IP rights on the one hand
and competition laws on the other in general. As an example a patent frequently would be
the result of a common R&D project of competitors. Since already the R&D activities have to
comply e.g. with the R&D group exemption regulation the same rules must apply to the result
of R&D i.e. the patent.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
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This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
Indeed the national law of the country which presents the closest connections with the IP right
governs the co–ownership.
Obviously, in cases where the co–ownership is limited to an IP–right that extends only to one
country the laws of this country should apply. Otherwise the country which presents the closest
connection must be defined by using the criteria also applicable for this test, such as residence,
citizenship, currency, place of entering into the agreement etc. Rome I may apply.
But once the co–ownership is condensed to an association (namely a civil law association)
the law of the country where there is the seat of the association will apply (it has to be noted
though that the doctrine is split on this issue).
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
Harmonisation of national laws would be useful in general.
Distinctions between various IP–rights need to be drawn very carefully but it seems inevitable
that by nature of the various IP–rights it is impossible that among them they are treated
equally.
One additional aspect may be worthwhile to be looked at, i.e. the line between a co–
ownership and an association. If this line is drawn differently in different countries it is possible
that even on the basis of harmonised rules on the conflict of laws it makes a big difference to
which country a case is directed by such rules as in one case the people who have rights to
an IP–right may find themselves as “simple” co–owners or as shareholders/partners.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
Harmonisation should advance since cases where co–owners are coming from various
jurisdictions will increase in numbers. Therefore in a first step harmonisation is important as
regards the rules of international private law defining the law which governs such multinational
co–ownerships.
There should be looked at to which extent the various IP–rights require different treatment.
Copyright may be different from other IP–rights.
Particular attention is required as regards the relation between IP–rights and Competition
Law. The latter must not prevail to the extent unduly hollowing IP–rights.
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Belgium
Belgique
Belgien
Report Q194
au nom du Groupe belge
par Emmanuel CORNU, François GEVERS, Dominique KAESMACHER,
Sophie LENS, Gunther MEYER, Véronique PEDE et Christophe RONSE
L’influence de la copropriété des droits de propriété intellectuelle sur
leur exploitation
Remarque préliminaire
La plupart des questions complémentaires posées suite à l’EXCO 2007 de Singapour ont déjà été
abordées, directement ou indirectement, dans le premier rapport rédigé en vue de cet EXCO 2007.
Ainsi, pour éviter des redondances inutiles, lorsqu’une réponse a déjà été apportée dans le cadre de
ce premier rapport, il y sera fait référence, quitte à apporter certaines précisions complémentaires.
Pour rappel, en Belgique, il n’existe pas de régime uniforme de la copropriété des droits de propriété
intellectuelle, pas plus qu’il n’existe un régime spécifique de copropriété propre à chaque droit de
propriété intellectuelle.
La plupart des législations spéciales contiennent, certes, quelques références à des situations
d’indivision ou de cotitularité, mais aucune de ces législations ne règle la question de manière
exhaustive. Dans le silence des législations spéciales, c’est donc le droit commun de la copropriété
qui régit cette matière (art. 577-2 du Code civil).
Ainsi, conformément au schéma adopté pour le premier rapport, chaque question sera abordée
en deux temps, un premier point étant consacré à l’analyse, lorsqu’elles existent, des dispositions
légales spécifiques aux droits intellectuels, tandis que nous examinerons, dans un deuxième point, le
régime de droit commun de la copropriété applicable dans le silence des législations spéciales.
Discussion and Questions
I) Analyse de la législation en vigueur et réponse aux questions
1) Origine volontaire ou non de la copropriété
Est-ce que les règles applicables à la copropriété d’un droit intellectuel diffèrent en fonction
de l’origine volontaire ou non de la copropriété?
Quelles sont les éventuelles définitions légales des différentes situations de copropriété d’un
droit intellectuel?
1.1. Régimes spécifiques
a. Droit d’auteur
La loi du 30 juin 1994 relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisons (ci-après « LDA ») aborde
la question de la copropriété des droits d’auteur en ses articles 4 et 5.
Aux termes de ces deux dispositions, il apparaît que le législateur ne fait aucune distinction
quant aux modes d’exploitation des droits de copropriété sur une œuvre selon que la
copropriété soit volontaire ou «forcée».
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La seule distinction existante repose sur le caractère divisible ou non de l’œuvre détenue en
copropriété 1 . En effet, comme indiqué à l’article 4 LDA, en cas d’œuvre indivise, aucun acte
d’exploitation ne peut être accompli sans l’accord unanime des indivisaires. Au contraire,
lorsqu’il s’agit d’une œuvre divisible, l’article 5, alinéa 2, LDA prévoit que les coauteurs ont le
droit d’exploiter isolément leur contribution, pour autant que cette exploitation ne porte pas
préjudice à l’œuvre commune.
b. Droit des marques
b.1. Marque communautaire
La marque communautaire obéit à un régime unique en tant qu’objet de propriété et, a
fortiori, de copropriété, de manière à sauvegarder le principe du traitement unitaire de la
marque communautaire consacré par le règlement 40/94 du 20 décembre 1993 sur la
marque communautaire.
Ainsi, le règlement 40/94 prévoit qu’«en tant qu’objet de propriété», la marque communautaire
«est considérée dans sa totalité et pour l’ensemble du territoire de la Communauté comme une
marque nationale enregistrée dans l’Etat membre dans lequel, selon le Registre des marques
communautaires: le titulaire a son siège ou son domicile (…) ou (…) a un établissement (…)»
(voy. art. 16, § 1 er du règlement n° 40/94). Dans les autres cas que ceux prévus à l’article
16, § 1 er précité, la marque communautaire sera gouvernée par la loi espagnole, loi de l’état
dans lequel l’Office a son siège (art. 16, § 2).
L’article 16, § 1 er évoque encore le cas dans lequel la marque communautaire est enregistrée
au nom de plusieurs personnes : en ce cas, le paragraphe 1 er est applicable au premier inscrit
; à défaut, il s’applique dans l’ordre de leur inscription aux co-titulaires suivants.
Le présent rapport portant sur la situation en Belgique, on présumera que les critères définis à
l’article 16 du règlement n° 40/94 renvoient à l’Etat belge. C’est dès lors conformément aux
principes de la Convention Benelux en matière de propriété intellectuelle et du droit belge
que la copropriété de la marque communautaire s’analysera (cfr. ci-dessous).
b.2. Marque Benelux
La Convention Benelux du 25 février 2005 en matière de propriété intellectuelle (marques
et modèles) (ci-après la «CBPI») ne contient aucune disposition spécifique relative à la
copropriété. Il importe dès lors d’appliquer les règles de droit commun prévues dans le Code
civil et applicables à toute forme de copropriété, à savoir, pour rappel, l’article 577-2 du
Code civil 2 .
La loi ne distingue pas selon l’origine de la copropriété. Plusieurs cas sont à cet égard
envisageables. Le cas le plus fréquent est celui qui résulte d’une indivision entre cohéritiers.
Un cas voisin est celui où la marque ayant appartenu à une société de personnes est devenue,
à la dissolution de celle-ci, la propriété commune de chacun des associés. Une troisième
situation se rencontre lorsque le droit à la marque entre dans une communauté conjugale. Il
y a enfin la copropriété résultant de la collaboration de plusieurs personnes en vue du choix
d’une marque unique et de son usage simultané 3 .
Que la copropriété soit volontaire ou ne soit pas volontaire, les mêmes règles
s’appliqueront.
1 Pour rappel, l’œuvre divisible se distingue de l’œuvre indivise en ce qu’on peut distinguer la part de chacun des
collaborateurs et que chaque part peut faire l’objet d’une exploitation individuelle (M. BUYDENS, «La bande dessinée
comme œuvre de collaboration», in Droit d’auteur et bande dessinée, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, p.31-32).
2 A. BRAUN et E. CORNU, Précis des marques, 5 ème éd., Larcier, 2009, n° 229, pp. 264 à 266.
3 A. BRAUN et E. CORNU, op. cit., n° 229, et les références citées.
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Il faut cependant souligner la réserve importante inscrite à l’article 5, c), alinéa 3 de la
Convention d’Union de Paris, suivant laquelle l’emploi simultané d’une marque par des cotitulaires
ne peut avoir pour effet d’induire le public en erreur ni être contraire à l’intérêt
public 4 .
c. Droit des dessins et modèles
La Convention Benelux du 25 février 2005 en matière de propriété intellectuelle (marques
et modèles) (ci-après la «CBPI») ne contient aucune disposition spécifique en matière de
copropriété de dessin ou modèle, et ce quelle qu’en soit l’origine (volontaire ou involontaire).
C’est, dès lors, le droit commun de la copropriété qui trouvera à s’appliquer.
d. Droit des brevets
À défaut de convention entre les copropriétaires, la copropriété d’une demande de brevet
ou d’un brevet est régie par l’article 43 de la loi belge du 28 mars 1984 sur les brevets
d’invention (ci-après «LBI») dont le § 2 prévoit que chaque copropriétaire a le droit d’exploiter
personnellement l’invention.
La LBI ne fait aucune distinction selon l’origine volontaire ou forcée de la copropriété de sorte
que le droit commun s’applique en l’espèce.
e. Droit des obtentions végétales
La loi belge du 20 mai 1975 sur la protection des obtentions végétales spécifie que, sauf
convention contraire, si la variété nouvelle a été obtenue en collaboration, le droit est indivis
entre les personnes qui ont collaboré (article 26). Il n’y a pas d’autres dispositions spécifiques
de sorte que le droit commun de la copropriété est applicable pour le surplus.
1.2. Régime de droit commun
Au vu de l’énoncé de cette première question, telle que formulée dans le questionnaire qui
nous a été communiqué, nous notons qu’une distinction est faite entre la copropriété volontaire
(«voluntary») et la copropriété imposée aux copropriétaires («imposed» ou «resulting from
other situations»).
Or, en droit positif belge, outre ces deux catégories, la copropriété se décline également
en une troisième catégorie, la copropriété ordinaire. Cette classification est fonction des
circonstances faisant naître la copropriété 5 :
- copropriété ordinaire 6 : ce qui caractérise cette espèce de copropriété, c’est
(i)
son caractère fortuit : elle n’est ni précédée, ni accompagnée du moindre accord de
volonté des copropriétaires;
(ii) son absence d’organisation: dans les limites de sa part privative, chacun des
copropriétaires peut, en principe, faire ce que bon lui semble. Il peut, par exemple,
disposer de sa part, ou l’hypothéquer, sans se soucier de ses consorts (577-2, §4 C.
Civ.). Au contraire, au-delà des limites de sa part, le copropriétaire ne peut rien faire
sans l’accord de tous les autres.
Comme les copropriétaires s’accommodent rarement de cette situation à la fois gênante et
imprévue, la loi leur ménage une issue: le partage, au terme duquel plusieurs propriétés
privatives indépendantes sont substituées à la copropriété initiale.
4 A. BRAUN et E. CORNU, op. cit., p. 270, n° 236 et p. 824, n° 723.
5 H. DE PAGE, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1975, n°1136 et suiv.
6 Un des exemples types de la copropriété ordinaire est l’indivision successorale. Pour information, en droit belge, la
succession est régie par les articles 718 et suivants du Code civil. En vertu de l’article 724 du Code civil,«les héritiers
sont saisis de plein droit des biens, droits et actions du défunt, sous l’obligation d’acquitter toutes les charges de la
succession».
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- Copropriété forcée: cette forme de copropriété (à titre principal ou accessoire) vise un
bien destiné à rester en état d’indivision pendant un temps plus ou moins long (tombeaux
de famille, accessoires de plusieurs propriétés individuelles tels que gros murs, toit, cage
d’escalier d’un immeuble à appartements privatifs, etc.).
Le seul fait que cette copropriété est imposée par les circonstances qui la font naître, ou
par l’objet sur lequel elle porte, exclut tout partage, tant que durent ces circonstances.
En outre, étant donné que cette copropriété est inévitable, les copropriétaires sont
souvent contraints de s’entendre quant à l’exercice de leurs droits concurrents. Ainsi, si,
à la base, ils disposent des mêmes prérogatives que les copropriétaires en situation de
copropriété ordinaire (libre disposition de sa part privative), on voit souvent apparaître
ici des accords entre les copropriétaires de sorte qu’au statut réel de la copropriété vient
se greffer un statut conventionnel.
- Copropriété volontaire : copropriété résultant de l’accord de plusieurs personnes.
Cette situation s’écarte de la copropriété ordinaire en ce qu’elle n’est plus subie (et partant
provisoire), mais voulue (et partant stable). Dès lors, comme la copropriété forcée, elle
exclut le partage. En outre, cette forme de copropriété appelle généralement aussi une
certaine organisation conventionnelle.
La doctrine distingue également la copropriété collective, résultant de la mise en commun
d’un même bien dans un cadre librement consenti et sans caractère fortuit et faisant l’objet
d’une certaine organisation institutionnelle (tel qu’une société, association, communauté de
mariage, etc, …) 7 . Cette situation n’emporte cependant pas de véritable indivision et tombe
dés lors en dehors du cadre du présent rapport.
Aux termes de ce qui précède, il apparaît donc que la distinction consacrée par le droit positif
belge entre la copropriété ordinaire, forcée et volontaire est d’ordre purement terminologique
dès lors que dans la pratique, les prérogatives des copropriétaires sont en principe identiques
quelle que soit la forme de copropriété considérée (principe de libre disposition de sa part
privative).
Toutefois, nous notons qu’une différence existe par rapport au droit de demander le partage
et la possibilité de déroger à ce droit par convention : tandis qu’un partage est exclu en
cas de copropriété forcée, la doctrine est divisée sur la question de savoir si en cas de
copropriété volontaire, la convention par laquelle un copropriétaire renoncerait à exercer son
droit de demander le partage peut avoir une durée supérieure à la période de 5 ans fixée à
l’article 815 du Code civil 8 .
2) Sous-traitance
Est-ce que l’éventuel droit d’exploitation personnelle d’un copropriétaire implique également
la possibilité de faire appel à un sous-traitant ?
2.1. Régimes spécifiques
a. Droit d’auteur
La LDA ne contient pas de dispositions particulières en la matière. Le droit commun trouvera
donc à s’appliquer (voy. infra 2.2).
7 J.F. ROMAIN, “Copropriété et autonomie de la volonté: de la copropriété volontaire à titre principal et de l’application
de l’article 815 du Code Civil”, in Les Copropriétés, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1999, nr. 1, p. 10.
8 R. DEKKERS et E. DIRIX, Handboek Burgerlijk recht, Dl. II, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2005, nr. 290, p. 121 et les
références citées
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. Droit des marques
La CBPI ne contient pas de dispositions particulières en la matière. Le droit commun trouvera
donc à s’appliquer (voy. infra 2.2).
c. Droit des dessins et modèles
La CBPI ne contient pas de dispositions particulières en la matière. Le droit commun trouvera
donc à s’appliquer (voy. infra 2.2).
d. Droit des brevets
Le titulaire d’un brevet a le droit exclusif d’exploiter celui-ci, ce qui couvre, notamment, la
fabrication, l’offre, la mise dans le commerce, l’utilisation, l’importation ou la détention aux
fins précitées du produit objet du brevet (art. 27, §1 er , a) LDI).
Selon une première tendance, il en résulte que les actes de « sous-traitance » visés dans
la question 2 du questionnaire à savoir «subcontracting the manufacturing of all or part
of the invention being the subject matter of the patent» devront faire l’objet d’une licence
d’exploitation dans la mesure où ces actes de « sous-traitance » visent des prérogatives
exclusives du titulaire du brevet, lesquelles ne peuvent dès lors être « déléguées » que dans le
cadre d’une licence. En d’autres termes, la fabrication par un tiers, quel qu’il soit, d’une partie
ou de la totalité de l’invention couverte par le brevet ne pourrait être qualifiée d’exploitation
personnelle de ce brevet mais constitue un acte qui nécessitera le concours de tous les
copropriétaires.
A cet égard, comme nous le verrons également dans la question 3, l’article 43, §2, LDI
dispose qu’«un copropriétaire ne peut […] concéder une licence d’exploitation [sur tout ou
partie du brevet] […] qu’avec l’accord de l’autre copropriétaire ou, à défaut d’accord, avec
l’autorisation du tribunal». Ainsi, dans la mesure où il est estimé que l’acte de sous-traitance
(«subcontracting») visé à la question 2 doit faire l’objet d’une licence d’exploitation (dès
lors que l‘acte envisagé ressort des prérogatives exclusives du titulaire du brevet), seule
une convention entre les copropriétaires pourra prévoir une éventuelle dérogation quant à
l’exigence d’un accord de l’ensemble des copropriétaires.
Cette thèse ne fait cependant pas l’unanimité. Selon une autre tendance, la sous-traitance ne
requiert pas l’accord des autres copropriétaires, dès lors que la ratio legis de l’article 43, §
2 LBI ne viserait qu’ à garantir les copropriétaires contre l’apparition de nouveaux exploitants
du brevet sur le marché concerné, cette question ne se posant pas par rapport aux actes de
sous-traitance qui ne viseraient qu’ à permettre au copropriétaire concerné d’ exercer son
droit d’exploitation personnelle.
Vu l’absence de jurisprudence et le silence de la doctrine récente, il reste à voir laquelle de
ces thèses prévaudrait dans le contexte belge.
e. Droit des obtentions végétales
A défaut d’une quelconque règle énoncée dans la loi du 20 mai 1975, il faut ici aussi se
référer au régime de droit commun.
2.2. Régime de droit commun
L’article 577-2, §§ 5 et 6 du Code civil dispose que:
«§ 5. Le copropriétaire peut user et jouir de la chose commune conformément à sa
destination et dans la mesure compatible avec le droit de ses consorts.
Il fait valablement les actes purement conservatoires et les actes d’administration
provisoire.
§ 6. Ne sont valables que moyennant le concours de tous les copropriétaires les autres
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actes d’administration et les actes de disposition. Néanmoins, l’un des copropriétaires
peut contraindre les autres à participer aux actes d’administration reconnus nécessaires
par le juge».
Nous nous référons à cet égard à la réponse donnée aux questions 2 et 4, sous B dans notre
rapport sur la question Q194 traitée lors de l’EXCO 2007 à Singapour.
En résumé, l’article 577-2, §5, alinéa 1 er du Code civil implique, selon nous, que tout cotitulaire
peut exploiter personnellement le bien indivis. Cependant, son droit d’usage et de jouissance
individuelle est soumis à la double condition (i) de ne pas changer la destination du bien et
(ii) de ne pas empêcher les autres copropriétaires d’en user et d’en jouir également selon
leurs droits.
Le droit de concéder l’usage d’un droit, quel qu’il soit, sur le bien en copropriété («
subcontracting ») nécessitera par contre le concours de tous les copropriétaires en vertu de
l’article 577-2, § 5, alinéa 2 et § 6 du Code civil.
3) Influence de la nature de la licence concédée
La nature de la licence (exclusive ou non) a-t-elle une influence sur la possibilité pour le
copropriétaire de concéder des licences ?
3.1. Régimes spécifiques
a. Droit d’auteur
La LDA ne contient aucune disposition spécifique quant à la possibilité pour les copropriétaires
d’une œuvre couverte par le droit d’auteur de concéder des licences sur celle-ci. C’est donc le
droit commun de la copropriété qui trouvera à s’appliquer à cet égard.
b. Droit des marques
Ni l’article 2.32 de la CBPI, ni l’article 22 du Règlement n° 40/94 sur la marque communautaire,
consacrant la possibilité de donner une marque en licence, ne règlent la question de la
licence d’une marque détenue en copropriété. On appliquera dès lors à nouveau les règles
de droit civil belge à cet égard.
S’agissant plus précisément du nombre de licences pouvant être consenties, la CBPI ne limite
pas leur nombre. Il importe cependant d’éviter de se retrouver dans une situation où les
différents co-titulaires auraient conféré un nombre à ce point important de licences sur la
marque, qu’elle pourrait perdre sa fonction distinctive.
On peut à cet égard songer au cas assez exceptionnel qu’eut à connaître la Cour de justice
Benelux dans son arrêt Beaphar du 19 décembre 1997 9 : le titulaire d’une marque de forme
avait mis dans le commerce les produits qu’il fabriquait sous cette forme et les avait revêtus de
sa propre marque verbale, alors qu’il avait également autorisé d’autres agents économiques
à mettre dans le commerce des produits similaires provenant de leurs entreprises et ayant une
forme identique mais sous une autre dénomination ou sous leur propre marque verbale ou
figurative avec indication de leurs propres entreprises.
Dans ce cas, on peut craindre que la marque de forme en cause ne permette plus au public de
reconnaître le produit marqué provenant d’une entreprise déterminée, ce qui signifie qu’elle a
perdu son pouvoir distinctif 10 . Tel pourrait ainsi être le cas si les co-titulaires devaient multiplier
inconsidérément le nombre de licences sur la marque détenue en copropriété.
9 Ing. Cons., 1997, p. 404.
10 A. BRAUN et E. CORNU, op. cit., p. 598, n° 524ter.
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c. Droit des dessins et modèles
Une fois de plus, dès lors que la CBPI ne contient aucune disposition spécifique en matière
de copropriété de dessin ou modèle, c’est le droit commun qui s’applique à la question de
savoir si et à quelles conditions un copropriétaire peut concéder seul une licence exclusive
ou non exclusive.
d. Droit des brevets
En matière de brevets, l’article 43, § 2 LBI prévoit expressément qu’un copropriétaire ne peut
concéder une licence d’exploitation qu’avec l’accord du ou des autres copropriétaires ou, à
défaut d’accord, avec l’autorisation du tribunal.
Aucune distinction n’est faite entre les licences exclusives et non exclusives. Dans les deux cas,
il y a donc lieu d’obtenir l’accord du ou des autres copropriétaires.
e. Droit des obtentions végétales
A défaut d’une quelconque règle énoncée dans la loi du 20 mai 1975, il faut à nouveau se
référer au régime de droit commun.
3.2. Régime de droit commun
Nous nous référons à cet égard à la réponse donnée à la question 4, sous B dans notre
rapport sur la question Q194 traitée lors de l’EXCO 2007 à Singapour.
L’article 577-2, § 5 du Code civil permet à chaque copropriétaire de faire valablement des
actes purement conservatoires, ainsi que des actes d’administration provisoire. Le paragraphe
6 de cette même disposition précise que «ne sont valables que moyennant le concours de tous
les copropriétaires les autres actes d’administration et les actes de disposition. Néanmoins,
l’un des copropriétaires peut contraindre les autres à participer aux actes d’administration
reconnus nécessaires par le juge».
A cet égard, on peut considérer que l’octroi d’une licence, qu’elle soit exclusive ou même
non exclusive, ainsi a fortiori que l’octroi de plusieurs licences constituent non pas un acte
d’administration provisoire, mais bien un acte d’administration ou de disposition du droit
intellectuel en cause. Cet acte nécessitera donc l’accord des autres co-titulaires. A défaut, le
tribunal tranchera le différend entre eux.
La nature des licences (exclusives ou non) n’a pas d’importance à cet égard.
4) Cession de tout ou partie de sa quote-part de copropriété
Le copropriétaire d’un droit intellectuel peut-il céder tout ou partie seulement de sa quotepart?
4.1. Régimes spécifiques
a. Droit d’auteur
La LDA ne contient aucune disposition spécifique sur ce point.
L’aliénation de tout ou partie d’une quote-part semble toutefois permise puisque aucune
disposition spéciale ne l’interdit (voy. question 5.A de notre rapport sur la question Q194
traitée lors de l’EXCO 2007 à Singapour). Le coauteur cédant conserverait son droit moral et
le cessionnaire, ne disposant pas de plus de droits que le cédant, ne pourra exploiter l’œuvre
sans l’assentiment des autres coauteurs, sauf dans la mesure permise par l’article 5, alinéa
2 LDA (s’appliquerait ici le régime d’exploitation étudié à la question 2 de notre rapport
précédent).
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. Droit des marques
L’article 2.31, § 2 de la CBPI, qui concerne la cession de la marque Benelux, ne prévoit
aucune disposition spécifique s’agissant d’une marque détenue en copropriété. Dès lors, il y
aura lieu de se référer au droit commun.
Tout comme la licence, la cession de la marque dans son ensemble nécessite l’accord de tous
les co-titulaires, car il s’agit d’un acte de disposition, qui nécessite conformément à l’article
577-2, § 6 du Code civil l’accord de tous les copropriétaires. A défaut d’accord, le tribunal
tranchera le différend entre les copropriétaires.
En revanche, s’il s’agit seulement de céder tout ou partie de sa part indivise sur la marque,
l’accord des autres co-titulaires n’est pas nécessaire.
c. Droit des dessins et modèles
Comme indiqué plus haut, la CBPI ne contient aucune disposition spécifique en matière de
copropriété de dessin ou modèle. C’est le droit commun qui s’applique donc à la question
de savoir si et à quelles conditions un copropriétaire céder tout ou partie de sa quote-part
de copropriété.
d. Droit des brevets
L’article 43 § 2 stipule que dans l’hypothèse où l’un des copropriétaires désire céder sa
quote-part, le ou les autres copropriétaires dispose(nt) d’un droit de préemption pendant trois
mois à compter de la notification du projet de cession.
La partie la plus diligente peut demander au président du tribunal de désigner un expert
selon les règles du référé afin de fixer les conditions de la cession. Le cas échéant, les
conclusions de l’expert lient les parties, à moins que, dans le mois de leur notification, une
des parties ne fasse savoir qu’elle renonce à la cession, les dépens afférents étant dans ce
cas mis à sa charge.
Le droit de préemption s’appliquera également lorsqu’un copropriétaire désire céder une
partie de sa quote-part.
e. Droit des obtentions végétales
A nouveau, nous ne pouvons que nous référer sur ce point au droit commun.
4.2. Régime de droit commun
Dans notre rapport sur la question Q194 traitée lors du EXCO 2007 à Singapour (questions
2 et 4, sous B), nous avons déjà indiqué que la vente (cession) ou tout autre transfert par
un copropriétaire de la quote-part qu’il possède en copropriété dans un droit de propriété
intellectuelle ne requiert pas le concours des autres copropriétaires 11 .
En ce sens, l’article 577-2, § 4 du Code civil dispose en effet que «le copropriétaire peut
disposer de sa part et la grever de droits réels».
Cela vaut également pour la vente (cession) ou tout autre transfert par un copropriétaire d’une
partie de la quote-part qu’il possède en copropriété dans un droit de propriété intellectuelle.
Dans cette dernière hypothèse, et à défaut de convention, les parts indivises seront présumées
égales (article 577-2, § 2 du Code civile).
Enfin, dans la mesure où la loi n’impose pas de conditions spécifiques quant à la procédure
à suivre pour la cession des parts dans la copropriété, les dispositions de droit commun en
matière de transport de créances et d’autres droits incorporels sont applicables (art. 1689-
1701 C. civ.).
11 Sous réserve d’une éventuelle convention contraire entre les copropriétaires qui restent libres de conférer un caractère
intuitu personae à la copropriété.
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5) Droit de la concurrence – risque de position dominante
Existe-t-il des règles spécifiques dans le droit de la concurrence régissant la copropriété d’un
droit intellectuel?
En Belgique, le droit de la concurrence constitue un corps de règles indépendant devant être
respecté par tout un chacun quelle que soit la nature du droit qu’il entend exercer.
Il n’existe pas de règles de concurrence propres à la matière de la copropriété et/ou des
droits intellectuels de sorte que dans un cas comme dans l’autre, et a fortiori en cas de
copropriété de droits intellectuels, le droit commun de la concurrence trouvera à s’appliquer
(art. 81 et 82 du Traité instituant la Communauté européenne et loi belge sur la protection de
la concurrence économique, coordonnée le 15 septembre 2006).
Quoi qu’il en soit, il nous semble que la question 5 du questionnaire nous ayant été
communiqué est mal formulée.
En effet, dans l’hypothèse où un des copropriétaires refuse, par exemple, de donner son
accord à l’octroi d’une licence – ce qui, dans les faits, pourrait effectivement avoir pour effet
de réduire le nombre de concurrents –, il ne fait qu’exercer son droit de copropriétaire sans
qu’il puisse se voir accuser d’abuser d’une quelconque position dominante.
Si le désaccord entre les copropriétaires persiste, il est alors possible de saisir le tribunal,
lequel tranchera le litige. Le cas échéant, le tribunal pourra, conformément à l’article 43, §2
LDI, autoriser la licence sollicitée et, éventuellement, déclarer qu’en refusant de donner son
accord à l’octroi de ladite licence, le copropriétaire récalcitrant a commis un abus de droit.
Ainsi, le problème abordé à la question 5 relève davantage de la question de l’abus de droit
que de l’abus de position dominante et/ou, plus généralement, du droit de la concurrence.
6) Règles de conflits de lois en cas de copropriété de droits intellectuels
Est-ce que la loi nationale accepte que la copropriété des droits intellectuels puisse être régie,
même en cas d‘absence de contrat entre les copropriétaires, par le droit national de l‘état
avec lequel le droit intellectuel considéré présente les liens les plus étroits?
Si tel est le cas, quels sont les éléments à prendre en considération pour évaluer ces liens?
Pour répondre à la question, il faut tout d’abord faire une distinction entre la propriété
industrielle (principalement les brevets d’invention, les obtentions végétales, les dessins et
modèles et les marques) et la propriété intellectuelle au sens strict (droit d’auteur, droits
voisins, banques de données, semi-conducteurs).
- En ce qui concerne la propriété industrielle, l’article 93, alinéa 2, du Code belge
de droit international privé (ci-après «Code DIP» – Loi du 16 juillet 2004 portant le Code
de Droit International Privé) stipule que:
«La détermination du titulaire originaire d’un droit de propriété industrielle 12 est régie
par le droit de l’Etat avec lequel l’activité intellectuelle présente les liens les plus étroits.
Lorsque l’activité a lieu dans le cadre de relations contractuelles, il est présumé, sauf
preuve contraire, que cet Etat est celui dont le droit est applicable à ces relations».
La loi fait donc clairement référence au pays avec lequel «l’activité intellectuelle» (non
pas le droit intellectuel) présente les liens les plus étroits.
Il est communément, admis, que par l’expression «l’Etat avec lequel l’activité intellectuelle
présente les liens les plus étroits» est désignée la loi où l’acte créateur prend sa source 13 .
C’est la règle de la lex loci originis.
12 Exposé des motifs, p. 119 : la propriété industrielle doit être comprise au sens de la convention d’Union de Paris.
13 A. PUTTEMANS, « Les droits intellectuels et la concurrence déloyale dans le Code de droit international privé »,
R.D.C., 2005, p. 621, K. ROOX, «Intellectuele eigendom in het nieuwe wetboek IPR», IRDI, 2005, p. 154.
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En pratique, au cas où l’acte créateur est effectué par plusieurs personnes se trouvant
dans plusieurs Etats, il faudra déterminer dans les faits avec lequel de ces Etats l’activité
intellectuelle présente les liens les plus étroits pour déterminer le droit applicable.
A cette fin, on pourrait envisager d’utiliser des critères tel que le centre décisionnel de
l’activité intellectuelle, le temps passé, le nombre de personnes impliqués, le know-how et
les appareils utilisés lors de l’activité intellectuelle, etc. On pourrait également imaginer
faire une pondération de ces différents critères.
Relevons encore que le critère de rattachement de l’article 93, alinéa 2, du Code DIP, peut
présenter quelques difficultés d’application pour les marques et les noms commerciaux
qui ne présupposent pas nécessairement une activité intellectuelle, en tant que droit
d’occupation 14 .
Notons que, pour simplifier les choses, le législateur a prévu une présomption réfragable
dans l’hypothèse où il existerait un contrat entre les copropriétaires (voir ci-dessous).
- En ce qui concerne la propriété intellectuelle au sens strict, c’est la règle de
la lex loci protectionis qui s’applique, soit en vertu de la Convention de Berne, soit en
application de Code DIP. Il n’est ici donc pas fait référence à l’état avec lequel le droit
intellectuel présente les liens les plus étroits.
En effet, il est communément admis que l’article 5.2 et l’article 14bis, alinéa 2, a) (pour
les œuvres cinématographiques) de la Convention de Berne contiennent des règles de
conflits de lois 15 . Or, ces articles de la Convention de Berne dont les dispositions priment
sur le Code DIP, se réfèrent explicitement à la législation du pays où la protection est
réclamée.
De surcroît, la règle générale de l’article 93, alinéa 1 er , du Code DIP est applicable pour
déterminer le ou les titulaires de droits intellectuels au sens strict en cas de conflits de
lois 16 . Cet article fait également application de la lex loci protectionis:
«Les droits de propriété intellectuelle sont régis par le droit de l’Etat pour le territoire
duquel la protection de la propriété est demandée».
Est-ce que le Règlement EU 583/2008 (Rome I) peut être applicable aux contrats de
copropriété ?
Comme annoncé ci-dessus, pour pallier à la difficulté de déterminer «l’Etat avec lequel
l’activité intellectuelle présente les liens les plus étroits», l’article 93, alinéa 2 du Code DIP
susmentionné instaure une présomption réfragable aux termes de laquelle : quand il existe
un contrat encadrant l’activité intellectuelle, le droit applicable au contrat déterminera la loi
applicable.
Or, pour déterminer la loi applicable au contrat, l’article 98, § 1 er du Code DIP dispose que
«le droit applicable aux obligations contractuelles est déterminé par la Convention sur la loi
applicable aux obligations contractuelles, conclu à Rome le 19 juin 1980».
A cet égard, l’article 24 du Règlement de Rome I dispose que ce Règlement remplace la
Convention de Rome et que toute référence à la Convention de Rome s’entend comme fait au
Règlement Rome I.
14 A. PUTTEMANS, «Les droits intellectuels et la concurrence déloyale dans le Code de droit international privé», op.cit.,
p. 621.
15 F. DE VISSCHER et B. MICHAUX, op. cit., p. 560-562, n° 713.
16 A. PUTTEMANS, «Les droits intellectuels et la concurrence déloyale dans le Code de droit international privé», op.cit.,
p. 621 ; M. PERTEGAS, Internationaal Privaatrecht, Intersentia, 2006, p. 477 ; K. ROOX, op.cit. p. 154 ; M. PERTEGAS
et H. BOULARBAH, «Le nouveau droit international privé belge», J.T., 2005, p. 202.
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Le Règlement Rome I prévoit principalement ce qui suit:
- Principe de l’autonomie de la volonté : Les parties signataires d’un contrat peuvent choisir
la loi qui s’applique à tout ou une partie de ce contrat. D’un commun accord, elles peuvent
changer la loi applicable au contrat lorsqu’elles le souhaitent (art. 3 du Règlement Rome
I);
- Si les parties n’ont pas choisi explicitement une loi applicable, le contrat est régi par la
loi du pays avec lequel il présente les liens les plus étroits, selon le principe de proximité
(lieu de la résidence habituelle ou de l’administration centrale du prestataire, lieu du
principal établissement ou de l’établissement qui assure la prestation, etc.) (art. 8 du
Règlement Rome I);
- Pour le contrat de travail, est d’application:
• la loi du pays où le travailleur accomplit habituellement son travail, même s’il est détaché
à titre temporaire dans un autre pays;
• si le travailleur n’accomplit pas habituellement son travail dans un même pays, la loi du
pays où se trouve l’établissement qui a embauché le travailleur;
• s’il résulte de l’ensemble des circonstances que le contrat de travail présente des liens
plus étroits avec un autre pays, la loi du pays avec lequel le contrat de travail présente
des liens les plus étroits.
Enfin, il convient de souligner que si les protagonistes décident de choisir une autre loi
applicable au contrat, ce choix ne peut se faire aux dépens de la protection du travailleur
(art. 8 du Règlement Rome I).
7) Questions pertinentes en matière de copropriété de droits intellectuels
N/A
II)
Proposition pour une future harmonisation
Sur ce point, nous nous permettons de reproduire ci-dessous la proposition que nous avions
formulée dans le cadre de l’EXCO 2007 de Singapour.
Ainsi, selon nous, le principe de la liberté contractuelle doit continuer à s’appliquer entre
cotitulaires. Des règles supplétives, telles celles prévues à l’article 577-2 §1 er et suiv. du Code
civil, apparaissent adéquates et suffisantes.
A défaut de convention contraire, chaque cotitulaire doit être présumé avoir une part égale
aux autres cotitulaires et chacun doit pouvoir faire usage du droit de propriété intellectuelle.
De même, chaque cotitulaire devrait pouvoir agir contre les actes de contrefaçon sans
dépendre de l’accord des autres cotitulaires. Toutefois, les actes de dispositions tels l’octroi
d’une licence doivent continuer à être soumis à l’accord des autres cotitulaires.
Cela étant, la co-titularité sur une marque individuelle est une situation qui ne devrait être
que passagère, comme c’est le cas dans une indivision ou dans le cadre d’une entreprise
momentanée. Dans la mesure du possible, cette situation doit en effet être évitée car, d’une
part, elle peut être source de conflit entre cotitulaires et dès lors d’insécurité juridique à
l’égard des tiers, mais surtout d’autre part, parce que la nature de la marque est de distinguer
les produits ou les services d’une entreprise déterminée et non de plusieurs entreprises
distinctes.
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Summary
First of all, we would remind you that, in Belgium, there is neither a uniform law regulating the coownership
of all intellectual property rights nor a complete co-ownership system specified by each
piece of special IP legislation Therefore, in the absence of specific dispositions, Belgian common
law on co-ownership will apply to intellectual property rights.
1. Impact of the voluntary or “forced” origin of co-ownership
None of the special IP laws distinguish between the methods of exploitation of an IP right on the
near basis of whether the co-ownership of this right has been established voluntarily or if this was
“forced”.
While common law on co-ownership does differentiate between different kinds of co-ownership
according to the circumstances in which the co-ownership was created (“ordinary/fortuitous”,
“forced” and “voluntary”), this distinction is purely terminological as, in practice, the co-owners’
prerogatives are basically the same (free disposal of his/her co-owned share), independently of the
kind of co-ownership considered.
2. Possibility for a co-owner to sub-contract the exploitation of his co-owned
share
None of the special IP laws regulate this matter, so common law must apply.
Each co-owner can personally exploit the co-owned good. Yet, the right to grant the use of a right
on this good, including, for example, to call in a sub-contractor, requires the agreement of all the
co-owners.
However, we note that there is no unanimity on the fact that this common-law principle can be
applied to patent rights, as some argue that the co-owner of a patent is entitled to call in a subcontractor
without the other co-owners’ approval.
3. Impact of the nature of a licence (exclusive or not) on the co-owner’s right
to grant licences
Whereas the law on patents contains a specific disposition on the question of granting a licence,
the other special IP laws do not contain any such disposition, so once again, common law applies.
In any case, whichever law applies, and whatever the nature of the licences, the agreement of
every co-owner is required. If this cannot be obtained, a court can be asked to make a ruling on
the question.
4. Possibility to transfer or assign all or part of a co-owned share of an IP
right
Once more, the law on patents is the only one which includes a disposition on this question: it
states that, when a co-owner wants to transfer all or part of his share, the other co-owners have a
right of pre-emption for 3 months from the date the co-owner notifies them of his/her intention to
transfer the right.
For all other IP rights, common law stipulates that a co-owner can transfer all or part of his/her
share without having to ask for the other co-owners’ agreement.
5. Competition rules applying to the co-ownership of an IP right
In the absence of any other specific rules, the general law on competition applies to co-ownership
of IP rights.
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6. Law applicable to co-ownership of IP rights co-existing in different
countries
In order to determine the applicable law, a distinction must be made between industrial property
(e.g. patent, plant variety right, design or trademark) and intellectual property sensu stricto (e.g.
copyright and related rights, database, etc.).
For industrial property, the applicable law is determined by applying the rule of lex loci originis
(law of the country with which the intellectual activity is the most closely connected, generally being
the location of the creative act – Art. 93, 1 of the Belgian Code of Private International Law).
For intellectual property sensu stricto, the rule of lex loci originis only applies when determining the
owner of the rights. However, the rule of lex loci protectionis will apply in every other case (law of
the country where the protection is sought – Bern Convention).
Eventually, if a contract regulates the intellectual activity, the law applicable to the contract will
determine the law applicable to the intellectual right concerned. In this respect, Article 98, § 1 er
of the Belgian Code of Private International Law refers to the Rome I Regulation in application of
which the parties to a contract can choose the applicable law. In the absence of such a choice, the
contract will be governed by the law of the of the country with which it is most closely connected.
Résumé
Tout d’abord, il convient de rappeler qu’en Belgique, il n’existe pas de régime uniforme de la
copropriété des droits de propriété intellectuelle, pas plus qu’il n’existe un régime spécifique de
copropriété propre à chaque droit de propriété intellectuelle. Ainsi, dans le silence des législations
spéciales, le droit commun de la copropriété trouve à s’appliquer.
1. Incidence de l’origine volontaire ou « forcée » de la copropriété
Aucune des législations spéciales ne fait de distinction quant aux modes d’exploitation des droits
intellectuels considérés selon que la copropriété soit volontaire ou «forcée».
En ce qui concerne le droit commun de la copropriété, s’il existe bien différentes catégories de
copropriété selon les circonstances dans lesquelles celle-ci naît (copropriété ordinaire/fortuite,
forcée et volontaire), il échet cependant de constater que cette catégorisation est d’ordre purement
terminologique dès lors que dans la pratique, les prérogatives des copropriétaires sont, en
principe, identiques quelle que soit la forme de copropriété considérée (libre disposition de la
partie privative).
2. Possibilité pour un copropriétaire de faire appel à un sous-traitant
Dès lors que cette possibilité n’est envisagée dans aucune des législations spéciales, le droit
commun trouve à s’appliquer.
A cet égard, si tout copropriétaire peut exploiter personnellement le bien indivis, le droit de
concéder l’usage d’un droit, quel qu’il soit, sur ce bien (comme, par exemple, faire appel à un soustraitant)
nécessitera par contre le concours de tous les copropriétaires.
Toutefois, nous notons que le principe ainsi dégagé ne fait pas l’unanimité en ce qui concerne la
possibilité pour le copropriétaire d’un brevet de faire appel à un sous-traitant, certains étant d’avis
qu’un tel acte doit pouvoir être accompli personnellement.
3. Influence de la nature de la licence (exclusive ou non) sur la possibilité
pour le copropriétaire de concéder des licences
Seule la loi sur les brevets d’invention contient une disposition spécifique à l’octroi d’une licence
d’exploitation, tandis qu’en ce qui concerne les autres droits intellectuels, le droit commun est
applicable. Quoi qu’il en soit, quelle que soit la législation considérée, la nature des licences n’a
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pas d’importance, l’accord de tous les copropriétaires étant requis, à défaut de quoi, le tribunal
pourra être amené à trancher.
4. Possibilité de céder tout ou partie seulement de sa quote-part
Une fois de plus, seule la loi sur les brevets d’invention règle cette question de manière spécifique.
A cet égard, dans l’hypothèse où l’un des copropriétaires désire céder tout ou partie de sa quotepart,
le ou les autres copropriétaires dispose(nt) d’un droit de préemption pendant trois mois à
compter de la notification du projet de cession.
En ce qui concerne les autres droits de propriété intellectuelle, le droit commun dispose que la
cession par un copropriétaire de tout ou partie de sa quote-part ne requiert pas le concours des
autres copropriétaires.
5. Règles de droit de la concurrence régissant la copropriété d’un droit
intellectuel
Il n’existe pas de règles de concurrence propres à la matière de la copropriété et/ou des droits
intellectuels de sorte que dans un cas comme dans l’autre, le droit commun de la concurrence
trouvera à s’appliquer.
6. Règles de conflit de lois en cas de copropriété de droits intellectuels
Pour déterminer les règles de conflit de lois applicables, il faut tout d’abord distinguer la propriété
industrielle (brevet, obtention végétale, dessin et modèle et marque) et la propriété intellectuelle au
sens strict (droit d’auteur, droits voisins, banques de données, semi-conducteurs).
Ainsi, en matière de propriété industrielle, c’est la règle de la lex loci originis qui s’applique (loi
de l’Etat avec lequel l’activité intellectuelle présente les liens les plus étroits, le plus souvent, lieu de
l’acte créateur – art. 93, alinéa 1 er Code DIP).
En matière de propriété intellectuelle au sens strict, si la règle du lex loci originis s’applique
également pour déterminer le(s) titulaire(s) des droits considérés, la règle de la lex loci protectionis
trouve par contre à s’appliquer dans les autres cas (loi de l’Etat où la protection est réclamée –
Convention de Berne).
Enfin, lorsqu’un contrat encadre l’activité intellectuelle, le droit applicable au contrat détermine la
loi applicable au droit intellectuel considéré. A cet égard, l’article 98, § 1 er du Code DIP renvoie
au Règlement de Rome I en vertu duquel les parties signataires d’un contrat peuvent choisir la loi
qui s’applique à tout ou une partie de ce contrat. A défaut de quoi, le contrat est régi par la loi du
pays avec lequel il présente les liens les plus étroits.
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Brazil
Brésil
Brasilien
Report Q194
in the name of the Brazilian Group
by Cláudio Roberto Barbosa, Juliana L. B. Viegas and Marcio Merkl
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Brazilian legislation makes no distinction between the voluntary and the non-voluntary coownership
deriving from an IP Right.
Even considering situations in which there is a mandatory co-ownership of an IP Right, as
provided for in the law fostering innovation by means of joint efforts from public and private
organizations (Brazilian Law nb. 10,973/04 and its regulating Decree nb. 5,563/95), there
are no legal rules concerning permissions, control and economic implications of further
exercise of co-ownership of an IP Right, but for the general rules of the Brazilian Civil Code
(hereinafter “BCC”) mentioned in the previous report.
In fact, Brazilian Law regulates the exercise of co-ownership based on provisions established
by the Brazilian Civil Code and also based on few rules concerning the exercise of joint
ownership of an invention made by an employee (not specifically hired to research and
develop) using resources of its employer, regulated by the Brazilian Industrial Property Law.
This late regulation is established by article 91 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law (Law
nb. 9,279/96) and points that “[a]n invention or utility model shall be jointly owned, in
equal shares, if it results from the personal contribution of the employee and from resources,
data, means, materials, facilities or equipment of the employer, without prejudice to express
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contractual provisions to the contrary”. Concerning the exercise of the co-ownership, the
following paragraphs of the referred article provide that: (a) if more than one employee is
involved, employees share shall be equally divided among them; (b) the employer shall be
entitled to an exclusive license right for the exploitation and the employees shall receive a fair
remuneration; (c) the employer shall start the exploitation within one year from the granting
of the patent, otherwise the title to the patent shall be transferred to the employee(s), except if
the lack of exploitation resulted from justifiable reasons. A final provision reflects the general
Civil Code understanding concerning co-ownership granting to any of the co-owners, under
the same conditions, a preferred right in the event of an assignment.
Finally, as already mentioned in the previous report concerning co-ownership of IP Rights
in Brazil, besides the common basis established by the BCC, there are specific regulations
concerning the different IP Rights. Trademarks should be object of some careful consideration
due to the peculiar understanding of the Brazilian Trademark Office as stressed in the previous
report. Moreover, some additional regulation is art. 15 of Law nb 9,610/98 (Brazilian
Copyright Law, hereinafter “BCL”), art. 5 of Law nb. 9,456/97 (Plant Variety Protection Law)
and articles 27 and 28 of Law nb. 11,484/07 (concerning the Protection of Topographies of
Integrated Circuits).
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
There is no clear solution based on the Brazilian experience. The Brazilian group is concerned
and aware of the different problems that may arise if one of the co-owners subcontracts a
third company.
Under Brazilian Law, a co-owner of an IP Right is able to outsource or license his own part
of the patent. However, it is important to note that the exploitation made by one co-owner
(direct or outsourced) turns this co-owner accountable for the gains perceived, which must be
distributed among all the other co-owners, in the proportion of each respective shares (BCC,
articles 1319 and 1326). Therefore, any use of the co-ownership should, in theory, bring a
neutral or positive result to all co-owners. Nevertheless, in a controversial decision, the Court
of Justice of Rio de Janeiro (Panther et al vs. Crysfred et al, Ap. Cível No. 2007.00134403)
ruled that a co-owner of a patent may directly or indirectly exploit the patent rights.
As mentioned, a different situation may be faced when an action of a co-owner (either
directly or by means of an outsourcing) inflicts an undue burden upon any co-owner. The
solution would imply in the usual compensation of damages.
As it is agreed that the outsourcing or licensing could bring some difficulties related to the
exploitation of an IP Right, a possible legislative solution to prevent such impasse could
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encompass the establishment, or the enlargement of the scope, of a right of first refusal
(preference) concerning any co-owner right, assignment, outsourcing, and/or licensing of a
co-owner over its share of an IP Right.
Nevertheless, it is important to consider that cooperation among the co-owners could be the
most effective solution even when considered a joint ownership of an IP Right by competitors.
Examples from pool of patents owners to the same technology (video and music patterns and
formats, as well as video and music compression technologies, etc.) could be a clear example
of cooperation within co-ownership in a broader sense (as there is seldom a co-ownership
within a single IP Right, but the technology itself is built upon several different IP Rights).
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The difference between “non-exclusive” and “exclusive” licenses concerning co-ownership
represents a particularly difficult problem and should be object of a previous discussion
related to their terminology. In this sense, it is convenient to differentiate “exclusive licenses”
from “single licenses”. If all jointly owners could license the technology, it is not exact to
consider any license granted by one particular co-owner as “exclusive” because each license
should coexist with the license granted by the other co-owners.
Besides the terminology issue, the Brazilian Group does not agree that the nature of the
license would be able to overcome the fact that a co-owner is able to cause damages to other
co-owner by the legal exercise of his right to use, license or outsource.
Such situations of potential damages caused in despite of the fulfilment of legal dispositions
could be remedied, under Brazilian Law, by the general doctrine of abuse of right and fraud 1
or, in some particular situations, the general principles against unfair competition. However,
a possible solution to prevent such damages is to force co-owners to a prior negotiation
and the solution already presented herein is the establishment of a mandatory right of first
refusal.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
1. Concerning fraud, please see Josserand, Louis. L’Esprit des droits et de leur relativité. Théorie dite de l’abus des droits.
Dalloz : Paris, 1927; Lima, Alvino. A fraude no direito civil. Saraiva ; São Paulo, 1965.
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may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
According to the general rules on co-ownership established by the BCC, each co-owner
is free to exercise all ownership rights to the undivided asset, but should observe some
conditions, concerning the right to sell and assign its respective share (BCC, article 1322
and its sole paragraph). These general rules should be regarded with extreme caution when
applied to IP co-owned rights.
As previously mentioned (items 2 and 3, above) the Brazilian Group understands that a
feasible solution could encompass the establishment of a mandatory right of first refusal
(preference) concerning any co-owner right, assignment and/or licensing of the jointly owned
IP right.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
The situation is likely to receive no special treatment under the Brazilian Law than other coownership
or other usual situations (such a specific purpose company, a joint venture, or any
other form of association among companies). If by consequence of a co-ownership of an IP
Right a dominant position under a market is established, Brazilian Competition Law (Law nb.
8,884/94) would be applied.
It is likely that Brazilian Antitrust Law could be applied to a similar situation, mainly because
the impact of the agreement on the market is a matter of public interest and the antitrust
provisions are aimed to the effects of the co-ownership on the market. Brazilian Antitrust Law
defines as a “dominant position” the control of a 20% share of the relevant market. Thus,
situations among companies that combined control less than 20% of the relevant market
usually are not scrutinized by the Brazilian antitrust authorities. Concerning license limitations,
article 21, X of Brazilian Competition Law should also be considered.
(The mentioned article provides that certain actions, such as but not limited to the ones listed
therein, may be considered anti-competitive. Among the listed actions, the referred item X
mentions the regulation of markets of goods and services by means of agreements for the
purpose of limiting or controlling the research and development, the production of goods
and the supply of services, or for the purpose of jeopardising investments for production and
distribution of goods and services.)
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6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
Under Brazilian law it is likely that an agreement concerning areas not directly governed by
Brazilian legislation would be accepted and, moreover, this agreement could be ruled by a
foreign law even if some of its clauses handle the relation among the co-owners.
However, in the absence of an agreement among the co-owners, it is extremely unlikely that
a foreign law could be applied to govern the co-ownership of an IP Right by itself.
It is also important to stress that all contracts to be performed at least partially in Brazil must
consider Brazilian law also applicable regardless of a choice of foreign law, because the
Brazilian Superior Court of Justice holds that the rules contained in the Brazilian legal system
which are considered mandatory (of “public interest”) must always be respected.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
There are no further comments from the Brazilian group.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
Proposals for the future harmonisation were made during the discussions of the points raised
by the working guidelines. There are no further proposals from the Brazilian group.
Summary
Brazilian legislation makes no distinction between the voluntary and the non-voluntary co ownership
deriving from an IP Right. Brazilian Law regulates the exercise of co-ownership based on provisions
established by the Brazilian Civil Code and also based on few rules concerning the exercise of
joint ownership established by the Brazilian Industrial Property Law. A possible solution in order to
harmonize internationally co-ownership related to IP Rights is the establishment, or the enlargement
of the scope, of a right of first refusal (preference) concerning any co-owner right, assignment,
outsourcing, and/or licensing of a co-owner over its share of an IP Right.
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Résumé
La legislation brésilienne ne fait pas de distinction entre la co-propriété volontaire e non volontaire
ressortissant d´un droit de propriété industrielle. La loi brésilienne régule l´exercice de la co-propriété
selon les régles du Code Civil brésilien et encore dans quelques règles concernant l´exercice de
propriété conjointe établie dans la Loi de Propriété Industrielle brésilienne. Une solution possible
pour harmoniser mondialement la co-propriété relatif aux droits de propriété industrielle, c´est
l´établissement, ou l´élargissement de l´objectif, du droit de préférence rélatif a n´importe quel droit
de co-propriété, cession, outsourcing, et/ou licence d´un co-propriétaire sur sa part du droit de
propriété intellectuelle.
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Canada
Canada
Kanada
Report Q194
in the name of the Canadian Group
by Bruce Morgan, Philip Mendes da Costa and Michael Crinson
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) Regulation of co-ownership
The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
The groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the co-ownership
of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of an IP Right
in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other situations,
including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In Canada, neither the IP statutes nor common law provide any distinction as to the nature
of co-ownership on the basis of voluntary or involuntary acquisition. However, co-ownership
may be either joint ownership or ownership as tenants-in-common. Joint ownership arises,
at common law, when joint ownership is expressly provided in the agreement, or where the
ownership agreement provided a unity of interest, a unity of title, a unity of time and a unity of
possession. In all other cases, there will be ownership as tenants in common. Joint tenancy
automatically transfers legal title to the survivor(s) in case of death of a joint owner, whereas
tenants-in-common retain title and must transfer it through succession provisions.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Various Canadian IP statues do recognize that IP rights may be owned by more than one
legal entity. In particular, as detailed below, patents, designs and copyright may each be
registered in the name of multiple owners. The Registrar of Trademarks will only permit a
trademark to be registered to a single entity, although the single entity might be a joint venture
of two or more owners (Trade-marks Examination Manual, section II.5.2.5).
• Inventions, and accordingly, utility patents, may be assigned “either as to the whole
interest or any part thereof “(Patent Act, Section 50).
• Designs may be assigned, “either as the whole interest or any undivided part” (Industrial
Design Act, Section 13).
• The Copyright Act provides that the author(s) of a work is(are) the first owner(s) of copyright
unless the work is made in the course of employment in which case the employer is the
first owner. The owner may assign the right, either wholly or partially (Copyright Act,
Section 13). The Registrar of Copyrights shall register an assignment of copyright, or a
license granting an interest in copyright (Copyright Act, Section 57).
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• A trademark is transferable (Trademark Act, Section 48) However, Section 48(2) provides
that a trademark may be held non-distinctive as a result of the transfer of the trademark
to two or more persons and the trademark is used by more than one person.
There is no statutory definition of the rights of co-owners of IP rights in Canadian IP statutes.
Accordingly, the rights of co-owners of an IP right have had to be determined by the courts.
In Canada, there has been a paucity of litigation on this point and accordingly, little guidance
is provided by jurisprudence.
2) Outsourcing and Subcontracting of IP Rights
This question covers not so much the right of a co-owner to exploit the IP right but whether the
party exploiting must account to co-owners.
In the case of patents, the leading case in common law jurisdictions held that a patent coowner
is entitled to personally exploit the patent without accounting to the co-owners (Forget
v. Specialty Tools, 62 C.P.R., 3d, 539). The only other case on point is a decision of the courts
of the Province of Quebec, which is a civil law jurisdiction, that held the opposite, (Marchand
v. Peloquin, 45 C.P.R. (2d) 48). Accordingly, in common law jurisdictions, a co-owner may
exploit a patent personally, but cannot grant a valid license without the consent of remaining
co-owners (Forget v. Specialty Tools). Further, a co-owner may dispose of its entire interest
but may not dispose of a part interest, or dispose of the entire interest to more than one party,
as this dilutes the rights of the remaining co-owners. A license is somewhat less than disposal
but still dilutes the rights, and consent is required.
As to subcontracting/outsourcing, the nature of the relationship will be determinative. A
license requires consent of the co-owners. A true agency relationship, however, is exploitation
by the principle and should not require consent of co-owners as thee is no dilution of the rights
(Forget v. Specialty Tools). Whether such an arrangement would be practical is a separate
issue. Nonetheless, at least under Quebec law, tenants-in-common would be required to
account to their co-owners in proportion to their respective interests. Joint tenants, however,
hold an undivided interest and consequently may not be required to account. There is no
Canadian case law on this point.
There is no Canadian law on this issue in respect of Designs, but the patent decisions would
likely be persuasive.
As to Copyright, there are many uncertainties. The Copyright Act, Section 19, provides
that royalties are payable for reproduction of a sound recording, payable equally to the
performer(s) and the maker(s), thereby recognizing implicitly the obligation of co-owners to
account
3) Is There Any Distinction in Law to the Granting of a Non-exclusive or an Exclusive License?
Prior to reviewing this issue, it is prudent to ensure there is clarity of terminology. Under
Canadian law, an exclusive licence grants the rights to the licensee to the exclusion of the
licensor. A sole licence provides that the licensee will be the only licensee, while the licensor
may still exploit the IP right. A non-exclusive license may permit several licenses to be granted
without inhibiting the licensor.
As stated by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Forget v. Specialty Tools, any license
requires consent of the co-owners, and absent consent, the license is void. Consequently,
exploitation pursuant to a void license constitutes infringement. The Forget case did not
distinguish between an exclusive license or any other form of license. It would seem logical,
however, that an exclusive license, by depriving the licensor of the right to exploit and
providing that right exclusively to the licensee, it is not a dilution of the patent rights any more
than an assignment of total interest is not a dilution. On that analysis, consent would not be
required, but the question is still open in the absence of any case law in support.
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4) Is It Possible to Transfer or Assign a Co-owned share of an IP Right.
According to Canadian statutory law, patents, designs and copyright may be assigned, in
whole or in part. Consequently, a co-owner may assign all or part of the co-owned IP right.
However, the statutes are not determinative of whether there must be an accounting by the
new owners. Following the logic of Forget v. Specialty Tools, the fundamental or essential
characteristic of a patent is the exclusive right to manufacture. Dilution of exclusivity will
defeat the legislative purpose underlying the Patent Act. Consequently, according to the
Forget logic, consent is required from other co-owners for a partial disposition of the patent
interest, whether by way of a partial disposition of the interest or by total disposition to more
than one party. The Forget court specially held the right to assign set out in Section 50 did
it not address the question of accountability, but rather that assignment is permissible. This
determination would likely be applied to other forms of IP rights as well.
5) Explain whether national laws address competition issues if co-owned IP rights give the coowners
the dominant position in the market, especially where there is an agreement between
them on exploitation of the co-owned IP rights such as refusal to license.
IP rights are “choses in action”, not chattles. There is not physical object to be exploited, and
the IP rights are essentially proscriptive rights – the IP rights holder has the right to prevent
others from exploiting the right. The grant of IP rights entitles the owner to utilize this right and
to retain the market for the IP rights owner. Such behaviour is not considered anticompetitive
in Canadian law so long as the rights owner satisfies the market demand. The Canadian
Competition Act is a separate statute, under which abusive IP exploitation may be restrained.
A conspiracy between co-owners to adversely affect the market may be restrained under the
competition laws.
Failure to supply the market may be the basis for granting compulsory licenses under Section
65 and 66 of the Patent Act. Comparable provisions do not appear in the Design, Trademark
or Copyright Acts and would therefore be governed by the provisions of the Competition Act,
if at all.
6) Applicable Law and jurisdiction in Absence of Agreement
Canadian law recognizes co-ownership, even in the absence of a contractual agreement.
These rights can arise by collaboration in the creation of the IP right, or by devolution, such
as inheritance.
As to jurisdictional issues, where IP rights are national, (not regional), and all co-owners
reside in the particular country, then no jurisdictional issues should arise, and the courts of
that country should determine the respective rights. Similarly, for national IP rights, even where
one or more co-owners do not reside in the country, the courts of the country issuing the IP
right should have jurisdiction over the respective rights between co-owners. Nonetheless,
as it is a property right, the courts having jurisdiction over the owners can likely determine
rights, so long as they apply renvoie and take the relevant law (if any) of the issuing country
into consideration.
A separate question is whether, in the absence of consent, a licence granted by one co-owner
is void, or merely voidable, and can be ratified by an accounting between co-owners. If void,
the issue is one of infringement, which is to be determined by national law of the issuing
country.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
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II)
An issue arose, principally with US members, whether the right to exploit IP rights, particularly
patent rights, would allow a co-owner to have product made exclusively for that owner,
without a requirement to account to co-owners. It is relatively universal that co-owners must
obtain consent to licence, (although the consequences of failure to obtain consent are less
certain). However, if an agency relationship is established, where acts of the agent are acts
of the principal, this may avoid the requirement of consent. In practice, however, liability
issues for the principal for the work of the agent may render such an arrangement less than
satisfactory.
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
In view of the possible inconsistency between or within countries as to the legal ramifications
of a licence granted without consent, express legislation is desirable to clarify the effect of
a licence granted without consent. – what that effect should be is the open question. Such a
non-consensual licence could be “valid”, “voidable” or “void”.
A valid licence would permit a co-owner to dilute the exploitation rights of the other co-owners.
This is contrary to the law in most jurisdictions, and is, in the Canadian view, undesirable.
A voidable licence would provide a degree of flexibility at the expense of certainty as to the
consequences. A co-owner could choose to ratify a non-consensual licence, which may provide
the option of an increased accounting, in contrast to damages for patent infringement.
Legislation determining that a non-consensual licence is void ab initio would result in greater
certainty for all parties. This is consistent with existing Canadian case law.
Further the consequences of assignment should be clarified. Certainly, in the Canadian
context, legislative clarification of the rights of co-owners to assign their entire interest to
another party, without consent, is desirable. Canadian case law is inconsistent – in the only
common law case, the Court of Appeal has confirmed the right to assign the entire co-owned
interest without consent or accounting to the other co-owner(s). The only Quebec civil law
decision has required an assignee of the entire co-owned portion to account to the other coowner.
This result was dictated, in part, by the particular form of co-ownership which provides
for a specific percentage division, and by provisions of the Civil Code of Quebec pertaining
to such contracts. In the view of the Canadian Group, assignment of the entire right of one
co-owner to a single assignee should not require accounting to co-owners, as was the case
in the initial relationship. The risk, of course, is that an imbalance of commercial ability to
exploit may arise if the assignee is disproportionate compared to the assignor. If that is a
concern, it should be addressed by contract between the co-owners, not by legislation of
general application.
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Summary
Canadian law on the rights of a co-owner to exploit co-owned IP Rights is in its infancy, and is
relatively uncertain, in view of the few, and possibly conflicting or inconsistent decisions. It appears
that the better view is that patent and design rights may be exploited personally by a co-owner,
and assigned in toto without consent of, or accounting to, co-owners. However, any dilution of the
patent or design right by licence or partial assignment is either void, or will require an accounting
to co-owners.
As to trademarks, as a practical matter, independent exploitation would likely result in loss of
distinctiveness as to source, and invalidity of the mark. Co-ownership therefore requires a clear
agreement on exploitation.
Copyright requires that co-owners account to each other for all exploitation.
Résumé
Le droit canadien relatif aux droits d’un copropriétaire d’exploiter des droits de PI partagés en est
à ses balbutiements et est relativement incertain, vu les rares décisions, sans doute contradictoires
ou incohérentes. Au meilleur de notre connaissance, il semble que les droits de brevet et de dessin
ou modèle puissent être exploités individuellement par un copropriétaire et attribués intégralement
sans le consentement des copropriétaires ou sans leur en rendre compte. Toutefois, toute dilution
du droit de brevet ou de dessin ou modèle par permis ou affectation partielle est nulle ou nécessite
d’en aviser les copropriétaires.
Quant aux marques de commerce, pratiquement, l’exploitation indépendante entraînerait
probablement la perte de caractère distinctif de la source et l’invalidité de la marque. La copropriété
nécessite donc une entente claire en ce qui concerne l’exploitation.
Le droit d’auteur exige que les copropriétaires se rendent compte l’un à l’autre de toute
exploitation.
Zusammenfassung
Das kanadische Gesetz über die Rechte eines Miteigentümers zum Nutzen von Rechten an
gemeinschaftlich gehaltenem geistigen Eigentum befindet noch in der Anfangsphase und ist
aufgrund der wenigen und möglicherweise widersprüchlichen und inkonsistenten Rechtssprüche
relativ unzuverlässig. Dem Anschein nach ist die bessere Betrachtungsweise, dass Patent- und
Designrechte persönlich durch den Miteigentümer genutzt werden und ohne das Einverständnis der
Miteigentümer bzw. ohne Rechenschaftslegung diesen gegenüber als Ganzes zugewiesen werden.
Jegliche Minderung der Patent- oder Designrechte durch Lizenzierung oder teilweise Übertragung
ist jedoch entweder ungültig oder erfordert Rechenschaftslegung gegenüber den Miteigentümern.
Bei Handelsmarken würde, von einem praktischen Standpunkt aus gesehen, die unabhängige
Nutzung wahrscheinlich zum Verlust der Kennzeichnungskraft und demzufolge Ungültigkeit der
Marke führen. Miteigentümerschaft erfordert daher eine klare Vereinbarung über die Nutzung.
Das Urheberrecht erfordert, dass die Miteigentümer über jegliche Nutzung einander Rechenschaft
ablegen.“
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Chile
Chili
Chile
Report Q194
in the name of the Chilean Group
by Marcos Morales
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
There is no distinction established by Chilean law regarding co ownership resulting from
voluntary o nor voluntary reasons.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
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Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
There is no special provision in Chilean law. However, two important aspects must be
considered. Co-owners may establish regulations and prohibitions related to the their co
ownership, and when no special stipulation is established by the co-owners, laws and
principles are applied. One of the main principles included in the to Chilean civil code is the
freedom of contract. On the other hand, any IP right is a kind of property right, being the
latter a very important protected right in Chilean legislation. Therefore, the right to exploit
a patent must be considered as a manifestation of the property right and thus the right to
subcontract must be necessarily covered. Notwithstanding this, all co owners must act upon
a bona fide basis.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
There is no special provision in Chilean law regarding whether the nature of licenses influence
the solutions in respect of the right to grant a licence by a co-owner of an IP right. However,
considering the freedom of contract principle and the understanding of any IP right as a
property right, the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) does not affect the right
of granting any kind of licences by a co-owner of an IP right, but always upon a bona fide
basis.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
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There is no special provision nor prohibition in Chilean law. However, since IP rights are
properly property rights, all co-owners are free to transfer or assign the whole share of a coowned
IP right or only a part of the same.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
The is no special provision in Chilean laws regarding this specific point, neither in our IP law
nor in our Free Competition and Antitrust law.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
In the absence of a contractual agreement between the co-owners, the co-ownership of an IP
Right registered in Chile will be ruled by the Chilean law, even if some or all the co-owners
are foreigners.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
Should the action for division of co-ownership not prescribe? In other words, should all coowners
be always entitled to claim for the division of the co-ownership?
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
1) Non prescription of action for division of co-ownership.
2) Exercise of the co-owners rights may never affect the co-owned right or its subject
matter.
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3) All co-owners by themselves should be entitled to maintain and take care of the common
right and even to file judicial actions against infringers.
Note:
It will be helpful and appreciated if the Groups follow the order of the questions in their
Reports and use the questions and numbers for each answer.
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Czech Republic
République tchèque
Tschechische Republik
Report Q194
in the name of the Czech Group
by Dr. Jan Matějka
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
According to the Czech law, the regulation of co-ownership does not depend on the origin
of co-ownership.
There are no legal definitions of co-ownership of IP rights in the Czech legal system.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
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if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
According to the Czech law, the right to exploit the patent also covers the right to subcontract.
However, according to the provisions of the Law on Inventions and Rationalisation Proposals,
the Law on Industrial Models and the Law on Industrial Designs, the consent of all co-owners
shall be necessary to the valid conclusion of a license contract, unless otherwise agreed by
a special contract.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The difference in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) does not influence the
solution of the Czech law in respect of the right to grant the license by a co-owner of an IP
right.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
According to the Czech regulation, the consent of all co-owners shall be necessary for the
transfer of the industrial property rights. The co-owner is entitled to transfer his share without
consent of others to some of the co-owners. He can transfer his share to a third person only
in case, when none of the co-owners accepts the written offer of transfer within time limit on
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one month. The above is to be applied in both cases, i.e. when it is the transfer of whole
share of a co-owned IP right as well as when it is the transfer of the part of the share of the
co-owned IP Right only.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
It seems rather improbable that the co-owned IP Rights would give the co-owners the dominant
position on the Czech market. However, in such a case, it would be National Competition
Authority, which would be competent to decide according to the Czech Act on Protection
of Competition. The National Authority would also proceed in case of suspicion that an
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights would be seen as eliminating the competition from the
market.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
Generally the Council Regulation No 593/2008 may be applicable to the co-ownership
agreements. Co-ownership of IP rights shall be regulated by legal order referred to by private
international law. If the co-owners of IP rights conclude an agreement to exercise the rights in
question and all co-owners are from EU countries, then such agreement shall be governed by
legal order of a member state referred to by the Council Regulation No 593/2008 “Rome
I”, if not agreed otherwise ( the agreement of co-owners has always priority).
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
The standpoint of the Czech Group can be deduced from the above replies.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
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The Czech Group is of the opinion that an international harmonisation of the above issues
would contribute to the definition of relations between co-owners of IP Rights.
Summary
The Czech law does not contain any special regulation of co-ownership of IP Rights in general. The
co-ownership relations are regulated by general statutory rules such as Civil Code and Commercial
Code.
Our Group has no information that any changes in the Czech legal system will occur in this respect
in the near future.
Résumé
La loi tchèque ne comporte aucune régulation spéciale sur la copropriété des droits industriels
en général. Les relations dérivées de la copropriété des droits industriels sont réglées par les
dispositions générales du Code Civil et du Code de Commerce.
Notre groupe ne possède aucune information qu´on puisse attendre des changements du système
légal tchèque en cet égard dans un futur proche.
Zusammenfassung
Das tschechische Gesetz enthält keine spezielle Regelung des Miteigentums der geistigen
Eigentumsrechten im allgemeinen. Die Beziehungen stammende aus dem Miteigentum sind durch
allgemeine Bestimmungen des Zivilgesetzes und des Handelsgesetzes geregelt.
Unsere Gruppe besitzt keine Information über mögliche Änderungen des tschechischen Rechtssystems
in dieser Hinsicht in näher Zukunft.
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Denmark
Danemark
Dänemark
Report Q194
in the name of the Danish Group
by Peter–Ulrik PLESNER, Jakob KRAG NIELSEN, Leif RØRBØL and Lena ERICSSON
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Under Danish law, the same general legal principles are applied to co-ownership irrespective
of how the co-ownership was created.
As a co-ownership that is not subject to any explicit contractual regulation is nevertheless
considered as a quasi contract, the facts pertaining to a particular co-ownership will impact
the inter-partes rights and obligations. Take the following example: The general Danish rule
is that positive exploitation of a co-owned IP right requires mutual consent. If two persons in
their individual businesses are faced with the same problem, and if these two persons decide
to try to mutually solve the problem with a view to exploit the solution in their respective
business, then a Danish court may well find that they are both entitled to individually exploit
their common invention without each others consent.
In situations where a share of the co-owned asset is voluntarily, by heritage or by means of
insolvency-procedures assigned to a third party (assignee), the assignee will as the general
rule acquire the same rights and obligations as the original co-owner. The facts pertaining to
the co-ownership may modify this general rule. By way of example, if the surrounding facts
imply that the two co-owners may both positively exploit the invention, the same facts may
probably often be interpreted to mean that the children of the co-owners in case of inheritance
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may continue such exploitation. The same facts may, however, also imply that a contractual
assignee of one of the co-owners will not have such right to positive exploitation.
Danish statutory law does not comprise any general legal definition of co-ownership of IP
rights.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
The general Danish rule is that each co-owner has an autonomous power to enforce the
negative aspects of the co-owned IP right. This implies that a co-owner may seek injunctions
against third parties, including his follow co-owners.
The Danish group expects that a Danish court will often interpret the factual context in which
a particular IP right is created to imply that each co-owner is allowed to positively exploit but
not necessarily to license the co-owned IP right. Legally speaking, this interpretation implies
that each co-owner has from the other co-owners obtained a simple licence without any right
to sublicense. The Danish group believes that the exact scope of such simple licence should
be delimited taking all relevant facts of the case into consideration. The Danish group would
generally expect the simple licence to cover use of subcontractors.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
Under Danish law, an IP right is first and foremost a right to prevent third parties from
performing particular acts that fall within the protective scope of the IP right in question.
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In Denmark, the word “licence” does not have a precise legal meaning. In the context of IP
rights, the legal core of a licence is that the licensor undertakes not to enforce the licensed
IP right against the licensee. Also the words “exclusive licence” does not have any precisely
defined legal meaning. Usually, an “exclusive licence” denotes a situation where the licensor
undertakes (i) not to enforce the licensed IP right against the licensee, and (ii) not to grant any
other third parties with similar non-enforcement undertakings. Often an exclusive licensee
is conferred with the right to enforce the licensed IP right against third parties, sometimes
including the licensor.
Each co-owner has an autonomous right to enforce the co-owned IP right against third parties.
Each co-owner is generally free to license third parties in the sense that the co-owner on an
individual basis vis-a-vis the licensee undertakes not to enforce the right in question. Such
undertaking obviously does not prejudice the other co-owners, who remain free to enforce
the IP right.
If a third party seeks comfort not the be faced with enforcement of a particular co-owned
IP right, the third party therefore needs non-attack undertakings, i.e. licences, from all coowners.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
Each co-owner may fully or partially assign his share.
As set out in question 1, the assignee will as the general rule acquire the same rights and
obligations as the original co-owner. The facts pertaining to the case may imply that this
general rule is modified. By way of example, if the facts pertaining to a co-owned invention
imply that the two co-owners may both positively exploit the invention, the same fact may be
interpreted to mean that the children of the co-owners in case of inheritance may continue
such exploitation. The same facts may, however, also imply that a contractual assignee of one
of the co-owners will not have such right to positive exploitation.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
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The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
The Danish group has no knowledge of any reported case-law where the Danish Competition
Authority or the Danish courts have considered cases where IP co-ownerships gave rise to
anticompetitive concerns.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
Danish rules of private international law do not contain any explicit regulation regarding
co–owned of IP rights.
It is believed that a Danish court will consider the inter–partes rights and obligations within
a co–ownership to constitute “contractual obligations” that fall with the scope of the Rome I
Convention. Accordingly, the co–ownership is governed by the law upon which the co–owners
have agreed. In the absence of any such agreement, the law of the country with which the
co-ownership is most closely connected applies. If, however, a severable matter is deemed to
have a closer connection to another country, the court may, by way of exception, decide to
apply the law of that other country to such severable matter (so–called “dépeçage”).
When determining which country has the closest connection to a particular co-owned IP right,
Danish court are expected to consider all facts pertaining to the case. Of particular relevance
is arguably the place where the co-owned IP right was created, the domicile of the majority
of co-owners and the place where the IP right is or was planned to be exploited.
The dépeçage option may be relevant to consider in situations where multiple parallel national
rights - e.g. unregistered copyrights - exist in respect of the same IP asset, e.g. a film.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
If two or more partners run a business together, such business will if nothing else is agreed
constitute an unlimited partnership. An IP right that is created in the context of such partnership
will be owned by the partnership. The close links and grey zones between co-ownerships and
partnerships should be taken into consideration in case of future harmonisation.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
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The Danish group suggests that AIPPI draws up an international model act on co-ownership.
Summary
Under Danish law, the same general legal principles are applied to co-ownership irrespective of
how the co-ownership was created.
As a co-ownership that is not subject to any explicit contractual regulation is nevertheless considered
as a quasi contract, the facts pertaining to a particular co-ownership will impact the inter-partes
rights and obligations.
Under Danish law, an IP right is first and foremost a right to prevent third parties from performing
particular acts that fall within the protective scope of the IP right in question. Each co-owner has an
autonomous power to enforce this negative aspect of a co-owned IP right.
In Denmark, the word “licence” does not have a precise legal meaning. In the context of IP rights,
the legal core of a licence is that that the licensor undertakes not to enforce the licensed IP right
against the licensee. Each co-owner is generally free to license third parties in the sense that the
co-owner on an individual basis vis-a-vis the licensee undertakes not to enforce the right in question.
Such undertaking obviously does not prejudice the other co-owners, who remain free to enforce the
IP right. If a third party seeks comfort not the be faced with enforcement of a particular co-owned IP
right, the third party therefore needs non-attack undertakings, i.e. licences, from all co-owners.
Résumé
Sous la législation danoise, les mêmes principes juridiques générals sont appliqués à la copropriété
indépendamment de la manière dont la copropriété a été créée.
Étant donné qu’une copropriété, qui n’est sujet à aucun règlement contractuel explicit, est toutefois
considérée comme un quasi-contrat, les faits relatifs à une copropriété particulière vont avoir un
impact sur les droits et les obligations inter partes.
Sous la législation danoise, un droit de propriété intellectuelle est tout d’abord un droit de prévenir
aux tiers d’exécuter des actes particuliers qui rentrent sous la sphère de protection du droit de
propriété intellectuelle en question. Chaque copropriétaire a un pouvoir autonome d’exécuter cet
aspect négatif d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle de copropriété.
Au Danemark, le mot “licence” n’a pas une signification juridique précis. Dans le contexte des
droits de propriété intellectuelle, le coeur juridique d’une licence consiste en ce que le donneur de
licence entreprend de ne pas exécuter le droit de propriété intellectuelle délivré en licence envers
le détenteur de licence. Chaque copropriétaire est généralement libre de donner une license au
tiers dans le sens que le copropriétaire, sur une base individuelle envers le détenteur de la licence,
entreprend de ne pas exécuter le droit en question. Un tel engagement ne va évidemment pas porter
préjudice aux autres copropriétaires, qui sont libres d’exécuter le droit de propriété intellectuelle.
Si un tiers cherche à s’assurer de ne pas être confronté avec une exécution d’une droit de propriété
intellectuelle de copropriété, le tiers va alors avoir besoin d’un accord de non-agression, c’est-à-dire
des license, de la part de tous les copropriétaires.
Zusammenfassung
Gemäß dänischem Recht werden die gleichen Rechtsprinzipien für Miteigentum verwendet
ungeachtet der Gründungsweise des Miteigentums.
Da ein Miteigentum, welches nicht von einer ausdrücklich vertraglichen Regelung umfasst ist,
nichtsdestoweniger als vertragsähnlich betrachtet wird, werden die Fakten, die ein bestimmtes
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Miteigentum betreffen, die inter partes Rechte und Verpflichtungen beeinflussen.
Gemäß dänischem Recht ist ein immaterielles Recht vor allem ein Recht, dass zur Vermeidung
von Dritten zur Ausführung von bestimmten Tätigkeiten, die zum Schutzumfang des betreffenden
immateriellen Rechtes gehören, führen soll. Jeder Miteigentümer ist unabhängig dazu befugt, dieses
negative Aspekt des gemeinsamen Eigentums des immateriellen Rechtes durchzuführen.
In Dänemark hat das Wort “Lizenz” keine präzise juristische Bedeutung. Im Kontext von immateriellen
Rechten besteht das juristische Kernstück von einer Lizenz darin, dass der Lizenzgeber gewährleistet,
dass er das von der Lizenz umfasste immaterielle Recht nicht gegen den Lizenznehmer geltend macht.
Es steht im Allgemeinen jedem Miteigentümer frei Dritter eine Lizenz zu übertragen in dem Sinn,
dass der Miteigentümer auf einer individuellen Basis gegenüber dem Lizenznehmer gewährleistet
nicht das betreffende Recht geltend macht. Ein solches Vorhaben wird selbstverständlich nicht die
übrigen Miteigentümer beeinträchtigen, es steht ihnen frei das immaterielle Recht durchzuführen. Um
sich gegen die Durchführung eines bestimmten immateriellen Rechtes mit Miteigentum zu sichern,
benötigt Dritter deswegen nicht-angreifende Tätigkeiten, d.h. Lizenz, von allen Miteigentümern.
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Ecuador
Equateur
Ecuador
Report Q194
in the name of the Ecuadorian Group
by C. Guerrero
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
In Ecuador there are two legal regulations which govern intellectual and industrial property
rights: the Intellectual Property Law and Decision 486 of the Andean Nations Community.
Both legal bodies have taken into consideration the coexistence of intellectual and industrial
property rights on creations which are the result of the ingenuity of several people or a duly
formed organization of people.
In such a way, various articles from the aforementioned legal bodies make reference to the
rights of co-owners of creations which are the result of their ingenuity or intellect. For example,
in the case of author’s rights, specifically in the case of works of divisible collaboration, each
collaborator is the bearer of such rights for the part that he/she authored, except when the
contrary is agreed upon.
Now, works of divisible collaboration, according to our legislation, are works in which each
collaborator holds rights for the part which he/she has authored, except in the case that the
contrary is agreed upon between parties bearing such rights.
Works of divisible collaboration in which these rights are commonly and undividedly held
by coauthors, also exist, unless an alternative has been agreed upon. The person holding
author’s rights of a collective work is considered as a natural or legal person who has
organized, coordinated and directed the work, who could exercise, in his/her own name, the
moral rights for the exploitation of the work.
In reference to the transmission of author’s rights by inheritance, our legislation indicates that
these rights are transmitted to inheritors and legatees of the holder of these rights, which
permits the granting of co-ownership of rights. However, nothing is said with regards to
the impact of co-ownership nor have regulations governing co-ownership of these rights or
actions in the case of conflict between co-owners been imposed.
Meanwhile, our legislation does not make a distinction between acquired co-ownership rights
resulting from creation and those acquired resulting from inheritance, legacy or participation
in partnerships or companies.
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of existing national legislation referring to issues of Coownership
of intellectual and industrial property rights
(1) (6) As mentioned above, although Ecuadorian legislation makes reference to coownership
of intellectual or industrial property rights being granted for joint creation or
as a consequence of inheritance or legacy, it does not differentiate between the rules
governing these different cases of co-ownership, but only deals with this issue in general
terms as co-ownership rights.
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(2) With reference to Intellectual Property, our legislation only makes a distinction between
authors’ moral and patrimonial rights, however, regulations have not been established
that govern co-ownership and even less so those governing solutions in the case that
conflicts arise with regards to the issue. In reference to author’s rights it has been
established that in order to authorize the exploitation of any work, via any means, the
consent of the inheritors representing the majority is required, meaning that in this case
co-ownership is subject to the wilingness expressed by the majority of co-owners, when
this concerns inheritors.
In reference to vegetation obtainment our legislation indicates that the acquiring party,
beneficiary or successor-in-title, which are natural or legal, national or foreign persons,
has the right to request an acquisition certificate. In the case that several people have
commonly created or developed a variety, right to protection corresponds to these people
jointly. Except in the case that the contrary is stipulated by the co-acquiring parties, their
share will be equal, however, in reference to vegetation obtainment, regulations referring
to co-ownership and conflict solution on this issue have not yet been established.
(3) With reference to the possibility that co-owners of Intellectual Property rights can concede
licenses for use of their rights to third parties, our Intellectual Property Law states that
the collective framework cannot be the object of a license in favor of people other than
those authorized to use this, according to the regulations for its employment; therefore
in the case of collective frameworks, regulations must be elaborated for the use of these,
which must be undertaken by co-owners themselves. However, a distinction is not made
between licenses and sublicenses for use, nor between exclusive and non-exclusive
licenses; nor have cases where disagreement could arise between owners in granting
licenses for use been contemplated. In this case the co-owner majority makes the decision
with regards to brand licencing.
With reference to Patents, licenses for use are obligatory in the following cases:
In the aforementioned cases, legislation does not make a distinction between whether or
not this deals with collective rights or co-ownership of patents.
(4) With regards to patents, Ecuadorian Legislation indicates that the right to patents belongs
to the inventor and that this right is transferible among living persons and transmissible as
a result of death. It also indicates that patent holders can be natural or legal persons.
With reference to inventor co-ownership our legislation states that if several people have
made a joint invention, common rights correspond to those people and their successorsin-title
(in the case of inheritance).
With regards to unique sign property rights, such as brands and commercial names,
these can be requested in a collective manner. These unique signs can be transferred
as and when the association, organization or group of people authorize this, upon its
request and registration in the National Industrial Property Office. In any case, use of this
will be reserved for members of the association, organization or group of people.
(5) In order for disloyal competence not to affect neither the rights of consumers nor the
exclusive rights of intellectual property of industries and dealers, several supranational
and United States regulations have been created. TRIPs regulate pertinent aspects of
intellectual property rights related to commerce. Similarly, the Treaty of Paris for the
Protection of Industrial Property obliges member states to ensure efficient protection
against disloyal competence and indicates that disloyal competence constitutes any
dishonest act of competence concerning industrial or commercial issues. Nevertheless,
nothing is said with regards to disloyal competence between co-owners with the same
protected intellectual property rights, given that it is considered that this protection
should be provided for creations, inventions, unique signs, etc. and therefore its holders.
However, the fact that these creations, inventions, unique signs, etc. can be the property
of several people has not been considered.
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II)
We consider it necessary that national, international and Community legislation protects
co-owners of intellectual property rights, not only from third parties which can affect
these by performing acts detrimental to their rights, but also from other co-owners who
could also cause detriment to their creations and therefore consumers as well as the
interests of other co-owners. These acts should also be considered as acts of disloyal
competence and therefore included in legislation, without affecting the rights of each
owner in exploiting their inventions, creations or obtainments.
Proposal for the future harmonisation
In light of the fact that the right to Co-ownership of intellectual property rights is related to
Co-ownership rights in general, established and recognized by each one of the Member
States, it is worth mentioning that the protection of these rights must agree with the legislation
adopted by each country and therefore each country must take into consideration that the
rights and regulations governing co-ownership concerning intellectual property are widelyrelated
to Civil co-ownership rights.
In view of the fact that each day intellectual and industrial property rights acquire more
and more importance as assets belonging to partnerships and companies, it is necessary to
regulate co-owner relations and clearly identify the rights and obligations and how far these
extend in relation to co-ownership. Distinctions between the protection of rights for original
co-owners and inheritor co-owners, legacies or partnership or company participation, should
also be made.
In order to avoid disloyal competence on behalf of the co-owner to the detriment of rights
belonging to the co-owner, legislation must be clear upon determining the cases when licenses
should not be granted if co-owners have not reached a unanimous agreement on granting
these.
Finally, we consider it of utmost important that both national and international legislation
make a distinction between acquired co-ownership rights resulting from creation and rights
acquired resulting from inheritance, legacy or participation in partnerships of companies,
given that each case should be dealt with differently in order to ensure better protection for
authors, creators, inventors or acquiring parties against co-owners who have acquired these
rights over time through inheritances, legacies or participation in partnerships.
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Egypt
Egypte
Ägypten
Report Q194
in the name of the Egyptian Group
by Tamer El–Hennawy
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
There is no distinction established by Egyptian Law regarding co ownership resulting from
voluntary or non voluntary reasons.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
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Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
The Egyptian legal system respects the principle of “freedom of contract”. Therefore, the right
to subcontract the manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject of the patent
will be admitted, provided there is no prohibition to license expressly set out in a contract
between the co owners.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
There is no distinction established by Egyptian Law that would deem the nature of the license
a factor in the ability of the co owner to grant same.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
Transfer and assignment of all or part of the ownership rights is permissible. However, such
transfer or assignment will not prejudice the rules applicable to exploitation of such right
which may require unanimous or majority approval of the owners for certain actions to be
adopted.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
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The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
The Egyptian competition law has just been promulgated recently and such situation is not
explicitly contemplated therein. However, based on the fundamentals of the Egyptian legal
system if an action, although in line with one law, is in breach of another then the penalties
applicable in the law being breached would apply. Therefore, in this case if refraining from
granting a license represents a barrier to enter the market and is unjustified economically
the party refraining from granting the license may be subject to the penalties set out in the
competition law.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
Unless there is an explicit agreement between the parties to subject there agreement to a
foreign law the Egyptian Laws would apply. If the IP right and the parties owning same have
no relation to Egypt then in such case a dispute occurring in Egypt should, based on the
applicable conflict of laws rules, be governed by the law having the closest connection to
the IP right.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
No further comments.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
We trust that the principle of freedom to contract should continue to apply. Furthermore,
the ability to license and dispose of rights should be granted to the majority of the owners
rather than requiring a higher quorum while allowing minorities the right to petition a court
to intervene in the event they believe their rights are not being properly safeguarded by the
majority.
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Summary
There are no specific regulations in Egypt governing the exploitation of co owned IP rights. As
described in detail hereinabove the general principles of the Civil Law apply in most cases. In light
of the specific nature of IP rights it is our contention that specific rules should be promulgated to
address same. We trust that special attention should be given when preparing such rules to the
fact that the protection of such IP rights extends for a substantial duration and thus it is highly likely
for heirs of such co owners to be involved and as a result the number of owners may increase
significantly making it practically impossible in such case to achieve unanimous approval or even
¾ approval.
It should also be noted in that respect that the fundamental rule of “freedom to contract” continues
to apply in this field and thus an agreement between the co owners on the manner of utilizing their
right shall be upheld unless it is in violation of a rule of public policy.
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Estonia
Estonie
Estland
Report Q194
in the name of the Estonian Group
by Mari Must and Ants Nõmper
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Co-ownership of trademarks, patents or industrial designs is not regulated in IP laws (only
relations of co-authors in case of copyright and inventions). Therefore general rules of coownership
are applied in Estonia. General rules do not make any distinction whether the
origin of the co-ownership is voluntary or results from other situations such as heritage.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
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No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
There is no special regulation concerning this question. However, as manufacture of product
requests consent from the patent owner, the owner gives actually its consent or license for
manufacturing also in case of subcontract. Therefore the essential question is whether one of
the co-owners can license the IP or only co-owners together.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
There is no special regulation concerning this question. It would be fare if the co-owner
has complete control over its share, however, in case of licensing IP the co-owner actually
exercises control over all shares or IP. It would be also fare that only all co-owners together
exercise control over the intellectual property as a whole. Therefore there should be no
difference in the right to grant exclusive or non-exclusive license by one of the co-owners as
both should be done only by co-owners together.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
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Co-ownership of trademarks, patents or industrial designs is not regulated in IP laws (only
relations of co-authors in case of copyright and inventions). Therefore general rules of coownership
are applied in Estonia. However, application of the general rules is problematic
as the general rules have been drawn to be applicable in case of corporeal object. In case of
corporeal object a co-owner may transfer, bequeath, pledge or in any other manner dispose
of the share in a shared thing belonging to the co-owner. In principle, the co-owner can
transfer also only a part of the share.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
In Estonia there is no special regulation concerning dominant position on the market through
co-owned IP Rights. According to the competition law the co-owners of IP right are entitled
to be in dominant position, however, they are not allowed to directly or indirectly abuse the
position. In case of abuse the general competition law rules apply and most likely there is no
need for special regulation for co-owned IP rights.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
All IP rights are territorial in their nature, i.e. limited to certain territory. According to the
Private International Law Act intellectual property and the creation, content, extinguishment
and protection thereof shall be governed by the law of the state for the territory of which
protection of the property is applied for.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
There are no other questions for discussion.
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II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
As the regulation concerning co-ownership of IP is scarce in Estonia, it is not possible propose
working solutions for co-ownership in order to harmonise national laws.
Summary
Co-ownership of trademarks, patents or industrial designs is not regulated in Estonian IP laws.
Therefore general rules of co-ownership are applied. General rules do not make any distinction
whether the origin of the co-ownership is voluntary or results from other situations such as heritage.
General rules of co-ownership also allow partial transfer of a share thus extending the number of
co-owners. As in case of licenses the co-owners do not exercise control over only their own share
but the IP as a whole, it should be done with consensus of all owners.
Résumé
La copropriété des marques, brevets ou dessins industriels n’est pas régulée dans les lois sur la
PI estoniennes. C’est pourquoi les règles générales de copropriété sont appliquées. Les règles
générales ne font pas de différence selon que les origines de la copropriété sont volontaires ou le
résultat d’autres situations tel qu’un héritage. Les règles générales de copropriété permettent aussi
le transfert partiel d’une part élargissant ainsi le nombre de copropriétaires. Comme dans le cas
des licences les copropriétaires n’exercent pas un contrôle seulement sur leurs parts propres mais
sur la PI dans son ensemble, il doit être réalisé avec le consensus de tous les propriétaires.
Zusammenfassung
Das Miteigentum an Marken, Patenten oder gewerblichen Mustern ist in den estnischen Gesetzen
über geistiges Eigentum nicht geregelt. Darum werden die allgemeinen Vorschriften des Miteigentums
angewendet. Die allgemeinen Vorschriften machen keinen Unterschied, ob die Herkunft des
Miteigentums freiwillig ist oder sich aus anderen Situationen wie beispielsweise Nachlass ergibt.
Die allgemeinen Vorschriften über Miteigentum lassen auch eine teilweise Übertragung eines
Anteils zu und erweitern auf diese Weise die Anzahl der Miteigentümer. Wie bei Lizenzen üben die
Miteigentümer Kontrolle nicht nur über ihren eigenen Anteil, sondern über das geistige Eigentum als
Ganzes aus, dies sollte im Konsens aller Eigentümer getan werden.
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Finland
Finlande
Finnland
Report Q194
in the name of the Finnish Group
by Rainer OESCH, Jussi KARTTUNEN, Teresa LAIMIO, Jan LINDBERG, Ella MIKKOLA,
Kimmo OILA, Essi POKELA, Jaakko RITVALA, Pekka SALOMAA,
Elina SAVIHARJU, Tarja TCHERNYCH and Tapio ÄKRÄS
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
As stated in the previous report of the Finnish AIPPI Group presented in the EXCO 2007 in
Singapore on question Q194, the possibility of co-ownership of IP Rights is recognized under
the Finnish legal regime, but there are no specific rules governing this relationship, except for
Section 6 of the Copyright Act (404/1961). However, the law governing certain relationships
based on co-ownership (180/1958) may be analogically applied to co-owned IP Rights.
However, the co-owners may always freely agree upon the co-ownership relationship as
freedom of contract prevails.
The provisions concerning co-ownership do not make any distinction in the applicable
provisions to the co-ownership in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary
but results from other situations, e.g., heritage.
However, with respect to undistributed estate, the Finnish Inheritance Code (40/1965)
governs the exploitation of the property of the estate. Under Chapter 18, Section 2 of the
Finnish Inheritance Code, the shareholders of an estate administrate the property of the estate
jointly. Consequently, the exploitation of an IP Right of an estate is subject to all shareholders’
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consent, unless otherwise agreed. In any event, a measure which cannot be delayed may be
undertaken even if the consent of all of the shareholders cannot be obtained. Additionally, a
shareholder may be entitled to bring an action to the benefit of the estate. Other shareholders
shall, however, also be summoned to be heard in the matter.
There are no specific legal definitions of co-ownership.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
As stated in the previous report of the Finnish AIPPI Group in 2007, one co-owner may exploit
the right to his or her share by himself or herself without any prior consent from the other coowners
provided that such exploitation is customary and does not impede the exploitation of
the rights by the other co-owners.
Notwithstanding the above, according to legal literature, use of the co-owned IP Right in the
co-owner’s own business does not typically require any permission. However, the definition
of the scope of one’s own business raises difficulties. In practice, some of the co-owners use
subcontractors to exploit the invention, but whether such subcontracting can be regarded as
use within the co-owner’s own business has not been tested before the Finnish courts.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
Provisions concerning co-ownership do not make any difference between non-exclusive and
exclusive licenses and, as stated in the previous report of the Finnish AIPPI Group in 2007, in
situations in which one of the co–owners is willing to grant a license to the IP Right in question
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or his or her share of it, permission from the other co–owners must be obtained. This could be
deemed to reflect the provisions according to which the patent licensee or copyright assignee
or licensee may not assign or license his or her rights unless otherwise agreed (Section 43 of
the Patents Act, Section 28 of the Copyright Act).
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
In situations of transfer or assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, freedom of contract
prevails. As stated in the previous report of the Finnish AIPPI Group in 2007, each co-owner
is basically free to transfer or assign his or her own share of the IP unless doing so impedes
the exploitation of the rights by the other co-owners.
As a general rule under Finnish law, the competence to transfer or assign an object in whole
also comprises the competence to transfer or assign such object in part. In light of the above
mentioned, it can be argued that a co-owner may transfer or assign a part of his or her own
share unless doing so impedes the exploitation of the rights by the other co-owners. Said
argumentation has not, however, been tested before the Finnish courts.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
With respect to agreements between business undertakings, decisions by associations of
business undertakings and concerted practices by business undertakings, Section 4 of the
Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992) provides that all agreements between business
undertakings, decisions by associations of business undertakings and concerted practices
by business undertakings which have as their object the significant prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition or which result in the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition shall be prohibited. In particular, agreements, decisions or practices which: 1)
directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 2) limit
or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 3) share markets or
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sources of supply; 4) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or 5) make the conclusion of
agreements subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which,
by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject matter
of such agreements shall be prohibited.
Respectively, as regards abuse of dominant position, Section 6 of said Act provides that any
abuse by one or more business undertakings or an association of business undertakings
of a dominant position shall be prohibited. Abuse may, in particular, consist in: 1) directly
or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
2) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
3) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading partners,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 4) making the conclusion of agreements
subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject matter of such
agreements.
In practice, Sections 4 and 6 of the Act on Competition Restrictions correspond with the EC
competition rules, i.e. Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. Thus, substantive Finnish national
competition law rules are in line with the corresponding EU rules.
In connection with IP Rights, competition rules may be of relevance. Even though the mere
possession of an IP Right is not in conflict with the competition law rules, the exercise of an
IP Right, e.g. by means of an agreement on co-ownership of an IP Right, may in certain
situations be problematic from a competition law perspective.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
With respect to the applicable law governing the co-ownership of an IP Right co-existing in
different countries, a distinction should be made between the law governing the co-ownership
between the co-owners and the law applicable to the relationship between the co-owners
and third parties.
Provided that the parties have entered into an agreement on their co-ownership relationship,
Rome I may become applicable. According to Rome I, the parties are free to choose the law
applicable to their agreement. In the absence of such choice, Articles 4(2), 4(3) and 4(4) of
Rome I provide the following: (i) the applicable law is the law of the country where the party
required to effect the characteristic performance of the agreement has his habitual residence;
(ii) where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the agreement is manifestly
more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in section (i) above, the law
of that other country shall apply; and (iii) where the law applicable cannot be determined
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pursuant to section (i) or (ii) above, the agreement shall be governed by the law of the country
with which it is most closely connected.
In the absence of an agreement between the co-owners, the question on applicable law
will be decided based on international private law. The law applicable to the relationship
between the co-owners of an IP Right and third parties is generally subject to the law of the
country for which protection is sought (lex loci protectionis), unless the co-owners have not
agreed on their rights to use, defend and enforce the IP Right.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
No further issues.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
The Finnish AIPPI Group believes that cautious harmonisation of the statutory rules of co–owned
IP Rights would be desirable. However, legislation in this field should be non–mandatory and,
consequently, the current level of freedom of contract should not be limited.
Summary
In Finland, the regulation and case law concerning the exploitation of co-owned IP Rights is limited.
Considering the provisions related to co-ownership of tangible property under the Finnish legal
regime, the following general principles are likely to be applied to the co-ownership of IP Rights:
The origin of the co-owned IP Right does not affect the applicable provisions thereto. Customary
use of the co-owned IP Right in the co-owner’s own business may be allowed as well as the transfer
and assignment of the co-owner’s own share to the IP Right, provided that such use, transfer or
assignment does not impede the exploitation of the rights by other co-owners.
The Finnish AIPPI Group is in favour of cautious statutory harmonisation in the area of co-ownership
of IP Rights. The current level of freedom of contract should not, however, be limited.
Résumé
En Finlande, la législation et la jurisprudence concernant l’exploitation des droits de propriété
intellectuelle détenus en copropriété sont limités. En considération des règles légales applicables
à la copropriété des biens corporels faisant partie du système juridique finlandais, il est probable
que les principes généraux suivants seront applicables à la copropriété des droits de PI: L’origine
des droits de propriété intellectuelle détenus en copropriété n’affecte pas les règles qu’y sont
applicables. L’utilisation habituelle des droits de PI détenus en copropriété dans les affaires propres
du copropriétaire peut être permise aussi bien que le transfert et la cession de sa quote-part de
PI détenus en copropriété, à condition qu’une telle utilisation, transfert ou cession n’empêche pas
l’exploitation des droits par d’autres copropriétaires
Le groupe AIPPI finlandais est en faveur de l’harmonisation prudente de la règlementation dans
le domaine de copropriété de la propriété intellectuelle. Le niveau actuel de liberté de contrat ne
devrait pas, pourtant, être limité.
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Zusammenfassung
In Finnland ist die Regelung und die Rechtsprechung betreffend die Verwertung von gemeinsam
besitzten IP-Rechten begrenzt. Beim Betrachten der Vorschriften des finnischen Rechtssystems
angehend Miteigentümerschaft von materiellem Eigentum, werden für Miteigentümerschaft
von IP-Rechten die folgenden allgemeinen Grundsätze wahrscheinlich angewendet: Die dazu
anwendbaren Vorschriften werden nicht von der Herkunft der gemeinsam geeigneten IP-Rechten
beeinflusst. Die übliche Anwendung der gemeinsam geeigneten IP-Rechten in dem eigenen Betrieb
des Miteigentümers, wie auch die Übertragung und Abtretung von eigenem Miteigentumsanteil
an einem IP-Recht, kann erlaubt sein, vorausgesetzt, dass solche Anwendung, Übertragung oder
Abtretung nicht die Verwertung der Rechte der anderen Miteigentümer verhindert.
Die finnische Landesgruppe der AIPPI unterstützt die vorsichtige gesetzliche Harmonisierung im
Bereich von Miteigentümerschaft der IP-Rechte. Das gegenwärtige Niveau von Vertragsfreiheit
dürfte jedoch dadurch nicht begrenzt werden.
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France
France
Frankreich
Report Q194
in the name of the French Group
by Clothilde Turleque, Marianne Schaffner, Thibault Lancrenon, Jean-Pierre Stenger,
Alain Gallochat, Christian N’Guyen, Emmanuel Gougé, Fabirama Niang,
Raphaëlle Déquiré-Portier and Francis Hagel
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
Introduction
First the group reminds, in the following of its previous report on this question, that the
different intellectual property rights are treated differently under French law according to
their nature:
Enforceable texts:
The regime of co-ownership on intellectual property rights is not harmonised, as two distinct
regimes coexist.
General regime: Pursuant to French law, a good belonging to two or more persons is hold
in co-ownership. The co-ownership legal system is set out by articles 815 and following of
the civil Code. This system applies to all intellectual property rights except for patents and
assimilated rights.
Specific regime: The intellectual property Code sets out a specific legal regime regarding the
co-ownership of patents and assimilated rights in articles L. 613-29 and following, article L.
613-30 explicitly excluding the common law co-ownership regime.
The freedom to contract principle
If, according to the nature of the intellectual property right, two distinct legal regimes exist
under French law, nevertheless, these two legal regimes are always auxiliaries: they are due
to apply only if the parties have not conventionally organised their co-ownership relation or
if their convention is incomplete.
Article L. 613-32 of the intellectual property Code states that the parties can derogate from
the legal regime of article L. 613-29 of the said code at any time.
Articles 1873-1 and following of the civil Code provide that the co-owners can organise their
relations conventionally.
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I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of the co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual property right (aesthetical,
technical or commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to
such a situation may be different from those applicable to the situation where a co-ownership
results from the division of a same right between different people as the consequence, for
example, of heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be situations where the co-ownership is in reality imposed by a party to
the other such as in cases of a technical creation (for example where improvements or
modifications of prior creations do not succeed in independent rights).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate whether, under their national law, the rules
relating to co-owned intellectual property rights make any distinction where the origin of the
co-ownership of the rights is not voluntary or where it results from other situations, including
the division of a right in the case of an inheritance.
In this context, the Groups may also indicate whether any legal definitions of co-owned
intellectual property rights have been adopted in their country and, if so, specify what the
definitions are.
In general, the French intellectual property Code (IPC) does not distinguish according to the
origin of the co-ownership to determine the regime. However, an analysis of the law can lead
to suggest such a distinction. Therefore, the French group considers it is useful to distinguish
the “original co-owners” (by common creation) from the “successor co-owners”.
The intellectual property Code does not provide any legal definition of co-owned intellectual
property rights.
1.1 The “original” co-owners (generally voluntaries)
1.1.1 Pursuant to industrial property right
Where a right is created by filing, the initial co-ownership supposes the existence of a filing
made in common.
In the absence of a contribution to the filing, there may be however, de facto, a common
invention or a common creation for example of a trademark or of a design and a subsequent
action for recovery of a co-owned share which re-establishes the situation in what it should
have been originally thanks to the action of those who were simply deprived of their “original”
rights on part of an intellectual property right (Design, Trademarks, Patents and assimilated
rights, semiconductor product): case law admits indeed the right to exercise an action for
recovery of a co-ownership.
Regarding the rights which exist without any filing formality (non registered community
industrial designs), they should, a priori, belong to the original co-owners if the latter have
proceeded, in common, to the first disclosure of the industrial design.
1.1.2 Pursuant to intellectual property right
Pursuant to droit d’auteur, only the physical persons who contributed to the creation of a
“collaborative work”, i.e. a work created in common by at least two authors, may be the
original co-authors of a work of the mind.
The original co-ownership of intellectual property related rights between phonogram
producers, videogram producers, or audiovisual communication entities is also possible, as it
may also be between performers. Thus they enjoy a co-ownership of the related rights.
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1.2 “Successor” co-owners
IP rights may be transmitted and/or divided by or between different co-owners by means of a
contract, by inheritance, by dissolution or by the execution of an executive measure.
1.2.1 Division of an IP right by inheritance
In practice, it is mainly the literal and artistic creations which are mostly subject to the
devolution of a succession. Industrial creations are indeed frequently the property of legal
corporate bodies who exploit them during all the duration of the monopoly or until their
dissolution.
Droit d’auteur:
The intellectual property Code only provides specific provisions concerning the transmission
of property by inheritance under droit d’auteur matters.
Articles L. 123-2 and following of this code detail, within a special order of devolution, the
vocation of the moral and economic rights of the deceased author. The general idea of this
derogatory regime is to give the deceased a greater liberty in the transmission of his artistic
patrimony, in particular regarding the right to disclose his works.
Patents and assimilated rights:
The patents and assimilated rights are submitted to the public policy rules of inheritance set
out in the civil Code, which usually establish a co-ownership between heirs or between heirs
and legatees. But, in accordance with article L. 613-30 of the IPC, the co-ownership regime is
explicitly excluded for the patents and assimilated rights. Thus, whenever the co-ownership
of a patent results from a post mortem transference, it shall follow the specific regime of the
co-ownership of the patents and related rights.
Other IP rights:
The other IP rights are submitted to the public policy rules of devolution set out in the civil
Code which usually establish a co-ownership between heirs or between heirs and legatees.
1.2.2 Division of an IP right by dissolution of a joint estate or of an entity:
Dissolution of a joint estate:
In theory, the dissolution of a joint estate can generate a situation of co-ownership, eventually
enforceable on IP rights.
However, it must be underlined that pursuant to droit d’auteur, article L. 121-9 of the IPC states
that “Whatever matrimonial property regime and under the penalty of nullity of any clause to
the contrary contained in a marriage contract, the right to disclose a work, to lay down the
conditions for exploiting it and for defending its integrity shall remain vested in the spouse
who is the author or in the spouse to whom such rights have been transmitted. This right may
not be brought in dowry nor acquired as community property nor subsequently acquired as
community property”.
The droit d’auteur rights forming separate properties, the co-ownership of such rights may
not have for origin the dissolution of a joint estate.
Dissolution of a entity:
The dissolution of an entity usually leads to a share of the assets between the ex-associates.
However, the dissolution may generate in a situation of co-ownership, as it is stated in article
1844-9 of the civil Code according to which “All members, or some of them only, may also
remain in undivided ownership of all or part of the property of the firm. Their relationships
as to that property shall be then regulated, at the close of the liquidation, by the provisions
relating to undivided ownership”.
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The industrial creations within the assets of a company may thus be subject to a co-ownership
after its dissolution.
Such is not the case for works of the mind which, due to the existence of the author’s moral
right prerogatives, cannot be subject to a real contribution of property to a company.
1.2.3 The transmission and/or division of an IP right by the exercise of an executive measure
The IP rights, intangible rights of movable nature, may be subject to executive measures either
individually, or in relation to other elements of business assets and premises (see point 5.3 of
the first French Group report regarding question Q194).
• Patents and related rights: due to the independence between the co-owners, the seizure
of a property share is possible;
• Trademarks: the seizure follows the common law rules of proceedings for enforcement
(auction statement will establish the transfer and will be subject to a publication in the
national trademark register);
• Droit d’auteur: moral rights are inalienable. Furthermore, the profits which are entitled to
remunerate the authors/co-authors are not liable for seizure pursuant to article L. 121-1
of the IPC.
1.3 Influence of the origin of the co-ownership on its regime
Under industrial property law, the intellectual property Code does not reserve to the “original”
co-owners more rights than to the “successor” co-owners.
The fact, for example, of not proceeding in common to the filling of a trademark does not
reduce the perimeter of the rights of the one who has acquired, subsequently, a share of
the property of the trademark compared to the rights of the one who owned them since the
origin. Equally, the original co-owner of a share of a patent, by mention of his name as a
co-depositor, does not have more rights than the one who becomes, afterwards, owner of a
share of the same right.
On the contrary, under droit d’auteur, only the original co-owners of a collaborative work
enjoy a full exercise of the moral rights on their work, given that it is impossible to alienate
moral rights (article L. 121-1 of the IPC) and that the moral rights’ prerogatives diminish with
the devolution of the succession. Besides, only the original co-owners of a collaborative
work may benefit from the regime of these types of work, notably concerning the period of
protection granted by the droit d’auteur (article L. 123-2 of the IPC).
Therefore, there is a fundamental difference between original and successor co-owners of a
work of the mind however, less than a distrust towards the co-owners, the difference seems
to recover the general protection rule of the creators who innervate all the French droit
d’auteur.
1.4 The particular case of the forced co-ownership due to the improvement or the modification
of a prior creation
There may be situations whereby a creator modifies or improves a prior creation without the
consent of the initial creator.
Under droit d’auteur, the author of a first work incorporated in a second work is not legally
a “co-owner” of the composite work created by the author who used his work, unless he also
participated in the creation of the second work. This being said, the author of the composite
work must exercise his rights “subject to the author of the pre-existing work”, so that in
practice, the author of the first work and the author of the second work have competitive rights
on the composite work.
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Regarding “technical” creations, such as a software, such dependence of the later work
towards a prior work is common. It occurs when the author of a software source code
assigns a licence with a right of modification by third parties. In such cases, the third party
will either add supplements or bring modifications to the original software. In the first case, it
is possible to divide the properties in subgroups likely to fill each separate technical function.
In the second case, such division is not possible. The property of the original software author
is progressively “colonised” by the rights of the second author on his own creations.
In this case, it is often anticipated, when a contract regulates the relations between the
parties, that within a certain time the second author will be free to use the composite software
without any prerogatives towards the first author, subject to the respect of his moral rights (in
particular his paternity right). The rationality of this share is that the obsolescence of software
goods being fast, after 3, 5 or 10 years according to the case, the imprint of the first author
will be dissolved in the work of the second author. We could eventually contractually fix the
starting point of this dissolution leading to the disappearance of all patrimonial rights of the
first author where a certain threshold percentage of the number of lines of the software code
has been exceeded.
The code does not provide any auxiliary legal provision on this type of situation.
Under industrial property right (patents and assimilated rights), the accomplishment of an
improvement or a modification of a prior creation may create a situation of dependence.
However, there are no cases of co-ownership, only the necessity for the owner of a junior
patent to depend upon the licence of a senior patent if he wants to exploit his own patent.
2) An active debate, during the ExCo of Singapore, took place with regard to the notion of
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, of great importance concerning patents, is related to the problem of
subcontracting when the co-owner of a patent, who, generally, and at least in accordance
with the position expressed by the AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore resolution, has the personal
right to exploit his own part of the patent, in particular by manufacturing and selling the goods
or processes covered by the patent, must subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing of
the good covered by the patent.
The ExCO of Singapore in 2007 reached no common position regarding whether the right to
exploit a patent should also cover the right to subcontract, especially the manufacturing of
all or part of the invention, subject matter of the patent.
Thus, the groups are invited to present the solutions offered by their national legislation on
this specific point.
The European Commission has, in its communication dated 18th December 1978 (OJEC No
C1 of the 3 rd January 1979) defined the subcontracting agreements as “a contract, resulting
or not from a third party order, by which an entity, the contractor, enforces, following his
directives, another entity, the subcontractor, to manufacture the goods, provide services or
execute the works which are intended to be delivered to the contractor or executed for his
own account”.
For the analysis, the question asked can usefully be compared to the provisions characterising
a supply of counterfeiting means (L. 613-4): absence of consent of a patent owner and supply
to a person non-authorised to exploit.
By analogy, subcontracting should not be considered as counterfeiting the co-owned IP rights
as:
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• It is made with the consent of the co-owner holder, contractor,
• At the same time the goods resulting from this subcontracting/the subcontract are
delivered to a person authorised to exploit (the contractor co-owner of the right).
This subcontracting, which confers no autonomy to the subcontractor regarding the exploitation
of the right, does not require the licensing of the exploitation of the patent.
3) The working guidelines established for the ExCo of Singapore also contained the question
related to the possibility for the co-owner of an IP right to license his right to a third party.
No distinction however was made, in this context, between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
Likewise, no differentiation was made regarding the number of licences which could be given
by a co-owner in a case where the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national
law.
And if the AIPPI has adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting a licence, it also
appeared during the debates at the ExCo that different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained had the Working Commission established a distinction according to the nature
of the licence.
Thus, and in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of the licences (non-exclusive or exclusive) have an impact on the
solutions of their national laws regarding the licensing of an IP right by the co-owner.
The French Group invites to refer to point 4 of its previous report stating the conditions
whereby a licence may be granted by a co-owner whether the licence is exclusive or not.
For your information, point 4 of the previous report is reproduced hereunder:
“The question to be asked is that of the qualification of the assignment of a licence:
administration or disposal act?
This question is all the more important since, following the adoption of the law of 23 June
2006, French law has established a distinction between these two types of acts. Indeed, until
the adoption of this law, unanimity was required for all acts whether they were of disposal
or administration. Yet, pursuant to the provisions introduced by the law of 23 June 2006, an
act of administration can be made with the majority of at least two-third of the co-ownership,
whereas the acts of disposal require the consent of all the co-owners.
Consequently,
• If granting a licence is an act of administration, the consent of at least 2/3 of the coownership
will be required,
• If granting a licence is an act of disposal, unanimity will be required.
The French Group considers that granting an exclusive licence, leading to the impossibility
for the other co-owners to exploit the right, must be qualified as an act of disposal, requiring
therefore the consent of all the co-owners.”
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the ExCo of
Singapore concerned the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
However, the problem seemed so complicated that the Working Commission finally decided
to withdraw its resolution proposition on this point.
In reality the debates showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
could differ due to the very big variety of situations related to the transfer of co-owned
share.
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In particular, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the coowned
IP right, but also that it may only consist in the assignment of part of a co-owned
share, therefore creating an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such a transfer of part of a share of an IP right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or the
assignment of a share of a co-owned IP right, taking in consideration the different situations
which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP right or the transfer of
only part of the share of a co-owned IP right).
At the time of the previous report, the French Group had dealt with the question of the
voluntary assignment of a co-owned share (cf. point 5.1 of the previous report reproduced
hereunder in point 4.1)
The French Group revealed by studying the reports of the other national groups, that in
Canada, regarding patent matters, a co-owner may transfer the totality of his share without
obtaining a previous authorisation by the other co-owners, but that the transfer of a only
part of a patent share supposes, subject to penalty, the authorisation of the other co-owners.
Indeed, this transfer leads to the dilution of the patent’s rights.
4.1 The assignment of a share
Article 815-14 of the Civil Code provides for a strict regime for the assignment of a share.
The coparcener is required to notify by an extra-judiciary act to the other coparceners the
price and the conditions of the projected assignment as well as the name, the registered
address and profession of the person who offers to acquire the right.
All coparceners have then a month to tell the grantor, by an extra-judiciary act, whether
or not they wish to exercise their right of pre-emption at the price and conditions that were
notified.
In case of pre-emption, the person who exercises it has two months following the date of
despatch of his response to the seller to realise a bill of sale.
Past this delay, the pre-emption declaration is automatically void, fifteen days after the formal
notice stayed without effect (without prejudice of damages which could be solicited by the
seller).
If several coparceners exercise their pre-emption right, they are reputed, subject to a contrary
convention, to have acquired the whole portion put on sell proportionally to their respective
share in the undivided property.
Article 815-14 states that all assignment or all sale by auction of a property held in co
ownership is void if made in contempt of the provisions aforementioned.
However, the question of the assignment of part of a co-owned share had not been foreseen
and therefore is subject to the following development. (4.2)
4.2 The assignment of part of a co-owned share
4.2.1 Trademarks, Designs, Software and Databases (beyond droit d’auteur)
Article 815-14 of the Civil Code regulates the assignment of “all or part of the undivided
property”.
Consequently, the assignment of part of a share follows the same regime as the assignment
of a whole share.
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4.2.2 Patents and assimilated rights
The intellectual property Code does not consider specifically the question of the assignment of
part of a patent share.
In the absence of specific provisions, in accordance with the general rule according to which
”there is no need to distinguish where the law does not distinguish”, it seems that the assignment
of part of a patent share follows the same regime as the assignment of a whole share.
4.2.3 Droit d’auteur
No text foresees the specific question relating to the assignment of part of a share of a droit
d’auteur.
Once more, the assignment regime of a whole share must apply.
5) The exercise of an IP right held in co-ownership by two or more co-owners, each of whom has,
as a rule, the right to exploit his right of co-ownership, can also raise difficulties regarding
competition rules.
Co-owned IP rights can confer to the co-owners a dominant position on the market and their
agreement relating to their co-owned IP rights (when for example it prohibits conceding
licences) may also be considered as eliminating competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national law had to treat such situations
and explain which solutions were adopted in such cases.
French Substantive law is not really developed in this domain, the doctrine is very little
advanced and case law is non existent.
It is mainly in community law and in the frame of the provisions relating to “the improvements
and agreements on research and development in common” that the case of co-ownership
has been dealt with.
The French Group, in order to determine the guidelines enforceable to the co-ownership
agreements in its relation with competition law, recommends extending the scope of the rules
established in presence of a unique IP right owner. This extension should however take into
account the specificities relating to the co-owned intellectual property rights.
The rules referred to by the French Group were elaborated for the most by community case
law and applied subsequently by national courts.
5.1 May a co-ownership consent be qualified as an “agreement” within the meaning of article
81 of the treaty?
When several entities decide to resort to a common exploitation, via a co-ownership
agreement, of intellectual property rights, they expose themselves to the rule prohibiting
cartels if their agreements prevent the exercise of free competition by other entities, especially
when these agreements prevent the exploitation of the patents by other entities (by refusing
for example to grant licences to third parties for the exploitation of the intellectual property
in question). The restrictions to competition imposed by the execution of a co-ownership
agreement must therefore be indispensable to reach the objectives set out in article 81§3.
Notably, the Commission could impose particular restrictions to limit the effects of co-ownerships
on competition. The French Group had knowledge of a case where a co-ownership was
created on a patent portfolio by “succession”, two companies each having retrieved part of
the assets of the original owner and agreed on having a co-ownership of the portfolio which
was useful for both “successors”, thus becoming co-owners:
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The European Commission analysed this case and accepted this situation but imposed on the
successive co-owners extremely strict conditions regarding the management of the co-owned
a portfolio as well as its exploitation, in particular compelling the absence of exchanges
between the co-owners, imposing on them intermediaries hold by the secret as well as the
designation of a mandatory bold to assign licences for these patents to third parties.
Regarding the legal co-ownership, i.e. not organised by a co-ownership agreement, no
agreement in the meaning of the article aforementioned seems to be required, even though
the French Group questions itself on the possible existence of situations where a legal coownership
would constitute a cartel within the meaning of article 81 aforementioned.
5.2 The exemption cases of article 81 and the execution of the co-ownership agreements
General rule
Restrictions to competition resulting from the execution of a co-ownership agreement must be
indispensable and therefore fulfil the four cumulative conditions imposed by article 81§3, to
benefit of exemption, that is to say:
• Efficiency gains,
• Contribution of a fair part of the profits to the consumers,
• Indispensible character of the exemptions,
• No elimination of the competition.
Applicability of the exemption Regulations to the co-ownership agreements
5.2.1 Exemption Regulation n°772/2004 of 7 April 2004 on the application of article 81§3 of the
Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements
According to the definition provided by the Regulation itself, are considered as technology
transfer agreements assignments of patents, know-how, software copyright and a combination
thereof, where part of the risk associated with the exploitation of the technology remains with
the assignor.
The assignment of one of the cited rights may in practice be limited to the assignment of
a share of this right, leading to the establishment of a co-ownership. The text of the Treaty
having not excluded a priori the co-ownership from the definition, the French Group considers
that the exemption Regulation n°772/2004 may apply to a co-ownership convention,
notwithstanding it fulfilled the cumulative conditions aforementioned.
The scope of the Regulation is however limited as it only applies to agreements consented
between two parties (two co-owners maximum).
Beyond the market-share threshold to be respected (article 3), the exemption will be granted
under the condition that the concerned agreements do not contain certain restrictions with
important anticompetitive effects. In this respect, the regulation lists a certain number of
characterised restrictions (article 4 and 5) for which nothing indicates that they are not
enforceable to co-ownership agreements.
5.2.2 The exemption Regulation n°2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of article
81§3 of the Treaty to categories of research and development agreements
Frequently co-ownership agreements are consented in order to enable the common exploitation
of the solutions resulting from a previous research accomplished by the parties: “it is mainly
within the framework of the provisions relating to the improvements and the agreements on
research and development in common that the co-ownership has been dealt with”.
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The European Commission admitted that no community provision is opposed to the constitution
of co-owned intellectual property rights achieved in common. The Commission would have
notably granted the exemption solicited to a research and development agreement providing
the filling of “common patents” resulting from works, without expressing any “reserves against
the expression of co-ownership”.
In order to benefit from the regulation provisions aforementioned, the co-ownership agreement
must fulfil the following conditions:
• Accessibility of the solutions resulting from the works to all the parties;
• Exploitation of the solutions by all the parties;
• Exploitation of the solutions protected by intellectual property rights or constituting a
know-how determinant for the manufacturing or the use of the final products;
• Manufacturing and delivery by the entity charged with the manufacturing and the delivery
to all the parties to the agreement.
5.3 Exercise of co-owned intellectual property rights and abuse of dominant position (article
82)
The Competition Council (Conseil de la concurrence) considers that “even in a situation of
dominant position, the simple fact for a company to file patents and to defend the rights which
result from it is not excessive “. However, “the exercise of a right would not be tolerated by
competition law since it would constitute an excessive exploitation of the dominant position
resulting from its holding “.
This remark seems all the more important as the co-ownership agreements can be factors of
emergency situations where companies in co-ownership would be in a dominant position.
This could be for example the case if two or several main companies on a definite market
came to conclude such an agreement. Similarly, when one of the co-owners transfers his
share or abandons it to the other co-owners: the latter could then be in a dominant position
on the said market.
Even though the national and community courts did not express themselves specifically on
cases of co-owned intellectual property rights, the French Group considers that there is, a
priori, no obstacle to expand to these cases the solutions brought out within the framework of
a unique entitlement. However, this transposition could sometimes collide with the specificity
of the execution of the co-ownership agreements.
5.3.1 The legitimate character of the refusal to grant an exploitation license within the framework
of a co-ownership agreement.
According to the Court of Justice, the fact of reserving to the holder of an IP right the profit
of its exploitation, by refusing to grant a license, emerges from the substance of intellectual
property right and would not constitute in itself an abuse of dominant position. The Court of
Justice indeed judged that “the refusal, on behalf of the holder of an intellectual property
right, even though it would be the fact of a company in a dominant position, would not
constitute in itself an abuse of this one“.
From then on, and legitimately, the holders of intellectual property rights held in co-ownership
can refuse to grant exploitation licenses to third parties.
5.3.2 The application of the essential facilities theory to co-ownership agreements
In the hypothesis where the co-owners of an intellectual property right in a dominant position
refuse to grant a license, these could (subject to certain conditions) see themselves opposed
the theory of the essential facilities.
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Because the Competition Council (Conseil de la concurrence) considered that there are
“no reasons, a priori, to contest that an intellectual property right can be considered as an
essential facility“.
According to the French Group, it is not justified to subtract co-ownership agreements from
the scope of this case law.
• The obligation for a unique holder or for co-owners to grant a license is a strong outrage
on their intellectual property right, this obligation must thus remain exceptional. Therefore,
the national and community case law framed in a rigorous way the conditions in which
this obligation can apply.
But, in the hypothesis where all the criteria would be gathered and only in this case, the
dominant position of companies in co-ownership could, it seems, be considered as being
abusive and contrary to article 82 of the EC Treaty.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more on the question of the applicable law
which could be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights which coexist in various
countries.
This point was left aside for further study of paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically, the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept that
an IP right held in co-ownership, even in the absence of contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP right.
If that was the case, what will be, in the opinion of the groups, the elements to take into
consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the European Union countries in this context are asked to indicate if they
consider that the le Council Regulation of 17 June 2008 (No 593/2008), also called “ Rome
I “, may be applied to co-ownership agreements.
The French Group in its previous report dealt with the question of the conflict of laws and
had made reference to the draft of Rome 1 Regulation (cf. 9.1) which is partly reproduced,
hereunder.
The courts rule that the exploitation of an intellectual property right can be governed by a
foreign law: the co-ownership of an intellectual property right has an international character,
provided that the parties are domiciliated in various States and\or that the co-ownership
concerns intellectual property rights located or exploited in several States.
The determination of the applicable law will depend on the existence or not of a co-ownership
contract.
6.1 In the absence of a contract
The legal system of the co-ownership of patent is established by article L.613-29 of the
intellectual property Code whereas the legal system of the co-ownership of the other
intellectual property rights is set by articles 815-1 and following of Civil Code.
First of all, as for the co-ownership of copyright, the applicable law is the one of the countries
where the protection is claimed, so that there will be as many applicable laws as States in
which the protection is asked.
For the other kinds of rights, both of the abovementioned legal systems have no vocation
to govern the relations between the co-owners of intellectual property rights, filed under
the priority of a French right: “the co-ownership system governed by article L 613-29 of the
intellectual property Code applies only to the French patents or to the French part of an
European patent, and not to the foreign extensions“.
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As regards the co-ownership of community trademarks, article 16 of the EC Regulation 40/94
expounds that the applicable law is the one of the State where the first holder registered on
the trademark register has his residence or his firm, provided that this last one is located
within the Union, in the contrary according to the following co holders in accordance with
their order of registration. In the hypothesis where none of the co holders is established within
the Union, the law of the seat of the OHMI will be applied, namely the Spanish law.
Concerning community industrial designs, the same rule applies, according to article 27 of
the EC Regulation 6/2002.
6.2 In presence of a co-ownership agreement
When applying the rule of the autonomy of the will, the parties can elect the law they wish to
subject their contractual relation.
However, in the absence of designation of the applicable law, it is advisable to refer to
the choice of law rule such as expressed by the Rome convention of 19 June 1980, which
constitutes the French international private law independently of the nationality of the parties.
It is interesting to note that the Council Regulation of 17 June 2008 (No 593/2008), also
called “ Rome I “, substituting itself within the European Union (with the exception of Denmark)
to the Rome Convention, will come into effect on December 17th, 2009. Therefore, at the
time of the drafting of the present report and during the conference of Buenos Aires, the
Rome Convention will always be the unique instrument in force within the European Union.
Furthermore, this Agreement shall remain enforceable concerning Denmark.
Article 4(1) of the Rome convention (and article 4 ( 2 ) of the EC Regulation No 593/2008)
provides that the contract is governed by the law of the state which presents the closest
connections or by the law of the state where the party who supplies the characteristic service
has his usual residence, being observed that the criterion of priority fastening is the one of
the “most narrow links”.
Concerning assignment or license matters, it is considered that the link between several
contracts which proceed of the foreign extension of an initial contract concluded within a
purely national frame and subject to the local rule can constitute a hint.
However, determining the applicable law according to the place of the State where the
characteristic service must be supplied seems to be more difficult to hold concerning coownership,
because the contract contains obligations which are under the responsibility of
the parties without it being possible to determine the characteristic service.
This is why the criterion of the closest connection must be hold.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other problems which appear as relevant
towards the present question and which would have been discussed neither in the present
working guidelines, nor in the previous ones for the ExCo of Singapore in 2007.
7.1 What is the fate of the co-ownership in case of a „vacancy“ of a share?
The “vacancy” of an IP right share can be defined as the time during which a share has
no owner. This situation can result either from the disappearance of a person who used to
occupy this quality, or from the refusal of a person to occupy this quality.
If, for example, two companies register a trademark in common and one falls in compulsory
liquidation, it is possible that the sentence closing the liquidation intervenes without attributing
the property share of the trademark to a new owner. If the company, which stayed in bonis
decides, after having lost interest in the trademark, to exploit it, one can wonder to what
extent he has rights on this trademark.
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Also, in the hypothesis where the co-owner of an IP right, a physical person, dies without any
heir, without identified heir or without a heir accepting the succession, a share of the property
of this right will be vacant.
Must be added to these hypothesis, that of the co-owner not giving any more sign of life,
which is not a real case of vacancy (except if a declarative judgment of death has been
pronounced - articles 89 and following of the civil Code) because the renunciation of an IP
right cannot normally be presumed (see question 8 of the first report of the French Group on
question Q194).
The vacancy of a share must be differentiated from its abandonment which is inevitably
voluntary. In this respect, it does not seem possible to apply to the vacancy the special rules
which the intellectual property code dedicates to the abandonment of a share of a co-owned
patent, if for no other reason than just because no notification of the vacancy to the other
co-owners is naturally possible.
The vacancy of a share can have serious consequences on the co-ownership. Indeed,
let us recall, for example, that the renunciation to Patents and assimilated rights and to
trademarks and drawings and models supposes the consent of all the co-owners, as well as
the accomplishment of formalities of renewal of a trademark or of extension of a drawing
and model (see question 8 of the first report of the French Group on the question Q194).
The intellectual property code and the rules of the civil Code on co-ownership do not evoke
exactly the hypothesis of the vacancy of a share of property.
However, the intellectual property code contains measures relative to the vacancy or to the
escheat (vacancy of a succession) of copyright or similar rights of copyright, which seem
perfectly applicable to the hypothesis of co-ownership of such rights:
7.1.1 Copyright
• Article L121-3: “In the event of manifest abuse in the exercise or non-exercise of the right
of disclosure by the deceased author’s representatives referred to in Article L121-2, the
first instance court may order any appropriate measure. The same shall apply in the
event of a dispute between such representatives, if there is no known successor in title,
no heir or no espouse entitled to inherit. Such matters may be referred to the courts by
the Minister responsible for culture.”
• Article L122-9: “In the event of manifest abuse in the exercise or non-exercise of the rights
of exploitation by the deceased author’s representatives referred to in Article L121-2,
the first instance court may order any appropriate measure. The same shall apply in the
event of a dispute between such representatives, if there is no known successor in title,
no heir or no espouse entitled to inherit. Such matters may be referred to the courts, inter
alia, by the Minister responsible for culture.”
7.1.2 Copyright related rights:
• Article L211-2: “In addition to any person having a justified interest, the Minister
responsible for culture shall be entitled to take legal action, particularly where -there is
no known successor in title or where there is no heir or no spouse entitled to inherit.”
If the intellectual property code refers to the vacancy only in relation to literary and artistic
property, it is unmistakably because it is in this domain that the difficulty arises with most
acuity. Unlike the industrial property where the co-owners normally have to appear on a
national register, the identification of the heirs of a dead author can be very delicate (all the
more so as several heirs’ generations can succeed one another). After various researches, a
co-owner can decide for a vacancy of a share and decide to authorize certain exploitations,
for example of an audiovisual work.
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Now it can occur that no identified heirs show themselves on the occasion of this exploitation.
The demonstration of the researches made (with the Service Domains, authors’ companies) to
find them will not necessarily be sufficient to escape the infringement grievance. It can thus be
planned to make, preventively, a kind of legal action in escheat to obtain from the competent
Court a decision in ex parte proceedings authorizing the exploitation.
Except for these particular cases, it will be undoubtly necessary to apply to the vacancy of
an IP right share the general measures of the Civil code, in particular the measures of article
539 according to which “the properties of the persons who died without heirs or whose
successions are abandoned belong to the State“, those of article 811 and following on the
successions in escheat, and possibly article 713 which provides that“The goods without any
master belong to the township on where the goods are located“.
It must however be underlined that the parties, who can decide to contractually organize the
co-ownership of their IP rights (articles L. 613-32 of the IPC and 1873-1 of the Civil code),
can envisage the hypothesis of the vacancy or the escheat of a share in the agreement which
binds them.
One could wonder whether the agreement should not establish, within the provisions
governing the auxiliary regimes, an attribution of the vacant shares to the co-owner(s)
remaining at the date of the observation of the vacancy. This mechanism could be imagined
subject to certain strong guarantees. So, an intervention of the judge to validate a possible
record of vacancy would certainly be necessary.
7.2 What is the incidence of the judicial recognition of a co-ownership situation on acts concluded
previously to this recognition?
It is not rare that the existence of a situation of co-ownership of an IP right is proclaimed by
a court order. As it has already been mentioned, the actions for recovery can indeed only
concern the simple share of a patent property, of a trademark or of a work of the mind. Thus
arises the question of the fate which should be reserved to the acts agreed by the one who
presented himself to third parties as the unique owner of the IP right prior to the recognition
of a situation of co-ownership.
There are several possible answers to this question :
• nullity of all the acts ;
• nullity of the only acts which cannot be made by a single co-owner ;
• validity of all the acts ;
• validity of the acts made previously to the definitive justice order recognizing the existence
of a co-ownership but end of their effects beyond …
This question joins another, very controversial in doctrine, regarding the sharing of a coownership,
which will not directly be dealt with here. It will be simply underlined that if one
considers that the IP rights are ruled by the legal system regarding co-ownership, each party
can ask for the sharing in application of the provisions of article 815 of the Civil code (“No
one may be compelled to remain in undivided ownership and a partition may always be
induced, unless it was delayed by judgment or agreement“). The sharing having a declarative
effect which erases retroactively the co-ownership period (article 883 of the Civil code “Each
coheir shall be deemed to have succeeded alone and immediately to all the effects comprised
in his share, or falling to him through auction, and never to have had ownership of the other
effects of the succession“), one can consider that the licenses which were granted during the
co-ownership by co-owners other than the one to whom were attributed the IP rights will be
non-evocable to this last one if such a sharing is possible.
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This question is strictly bound to that of the possible restitution, in favour of the co-owner
restored in his rights, of the fruits which the visible owner may have perceived when he
claimed himself to be the only holder of the rights. The classic provisions of the Civil code
will be normally applicable to settle this issue, in particular the one according to which “ The
fruits made by the simple holder belong to him only if he possesses in good-faith “ - article
549 - (For an application: Paris, March 24th, 2006, Orelis c / T.A.M.I.).
7.2.1 Case of the transfer of the right
If the apparent owner assigned the IP right to a third party, the assignment does not prevent
the action for recovery of property against the assignee of the right, who can undoubtly
prevent it thanks to the appearance theory if he demonstrates his good faith. In that case, the
co-owner restored in his rights can normally claim towards his co-owner, at the very least, a
restitution of part of the assignment price.
7.2.2 Case of the exclusive licence
If the apparent owner of an IP right has granted to a third party an exclusive license, this
license cannot prevent the action for recovery of property against the exclusive licensee of
the right, who can undoubtly prevent it thanks to the appearance theory if he demonstrates
his good faith.
The Paris First instance court judged that if the plaintiff in the framework of an action for
recovery of property only claims for a share of the co-ownership, he can ask for compensation
but the contracts agreed by the apparent owner must remain as an effective rule (TGI Paris,
October 21st, 1987, Dossier Brevets 1998. III.2).
But, following this decision, the Court of Cassation considered that, if the license is a contract
which produces effects continuously in the time, the appearance theory can apply only as far
as this appearance persists. It thus judged, regarding the claim of the whole patent property,
that the exclusive licensee could not claim to conserve the profit of this license since the
owner restored in his rights challenged such a possibility (7 February 1995, N° of appeal:
93-12212):
This solution seems to be directly transposable to the co-ownership of a patent, of assimilated
rights and of copyright because the exclusive exploitation licenses of these rights require,
unless otherwise agreed, the consent of all the co-owners.
It is also transposable to the other IP rights, in cases where the restoration of the co-owner
in his rights questions the validity of this type of act of disposal (the authorization requires at
least 2/3 of the co-ownership - see question 4.2 of the first report of the French Group on the
question Q194).
7.2.3 Case of non exclusive licence
Regarding Patents and assimilated rights, unless otherwise agreed, a co-owner can grant
non-exclusive licenses to third parties. The fact that the co-ownership results from a court
order should not thus question the validity of these licenses. The co-owner restored in his rights
can however lean on the provisions of article L. 613-29 of the IPC to claim for compensation
(“Each joint owner may exploitation the invention for his own benefit subject to an equitable
compensation of the other co-owners who do not personally exploit the invention or who have
not granted a license.”).
Regarding Copyright, the solution drawn by the «Cour de cassation» in its decision of 7
February 1995 will be a priori applicable.
For the other IP rights, in cases where the restoration of the co-owner in his rights questions
the validity of this type of act of disposal (the authorization requires at least 2/3 of the coownership),
the solution drawn by «Cour de cassation» in its decision of 7 February 1995
will be a priori applicable.
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7.3 Rules relating to conflicts of jurisdiction
It is advisable to operate a distinction between the rules relating to rules of jurisdiction resulting
from the EC community Regulation No 44/2001 and the internal rules of conflict such as they
result from articles 42 and 46 of the civil procedure Code and articles 14 and 15 of the civil
Code establishing a privilege of jurisdiction for the benefit of the French nationals, being
observed that this privilege is expressly excluded by the EC Regulation No 44/2001.
As for the applicable law issue, it will be necessary to distinguish whether there is a contract
or not and in the hypothesis of the existence of a contract whether the place of the «forum»
was designated.
Besides it is advisable to underline that the Protocol on the judicial competence and the
recognition of the decisions of the European patent convention contains specific rules of
competence relative to the actions which tend to assert a right to obtain a patent instituted
against the holder of a European patent demand.
7.3.1 The European patent convention
Subject to articles 4 and 5, article 2 provides that when the holder of a patent application is
domiciled in one of the State contracting parties, the action against this one must be brought
before the jurisdiction of the aforementioned State.
Subject to articles 4 and 5, article 3 provides that when the holder of a patent application
has no residence in one of the State contracting parties and when the plaintiff is domiciled
in one of the States contracting parties, only the courts of this State have jurisdiction to know
of this action.
Article 4 regarding the actions which oppose an employer to his employee provides that have
jurisdiction the courts of the State contracting according to which the law of the right of the
European patent is determined, pursuant to the second sentence of article 60(1) of the CBE.
Article 5 concerns the written agreements between the parties containing a jurisdictional
clause.
It is advisable to indicate that in the absence of an agreement on a rule of conflict of jurisdiction
pursuant to article 5 or non application of articles 2 - 4, article 6 provides that only the courts
of the German Federal Republic have jurisdiction.
7.3.2 The EC Regulation No 44/2001 system
As a preliminary observation, it is advisable to underline that article 22 (4) of the
aforementioned regulation conferring exclusive jurisdiction, regarding registration, validity
of intellectual property rights, for the benefit of the courts of the State in which the title was
delivered cannot be applied to the co-ownership
Indeed, this text, which is a text of exception, is of strict interpretation, as well as the ECJ ruled
it in its decision Duinjstee, 15 November 1983 (Case C-288/82).
As a consequence, only the general or special jurisdictional rules can be retained.
(i) In the absence of contract
The rule of general competence promulgated in article 2 must apply, so that the court of
the place of the defendant’s residence will have jurisdiction.
In the hypothesis of a plurality of defendants, the defendant can benefit from an option
of competence, because article 6 ( 1 ) provides jurisdiction to the court of the place of
residence of only one of the defendants, subject to the existence of a narrow link between
the demands and to avoid incompatible solutions if they were separately heard.
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(ii) In presence of a contract
A new subdivision must be operated whether the law of the forum was designated or not.
(a) The designated «forum»
Article 23 provides the conditions to which are subject attributives clauses of
jurisdiction:
• one of the parties, at least, has to have its place of residence on the territory of
the European Union,
• A European Union court must have been designated,
• the agreement regarding the attribution of the jurisdiction must be written.
(iii)
As a consequence, in the presence of an attributive clause of jurisdiction, the parties
cannot subject their dispute to another jurisdiction.
(b) Absence of designation of the «forum»
In this hypothesis, besides the rule of general competence of article 2 and the rule of
special competence of article 6 ( 1 ), the rule of special competence of article 5 (1) has
vocation to apply.
Article 5 ( 1 ) provides a rule of general competence based on the place where the
obligation used as a base to the demand was or must have been executed.
The difficulty in a co-ownership agreement relies on the different natures of the
obligations.
One could wonder which court has jurisdiction when the dispute concerns a plurality of
obligations that must be executed in several States.
The ECJ asserted a principle in its Shenavaï decision, 15 January 1987 (Case 266/85)
that it is the main obligation amongst several obligations in cause which determines the
competent judge. Thus, the Court applied the Accessorium sequitur principale rule.
However, if the location of the obligation is impossible to determine, the option of
competence of article 5 ( 1 ) disappears for the benefit of the rule of the general competence
of article 2, as expressed by the ECJ in its decision Besik vs Wasserreinigungsbau Alfred
Kretzschmar, 19 February 2002 (Case C-256/00).
Moreover, this rule had already been operated by the Paris First instance court, in a
judgment of the 29 January 1988, which considered that “ if article 5 of the Brussels
convention allows the plaintiff in contractual matters to assign the defendant where the
obligation was executed or must be executed, it is advisable to retain the competence of
the courts where the defendant is domiciled, asserted by article 2 of the convention, since
is claimed the resolution of a license agreement covering 24 countries including France
for non-fulfilment by the patentee of his obligations of information, patent preservation
and protection of the licensee against third parties and for lack of reliability of goods
built according to his plans”.
The rules of conflict of private international law
No international instrument on attributives clauses of jurisdiction is to this date effective.
However it is important to highlight the existence of the Hague Convention of the 30 June
2005 on the agreements of election of for which has not yet been ratified.
Under these conditions, the competent jurisdiction shall be determined by the internal rules
of competence.
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The first criterion of fastening with French jurisdictions is the place of residence of the
defendant, asserted by article 42 of the Code of civil procedure.
Article 46, paragraph 1, offers to the plaintiff an option of competence regarding contractual
matters for the benefit of the jurisdiction of the place of delivery of the good or the execution
of the provision of a service.
Thus, the developments aforementioned (9.2.1 (b) ii)) apply mutatis mutandis.
Besides, the French courts will also have jurisdiction, whenever one of the parties is French by
application of articles 14 or 15 of the civil code.
Pursuant to article 14 of the civil code, the foreign defendant can be judged in France due
to the violation of an obligation resulting from the co-ownership agreement to the detriment
of French national.
Furthermore, pursuant to article 15 of the Civil code, a French defendant can always be
brought before a French jurisdiction, for obligations contracted by him abroad, under the
reserve that the plaintiff is not a national of the European Union.
The provisions of articles 14 and 15 must be applied whether the co-ownership is governed
by a contract or not. It is advisable to note that these articles cannot be invoked against a
party domiciled or having his residence on the territory of the European Union.
Proposals for a future harmonization
The Groups are also invited to formulate their suggestions within the framework of a possible
national or regional harmonization of the intellectual property rights or, at least, an improvement
or a complement to the current solutions.
1 On the origin of the co-ownership
Generally speaking, the French Group is not in favour of the introduction of compulsory legal
requirements which would make a difference according to the quality of the “native” or “the
successors” co-owners (or even “voluntary or “forced“) because, as a rule, nothing prevents
the co-owners from taking into account these elements to contractually organize their coownership,
originally.
However, the French Group notices that the co-ownerships generated within the framework
of successions, can create important consequences, which could lead to a real blocking. The
arrival in the co-ownership of persons who were not originally co-owners of the IP right can
indeed create conflicts making impossible any unanimity. But such an unanimity is necessary
for the fulfilment of certain acts of exploitation ( Acts of disposal in this included the exclusive
license see below Question 3), or even for the survival of certain IP rights (for example the
trademark law).
From then on, one can wonder whether it would be possible and desirable to foresee, in a
legislative way within the framework of an auxiliary regime, that the heirs of a dead co-owner
should be to assign, to the other co-owners, the co-ownership share of the IP right which
returned to them following the death.
An auxiliary system of pre-emption right or option, with compensation of the heirs which
could be possibly fixed by the judge in case of discord, could be imagined.
This solution would enable the protection of the intuitu personae of the co-ownership
originally and would limit the dilution of the right, thus facilitating the exploitation.
A priori, all the co-owners at the time of the succession should be able to benefit from this preemption
right or option right. In the hypothesis where this mechanism would not be activated
by the surviving co-owners within a specific legal delay, the share of the deceased would
normally be passed on to his heirs.
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2 On the subcontracting
The co-owner of a patent, which has the personal right to exploit the patent, has of this fact the
right “ to outsource “ by subcontracting the manufacturing of the products or of a subset of a
product covered by the patent if such is his decision, without having to collect the preliminary
consent of the other co-owners or even to have to inform them (and thus all the more, without
having to follow the measures relating to the concession of licenses by a co-owner, whether
they are “contractual” or result from the “auxiliary” regime).
3 On the concession of exclusive and non exclusive licenses
The grant of an exclusive license is subject to the unanimity rule. As a consequence, the consent
of all the co-owners must be required, under penalty of nullity of the exclusive license.
The grant of a simple license by a single co-owner is subject to a simple notification to the
other co-owners. The other co-owners must benefit of a reasonable delay to make opposition
to the project when it relies on legitimate grounds. One of the legitimate grounds could be
the fact of granting a license to the competitor of another co-owner.
4 Transfer of a part of a co-ownership share
No dichotomy should be made between the transfer of a co-ownership share and a only part
of a co-ownership share: they should only be operated with the preliminary consent of the
other co-owners and, in the absence of an agreement, allow the exercise of the right of preemption
for both the transfer of a share and the transfer of part of a co-ownership share.
5 Incidence of the exploitation of IP rights held in co-ownership on competition law.
The holding of IP rights in co-ownership as such is not contrary to competition law.
Nevertheless, the common principles of competition law govern the exercise of the IP rights
held in co-ownership, in particular as far as the relations between the co-owners could lead
to a cartel situation.
6 Determination of the applicable law and the applicability of the EC Regulation No.
593/2008
The co-ownership agreements are governed by the EC Regulation No 593/2008, as they are
today and until the 17 December 2009 by the Rome Convention.
In the absence of a choice of a law by the parties, the notion of “the closest connection “in the
meaning of article 4 (4) of the said Regulation, can be determined in reference to the priority
patent application place or the IP right used as a base to an international extension. Thus,
the law applicable to the co-ownership agreement will be the law of the state in which the IP
right used as a base to the international extensions was filed.
Summary
8 On the origin of the co-ownership
The French Intellectual Property Code does not make any distinction depending the origin of
the ownership.
Generally speaking, the French Group is not in favour of the introduction of compulsory legal
requirements which would make a difference according to the quality of the “native” or “the
successors” co-owners (or even “voluntary or “forced“) because, as a rule, nothing prevents
the co-owners from taking into account these elements to contractually organize their coownership,
originally.
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However, the French Group notices that the co-ownerships generated within the framework
of successions, can create important consequences, which could lead to a real blocking. The
arrival in the co-ownership of persons who were not originally co-owners of the IP right can
indeed create conflicts making impossible any unanimity. But such an unanimity is necessary
for the fulfilment of certain acts of exploitation ( Acts of disposal in this included the exclusive
license see below Question 3), or even for the survival of certain IP rights (for example the
trademark law).
From then on, one can wonder whether it would be possible and desirable to foresee, in a
legislative way within the framework of an auxiliary regime, that the heirs of a dead co-owner
should be to assign, to the other co-owners, the co-ownership share of the IP right which
returned to them following the death.
An auxiliary system of pre-emption right or option, with compensation of the heirs which
could be possibly fixed by the judge in case of discord, could be imagined.
This solution would enable the protection of the intuitu personae of the co-ownership
originally and would limit the dilution of the right, thus facilitating the exploitation.
A priori, all the co-owners at the time of the succession, should be able to benefit from
this pre-emption right or option right. In the hypothesis where this mechanism would not be
activated by the surviving co-owners within a specific legal delay, the share of the deceased
would normally be passed on to his heirs.
9 On the subcontracting
The co-owner of a patent, which has the personal right to exploit the patent, has of this fact the
right “to outsource“ by subcontracting the manufacturing of the products or of a subset of a
product covered by the patent if such is his decision, without having to collect the preliminary
consent of the other co-owners or even to have to inform them (and thus all the more, without
having to follow the measures relating to the concession of licenses by a co-owner, whether
they are “contractual” or result from the “auxiliary” regime).
10 On the concession of exclusive and non exclusive licenses
The French Group invites to refere to point 4 of its previous report drafted for the Singapore
ExCo.
The grant of an exclusive license is subject to the unanimity rule. As a consequence, the consent
of all the co-owners must be required, under penalty of nullity of the exclusive license.
The grant of a simple license by a single co-owner is subject to a simple notification to the
other co-owners. The other co-owners must benefit of a reasonable delay to make opposition
to the project when it relies on legitimate grounds. One of the legitimate grounds could be
the fact of granting a license to the competitor of another co-owner.
11 Transfer of a part of a co-ownership share
No dichotomy should be made between the transfer of a co-ownership share and a only part
of a co-ownership share: they should only be operated with the preliminary consent of the
other co-owners and, in the absence of an agreement, allow the exercise of the right of preemption
for both the transfer of a share and the transfer of part of a co-ownership share.
12 Incidence of the exploitation of IP rights held in co-ownership on competition law.
The holding of IP rights in co-ownership as such is not contrary to competition law.
Nevertheless, the common principles of competition law govern the exercise of the IP rights
held in co-ownership, in particular as far as the relations between the co-owners could lead
to a cartel situation.
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13 Determination of the applicable law and the applicability of the EC Regulation No.
593/2008
The co-ownership agreements are governed by the EC Regulation No 593/2008, as they are
today and until the 17 December 2009 by the Rome Convention.
In the absence of a choice of a law by the parties, the notion of “the closest connection“,
in the meaning of article 4 (4) of the said Regulation, can be determined in reference to the
priority patent application place or the IP right used as a base to an international extension.
Thus, the law applicable to the co-ownership agreement will be the law of the state in which
the IP right used as a base to the international extensions was filed.
14 Other issues
14.1 What is the outcome of the co-ownership in the situation of the vacancy of a co-ownership
share?
A subsidiary legal system should be contemplated.
14.2 What is the consequence of the judicial acknowledgment of a co-ownership on the acts
executed prior to that acknowledgment?
Several answers can be contemplated:
• nullity of all the acts
• nullity of the sole acts that could have been executed by a single co-owner
• validity of all the acts
• validity of all the acts executed prior to the judicial decision acknowledging the existence
of the co-ownership but cease of their effects thereafter
14.3 Jurisdiction conflict rules
The French Group invites to refer to its previous report drafted for the Singapore ExCo
Résumé
1 Sur l’origine de la copropriété
Le Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle ne fait pas de distinction selon l’origine de la
copropriété.
D’une manière générale, le Groupe français n’est pas favorable à l’introduction de dispositions
légales obligatoires qui feraient une différence selon que la qualité des copropriétaires
«originaires» ou «successeurs» (ou encore «volontaires» ou «forcés») car, en principe, rien
n’empêche les copropriétaires de tenir compte de ces éléments pour organiser leur copropriété
contractuellement, à l’origine.
Cependant, le Groupe français remarque que la copropriété générée dans le cadre de
successions, peut emporter des conséquences graves, pouvant aller jusqu’à un véritable
blocage. En effet, l’arrivée dans la copropriété de personnes non copropriétaires à l’origine du
droit de PI peut créer des conflits rendant impossible toute unanimité. Or une telle unanimité
est nécessaire pour l’accomplissement de certains actes d’exploitation (actes de disposition
en ce compris la licence exclusive voir ci-après Question 3), ou même pour la survivance de
certains droits de PI (par exemple le droit de marque).
Se pose dès lors la question de savoir s’il serait possible et souhaitable de prévoir, de manière
législative dans le cadre d’un régime supplétif, que les héritiers d’un copropriétaire décédé
soient tenus de céder, aux autres copropriétaires, la quote-part de copropriété d’un droit de
PI qui leur est revenue à cause de mort.
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Un système supplétif souple de droit de préemption ou d’option, avec indemnisation des
héritiers éventuellement fixée par le juge en cas de désaccord, pourrait être imaginé.
Cette solution pourrait permettre de sauvegarder l’intuitu personae de la copropriété à
l’origine et limiterait la dilution du droit, facilitant ainsi l’exploitation.
A priori, tous les copropriétaires au moment de la succession, devraient pouvoir bénéficier de
ce droit de préemption ou d’option. Dans l’hypothèse où ce mécanisme ne serait pas activé
par les copropriétaires survivants dans un certain délai légal, la quote-part du défunt serait
normalement transmise aux héritiers.
2 Sur la sous-traitance
Le copropriétaire d’un brevet, qui a le droit personnel d’exploiter le brevet, a de ce fait le
droit « d’externaliser » en sous-traitant la production de produits ou d’un sous-ensemble d’un
produit couvert par ce brevet si telle est sa décision, sans avoir à recueillir le consentement
préalable des autres copropriétaires ni même à avoir à les informer (et donc a fortiori, sans
avoir à suivre les dispositions relatives à la concession de licences par un copropriétaire,
qu’elles soient « contractuelles » ou qu’elles résultent du régime « supplétif »).
3 Sur la concession des licences exclusives et non-exclusives
Le Groupe Français invite à se référer au point 4 du rapport dressé pour l’ExCo de
Singapour. La concession d’une licence exclusive doit être soumise à la règle de l’unanimité.
En conséquence, le consentement de l’ensemble des copropriétaires doit être requis, sous
peine de nullité de la licence exclusive.
La concession d’une licence simple par un seul copropriétaire doit faire l’objet d’une simple
notification aux autres copropriétaires. Les autres copropriétaires devant bénéficier d’un délai
raisonnable pour s’opposer au projet en cas de motifs légitimes. Un des motifs légitimes
pourrait être la concession d’une licence par un copropriétaire à un concurrent d’un autre
copropriétaire.
4 Cession d’une partie de quote-part de copropriété
Aucune dichotomie ne devrait être faite entre la cession d’une quote-part de copropriété ou
d’une partie de quote-part de copropriété : elles ne devraient être opérées qu’avec l’accord
préalable des autres copropriétaires et, à défaut d’accord, permettre l’exercice d’un droit
de préemption tant pour la cession d’une quote-part que pour la cession d’une partie d’une
quote-part de copropriété.
5 Incidence de l’exploitation des droits de PI détenus en copropriété sur le droit de la
concurrence
La détention de droits de PI en copropriété en tant que telle n’est pas contraire au droit de la
concurrence
Néanmoins, les principes communs du droit de la concurrence doivent s’appliquer à l’exercice
des droits de PI détenus en copropriété, notamment dans la mesure où les relations entre les
copropriétaires pourraient conduire à une situation d’entente.
6 Détermination de la loi applicable et applicabilité du règlement CE No 593/2008
Les accords de copropriété sont régis par le Règlement CE No 593/2008, comme ils le sont
aujourd’hui et jusqu’au 17 décembre 2009 par la Convention de Rome.
En l’absence de choix d’une loi par les parties, la notion de «liens les plus étroits», au sens
de l’article 4(4) dudit Règlement, peut être déterminée par référence au lieu du dépôt du
brevet de priorité ou du droit de PI servant de base à une extension internationale. Ainsi, la
loi applicable à l’accord de copropriété sera la loi de l’État dans lequel le droit de PI servant
de base aux extensions internationales aura été déposé.
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7 Autres problèmes
7.1 Quel est le sort de la copropriété en cas de « vacance » d’une quote-part?
Un système légal supplétif harmonisé devrait être envisagé.
7.2 Quelle est l’incidence de la reconnaissance judiciaire d’une situation de copropriété sur les
actes passés antérieurement à cette reconnaissance?
Plusieurs réponses sont envisageables:
• nullité de tous les actes;
• nullité des seuls actes qui ne peuvent être effectués par un seul copropriétaire;
• validité de tous les actes;
• validité des actes effectués antérieurement à la décision de justice définitive reconnaissant
l’existence d’une copropriété mais cessation de leurs effets au-delà…
7.3 Règles de conflit de juridictions
Le groupe français invite à se référer à son précédent rapport dressé pour l’ExCo de
Singapour.
Zusammenfassung
8 Zum Ursprung der Miteigentümerschaft
Das französische geistigen Eigentums Buch macht doch keinen Unterschied nach der Ursprung
der Miteigentümerschaft.
Die französische Gruppe unterstützt grundsätzlich keine Einführung von zwingenden
Gesetzen, die einen Unterschied nach Eigenschaft der Miteigentümer in „ursprüngliche
(Miteigentümer)“ oder „Nachfolger“ (oder auch „freiwillige (Miteigentümer)“ oder
„gezwungene (Miteigentümer)“) machen; da die Miteigentümer grundsätzlich nicht daran
gehindert werden, diese Eigenschaft zu berücksichtigen, um ihr Miteigentümerschaft
ursächlich vertraglich zu gestalten.
Jedoch macht die französische Gruppe darauf aufmerksam, dass die Miteigentümerschaft,
das durch eine Erbschaft entstanden ist, schwere Auswirkungen nach sich ziehen kann,
die zu einer völligen Sperrung führen können. In der Tat kann die Aufnahme einer Person,
die ursächlich nicht Miteigentümer am Recht des geistigen Eigentums war, im Kreise der
Eigentümer zu Konflikten führen, die die Einstimmigkeit bei der Abstimmung verhindern. Nun
ist aber gerade diese Einstimmigkeit für die Ausführung von manchen Nutzungshandlungen
erforderlich (Verfügungshandlung, darin enthalten die ausschließliche Lizenz, siehe Punkt
3), wie die Entscheidung über die Verlängerung von gewerblichen Schutzrechten (z.B. einer
Marke).
Infolgedessen stellt sich die Frage, ob es möglich und wünschenswert wäre, gesetzlich ein
ergänzendes Recht zu schaffen, das die Erben eines verstorbenen Miteigentümers verpflichtet,
den anderen Miteigentümern den Anteil der Miteigentümerschaft eines Rechts am geistigen
Eigentum zu überlassen, welches ihnen durch einen Todesfall zuteil wurde.
Ein flexibles ergänzendes System von Vorkaufsrecht oder Wahlrecht, mit einer Entschädigung
der Erben, welche im Fall einer Uneinigkeit vom Richter festgelegt würde, könnte vorstellbar
sein.
Diese Lösung könnte das Prinzip der „Intuitu personae“ der ursächlichen Miteigentümerschaft
wahren, die Auflösung des Rechtes einschränken und somit die Nutzung des geistigen Rechts
erleichtern.
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Von vornherein sollten alle Miteigentümer im Moment der Nachfolge dieses Vorkaufs- oder
Optionsrecht nutzen können. Falls diese Option nach einer bestimmten gesetzlichen Frist von
den überlebenden Miteigentümern nicht genutzt worden ist, wäre der Anteil des Verstorbenen
üblicherweise auf die Erben zu übertragen.
9 Über Ausgliederungen
Der Miteigentümer eines Patents, der das persönliche Recht zur Nutzung des Patents
hat, hat somit das Recht, über eine „Ausgliederung“ durch Vergabe der Produktion eines
Produktes oder einer Produktgruppe, die durch das Patent geschützt sind, zu entscheiden,
ohne dazu weder das vorherige Einverständnis der anderen Miteigentümer einholen noch
diese informieren zu müssen (und ohne den Vorschriften, die die Lizenzerteilung von einem
Miteigentümer regeln, folgen zu müssen, seien sie „vertraglich“ oder durch ein „ergänzendes
System“ geregelt).
10 Über die Erteilung von exklusiven und nicht-exklusiven Lizenzen
Das französische Gruppe ladet ein, sich auf seinen vorigen Bericht (Punkt 4) für den ExCo in
Singapur zu beziehen.
Die Erteilung von einer Exklusivlizenz erfordert die Einstimmigkeit. Infolgedessen muss
die Zustimmung aller Miteigentümer eingeholt werden, anderenfalls ist die Exklusivlizenz
nichtig.
Die Erteilung einer Einzellizenz durch einen einzigen Miteigentümer erfordert eine einfache
Benachrichtigung der anderen Miteigentümer. Die anderen Miteigentümer sollen eine
angemessene Frist haben, um gegen diesen Plan mit berechtigten Gründen Einspruch zu
erheben. Ein berechtigter Grund könnte die Lizenzvergabe eines Miteigentümers an den
Konkurrenten einer anderen Miteigentümerschaft sein.
11 Abtretung eines Anteils der Miteigentümerschaft
Es sollte kein Unterschied zwischen der Abtretung des Miteigentümerschaftsanteils oder
nur eines Teils eines Miteigentümerschaftsanteils gemacht werden: sie müssen nur erfolgen,
wenn die anderen Mitinhabern vorherig zustimmen, und falls es keine Zustimmung gibt, die
Ausübung eines Vorkaufsrechts sowohl für die Abtretung einer Miteigentümerschaftsanteils
als auch für die Abtretung eines Teils eines Miteigentümerschaftsanteils ermöglichen.
12 Auswirkung der Nutzung von in Miteigentümerschaft gehaltenen geistigen Rechten auf das
Wettbewerbsrecht
Der Besitz von Rechten des geistigen Eigentums in Miteigentümerschaft verstößt grundsätzlich
nicht gegen das Wettbewerbsrecht.
Dennoch müssen die Rechtsgrundsätze des Wettbewerbsrechts auf die Ausübung der in der
Miteigentümerschaft gehaltenen Rechte des geistigen Eigentums Anwendung finden, besonders
insoweit als die Beziehungen zwischen den Miteigentümern zu einer Absprachesituation
führen können.
13 Bestimmung des anwendbaren Rechts und Anwendbarkeit der Verordnung EG 593/2008
Die Vereinbarungen über die Miteigentümerschaft sind in der Verordnung EG 593/2008
geregelt sowie sie es heute und bis zum 17. Dezember 2009 durch das Römische
Übereinkommen sind.
Mangels Rechtsauswahl durch die Parteien kann der Begriff der „engsten Verbindungen“,
im Sinne von Paragraph 4(4) dieser Verordnung, hauptsächlich mit Bezug auf den Ort
der Anmeldung des Patents bestimmt werden oder mit Bezug auf das Recht des geistigen
Eigentums, das als Basis für eine internationale Ausbreitung dient. Deswegen ist der
Miteigentümerschaftsvertrag von dem Recht des Staates geregelt, in dem das Recht auf
geistiges Eigentum als Basis für eine internationale Ausbreitung hinterlegt wurde.
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14 Andere Probleme
14.1 Was ist das Verhängnis der Miteigentümerschaft im Falle der Vakanz eines Anteils?
Ein gesetzliches Ergänzungssystem sollte betrachtet sein.
14.2 Welche Rechtsfolge hat die gerichtliche Anerkennung einer Miteigentümerschaft auf den
angenommenen Akten?
Mehrere Antworten werden betrachtet:
• Nichtigkeit aller Akten;
• Nichtigkeit der einigen Akten die von einem einzigen Miteigentümer nicht angenommen
werden können.
• Gültigkeit aller Akten;
• Gültigkeit der vor der gerichtlichen Entscheidung angenommenen Akten aber danach
Wirkungsaufhörung
14.3 Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit
Das französische Gruppe ladet ein, sich auf seinen vorigen Bericht für den ExCo in Singapur
zu beziehen.
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German
Allemand
Deutsch
Report Q194
in the name of the German Group
by Volkmar HENKE, Mary-Rose McGUIRE, Stefan SCHWEYER, Stefan
SCHOHE, Stefan ABEL, Kristofer BOTT, Gert JAEKEL and Ralph NACK
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
In general the acts governing industrial property rights only regulate the formation
of co-ownership in such rights, i.e. the case that, for example, that several persons jointly
made one invention (§ 6 2 nd sentence Patent Act (PatG)) or a design was jointly created by
more than one designer (§ 7 (1) 2 nd sentence Design Act (GebrMG)). However, the provisions
mentioned do not provide for the legal relationship between the co-owners. In this regard,
the provisions concerning joint-ownership (Bruchteilsgemeinschaft, § 741 Civil Code (BGB))
apply. Under these provisions it is irrelevant whether co-ownership originates from common
invention/creation or results from assignment to more than one assignee.
With regard to copyright law § 8 Copyright Act (UrhG) provides for rules governing
the formation of joint authorship, i.e. the case that authors have jointly created a work with
regard to which ist is impossible to separately exploit the single contributions. Furthermore, §
8 (2) Copyright Act provides that the rights to publish and exploit the work(s) are commonly
owned by the authors. In contrast to the rules for industrial property this joint ownership has
the effect that none of the co-authors may individually dispose of his part. Since copyrights as
such may not be transferred in a transaction, but merely can be the subject of a right of use,
co-ownership in copyrights cannot arise by means o legal transaction.
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The rules of inheritance law, which form a part of the Civil Code, may lead to different types of
legal relationships between the heirs: These form a community of heirs (Erbengemeinschaft),
which is governed by rules largely corresponding to those of the part owners’ community,
and cover the entire heritage. Accordingly, each heir may dispose of his right to the heritage,
whilst the other heirs have a right of pre-emption (§ 2034 (1) Civil Code). The administration
of the heritage lies at the hands of the community of heirs (§ 2038 Civil Code). The individual
heir may not, however, dispose of the individual assets of the heritage (§ 2034 (2) Civil Code),
such as a patent. Such patent will remain part of the common estate until the community of
heirs is dissolved and liquidated according to § 2024 Civil Code.
In principle, the same applies in the field of copyright: Although copyrights are not
transferable by legal transactions inter vivos, they remain transferable in mortis causa. The
legal relationship of co-heirs is not governed by § 8 (2) Copyright Act, but exclusively subject
to the rules governing the community of heirs provided for by §§ 2032 et sequ. Civil Code 1 .
This means that different rules apply to co-authors on the one hand, and co-heirs of an author
on the other hand.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
As pointed out in our last report, German law – jurisdiction included – does not provide clear
guidance on the question whether or not, and if so to what extent, individual co-owners of a
commonly owned IPR may grant licenses to third parties 2 . Even less clear is where proprietary
exploitation of an IPR by a co-owner ends and where the use of the right (by third parties)
under a license starts 3 .
In general, German law distinguishes between agreements that grant a license to produce on
the one hand, and mere production agreements with contract manufacturers on the other. In
German legal terms, the later is a use (of the invention) by the patent owner itself, and so is
the German National Group’s understanding of the Singapore Resolution concerning Q 194.
There, it is stated (no. 4 a) that each co-owner is entitled to individually exploit the patented
invention, and this must therefore similarly apply to the so-called contract manufacturing
agreements 4 . The characteristic element of such manufacturing contract is the fact that the
contractor has the right to manufacture the product, but not to positively use the invention; 5
1. BGH GRUR 1982, 308, 310 – Kunsthändler.
2. German National Group, Q 194, question 4.
3. German National Group, Q 194, question 4.
4. See e.g. Stumpf/Groß, Der Lizenzvertrag (2008) 8 , no. 33.
5. Stumpf/Groß, Der Lizenzvertrag (2008) 8 , no. 33.
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accordingly the economic risk typically connected with the production (merchantability,
market success) remains with the co-owner of the patent.
The German National Group holds that such contract manufacturing agreements should be
covered by Article 4 (a) of the Singapore Resolution, in order to prevent the discrimination
of co-inventors, which have no proprietary production facilities, as they otherwise would be
deprived of the essential IP exploitation right without an economic equivalent. In fact Article
5 (a) of the Singapore Resolution reveals that, within the framework of the harmonized law
supported by AIPPI, the granting of a license is subject to additional requirements, in particular,
to the consent of other co-owners. Accordingly, co-owners without their own production
facilities would be dependent on the other co-owners’ good will (namely, their consent) in
drawing any benefit at all from their right in case contract manufacturing agreements would
not fall within the category of proprietary exploitation by the co-owner. One can certainly not
expect that those co-owners would build their own plant in order to exploit their right.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
For most IPR’s the question whether the co-owner of an IPR may, without the other co-owners’
consent, grant licenses to third parties, is determined by the rules regarding common
ownership (cfr. question 1). In this context, a distinction must be made between exclusive and
non-exclusive, i.e. single licenses.
It is commonly accepted that granting an exclusive license in a commonly owned IPR constitutes
an act that requires the consent of all co-owner, because § 745 (3) Civil Code provides that
no co-owner may be deprived from his right of use in the commonly owned asset (§ 743
(2) Civil Code) without his consent 6 . It further is generally acknowledged that the co-owners
may, at least with a majority vote, grant single licenses, as this will not impede the co-owner’s
individual right of use and thus the minority of co-owners is not negatively affected.
It is under discussion, however, to what extent an individual co-owner may grant a single
license in the co-owned right.
Various sets of rules have been discussed. The right to grant a single license under a coowned
right for two reasons cannot be inferred from § 747 (1) Civil Code, which states that
each co-owner may dispose of its part. First, the granting of a non-exclusive license is no
disposal in terms of § 747 (1) Civil Code. Secondly, it is held that a license solely grants a
right to use the protected right as such and not just to use a portion of it 7 . It is however also
6. Melullis, in: Benkard, Patentrecht (2006) 10 , § 6 PatG, no. 35e; Keukenschrijver, in: Busse, Patentrecht (2003) 6 , § 6
PatG, no. 42.
7. Kraßer, Patentrecht (2009) 6 , p. 358; Lindenmaier/Weiss, Das Patentgesetz (1973) 6 , § 3 PatG, note 23; dissenting
however Chakraborty/Tilmann, FS-König (2004), p. 77; Fischer, GRUR 1977, 313, 315; Henke, GRUR 2007, 89, 95;
Kisch, GRUR 1952, 267, 269.
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discussed whether such a right, deriving from the co-owner’s own right to use in accordance
with § 743 (2) Civil Code, should be accepted, either by means of a transfer of the right by
the co-owner combined with his own waiver of use, or by constructing such a right in analogy
to the granting of sub-licenses 8 .
Against this assumption, it has been argued that, in permitting the individual co-owner the
granting of single licenses, the circle of persons with a right to use is consequently enlarged,
thus affecting the use of the other co-owners 9 . This is however, not entirely convincing, since
the co-owner’s extensive utilization of their own right to use can affect the other co-owners
even more than the granting of a license by a co-owner who has no opportunity to exercise
his genuine right to use.
In any case, the relevant question must be solved with regard to the internal relationship
be-tween the co-owners and the necessary balancing of interests must take place within the
framework provided by § 745 Civil Code: It comes down to the question whether the coowner
may – in the context of the fair and equal administration of common ownership (§ 745
(2) Civil Code) – request that he may make use of his respective share by means of a granting
a licence in order to exploit his share to an extent corresponding to the other co-owner’s
use and thereby achieve a similar benefit from his co-ownership (§ 743 (1) Civil Code)? This
solution would be in tune with the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH), according
to which financial compensation between co-owners in the event of diverging intensity of use
is granted immediately, yet only with regard to § 745 Civil Code, and not under § 743 Civil
Code 10 .
The question regarding whether or not the co-owner who intends to grant a license, can
suc-cessfully request the consent of the other co-owners thereto, may, in our opinion, not
only be answered with regard to the number of the eventual licensees. The discussion should
rather concentrate on precisely addressing the conditions under which such consent may
not be refused. Therefore, criteria should be developed to determine how the reservation
contained in Article 5 (a) of the Singapore Resolution could be interpreted, and to define the
circumstances in which the remaining co-owners may withhold their consent.
We believe that consent should not be refused if the remaining co-owners (non-licensors),
despite the granting of the license, remain in the position to – with reasonable efforts – exploit
their right in a commercially successful manner 11 . Consent should not be refused if the licensee
would have no other alternative, in particular, no opportunity to exploit his right on his own.
In our opinion, the core of the conflict of interests which needs to be solved is as follows:
Any harmonized law must take care that joint rights in IPR’s will be lucrative for each of the
respective owners – be it by means of individual acts of exploitation, by own use of the
invention, design or trade mark, or by transferring the share or granting a license which fits
with the individual co-owner’s interests. Individual exploitation by a single co-owner must
be limited to the extent that it does not adversely affect the other co-owners’ corresponding
exploitation. These interests have to be balanced in each individual case, taking into
consideration the specific, personal and economic situation as a whole. Simply to reduce the
number of admitted licenses to a certain limit would not solve the problem.
8. The concept of licences in parts of a right (“Anteilslizenzen“) is discussed in legal doctrine.
9. Nirk, in: Klauer-Möhring, Patentgesetz (1973) 3 , § 3 PatG, no. 18; Kraßer, Patentrecht (2009) 6 , p. 358.
10. BGH GRUR 2005, 663 – Gummielastische Masse II; BGH GRUR 2006, 401 – Zylinderrohr.
11. This criterion was developed in German legal doctrin to answer the question in which cases a financial
compensation for individual exploitation should be granted to other co-owners, see Kraßer, Patentrecht (2009) 6 , p.
355. The conflict situation apparently corresponds to those under discussion here.
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4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
As previously stated, a limitation of the number of assignees does not appear appropriate: For
example, the assignment of his right by one co-owner to a small consortium of assignees may
affect the other co-owners rights far less than the assignment to one single, but economically
strong, purchaser.
In general a transfer of shares in a commonly owned asset is admitted under German law
(§ 747 1 st sentence Civil Code). This provision may be seen as the core legal model for the
community of part owners and may be summarized as follows. As the part owners are not
contractually bound they must be granted a far-reaching freedom to act in the market. An
exception however applies under copyright law as a consequence of the general rule that
copyrights are non-transferable inter vivos. Thus an assignment of a share is only admitted
in the course of the procedure of dissolving and liquidating the community of heirs (§ 29
Copyright Act). For the remainder, co-authors may only waive their shares in favour of the
other co-authors (§ 8 (4) Copyright Act).
But of course legal doctrine has observed that the consequences of this legal model may lead
to inequitable results in the field of IPR’s 12 . Suggestions, according to which the assignment
of shares should not be admitted in particular cases, regularly rely on general principles of
German civil law. For example, the assignment is not admitted if its single purpose is to harm
another co-owner (cf. §§ 226, 826 Civil Code (prohibiting intentional, unjust harassment)).
In addition, within the legal framework of the community of co-owners of an IPR, the general
requirement to act in good faith and to respect the other co-owners’ interests (§§ 242, 241
(2) Civil Code) applies. Against this background, there is an argument de lege ferenda to
establish a general duty of an individual co-owner to accept an equivalent purchase offer of
an other co-owners, and to inform them in due time about the intention to assign its share 13 .
The German National Group supports this argument, which goes beyond the current German
law. It would support a draft resolution which contains elements of a right of first refusal of
co-owners of a community of part right owners in IPR’s.
12. Fischer, GRUR 1977, 317; Lüdecke, Erfindungsgemeinschaften (1962), p. 207; Kraßer, Patentrecht (2009) 6 , p.
357.
13. Kraßer, Patentrecht (2009) 6 , p. 357.
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5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
Agreements between co-owners of IP rights concerning their exploitation can relate to the
co-owners’ own use of the intellectual property right or to the granting of licenses to third
parties.
As regards simple co-ownership of patents, where no further common purpose is intended
and where the internal relationship between the co-owners is therefore determined according
to the rules of joint ownership (cf. clause 1a of the already available report on Q 194), each
co-owner is entitled to use the protected invention as long as this does not impair the use by
the other co-owners (§ 743 (2) Civil Code). Thus, the own use of the individual co-owners does
not require an agreement, in principle. However, if the co-owners agree on a certain division
of the use, such as the division of markets or a material delimitation of the products to be
produced using the invention, such agreements are subject to the prohibition of agreements
restricting competition pursuant to § 1 Competition Act (GWB), and the exemption pursuant
to § 2 Competition Act, which in turn refers to the block exemption regulations of the Council
or the Commission of the European Community about the application of Art. 81 (3) EC. As a
matter of fact, these regulations are only applicable if competition is appreciably impaired
by the agreement.
In copyright law, the publication and exploitation of the work always requires the consent
of all joint copyright holders (§ 8 (2) Copyright Act. Agreements between joint owners of
copyright are especially relevant with regard to software development or in the area of
applied art. Such agreements can then also be subject to the prohibition of agreements
restricting competition, if the relevant prerequisites are met.
In trade mark law, the co-ownership of a trade mark which is not aimed at joint licensing is
hardly possible. This is because trade mark law provides for a division of a mark, so that the
same mark can be held by several owners as an individual trade mark, each for different
goods/services. However, it is also conceivable that a trade mark is held by several coowners
and in this case the individual use of the trade mark by the joint owners can also be
subject of an agreement restricting competition.
In summary, it can therefore be said concerning the question of own use that – irrespective of
whether or not the individual use requires the consent of the other joint owners – agreements
concluded in this respect can be subject to the prohibition of agreements restricting competition
if competition is appreciably impaired by them and the prerequisites of exemption are not
fulfilled. Cartel law is independent from the provisions of civil law governing the administration
of the jointly held property right, so that it cannot be argued that the provisions of cartel law
do not apply on such agreements under civil law 14 . If the individual use of a property right
is not based on an agreement due to the fact that such an agreement is not required, the
prohibition of agreements restricting competition does not apply. In addition, although the
mere waiver by one joint owner of his/her user right for the benefit of another joint owner
can have consequences restricting competition, such waiver does not constitute an agreement
restricting competition.
14. cf. Immenga/Mestmäcker,Wettbewerbsrecht (2007) 4 , § 1 GWB, no. 300, on research cooperations.
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In contrast, the situation is different with regard to the licensing of property rights, which in
principle can only be carried out jointly.
When assessing agreements governing the licensing of property rights, one must differentiate
between a regulation concerning whether and to whom a license will be granted, and the
content of the provisions of such license agreements.
The denial of a license can violate the prohibition of discrimination pursuant to § 20
Competition Act if the co-owner has market dominance due to the property right. However,
in this context the Federal Court of Justice held in an important judgment of July 13, 2004 15
that the owner of a patent or of another industrial property right or of a copyright has a
wide discretion for granting different licensing terms to different parties or for even complete
denial of a license, as the unequal treatment of parties requesting a license – with respect to
the scope of the right to use the property right – is a core element of the exclusionary effect
of an property right as such. However, discrimination without objective justifications could
be found illegal if the market dominant position of the patentee does not only stem from the
technical contribution itself the patent is based on, but rather, for example, from the fact that
the invention became part of an industry standard. Apart from such special cases, it should
be left to the patentee whether and to whom he/she will grant a license. Thus, the same must
apply to joint property right holders. As long as no special circumstances are present, the
exclusive effect being an immanent part of a property right includes the right to license the
use of an property right not to every interested party, but rather - instead of or in addition to
the own use - only to certain individuals. There should be no high requirements as to objective
justification for such kind of unequal treatment.
The content of the provisions of license agreements, however, is subject to the prohibition of
agreements restricting competition pursuant to § 1 Competition Act. There are no differences
between the joint licensing by several owners of a property right and the licensing by the
single owner of a property right. Accordingly, the license agreement must not contain any
provisions which appreciably impair competition in the relevant market and are not exempted
pursuant to § 2 Competition Act.
Finally, it is to be noted that jointly held property rights can certainly also be instruments
of agreements virtually aimed at a restriction of competition. It is self-evident that such
agreements are subject to the control of cartel law in their entirety, which, however, cannot
be enlarged upon here.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
15. BGH WuW/E DE-R 1329 – Standard-Spundfass II.
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In absence of explicit provisions regarding the applicable law (conflict of laws) for intellectual
property rights, the determination of the applicable law concerning the legal relationship
between joint inventors and concerning agreements concluded with third parties requires
a separate discussion of four distinct questions, resulting in a respectively independent
determination of the applicable law:
1. the law applicable to the intellectual property right, determining the question of creation
and original ownership of the property right;
2. the law applicable to the joint ownership relations, i.e. the applicable law to the creation
and administration of joint ownership;
3. the law applicable to contractual obligations concerning possible contractual agreements
between the co-owners regarding the administration of the joint right;
4. the law applicable to contractual obligations concerning the legal relationships of the
joint ownership to third parties, especially contracts governing the contractual exploitation
of the property rights;
As for the first question, the determination of applicable law seems unproblematic: Even if
there is no express statutory provision, it is acknowledged by scholars and case law that the
question of the availability of protection and original ownership is to be determined according
to the doctrine of national protection 16 . It is a basic rule that both the scope of protection and
original ownership are governed by the law of the country for which protection is sought. This
rule results from the principle of territoriality 17 valid in intellectual property law. Therefore, if
co-ownership relates to a creation for which protection is sought in multiple countries (bundle
of protective rights), the question of original ownership has to be decided individually for
each country 18 .
However, it is more difficult to decide the question of the applicable law to the relationship
between several co-owners of an intellectual property right. First of all, it must be noted that
there are no provisions in existence also with regard to this question. EC International Private
Law so far does not cover the questions of legal statute of individuals and entities, so that
this question cannot be solved by referring to the Rome I Regulation 19- ; likewise, the German
International Private Law Act (EGBGB) does not contain provisions concerning the applicable
law to legal statute of individuals and entities. According to the prevailing opinion of scholars
and case law, however, the law applicable to a joint ownership (Bruchteilsgemein-schaft
or Gesamthandsgemeinschaft, respectively) follows the law applicable to the jointly owned
object 20 . Therefore, the so-called “connecting factor” concerning the relationship between
co-owners follows the “connecting factor” concerning the intellectual property right, i.e. is
governed by the doctrine of national protection. This is an objective “connecting factor”; a
choice of law is not possible. As a consequence, a joint ownership of a German intellectual
property right is generally subject to German substantive law. Therefore, § 741 et sequ. Civil
Code apply with regard to property rights or the special provisions of § 8 Copyright Act for
copyrights – provided that there are no special agreements on the joint exploitation differing
from the statutory regulations (c.f. question 1).
Thus, the applicable law governing the property rights and the relationship between the coowners
are the same. Problematic, however, are two questions: firstly, what is the substantive
scope of application of the law applicable to the joint ownership, secondly, whether the basic
16. By Welser, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, UrhG (2006) 2 , Introduction to §§ 120 et sequ. no. 4; von Hoffmann, in:
Staudinger, Art. 38 EGBGB, no. 591; c.f. BGH, GRURInt. 2003, 71, 72 – FROMMIA.
17. C.f. Fezer/Kos, in: Staudinger, IntWirtschR (2006), no. 814.
18. Fezer/Kos, in: Staudinger, IntWirtschR (2006), nos. 848, 857
19. C.f. the exemption provided for in Art. 1 (2) lit a and f of the Regulation 593/2008 of 17.6.2008, OJ EU 177,
6.
20. BGH, NJW 1998, 1321 (for co-ownership); Sprau, in: Palandt, BGB (2009) 68 , § 741 BGB, no. 1.
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ule set forth above needs to be modified if the joint ownership comprises property rights of
several states. A strict compliance with the basic rule by contrast would lead to the situation
that there is no uniform applicable law to the joint ownership, but the joint ownership being
rather subject to a different applicable laws with regard to each intellectual property right of
the bundle of rights.
With regard to the substantive scope of the applicable law concerning the joint ownership, it
should be noted that all questions concerning the statute of the joint ownership are covered:
the reason for the creation and termination of the joint ownership, the legal status of the
co-owners including the decision-making competence concerning the administration. Not
covered, however, are purely contractual agreements between the holders of the rights (c.f.
question 1). If the co-owners are based in different states and if, as a result, there is a
crossboarder relationship, it is not apparent why the parties should not be able to choose
the applicable law for the contractual agreement. Due to a lack of an express choice of law
it is accepted that in general the law applicable to contractual agreements follows the law
appli-cable to the joint ownership. However, it should be clear that the law applicable to
contractual agreements may also deviate from the law applicable to the joint ownership;
this is important for two reasons: on the one hand, this is the basis for a uniform decision
on the applicable law to contractual agreements regarding the administration of intellectual
property rights that are subject to various national laws; on the other hand, it becomes clear
that individual sub-questions – e.g. the legal and contractual capacity and the legal statute –
may be subject to different applicable laws.
The question whether it is possible to agree on a uniform applicable law regarding the
administration of a bundle of property rights in several states leads to the question whether the
law applicable to the joint ownership must always follow the doctrine of national protection.
It is accepted that the doctrine of national protection is – due to the principle of territoriality –
inevitable with respect to the creation of a property right and original ownership; however, it
is not convincing that a uniform law applicable to the joint ownership should be impossible.
It is rather suggested to refer to the principle of the closest connection and thus determine
the law applicable to the joint ownership according to the residence of the (majority of) coowners.
The necessity of such uniform applicable law becomes especially clear when dealing
with a preliminary stage of an intellectual property right, e.g. a patent application filed with
the EPO having more than one designated contracting states. If all co-owners have residence
in Germany, German law would also be applicable according to the opinion stated above,
even if this application leads to a foreign protective right, in addition to a domestic protective
right. However, if the various right owners have residence in different states, the principle of
the closest connection has to be applied. Apart from the aspect of residence, one could also
gear to the question as to which co-owner provided the major share, from which territory and
in which language the administrative measures (e.g. the application) are carried out or to
which legal system the parties have submitted their contractual agreements.
As far as the co-ownership community makes use of the property rights by way of legal
transactions, e.g. by assignment or licensing, we are dealing with a contract which will
be subject to the Rome I Regulation in future 21 . As a result, the general basic rules apply 22
: According to Art. 3 Rome I Regulation the parties can choose the law applicable to the
contract 23 . Lacking a choice of law agreement, the law of the state in which the party, which
effects the characteristic performance under the contract, has its residence applies. In case
of an assignment on the basis of a legal transaction, this follows from Art. 4 (1) lit a Rome I
Regulation, otherwise according to Art. 4 (2) Rome I Regulation. The party performing the
service conforming to the contract (i.e. the non-monetary service) is the holder of the property
right for both the legal assignment and the licensing. As far as the state of residence and the
protected country are not the same, it is recommended, however, to apply the escape clause
according to Art. 4 (3) Rome I Regulation. 24
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It seems problematic, however, whether the transaction (assignment) itself also follows the law
applicable to the contractual obligations (so-called no-splitting doctrine (Einheitstheorie)) or
whether this must be “connected” objectively according to the doctrine of national protection
(so-called splitting doctrine (Spaltungstheorie)). With regard to the no-splitting doctrine, it is
especially argued that it enables a uniform assessment of an assignment with respect to several
countries; an advantage of the splitting doctrine is, however, that it ensures the assignments
being in conformity with the law of the country of protection in question. Contrary to tangible
property law, it is generally accepted that assignments of intangible property rights follow the
law applicable to the contractual agreement. 25
According to this approach, the proper law of the contract can be chosen freely and at the
same time governs the law applicable to the transaction. If the parties have not made a
choice with regard to the applicable law, the contractual assignment of a German property
right is subject to German law.
If the jointly owned property right is not a national property right but a Community IPR
(Community trademark (CTM) or Community design (CD)), this leads to discrepancies with
regard to the first two questions, whereas for the rest, the above-mentioned rules apply
accordingly.
The starting point is that the question of the original ownership of a Community protective
right is to be assessed autonomously according to the relevant regulation. On this first level,
a reference to international private law is not necessary. The generally acknowledged rule
that the law applicable to the joint ownership follows the law applicable to the intelelctual
property right, cannot, however, be applied to the Community law, since on Community
level, no such provisions exist. In order to bridge this gap, one must refer to the conflict of
law rule of the statute for Community IPRs. Since, in this case we are not dealing with a
question regarding the statute of property rights, but with the ownership being a prerequisite
of contractual exploitation, the rules on applicable law set for the in the provisions dealing
with intellectual property rights as subject matter of property (Art. 16 et sequ. CTMR, Arti.
27 et sequ.
CDR) are relevant. Consequently, the Community protective rights are generally subject to a
uniform applicable law 26 :
The primarily applicable law is the law of the state in which the owner of rights has its
residence. If all owners have their residence in Germany, the Regulation therefore refers to
German law. If no joint residence exists, the residence of the owner named first in the register
determines the applicable law 27 , whereas with respect to non-registered rights an agreement
between the parties is to be taken into account 28 . This constitutes a reference of all norms
to the national law, including International Private Law. It also follows from this that, in the
case of a reference to German law, the principle of “objective connection” applies, so that a
choice of law is not possible.
21 At present, the 1980 Rome Convention (on the law applicable to contractual obligations) applies, which is
implemented into German law by Art. 27-35 EGBGB, so that the choice of law is presently results from Art. 27 EGBGB,
the objective connecting factor from Art. 38 EGBGB. With regard to content there is no deviation with regard to the
Rome I Regulation.
22 Von Welser, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, UrhG (2006) 2 , Introduction to §§ 120 et sequ., no. 21; Fezer/Kos, in:
Staudinger, IntWirtschR (2006), no. 878 et. sequ., 911 et sequ.
23. Regarding the freedom of choice c.f. Drexl, in: MünchKomm BGB (2006) 4 , vol. 11 IntImmGR, no. 133
24. C.f. Staudinger/Fezer/Kos, Intenational Economic Law (2006), marg.no. 915 et seq.
25. Drexl, in: MünchKomm BGB (2006) 4 , vol. 11 IntImmGR, 133 with reference to LG Frankfurt, GRUR 1998, 141,
142.
26. Fezer/Kos, in: Staudinger, IntWirtschR (2006), no. 944.
27. Art. 16 (3) CTMR, Art. 27 (2) lit b CDR.
28. Art. 27 (2) lit a CDR.
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7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
The German Group would like to present two further aspects for discussion.
a.) Quorum for joint decisions regarding exploitation
So far, the reports on Q 194 have only addressed individual rights of co-owners: Do individual
co-owners have a right of use, licensing, or transfer of co-ownership?
Decisions that must be taken jointly and that concern the co-owners’ joint right as such are
important as well: In patent filings, for example, co-owners must decide on claim modifications
and restrictions. Furthermore, after an IP right has been established, co-owners may wish to
sell the IP right as a whole or to grant exclusive licences with the consequences that all other
co-owners lose their rights of use and that only a particular third party is entitled to use the
invention.
The German Group holds that resolutions concerning an IPR as a whole can generally be
brought about by majority decision. 29 This said, minority co-owners must participate in the
proceeds of the joint decision regarding the exploitation of an IP right pro rata to their shares
in the IP right. 30 Moreover, minority co-owners should be afforded a right to veto in case they
otherwise are deprived of their individual right to exploit the IPR.
For example, majority resolutions should be inadmissible with regard to the entitlement of a
single co-owner an exclusive right to license the IP right even if the majority resolution provides
that all co-owners are to share in the licence proceeds pro rata to their shares: No ma-jority
resolution may strip co-owners of the right to exploit their shares in the IP right independently,
whether by own use, individual licensing, or sale of their shares.
b) Legal Status of Licences
The exploitation of a patent or patent filing having several co-owners can be particularly
problematic if a party’s co-ownership has resulted from that party’s successful intervention
to challenge the registered patent applicant’s or patent holder’s exclusive ownership of the
patent. This situation exists namely if the invention, in addition to the inventors stated in the
patent filing or in the patent, turns out to have involved other inventors that have not assigned
their rights to the patent applicant or the patent holder.
According to § 8 Patent Act, a rightful holder whose invention was filed by a non-rightful
applicant may, while the patent filing is pending and within a period of two years after the
publi-cation of the patent grant, demand that the claim for grant of the patent be assigned
to them. If the patent holder has acted in bad faith, the rightful holder may even demand
assignment after that period has expired. If the registered applicant or patent holder is a
rightful applicant but not the only rightful applicant, then the rightful holder who is not the
applicant or holder of the patent can demand the grant of co-ownership to the patent filing
or the patent.
While § 15 (3) Patent Act provides that transfer of title does not prejudice licences previously
granted to third parties, the prevailing view holds that this does not apply if a rightful holder
has succeeded with a claim under § 8 Patent Act enforced against a non-rightful patent
applicant or patent holder. 31 Acquisition of a licence in good faith is impossible under
German law.
29 In the German law, this corresponds to § 745 (1) Civil Code.
30 Cf. § 745 (3) 2 nd sentence Civil Code.
31 Cf. Benkard, Patentgesetz (2006) 10 , § 15 PatG, no. 88, Nirk, in: Klauer-Möhring, Patentgesetz (1973) 3 , § 5, no.
24 and § 8, no. 4, Schulte, Patentgesetz mit EPÜ (2008) 8 , § 8, no. 11.
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The situation that a party which successfully enforces a claim under § 8 Patent Act is not
the sole beneficiary and thus just acquires co-ownership to the patent filing or the patent is
not expressly addressed in legal reading. On the other hand, in the absence of additional
contractual understandings between the holders, a community of co-ownership is understood
to exist, which according to the currently prevailing view requires the consent of all coowners
for a rant of a licence to be valid 32 . It appears to be logical that in this case too, a
licence granted by the current patent applicant or patent holder expires if the other party has
acquired co-ownership and does not approve the licence.
II)
Particularly in situations where the current patent applicant or patent holder does not exploit
the invention himself but has transferred the – typically exclusive – right of exploitation to a
licensee, this typically involves a substantial loss for the licensee, as the latter has adapted
his business to the exploitation of the licensed invention and can no longer use the licence,
expecting the newly added holder of the patent to enforce his right against the licensee.
Similar to the former Art. 24 of the Community Patent Convention, Art. 6 of the draft Community
Patent Regulation, which has not yet come into force, provides that a patent holder or licensee
who has used the invention or actually and seriously sought to use the invention prior to the
initiation of a court procedure for the grant of ownership or co-ownership to the patent or the
patent filing to a third party, is entitled to a non-exclusive licence and may continue using the
invention on that basis if the third party prevails in the court procedure. The applicable German
law contains no such provision. In a decision issued quite some time ago, the Federal Court
of Justice denied the analogous applicability of the rule provided by th Community Patent
Convention under German law in a similar context 33 holding that the legal view expressed in
the Community Patent Convention was irrelevant under German law and that the legislature,
in adapting the German patent law to the Community Patent Convention, failed to provide for
provisions in accordance with the Community Patent Convention. The same might be true for
the draft Community Patent Regulation. In precedents of more recent dates, the Federal Court
of Justice did not address the implications of the enforcement of a claim under § 8 Patent Act
on existing licences. A decision that accords with the legal concept of the draft Community
Patent Regulation thus cannot be expected without an amendment of the current law.
The German Group endorses an arrangement by which, in the case of the successful
enforcement of a claim for co-ownership of a patent or of a patent filing, the licensee under
a licence agreement made in good faith prior to the enforcement of the claim, may continue
using the invention on condition that he has already used the invention or actually and seriously
sought to use the invention, as far as such use is not in conflict with overriding interests
of the new co-owner. However, the IP right must not be burdened with an exclusive licence
granted by the former holder. A possible solution would be to have such a licensee keep
a non-exclusive licence or, similar to the right of prior use according to § 8 German Patent
Act, to disallow the new co-owner to enforce his right against that licensee on the above
-mentioned conditions.
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
The exploitation of co-owned IP rights is on the horns of a dilemma: On the one hand, any
financially reasonable exploitation requires initiative by the individual co-owners. On the
other hand, one-sided and uncoordinated exploitation activity can destroy the overall benefits
of an IP right. Therefore, any further harmonisation should consider these opposing aspects
and ensure a fair chance for each co-owner (regardless of his financial situation) to exploit
his share.
32 Cf., for example, the Singapore Resolution on Q 194.
33 BGH GRUR 1982, 411 – Verankerungsteil.
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In the light of the foregoing, the German Group has arrived at the following recommendations
for its future national law:
a) Pre-emptive Right
Co-owners of an IP right should have a pre-emptive right to buy the remaining shares in the
IP right. First, this would ensure the co-owners’ freedom to dispose of their shares. Second,
this would prevent (at least to a certain extent) IP shares from being dtransferred to a direct
competitor of the remaining co-owners, which would be a disposition considerably affecting
the exclusiveness and the value of the IP right as a whole.
For the avoidance of doubt, the German Group, with the exception of copyrights, expressly
objects to a general prohibition of disposition: Disposing IP rights to competitors must be
allowed, at least in principle. 34
b) Conditions for Patent Licence Approval
Patent licences (Section 5a Singapore Resolution) ought to be approved whenever the coowner
desirous to licence is unable to use the invention in a financially successful way and
with reasonable effort. The relevant assessment must take the financial environment of the
co-owner desirous to licence into account.
The interests of the remaining co-owners must be considered as well. Withholding the approval
to grant a patent licence (Section 5a Singapore Resolution) should be individually allowed if a
patent licence is to be granted to a direct competitor of the remaining co-owners. In that case,
the conflict of interests should be resolved in another way, for example by compensation
payments. This situation should be acknowledged as an “extraordinary event” for purposes
of Section 4a Singapore Resolution.
Note:
It will be helpful and appreciated if the Groups follow the order of the questions in their
Reports and use the questions and numbers for each answer.
Summary
In principle, shares in IP rights must bring a financial benefit to each co-owner. Consequently,
co-owners’ individual exploitation rights must be extensive, at least as a basic principle. On the
other hand, individual exploitation rights are limited by corresponding (and possibly conflicting)
exploitation rights of the other co-owners. The German Group believes that this conflict of interests
leads to the following answers to the issues discussed here:
Contract manufacture in which the co-owner of a patent retains the typical manufacturing risk
should be allowed and not be subject to any restriction or approval. Individual co-owners’ approval
to the grant of licences should depend not on the number of licensees but on the co-owners’ own
possibilities of exploitation. Third parties that have entered into licence agreements with a licensee
in good faith must be protected. Dispositions of shares should be inadmissible if they are of a
deliberately impairing nature or, with respect to the remaining co-owners, are made in breach of
trust and in a “ruthless” manner.
Like any other legal relationship, the legal relationship among co-owners of IP rights is subject to
antitrust rules. To determine the applicable law, one must differentiate between the origination and
original ownership of a right on the one hand and the joint ownership statute on the other. Both
statutes typically co-exist and base on the principle of national protection. However, co-owners
are allowed to choose the substantive law applicable to their contractual understandings. As for
the joint ownership statute, namely in the case of bundled IP rights, the applicable law should be
determined according to the principle of closest connection.
34 For the special cases disallowing such disposition, see the statements as to question 4) above.
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Germany
Allemagne
Deutschland
Report Q194
im Namen der Deutschen Landesgruppe
von Volkmar HENKE, Mary-Rose McGUIRE, Stefan SCHWEYER, Stefan SCHOHE, Stefan ABEL,
Kristofer BOTT, Gert JAEKEL und Ralph NACK
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Bei den meisten Schutzrechten regelt das Gesetz nur das originäre Entstehen einer
Schutzrechtsgemeinschaft, also den Fall, dass mehrere gemeinsam eine Erfindung gemacht
haben (§ 6 Satz 2 PatG) oder gemeinsam ein Muster entworfen haben (§ 7 Abs. 1 Satz 2
GschMG). Die Rechtsbeziehungen zwischen den Mitinhabern sind dort aber nicht geregelt.
Insoweit finden die Regeln der Bruchteilsgemeinschaft gemäß § 741 BGB Anwendung. Für
die Anwendung dieser Bestimmungen ist es nicht von Bedeutung, ob die Mitinhaberschaft an
dem Schutzrecht originär oder durch rechtsgeschäftliche Übertragung entstanden ist.
Im Urheberrecht regelt § 8 UrhG dagegen nicht nur die Entstehung der Miturheberschaft,
also den Fall dass mehrere ein Werk gemeinsam geschaffen haben, ohne dass sich ihre
Anteile gesondert verwerten lassen. Sondern in § 8 Abs. 2 UrhG ist auch geregelt, dass
das Recht auf Veröffentlichung und zur Verwertung des Werkes den Miturhebern nur zur
gesamten Hand zusteht: Anders als bei anderen Schutzrechten kann ein Miturheber also nicht
allein über seinen Anteil verfügen. Da das Urheberrecht im deutschen Recht als solches nicht
rechtsgeschäftlich übertragbar ist – es können daran nur Nutzungsrechte eingeräumt werden
– kommt eine Mitinhaberschaft in Folge rechtsgeschäftlicher Übertragung nicht in Betracht.
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Der Erbgang ist im allgemeinen Zivilrecht gesondert geregelt und führt zu abweichenden
Rechtsbeziehungen unter den Beteiligten: Die Erben bilden eine Erbengemeinschaft, deren
Regelungen (in Ansehung des gesamten Nachlasses) weitgehend parallel zu denjenigen der
Bruchteilsgemeinschaft gebildet sind: Über seinen Anteil (an dem Nachlass) kann jeder Erbe
verfügen, wobei den übrigen Erben allerdings ein Vorkaufsrecht zusteht (§ 2034 Abs. 1
BGB), und die Verwaltung des Nachlasses steht den Erben gemeinschaftlich zu (§ 2038
BGB). Allerdings können die Miterben individuell nicht über die einzelnen Gegenstände
des Nachlasses, also z.B. über ein einzelnes Patent, verfügen (§ 2034 Abs. 2 BGB): Das
Patent bleibt so lange in den Nachlass eingebunden, bis es zu einer Auseinandersetzung der
Erbengemeinschaft gemäß § 2042 BGB gekommen ist.
Das gilt im wesentlichen auch für das Urheberrecht, das zwar nicht übertragbar aber vererblich
ist. Für die Rechtsbeziehungen unter Miterben gelten dann nicht die Regelungen gemäß § 8
Abs. 2 UrhG, sondern ausschließlich die Bestimmungen über die Erbengemeinschaft gemäß
§§ 2032 ff. BGB 1 . Damit gelten auch im Urheberrecht für Miturheber einerseits und für
mehrere Erben eines Urhebers andererseits unterschiedliche Regelungen.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
Wie wir bereits in unserem vergangenen Bericht dargestellt haben, ist im nationalen deutschen
Recht (auch in der Rechtsprechung) noch keine klare Linie darüber zu erkennen, ob und
in welchem Umfang von einzelnen Teilhabern eines gemeinschaftlichen IP-Rechts Lizenzen
an Dritte eingeräumt werden dürfen 2 . Und um so weniger ist bislang im Zusammenhang
mit Mitinhaber-Gemeinschaften an IP-Rechten die Frage diskutiert worden, wo die „eigene“
Verwertung endet und wo die Lizenzierung (an Dritte) beginnt 3 .
Grundsätzlich ist nach deutschem Recht zwischen Herstellungslizenzen einerseits und bloßen
Lohnfertigungsverträgen (sogenannte „verlängerte Werkbank“) andererseits zu unterscheiden.
Letztere unterfallen nach deutschem Verständnis der „eigenen“ Verwertung
und die deutsche Landesgruppe versteht die Singapur-Resolution zur Frage Q 194 auch in
diesem Sinne:
1. BGH GRUR 1982, 308, 310 – Kunsthändler.
2. German National Group, Q 194, Question 4).
3. German National Group, Q 194, Question 4).
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Wenn es dort in Ziffer 4a) heißt, dass jeder Mitinhaber berechtigt ist, die patentierte Erfindung
„individuell“ zu verwerten – dann muss dass auch für die sogenannten Lohnfertigungsverträge
gelten. Diese zeichnen sich vor allem dadurch aus, dass der Dritte nur eine Herstellungsbefugnis,
aber keine positive Benutzungsbefugnis besitzt 4 , und dass das typische Risiko der Herstellung
(Absetzbarkeit, Markterfolg) bei dem Mitinhaber des Patents liegt.
Nach Auffassung der deutschen Landesgruppe sollten solche Lohnfertigungsverträge von
Ziffer 4a) der Singapur-Resolution umfasst und (einschränkungslos) erlaubt sein. Denn sonst
würden von vornherein all jene Mitinhaber benachteiligt, die keine eigenen innerbetrieblichen
Herstellungsmöglichkeiten haben. Ihnen wäre die zentrale, mit dem IP-Recht verbundene
Verwertungsbefugnis genommen, ohne dass ihnen statt dessen ein wirtschaftliches Äquivalent
gegeben wäre: Gerade Ziffer 5a) der Singapur-Resolution zeigt, dass im Rahmen des von der
AIPPI befürworteten harmonisierten Rechts die Lizenzvergabe an weitere Voraussetzungen
geknüpft wird – insbesondere nämlich an die Zustimmung der übrigen Teilhaber. Würden
Lohnfertigungsverträge nicht als Unterfall der „eigenen“ Verwertung gestattet, so wären
Mitinhaber ohne eigene Herstellungsmöglichkeiten maßgeblich auf das Wohlwollen ihrer
Mitinhaber angewiesen (nämlich auf deren „Zustimmung“), um überhaupt einen eigenen
Nutzen aus ihrem Rechtsanteil ziehen zu können. Denn man wird von den Teilhabern
sicherlich nicht erwarten können, dass sie sich eigens zur Schutzrechtsverwertung eine eigene
Fabrikationsstätte errichten.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
Die Frage, ob ein Mitinhaber eines IP-Rechts ohne Zustimmung der anderen Teilhaber daran
Lizenzen erteilen kann, beurteilt sich bei den meisten Schutzrechten nach dem Recht der
Bruchteilsgemeinschaft (vgl. Frage 1) und wird hier kontrovers diskutiert. Dabei wird auch
zwischen einer ausschließlichen und einfachen Lizenz differenziert.
Einigkeit besteht darüber, dass eine ausschließliche Lizenz an dem gemeinsam gehaltenen
Schutzrecht eine Verwaltungsmaßnahme darstellt, die nur mit Zustimmung aller Teilhaber
getroffen werden kann, weil kein Mitinhaber ohne seine Zustimmung von seinem
Gebrauchsrecht nach § 743 Abs. 2 BGB ausgeschlossen werden kann (§ 745 Abs. 3 BGB) 5 .
Zudem kann die Erteilung einfacher Lizenzen von den Mitinhabern jedenfalls mehrheitlich
beschlossen werden, da das eigene Gebrauchsrecht der (überstimmten) Mitinhaber dadurch
nicht beeinträchtigt wird.
Fraglich ist aber, inwieweit ein einzelner Mitinhaber einfache Lizenzen an dem Schutzrecht
erteilen kann.
4. Vgl. nur Stumpf/Groß, Der Lizenzvertrag (2008) 8 , Rn. 33.
5. Melullis in: Benkard, Patentrecht (2006)10, § 6 PatG, Rn. 35e; Keukenschrijver in: Busse, Patentrecht (2003)6, §
6 PatG, Rn. 42.
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Als Rechtsgrundlage dafür sind unterschiedliche Wege diskutiert worden. Eine solche Befugnis
folgt nicht aus § 747 Abs. 1 BGB, wonach jeder Teilhaber über seinen Anteil verfügen kann.
Denn zum einen ist die Erteilung einer einfachen Lizenz keine Verfügung im Sinne dieser
Vorschrift, zum anderen wird vertreten, dass eine Lizenz stets nur eine Benutzungsbefugnis
am Gegenstand des Schutzrechts als ganzem und nicht an einem Anteil daran begründen
kann 6 . Diskutiert wird aber, ob es ein vom Gebrauchsrecht des Mitinhabers nach § 743 Abs.
2 abgeleitetes Gebrauchsrecht geben kann, sei es, dass der Mitinhaber sein Gebrauchsrecht
unter Verzicht auf eine eigene Nutzung auf einen Dritten überträgt, sei es, dass ein solches
Gebrauchsrecht analog zur Vergabe von Unterlizenzen konstruiert wird 7 .
Gegen Letzteres wird vor allem eingewandt, dass damit der Kreis der Nutzungsberechtigten
erweitert wird, und dass dies den Mitgebrauch der übrigen Teilhaber beeinträchtige 8 .
Dies erscheint nicht unbedingt überzeugend, weil eine extensive Ausübung des eigenen
Gebrauchsrechts die anderen Teilhaber durchaus stärker beeinträchtigen kann, als wenn ein
Mitinhaber, der sein Gebrauchsrecht selbst nicht ausüben kann, daran Lizenzen einräumt.
Jedenfalls stellt sich die entscheidende Frage vor allem im Innenverhältnis der Teilhaber, wo die
insoweit gebotene Interessenabwägung vor allem im Rahmen des § 745 BGB erfolgen kann:
Kann ein Mitinhaber im Rahmen der billigem Ermessen entsprechenden Verwaltung (§ 745 Abs.
2 BGB) verlangen, dass er durch Lizenzierung des Schutzrechts einen den Gebrauchsvorteil
der anderen Teilhaber aufwiegenden Anteil an den Früchten des Schutzrechts erhält (§ 743
Abs. 1 BGB)? Dies liegt auch auf der Linie der Rechtssprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs, der
einen finanziellen Ausgleich unter den Mitinhabern bei unterschiedlich intensiver Nutzung
des Schutzrechts auch nur im Rahmen des § 745 BGB zubilligen will, und nicht unmittelbar
nach § 743 BGB 9 .
Bei der Frage, ob ein Mitinhaber einen Anspruch auf Zustimmung zu einer von ihm beabsichtigten
Lizenzierung des Schutzrechts hat, ist nach Auffassung der deutschen Landesgruppe nicht
allein auf die Anzahl der in Aussicht genommenen Lizenznehmer abzustellen. Vielmehr sollte
das Augenmerk der Diskussion darauf gerichtet sein, insgesamt die Bedingungen präziser
zu fassen, unter denen eine Zustimmung nicht versagt werden kann. Es sollten also Kriterien
dafür entwickelt werden wie der auch in Ziff. 5a) der Singapur-
Resolution enthaltene Zustimmungsvorbehalt verstanden werden muss – unter welchen
Umständen also die übrigen Mitinhaber ihre Zustimmung erteilen müssen.
Nach unserem Dafürhalten sollte die Zustimmung dann nicht verweigert werden dürfen, wenn
dem nicht-lizenzierenden Teilhaber trotz der Lizenzvergabe unter zumutbaren Anstrengungen
eine angemessene, wirtschaftlich erfolgversprechende Verwertungsmöglichkeit verbleibt 10 .
Und die Zustimmung sollte auch dann nicht verweigert werden dürfen, wenn der lizenzierende
Teilhaber keine andere (insbesondere keine „eigene“) Verwertungsmöglichkeit hat.
6. Kraßer, Patentrecht (2009)6, S. 358; Lindenmaier/Weiss, Das Patentgesetz (1973)6, § 3 PatG, Anm. 23; aA
aber Chakraborty/Tilmann, FS-König (2004), S. 77; Fischer, GRUR 1977, 313, 315; Henke, GRUR 2007, 89,
95; Kisch, GRUR 1952, 267, 269.
7. Insofern wird in der Literatur auch von „Anteilslizenzen“ gesprochen, z.B. Henke, Die Erfindungsgemeinschaft,
Rn. 658.
8. Nirk in: Klauer-Möhring, Patentgesetz (1973)3, § 3 PatG, Anm. 18; Kraßer, Patentrecht (2009)6, S. 358.
9. BGH GRUR 2005, 663 – Gummielastische Masse II; BGH GRUR 2006, 401 – Zylinderrohr.
10. Dieses Kriterium ist in der deutschen Literatur zunächst entwickelt für die Frage entwickelt worden, in welchen
Fällen unter den Teilhabern ein finanzieller Ausgleichsanspruch für individuelle Benutzungshandlungen entsteht,
Krasser, Patentrecht (2009) 6 , S. 355. Die Konfliktlage scheint aber auf den hier zu beurteilenden Fall
übertragbar zu sein.
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Insgesamt erscheint uns hier der Kern des zu lösenden Interessenkonflikts zu liegen: Jedes
harmonisierte Recht muss der Forderung Rechnung tragen, dass Anteile an IP-Rechten für
ihre jeweiligen Rechtsinhaber wirtschaftlich nutzbringend sind – und zwar durch individuelle,
Verwertungshandlungen, sei es durch die eigene Benutzung der Erfindung, eines Designs oder
einer Marke, sei es durch den Verkauf der Schutzrechtsanteile oder eine den individuellen
Interessen Rechnung tragende Lizenzierung. Jede individuelle Nutzziehung eines einzelnen
Teilhabers muss aber dort ihre Grenze finden, wo sie das Recht der übrigen Teilhaber zu
einer entsprechenden Nutzziehung beeinträchtigt. Diese Interessenabwägung muss in jedem
Einzelfall (mit Blick auf die konkrete, persönliche und ökonomische Gesamtsituation) vollzogen
werden. Sie beschränkt sich nicht darauf, die Anzahl der erteilten Lizenzen zu begrenzen.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
Ebenso wie bei der vorangegangenen Frage können wir auch hier zunächst festhalten,
dass Einschränkungen hinsichtlich der „Anzahl“ der Rechtsempfänger nicht sachgerecht
sind: Beispielsweise trifft die Anteilsübertragung auf ein kleines Konsortium Dritter die
übrigen Teilhaber regelmäßig weit weniger schwer als die Übertragung auf einen einzigen,
wirtschaftlich mächtigen Anteilskäufer.
Anteilsveräußerungen sind nach deutschem Recht grundsätzlich zulässig (§ 747 Satz
1 BGB). Diese Vorschrift lässt sich wohl als der Kern des gesetzlichen Grundmodells der
Bruchteilsgemeinschaft verstehen, dessen ratio sich wie folgt fassen lässt: Die Teilhaber sind
vertraglich nicht gebunden – von daher müssen sie sich auch auf dem Markt (weitgehend)
frei bewegen können. Eine Ausnahme gilt nur im Urheberrecht, wo eine Anteilsübertragung
nur im Rahmen der Erbauseinandersetzung an einen Miterben möglich ist (§ 29 UrhG). Im
übrigen können Miturheber nur zu Gunsten der übrigen Miturheber auf ihren Anteil an den
Verwertungsrechten verzichten (§ 8 Abs. 4 UrhG).
Freilich sind die Unbilligkeiten, die aus diesem Grundsatz gerade bei IP-Rechten folgen können,
in der Literatur gesehen worden 11 . Die Lösungsvorschläge, wonach die Anteilsübertragungen im
Einzelfall als unzulässig angesehen werden können, basieren regelmäßig auf den Grundsätzen
des allgemeinen deutschen Zivilrechts. Beispielsweise darf die Rechtsübertragung nicht mit
dem einzigen Zweck erfolgen, einem anderen Teilhaber Schaden zuzufügen (§§ 226, 826
BGB). Zudem besteht auch nach der gesetzlichen Grundkonstellation das für alle Teilhaber
geltende Gebot, nach Treu und Glauben zu handeln und auf die Interessen der anderen
Teilhaber Rücksicht zu nehmen (§§ 242, 241 Abs. 2 BGB). Von daher könnte de lege ferenda
die grundsätzliche Pflicht abgeleitet werden, ein in jeder Hinsicht gleichwertiges Kaufangebot
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von Teilhabern zu bevorzugen und diese auch rechtzeitig über Veräußerungsabsichten
hinsichtlich eines Anteils zu informieren 12 .
Die deutsche Landesgruppe befürwortet diesen Ansatz, der das geltende deutsche Recht
überschreitet, und würde einen Resolutionsentwurf unterstützen, der Elemente eines
Vorkaufsrechts für Teilhabergemeinschaften an IP-Rechten beinhaltet.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
Vereinbarungen zwischen Mitinhabern an Rechten des geistigen Eigentums, die deren
Verwertung zum Gegenstand haben, können sich auf die eigene Nutzung des Schutzrechts
durch die Mitinhaber beziehen oder aber auf die Vergabe von Lizenzen an Dritte.
Bei der Mitinhaberschaft an Patenten, mit der kein darüber hinausgehender gemeinsamer
Zweck verfolgt wird und bei der sich das Innenverhältnis der Mitinhaber daher nach dem
Recht der Bruchteilsgemeinschaft bestimmt (vgl. Ziffer 1a des bereits vorliegenden Berichts zu
Q 194), ist jeder Mitinhaber berechtigt, die geschützte Erfindung zu benutzen, solange der
Mitgebrauch der übrigen Teilhaber dadurch nicht beeinträchtigt wird (§ 743 Abs. 2 BGB). Die
eigene Nutzung des Schutzrechts durch die einzelnen Mitinhaber bedarf daher grundsätzlich
keiner Vereinbarung. Einigen sich die Teilhaber gleichwohl über eine bestimmte Aufteilung
der Nutzung, also z.B. eine Aufteilung der Märkte oder eine sachliche Abgrenzung der unter
Benutzung der Erfindung herzustellenden Produkte, unterliegen solche Vereinbarungen dem
Verbot wettbewerbsbeschränkender Vereinbarungen gemäß § 1 GWB mit der Freistellung
nach § 2 GWB, die ihrerseits Bezug nimmt auf die Gruppenfreistellungsverordnungen
des Rates oder der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaft über die Anwendung von
Art. 81 Abs. 3 EGV. Diese Bestimmungen finden freilich nur Anwendung, wenn durch die
Vereinbarung der Wettbewerb spürbar beeinträchtigt wird.
Im Urheberrecht bedarf die Veröffentlichung und Verwertung des Werkes stets der
Einwilligung aller Miturheber (§ 8 Abs. 2 UrhG). Vereinbarungen unter Miturhebern, die
die eigene Nutzung des Werkes durch die Urheber regeln, kommen hier insbesondere bei
der Softwareentwicklung oder auf dem Gebiet der angewandten Kunst in Betracht. Solche
Vereinbarungen können dann auch dem Verbot wettbewerbsbeschränkender Vereinbarungen
unterliegen, wenn die dafür bestehenden Voraussetzungen erfüllt sind.
Im Markenrecht kommt eine Mitinhaberschaft an einer Marke, die nicht auf eine gemeinsame
Lizenzierung abzielt, kaum in Betracht. Dies umso weniger als das Markenrecht eine Teilung
vorsieht, so dass dasselbe Kennzeichen von mehreren Inhabern als jeweils eigene Marke für
unterschiedliche Waren/Dienstleistungen gehalten werden kann. Denkbar ist aber gleichwohl,
dass eine Marke von mehreren Mitinhabern gemeinsam gehalten wird, und eine individuelle
Nutzung der Marke durch die Teilhaber kann dann grundsätzlich auch Gegenstand einer
wettbewerbsbeschränkenden Vereinbarung sein.
11. Fischer, GRUR 1977, 317; Lüdecke, Erfindungsgemeinschaften (1962), S. 207; Kraßer, Patentrecht (2009) 6 , S.
357.
12. Kraßer, Patentrecht (2009) 6 , S. 357.
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Zusammenfassend kann daher zu dem Komplex der eigenen Nutzung eines gemeinsam
gehaltenen Schutzrechts gesagt werden, dass – gleichgültig, ob die individuelle Nutzung der
Zustimmung der anderen Teilhaber bedarf oder nicht – darüber getroffene Vereinbarungen
dem Verbot wettbewerbsbeschränkender Vereinbarungen unterliegen können, wenn der
Wettbewerb hierdurch spürbar beeinträchtigt wird und die Freistellungsvoraussetzungen
nicht gegeben sind. Das Kartellrecht steht selbständig neben den zivilrechtlichen
Bestimmungen, die die Verwaltung des gemeinsam gehaltenen Schutzrechts regeln,
und es kann nicht eingewandt werden, dass solche zivilrechtlichen Vereinbarungen dem
Anwendungsbereich des Kartellrechts entzogen wären 13 . Wenn die individuelle Nutzung
des Schutzrechts nicht auf einer Vereinbarung beruht, weil es einer solchen nicht bedarf,
greift das Verbot wettbewerbsbeschränkender Vereinbarungen nicht ein. Der bloße Verzicht
eines Teilhabers auf sein Gebrauchsrecht zu Gunsten der anderen Teilhaber kann sich zwar
wettbewerbsbeschränkend auswirken, stellt aber gleichfalls keine wettbewerbsbeschränkende
Vereinbarung dar.
Anders liegen die Dinge bei der Lizenzierung von Schutzrechten, die grundsätzlich nur
gemeinschaftlich vorgenommen werden kann.
Bei der Beurteilung von Vereinbarungen, die die Lizenzierung von Schutzrechten regeln, ist
zwischen einer Regelung ob bzw. wem eine Lizenz eingeräumt wird und der inhaltlichen
Ausgestaltung solcher Lizenzverträge zu unterscheiden.
Die Verweigerung einer Lizenz kann, wenn das Schutzrecht den Mitinhabern eine
marktbeherrschende Stellung verschafft, gegen das Diskriminierungsverbot des § 20 GWB
verstoßen. Diesbezüglich hat der Bundesgerichtshof aber in einer grundlegenden Entscheidung
vom 13.07.2004 14 entschieden, dass eine unterschiedliche Behandlung von Interessenten bei
der Gestattung der Benutzung eines Patents, eines anderen gewerblichen Schutzrechts oder
eines Urheberrechts ein wesentliches Element der Ausschließungswirkung des Schutzrechts
selbst ist, und dass daher für eine Ungleichbehandlung von Lizenzinteressenten oder auch
für eine gänzliche Verweigerung jeder Lizenzvergabe, ein weiter Spielraum bestehe. Eine
sachlich nicht gerechtfertigte
Diskriminierung komme aber dann in Betracht, wenn sich die marktbeherrschende Stellung
des Patentinhabers nicht allein aus der der Erfindung zugrunde liegenden Leistung ergibt,
sondern z.B. daraus, dass diese Eingang in eine Norm gefunden hat. Von solchen Sonderfällen
abgesehen, dürfte es einem Patentinhaber danach freistehen, ob und wem er eine Lizenz
erteilt. Für eine Gemeinschaft mit Schutzrechtsinhabern kann insoweit nichts anderes gelten.
Solange keine besonderen Umstände hinzutreten, schließt die dem Schutzrecht immanente
Ausschließungsbefugnis das Recht ein, nicht jedem Interessenten, sondern anstelle oder neben
einer Eigennutzung nur einzelnen Bewerbern eine Lizenz zur Nutzung des Schutzrechts zu
erteilen. An die sachliche Rechtfertigung einer solchen Ungleichbehandlung sind keine hohen
Anforderungen zu stellen.
Die inhaltliche Ausgestaltung von Lizenzverträgen unterliegt dagegen wiederum dem Verbot
wettbewerbsbeschränkender Vereinbarungen gemäß § 1 GWB. Für eine gemeinsame
Lizenzvergabe durch mehrere Schutzrechtsinhaber ergeben sich keine Besonderheiten
gegenüber der Lizenzvergabe durch einen einzelnen Schutzrechtsinhaber. Danach darf der
Lizenzvertrag keine Regelungen beinhalten, die den Wettbewerb auf dem relevanten Markt
spürbar beeinträchtigen und nicht nach § 2 GWB freigestellt sind.
13. vgl. Immenga/Mestmäcker, Wettbewerbsrecht (2007) 4 , § 1, Rn. 300, zu Forschungskooperationen.
14. BGH GRUR 2004, 966 – Standard-Spundfass; jüngst weitergeführt in BGH KZR 39/06 v. 6.5.2009 – Orange-
Book-Standard (zur Veröffentlichung vorgesehen).
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Abschließend sei darauf hingewiesen, dass gemeinsam gehaltene Schutzrechte natürlich
auch Instrumente von Vereinbarungen sein können, die geradezu auf eine Beschränkung des
Wettbewerbs abzielen. Es versteht sich, dass solche Vereinbarungen in vollem Umfang der
kartellrechtlichen Kontrolle unterliegen, was aber hier nicht weiter vertieft werden kann.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
Mangels ausdrücklicher kollisionsrechtlicher Regelung zum Immaterialgüterrecht, macht die
Bestimmung des anwendbaren Rechts auf das Rechtsverhältnis der Miterfinder untereinander
sowie auf von ihnen geschlossene Verträge mit Dritten, es erforderlich, zwischen vier
verschiedenen Fragen zu unterscheiden, für die das anwendbare Recht jeweils gesondert zu
bestimmen ist:
1. das auf das Immaterialgüterrecht anwendbare Recht, nach dem sich die Entstehung und
die originäre Inhaberschaft des Schutzrecht bestimmt;
2. das Gesellschaftsstatut, d.h. das auf Fragen der Entstehung der Rechtsgemeinschaft wie
der Verwaltung anwendbare Recht;
3. das Vertragsstatut für mögliche rechtsgeschäftliche Vereinbarungen der Mitinhaber über
die Verwaltung des gemeinsamen Schutzrechts;
4. das Vertragsstatut für die Rechtsbeziehungen der Inhabergemeinschaft zu Dritten,
insbesondere Verträge über die rechtsgeschäftliche Verwertung des Schutzrechts;
Unproblematisch erscheint die Bestimmung des Rechts für die erste Ebene: Wenn auch nicht
ausdrücklich gesetzlich normiert, so ist in Lehre und Rechtsprechung anerkannt, dass die
Frage der Schutzgewährung sowie die Person, bei der das Schutzrecht originär entsteht, stets
nach dem Schutzlandprinzip zu bestimmen ist. 15 Diese Grundregel, dass Schutzumfang und
originärer Schutzrechtsinhaber sich nach dem Recht des Staates bestimmen, für den Schutz in
Anspruch genommen wird, ist eine zwingende Folge des im Immaterialgüterrecht herrschenden
Territorialitätsprinzips. 16 Daraus folgt zugleich, dass soweit sich die Mitinhaberschaft auf eine
Schöpfung bezieht, für die in mehreren Staaten Schutz erlangt wird (sog. Bündelschutzrechte),
die Frage der originären Inhaberschaft für jedes Land gesondert beurteilt werden muss. 17
Schwieriger ist die Frage zu beurteilen nach welchem Recht sich das Verhältnis der mehreren
Berechtigten zueinander verhält. Festzustellen ist zunächst, dass auch diesbezüglich ein
Normenmangel besteht. So spart das IPR der Gemeinschaft Fragen des Personen- und
Gesellschaftsrechts bisher aus, so dass diese Frage nicht durch Rückgriff auf die Rom-
I-Verordnung gelöst werden kann, 18 und auch das deutsche EGBGB, in dem die Normen
des nationalen IPR niedergelegt sind, enthält keine Vorschrift über die Bestimmung des auf
Personengemeinschaften oder Gesellschaften anwendbaren Rechts. Nach herrschender
Lehre und Rechtssprechung ist jedoch anerkannt, dass auf eine Bruchteils- oder
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Gesamthandgemeinschaft das Statut der gemeinschaftlich gehaltenen Sache Anwendung
findet. 19 Das Verhältnis der mehreren Berechtigten wird daher grundsätzlich akzessorisch
angeknüpft und nach dem Schutzlandprinzip bestimmt. Es handelt sich hierbei zwingend
um eine objektive Anknüpfung, eine Rechtswahl ist nicht vorgesehen. Daraus folgt, dass
eine Inhabergemeinschaft an einem deutschen Schutzrecht stets deutschem materiellem
Recht unterliegt. Anwendbar sind – mangels abweichender Vereinbarung über die
gemein¬schaftliche Verwertung in einer anderen Form (vgl. Frage 1) – demnach die §§
741 ff. BGB für gewerbliche Schutzrechte bzw. die Spezialvorschriften des § 8 UrhG für
Urheberrechte.
Beide Statute, d.h. das auf das Schutzrecht und auf das Verhältnis der Mitinhaber
anzuwendende Recht, laufen mithin parallel. Problematisch sind jedoch zwei Fragen: erstens,
welchen sachlichen Anwendungsbereich das Gesellschaftsstatut hat, zweitens, ob die
Grundregel einer Modifikation bedarf, wenn die Inhabergemeinschaft sich auf Schutzrechte
in mehreren Staaten erstreckt, hätte doch die strenge Befolgung der Grundregel zur Folge,
dass die Inhabergemeinschaft nicht einem einheitlichen Statut, sondern im Hinblick auf jedes
Teilrecht des Bündels einer anderen Rechtsordnung unterworfen wäre.
Fragt man nach der Reichweite des Gesellschaftsstatuts so ist festzuhalten, dass alle die
Rechtsgemeinschaft konstituierenden Regelungen umfasst sind: d.h. der Grund für Entstehung
und Erlöschen der Rechtsgemeinschaft, die Rechtstellung der Mitinhaber einschließlich der
Entscheidungskompetenz über die Verwaltung. Nicht umfasst sind indes
rein vertragliche Absprachen zwischen den Rechtsinhabern (vgl. Frage 1). Soweit die
mehreren Mitinhaber ihren Sitz in unterschiedlichen Staaten haben und folglich ein
grenzüberschreitender Bezug besteht, ist nicht ersichtlich, warum die Parteien das für die
rechtsgeschäftliche Vereinbarung maßgebliche Recht nicht wählen können. Mangels
ausdrücklicher Rechtswahl wird man hier zwar regelmäßig davon ausgehen, dass auch
auf Verträge zwischen den Mitinhabern das Recht des Gesellschaftsstatuts zur Anwendung
kommt. Die Klarstellung, dass ein Gleichlauf zwischen Gesellschaftsstatut und Vertragsstatut
nicht notwendig ist, ist aber aus zwei Gründen von Bedeutung: Einerseits ermöglicht sie die
einheitliche Beurteilung rechtsgeschäftlicher Vereinbarungen über die Verwaltung mehrerer
verschiedenen Rechtsordnungen unterliegenden Schutzrechten, andererseits verdeutlich sie,
dass auch hier für einzelne Teilfragen – bspw. die Rechts- und Geschäftsfähigkeit und die
Form – durchaus eine Sonderanknüpfung in Betracht kommt.
Mit der Problematik, ob es möglich ist, die Verwaltung von Bündelschutzrechten in mehreren
Staaten einem einheitlichen Statut zu unterwerfen, ist die Frage aufgeworfen, ob der
Gleichlauf zwischen Schutzlandprinzip und Gesellschaftsstatut zwingend ist. Während
nämlich die Anknüpfung an das Schutzland für Entstehung und Bestimmung der originären
Inhaberschaft auf Grund des Territorialitätsprinzips unvermeidlich ist, ist nicht ersichtlich,
warum für die Frage des Gesellschaftsstatuts nicht eine einheitliche Rechtsordnung bestimmt
werden kann. Hier sollte man auf den Grundsatz der engsten Verbindung zurückgreifen und
das Gesellschaftsstatut nach dem Sitz der (Mehrheit der) Mitinhaber bestimmen. Besonders
offenkundig wird der Bedarf nach einer solchen einheitlichen Anknüpfung, wenn es um
eine Vorstufe eines Schutzrechts geht, bspw. die Anmeldung eines Patents beim EPA mit
mehreren Bestimmungsstaaten. Haben alle Mitinhaber ihren Sitz in Deutschland so bleibt es
daher nach der hier vertretenen Ansicht für die Frage des Rechtsverhältnisses zwischen den
15. Von Welser, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, UrhG (2006) 2 , Vor §§ 120 ff Rn. 4; Von Hoffman, in: Staudinger, Art. 38
EGBGB, Rn. 591; vgl. BGH GRUR Int. 2003, 71, 72 – FROMMIA.
16. Vgl. Fezer/Kos, in Staudinger, IntWirtschR (2006), Rn. 814.
17. Fezer/Kos, in: Staudinger, IntWirtschR (2006), Rn. 848, 857.
18. Vgl. die Bereichsausnahme in Art. 1 Abs. 2 lit a und f der VO 593/2008 vom 17.6.2008, ABl EU 177, 6.
19. BGH NJW 1998, 1321 (für Miteigentum); Sprau, in: Palandt, BGB (2009) 68 , § 741 Rn. 1.
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Mitinhabern auch dann bei der Anwendung deutschen Rechts, wenn zusätzlich zu einem
im Inland bestehenden Schutzrecht ein Schutzrecht im Ausland erlangt wird. Haben die
Berechtigten ihren Sitz in verschiedenen Staaten ist auf das Prinzip der engsten Verbindung
zurückzugreifen. Neben dem Sitz könnte hierfür bspw. auf die Frage abgestellt werden,
welcher der Mitinhaber den größten Anteil erbracht hat, von welchem Ort und in welcher
Sprache aus die Verwaltungsmaßnahmen (bspw. die Anmeldung) durchgeführt werden oder
welcher Rechtsordnung die Parteien ihre rechtsgeschäftliche Vereinbarung unterstellt haben.
Soweit die Mitinhabergemeinschaft ihr Schutzrecht rechtsgeschäftlich verwertet, bspw. durch
Übertragung oder Lizenzierung, handelt es sich hierbei um einen Vertrag, der künftig 20 in
den Anwendungsbereich der Rom-I-VO fällt. Es gelten folglich die allgemeinen Grundsätze: 21
Die Parteien können das auf den Vertrag anwendbare Recht nach Art. 3 Rom-I-VO wählen. 2 2
Mangels Rechtswahl kommt das Recht des Staates zur Anwendung in dem die Partei, die
die vertragscharakteristische Leistung erbringt ihren Sitz hat. Im Falle einer Übertragung auf
Grundlage eines Rechtskaufs ergibt sich dies aus Art. 4 Abs. 1 lit a Rom-I-VO, im Übrigen
aus Art. 4 Abs. 2 Rom-I-VO. Die Partei, die die vertragscharakteristische Leistung (d.h. die
Nichtgeldleistung) erbringt ist sowohl für die Rechtsübertragung als auch die Lizenzierung der
Schutzrechtsinhaber. Soweit Sitzstaat und Schutzland nicht übereinstimmen wird allerdings
befürwortet, die Ausweichklausel nach Art. 4 Abs. 3 Rom-I-VO anzuwenden. 23
Problematisch erscheint, ob das Verfügungsgeschäft sich ebenfalls nach dem Vertragsstatut
richtet (sog. Einheitstheorie) oder ob dies gesondert und damit objektiv nach dem
Schutzlandprinzip angeknüpft werden muss (sog. Spaltungstheorie). Für die Einheitstheorie
wird vor allem ins Treffen geführt, dass es eine einheitliche Beurteilung einer für mehrere
Länder erfolgten Übertragung erlaubt, für die Spaltungstheorie, dass dadurch sicher gestellt
werden kann, dass die Verfügung sich nach dem Recht des betreffenden Schutzlandes
richtet. Anders als beim Sacheigentum wird im Bereich des Immaterialgüterrechts auch
das Verfügungsgeschäft nach der ganz überwiegend vertretenen Einheitstheorie dem
Vertrags¬statut unterworfen. 24 Folgt man diesem Ansatz führt dies dazu, dass das Vertragsstatut
frei wählbar ist und zugleich über das auf die Verfügung anwendbare Recht bestimmt. Sofern
die Parteien keine Rechtswahl getroffen haben, folgt die rechtsgeschäftliche Übertragung
eines deutschen Schutzrechts dem deutschen Recht.
Handelt es sich bei dem gemeinsamen Schutzrecht nicht um ein nationales Schutzrecht,
sondern um ein Gemeinschaftsschutzrecht, so kommt es auf den ersten beiden Ebenen zu
Abweichungen, während im Übrigen das oben ausgeführte entsprechend gilt.
Ausgangspunkt ist zunächst, dass die Frage der originären Inhaberschaft an einem
Gemein¬schaftsschutzrecht nach der jeweils einschlägigen Verordnung autonom zu
beurteilen ist. Auf dieser ersten Ebene bedarf es daher keines Rückgriffs auf das internationale
Privatrecht. Die allgemein anerkannte Regel, dass das Gesellschaftsstatut durch akzessorische
Anknüpfung an das Schutzrecht bestimmt wird, kann jedoch nicht auf das Gemeinschaftsrecht
übertragen werden, weil es auf Gemeinschaftsebene keine entsprechenden Normen gibt.
Um diese Lücke zu schließen ist daher auf die Kollisionsnorm der Verordnungen über
Gemeinschafts¬schutzrechte zurückzugreifen. Da es sich hier jedoch nicht um eine Frage
20. Derzeit ist das EVÜ 1980 anwendbar, das durch die Art. 27-35 EGBGB in deutsches Recht umgesetzt ist, so
dass sich die Rechtswahlmöglichkeit derzeit aus Art. 27 EGBGB, die objektive Anknüpfung aus Art. 38 EGBGB
ergibt. Inhaltlich besteht insoweit keine Abweichung zur Rom-I-VO.
21. Von Welser, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, UrhG (2006) 2 , Vor §§ 120 ff, Rn. 21 ff.; Fezer/Kos, in: Staudinger,
IntWirtschR (2006), Rn. 878 ff, 911 ff.
22. Zu Rechtswahlfreiheit vgl. Drexl, in: MünchKomm BGB (2006) 4 , Bd. 11 IntImmGR, Rn 133
23. Vgl. Fezer/Kos, in: Staudinger, IntWirtschR (2006), Rn. 915 f.
24. Drexl, in: MünchKomm BGB (2006) 4 , Bd. 11 IntImmGR Rn. 133 mit Verweis auf LG Frankfurt GRUR 1998, 141,
142.
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der Schutzrechts¬verletzung handelt, sondern der Inhaberschaft als Voraussetzung der
rechtsgeschäftlichen Verwertung sind die Kollisionsnormen des Abschnitts über Rechte des
Geistigen Eigentums als Gegenstand des Vermögens (Art. 16 ff GMVO, Art. 27 ff GGVO)
einschlägig. Das Gemeinschaftsschutzrecht unterliegt damit stets einem einheitlichen
Statut: 25
Primär anwendbar ist das Recht des Staates in dem der Rechtsinhaber seinen Sitz hat. Haben
alle Berechtigten ihren Sitz in Deutschland, verweisen die VO daher auf deutsches Rechts.
Besteht kein gemeinsamer Sitzstaat der Mitinhaber, ist nach der ausdrücklichen Regelung
subsidiär an den Sitz des im Register zuerst genannten Inhabers anzuknüpfen, 26 bei nicht
registrierten Rechten auf eine Vereinbarung der Parteien abzustellen. 27 Es handelt sich hierbei
um eine Gesamtnormverweisung auf das nationale Recht einschließlich des IPR. Daraus folgt
zugleich, dass im Falle der Verweisung auf deutsches Recht auch hier der Grundsatz gilt, dass
das Recht objektiv anzuknüpfen und einer Rechtswahl daher nicht zugänglich ist.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
Die deutsche Landesgruppe möchte zwei weitere Problemkreise zur Diskussion stellen.
a.) Quorum für gemeinschaftliche Verwertungsentscheidungen
Die bisherigen Fragen, die im Rahmen der Q 194 gestellt wurden, bezogen sich einzig
und allein auf die jeweiligen individuellen Befugnisse der Teilhaber: Haben einzelne
Teilhaber das Recht zur Benutzung, zur Lizenzierung oder zur Anteilsübertragung?
Ebenfalls von Bedeutung sind aber auch Entscheidungen, die gemeinschaftlich
getroffen werden müssen und die das gemeinschaftliche Recht als solches betreffen:
Beispielsweise sind im Rahmen des Patenterteilungsverfahrens Entscheidungen über
Anspruchsänderungen und -einschränkungen zu treffen. Und nach Entstehung eines
Schutzrechts könnten die Teilhaber beschließen wollen, das Schutzrecht als Ganzes
zu verkaufen oder auch ausschließliche Lizenzen in dem Sinne zu erteilen, dass alle
anderen Teilhaber ihre Benutzungsbefugnis verlieren und dass nur ein einzelner Dritter
zur Benutzung der Erfindung berechtigt ist.
Nach Auffassung der deutschen Landesgruppe sollten solche Beschlüsse, die das IP-
Recht als Ganzes betreffen, grundsätzlich durch Mehrheitsentscheidungen herbeigeführt
werden können 28 . Dann versteht sich allerdings von selbst, dass auch die Minderheit
an den Erlösen der gemeinschaftlichen Verwertungsentscheidung im Umfang ihres
Schutzrechts-Anteils beteiligt werden muss 29 . Und der Minderheit sollte für den Fall ein
Vetorecht zugestanden werden, dass ihr die Möglichkeit genommen wird, das Schutzrecht
individuell zu verwerten.
Beispielsweise sollten keine Mehrheitsbeschlüsse möglich sein, die einem einzelnen
Teilhaber die alleinige Befugnis zusprechen, das Schutzrecht zu lizenzieren – und zwar
auch dann, wenn der Mehrheitsbeschluss vorsieht, dass alle Teilhaber nach Maßgabe
ihrer jeweiligen Anteilshöhen an den Erlösen dieser Lizenzen beteiligt werden sollen:
Keinem Teilhaber darf per Mehrheitsbeschluss das Recht genommen werden, seinen
Anteil an dem Schutzrecht eigenständig zu verwerten – sei es durch eigenen Benutzung,
durch individuelle Lizenzierung oder durch Verkauf seines Anteils.
25. Fezer/Kos, in: Staudinger, IntWirtschR (2006), Rn. 944.
26. Art. 16 Abs. 3 GMVO, Art. 27 Abs. 2 lit b GGVO.
27. Art. 27 Abs. 2 lit a GGVO.
28. Im geltenden deutschen Recht entspricht dies § 745 Abs. 1 BGB.
29. Vgl. § 745 Abs. 3 Satz 2 BGB.
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) Rechtsbestand von Lizenzen
Probleme bei der Verwertung eines Patents oder einer Patentanmeldung mit mehreren
Inhabern können insbesondere dann auftreten, wenn die Mitinhaberschaft einer
Partei darauf zurückgeht, dass diese erfolgreich geltend gemacht hat, dass dem
zuvor eingetragenen Patentanmelder oder Patentinhaber das Recht auf das Patent
nicht alleine zusteht. Derartige Konstellationen kommen insbesondere dann vor, wenn
sich herausstellt, dass außer den in der Patentanmeldung oder dem Patent genannten
Erfindern noch weitere Erfinder an der Erfindung beteiligt waren, die ihr Recht nicht an
den Patentanmelder oder Patentinhaber abgetreten haben.
Gemäß § 8 PatG kann ein Berechtigter, dessen Erfindung von einem Nichtberechtigten
angemeldet wurde, während der Anhängigkeit der Patentanmeldung und innerhalb einer
Frist von zwei Jahren nach der Veröffentlichung der Erteilung des Patents verlangen, dass
ihm der Anspruch auf Erteilung des Patents abgetreten wird, im Falle von Bösgläubigkeit
des Patentinhabers auch nach Ablauf dieser Frist. Ist der zunächst eingetragene Anmelder
bzw. Patentinhaber zwar berechtigt, aber nicht allein berechtigt, kann der Berechtigte,
der nicht Anmelder bzw. Patentinhaber ist, die Einräumung einer Miteigentümerschaft an
der Patentanmeldung bzw. dem Patent verlangen.
Während § 15 Abs. 3 PatG vorsieht, dass ein Rechtsübergang nicht Lizenzen berührt, die
Dritten vorher erteilt worden sind, ist es herrschende Meinung, dass dies nicht für den Fall
gilt, dass ein Berechtigter einen Anspruch gemäß § 8 PatG gegen einen nicht berechtigten
Patentanmelder oder Patentinhaber erfolgreich geltend gemacht hat 30 . Insofern ist nach
deutschem Recht also kein gutgläubiger Erwerb der Lizenz möglich.
Der Fall, dass die Partei, die erfolgreich einen Anspruch gemäß § 8 PatG geltend macht,
nicht allein berechtigt ist und dementsprechend auch nur eine Mitinhaberschaft an der
Patentanmeldung oder dem Patent erwirbt, wird in der Kommentarliteratur nicht ausdrücklich
behandelt. Andererseits wird regelmäßig mangels weitergehender vertraglicher Absprachen
zwischen den Inhabern von einer Bruchteilsgemeinschaft ausgegangen, bei der nach
derzeit herschender Meinung für die Lizenzierung die Zustimmung aller Inhaber erforderlich
ist 31 . Es erscheint daher folgerichtig, dass auch in diesem Fall eine von dem bisherigen
Patentanmelder oder Patentinhaber erteilte Lizenz erlischt, wenn die besagte weitere Partei
eine Mitinhaberschaft erworben hat und der Lizenz nicht zustimmt.
Insbesondere in Fallkonstellationen, bei denen der bisherige Patentanmelder oder
Patentinhaber die Erfindung nicht selbst verwertet, sondern die – in der Regel ausschließliche
– Verwertung an einen Lizenznehmer übertragen hat, bedeutet dies für den Lizenznehmer,
der seinen Geschäftsbetrieb auf die Verwertung der lizenzierten Erfindung eingestellt hat, in
aller Regel einen erheblichen Schaden, wenn er seine Lizenz nicht mehr ausüben kann und
gewärtig sein muss, dass der neu hinzugetretene Inhaber des Patents sein Verbietungsrecht
gegen ihn geltend macht.
Art. 6 des Entwurfs für eine Verordnung über das Gemeinschaftspatent, die
bislang nicht in Kraft getreten ist, sieht hierzu, ebenso wie der frühere Art. 24 des
Gemeinschaftspatentübereinkommens (GPÜ), vor, dass ein Patentinhaber oder Lizenznehmer,
der vor der Einleitung eines gerichtlichen Verfahrens zur Einräumung einer Inhaberschaft oder
Mitinhaberschaft an dem Patent oder der Patentanmeldung an einen Dritten die Erfindung
benutzt oder dazu wirkliche und ernsthafte Anstalten getroffen hat, einen Anspruch auf eine
nicht ausschließliche Lizenz hat und auf dieser Grundlage die Benutzung fortsetzen kann,
wenn das Verfahren zugunsten des Dritten ausgeht. Das geltende deutsche Recht enthält
30. vgl. Ullmann, in Benkard, Patentgesetz (3006) 10 , § 15, Rn. 88; Nirk, in: Klauer-Möhring, Patentgesetz (1973) 3 ,
§ 5, Rn. 24, und § 8, Rn. 4, Kühnen, in: Schulte, Patentgesetz mit EPÜ (2008) 8 , § 8, Rn. 11.
31. So etwa auch die Singapur-Resolution zur Q 194.
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allerdings keine vergleichbare Regelung. Der BGH hat in einer länger zurückliegenden
Entscheidung in vergleichbarem Zusammenhang die Anwendbarkeit des GPÜ für das
deutsche Recht verneint 32 , da die im GPÜ zum Ausdruck kommende Rechtsauffassung
nach deutschem Recht nicht maßgebend sei und der Gesetzgeber bei der Anpassung des
deutschen Patentrechts an das GPÜ dem GPÜ entsprechende Regelungen nicht vorgesehen
habe. Entsprechendes könnte auch im Verhältnis zu dem Entwurf für die Verordnung über
das Gemeinschaftspatent gelten. Der BGH hat sich in seiner jüngeren Rechtsprechung nicht
zu der Frage der Konsequenzen der Geltendmachung eines Anspruchs gemäß § 8 PatG auf
bestehende Lizenzen geäußert. Eine Entscheidung, die dem Rechtsgedanken des Entwurfs für
eine Verordnung über das Gemeinschaftspatent entspricht, ist allerdings ohne eine Änderung
der derzeitigen Gesetzeslage nicht zu erwarten.
Die deutsche Landesgruppe befürwortet eine Regelung, bei welcher auch im Falle der
erfolgreichen Geltendmachung eines Anspruchs auf Mitinhaberschaft an einem Patent oder
einer Patentanmeldung der Lizenznehmer eines Lizenzvertrags, den er in gutem Glauben vor
der Geltendmachung dieses Anspruchs abgeschlossen hatte, das Recht behält, die
Erfindung weiter zu benutzen, sofern er die Erfindung bereits benutzt hat oder hierzu wirkliche
und ernsthafte Veranstaltungen getroffen hat, jedenfalls dann, wenn dem keine höherrangigen
Interessen des neuen Mitinhabers gegenüberstehen. Das Schutzrecht darf dabei allerdings
nicht durch eine von dem früheren Inhaber gewährte ausschließliche Lizenz belastet werden.
Denkbar wäre eine Lösung, der zufolge ein solcher Lizenznehmer eine einfache Lizenz behält
oder – in Anlehnung an das Vorbenutzungsrecht gemäß § 8 PatG – der neue Mitinhaber
unter den vorangehend genannten Bedingungen sein Verbietungsrecht nicht gegen diesen
Lizenznehmer geltend machen kann.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
Die Verwertung gemeinschaftlich gehaltener IP-Rechte steht vor einem grundlegenden
Dilemma: Einerseits muss jede wirtschaftlich sinnvolle Verwertung notwendigerweise von der
Initiative der einzelnen Teilhaber ausgehen. Andererseits können einseitige und unkoordinierte
Verwertungsmaßnehmen den Gesamtnutzen des IP-Rechts zunichte machen. Alle weiteren
Harmonisierungsbestrebungen sollten diese gegensätzlichen Gesichtspunkte im Blick
behalten und zudem sicherstellen, dass jeder Teilhaber (ungeachtet seiner wirtschaftlichen
Ausgangslage) eine faire Chance hat, seinen Anteil zu verwerten.
Vor diesem Hintergrund kommt die deutsche Landesgruppe zu den folgenden Empfehlungen
für eine zukünftige nationale Gesetzgebung:
a) Vorkaufsrecht
Teilhabern von IP-Rechten sollte ein Vorkaufsrecht an den übrigen Schutzrechtsanteilen
zustehen. Damit ließe sich einerseits sicherstellen, dass die Teilhaber nicht daran gehindert
sind, sich ihrer Anteile zu entäußern. Andererseits könnte (zumindest in einem gewissen
Umfang) verhindert werden, dass Schutzrechtsanteile an unmittelbare Wettbewerber der
verbleibenden Teilhaber veräußert werden, wodurch die Ausschließungswirkung und der
Wert des Schutzrechts insgesamt spürbar beeinträchtigt werden könnte.
32. BGH GRUR 1982, 411 – Verankerungsteil.
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Klarstellend sei allerdings hinzugefügt, dass sich die deutsche Landesgruppe mit Ausnahme
des Urheberrechts ausdrücklich gegen ein generelles Verfügungsverbot ausspricht: Auch
die Veräußerung von Schutzrechtsanteilen an Wettbewerber muss – jedenfalls prinzipiell
– ge¬stattet sein 33 .
b) Bedingungen für Zustimmung zur Lizenzvergabe
Die Zustimmung zur Lizenzvergabe an Patenten (Ziff. 5 a) der Singapur-Resolution)
sollte stets dann erteilt werden müssen, wenn dem lizenzierungswilligen Teilhaber
unter zumutbaren Anstrengungen keine wirtschaftlichen Erfolg versprechende eigene
Benutzung
der Erfindung möglich ist. Dabei ist vor allem auf das wirtschaftliche Umfeld des
lizenzierungswilligen Teilhabers abzustellen.
Aber auch die Interessen der übrigen Teilhaber müssen Berücksichtigung finden. Im Einzelfall
könnte die Zustimmung dann versagt werden dürfen, wenn die Lizenzierung an einen
unmittelbaren Wettbewerber der übrigen Teilhaber erfolgen soll. In diesem Fall müsste der
Interessenkonflikt anders gelöst werden – beispielsweise durch finanzielle Ausgleichszahlungen.
Diese Konstellation sollte als „außergewöhnlicher Fall“ im Sinne der Ziff. 4 a) der Singapur-
Resolution anerkannt werden.
Zusammenfassung
Anteile an IP-Rechten müssen prinzipiell für jeden Anteilsinhaber individuell wirtschaftlich
nutzbringend sein. Daraus folgt einerseits, dass – jedenfalls im Grundsatz – weitreichende individuelle
Verwertungsbefugnisse bestehen müssen. Andererseits aber finden diese Verwertungsbefugnisse
ihre Grenze in den entsprechenden (möglicherweise entgegenstehenden) Verwertungsbefugnissen
der übrigen Teilhaber. Dieser Interessenkonflikt führt nach Ansicht der deutschen Landesgruppe für
die hier diskutierten Probleme zu den folgenden Antworten:
Lohfertigungsverträge, bei denen ein Mitinhaber eines Patents das typische Herstellungsrisiko
behält, sollten einschränkungslos erlaubt sein und keinem Zustimmungsvorbehalt unterliegen.
Für die Zustimmung zur Lizenzvergabe durch einzelne Teilhaber sollte es nicht auf die Anzahl
der Lizenznehmer ankommen, sondern auf die bei den Teilhabern bestehenden (eigenen)
Verwertungsmöglichkeiten. Dritte, die im guten Glauben einen Lizenzvertrag mit einem Lizenznehmer
abgeschlossen haben, sind zu schützen. Anteilsveräußerungen sollten jedenfalls dann als unzulässig
angesehen werden, wenn sie bewusst schädigend oder im Hinblick auf die übrigen Teilhaber
treuwidrig und „rücksichtslos“ erfolgen.
Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Mitinhabern von IP-Rechten unterliegt, wie jedes andere gewerbliche
Rechtsverhältnis auch, den Regeln des Kartellrechts. Bei der Bestimmung des anwendbaren Rechts
ist grundsätzlich zu unterscheiden zwischen der Entstehung und der originären Inhaberschaft des
Rechts einerseits und dem Gesellschaftsstatut andererseits. Beide Statute laufen regelmäßig parallel
und richten sich nach dem Schutzlandprinzip. Allerdings ist es den Teilhabern möglich, das auf die
vertraglichen Abreden anzuwendende materielle Recht zu wählen. Und für das Gesellschaftsstatut
sollte insbesondere bei Bündelschutzrechten einheitlich auf den Grundsatz der engsten Verbindung
abgestellt werden.
33. Zu den Sonderfällen, in denen sich eine solche Veräußerung verbietet, s. oben zu Frage 4).
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Résumé
Les parts de copropriété de droits de propriété intellectuelle doivent au niveau économique en
principe être profitables à chaque copropriétaire. Il en résulte d’une part, du moins en principe,
la nécessité qu’il existe des autorisations individuelles d’exploitation étendues pour chaque
copropriétaire. Mais d’autre part, ces autorisations d’exploitation sont limitées par les autorisations
d’exploitation correspondantes, et éventuellement contraires, des autres copropriétaires. Ce conflit
d’intérêts abouti, d’après l’avis du groupe allemand, aux réponses suivantes aux problèmes
discutés:
Il conviendrait de permettre sans restriction ni réserve d’approbation des autres copropriétaires
des contrats de sous-traitance industrielle par lesquels le copropriétaire d’un brevet supporte
le risque typique de production. La concession d’une licence par un seul copropriétaire ne
devrait pas dépendre du nombre de bénéficiaires d’une licence, mais des possibilités (propres)
d’exploitation de chacun des copropriétaires. Il convient en toute hypothèse de protéger
les tiers qui ont conclu en toute bonne foi un contrat de sous-licence avec le bénéficiaire
d’une sous-licence. Les cessions de parts de copropriété devraient être considérées comme
illicites si celles-ci ont consciemment été effectuées afin de causer un préjudice ou conclues en
méconnaissance des règles de bonne foi et des intérêts légitimes des autres copropriétaires.
La relation juridique entre les copropriétaires de droits de propriété intellectuelle est soumise,
comme tout autre lien juridique commercial, aux règles du droit de la concurrence. Pour la
détermination de la loi applicable, il faut en principe faire une distinction entre la création et
le titulaire originaire du droit d’une part et le régime légal de la copropriété de l’autre. Les
deux régimes relèvent en général de la même loi, conformément au principe selon lequel la loi
applicable est celle du lieu où la protection est demandée. Toutefois, les copropriétaires ont
la possibilité d’élire la loi à laquelle ils souhaitent soumettre leurs stipulations contractuelles.
S’agissant du régime légal de la copropriété, s’il s’agit de la propriété intellectuelle, qui jouit
d’une protection par plusieurs états, il conviendrait d’opérer le rattachement en fonction du
principe des liens les plus étroits.
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Greece
Grèce
Griechenland
Report Q194
in the name of the Greek Group
by Helen Papaconstantinou
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Report:
The rights in question are mainly Patent rights, Copyrights and Trademark Rights.
The rules pertaining to the legal relationship between the co-owners are different depending on the
rights, which are co-owned.
1) Patent Law Co-ownership in Greece
The joint owners of a patent may assign each one separately, following written agreement, their
share of the patent. In case of a license, assignment, etc, for a joint patent the agreement of all the
patentees is required.
The question, which arises is whether the co-owners can share their patent rights.
In patent matters, co-ownership means necessarily also co-inventorhsip, in which the qualifying
contribution of each co-owner is difficult to be shared, so that each co-owner can assign or license
(following written agreement) his “share” on the patent.
In our opinion, the conclusion is that, if the patent is jointly owned, each joint owner, in the absence
of agreement to the contrary, may use the invention. With regard, however, to any dealing such as
assignment, mortgage, etc, the consent by all co-owners is required.
The Greek group fully agrees with paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Resolution.
We only wish to underline that in Greece co-ownership rules are disseminated in the IP statutes.
Civil codes or common law is, as a rule, invoked as an additional or substitute reference.
As in most cases of IP rights co-owners do not have separate rights over their shares, they cannot
be used or disposed of freely by each owner without the need of consent by the rest.
A single co-owner cannot file the application to register the whole work.
A single owner has the right to renew or otherwise maintain the co-owned IP right without the need
of consent from the other owners.
2) Copyright law
Joint ownership is established where there is collaborative creation, which in general refers to a
right in undivided scheme.
Joint ownership means joint authorship. It is clear that any kind of contribution becomes an
inseparable element of the work and the result of such contribution cannot be commercially
exploited in its own right.
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The effect is that any dealing is subject to the other parties’ consent irrespective as to whether there
is unequal quality of creative contributions.
An assignment of copyright relates only to economic rights in whole or part. Moral rights remain
with the original authors.
Taking into consideration the particularities of the joint ownership with regard to copyright, the
following additional questions arise:
– what happens in the case of one parties’ death. Will his inherent pass to the others of it can
be inherited;
– co-authors are allowed to exercise their rights over their contribution to the work. However,
as, as a rule, said contribution cannot be clearly identified, in our opinion, co-authors should
not be free to dispose of their shares, since shares are undivided and exploitation cannot be
made by co-authors actions individually;
– a single co-owner cannot file an application to register its whole work;
– exploitation of the copyright work requires consent by the majority of the co-authors.
3) Trademarks
Can trademarks be co-owned?
Since trade symbols can only be used by one single entity, to protect consumers against confusion,
laws which recognize that a regular trademark registration can be co-owned must require that joint
applicants file along with the trademark application rules of use describing exactly the manner
the trademark will be used, as well as the agreement of the joint holders regarding licensing,
assignment, maintenance, etc.
In our opinion, trade mark applications filed as co-owned should never be accepted without
submitting to the Trademark Office “rules of use”, namely rules reflecting the co-applicants’
agreements.
The recommendation of the Greek Group is that efforts should be made to establish IP co-ownership
provisions to enable the countries to apply these uniform co-ownership provisions, rather than their
national IP statutes.
A further recommendation is that special attention should be given to the co-ownership of trade
marks as their main role (distinctiveness) is completely different from the role of the patents and the
copyright.
Further, a provision could be included in any agreement regarding all co-owned IP rights, relating
to the dissolution of the co-ownership.
Summary
There is substantial difference among IP rights and therefore some of the rights should be treated
individually.
Special attention should be given to the treatment of the trademarks the role of which is completely
different from the role of the other IP rights.
It is necessary that ad hoc rules be adopted for the national IP laws, concerning co-ownership to
avoid the application of national codes of common law.
It is further necessary that those ad hoc national rules be harmonized.
Harmonization is required for all kinds of IP co-ownership.
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Résumé
Il y a des différences substantielles entre les droits de propriété intellectuelle. Par conséquent il faut
traiter certains droits autrement.
Il faut faire attention en ce qui concerne le traitement des droits de marque, parce que leur rôle est
complètement différent de celui des autres droits de propriété intellectuelle.
Il est important d’ adopter des règles ad hoc concernant la copropriété dans les Etats-membres,
pour éviter l’application des règles nationales.
De plus il est nécessaire que cettes règles nationales ad hoc soient harmonisées.
L’harmonisation est necessaire pour toutes sortes de copropriété de droits de propriété
intellectuelle.
Zusammenfassung
Es gibt wesentliche Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen gewerblichen Schutzrechten. Einige
Rechte müssen deswegen differenziert behandelt werden.
Es muss besonders auf die Behandlung der Markenrechte geachtet werden, weil sie im Vergleich
zu den anderen Rechten eine unterschiedliche Rolle spielen.
Im Bezug auf das Miteigentum an gewerblichen Schutzrechten ist nötig, dass ad hoc Regeln in den
Staaten adoptiert werden, um die Anwendung nationaler Vorschriften zu vermeiden.
Ausserdem ist die Harmonisierung dieser nationalen ad hoc Vorschriften notwendig.
Die Harmonisierung ist notwendig für das Miteigentum an gewerblichen Schutzrechten aller Art.
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Hungary
Hongrie
Ungarn
Report Q194
in the name of the Hungarian Group
by Arpad PETHO, András ANTALFFY–ZSIROS, István GÖDÖLLE,
Zsófia LENDVAI and Eszter SZAKACS
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
Patent, utility model, design, trademark and geographical indication:
None of the respective Hungarian acts declare any distinction in the applicable rules to the
co-ownership of an IP right depending on the origin of the co-ownership.
Copyright: If a work has been created by several authors, the co-authors shall be entitled
to copyright protection jointly. The authors are entitled to the whole copyright – moral and
economic rights – from the time the work is created. With the exceptions stipulated definitely
in the law, neither moral nor economic rights can be assigned. Said rights, however, can be
inherited, whereby the heir becomes entitled to the same rights as the original co-author.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
There are no special legal definitions of co-ownership of IP rights in IP laws. Thus, the following
general provision of Art. 139(1) of the Civil Code apply: ”Ownership of the same thing, by
specific shares, can belong to two or more persons.”
Of course, such shares are undivided.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
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More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
Patent, utility model and design: The Hungarian Patent Act of 1995 allows each
co-owner to exploit the entire patent individually, without the consent of the other co-owner(s),
subject to an obligation of paying proportionate royalty to the other co-owner(s) (Article 26,
paragraph 2). It is also stipulated in this article that licenses to third parties shall be granted
by the co-owners jointly. The consent of a non-cooperative co-owner may be substituted by a
judgment of the court under the general provisions of the civil law (Article 26, paragraph 3).
The Patent Act, however, remains silent on the interpretation of the right of individual
exploitation and gives no explanation whether this right includes the right of outsourcing
and/or subcontracting or whether it is limited to exploitation by the co-owner within its own
capacity. We are not aware of any case law in Hungary concerning this specific issue.
An interpretation can be found in the Ministerial Motivation to the former Patent Act of 1969
in which the provisions concerning co-ownership of patents and exploitation of such patents
were almost identical with those of the present Patent Act. According to this “the co-owner of
a patent may exploit the patent individually, if he is in possession of the conditions needed to
perform exploitation”. Because of this interpretation, we believe that the legislative intention
behind this provision was to give the right of individual exploitation to each co-owner only
within their own capacity, excluding the possibility of subcontracting.
However, based on this it seems that the Patent Act does not exclude to make subcontracts
within the framework of own exploitation if the activity performed by the subcontractor does
not itself qualify as the exploitation of the concerned patent, e.g. the subcontractor makes and
supplies only some parts, even an essential element, of the patented device. Otherwise, if the
co-owner (together with its subcontractors) cannot perform the exploitation of the invention
within its own capacity and wishes to outsource, it shall be done in the form of a license
agreement, which shall be agreed by each co-owner. In case another co-owner rejects to give
his consent in an unjustified way, the co-owner wishing to outsource the exploitation may sue
the reluctant co-owner before the competent court.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
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een obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
Patent, utility model and design: The provisions of Art. 26(3) of the Patent Act
that an exploitation license may only be granted to a third party jointly by the co-owners
of a patent relates to both non-exclusive and exclusive licenses. Furthermore, there is no
differentiation in said provision according to the number of licenses which could be given in
case of non-exclusive licenses which are permitted by the Hungarian law.
Trademark: The provisions of Art. 21(3) of the Trademark Act for a trademark license are
the same as those for a patent exploitation license discussed above. Therefore, there are no
differentiation concerning the type of the license or the number of non-exclusive licenses.
Copyright: According to Art. 5(1) of the Copyright Act, the exploitation rights of commonly
created works can only be exercised by the co-authors jointly. There is no difference according
to the exclusive or non-exclusive character of the license agreement or the number of nonexclusive
licenses.
Geographical indication: The rights to a geographical indication cannot be
licensed.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
Patent, utility model and design: According to Art. 26(1) of the Patent Act each
of the co-owners of a patent can dispose of his own share of the patent. The right of disposal
includes the right to transfer or assign. However, in this case the other co-owners shall have
a pre-emption right with respect to third parties.
There is no express provision on a partial transfer or assignment of a share of a patent. We
think that according to the provisions of the Civil Code concerning property rights, the right
of disposal encompasses the right of a partial disposal as well. Of course, also in this case
there is a right of pre-emption for the co-owners of the patent.
By exercising the right of pre-emption a co-owner or any of the co-owners may prevent
an unwanted partial transfer which would be used to overcome the limitation concerning
granting of a license by the co-owners jointly.
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Trademark: The respective provisions are the same as for patents.
Copyright: A copyright cannot be assigned according to the Hungarian law.
Geographical indication: Theoretically, it is possible to assign a co-owned share of
a right to a geographical indication to any person who would be entitled to the protection.
However, such an assignment has no effect to the group of persons who are entitled by the
law to use the geographical indication.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
Patent, utility model and design: In case the exercise of a co-owned patent, utility
model or design right by the co-owners occurs in such a way that would be in line with the
competition rules if there would be one single right owner, we think the exercise cannot be
against the competition rules just because of the plurality of the right owners.
If, however, two or more co-owners conclude an agreement on the exploitation of the coowned
right, e.g. on manufacturing and/or distributing the product according to the invention,
their agreement on such exploitation may violate prohibitions of the competition law.
In the Hungarian Unfair Competition Act there is a provision in Art. 11(1) that the prohibitions
on agreements restricting competition cannot be applied for agreements between nonindependent
undertakings. According to Art. 15 of that Act, in case of enterprises belonging to
the same concern, or where an enterprise is controlled by another enterprise, such enterprises
shall be deemed not independent.
We think undertakings being co-owners of IP rights cannot be regarded as non-independent
in the sense of the competition law for the sole reason of co-ownership in IP rights. Therefore,
in such agreements the competition rules shall be observed, similarly to agreements of parties
in a patent pool.
Trademark and Copyright: We think the same principles apply as for patents, utility
models and designs.
Geographical indication: Legal usage of a commonly owned geographical indication
can not result in a situation that could be considered as an illegal restriction of the competition
because geographical indications, when used legally, simply indicate the geographical origin
and the specific quality connected thereto of the commercialized goods and, therefore, can
not give rise to any illegal restriction of competition. Furthermore, geographical indications
can not be licensed.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
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If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
In case the co-owners did not make a choice of law, according to Hungarian international
private law, the applicable law will be the law of the state where the IP right is registered or
in the case of copyright where the protection is claimed. In these matters the term “closest
connection” is unknown in the Hungarian law.
We think “Rome I” will be applicable to agreements concerning co-ownership of IP rights
concluded after 17 December 2009.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
With respect to above paragraph 2), where in many legislations the co-owner of a patent
may only exploit the invention within it “own capacity” we submit that it would be very
welcome if some harmonized definition would be available in the IP law on the term “own
capacity” because the present situation with respect to subcontracting in the framework of
“own” exploitation is somewhat ambiguous in lack of said clear-cut definition.
Summary
In Hungary, the regulation of co-ownership does not at all depend on the origin of co-ownership.
The Patent Act does not exclude subcontracting within the framework of own exploitation if the
activity performed by the subcontractor does not itself constitute the exploitation of the patent
concerned. Otherwise, if the co-owner cannot perform the exploitation of the invention within its
own capacity and wishes to outsource, it shall be done in the form of a license agreement, which
shall be agreed by each co-owner.
The provisions of the Patent Act do not differentiate between non-exclusive and exclusive licenses
concerning the right to grant a license by a co-owner of an IP right.
There are no express provisions on a partial transfer or assignment of a share of an IP right.
In accordance with the Civil Code concerning property rights, the right of disposal should also
encompass the right of a partial disposal.
Agreements on exercising of co-owned IP rights between the co-owners of such rights may violate
prohibitions of the competition law.
When the co-ownership of various IP rights coexists in different countries, the applicable law will be
the law where the IP right is registered or in the case of copyright where the protection is claimed.
In these matters the term “closest connection” is unknown in the Hungarian law.
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Résumé
En Hongrie la régulation de la copropriété ne dépend pas de tout de l’origine de la copropriété.
La loi sur les brevets d’invention n’exclut pas les contrats de sous-traitance dans le cadre de
l’exploitation par soi-même si l’activité exercée par le sous-traitant ne représente pas elle-même
l’exploitation du brevet concerné. Autrement si l’un des copropriétaires ne peut pas exploiter
l’invention dans le cadre de sa capacité et souhaite la sous-traiter, il pourra faire un contrat de
licence mais le consentement de tous les copropriétaires est nécessaire.
La législation sur les brevets ne fait pas la différence entre une licence exclusive et non-exclusive
en ce qui concerne l’octroi par l’un des copropriétaires d’une licence sur un droit de propriété
intellectuelle (PI).
Il n’y a pas de dispositions spéciales concernant le transfert ou la cession partiels de la quote-part
d’un droit de PI. En accord avec le Code civil concernant les droits de propriété en général, le droit
à disposer devrait comprendre aussi le droit à disposer partiellement.
Un contrat sur l’exercice d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle en copropriété entre différents
opérateurs du marché qui sont les copropriétaires peut faire l’objet d’un contrôle à l’égard du droit
de la concurrence.
Au cas où la copropriété de droits variés de PI se trouverait dans des pays différents, la loi à
appliquer sera la loi du pays où le droit de PI a été enregistré ou bien dans le cas du copyright où
la protection est revendiquée. A ce sujet le principe des “liens les plus étroits” est inconnu dans la
loi hongroise.
Zusammenfassung
In Ungarn hängen die Mitinhaberschaft betreffenden gesetzlichen Regelungen überhaupt nicht von
dem Ursprung der Mitinhaberschaft ab.
Das Patentgesetz schliesst Subverträge im Rahmen der eigenen Nutzung nicht aus, wenn die
von dem Subunternehmer vorgenommene Tätigkeit an sich nicht die Nutzung des betreffenden
Patentes darstellt. Andererseits, wenn der Mitinhaber die Nutzung der Erfindung in seinem
eigenen Tätigkeitskreis nicht vornehmen kann und auslagern möchte, so muss dies in Form einer
Lizenzvereinbarung erfolgen, welcher von jedem Mitinhaber zugestimmt werden muss.
Die Regelungen des Patentgesetzes machen keinen Unterschied zwischen ausschliessliche und nicht
ausschliessliche Lizenzen in Hinsicht auf das Recht zur Erteilung einer Lizenz durch einen Mitinhaber
eines Rechtes des Geistigen Eigentums.
Es bestehen keine ausdrücklichen Vorschriften bezüglich einer partiellen Rechtsnachfolge oder
Übertragung eines Anteils eines Rechtes des Geistigen Eigentums. Gemäss den das Eigentumsrecht
regelnden Vorschriften des Zivilrechts sollte das Recht der Veräusserung ebenso das Recht einer
partiellen Veräusserung umfassen.
Vereinbarungen über Verwertung zwischen Unternehmen, die Mitinhaber an Rechten des Geistigen
Eigentums sind, können die wettbewerbrechtlichen Vorschriften verletzen.
Wenn die Mitinhaberschaft an verschiedenen Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums in verschiedenen
Ländern koexistiert, so wird das anzuwendende Recht das Recht sein, unter welchem das jeweilige
Recht des Geistigen Eigentums registriert ist oder im Falle des Urheberrechtes, wo der Schutz
beansprucht wurde. In diesen Angelegenheiten ist die Formulierung „engster Zusammenhang” in
dem ungarischen Recht unbekannt.
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Indonesia
Indonésie
Indonesien
Report Q194
in the name of the Indonesian Group
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
According to our National Law of Intellectual Property Rights, legal definition of co-ownership
is only given in case of the object of an intellectual property is jointly created by two or
more persons. As examples, Article 1 (3) and Article 10 of Indonesian Patent Law No.
14/2001stipulate that:
Article 1 (3 ):
Inventor shall mean a person or several persons acting together implementing an idea poured
in an activity resulting in an Invention. (Joint inventor; Co-inventors)
Articles 10 :
(1) An Inventor or a subsequent recipient of the rights of the Inventor shall be entitled to
obtain a Patent.
(2) If an Invention is produced jointly by several persons, the right on the Invention shall
belong to the relevant Inventors. (joint ownership/co-ownership)
Co-ownership occurs if an invention produced jointly by several persons, and the right of
the invention belongs to those inventors. There is no specific provision describing the situation
when co-ownership results from the division of the same right among different persons.
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On others IP rights such as, Industrial Design, Copyrights, and Trademark, the rules
concerning the joint ownership are basically similar. However, the use of legal definitions of
ownership on each IP right is adapted to the kind/product of IP right itself. For instance the
terms copyright holder, author for copyright (under Copyright Law no. 19/2002); the term
registered mark owner for trademark (under Trademark Law no. 15/2001); the term the right
holder to industrial design, designer for the industrial design (under Industrial Design Law no.
31/2000).
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
Article 16 of the Indonesian Patent Law No. 14/2001 only stipulates the regulation concerning
the right of the Patent Holder(s) in exploiting their rights, without further clarifying the portion
of each patent holder’s right, in case of a joint ownership, in terms of manufacturing of all or
part of the invention that being the subject of the patent.
Article 16
(1) A Patent holder shall have the exclusive right to exploit his Patent and prohibit any other
party who without his consent:
a. in the case of product-Patent: makes, uses, sells, imports, rents out, delivers, or makes
available for sale or rental or delivery of the Patented product;
b. in the case of process-Patent: uses the Patented production process to make products
and commits other activities as referred to in point a.
We may conclude that the right to exploit the patents among the owners would depend on
the agreement. Joint ownership of IP introduces complexities and possibilities of significant
unintended consequences. Note, if joint ownership is proposed, one is advised to examine
what objectives the parties seek to accomplish by joint ownership and consider whether those
objectives cannot be accomplished by sole ownership by one party. If the parties do structure
their relationship to include joint ownership of intellectual property, they should explicitly
agree upon the ground rules.
On others IP rights such as, Industrial Design, Copy rights, and trademark, the rules concerning
the above matter are basically similar. However, the application of such on each IP right is
adapted to the kind/product of IP right itself.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
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No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
License under Indonesian Patent Law no. 14/2001 is stipulated as follows:
Article 69
(1) A Patent Holder shall have the right to grant a license to other person on the basis of a
licensing agreement in order to perform acts as referred to in Article 16.
(2) Unless agreed otherwise, the scope of a License as referred to in paragraph (1) shall
cover acts as referred to in Article 16 and shall continue for the term of the License
granted, and shall be effective for the entire territory of the Republic of Indonesia.
Article 70
Unless agreed otherwise, a Patent Holder shall continue to be able to personally exploit the
Invention or to grant a license to any other third party to perform acts as referred to in Article
16.
Article 71
(1) A licensing agreement shall not contain any provisions that may directly or indirectly
damage the Indonesian economy, or to contain restrictions, which obstruct the ability of
the Indonesian people to master and develop technology in general and in connection
with the Patented Invention in particular.
(2) The Directorate General shall refuse any request for registration of a licensing agreement
containing provisions as referred to in paragraph (1).
Article 73
Provisions concerning licensing agreements shall be further regulated by Government
Regulation.
The main point of this regulation is that a Patent Holder has the right to grant a license to
other person on the basis of a licensing agreement in order to perform acts as referred to in
Article 16. In addition, unless agreed otherwise, a Patent Holder personally could exploit the
Invention or to grant a license to any other third party to perform acts as referred to in Article
16. However until now, the Government regulation which further regulates the provisions
concerning licensing agreements has not been issued yet.
Therefore, we may conclude that the right to exploit the patents including giving license
among the owners would depend on the agreement. If joint ownership is proposed, one is
advised to examine what objectives the parties seek to accomplish by joint ownership. If it is
accompanied by a license of applicable rights to the other party they should explicitly agree
upon the ground rules which containing the provision of licensing.
On others IP rights such as, Industrial Design, Copy rights, and trademark, the rules concerning
the license are basically similar. However, the application of such on each IP right is adapted
to the kind/product of IP right itself.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
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And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
Transfer of a patent under Indonesian Patent Law No. 14/2001 is stipulated as follows:
Article 66
(1) A Patent or the ownership of a Patent may be transferred in whole or in part by:
a. inheritance;
b. donation;
c. testament;
d. written agreement; or
e. other reasons recognized by the law.
(2) The transfer of a Patent as referred to in paragraph (1) items a, b and c shall be furnished
with the original Patent documents together with other rights pertaining to the relevant
Patent.
(3) All forms of Patent transfer as referred to in paragraph (1) must be recorded and
announced, with the payment of a fee.
(4) Any transfer of Patent, which is not in accordance with the provisions of this Article, shall
be invalid and void.
(5) The requirements and procedures for the recording of Patent transfers shall be further
regulated by Presidential Decree.
From the above regulation, it is clear that the ownership of a Patent may be transferred in
whole or in part by inheritance; donation; testament; written agreement; or other reasons
recognized by the law.
Although not clearly stipulated, Article 66 of the Indonesian Patent Law No. 14/2001 gives
a notion on possible transfer of a patent in whole or in part.
Unlike in patent, the transfer of other IP rights (trademark, design or copyright) can only be
made in whole. No transfer can be made for only a part of the right.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
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The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
(See the answers of Questions 2-3 above)
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
On Article 12 (paragraph 5) under Indonesian Patent Law no. 14/2001, it is cited that if no
agreement can be reached about the method of calculation and the determination of the
amount of compensation, the Commercial Court may be requested to decide the matter.
From the above regulation, it can be concluded that if there are no agreement can be
reached, or no contractual agreement between the co-owners at all, regarding the method
of calculation and determination the amount of compensation, the Commercial Court can
be requested to decide the matter.
The freedom of making an agreement, if it is made in Indonesia, is given to the member of the
agreement itself, as stipulated under our national Civil Law (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum
Perdata).
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
a. One of the complexities of joint ownership of patents and others IP rights is that the rules
apply in the absence of explicit agreement between the co-owners differ between patents
and others IP rights and may or may not reflect the parties’ expectations. Thus, in most
cases, the parties should expressly provide for and define their rights and obligations by
agreement, and not rely on the present default rules.
b. Patents and others IP rights are the right to enforce the legal rights to prevent others from
using the intellectual property. Thus, their value derives from the ability to enforce those
rights against third parties.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
In general, Indonesian IPR Laws recognize co-ownership of an IP Right. However, there is no
clear provision in any of the Indonesian IPR Laws giving details on how to exercise the rights
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of a co-owned IP Right. With regard to the transfer of a co-owned IP Right, Indonesian Patent
Law is the only law which gives a notion on possible transfer of a patent in whole or in part,
while the other IPR Laws only allow the transfer the whole rights.
In view of the above, Indonesia takes the position to leave the details on how to exercise
the rights to the parties who own the rights. Therefore, it is very important to draw up a
contractual agreement giving detailed ground rules agreed by all parties.
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Israel
Israël
Israel
Report Q194
in the name of the Israeli Group
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Israeli law offers no clear guidance as to the distinction between voluntary and statutory coownership
of IP rights.
However, it may be inferred that the origin of the co-ownership of the IP right may determine
whether the general principles governing partnership, or those governing co-ownership, will
apply to the relationship between the co-owners.
The Partnership Ordinance [New Version], 1975, provides that the joint holding of property,
even the sharing of any profits generated through the use of such property, shall not, in and
of itself, create a partnership in the property. 1 Nor does receiving, by way of inheritance,
portion of the profits of a business, deem the heir a partner in the business. It is generally
understood that a partnership is created by the joint purpose of the partners, and cannot be
created by statute. 2
The practical effect of the distinction between a partnership and co-ownership lies in the
liability of the joint holders amongst themselves. A partner, unlike a co-owner, is considered an
agent of the partnership, and may act on its behalf. Furthermore, partners, unlike co-owners,
1. Patents Law, 1967, §2(2), 2(5).
2. [Weisman II 130]
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are subject to a requirement of good faith in their dealings with one another. A partner cannot
transfer his share of the joint property, without the consent of the other partners, while a coowner
may do so freely (giving notice to the other co-owners). 3 Partnership property may
only be applied for the purposes of the partnership and according to the relevant partnership
agreement. 4 In contrast, each co-owner may make reasonable use of the joint property, without
the consent of the other co-owners, provided that he does not prevent them from similarly
making such use. 5
The Patents Law, 1967, contains specific provisions for the joint ownership of a patent. These
provisions appear to be indicative of co-ownership, rather than of a partnership: each coowner
may transfer ownership of his share of the patent right, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties and the fact of the agreement has been duly recorded in the Patents Register; 6 each
co-owner is entitled to exploit the invention, subject of the patent, in a reasonable manner,
subject to a different written agreement, but if, by so doing, another co-owner is denied to
similarly exploit the invention, such other co-owner may demand from the exploiting co-owner
appropriate royalties or a share of the profits derived by the exploiting co-owner. 7 The Patents
Law further provides that patent rights may devolve by operation of law. 8
Thus, it appears that the co-ownership lex specialis of the Patent Law does not assume a
partnership in the patent. Nonetheless, it may be inferred that [OR it is an open question
whether] the Patents Law does not preclude the applicable partnership laws, where a patent
is owned by a partnership.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
Under the Patents Law, each patent co-owner is entitled to exploit the invention, subject of
the patent, in a reasonable manner, subject to a different written agreement. However, if by
so doing, another co-owner is denied the right to similarly exploit the invention, such other
co-owner may demand from the exploiting co-owner appropriate royalties or a share of the
profits derived by such exploiting co-owner. 9
3. [Weismann II 132] Partnership Ordinance [New Version], 1975, §§40, 43; Movable Property Law, 1971, §9.
4. Partnership Ordinance, §33.
5. Movable Property Law, §9(e); Land Law, 1969, §31.
6. Patents Law, § 80.
7. Patents Law, §78.
8. Patents Law, §82.
9. Patents Law, §78.
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In light of the above, the question whether a patent co-owner may subcontract, partially or
wholly, the manufacture of the product covered by the patent, appears to be contingent on
whether the subcontracting constitutes reasonable exploitation of the patent. Israeli case
law offers no guidance as to what may constitute reasonable exploitation, but the ruling
factors likely to be considered will be the effect of such exploitation on the other co-owners’
respective rights in the patent. Arguably, subcontracting the manufacture of the invention (or
portion thereof), so long as this is truly the economic nature of the transaction, does not affect
co-owners’ rights any more or less than personal exploitation by a fellow co-owner.
A further issue is whether the subcontractor, by manufacturing the patented invention for
one co-owner, will infringe the patent. Indeed, the subcontractor cannot be deemed to hold
a license (and thus legally exploit the invention), since a license to exploit a jointly owned
patent shall only be granted with the consent of all patent co-owners. 10 Furthermore, under
the Patents Law, each co-owner is entitled to file a claim for patent infringement and may thus
sue the subcontractor.
Perhaps, the courts may find guidance in a Patents Law provision holding that a person
acquiring a patented product, or a product produced by a patented process, from one coowner
of a jointly owned patent, will be deemed to have acquired the product from a sole
patent holder, so long as the acquisition was in good faith. 11 On the other hand, there is no
like provision with regard to the manufacture of a patented product, for one co-owner.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The Patents Law provides that a license to exploit a jointly-owned patent shall only be granted
with the consent of all co-owners, regardless of whether said license is exclusive or nonexclusive.
12 However, a patent co-owner may apply to the courts ordering the other co-owners
to grant a license in the patent. 13
The Copyright Law, 2007, does not provide any guidance as to the right of a co-owner
to grant a license in respect of protected works. A District Court decision (rendered under
previous copyright legislation, which also lacked such guidance), held that a co-owner is
barred from granting a non-exclusive license in respect of the jointly-owned literary work, to
several of the largest publishers in the market (thus exhausting its market potential), since this
would constitute unreasonable use of the work and deny the other co-owners from making
reasonable use of the work themselves. The court declined from addressing the fundamental
question of whether a co-owner may, in principal, grant a licence in respect of the protected
work.
10. Patents Law, §88.
11. Patents Law, §79.
12. Patents Law, §88.
13. Patents Law, §81.
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4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
The Patents Law entitles each patent co-owner to transfer ownership of his share without the
consent of the other co-owners, unless the parties agreed otherwise between them and the
fact of the agreement is duly recorded in the Patents Register. 14 Arguably, this right may still
be subject to the provisions of the Patents Law which limit a co-owner’s use of the invention
to reasonable exploitation. Thus, the transfer of ownership rights in the share of the patent to
several parties may not be deemed to constitute reasonable exploitation as aforesaid.
Should a patent co-owner transfer his entire share to several parties, each such party will
be deemed to hold only a part of the share transferred. Speculatively, under this scenario,
reasonable exploitation of the invention by the new co-owners (who each hold only a small
portion of the co-owned share in the patent), may be deemed to be more limited than that
afforded the original co-owners, who hold a larger share of the patent.
Alternatively, should several parties acquire a patent share jointly, they may be barred from
exploiting the patent independently of each other, as this may be deemed to constitute a
licensing arrangement, between their partnership in the patent share (as licensor) and each of
their independent ventures (as licensees). Under the Patents Law, a license to exploit a jointlyowned
patent shall only be granted with the consent of all co-owners. 15
Similarly, a patent co-owner transferring a part of his share to a third party, while still being
vested with proprietorship in the remaining part of his original share, may be deemed to be
executing a licensing transaction, rather than a transfer of rights.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
14. Patents Law, §80.
15. Patent Law, §88.
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The Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 1988, the principal antitrust legislation in Israel, does not
apply to restrictive arrangements solely involving the right to use patents, designs, trademarks
or copyrights, for so long as said arrangement is between the IP proprietor and the party
receiving the right to use the IP right.
Agreements between IP co-owners are not similarly excluded and, theoretically, may constitute
a restrictive arrangement.
Additionally, any monopoly gained through the exploitation of patents is not immune from
antitrust issues.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
Under Israeli law, the rule governing choice of law on questions of proprietorship is that of
lex situs, i.e., the law governing the transfer of property is determined by the location of the
transferred property, on the date of transfer.
Thus, the proprietorship in a patent, being a territorial right limited to Israel, is likely to be
governed by Israeli law.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws. $
Note:
It will be helpful and appreciated if the Groups follow the order of the questions in their
Reports and use the questions and numbers for each answer.
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Italy
Italie
Italien
Report Q194
in the name of the Italian Group
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) Copyright
In the Italian Copyright Law the regulation of the co-ownership may depend on its origin.
In particular, section 10 regards the situation when the co-ownership is a consequence of
a joint creation of the work by more than an author. Otherwise, sections 115-117 provide a
regulation for the case of the co-ownership that results from heritage. Both these groups of
rules i) provide that the rights of exploitation of the work shall be regulated by the general
regulation of the community set forth by the Italian Civil Code; and ii) add some special rules
that integrate this general regulation. In particular, the special rules about the co-ownership
generated by a joint creation of the work concern the enforcement of the moral rights coowned
by more than an author. Instead, the rules about the co-ownership generated by a
heritage concern the period of mandatory community (three years since the death of the
author) and the administration of this community.
Patents and Trademarks
The Italian regulation regarding patents and trademarks, set forth by section 6 of the Italian
Industrial Property Code, is the same regardless of the origin of the co-ownership.
In the Italian regulation there isn’t any definition of co-ownership of an IPR
2) Copyright, Patents and Trademarks
The Italian regulation doesn’t provide for this case.
3) Copyright and Patents
Pursuant to the general rules set forth in the Civil Code about the community, the scholars
and the jurisprudence maintain that a license to third parties during less than 9 years must
be authorized by a qualified majority (2/3 of the co-owners), while a license during more
than 9 years must be agreed by all the co-owners. This solution doesn’t depend on the nature
(exclusive or non-exclusive) of the license.
Trademarks
Unless a different rule has been agreed on by the parties, each co-owner is permitted to grant
an exclusive licence on its share of the co-owned trademark but prevented from granting
non-exclusive licences on the same (as this may cause the different entities which may use the
trademark in the market be multiplied, without the consent of the other co-owners).
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4) Copyright, Patents and Trademarks
Pursuant to Italian law – unless restrictions to the assignment have been agreed by the parties
– the assignment of a share of co-ownership on an IP right to third parties can be carried out
freely without the need of the co-owners’ agreement. On the basis of this freedom of transfer,
the co-owners can assign the whole share or only a part of their share of the co-owned IP
rights.
5) Trademarks, Patents and Copyrights
The Italian Regulation doesn’t set forth any particular rules for this case. Any conduct of the
co-owners of an IPR which generates an abuse of a dominant position shall be regulated by
the general antitrust rules.
6) Copyright, Patents and Trademarks
In the case of lack of an agreement regarding the administration of the co-ownership, the
relationship between the co-owners of an IPR set forth by the Italian regulation (i.e.: a copyright,
a trademark or a patent right for the Italian territory) is regulated by the Italian Law
Reasonably, the European Council Regulation No. 593/2008 (so called: “Rome I Regulation)
is applicable to the agreements regarding the co-ownership of an IPR.
7) Copyright, Patents and Trademarks
The Italian Group deems that all the relevant issues regarding IPR co-ownership have been
discussed in the guidelines of the questions 194 and 194BA.
II) Trademarks, Patents and Copyrights
The Italian Group has not any proposals for future harmonization.
Summary
In the Italian Copyright Law the regulation of the co-ownership may depend on its origin. Otherwise,
the rules regarding patents and trademarks are the same regardless of the origin of the coownership.
Pursuant to Italian law – unless restrictions to the assignment have been agreed by the
parties – the assignment of a share of co-ownership on an IP right to third parties can be carried out
freely without the need of the co-owners’ agreement. Reasonably, the European Council Regulation
No. 593/2008 (so called: “Rome I Regulation) is applicable to the agreements regarding the coownership
of an IPR.
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Japan
Japon
Japan
Report Q194
in the name of the Japanese Group
by Eiichiro Kubota
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
Under Japanese laws, the rules related to the co-ownership of IP Rights make no distinction
depending on the origin of the co-ownership.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Under Japanese IP laws, a legal definition of co-ownership is not given.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
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if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
In Japan, subcontracting another party to manufacture patented products based on a
subcontracting agreement is not necessarily viewed from the standpoint of a licensing issue.
In some cases, such subcontracting may, to a certain extent, constitute patent exploitation by
a co-owner himself/herself (i.e. co-owner’s own exploitation). The court precedents have not
yet established criteria for determining the cases where the use of subcontractors constitutes
patent co-owner’s own exploitation. However, the court precedent (Former Supreme Court
judgment dated December 22, 1938: “Knitting Machine Case” (Moyo Meriyasu Jiken))
holds that the subcontracted manufacturing work may be interpreted to constitute patent
exploitation by a co-owner, subject to fulfilment of the following conditions: (i) the co-owner
and the subcontractor have entered into a contract which provides that the co-owner will have
the subcontractor manufacture the products by paying labor charges; (ii) the co-owner has
directed and supervised the subcontractor’s manufacturing; and (iii) the subcontractor has
delivered all of the products manufactured to the co-owner.
As shown in the previous answer, the Japanese Group has laid emphasis on the necessity
to make clear the relationship between co-owner’s own exploitation and subcontracting. As
detailed specifically below, we consider it important to make clear the relationship between
the right to subcontract and “right to have made”.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The Japanese Group believes that the stance shown in the resolution, i.e., that a co-owner
may not, in principle, grant any exclusive or non-exclusive license without the consent from
the other co-owners, should be sustained. In the Japanese Group session, some members
emphasized that the right to exclude exploitation by others shall be regarded as a very
fundamental element of IP Rights (particularly patent rights) even in the case of co-ownership,
and when each co-owner is unconditionally allowed to grant licenses, companies would not
choose the co-owned patent scheme.
It should be noted that the granting of an exclusive license and the assignment of co-owned
shares (shares in co-ownership) are absolutely connected and that sometimes the difference
between these acts are merely perfunctory.
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4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
As shown in the previous answer, the Japanese Group is convinced that voluntary assignment
of whole or part of the shares in co-owned IP Rights shall be subject to the consent of other
co-owners, and the Japanese Group has not changed this stance so far. Even in the countries
(including Japan) that provide legal systems unconditionally enabling assignment of shares
in properties in general other than IP Rights, there is no established logical basis supporting
the necessity of treating IP Rights in the same manner as other properties, in terms of coownership.
Moreover, when discussing IP Rights, the characteristics of the co-owners shall be
given more weight than in case of other properties, as a co-owner of IP Rights is entitled to
exploit the right in its entirety. Therefore, it is desirable to always require the consent of the
other co-owners for assignment of shares in co-ownership.
Further, discussion may arise regarding the opinion that the co-owner shall be afforded an
opportunity to withdraw from the co-owner relationship of IP Rights (this may also be regarded
as cancellation of the co-owner relationship), in case of failure to achieve the purpose initially
contemplated thereunder. However, it is acknowledged that a simple withdrawal (i.e., waiver
of shares in co-owned patent right) does not require other co-owners’ consent and therefore
such opportunity may be said to have already been afforded. In case of assignment of a share
to a third party, instead of simple withdrawal from the co-owner relationship, other co-owners
may suffer unexpected damage caused by the assignee (for example, if the assignee’s ability
for exploitation is far superior to that of other co-owners, the market may be dominated by
such assignee). Therefore, cancelling the co-owner relationship with other co-owners by way
of assignment of shares in co-ownership without consent of the other owners may put other
co-owners into unfavorable circumstances. In this context, the opinion that a party should be
given an opportunity to withdraw from the co-owner relationship by way of assignment is
inappropriate, as it would result in excessive protection of that party, considering the fact that
most of the co-owner relationships were initially created based on the co-owners’ respective
choices. Such parties shall therefore be held responsible for their own choice and it is not
necessary to afford them with any protection for having made a wrong estimate.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
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The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
In Japan, there has been no case where anti-competition law was applied in terms of coownership
of IP Rights. However, it is highly possible that anti-competition laws will be applied
if any person creates patent pools or exclusive licenses contravening anti-competition laws,
using the co-ownership scheme. According to the Guidelines Concerning Joint Research and
Development under the Antimonopoly Act prepared by the Fair Trade Commission, making
arrangements between parties regarding restriction on price or to whom to sell the products
in relation to the patent rights, which are the fruits of the joint research, may constitute a
violation of the Antimonopoly Act.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
As shown in the previous answer, what laws shall be applied to an issue involving coownership
depends on the specific nature of the issue. For example, where the co-owners
dispute over breach of the co-ownership agreement entered into among them, it is an issue
of the obligation-right relationship, and therefore the laws that the parties have designated in
the agreement shall apply. Where the dispute arising from a co-ownership agreement relates
to an issue of validity of the co-owned industrial properties, the laws of the country where the
disputed right has been registered shall be the laws that present the closest connections with
the disputed right, and the laws of that country shall apply.
The governing laws applicable to issues such as the validity of licenses granted or shares
assigned in breach of co-ownership agreement shall not be the governing laws chosen by the
parties under the co-ownership agreement. Such cases involve various issues in each country,
such as the requirements for perfection of transfer or license, the requirements for registration,
the handling of bankruptcy and the treatment of co-ownership under laws, including the
civil code, and should not be resolved merely based on the autonomous decision of the
parties. Therefore, from the standpoint of ensuring the certainty about the status of a third
party licensee or an assignee, the national laws of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP right in question should prevail.
Under Japanese laws, in cases where the co-owners have no contractual agreement on
governing laws, the governing laws are in principle determined based on the presumption
of the parties’ intention. In cases where such contractual agreement does not exist, it is
reasonable to presume that the parties intend to be governed by the national laws of the
country that presents the closest connections with the IP right to be co-owned.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
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Aside from trademark rights and copyrights, most of the co-owner relationships of patent
rights originate from contractual relationships (for example, joint research). Therefore,
when discussing a co-owner relationship of patent rights, such origin needs to be taken
into account. Joint research may include joint research between companies in vertical or
horizontal relationships and joint research between companies and academic institutions.
Issues involving the relationship among joint researchers may be handled on the basis of the
contractual relationship which is its origin; however, the standard structure predetermined by
the law would give factual impact on such a contractual relationship. It may at first glance
seem favorable to a co-owner if, as the standard structure predetermined by laws, the coowner
is entitled to a strong right (i.e., right of licensing or assignment without the need of
consent from the other co-owners, etc.). However, it shall be noted that, if such strong right is
granted to the co-owner, a company in a stronger position from the stage of initial contractual
relationship may be inclined to own the patent all by itself, instead of choosing co-ownership.
We would appreciate it if AIPPI Headquarters, to the maximum extent possible, conducted
comparative surveys on the status of utilization of co-owner relationships in countries ensuring
stronger positions to co-owners and countries granting weaker positions to co-owners.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
1) The Japanese Group is of the opinion that, in case of co-ownership of a patent, the right
of the co-owner may not be fully implemented unless use of subcontracting could be
regarded as exploitation by such co-owner. In this context, the Japanese Group believes
that the concept of “co-owner’s own exploitation” should be construed to include the
case of using subcontractors. However, even in Japan, the meaning of “co-owner’s own
exploitation” is ambiguous. So, in harmonization, the scope covered by the concept
of “co-owner’s own exploitation” (i.e., whether “co-owner’s own exploitation” should
literally be understood to mean exploitation by co-owner himself/herself, or whether it
may be understood to include subcontracting and if so, to what extent) should be made
clear. In addition, too strict interpretation of the concept of “co-owner’s own exploitation”
may work unfavorably against the co-owner, since there may be cases where even
exploitation that may be viewed as substantially being made by the co-owner himself/
herself would be prohibited. On the other hand, too broad interpretation of the concept
of “co-owner’s own exploitation” bears the risk of making the distinction between “coowner’s
own exploitation” and licensing unclear. In this respect, cautious examination
shall be required, while taking into consideration the borderline between “co-owner’s
own exploitation” and the “right to have made.” For reference, here are some opinions
expressed in the course of discussion on this issue at the Japanese Group session: (i)
no problem would arise in connection with the use of subcontracting, as long as the
co-owner “substantially manufactures” the patented products or “uses them for himself/
herself”; (ii) in discussing this issue, the substantial flow of patented products should
be taken into account; (iii) outsourced manufacturing by a company that has from the
outset been in a parent-subsidiary relationship may be regarded as “co-owner’s own
exploitation”; and (iv) in discussing this issue, the relationship between the co-owner and
subcontractor (i.e., the degree of independence of subcontractor) should be taken into
account.
2) In the previous Singapore EXCO, the majority of participants were of the opinion that
with regard to the co-owner relationship of IP Rights, a voluntary assignment of coowned
shares shall in principle require no consent from the other co-owners. However,
the Japanese Group disagrees with the opinion of the majority and finds it proper that
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assignment, whether in whole or in part, should require the consent of the other co-owners.
The reason for the disagreement, which has been mentioned thus far, is recapitulated
below. There is no established logical basis supporting the necessity of treating IP Rights
in the same manner as other properties, in terms of co-ownership. Moreover, when
discussing IP Rights, the characteristics of co-owners should be given more weight than
in the case of other properties, as a co-owner of IP Rights is entitled to exploit the right in
its entirety. Therefore, it is desirable to always require the consent of the other co-owners
for assignment of shares in co-ownership.
Summary
Concerning exploitation of a co-owned patent, the Japanese Group is of the opinion that there should
be some room for subcontracting. In this context, the Japanese Group believes that the concept
of “co-owner’s own exploitation” should be construed to include the case of using subcontractors.
However, this idea of “co-owner’s own exploitation” is ambiguous. So, in harmonization, the scope
covered by the concept of “co-owner’s own exploitation” (i.e., whether “co-owner’s own exploitation”
should literally be understood to mean exploitation by co-owner himself/herself, or whether it may
be understood to include subcontracting and if so, to what extent) should be made clear.
Concerning licensing of a co-owned IP right, it is the opinion of the Japanese Group that the
position of the AIPPI resolution should be maintained (i.e. no license should be given without the
consent of the other co-owners) regardless of the nature of the license.
The Japanese Group finds it proper that assignment of a co-ownership in an IP right, whether in
whole or in part, should require the consent of the other co-owners. There is no established logical
basis supporting the necessity of treating IP Rights in the same manner as other properties in terms
of co-ownership and when discussing IP Rights, the characteristics of co-owners should be given
more weight than in the case of other properties, as a co-owner of IP Rights is entitled to exploit
the right in its entirety.
As to the issue of what laws shall be applied to co-ownership depends on the specific nature of the
issue. Although the parties should be free to choose the laws that govern their relationship, it should
be noted that when a third party is involved the laws chosen by the parties may not prevail.
Résumé
Concernant l’exploitation d’un brevet détenu en copropriété, l’avis du groupe japonais est que
certaines possibilités devraient exister pour la sous-traitance. Dans ce contexte, le groupe japonais
estime que le concept « d’exploitation personnelle par le copropriétaire » devrait être interprété
comme incluant le cas de l’utilisation de sous-traitants. Cette idée « d’exploitation personnelle par
le copropriétaire » est toutefois ambiguë. En conséquence, dans l’harmonisation, le champ couvert
par le concept « d’exploitation personnelle par le copropriétaire » devrait être clarifié (autrement
dit, il faudrait déterminer si l’expression « exploitation personnelle par le copropriétaire » doit être
littéralement comprise comme signifiant l’exploitation par le copropriétaire lui-même, ou bien si elle
peut être comprise comme incluant la sous-traitance, et dans ce cas, dans quelle mesure).
Concernant la concession de licence d’un droit de PI en copropriété, l’avis du groupe japonais est
que la position de la résolution de l’AIPPI devrait être maintenue (c’est-à-dire qu’aucune licence ne
devrait être concédée sans le consentement des autres copropriétaires), quelle que soit la nature
de la licence.
Le groupe japonais estime convenable que la cession d’une quote-part de copropriété d’un droit
de PI, entière ou partielle, demande le consentement des autres copropriétaires. Il n’existe aucun
fondement logique établi qui étaye la nécessité de traiter les droits de PI de la même manière que
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les autres types de propriétés en ce qui concerne la copropriété, et lorsque les droits de PI sont
discutés, les caractéristiques des autres propriétaires devraient se voir accorder plus d’importance
que dans le cas des autres propriétés, car un copropriétaire de droits de PI est habilité à exploiter
le droit dans son intégralité.
Concernant la question de savoir quelles lois devraient être appliquées à la copropriété, la réponse
dépend de la nature spécifique du problème en question. Les parties devraient certes être libres de
choisir les lois qui régissent leur relation, mais il faut noter que lorsqu’un tiers est impliqué, les lois
choisies par les parties peuvent ne pas prévaloir.
Zusammenfassung
Hinsichtlich der Verwertung eines in Miteigentum stehenden Patents ist die japanische Gruppe der
Ansicht, dass ein gewisser Spielraum für Unterverträge verbleiben sollte. In diesem Zusammenhang
meint die Gruppe, dass das Konzept der „Verwertung durch den Miteigentümer“ so ausgelegt
werden sollte, dass es die Möglichkeit von Unterverträgen zulässt. Allerdings ist der Begriff
der „Verwertung durch den Miteigentümer“ nicht eindeutig. Zur Harmonisierung ist deshalb zu
verdeutlichen, ob das Konzept der „Verwertung durch den Miteigentümer“ wörtlich zu verstehen
ist, dahingehend, dass nur der Miteigentümer selbst zur Verwertung berechtigt ist, oder ob auch
Unterverträge einzubeziehen sind, und wenn ja, in welchem Umfang dies zulässig ist.
Bezüglich der Lizenzierung eines in Miteigentum stehenden geistigen Eigentumsrechts ist die
japanische Gruppe der Ansicht, dass die Position der AIPPI-Resolution beizubehalten ist (d.h., keine
Lizenzierung ohne Zustimmung der anderen Miteigentümer), und zwar unabhängig von der Art
der Lizenz.
Die japanische Gruppe hält es für angemessen, dass für die Zuteilung eines Miteigentums an
einem geistigen Eigentumsrecht, sei es an einem Teil oder insgesamt, die Zustimmung der anderen
Miteigentümer einzuholen ist. Es liegt keine etablierte logische Grundlage dafür vor, geistiges
Eigentumsrecht in Fragen des Miteigentums ebenso zu behandeln wie andere Eigentumsformen;
in Bezug auf geistiges Eigentum sollte die spezifische Eigenschaft der Miteigentümer stärkere
Berücksichtigung finden als bei anderen Eigentumsformen, da ein Miteigentümer an einem geistigen
Eigentumsrecht dazu berechtigt ist, das Recht in seiner Gesamtheit zu verwerten.
Durch welches Recht die Miteigentümerschaft geregelt wird, hängt von der jeweiligen Problematik
ab. Zwar sollten die Parteien frei über das Recht bestimmen können, dem ihr Verhältnis unterliegt,
doch ist dazu anzumerken, dass für den Fall der Beteiligung Dritter das von den Parteien gewählte
Recht möglicherweise nicht maßgeblich ist.
Note:
It will be helpful and appreciated if the Groups follow the order of the questions in their Reports and
use the questions and numbers for each answer.
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Malaysia
Malaisie
Malaysia
Report Q194
in the name of the Malaysian Group
by Tee Lee Chin
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the co-ownership
of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of an IP Right in
case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other situations,
including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In Malaysia, there is no distinction as such between the rules applicable to co-ownership
arising from involuntary disposition as opposed to co-ownership arising from other means.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Please see chart attached.
2) The groups are invited to present the position of their national laws on the issue of whether a
co-owner of a patent has the personal right to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent based on his own part/share of the patent.
• Section 40 of the Patents Act 1983 makes reference to a licence contract as follows:
“In the absence of any agreement to the contrary between the parties, joint owners of a
patent application or patent may, separately, assign or transmit their rights in the patent
application or patent, exploit the patented invention and take action against any person
exploiting the patented invention without their consent, but may only jointly withdraw the
patent application, surrender the patent or conclude a licence contract.”
• Section 41 of the PA defines “licence contract” as “any contract by which the owner of a
patent (the licensor) grants to another person or enterprise (the licensee) a licence to do any
or all of the acts referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1), and subsection (3), of section
36.”
• Section 36(1)(a) refers to the exclusive rights of the owner of a patent “to exploit the patented
invention” whilst subsection (3) defines acts of exploitation as “making, importing, offering
for sale, selling or using the product; or stocking such product for the purpose of offering for
sale, selling or using the patented products”.
• It appears from the above provisions that a co-owner cannot by himself subcontract the
manufacture of the patented product. He can only subcontract the manufacture of the patented
product jointly with the other co-owners. This is because a “sub-contract to manufacture”
appears to be a type of “licence contract” and therefore can only be granted jointly by all
the co-owners.
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3) The groups are invited to specify how the differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive
or exclusive) influence the solution of their national laws in respect of the right to grant the
licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The rules governing granting of licences by co-owners are as stated in the chart attached.
No distinction is made between different types of licences such as exclusive or non-exclusive
licences.
4) The Groups are invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or assignment
of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different situations which
may occur ( the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the transfer only of the
part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
Please see chart attached.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules. The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on
the market and their agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the
licensing) may also be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market. The groups are
therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations and what were
the solutions adopted in those cases.
This is not applicable in Malaysia as at the moment, there is no competition law in
Malaysia.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries. This
point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right. If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then
be the elements to take into the consideration to assess this connection? The Groups of the
EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that Council Regulation of
June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable to the Co-Ownership
agreements.
Our view is that the relevant Malaysian law will govern the issues concerning co-ownership
of the IPR regardless of the national law of the various parties (if not Malaysian law). This is
because the co-owners of the IPR will have to comply with what the Malaysian law is saying
concerning the issue since the IPR is territorial in nature.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 EXCO in Singapore.
No other issue to raise.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
No recommendations to present at this stage.
Note:
It will be helpful and appreciated if the Groups follow the order of the questions in their
Reports and use the questions and numbers for each answer.
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Co-ownership and Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in Malaysia
Type of IPR Definition of Co-Ownership
at the Time of Application for Registration
/ at Creation of the IPR
Right to license Right to assign/transfer
Trade Mark Joint application Jointly as the licensor Jointly as the assignor
Section 21 of the Trade Mark Act 1976 (TMA)
states that, “where two or more persons are
interested in a trade mark and none of them is
entitled as between himself or the other or
others to use the trade mark except – (a) on
behalf of both or all of them; or (b) in
relation to goods or services with which both
or all of them are connected in the course of
trade, both or all of them may be registered as
joint proprietors of the trade mark and this Act
has effect in relation to any rights of such
persons to the use of the trade mark as if
those rights were rights of a single person.”
Under Section 48 of the TMA, all the
co-owners must execute and file the
necessary documents for recordal of
registered user. This is because the
word “proprietor” refers to all the coowners
on record as proprietor of the
trade mark.
Under Section 55 of the TMA, it
appears that all co-owners must
execute and file the necessary
documents for recordal of
assignment. This is because the
word “proprietor” refers to all the
co-owners on record as
proprietor of the trade mark.
Patent Joint application
Section 22 of Patents Act 1983 (PA) states
that, “Where the right to obtain a patent is
owned jointly, the patent may only be applied
for jointly by all the joint owners.”
Jointly as the licensor
Section 40 of the PA states that, “In
the absence of any agreement to the
contrary between the parties, joint
owners of a patent application or
patent may, separately, assign or
transmit their rights in the patent
application or patent, exploit the
patented invention and take action
against any person exploiting the
patented invention without their
consent, but may only jointly withdraw
the patent application, surrender the
patent or conclude a licence contract.”
Based on the above, co-owners must
jointly enter into the licence contract.
Co-owner to assign
independently
Section 40 of the PA states that,
“In the absence of any
agreement to the contrary
between the parties, joint owners
of a patent application or patent
may, separately, assign or
transmit their rights in the patent
application or patent, exploit the
patented invention and take
action against any person
exploiting the patented invention
without their consent, but may
only jointly withdraw the patent
application, surrender the patent
or conclude a licence contract.”
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Industrial Joint application Jointly as the licensor unless Jointly as the Assignor unless
Designs (subject to agreement between the owners)
Section 11(2) of the Industrial Designs Act
1996 (IDA) states that, “Where two or more
persons own interests in an industrial design,
all of the persons owning such interests,
acting jointly, are, subject to any agreement
among such persons to the contrary, entitled
to make an application for the registration of
the industrial design
otherwise agreed between the coowners.
Section 31(3) of the IDA states that,
“Where two or more persons are joint
owners of a registered industrial
design, then, subject to any agreement
between them to the contrary, none of
them shall without the consent of the
other or others grant a licence with
respect to the use of the registered
industrial design, or assign or
mortgage his interest in the registered
industrial design.”
otherwise agreed between the
co-owners.
Section 31(3) of the IDA states
that, “Where two or more
persons are joint owners of a
registered industrial design, then,
subject to any agreement
between them to the contrary,
none of them shall without the
consent of the other or others
grant a licence with respect to
the use of the registered
industrial design, or assign or
mortgage his interest in the
registered industrial design.”
Copyright No registration required but the term “work of
joint authorship” is defined as “a work
produced by the collaboration of two or more
authors in which the contribution of each
author is not separable from the contribution
of the other author or authors”.
Section 27(5) of the Copyrights Act 1987 also
states that “For the purposes of assignment,
licences and testamentary disposition,
persons shall be deemed to be co-owners if
they share a joint interest in the whole or any
part of a copyright.”
Section 27(4) of the Copyrights Act
1987 provides that,
“An assignment or licence granted by
one copyright owner shall have effect
as if the assignment or licence is also
granted by his co-owner or co-owners,
and subject to any agreement between
the co-owners, fees received by any of
the owners shall be divided equally
between all the co-owners.”
Section 27(4) of the Copyrights
Act 1987 states that,
“An assignment or licence
granted by one copyright owner
shall have effect as if the
assignment or licence is also
granted by his co-owner or coowners,
and subject to any
agreement between the coowners,
fees received by any of
the owners shall be divided
equally between all the coowners.”
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Mexico
Mexique
Mexiko
Report Q194
in the name of the Mexican Group
by Laura Collada
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the co-ownership
of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of an IP Right
in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other situations,
including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definition of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adapted in their countries and what these definitions are.
There is no definition of co-ownership of the IP Rights adopted in Mexico. The only definition
of co-ownership that can be found in our legislation is in the Federal Civil Code (FCC)(in
connection and subsidiary to IP Rights): co-ownership exists when the thing or right is owned
pro-indiviso by several persons. (938 FCC)
Our country does not have legislation, in connection with co-ownership, that governs in a
uniform way the different objects of an intellectual right; therefore it is necessary to refer to
general rules found in civil law(FCC) to settle the question of co-ownership. There are rules
specific to certain property rights, but the principle of contractual freedom dominates the
arrangement between co-owners. The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin
of co-ownership, e.g., the resulting of an employment relationship.
Regarding trademarks it is mandatory, when filing the application, to submit the contractual
agreement that will govern the co-ownership. There is not the same statute in case of patents
or designs.
Regarding copyrights, and since our system accepts the moral and economic rights, it will
depend, if it is a work for hire, e.g., in case of employment; in case of commissioned work;
in case of labor agreements; in case of composite works, each of them having specific rules,
in case there is no contractual agreement.
If previsions were not suffice and/or an issue over sighted regarding the agreement, it will be
decided by the majority of the co-owners or submit the decision to a Federal Civil Court, given
that some rights are determinable on the basis of the Federal Civil Code.
In case of non voluntary co-ownerships once more it is necessary to refer to general and/or
specific rules found in civil law, e.g, if the co-ownership is undividable, whereas the nature
of the thing (right) or by mandate of law, they are not obligated to keep it that way, and
the co-owners that do not get into an agreement; will sell the right and the benefits divided
among them(939-940 FCC); in case of several co-owners, if one of them is selling its quota,
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it is subject to certain formalities, particularly the obligation to inform the joint owners, who
can profit from a right of pre-emption (975 FCC);in case of heritage, co-owners can enter
a contractual agreement, and experts can assess the price for buying the shares or quotas
(1767-1778 FCC).
2) The debate with regard to the notion of the exploitation of an IP Right. More specifically, the
issue of outsourcing and subcontracting the exploitation of an IP right as well as if the co-owner
has the personal right to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and
selling the good or processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally
the manufacturing of the product covered by the patent. The groups are invited to present the
solutions of their national laws on this specific point.
On first instance and in order to exploit a patent, if there is not a contractual agreements that
establishes such issue, a co-owner has the right to exploit it, with the condition of sharing the
benefits of such exploitation or compensate the other co-owners, in the proportion of each
quota. There is no specific legislation regarding IP assets, so once more it is necessary to
refer to general rules found in our Federal Civil Code. Also, if the co-owner of a patent needs
to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing of the product it is allowed. However, in
case of loss or detriment of the right, the co-owner that personally exploited the patent will
have to account the co-owners.
3) Question related to the possibility of a co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third
parties. In order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licences (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
In case there is no contractual agreement between the co-owners, and since there is no specific
regulations, once more the general rules of the Federal Civil Code would be applicable.
On first instance, a co-owner may not grant licences to third parties without the consent of
other co-owners, regardless the case if it is a non-exclusive or exclusive licence. The grant of
a licence cannot be refused by other co-owner insincerely or unjustified refused. As Mexican
law states that no one is obligated to the undividable, the interested co-owner may suit for the
division, and since it is undividable, might acquire, through judgment, the refusing co-owner’s
quota.
4) Groups are invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or assignment of a
share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different situations which may
occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the transfer only of a part of
the share of the co-owned IP Right).
The transfer of a quota (share) requires the agreement of all the other co-owners and it is
subject to certain formalities, mainly the obligation to inform the joint owners which have a
right of pre-emption and the right of “first refusal”, which must be exercised within the same
time, in certain period of time.
The same rule applies in case of transferring the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of a part of the share of the co-owned IP Right. In case of heritage, the right may
be bequeathed to his/hers/its/ heirs and they can decide to maintain their co-ownership, in
which then a quota of the IP Rights would have shares or, if they reject/refuse to be co-owners,
to offer it for transferring to the other co-owners with the same formalities stated above.
5) The groups are invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations and what
were the solutions adopted in those cases.
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Mexican legislation establishes different rules for each type of IP Right, while in trademarks it
is mandatory that when filing an application to file as well the contractual agreement entered
between the co-owners, that will govern the co-ownership, it will be a matter of negotiation
and consent.
On the other hand there is no similar rule in case of patents and designs. In case of dispute,
the solutions have been adopted depending on the particular facts of each single case
and based in common law since there are no guidelines for resolving co-ownership issues
concerning IP Rights. There are no general principles, and if available, they are always based
on our Federal Civil Code’s general rules; therefore the rules of governing co-ownership
are applied on a subsidiary basis, in the absence of contractual agreements or in case of
dispute.
In connection with the point of view of competition rules, it may raise issues such as dominant
position in the market, or monopoly practices which in first instance would be regulated by
the Economic Competency; though a co-owner may suit the division of the IP Right and since
industrial matters (patents, designs, trademarks) are considered as undividable, the result
most likely would be acquiring the quotas from other co-owners.
6) The groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept that the co-ownership of
an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between the co-owners, may be ruled
by the national law of the country which presents the closest connections with the IP Rights.
In this case, what in the opinion of the groups would then be the elements to take under
consideration to asses this connection?
As stated before, Mexican IP legislation does not address the consequences of co-ownership
of patents (which addresses it in connection with trademarks and copyrights). It simply
recognizes that co-ownership is possible. The national law with closest connection with the
IP Rights is our Federal Civil Code and the general rules that are established in such statute.
The assessment to take under consideration this connection is mandatory, given that civil law
applies, as subsidiary, to construe IP legislation, as well as when a lapse appears to be on
IP legislation.
7) The groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to the
questions and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
Other issues that must be explored are the co-ownership rules in case of granting securities,
liens or encumbrances, seizing the right by third parties, as well, as dissolution of co-ownership
or bankruptcy of a co-owner.
None of these issues are established in the Mexican IP legislation; however, our civil legislation
covers it with general rules and principles. Co-ownership in Mexico may be voluntary or
mandatory. The principle that no one is forced/compelled to maintain ownership of indivisible
things and/or rights: and due to the fact that IP Rights are considered as indivisible (except
copyright because its duality); any co-owner can exercise action against joint owner to divide
it, which most likely will result of acquiring quotas from other co-owners.
Also Mexican common law establishes that co-owners can encumbrance its right without
informing or obtaining consent of co-owners, situation that might put in danger the existence
of the right or its exploitation.
Finally, in case of bankruptcy, the order of creditors in Mexican legislation establishes that
employees and taxes are preferred creditors, may also put in danger the existence of the
right.
The need of general rules on IP legislation is basic to preserve the existence of rights.
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II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
1) The principle of contractual freedom must govern while establishing regulations and/or
legislations of co-ownership of IP Rights; however, a legal frame work, in such contractual
freedom, must include certain rules to avoid uncertainty, e.g., personal exploitation, right
to licence, right to transfer, etc., which would allow co-owners to determine the ruling
of rights, conditions, and legal consequences. In case of dispute, negotiations to obtain
consent must be admissible before settling in court.
2) In case of patents it should be allowed to individually exploit the IP Rights without prior
authorization of other co-owners, but obliged to compensate co-owners on the proportion
or percentage of their shares.
In case of trademarks, it should not be allowed because it may cause the dilution or lack
of distinctiveness, or cause confusion about the origin of the products or services.
In case of copyright it must not be allowed generally speaking with the exception of some
cases, e.g. composite works in which individual work can be recognized, economic
rights hold by a third party, etc.
Due to the above mentioned it would be desirable to visualize specific subsidiary rules
governing each one of these rights
3) A co-owner cannot freely grant licences without the agreement of the others in order to
preserve the existence of the right; consent is a must.
A co-owner should freely transfer his right, Pre-emption right is not necessary.
4) We should look for a fair and quick way of settlement in case the lack of a contractual
agreement exists or negotiation among co-owners fails. In our jurisdiction a trial trying to
settle these issues could take years, so it should be rules for expediting settlement, since
timing and opportunity are crucial on the IP field.
Summary
Co-ownership of IP Rights in Mexican Law is not completely regulated. The principle of contractual
freedom prevails; however, in case of dispute, it should be settled on the basis of Civil Law.
Patents and designs may be exploited personally but in case of licences or assignments co-owners
require the consent of the other co-owners.
Trademarks and copyrights have specific regulations, but in case of dispute, common law is the
statute for settlement.
Co-ownership requires as mandatory a “first refusal right” as well as a pre-emption right, if such
are not informed and offered to co-owners, agreements are deemed as void.
Co-ownership in Mexican Law requires that co-owners account to each other for all exploitation.
Mexican group considers that on all IP Rights personal exploitation would have as a consequence
dilution, loss of distinctiveness as for the source.
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Résumé
La copropriété des droits relatifs aux Propriété Intellectuelle dans la Loi Mexicaine n’est pas
complètement réglée. Le principe de la liberté contractuelle s’impose, mais, dans le cas d’un litige,
on doit faire appel à la Loi Civil.
Les Brevets et les dessins peuvent être exploites personnellement mais en ce qui concerne les
permissions ou les cessions il faut le consentement des autres copropriétaires.
Les marques et les droits d’auteur ont des régulations spécifiques, mais en cas d’un litige, la loi
commune c’est le moyen pour arriver à un accord.
La copropriété demande comme obligatoire un premier droit de négation ainsi qu’un droit de
priorité, si ceux-ci ne sont pas rapportes et offerts aux copropriétaires, les accords sont considérés
comme nuls.
La copropriété, dans la Loi Mexicaine, requiert que les copropriétaires soient en accord pour toute
exploitation.
Le Groupe Mexicaine trouve que dans toute exploitation des Droits de Propriété Intellectuelle aurait
comme conséquence une dilution et une perte de distinction concernant la source.
Zusammenfassung
Im Mexikanischen Gesetz ist das Recht der Teil-Inhaberschaft eines industriellen Eigentums nicht
komplett reguliert. Das Prinzip der vertraglichen Freiheit herrscht vor; obwohl, im Falle eines
Rechtsstreites, dieser meist durch das Zivilgericht beigelegt wird.
Patente und Geschmacksmuster koennten persoenlich ausgebeutet werden; aber im Falle, dass
ein Lizenzvertrag abgeschossen wurde oder eine Rechtsuebertragung besteht, benoetigt der Teil-
Eigentuemer den Konsenz des anderen Teil-Inhabers.
Marken und Urheberrechte haben spezifische Vorschriften ; aber im Falle eines Rechtsstreites, ist
dass Allgemeine Gesetz Grundlage einer Einigung.
Es ist gesetzlich vorgeschrieben, das eine Teileigentuemerschaft ein Recht auf «Erst-Ablehnung»,
wie auch ein “Vorkaufsrecht” besitzt, falls dieses Anrecht nicht mitgeteilt wurde und den anderen
Teil-Eigentuemern nicht angeboten wurde, werden die Abkommen als nichtig angesehen.
Das mexikanische Gesetz, erwaehnt unter dem Teileigentumsrecht, dass die Teileigentumer sich
gegenseitig ueber die finanzielle Ausbeutung Rechnung ablegen.
Die mexikanische Gruppe ist der Ansicht, dass die persoenliche Ausbeutung allem Industriellen
Eigentumrechts die Aufloesung und den Verlust an Unverwechselbarkeit, zur Konsequenz haette.
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Netherlands
Pays-Bas
Niederlande
Report Q194
in the name of the Dutch Group
by Marleen van den Horst, Bernard Ledeboer, Addick Land, Sierd Schaafsma,
Maurits Westerik and John Allen
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) The Current substantive law
1) Groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to co-ownership of
IP-rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership in case of the origin
is not voluntarily but results from other situations, including the division of a right in case of a
heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
In the Netherlands, there a no specific definitions applicable to the co-ownership of intellectual
property rights.
In the Dutch Civil Code (“DCC”) there is a specific section (Book 3, Title 7, section 1-3) which
addresses the co-called “community”, which exists where there is the co-ownership of certain
physical goods and/or or rights. These rules are not specific for intellectual property rights,
but apply to all co-owned assets.
In intellectual property laws, a limited number of specific rules for co-owned intellectual
property rights are provided. These address the exploitation of the right, including the right
to grant licenses.
The general rules on co-ownership and the specific rules on co-owned intellectual property
rights do not distinguish between situations of co-ownership which arise involuntarily (such
as through heritage) or voluntary (by e.g. joint creation/inventorship, transfer of a share
etc.)
However, a different distinction is made in the DCC between the community in general
and certain specific types of community. These specific communities are the estate in case
of heritage, a dissolved marital community, a partnership or shipping company. These
communities are generally characterised by a large collection of co-owned goods.
In these specific communities the co-owners may not freely transfer their ownership share in
an individual good belonging to the community, without the consent of the other co-owners.
In the more “classic” community where one or more individual rights are co-owned, the main
rule is that co-owners are free to transfer their share to a third party, unless agreed otherwise
(article 3:175 DCC).
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2) No common position could be achieved by the Singapore EXCO 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of the product covered by the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
In Dutch laws, there is no specific regulation of subcontracting or outsourcing by a co-owner
in Dutch Law.
Article 66 of the Dutch Patent Act 1995 (“DPA”) provides, insofar as relevant, that:
a) when a patent is co-owned, the legal relationship of the co-owners is determined by their
agreement;
b) if there is no agreement or the agreement does not provide otherwise, each co-owner
has the authority to perform the “reserved acts” in respect of the patent (which will be
explained hereafter; generally speaking this concerns the manufacturing and exploitation
of the invention); but
c) the grant of 1) a license or 2) permission to supply essential parts of the invention to a
third party shall be subject to the consent of all co-owners.
In the Netherlands, the exclusive right of the owner(s) of a patent is described as an exhaustive
list of “reserved acts” in respect of the patented invention.
Article 53 of the DPA provides that, with certain exceptions (such as a granted license or a
right of prior use), the patentee has the exclusive right:
- to manufacture, use, put into circulation or sell further, to rent out, to deliver or otherwise
trade in the patented product, or
- to offer, import or keep the patented product in stock for such purposes
For method patents, a similar provision applies to the patented method and products directly
derived form performing the patented method.
The patentee has the exclusive right to perform these so-called “reserved acts” in or for his
business.
The question is whether the wording “in or for his business” implies that the right to subcontract
or to outsource is a separate category of “reserved acts” which are within the scope of the
rights of the owners, which can be utilised without having to grant a separate license to a
subcontractor or outsourcing partner.
Whilst the wording “in or for his business” could perhaps literally be stretched to include
some forms of subcontracting or outsourcing, it nevertheless appears that this wording is
merely intended to specify that a patentee cannot oppose reserved acts which are performed
in a non-commercial, private setting (Gielen, T&C Intellectuele Eigendom, 2 nd ed,ROW 1995
art 53, note 2.)
If that is indeed so, the system would be such that the performance of reserved acts by a third
party (such as a subcontractor or outsourcing partner) would require a license or consent of
the owner, since subcontracting or outsourcing will generally involve acts which require a
license.
In case of co-ownership, the law specifically provides that each individual co-owner must
consent to the grant of a license.
In the Netherlands subcontracting and/or outsourcing are likely to be outside the scope of
the exploitation rights (the „reserved acts“) of a (co-)owner. Subcontracting or outsourcing will
under most circumstances require the third party to obtain a license. Licensing requires the
consent of all co-owners, unless the co-owners have agreed otherwise.
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3) Therefore, (…), the groups are invited to specify how the differences in the nature of licenses
(non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their national laws in respect of the right
to grant the license by a co-owner of an IP Right.
In the Netherlands, as far as granting a license is concerned:
a) copyrights and trademarks are governed solely by the generic laws on community/coownership,
and pursuant to Article 3:170 (2) of the Dutch Civil Code (“DCC”), exploitation
acts (such as granting licenses) shall require the consent of all co-owners; and
b) Article 66(2) of the Dutch Patent Act 1995 (“DPA”) provides specifically that a license
can only by granted with the permission of all co-owners.
In the relevant laws, no distinction is made between exclusive and non-exclusive licenses.
However, co-owners are at liberty to provide for their own arrangement and may deviate
from the “default” provisions of the DCC or the DPA.
4) The groups are invited to precise their position on the questions of the transfer or assignment
of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into consideration the different situations which
may occur ( the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the transfer only of the
part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
Article 64 (1) of the Dutch Patent Act 1995 (“DPA”) provides that a share in a patent or a
patent application can be transferred.
Art 3:175 of the Dutch Civil Code (“DCC”) provides that a co-owner of may freely transfer
or assign his share in a co-owned rights, unless this is inconsistent with the legal relationship
between parties.
There is no case law indicating that the mere co-ownership of an IP right is such a legal
relationship which would implicitly restrict the parties’ rights to transfer their share. Obviously
parties can restrict their right to transfer a share in a co-owned intellectual property right by
agreement.
The law does not clearly prohibit the further subdivision of shares in a co-owned property right,
but the dominant position among academics appears to be that only an entire share can be
transferred by a co-owner, and this share cannot be subdivided further (See Vermogensrecht,
Kluwer (Losbl) Art 175, note 3 (Lammers)). This could naturally be different if all the co-owners
would agree to such further subdivisions.
In case of patent rights, this issue is highly relevant, since pursuant to Art 66(2) DPA each
co-owner has an individual exploitation right, the other co-owners not being entitled to any
compensation. Therefore, if a co-owner would be allowed to further subdivide his share and
transfer parts of his share to third parties, he could in principle create numerous co-owners
who would all be entitled to exploit the invention, without the consent of the original coowner(s).
For trademarks and copyrights these issues are of less significance, since the exploitation
of co-owned trademarks and copyrights is normally subject to the consent of all coowners.
Further subdivision of shares therefore will not create additional parties entitled
to commercial use of the trademark or copyright.
The Dutch Group considers that a position where Dutch laws would allow the further subdivision
of a share in a patent, which could then be transferred to one or more third parties in order
to create additional exploitation rights without the consent of the original other co-owner(s)
of a patent, would be both undesirable and inconsistent with the system of the DPA. Such an
interpretation of the generic rules on co-ownership is not likely to be followed when tested in
the Dutch Courts.
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As explained above, a share in a co-owned property can be assigned to a third party without
the consent of the other co-owner.
At least for co- owned patents, the Dutch group considers that this provision should be
interpreted in a strict manner, i.e. only the transfer of the (i.e. entire) share in a patent is
possible. Unless the other co-owners consent thereto, a co-owner should not be entitled to
subdivide his share further, as this would create additional exploitation rights. Obviously this
will adversely affect the value of the exclusive rights of the original co-owner, especially if
the share in the patent is subdivided into ever smaller fractions, creating a virtually unlimited
number of third parties entitled to practice the patented invention.
This is contrary to the system of the DPA, which provides for a strong monopoly right of the
owner, which right is restricted by way of limited and narrowly construed exceptions. In this
context the Dutch group considers it particularly relevant that whenever such an exception
takes the form of a third party license, all the co-owners should consent thereto. It would be
inconsistent to circumvent this strict exception with the right of a co-owner to subdivide his
share in the patent and allow him to effectively grant a license to an unlimited number of third
parties, without having to obtain consent of the other co-owners.
5) The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market
The groups are invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations and what
were the solutions adopted in those cases
In general, substantive Dutch competition law is similar, if not identical, to substantive European
competition law. European block exemptions apply also under Dutch competition law in the
absence of interstate effect.
In the context of co-owned intellectual property, Commission Regulation 2659/2000 on the
application of article 81 (3) to categories of research and development agreements as well
as Commission Regulation 772/2004 on the application of article 81 (3) to categories of
technology transfer agreements may apply.
There is – to the best of our knowledge – no administrative practice and case law in the
Netherlands or at European Union level, which specifically addressed the co-ownership of
intellectual property rights.
However, it may not be excluded that under Dutch competition law, depending on the facts
and circumstances of individual cases, either the Netherlands Competition Authority or the
national judiciary would rule that co-ownership of IP rights might be anti-competitive. For
example, under the R&D Block Exemption joint exploitation by granting an exclusive licence
will not fall within its safe harbour, if and when this results in the creation of a dominant
position in a particular technology market. Possibly, a parallel may be found between such
joint exploitation and a situation of co-ownership, particularly if a share in essential intellectual
property is acquired rather than the result of a joint development.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
(…)
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
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The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of 17 June 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
The Dutch group reconsidered the question of the applicable law in respect of co-ownership
of various rights coexisting in different countries.
1. The first question to be dealt with is: which law determines who is the initial owner of
the right (the person to whom the intellectual property right is originally granted)? In the
present context: who are the initial co-owners of the right?
Under Dutch private international law, as a general principle, the protection of intellectual
property rights is governed by the law of the country for which protection is claimed,
the lex loci protectionis. 1 Currently, opinions differ on the foundation of the lex loci
protectionis rule. According to some, this is an unwritten, judge-made rule. According to
others, the lex loci protectionis rule is enshrined in the Berne Convention 1886 and the
Paris Convention 1883, either in the principle of national treatment or in other provisions
of these treaties such as article 5(2) Berne Convention. Anyhow, the lex loci protectionisrule
is recently laid down in article 8 of the Rome II-Regulation. 2
Opinions differ on the scope of the lex loci protections. Traditionally, the lex loci
protectionis is considered to govern the protection of an intellectual property right in
its entirety, hence including the question who is the initial owner of the right. 3 Currently,
there have been proposals, especially in the field of copyright law, to narrow the scope
of the lex loci protectionis by splitting off the question who is the initial owner of the
right, and subjecting it to another conflict-of-law rule, so that for example the lex originis
applies, or –in case of multiple co-authors– the law of the country that is most closely
connected to the creation of the work. 4 Such proposals are, however, controversial. The
Rome II Regulation is not very helpful in this respect, as it seems that its article 8 does
not cover the question who is the initial owner of the right: article 8 only covers the “noncontractual
obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual property right”. It
seems, in addition, that article 15 of the Rome II Regulation does not bring the question
who is the initial owner of the right, within the reach of article 8. 5
In view of the above, it is submitted that, according to Dutch private international law,
the lex loci protectionis is applicable to the question who are the initial co-owners of an
intellectual property right.
2. A second conflict-of-law question that may be relevant in the context of co-ownership
is: which law applies to the various questions concerning intellectual property rights
as objects of property. For example: may the right be transferred? May it be given
as security, or be the subject of rights in rem? May it be levied in execution? May a
license be granted? It is submitted that, according to Dutch private international law,
the aforementioned questions are governed by the lex loci protectionis. It should be
noticed that, for Community trade marks and Community design rights, uniform rules are
stipulated in this respect in the Regulations concerned. 6
1 Cf. Supreme Court 13 February 1936 (‘Das Blaue Licht II’), NJ 1936, 443; GRUR Int. 1936, 270; Supreme Court 27
January 1995, NJ 1995, 669 and the Opinion of Advocate General Strikwerda , par. 22.
2 Regulation (EC) nr. 864/2007 (OJ 2007, L 199/40).
3 Quaedvlieg, AMI 1997, p. 155 sqq; Schaafsma, WPNR 2008, p. 999-1000.
4 Spoor, Verkade & Visser, Auteursrecht, 2005, p. 709.
5 Schaafsma, WPNR 2008, p. 1000.
6 Regulation (EC) nr. 6/2002 (OJ 2002, L 3/1, ‘CDR’), art. 28-34; Regulation (EC) nr. 40/94 (OJ 1994, L 11/1, “CTMR’),
art. 17-24. For any question that is not governed by these uniform rules, these rights should – for these purposes – be
considered to be a national trade mark of the country designated by art. 16 CTMR or art. 27 CDR. This approach
is also suggested for Benelux trade marks (see Cohen Jehoram, Van Nispen & Huydecoper, Merkenrecht, 2008, p.
587).
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3. Thirdly, the question arises which law governs a contract between the co-owners which
regulates their rights and obligations in respect of the co-owned intellectual property.
According to Dutch private international law, the 1980 Convention on the law applicable
to contractual obligations applies, since such a contract does not fall outside the material
scope of the convention. The same applies to the convention’s forthcoming successor, the
Rome I Regulation. 7 Pursuant to article 3 of this Regulation, the parties are free to choose
the law applicable to their contact. Absent such choice of law, article 4 applies. As coownership
contracts do not easily fall within article 4(1), (2) or (3), we will have to turn to
paragraph (4): the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is
most closely connected. According to the Dutch group, this law should be:
(i) the law of the country where all the co-owners had their habitual residence or
principal place of business at the time the intellectual property right was granted;
or
(ii) in case the co-ownership results form the sale of a share in the intellectual property
right, the law of the country where the seller had his habitual residence or principal
place of business at the time of the sale.
It appears to the Dutch group that, if these guidelines do not point to a specific
country’s law, the applicable law to the contract may vary and should follow the law
of the protecting country (lex loci protectionis).
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
The Dutch Group does not consider that there are other relevant issues which should be
discussed at present.
II) Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
In the context of co-owned intellectual property rights, the Dutch Group considers that, taking
into account the recommendations made in the context inter alia the following principles
should be observed in future harmonisation of national laws:
1. Co-owners of intellectual property laws should be free to choose the law of a single
country, that shall govern their co-ownership contract;
2. The licensing of the co-owned intellectual property rights, irrespective of the exclusive or
non-exclusive nature of such licensing, shall require the consent of the other co-owners;
3. In case of trademarks, design rights and copyrights, co-owned intellectual property rights
may, absent an agreement which provides otherwise, only be commercially exploited by
individual co-owners if all co-owners agree thereto.
4. In case of patents, each individual co-owner has an individual commercial exploitation
right, which individual exploitation is personal and cannot be exercised by way of
subcontracting or outsourcing (except with the consent of the other co-owners). There
should be no obligation to compensate any non-practising co-owners, except where the
co-owners have agreed to such compensation;
7 Regulation (EC) nr. 593/2008 (OJ 2008, L 177/6). This Regulation shall apply to contracts concluded after 17
December 2009 (art. 28).
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4. Absent an agreement to the contrary, shares in co-owned intellectual property right may
be freely assigned to third parties, but cannot be subdivided into smaller portions except
with the consent of the other co-owners;
5. Decisions on maintaining or enforcing the relevant intellectual property right should be
possible for each individual co-owner.
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New Zealand
Nouvelle–Zélande
Neuseeland
Report Q194
in the name of the New Zealand Group
by Julie Ballance and Kate Duckworth
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Copyright
Copyright has two types of co-ownership: one type for where the contribution of each author
is indistinct (joint authorship), and one where the contribution of each author is distinct (coownership).
Where the contribution of each author is indistinct (joint authorship) both authors are entitled
to exploit the work. Where the contribution of each author is distinct (co-ownership) each
author is only entitled to exploit his or her part, and does not need the consent of the other
authors to exploit his or her part.
Patents
Where a patent is granted to 2 or more persons, each of those persons shall, unless an
agreement to the contrary is in force, be entitled to an equal undivided share in the patent.
Unless there is an agreement to the contrary, each of those persons shall be entitled to make,
use, exercise, and vend the patented invention for his own benefit without accounting to the
other or others.
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Trade marks
Joint owners of a trade mark are permissible if either or any of those persons is entitled to
use the trade mark only on behalf of both or all of them, or in relation to goods or services
with which both or all of them are connected in the course of trade. The joint owners must be
a joint enterprise.
Where there are joint owners of a trade mark the rights are to be exercised as if they were
the rights of a single person. Therefore consent is needed to exploit the trade mark.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
In relation to patents, where a patent is granted to 2 or more persons, each of those persons
shall, unless an agreement to the contrary is in force, be entitled to an equal undivided share
in the patent. Further, unless there is an agreement to the contrary, each co-owner has the
right, by himself or through his agent, to make, use, exercise, and vend the patented invention
for his own benefit without accounting to the other co-owners.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
In relation to patents, an exclusive licence means a licence from a patentee which confers on
the licensee, or on the licensee and persons authorised by him, to the exclusion of all other
persons (including the patentee), any right in respect of the patented invention; and “exclusive
licensee” shall be construed accordingly. The meaning of “non-exclusive licence“ is the same
as the meaning of exclusive licence, except it does not exclude the rights of all others in
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elation to the patent, including the patentee. In other words, the patentee can continue to
exercise its rights in relation to the patent.
In relation to patents, each co-owner may not licence or assign a share in a patent, without
the consent of all parties, other than licensor or assignor, who are registered as grantee or
proprietor of the patent.
In relation to copyright, an exclusive licence means a licence in writing, signed by or on behalf
of a copyright owner, authorising the licensee, to the exclusion of all other persons (including
the copyright owner), to exercise a right that would otherwise be exercisable exclusively by
the copyright owner. The meaning of “non-exclusive licence“ is the same as the meaning of
exclusive licence, except it does not exclude the rights of all others in relation to the copyright
work, including the copyright owner. In other words, the copyright owner can continue to
exercise its rights in relation to the copyright work.
In relation to copyright, although it is not stated in law, we believe that it is not possible to
transfer any rights to third parties, including an exclusive or non-exclusive licence, without
the consent of all joint authors; whereas it is most likely to be possible to transfer co-owner’s
rights to third parties.
In relation to trade marks, exclusive and non-exclusive licences are not defined by law.
Although not stated by law, we believe a meaning similar to that adopted by New Zealand
copyright and patent law would be adopted.
In relation to trade marks, although it is not stated in law, we believe that it is not possible
to transfer any rights to third parties, including a licence, without the consent of all joint
owners.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
In relation to patents, a share in a patent shall not be assigned, except with the consent of
all persons, other than licensor or assignor, who are registered as grantee or proprietor of
the patent.
In relation to trade marks, although it is not stated in law, we believe that it is not possible to
transfer any rights to third parties without the consent of all joint owners.
In relation to copyright, although it is not stated in law, we believe that it is not possible to
transfer any rights to third parties without the consent of all joint authors; whereas it is most
likely to be possible to transfer co-owner’s rights to third parties.
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5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
In relation to patents, where the market for the patented invention is not being supplied, or is
not being supplied on reasonable terms, in New Zealand, then it is possible to apply for a
compulsory licence. A compulsory licence is non exclusive, must not be assigned otherwise
than in connection with the goodwill of the business in which the patented invention is used,
and is limited to the supply of the patented invention predominantly in New Zealand. Further,
a compulsory license may be terminated where the court is satisfied that the grounds upon
which it was granted, now longer exist.
In relation to both copyright and trade marks, we are not aware any law which prohibits the
co-owners having the dominant position in the market and making an agreement to preclude
the ability to grant a licence over the copyright work or trade mark.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
No comment.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
No comment.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
No comment.
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Summary
Copyright
Copyright has two types of co-ownership: one type for where the contribution of each author
is indistinct (joint authorship), and one where the contribution of each author is distinct (coownership).
Where the contribution of each author is indistinct (joint authorship) both authors are entitled to
exploit the work. Where the contribution of each author is distinct (co-ownership) each author is
only entitled to exploit his or her part, and does not need the consent of the other authors to exploit
his or her part.
Patents
Where a patent is granted to 2 or more persons, each of those persons shall, unless an agreement
to the contrary is in force, be entitled to an equal undivided share in the patent. Unless there is an
agreement to the contrary, each of those persons shall be entitled to make, use, exercise, and vend
the patented invention for his own benefit without accounting to the other or others.
Trade marks
Joint owners of a trade mark are permissible if either or any of those persons is entitled to use the
trade mark only on behalf of both or all of them, or in relation to goods or services with which both
or all of them are connected in the course of trade. The joint owners must be a joint enterprise.
Where there are joint owners of a trade mark the rights are to be exercised as if they were the rights
of a single person. Therefore consent is needed to exploit the trade mark.
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Norway
Norvège
Norwegen
Report Q194
in the name of the Norwegian Group
by Harald Irgens Jensen and Amund Brede Svendsen
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
In Norwegian law, there are no definitions of co-ownership specifically directed at IP Rights.
The rules applying to co-ownership of IP Rights make generally no distinction between coownership
resulting from a voluntary act or from other situations, such as heritage. There are
two exceptions, both applying to copyright. Section 6 of the Copyright Act, which has some
provisions on co-owner’s rights to exploit the work, literally only applies to co-ownership
resulting from actual co-authorship. It is unclear to what extent this provision may be applied
by analogy to other forms of co-ownership in copyright. Section 39k of the Copyright Act
requires, in cases where the copyright has passed from the original creator to his legal
successors by heritage, the unanimity of all co-owners the first time the work is to be made
lawfully available to the public. If the issue is a subsequent making the work available, in
another way or form than earlier, the requirement is a majority of the heirs/co-owners.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
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This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
The law is not clear on this issue. It is thought that, in the case of patents, a co-owner who
is entitled under the law or under a co-ownership agreement to manufacture and sell the
products protected by the patent, is probably also entitled to have the products manufactured,
entirely or partly, for it.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
Reference is made to the report prepared for the Singapore ExCo by the Norwegian group, in
which the distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive licenses was raised: “For copyright
and other rights regulated by section 6 of the Copyright Act, the consent of all co-owners is
needed to make the protected subject matter available to the public for the first time, also
when this is done by a licensee. As stated under question 2 above, authorisation from all
other co-owners is also necessary for making the work available in another manner or in
another form than previously. However, each co-owner may without the others’ consent grant
the licensee a right to make the work or other protected subject matter available to the public
anew in the same manner as previously. The profit of such a licence will probably be shared
according to how much the parties have contributed to the making of the said subject matter.
In case this is difficult to establish, the parties are presumed to have an equal share. The
parties can agree otherwise.
For other IP rights, legal scholars agree that the granting of an exclusive licence requires
the consent of all co-owners. When it comes to non-exclusive licences, the position is more
uncertain, and co-owners are strongly recommended to clarify the matter in an agreement.
Unless specific circumstances in a case favours another solution, we doubt that a co-owner
is free to grant this regardless the opinions of the other co-owners, since also simple licenses
may have substantial effects on the value of the IP right for all co-owners. An analogy may
be drawn to the rule prohibiting licensees of IP rights from granting sublicenses without
authorisation from the licensor. However, it may be inferred form the Act on Co-ownership
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that a majority (according to their share of the IP in question) of the co-owners may decide to
grant simple licences, at least when the agreed duration of these is shorter than 10 years.”
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
According to the Act on Co-ownership, a co-owner of an IP right may assign his share or a
part of it to third parties, unless he has agreed otherwise with the other co-owners. However,
each of the other co-owners has an option to acquire the share for the price that the buyer
agrees to pay. If the agreed price is clearly below the market price, the price shall be adjusted
to an ‘ordinary’ level. Normally, the other co-owners’ right of purchase does not apply if the
buyer is ‘closely related’ to the seller, for instance a spouse or child.
If more than one co-owner wish to purchase the share, it shall be divided between them
according to the size of their previous shares.
For copyright and performers’ rights the situation may be different, due to the ‘moral’ aspect
of these rights. If one of the original creators or performers wants to assign his share to a third
party, it is assumed in legal doctrine that the other co-owners can only acquire this share if the
assignor has granted the third party the right to transfer the share to others.
Since there is, at least in the case of patents, where the issue appears to be most relevant, the
said right of preemption, it appears unlikely that selling a part of a share would be a viable
strategy to get around the limitation on granting non-exclusive licenses.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
In Norway there is no legislation expressly dealing with this issue, and no case law either.
It should be mentioned, however, that Norwegian competition law largely corresponds to
EU competition law, and our rules on agreements on the joint exploitation of research results
are basically the same as can be found in the EU (e.g. regulation 2659/2000 – the block
exemption for agreements on research and development).
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6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
Under Norwegian law, if there is no contractual agreement on the choice of law, it is the law
of the country to which the disputed issue has the closest connection that is to be applied. The
assessment is based on an overall approach. The main element to take into consideration is
which country the characteristic performance under the contract has the closest connection
to. A co-ownership, even if it is not governed by a contract established by the co-owners,
is a type of contractual relationship. However, it may be unclear what the characteristic
performance of a co-owner under a co-ownership agreement is.
An IP right will often be found to have the closest connections to the country where it is
registered, provided it is a right that can or has to be registered. This may lead to situations
in which several co-ownerships come into existence between the same parties and in respect
of parallel rights, e.g. in the case of parallel patents or in the case of a European patent, one
co-ownership for each designated country, each co-ownership being governed by a different
national law. This is probably not a good solution.
Norway is not a member state of the EU, and “Rome I” is therefore not applicable, although
the principles expressed in “Rome I” are, generally, the same as the non-statutory principles
applied in Norwegian international private law.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
Nothing to add at this time.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
First, it has to be recognised that IP rights are diverse, and that the same may be true of the
solutions that can be applied to the different issues relating to co-ownership.
Secondly, to the extent that the regulation of co-ownership in IP rights in the national laws
of some countries depends on the origin of the co-ownership, such distinctions should be
eliminated, as a prerequisite for international harmonisation.
Thirdly, the question of the co-owners right to individually exploit the IP Right should be
addressed, and this should be a right each co-owner can exercise without having to ask
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permission or consent of the others. Such right should extend to subcontracting from third
parties for a co-owner’s own requirements of products or services to be used or sold by it.
Fourth, the issue of granting licenses should be addressed. The Norwegian group notes
that a right for each co-owner to grant licenses without the consent of the other co-owners
or a majority among them, which appears to be the rule under the laws of some countries,
reduces the value of the IP right considerably and should not be the preferred harmonised
approach.
Finally, harmonisation of international private law in respect of the issue of which country’s
laws should govern co-ownership in IP Rights should be a priority. It would be especially
beneficial to avoid situations with numerous co-ownerships governed by different national
laws but relating to the same or parallel rights.
Summary
Rules distinguishing between co-creation and co-ownership resulting from voluntary acts or
succession. With the exception of the Copyright Act which has a) provisions on co-owners rights to
exploit works, and which at least literally appear to be limited to co-ownerships that have resulted
from actual co-creation, and b) provisions relating to situations in which co-ownership resulted from
succession by inheritance, there are no rules distinguishing between co-creation and co-ownership
resulting from voluntary acts or succession. Sub-contracting: the Norwegian group believes that
co-owners entitled to manufacture and sell a product under a patent, are probably also entitled to
sub-contract the manufacture. Granting of licences: the granting of exclusive licences requires the
consent of all co-owners. The situation is more uncertain when it comes to non-exclusive licences.
The Norwegian group believes that a simple majority of the co-owners may suffice to make such a
decision. A right for each co-owner to transfer or assign his or her share of an IP right is balanced
by a right of pre-emption for the other co-owners. Such right of pre-emption also appears to prevent
attempts at overcoming limitation on the granting of licences by means of transferring a part of a
share of the right. Relationship between co-ownership in IP rights and competition rules: there is
no legislation expressly governing this, nor any case law. However, Norwegian law mirrors EU
competition rules. Law applicable to co-ownership rights: criteria similar to those set out in EU
Council Regulation No 593/2008 (“Rome I”) apply under Norwegian international private law.
Future harmonisation: the Norwegian group believes it should be recognised that since IP rights
are diverse, the solutions best applied to co-ownership in each of them, may not necessarily be the
same. Harmonisation of applicable law rules should be a priority, to avoid situations with multiple
co-ownerships in parallel rights, governed by different national laws.
Résumé
En Norvège, faite exception pour la loi sur les droits d’auteur, les règles applicables aux droits de
propriété intellectuelle détenus en copropriété ne sont pas affectées par l’origine de la coproprieté
même. Sous-traitance: le groupe norvégien considère que les coproprietaires ayant le droit de
fabriquer et de vendre les produits couverts par le brevet, auront probablement aussi le droit de soustraiter
la fabrication. Concession de licence: l’unanimité est requise pour la concession d’une licence
exclusive. Dans le cas de la concession des licences non-exclusives, la situation n’est pas si claire.
Le groupe norvégien tend à considérer qu’une majorité simple des indivisaires devrait suffire pour
accorder une licence non-exclusive. Un droit pour chaque coproprietaire de céder sa quote-part de
copropriété d’un droit de PI est balancé par les droits de préemption des autres indivisaires. Le droit
de préemption paraît aussi prévenir les tentatives de tourner les limitations aux droits de concéder
des licences par la cession d’une partie d’une quote-part de copropriété. La copropriété d’un droit
de PI et les règles de concurrence: il n’y a aucun droit positif norvégien, ni aucune jurisprudence.
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Cependent la loi norvégienne reflét les règles communautaires de concurrence. Loi applicable: le
droit international privé norvégien applique des critères analogues a ceux du Règlement du Conseil
No 593/2008 (“Rome I”). Future harmonisation: le groupe norvégien considère que, lors que les
droits de PI sont de nature differente, le meilleures solutions à appliquer à leur copropriété, ne
seront pas forcément les mêmes. L’harmonisation des règles sur la loi applicable devrait être une
priorité, pour éviter des situations de copropriétes multiples de droits parallèles soumis aux lois de
differentes juridictions.
Zusammenfassung
Bestimmungen, die zwischen „originärer“ Miteigentümerschaft („Miturheberschaft“) und
Miteigentümerschaft, die auf freiwilligen Rechtsstiftungen oder Erbe beruht, unterscheiden. Mit zwei
Ausnahmen in dem Urheberrechtsgesetz, gibt es keine Bestimmungen, die zwischen „originärer“
Miteigentümerschaft und Miteigentümerschaft, die auf freiwilligen Rechtsstiftungen oder Erbe
beruht, unterscheiden. Subunternehmensverträge: Die norwegische Gruppe ist der Meinung,
dass Miteigentümer, die zur Produktion und zum Verkauf berechtigt sind, auch die Produktion an
Subunternehmer übertragen können. Erteilung von Lizenzen: Die Erteilung von ausschliesslichen
Lizenzen setzt die Zustimmung aller Miteigentümer voraus. Die Rechtslage für die Erteilung von
einfachen Lizenzen ist weniger eindeutig. Die norwegische Gruppe ist der Auffassung, dass eine
einfache Mehrheit der Eigentümer ausreichend ist, um eine einfache Lizenzen erteilen zu können.
Das Recht eines jeden Miteigentümers, seinen Teil zu übertragen oder abzutreten, ist durch das
Vorkaufsrecht der anderen Miteigentümer ausgeglichen. Ein solches Vorkaufsrecht verhindert
scheinbar auch Versuche, Begrenzungen im Hinblick auf das Recht zur Erteilung von Lizenzen durch
teilweise Übertragung von Anteilsrechten an der Lizenz zu umgehen. Das Verhältnis zwischen
der Miteigentümerschaft an Rechten des geistigen Eigentums und den Wettbewerbsregeln: Es
gibt keine gesetzlichen Bestimmungen hierzu und auch keine Rechtsprechung, die hierzu Stellung
nimmt. Jedoch stimmt das norwegische Wettbewerbsrecht mit dem EU-Wettbewerbsrecht überein.
Rechtswahl und Kollisionsregeln bei Miteigentumsrechten: Die Kriterien des norwegischen
internationalen Privatrechts ähneln denen der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 593/2008 vom 17. Juni 2008
(Rom I). Zukünftige Harmonisierungsbestrebungen: Die norwegische Gruppe ist der Meinung, dass,
da Immaterialgüterrechte verschiedenartig sind, auch die verschiedenen Lösungen im Hinblick auf
Miteigentümerschaft nicht notwendigerweise ähnlich ausgestaltet sein müssen. Die Harmonisierung
der anzuwendenden Rechtsbestimmungen sollte Priorität haben, um dadurch Situationen mit
mehrfachen Miteigentumsrechten in parallelen, und durch verschiedene nationale Rechtsordnungen
regulierte, Rechten zu vermeiden.
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Panama
Panama
Panama
Report Q194
in the name of the Panamanian Group
by Julie Martinelli and Nohemi de Mendez
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
The Panamanian law does not make any difference in the applicable rules to the co-ownership
of an IP Right in case of the origin of the co-ownership right is not voluntary by results from
other situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
The only two regulations included in the Panamanian Law, that may have a relationship in
connection with the co-ownership of an IP Right are the following:
a) Article 38 of Law No. 35 of May 10, 1996:
“When several inverts have made the same invention, independently one from the others,
the right to the patent will belong to the one who owns the application with the oldest filing
of claimed priority date.”
b) Article No. 6 of Executive Decree No. 7 of February 17, 1998:
“The right to the patent or the registration will belong to the inventor. When an invention or
design is carried out or created by two or more persons jointly, the right to obtain the patent
or registration will belong to all in common.”
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2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
The Panamanian Law reserves the right to exploit a patent to its owner of its licensee/s.
As a consequence of the above, in the event of co-ownership of an IP Right, the said coowners
will have the right to exploit the invention, unless they have executed an agreement
limiting or dividing the invention between them.
If a co-owner of an IP Right needs to subcontract a third party for the manufacture of all or
part of the invention being the subject matter of a patent, and no limitation has been imposed
to the exploitation right of the whole invention, it will have the right to subcontract whoever he
needs to manufacture the invention in order to allow him to commercialize the final product.
On the other hand, if the co-owners of an IP Rights imposed limitations to the rights obtained
by them by means of a private or public agreement, the co-owner must have the authorization
of the other/s co-owner/s to be in the position to subcontract a third party for the manufacture
of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The Panamanian Law does not regulate nor make any difference between non-exclusive
or exclusive license, since the agreement or contract executed between the parties will be
bind between them, and will not have any effect on the IP Right granted by the Panamanian
authorities.
On the other hand, there is no regulation on the number of license that may be granted,
since it would be determined on the agreement reached between the parties. However,
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once it has been granted an exclusive agreement for a specific territory, it is not possible to
grant a second license for the same territory without breaching the agreement, and with its
corresponding consequences of responsibilities or judicial decisions regarding the damages
that may be caused.
It is clear that the granting of a license of an IP Right owned by two or more co-owners, will
be subject to the capabilities or limitations granted or imposed to each of the co-owners of the
IP Rights. If limitations have been imposed, the co-owner may also grant a license (exclusive
or non-exclusive) of said part or potion of the invention. If no limitation has been imposed, the
co-owner will have the right to license the IP Right, considering and taking into account all of
the previous licenses that may be granted by the other co-owners of the IP Right.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
In any of the proposed situations, the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or
the transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right, the assignor must comply
with any kind or limitation or condition imposed by the rest of the co-owners of the IP Right,
such as previous authorization or notification.
Once it has comply with the conditions imposed by the rest of the co-owners, if the assignor
is transferring or assigning the whole part of the co-owned IP Right, this transferring will be
made with all the limitations, conditions or benefits previously imposed or granted to the
assignor. Accordingly, the new co-owner will have the same obligations and rights as the
original co-owner (assignor) of the co-owned IP Right.
We are of the opinion that the same applies to the assignment/transfer of a part of the share
of a co-owner IP Right, since as co-owner it has the faculty to dispose of his property and no
valid limitation may be imposed to his right of disposing of his property without violating his
personal rights in our law.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
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The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
It is clear that a protected IP Right such as a invention protected as a patent grants its owner
or co-owners a monopoly in the domestic market of the country or protection for the term of
validity to the granted registration.
The Panamanian Law protects the market and the commercial relationship between the
parties, avoiding the constitution of monopoly or unfair practices that derive in the direct
benefit of one individual person or limited group of persons from the rest.
Notwithstanding the above, the protected patent constitute an exception of the rule for the
term of validity of the registration in our country, and therefore it provides the owner or
co-owners with the right to dispose or decide whether to exploit or not the IP Right in our
country.
It is important to take into account that the Panamanian Law does not require the use, work
or exploitation of the protected IP Right in our country to maintain its validity, therefore the
owner/co-owners has the right to decide on this issue.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
According to our law, an IP Right protected in our country will be govern within the territory
of the Republic of Panama by the Panamanian Law.
On the other hand, the co-owners of an IP Right may agreed by means of an executed
agreement that the IP Right will be govern by the law of an specific country, in which case
said applicable law is valid in Panama.
In case of a controversy between the parties, and in the absence of an executed agreement
between the co-owners in this respect, the factors that may be taken into consideration in
order to determine the applicable law based on the provisions of the Panamanian Law are
the following:
– Country of origin/residence of the infringing co-owner;
– Country on which the violation occurred.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
At this point we cannot think of any other issued which appear to be relevant to the questing
and which have not been discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the previous
ones for the 2007 EXCO in Singapore.
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Summary
The impact of co-ownership of intellectual property rights on their exploitation is very simple in
Panama.
The Panamanian Law does not regulate the co-ownership of an IP Right, it just establishes that an
IP Right may be owned by more than one person.
Basically the co-ownership of an IP Right will be governs by the agreement of the parties, which will
have the faculty to determine obligations and rights of the co-owners.
The granting of a license, as well as the transfer/assignment of the part or share of a part of a coowned
IP Right will be also based on the agreement of the parties.
The applicable law will depend on the protection of the co-owned IP Right in our country. If no
protection derived from a registration has been granted, the applicable law will depend on the
origin/domicile of the infringing co-owner or the country on which the violation of the agreement
have occurred.
Résumé
L’impact de la copropriété des Droits de la Propriété Intellectuelle sur leur exploitation est vraiment
simple en Panama.
La Loi Panaméenne ne règle pas la copropriété d’un droit de Propriété Intellectuelle. Elle simplement
indique que le Droit de Propriété Intellectuelle peut appartenir à plus d’une personne.
La copropriété d’un Droit de Propriété Intellectuelle est réglée par l’accord entre les parties, qui
auront la faculté d’établir les obligations et les droits des copropriétaires.
L’octroi d’une licence, et le transfert/la cession d’une partie ou portion d’une partie de la copropriété
d’un droit de Propriété Intellectuelle seront aussi réglés par l’accord des parties.
La loi applicable va dépendre de la protection de ces droit de Propriété Intellectuelle dans notre
pays. S’il n’existe pas de protection à partir d’un registre, la loi applicable dépendra de l’origine/
le domicile du copropriétaire transgresseur ou le pays où l’accord a été violé.
Zusammenfassung
Die Wirkung von mit Besitz intellektueller Eigentumsrechte auf ihrer Ausbeutung, ist in Panama sehr
einfach.
Das panamaische Gesetz reguliert nicht der Mitinhaber eines IP (intellektueller Eigentums) Rechtes, es
schafft gerade, dass ein IP (intellektueller Eigentums) Recht vielleicht ehr als einer Person gehört.
Im Grunde wird das Miteigentum eines IP (intellektuellen Eigentums) rechtes des Besitzes von
Einverständnis den Teilen regiert werden, die Fähigkeit haben werden, um Verpflichtung und Rechte
von dem Mitinhaber zu bestimmen.
Das Zugeständnis einer Lizenz sowie die Übertragung / Aufgabe des Teiles oder dem Anteil ein
Stück von einem gemeinsamen IP (intellektuellen Eigentums) Recht, wird auch auf der Zustimmung
der Parteien gegründet werden.
Das anwendbare Gesetz wird davon vom Schutz den Mit-besassen IP (intellektuellen Eigentums)
Rechtes abhänge, in unserem Land. Wenn kein Schutz von einer Registrierung herleitet, ist gewährt
worden, das anwendbare Gesetz wird vom Ursprung / Domizil vom Rechtsbrecher Mitinhaber,
oder das Land, auf dem die Verletzung der Zustimmung vorgekommen ist.
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Paraguay
Paraguay
Paraguay
Report Q194
in the name of the Paraguayan Group
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Paraguay has no special legislation ruling intellectual co-ownership rights. None of the
legislations in force – Patent, Trademark, Industrial Model and Copyright – include specific
provisions related thereto, but do foresee isolated articles containing general and superficial
provisions with confusing context.
Private agreements between co-owners are subject to a few ambiguous provisions set forth by
internal legislations, which actually allow almost a free contractual activity.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
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No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
The Paraguayan legislation does not specify which of the co-owners is entitled to the
exploitation of the protected right and, particularly, how and under what conditions and
penalties.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The Paraguayan legislation does not regulate licensing of co-owned intellectual rights.
Therefore, the nature of the license is irrelevant.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
The Paraguayan legislation does not regulate the assignment of a share of co-ownership of
an IP Right.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
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The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
The Paraguayan legislation does not regulate the assignment of a share of co-ownership of
an IP Right.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
Paraguay’s private international law establishes that all matters related to industrial property
rights in the country shall be resolved according to the local legislation and be submitted
to the jurisdiction of competent Paraguayan courts. As for intellectual property rights, the
competent legislation shall be the work’s first registration date.
The Paraguayan legislation does not make a difference between IPR co-ownership in several
countries or in a single country, due to which whatever the case may be, the applicable law
shall be the Paraguayan, provided that said rights are being claimed in the country.
The Paraguayan legislation does not foresee conflicts between co-owners, due to which
„doctrine of renvoi“ would be applied to this particular case: the conflict regulation
would be the foreign material legislation of the co-owners’ country, provided that it resolves
over the applicable law and forum for handling the case.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
Ambiguity and loophole, main characteristics of the Paraguayan legislation in this regard,
constitute a concern in view of the obvious precariousness of the suppletory provisions of
the Civil Code, which legal solutions based on the materiality of the object in question
–incompatible assumption with the non-materiality of the intellectual creation– constitute more
than a palliative, a real risk for the achievement of inadequate juridical remedies.
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Peru
Pérou
Peru
Report Q194
in the name of the Peruvian Group
by José Barreda
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Peruvian Legislation on Intellectual Property Rights has no regulation over anything referred
to the co-ownership of the Intellectual Property rights. Even though our legislation accepts
it, given that it admits the co-ownership of a trademark, and it specifically indicates that
if many people have developed an invention together, or a utility model or have created
an intellectual work, the rights will correspond to each one of them as co-owners, said coownership
is not regulated.
Given that our legislation on Intellectual Property says nothing on co-property, we must turn
to our Civil Code, which, according to its IX article in the Preliminary Title, will be applied
when there’s no specific legislation.
Our legislation considers IP rights as mobile goods.
Our Civil code only regulates a few aspects of co-ownership. However, it makes no
differentiation between the origins of the co-ownership. Our legislation makes no difference
between the co-ownership that appears when an intellectual right is jointly created by
two or more persons or when the co-ownership results from the division of the same right
among different persons as the consequence, for example, of inheritance or a division of a
company
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2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
As above mentioned, Peruvian legislation in IP rights does not regulate anything referred to
the co-ownership of said rights. In this particular case, the silence can not be filled by using
our Civil Code given that the exploitation of said rights is an extremely punctual topic which
is not regulated in our civil law.
In absence of specific legislation one must assume that the co-owners of the IP rights will have
the same faculties that the unique owners of said rights. In this sense nothing stops them from
outsourcing or subcontracting the exploitation of an IP right.
We reach the same conclusion if we analyze the case from a different point of view. One of
our legislation principles is that “no one is forbidden to do what the law does not prohibit nor
obliged to do what it does not request”. According to this principle and given that no specific
legislation exists on this matter, we shall conclude that the co-owners have all the regular coownership
rights and may exploit said rights however they find it convenient, subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right, if they wish to do so.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
After analyzing our Civil Code, and analogically applying it to the given case, we may
conclude that, in order to give a license, exclusive or not, the unanimous consent of all coowners
is required. No co-owner may, under any circumstances, grant a license over an
IP right without the previous consent of the other co-owners. By doing so, they would be
contracting in bad faith and against a legal disposition.
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The Civil Code makes no distinction between exclusive and non exclusive license. This means
that both licenses will have the exact same regulation. One cannot distinguish where the law
does not.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
The topic on discussion is not regulated by our IP rights legislation; therefore, we must turn
once more to our Civil Code. Said Code tells us that each co-owner may freely dispose of
their share, which means that they are allowed to totally or partially transfer said share.
However, the law establishes that, before selling, one co-owner is obliged to offer his or her
share to the other co-owners. If he or she fails to do so, the other co-owners may use their
right of first refusal and acquire his or her co-owner share anyway.
Being that the case, in no time does the risk of one co-owner selling his or her share to a third
party exists because the co-owners will always be preferred. Nor will it be possible for a
co-owner to sell a part of his or her share to a third party to overcome the limitation that exist
when granting licences given that the other co-owners will have priority on the acquisition of
said part of a share.
Any co-owner will only be allowed to sell his or her share, or a part of it, to a third party if
the other co-owners refuse to acquire said share or part of share. To avoid any abuses, the
law protects the co-owners.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
According to Peruvian legislation, the co-ownership of an IP right does not raise any difficulties
from the point of view of competition rules. All co-owners, as co-owners of an IP right, will
have the same right to exploit it and, inside the frame allowed by our legislation, the exercise
of said right will never be understood as an act of disloyal competition or abuse of dominant
position.
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Our legislation clearly establishes that correct use of an IP right will never be understood as
an act to eliminate competitors, or as a way to obtain a dominant position or to monopolize
the market. There is no relation between the use of an IP right, as a unique owner or as a
co-owner, and the dominant position or the monopolies.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
Peruvian legislation on IP rights is only applicable inside the Peruvian territory. The Decision,
regulation applicable in the Andean Community, serves as a floor or a legal structure over
which our legislation may be designed. Said Decisions rules over all the countries in the
Andean Community but the Peruvian legislation is only applicable for the events that occur
inside our territory. In no case will our legislation apply to international problems or events
related with the IP rights.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
The main issue is that the Peruvian legislation on IP rights has no regulation over the coownership
of the IP rights; it simply recognizes and accepts their existence. This obliges us to
turn into our civil legislation which, even though it’s helpful, it is not always accurate because
it was not intended for this matter.
The Intellectual Property requires a special legislation given that, although IP rights are
considered as mobile goods, they require a more detailed regulation given the variety of
situations that may occur, as the ones analyzed along the present work. Said independent
legislation already exists, but it has some legal voids, such as the present topic and, in order
to fill said void, one must turn into our civil legislation which, though sometimes helpful, it ends
being a really poor regulation.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
Our country has no specific legislation in this matter, therefore, there’s really nothing to
harmonize. However, it would be really convenient to stop using the interpretations of the
Civil Code to fill the legal void and to create a special legislation that is in harmony with the
national and international legislation from the beginning.
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Philippines
Philippines
Philippinen
Report Q194
in the name of the Philippine Group
by Aleli Angela G. Quirino
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of ownership of IP rights
Joint co-ownership of a property, whether tangible or intangible as to include intellectual
property (“IP”), is generally governed by the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(“Civil Code”). Co-ownership is defined by the Civil Code as a situation whereby the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. In default of contracts,
or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
[Article 484, Civil Code]. Specific rules on joint ownership of IP rights are provided in the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (“IP Code”), save for trademarks, service marks
and trade names for which it is submitted that the Civil Code rules apply.
Under the Civil Code, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the other coowner(s),
make an alteration in the thing owned in common even though the benefits for all
would result therefrom [Article 491, Civil Code]. Alteration includes changing the use of the
thing such as when the thing is sold, donated, or mortgaged, without the consent of the other
co-owners [Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap, GR. No. L-17681082, 26 February 1965]. Such
sale, donation, or mortgage will not be valid, except with respect to the share of the co-owner
who sold, donated, or mortgaged the same.
However, since an IP right is an indivisible right, and the tangible object itself cannot be
divided without injury to the object, the remedy for a co-owner who wants to dispose of his
share is to demand that the shares be partitioned by allotting the while right to one of them
who shall indemnify the others or that the right be sold and its proceeds be accordingly
distributed [Article 498, Civil Code]. This is because no co-owner shall be obliged to remain
in the co-ownership.
Hence, the co-owner may divest himself of his part of the IP right by being “bought out” or by
way of sale of the whole right to a third party. In the latter case, the co-owners shall divide
the fruits of the sale among them. In case the co-owners do not give their consent in either
case, the co-owner who wants to dispose of his share has an actionable right that can be
enforced through the courts.
Patents
The IP Code provides that the right to a patent belongs to the inventor, his heirs, or assigns.
When two (2) or more persons have jointly made an invention, the right to a patent shall
belong to them jointly [Section 28, IP Code]. Furthermore, if two (2) or more persons jointly
own a patent and the invention covered thereby, either by the issuance of the patent in their
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joint favor or by reason of the assignment of an undivided share in the patent and invention or
by reason of the succession in title to such share, each of the joint owners shall be entitled to
personally make, use, sell or import the invention for his own profit [Section 107, IP Code].
In case the employee made the invention in the course of his employment contract, the patent
shall belong to: (a) the employee, if the inventive activity is not a part of his regular duties even
if the employee uses the time, facilities and materials of the employer; or (b) the employer, if
the invention is the result of the performance of his regularly-assigned duties, unless there is
an agreement, express or implied, to the contrary [Subsection 30.2, IP Code].
Trademarks, Service Marks and Trade Names
Joint ownership of trademarks, service marks and trade names is not specifically provided for
in the IP Code. The rules of the Civil Code on co-ownership thus apply. However, the owner
of a registered mark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the
owner’s consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar to those in respect of
which the trademark is registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion
[Section 147, IP Code].
Copyright
Copyright ownership is quite extensively discussed in the IP Code.
In the case of works of joint authorship, the co-authors shall be the original owners of the
copyright and in the absence of agreement, their rights shall be governed by the rules on coownership
provided in the Civil Code. If, however, a work of joint authorship consists of parts
that can be used separately and the author of each part can be identified, the author of each
part shall be the original owner of the copyright in the part that he has created [Subsection
178.2, IP Code].
In the case of work created by an author during and in the course of his employment, the
copyright shall belong to: (a) the employee, if the creation of the object of copyright is not
a part of his regular duties even if the employee uses the time, facilities and materials of the
employer; or (b) the employer, if the work is the result of the performance of his regularlyassigned
duties, unless there is an agreement, express or implied, to the contrary [Subsection
178.3, IP Code].
In the case of a work commissioned by a person other than an employer of the author and
who pays for it and the work is made in pursuance of the commission, the person who so
commissioned the work shall have ownership of the work, but the copyright thereto shall
remain with the creator, unless there is a written stipulation to the contrary [Subsection 178.4,
IP Code].
In the case of audiovisual work, the copyright shall belong to the producer, the author of the
scenario, the composer of the music, the film director, and the author of the work so adapted.
However, subject to contrary or other stipulations among the creators, the producer shall
exercise the copyright to an extent required for the exhibition of the work in any manner, except
for the right to collect performing license fees for the performance of musical compositions,
with or without words, which are incorporated into the work [Subsection 178.5, IP Code].
In respect of letters, the copyright shall belong to the writer subject to the provisions of Article
723 of the Civil Code [Subsection 178.6, IP Code]. Article 723 of the Civil Code provides:
“Letters and other private communications in writing are owned by the person to whom
they are addressed and delivered, but they cannot be published or disseminated without
the consent of the writer or his heirs. However, the court may authorize their publication or
dissemination if the public good or the interest of justice so requires.”
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2) Outsourcing or subcontracting the exploitation of an IP Right
There is no express provision of law under the IP Code or the Civil Code which directly
governs the outsourcing or subcontracting of the exploitation of an IP right or a part thereof
by a co-owner.
However, it is submitted that the Civil Code provisions regarding the use by a co-owner of the
thing owned in common may apply with regard to the outsourcing or subcontracting of the
exploitation of an IP right. In particular, the Civil Code provides that each co-owner may use
the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which
it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent
the other co-owners from using it according to their rights [Articles 486, Civil Code]. The Civil
Code further provides that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign, or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved
[Article 493, Civil Code].
3) Licensing of an IP Right to third parties
Patents
Patent owners shall have the right to conclude licensing contracts for the patent with third
parties [Subsection 71.2, IP Code]. With respect to voluntary licensing, in the absence of any
provision to the contrary in the technology transfer arrangement, the grant of a license shall
not prevent the licensor from granting further licenses to a third person nor from exploiting the
subject matter of the technology transfer arrangement himself [Section 89, IP Code].
In case of co-ownership, on the other hand, neither of the joint owners shall be entitled to
grant licenses without the consent of the other owner or owners, or without proportionally
dividing the proceeds with such other owner or owners [Section 107, IP Code]. This restriction
is without distinction between a non-exclusive and an exclusive license, and on the number of
licenses which a co-owner may grant to other third parties.
Trademarks, Service Marks and Trade Names
The IP Code provides for the possibility of a license contract to be concluded concerning the
registration of a mark or an application therefor [Section 150, IP Code]. However, there is
no specific rule on the licensing of a registered mark in case of joint ownership. Thus, it is
submitted that the rules of the Civil Code on co-ownership apply.
Copyright
If two (2) or more persons jointly own a copyright or any part thereof, neither of the owners
shall be entitled to grant licenses without the prior written consent of the other owner or
owners [Subsection 180.3, IP Code].
4) Transfer or assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right
Patents
One of the rights conferred by a patent to its owner or joint owners is the right to assign, or
transfer by succession the patent, and to conclude licensing contracts for the same [Subsection
71.2, IP Code]. Nonetheless, neither of the joint owners shall be entitled to assign his right,
title or interest or part thereof without the consent of the other owner or owners, or without
proportionally dividing the proceeds with such other owner or owners [Section 107, IP
Code].
Trademarks, Service Marks and Trade Names
There is no rule in the IP Code regarding the transfer or assignment of a share of a co-
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owned IP right, although said law provides for assignment and transfer of application and
registration in general.
An application for registration of a mark, or its registration, may be assigned or transferred
with or without the transfer of the business using the mark [Subsection 149.1, IP Code].
The assignment of the application for registration of a mark, or of its registration, shall be in
writing and requires the signatures of the contracting parties. Transfers by mergers or other
forms of succession may be made by any document supporting such transfer [Subsection
149.3, IP Code].
Copyright
The copyright may be assigned in whole or in part. Within the scope of the assignment, the
assignee is entitled to all the rights and remedies which the assignor had with respect to the
copyright [Subsection 180.1, IP Code].
The submission of a literary, photographic or artistic work to a newspaper, magazine or
periodical for publication shall constitute only a license to make a single publication unless a
greater right is expressly granted. If two (2) or more persons jointly own a copyright or any
part thereof, neither of the owners shall be entitled to grant licenses without the prior written
consent of the other owner or owners [Subsection 180.3, IP Code].
5) The exercise of a co-owned IP Right
Joint ownership of IP rights, with the exception of trademarks, service marks and trade
names, are specifically provided for in the IP Code. The Civil Code applies in a suppletory
character.
The IP Code, in the case of patents, provides that each of the joint owners shall be entitled to
personally make use, sell, or import the invention for his own profit; only that the granting of
licenses or the assignment of rights, title or interest or part thereof must be with the consent of
the other owner or owners [Section 107, IP Code].
As to copyright, the granting of licenses by an owner without the prior written consent of the
other owner or owners is prohibited [Subsection 180.3, IP Code].
6) The applicable law that could be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting
in different countries
Absent any agreement between the co-owners of intellectual property rights that would
govern the co-ownership of their rights coexisting in different countries, there is no law
applicable thereto. However, with respect to IP rights subsisting within Philippine jurisdiction,
the relevant provisions of the IP Code and the Civil Code provide specific provisions on the
joint ownership of patents and copyrights. Moreover, relevant provisions of international
treaties on IP rights protection to which the Philippines is a signatory may have suppletory
application or persuasive effect (so long as they are not contrary to existing national laws) in
terms of regulating co-ownership of various IP rights coexisting in different jurisdictions.
Summary
The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (“IP Code”) applies in the regulation of coownership
of intellectual property rights, particularly patents and copyrights. The Civil Code of the
Philippines (“Civil Code”) may be referred to in regulating the co-ownership of trademarks, service
marks and trade names, since there is no express provision in the IP Code which governs the coownership
of the same.
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Generally, under the IP Code, joint owners of patents and copyrights may personally use or exploit
the same, but may not license, transfer, or assign the said IP rights without the consent of the
other owner or owners, or without proportionally dividing the proceeds with such other owner or
owners.
The issue of outsourcing or subcontracting the exploitation of an IP right by the co-owners thereof is
not directly addressed by the IP Code. Thus, in dealing with the said issue and other similar issues
on co-ownership of IP rights, resort may be had to the provision on co-ownership under the Civil
Code.
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Portugal
Portugal
Portuga
Report Q194
in the name of the Portuguese Group
by Ana de Sampaio, Pedro Alves Moreira, Paulo Barreto, Inês Simões and
Teresa Colaço Dias
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
The Portuguese law applicable to industrial property rights (the Industrial Property Code –
approved by Decree-Law no. 36/2003 of March 5, revised by Decree-Law no. 143/2008
of July 25) does not foresee any provisions ruling co-ownership neither specifically in what
concerns each of the industrial property right, nor in regard to those rights in general.
The Portuguese law applicable to author’s rights (Code of Author’s Rights and Related
Rights, approved by Decree-law 63/85 of March 14) includes some rules that regulate coownership
with regard to works done in collaboration, but essentially it reverts to the rules of
co-ownership in general.
The provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code (articles 1403 and following) which rule the
co-ownership of rights in general are, therefore, the ones applicable to the situations of coownership
of intellectual property rights.
In accordance with the Portuguese law applicable also to intellectual property rights, there
is no distinction in the applicable rules, as regards the origin of the co-ownership of the IP
right. The rules applicable are the same if the co-ownership of the IP right is voluntary, or it
has resulted from a division of a right (in case of a heritage). However, in the specific case of
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the division of a right resulting from heritage the right is firstly treated as an undivided legacy
before being subsequently divided between its successors in the regimen of co-ownership.
Furthermore, the Portuguese law does not give a legal definition neither of co-ownership nor
of co-ownership of the IP right.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
The Portuguese law determines that all co-owners exercise jointly all the rights that belong
to a singular owner, and that one by one they all participate in the benefits and charges of
the right, in proportion to their shares. The personal exploitation of a right by one of the coowners
is not dependent on the consent given by the remaining co-owners. Each co-owner
may freely use and fully exploit its right within the reserve conferred by the law.
As regards the specific point now raised as to whether the right to exploit the patent should
also cover the right to subcontract, specifically for the manufacturing of all or part of the
invention being the subject matter of the patent, we believe that according to Portuguese law
the right to exploit the patent also covers the right to subcontract, since this is considered as
normal exercise of the right.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The licence to exploit an industrial property right binds the right in its whole, and it is not
possible to make it correspond to just one share. Consequently the co-owner may not grant a
licence to third parties without obtaining an authorisation from the other co-owners.
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As for author’s rights, the licence to disclose, have published, use or exploit the work will
depend on the consent of all the co-owners in what concerns the work as a whole, although
each one of the co-owners may individually and without the consent of the other co-owners
grant authorisation to third parties with regard to his personal contribution to the work, when
such part can be specified.
The nature of the licence (non exclusive or exclusive) or the number of licences, does not
influence the solution given by the Portuguese law to the granting of licences by the co-owner
of an IP right.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
The Portuguese law determines as a general principle that the co-owner may transfer his
share of an IP right to a third party without the consent from the other co-owners. However,
before the transfer the co-owner must first offer its share to the other co-owners who have a
mandatory pre-emption right. If there are two or more co-owners willing to acquire the share
this is transferred to all of them, according to the proportion of their shares. If a transfer of a
share is made without having been offered to the co-owner, he will be entitled to purchase
said share provided that he files the legal action at the Court within 6 months from the date
on which he became aware of the sale conditions and pays the price within fifteen days from
the filing of the legal action.
The transfer of the co-owned share may be a total transfer or a partial transfer to a third party.
In case of a partial transfer a division of the share occurs but the original co-owner may still
remain a co-owner of part of the share not transferred.
The transfer of the co-owned share may also be to one third party or several third parties, in
equal or different proportions, creating several additional co-owners.
In all the cases of total, partial transfer of the co-owned shares to one or several third parties
the rules described above must always be followed.
According to the Portuguese law the transfer of a part of a share may not be used to overcome
the limitation of granting of licences by the co-owners because, in case of a transfer the
remaining co-owner may exercise his pre-emption right.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
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The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
There are no specific provisions in the Portuguese law for these situations which, in case they
arise, will be treated according to the general rules of competition law. If a dominant position
in the market of a co-owned IP right leads to a monopoly situation, for instance, this will be
treated as any other monopoly situation.
It is up to the co-owners, exercising their contractual freedom but within the terms of the law,
to regulate their co-ownership.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
The general rule of the Portuguese law is that of contractual freedom - article 405 of the
Portuguese Civil Code - and the parties are free to determine by agreement, for instance, the
national law applicable to their co-owned right.
The Portuguese law of conflicts provides that the statute of industrial property is regulated by
the law of the country of creation (article 48, no. 2 of the Portuguese Civil Code), whereas
the creation is understood as protection.
Therefore, the Portuguese law is applicable to the co-ownership of IP rights protected in
Portugal without taking into consideration the nationality or the residence of its owners. In
case of an industrial property right co-owned in different countries, it is not allowed that the
corresponding legal relationships be regulated by a law which is not the law of protection.
The rules of conflicts in the Portuguese law determines that author’s rights are regulated by
the law of the place of the first publication of the work and, if the same is not published, by
the personal law of the author (article 48, no 1 of the Portuguese Civil Code). The personal
law is the law of the nationality of the person. Therefore the Portuguese conflict rules allow
that only one law is applicable to the co-ownership of an author right which is co-owned in
several countries, provided that such law is the law of the first publication or the law of the
nationality of the authors, whether the work was published or not.
Therefore, in case there is no contractual agreement between the co-owners the Portuguese
law may accept that the co-ownership of an IP Right be ruled by the national law of the
country which presents the closest connections with the IP Right, if that closest connection is
that of the protection.
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As regards Council Regulation ROME I ( Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008), in our opinion it may be applicable to coownership
agreements in the field of intellectual property.
However, it should be noted firstly that, although they are not specified, contractual obligations
in intellectual property matters are also not expressly excluded from the scope of application
of the Regulation.
Furthermore, said Regulation, in accordance with its Article 1, is applicable to contractual
obligations in commercial matters, under which it is possible to include intellectual property
matters.
Finally, even if any doubts were to remain, we believe that in the absence of directly applicable
provisions, it would also be possible to sustain the application of Rome I by analogy.
In any case, it should be clarified that said Regulation will apply to matters concerning the
relationship between the co-owners and not, naturally, to the rules which govern the IP right
itself (such as its conditions of validity, maintenance, etc.). In fact, in the case of these rules,
the applicable law, as we have already seen, shall be the law of the country of creation,
considered as the law of protection.
Thus, as far as the obligations between co-owners are concerned, the parties are free to
choose the law applicable, in accordance with Article 3 of Rome I.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
There are no specific recommendations from our group for further harmonisation of the
national laws in the context of co-ownership.
Note:
It will be helpful and appreciated if the Groups follow the order of the questions in their Reports and
use the questions and numbers for each answer.
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Republic of Korea
République de Corée
Republik Korea
Report Q194
in the name of the Korean Group
by Seong–Ki KIM
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
a. The Korean Civil Code provides three types of collective ownership: joint ownership
between un-related parties; co-ownership based on a partnership agreement; and coownership
by a non-registered incorporation. The co-ownership of IP Right is recognized
to be similar to that based on a partnership agreement.
Neither general civil law nor specific industrial property law makes any distinction in the
applicable rules to the co-ownership of patent, industrial design or trademark right in
case the origin of the co-ownership is not voluntary. For copyright, it is understood that
the rules are different in their limitations on the capability of a co-owner. A party of coowned
copyright is understood, though not tested before the Korean court yet, to be free
to exploit the co-owned right when the co-ownership results from heritage.
b. Korea law does not provide any legal definition in addition to the above-mentioned three
categories of collective ownership.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
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More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
Though no specific statutory provision is provided on this issue nor having been tested before
the Korean court, it is generally understood that, as long as selling the product is conducted
by the co-owner of a patent, the right to exploit the co-owned patent also covers the right to
subcontract.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
Under Korean law, the difference in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive of exclusive) does not
influence the right to grant the license by a co-owner of an IP Right.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
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The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
Under Korean law, transfer or assignment, either whole share of a party to the IP Right
co-ownership or a part of a share, is regulated under the same rules of law. Transfer or
assignment of a co-owned IP Right either the whole share of a party or a part of the co-owned
share, requires consent of the remaining co-owners, with one possible exception in case of a
co-owned copyright results from heritage.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
The Monopoly Prevention and Fair Trade Act of Korea provides “unfair refuse to deal” as one
of unfair trade practices. If an agreement by the co-owners of IP Right prohibits a licensing, it
could be found a violation of the anti-trust law.
(This question has many issues to be considered and it would not be easy to answer to the
question without more specific fact pattern.)
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
It is understood that Korean law would accept the co-ownership of an IP Right may be ruled
by the national law of the country with the closest connections with the IP Right. The elements
to take into consideration to assess this connection will be the nationality when all of the coowners
are of one and same state; and in case of different nationality among co-owners, the
law of the place where major inventive actives have occurred.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
N/A
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II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
The Korean Group of AIPPI believes that harmonization of rules on co-ownership of IP
Rights would be desirable, while maintaining the current level of freedom of contract is
maintained.
Summary
In Korea, the exploitation of co-owned IP Right is more restricted compared with co-owned right on
tangible properties, which is understood necessary from the inherent nature of IP Right. In order to
provide more predictability to exploitation of co-owned IP Rights, the Korean Group of AIPPI is in
favor of harmonization on, especially, the scope of co-owner’s right to subcontract to exploit the
co-owned IP Rights.
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Romania
Roumanie
Rumänien
Report Q194
in the name of the Romanian Group
by Doina Tuluca and Alexandru Harsany
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
The Romanian Law does not make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership
of an IP Right and there is no legal definition of co-ownership.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
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Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
The Romanian Rule no. 547 / 21.05.2008 for implementing the Law 64/1991 regarding
inventions provides, art. 84 (1,)(2),(4) In case there is no written agreement of the co-owners
concerning the exploitation of the patent Each of the co-owners may, to his own benefit,
grant a non-exclusive exploitation license to a third party, on condition that an equitable
indemnification should be paid to the other co-owners who do not exploit the invention
personally or who have not granted an exploitation license.
This license could be granted to the subcontractor for manufacturing the product.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
Patents Law:
In Romania, for patents, according to the Rule no. 547/21.05.2008 for implementing the Law
64/1991 regarding inventions at art. 84 (5) “An exclusive exploitation license can be granted
only with the agreement of all co-owners or according to a final and irrevocable decision of
the law court.”
Also at art. 84 (3) of the Rule no. 547 “if there is no written agreement concerning the way
of the exploitation of the IP right each of the co-owners, to his own benefit, may exploits his
right”.
Designs and Models Law:
The same provision is for the designs and models according to the Rule no. 211 of 10.03.2008
for implementing the Law 129/1992 regarding the protection of designs and models to art.
44 (6)” An exclusive exploitation license may be granted only with the agreement of all coowners
or according to a final and irrevocable decision of the law court.”
A non exclusive license for designs and models according to art 44(5) “Each of the co-owners
may, to his own benefit, grant a non-exclusive exploitation license to a third party.”
Trademark law
The Romanian trademark law 84/1998 has no provision regarding the co-owners. But such
provision has to be settling because of the difficult situations met in practice.
Copyright law:
According to art. 5 (3) of the Law 8/1996 on Copyright and neighboring rights the coauthors
cannot exploit the work otherwise than by common agreement, failing a convention
to the contrary. Denial of consent on the part of anyone of the co-authors shall have to be
thoroughly justified. Art. 39(3) provide that the author’s patrimonial rights or those of the
holder of the copyright may be transmitted by exclusive or nonexclusive transfer.
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4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
Patents Law
According to art 45 (1) of the Law 64/1991 the right to the patent, the right to grant the patent
and the rights granted by the patent may be assigned in whole or in part.
The art. 84 (6) of the Rule of implementing the Law 64/1991 regarding Patents provide that
each co-owner may, at any time, to assign his own share of the property covered by the
patent.
Designs and models law
According to art 44(7) of the Rule no. 211 of 10.03.2008 for implementing the Law 129/1992
regarding the protection of designs and models, each co-owner may, at any time, to assign
its own share of the property right covered by the certificate.
Trademark law
The Romanian trademark law 84/1998 has no provision regarding the co-owners. But such
provision has to be settling because of the difficult situations met in practice.
The Romanian group’s position is to let the co-owner free to decide if he wishes to transfer
only a part or the whole of his share of a co-owned IP rights.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
The Romanian laws did not treat such situations.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
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And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
In the absence of any contractual agreement between of the co-owners the Council Regulation
so called “Rome I“ is not applicable. The law applicable is the national law where the IP
Right it was brought to the knowledge of the public for the first time or registered according
to art. 60 and 61 of the Law 105/12.09.1992 on the settlement of the private international
law relations.
The Romanian law for patents and designs and models have special provisions in this case.
Patents Law
Art. 84 (2) of the Rule for implementing the Law 64/1991 regarding inventions stipulates
in default of a written agreement of the co-owners concerning the manner of exploitation
of the invention, each of the co-owners may exploit the invention to his own benefit, with
the obligation to pay equitable indemnification to the other co-owners who do not exploit
the invention personally, or who have not granted exploitation licenses; in default of an
agreement, the indemnification shall be established in the law court according to the civil
law.
Designs and models Law
According to art. 44 (4) of the Rule no. 211 of 10.03.2008 for implementing the Law
129/1992 regarding the protection of designs and models in default of a written agreement
of the co-owners concerning the manner of exploitation of the designs and models, each of
the co-owner may exploit them to his own benefit.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
Since the Romanian trademark law does not provide special regulations regarding the use of
the trademark rights by co-owners, several complex cases have arisen having as an object
of dispute the above mentioned use. Therefore, a harmonization of the trademark law in the
context of co-ownership is needed by amending it in a similar manner with the patent and
industrial design laws as regards to the use of the IP rights by co-owners.
Summary
The Romanian Law does not make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of an
IP Right and there is no legal definition of co-ownership
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Patents Law:
In Romania, for patents, according to the Rule no. 547/21.05.2008 for implementing the Law
64/1991 regarding inventions at art. 84 (5) “An exclusive exploitation license can be granted only
with the agreement of all co-owners or according to a final and irrevocable decision of the law
court.”
Also at art. 84 (3) of the Rule no. 547 “if there is no written agreement concerning the way of the
exploitation of the IP right each of the co-owners, to his own benefit, may exploits his right”.
Designs and Models Law:
The same provision is for the designs and models according to the Rule no. 211 of 10.03.2008
for implementing the Law 129/1992 regarding the protection of designs and models to art. 44
(6)” An exclusive exploitation license may be granted only with the agreement of all co-owners or
according to a final and irrevocable decision of the law court.”
A non exclusive license for designs and models according to art 44(5) “Each of the co-owners may,
to his own benefit, grant a non-exclusive exploitation license to a third party.”
Trademark law:
The Romanian trademark law 84/1998 has no provision regarding the co-owners. But such
provision has to be settling because of the difficult situations met in practice.
Copyright law:
According to art. 5 (3) of the Law 8/1996 on Copyright and neighboring rights the co-authors
cannot exploit the work otherwise than by common agreement, failing a convention to the contrary.
Denial of consent on the part of anyone of the co-authors shall have to be thoroughly justified. Art.
39(3) provide that the author’s patrimonial rights or those of the holder of the copyright may be
transmitted by exclusive or nonexclusive transfer.
Since the Romanian trademark law does not provide special regulations regarding the use of the
trademark rights by co-owners, several complex cases have arisen having as an object of dispute
the above mentioned use. Therefore, a harmonization of the trademark law in the context of coownership
is needed by amending it in a similar manner with the patent and industrial design laws
as regards to the use of the IP rights by co-owners.
Résumé
La loi roumaine ne fait aucune distinction entre les règlements applicables à la co-propriété d’un
droit de PI et il n’y a pas de définition juridique de la co-propriété.
En Roumanie, au sujet des brevets d’invention, conformément au Règlement no. 547/21.05.2008
d’application de la loi 64/1991 sur les inventions à l’art. 84 (5) “Une licence d’exploitation exclusive
peut être octroyée seulement avec l’accord de tous les co-propriétaires ou par une décision définitive
et irrévocable de la cour”.
De même, l’art. 84 (3) du Règlement no. 547 “au cas où il n’y a pas de contrat écrit sur la manière
d’exploitation du droit de PI, chacun des co-propriétaires peut exploiter ce droit à son propre
bénéfice”.
La même disposition s’applique aux dessins et modèles conformément au Règlement no. 211 du
10.03.2008 d’application de la Loi 129/1992 sur la protection des dessins et modèles à l’art. 44
(6) “Une licence d’exploitation exclusive peut être accordée seulement avec l’accord de tous les
co-propriétaires ou par une décision définitive et irrévocable de la cour”.
Une licence non exclusive pour les dessins et modèles conformément à l’art. 44 (5) “chacun des
co-propriétaires peut, à son propre bénéfice, octroyer une licence d’exploitation non exclusive à
un tiers”.
La loi roumaine des marques 84/1998 ne contient pas de disposition concernant les co-propriétaires.
Pourtant, il faut introduire cette disposition à cause des situations difficiles rencontrées dans la
pratique.
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En vertu de l’art. 5 (3) de la Loi 8/1996 sur le Droit d’auteur et les droits sous-jacents, les co-auteurs
ne peuvent pas exploiter leur œuvre qu’à base d’un accord, en cas d’absence d’une convention
contraire. Le refus de tout co-auteur de donner son accord devra être bien justifié. L’art. 39 (3)
prévoit que les droits patrimoniaux de l’auteur ou ceux du titulaire du droit d’auteur peuvent être
transmis par transfert exclusif ou non exclusif.
Puisque la loi roumaine du droit de marque ne prévoit pas de réglementations spéciales concernant
l’utilisation des droits de marque par les co-propriétaires, quelques causes complexes ont survenu
ayant l’utilisation ci-dessus comme objet litigieux. Par conséquent, il est nécessaire de réaliser une
harmonisation du droit de marque au sujet de la co-propriété, en lui apportant des modifications
similaires à celles des lois sur les brevets d’invention et dessins industriels, concernant l’utilisation
des droits de PI par les co-propriétaires.
Zusammenfassung
Rumänisches Recht hält für die Miteigentümerschaft anwendbare Regelungen eines gewerblichen
Schutz- und Urheberrechts nicht gesondert fest und es fehlt eine Rechtsdefinition der
Miteigentümerschaft.
Patentgesetz:
Für Patente kann in Rumänien gemäss Regel No. 547/21.05.2008 zur Anwendung des Gesetzes
64/1991 des Patentwesens, Art. 84 (5) „Ein ausschliessliches Nutzungsrecht nur auf Grund
der Zustimmung aller Miteigentümer oder auf Grund einer endgültigen und unwiderruflichen
Entscheidung des Gerichtes zuerkannt werden”.
Des weiteren, in Art. 4 der Regel No. 547 „Besteht keine schriftliche Vereinbarung betreffend die
Art und Weise der Nutzung des Urheberrechts, so darf jeder der Miteigentümer sein Recht zum
eigenen Vorteil nutzen.
Gesetz betreffend gewerbliche Muster und Modelle:
Dieselbe Bestimmung gilt für gewerbliche Muster und Modelle gemäss Regel No. 211 vom
10.03.2008 zur Anwendung des Gesetzes 129/1992 betreffend gewerbliche Muster und Modelle
gemäss Art. 44 (6) „Ein ausschliessliches Nutzungsrecht kann nur auf Grund der Zustimmung aller
Miteigentümer oder auf Grund einer endgültigen und unwiderruflichen Entscheidung des Gerichts
zuerkannt werden”.
Ein nicht ausschliessliches Nutzungsrecht für gewerbliche Muster und Modelle gemäss Art. 44(5)
“Ein jeder der Miteigentümer kann zu seinem Vorteil einem Dritten ein nicht ausschliessliches
Nutzungsrecht zuerkennen.“
Handelsmarkengesetz:
Das rumänische Handelsmarkengesetz 84/1998 enthält keine Bestimmung betreffend die
Miteigentümer. Wegen der schwierigen in der Praxis anzutreffenden Sachlagen ist die Festlegung
einer solchen Bestimmung aber erforderlich.
Gesetz des Urheberrechts:
Gemäss Art. 5 (3) des Gesetzes No. 8/1996 betreffend das Urheberrecht und verwandte Rechte,
können die Mitautoren das Werk nur auf Grund einer schriftlichen Vereinbarung nutzen, wen
keine gegenteilige Abmachung besteht. Die Verweigerung der Zustimmung seitens eines der Co-
Autoren ist eingehend zu begründen. Art. 39(3) sieht vor, dass die Vermögensrechte des Autors
oder jene des Urheberrechtsinhabers durch ausschliessliche oder nicht ausschliessliche Abtretung
weitergegeben werden können.
Da das Rumänische Handelsmarkengesetz keine speziellen Regelungen betreffend die Nutzung
der Markenrechte seitens der Miteigentümer vorsieht, ist es zu zahlreichen komplizierten Fällen
gekommen, die die oben genannte Nutzung zum Streitobjekt haben. Aus diesem Grund ist eine
Harmonisierung des Handelsmarkengesetzes betreffend die Miteigentümerschaft notwendig,
durch dessen Änderung in Sachen der Nutzung der Gewerblichen Urheberrechte in der Art des
Patentgesetzes und des Gesetzes für gewerbliche Muster.
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Russia
Russie
Russland
Report Q194
in the name of the Russian Group
by Aleksey Zalesov
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
The regulation of co-ownership (as the co-ownership of exclusive right) in Russia does not
depend upon the origin of co-ownership. Formally the Russian Civil Code (part 4 article
1228) declares that the intellectual property rights on the object created by joint activity of coauthors
belong to them on the basis of co-ownership. Then the law says that the intellectual
property rights include exclusive rights and moral rights of authors. The moral rights belong
to author only and can not be transferred. Further explanations sets the rule that every coowner
of the exclusive right (e.g. co-patent owners) has the same title in the co-ownership as
co-owner being co-author.
There is NO legal definition of co-ownership of intellectual property rights in the Russian
law.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
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of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
The Russian law (part 3 article 1229) says that every co-owner of the exclusive right has
the right to exploit the object without the consent of other co-owners if other situation is
not stipulated in the written contract between co-owners. The law does not specify if such
exploitation can be done via subcontracting (e.g. for manufacturing of goods). There is NO
senior courts decisions clarifying such disputable position.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The Russian law is very precise regarding licensing of the IP objects which is in co-ownership.
Any kind of license (exclusive or non- exclusive) can be provided only by the direct consent
of all co-owners. It means that the license contract (which as a general rule must be in written
form and - for patents and trademarks requires government registration) must be signed by
every co-owner and is void without such signature.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
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The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
The Russian law does not provide any ruling if the share of co-owner can be transferred or
assigned to other entities. According to the current practice of courts and the Russian Patent
and Trademark Office (which has the power to register all kind of licenses regarding invention
patents, utility model patents, design patents) is that the share of co-owner can be assigned
only with the consent of other co-owners.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
Currently the Russian Competition law says that it shall not be applicable for the relation
regulated by the intellectual property law. Although it does not specify the situation when in
agreement regulated by IP law (license or assignment of IP right) involves clear anti-competition
provisions. Currently in general it is not of practice to apply the anti-monopoly regulation to
the agreements regulated by the IP law because of broad understanding of exemption set by
the Russian Competition Law towards IP law. We do not have courts decisions overruling that
notion yet but we expect some of such decision in the foreseeable future.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
The Russian law provides that the way of exploitation of the co-owned IP shall be set in the
agreement between the co-owners. If NO agreement exists the income received by joint use
of IP shall be divided equally between the co-owners.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
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II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
It would be helpful to have harmonized definition of joint ownership of exclusive right and main
rights of co-owners (how to assign the share, how to license, how to exploit the object).
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Singapore
Singapour
Singapur
Report Q194
in the name of the Singapore Group
by Morris John
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
1) Any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of an IP Right in case the origin of
the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other situations, including the division
of a right in case of a heritage?
1. The Singapore Patents Act section 46 The Trade Marks Act section 37, The Registered
Designs Act section 33 and The Copyright Act, sections 7, and 75 to 80, all deal with
the issue of co-ownership. Generally, each co-owner shall, subject to any agreement to
the contrary, be entitled to an equal undivided share in the IP Right
2. Thus, an IP Right may start out as being solely owned. The owner may then in his will, for
example, bequeath the Right to his three children. Upon his passing, the three children
would become co-owners of the Right and be registered as such (except that there is no
registration procedure in the case of Copyright)
3. The Act does not provide for any definition of co-ownership and therefore the ordinary
dictionary meaning of the word i.e. owned by two or more persons or entities would
apply.
2) Should the right to exploit the IP Right also cover the right to subcontract, specifically by the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent?
1. Unless there is an agreement to the contrary, each co-owner shall be entitled, by himself
or his agents, to do in respect of the invention, for his own benefit and without the consent
of or the need to account to the other(s), any act which would, apart from this subsection
[s.46(2)] and s.56, amount to an infringement of the patent; and any such act shall not
amount to an infringement of the patent.
2. However s.46(2) only provides a skeletal outline of the rights and obligations of the
co-owners. Rights and freedom of each co-owner are therefore vague and the question
posed highlights its shortcomings. The law is unclear as to what is the answer to the
question posed. It would be safe to say that if the subcontracting is on a very small scale
i.e. for a co-owner’s own use, then there would be no issue. Clearly, subcontracting on
a huge scale e.g. large scale corporate manufacturing on behalf of one co-owner would
be objectionable – see dicta of the English Court of Appeal in Henry Bros v Ministry of
Defence [1999] RPC 442.
3. The co-owners should therefore enter into an agreement spelling out more clearly their
rights and freedom.
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3) This question relates to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right either
exclusively or non-exclusively and without limitation in the latter event to a 3 rd party.
Assuming that there is no agreement dealing with the rights of the parties, s.46(3) applies.
No co-owner may award a licence, exclusive or otherwise, without the consent of the other
co-owner(s).This is not to say that the solution is satisfactory but at least the position is clear.
The parties are at liberty to enter into an agreement to define their rights and freedom to
arrive at a more rewarding solution.
4) Can transfers or assignments of a part of a co-owned share of an IP right be used to overcome
the limitations which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners?
1. s.46(3) of the Act provides that subject to s.20 and 47 and to any agreement for the
time being in force, where 2 or more persons are proprietors of a patent, one of them shall
not without the consent of the other or others grant a licence under the patent or assign or
mortgage a share in the patent.
2. s.20 and 47 concern issues of entitlement to patents before grant and after grant respectively
and are not directly relevant to the question under consideration. Again assuming that there
is no agreement in force, s.46(3) precludes one co-owner from assigning his rights to the
patent without the consent of the other co-owner(s). Assignments therefore cannot be devised
to bypass the requirement of obtaining the consent of the other co-owner(s) to overcome the
limitations which exist on the granting of licences by a co-owner.
5) Co-owned IP-Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP-Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating competitors from the market.
1. Both the Act itself and The Competition Act prohibit abuse of dominant position and
provide for remedies against anti-competitive practices.
2. s.51 of the Act provides for the avoidance of restrictive covenants requiring the person
supplied to acquire from the supplier, or his nominee, or prohibit him from acquiring from
any specified person, or from acquiring from the supplier or his nominee, anything other
than the patent product.
3. s.55 of the Act empowers the Court to grant a licence under a patent on the ground that
the grant of the licence is necessary to remedy an anti-competitive practice.
4. The Court may determine that the grant of a licence is necessary to remedy an anticompetitive
practice if – (a) there is a market for the patented invention in Singapore; (b)
that market is not being supplied or is not being supplied on reasonable terms and (c)
the Court is of the view that the proprietor of the patent has no valid reason for failing to
supply that market with the patented invention, whether directly or through a licensee, on
reasonable terms.
5. s.66 (2) (g) provides that it is not an infringement to parallel import a patented product
or any product obtained by means of a patented process or to which a patented process
has been applied which is produced by or with the consent (conditional or otherwise) of
the proprietor of the patent or any person licensed by him. However, this “infringementsaving”
provision has been diluted in the case of a patented pharmaceutical product. In
the case of a pharmaceutical product the provision shall not apply if (a) the product has
not been previously been sold or distributed in Singapore; (b) the import of the product by
the importer would result in the product being distributed in breach of contract between
the patent proprietor and his licensee and (c) the importer has actual or constructive
knowledge of (b).
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6. The Competition Act s.34 makes it an offence for parties to agree, or make decisions, or
act in concert to prevent, restrict or distort competition unless they are exempted under
the Competition Act.
7. Agreements, decisions or concerted practices having the following characteristics may
be considered objectionable: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or
other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development
or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage or (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of the supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
8. Abuse of a dominant position is prohibited under s.47 of the Competition Act. The
dominant position may be a dominant position in Singapore or elsewhere. Examples of
abuse of dominant position are (a) predatory behaviour towards competitors; (b) limiting
production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage or (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the contract.
9. The Competition Act does not define “dominant position”. Guidelines published by the
Competition Commission provides that an undertaking will not be deemed dominant
unless it has substantial market power and that generally the Commission will consider
a market share above 60 percent as likely to indicate that an undertaking is dominant in
the relevant market.
6) Investigate the question of the applicable law that could be used to govern the co-ownership
of the various rights co-existing in different countries. More specifically indicate if national
laws accept that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement
between the co-owners may be ruled by the national laws of the country which presents the
closest connection with the IP Right.
The law relating to co-ownership has been provided earlier. s.46 applies if there is no
contractual agreement governing the co-ownership. If there is an agreement covering the
parties rights and obligations in another jurisdiction but in which excludes Singapore than
again s.46 will apply. If a party can persuade the Court that the agreement also covers
Singapore, then the Court will rule accordingly.
7) Are there other relevant issues which have not been discussed?
I cannot think of any
Summary
Singapore IP legislations allow for co-ownership of IP rights. However, unless there is an agreement
to the contrary, the relevant legislations permit each co-owner to do in respect of the co-owned
right, for his own benefit and without the consent of or the need to account to the other co-owner,
any act which would otherwise amount to an infringement of the right. Co-owners should therefore
have an agreement touching on the sharing and exploiting of the IP right(s) to avoid potential
disputes.
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Spain
Espagne
Spanien
Report Q194
in the name of the Spanish Group
by Patricia Koch, Manuel Lobato, Elena Molina, Ignacio Ramón, Anna Rivera,
Raquel Sampedro, Iñigo Elosegui, Isidro José García, David Muñoz,
Elia Sugrañes and Miguel Vidal–Quadras
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
There is no difference in the rules governing co-ownership due to the origin of co-ownership.
The rules applicable to any co-ownership situation are, firstly, the will of the parties, and,
subsidiarily, the law.
Obviously, when co-ownership derives from a contract, the issues are usually fully governed
by that contract, whereas if it results from any other circumstances, the applicable rules are
those provided by law, unless an agreement is reached at a later stage.
Article 392 of the Spanish Civil Code is clear:
“There is community of property when the ownership of a thing or right belongs to different
persons undividedly. In the absence of contracts or specific provisions, communities shall be
governed by the provisions of this Title”.
There are specific provisions in the Patent Act (Art. 72 Act 11/1986), the Trademark Act (Art.
46 Act 17/2001; Art. 16 of the Community Trademark Regulations refers to national laws),
the Industrial Design Act (Art. 58 Act 20/2003), and Intellectual Property Act (Arts. 7 and 8
Legislative Royal Decree 1/1996).
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2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
It is not possible, in Spanish Civil Law, to talk about “subcontracting” when it does not result
from a contract (e.g, in an incidental community). The right of a co-owner of an IP right derives
from co-ownership of that right, therefore the exercise of the right of exploitation by a patent
co-owner is not properly subcontracting, but lease of services, work contract, etc.
Thus, the question is if the patent owner (in the absence of agreement) may, by virtue of the
right of exploitation granted by the law (Article 72.2.b SPA), entrust third parties with carrying
out any activities which are deemed to be exploitation or if the co-owner must carry out by
himself/herself all the exploitation activities (preparation, fabrication, etc.).
The written law does not contain any specific provision on this point, but it seems that a
systematic and logic interpretation must allow the patent co-owner to subcontract the
exploitation. The requirement that all the manufacturing activities be carried out directly by
the co-owner seems to be more typical of an autarchic regime.
The co-owner will have to control the tasks delegated to third parties. If the third party does
not accomplish the obligations set forth in the contract, there will be patent infringement
(subject to, as the case may be, “culpa in eligendo” of the co-owner).
Even though the question refers to patents, there is no reason to give a different answer
depending on the IP right at issue (except for the specificities derived from the common
exploitation of the trademark and the need to prevent any of the co-owners from exploiting
the trademark totally independently).
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
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Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The Spanish Law does not contain any differentiation. Licences cannot be granted without
agreement of the co-owners (we are of course excluding compulsory licences); thus, the
applicable regulation is the general one on licences.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
In Spain, it is possible to transfer a part of a share, unless otherwise agreed. However, the
rights of pre-emption and redemption, which limit the admission of new co-owners, must be
taken into account. Consequently, the possibility of transferring a partial share of the whole
share can not be used to avoid the restrictions on the granting of licences.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
In the first place, it is necessary to clarify that the fact of being an owner (in this case, coowners)
of an industrial or intellectual property right does not grant a dominant position. A
dominant position exists, following the Spanish and Community case-law, when one owns,
at least and depending on the structure of the market, between 50% and 60% of the market
share. Furthermore, in order for this behaviour to be considered as an unlawful practice
it is required that the party having a dominant position abuses it. Consequently, it will be
necessary to test the effects that the behaviour at issue produces in the market in order to
determine whether there is an infringement or not.
In the specific case of co-ownership of IP rights, a collective dominant position may take place.
In this respect, the Judgment of the Court of First Instance [of the European Communities] (First
Chamber) of 10 March 1992 Società Italiana Vetro SpA, Fabbrica Pisana SpA and PPG
Vernante Pennitalia SpA v Commission of the European Communities (Joined cases T-68/89,
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T-77/89 and T-78/89 [European Court reports 1992 Page II-01403 European Court reports
1992 Page II-01403]), stated in its paragraph 358 that “There is nothing, in principle, to
prevent two or more independent economic entities from being, on a specific market, united
by such economic links that, by virtue of that fact, together they hold a dominant position vis-àvis
the other operators on the same market. This could be the case, for example, where two or
more independent undertakings jointly have, through agreements or licences, a technological
lead affording them the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of their
competitors, their customers and ultimately of their consumers“.
This interpretation was subsequently adopted in the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities of 16 March 2000, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA c.
Commission of the European Communities, (Joined Cases T-24/93 to T-26/93 and T-28/93
[European Court reports 2000 Page I-01365]) that states that a dominant position may be
held by two or more economic entities legally independent of each other, provided that from
an economic point of view they present themselves or act together on a particular market
as a collective entity. Accordingly, it has to be checked whether there exist economic links
between the undertakings concerned which enable them to act together independently from
their competitors, customers and consumers.
The Court of Justice states that the existence of a collective dominant position may therefore
flow from the nature and terms of an agreement, from the way in which it is implemented and,
consequently, from the links or factors which give rise to a connection between undertakings
which result from it.
In our case, it will be necessary to examine the agreement among the co-owners about the way
in which the co-owned IP right is to be exploited. If it can be ascertained from the agreement
that economic links between the co-owners -these being legally independent one from each
other- do exist it will be necessary to test the market structure and if the co-owners may,
collectively, have a dominant position. Eventually, it will be necessary to examine the effect
that the agreement between the co-owners (for example, market-sharing, fixing anormally
high prices, limitation of offer or of production or creation of barriers of entry to the relevant
market through the arbitrary refusal of granting licenses) may have on competition. If that was
the case, the co-owners may be punished for abusing of their collective dominant position or
even forced to grant licences or compulsory licences, mainly in the case of essentials facilities.
Cfr. Judgements of Court of Justice of 14 September 1982, Keurkoop / Nancy Kean Gifts, aff
144-81, Rec.p.2853; 5 October 1988, Case 238/87 Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., [1988]
ECR 6211, [1989] 4 CMLR 122; 6 April 1995, Joined cases C-241 & 242/91 Radio Telefis
Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd. (ITP) v. Commission, [1995] ECR
I-743, [1995] 4 CMLR 718, [1995] All ER (EC) 416; 29 April 2004 IMS Health GmbH & Co.
OHG v NDC, C-418/01, Rec. P. 5039.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
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The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
a) The Spanish law applies the principle of territoriality of IP rights, but not in absolute terms
(it is subject to the international Covenants and Treaties ratified by Spain). That regime
is applicable both to the substantive matters (Article 10.4 Spanish Civil Code, and the
related Article 8 of Regulation CE 864/2007) and procedural ones (Article 3 of Civil
Procedural Act).
This Working Group understands that co-ownership of rights co-existing in several countries
is ruled in Spain by the aforesaid Regulation. That implies as follows:
– If an applicable International Agreement or Covenant exists, this one:
• shall be applied and, extensively,
• shall determine the connection elements with the national regulation;
– If no International Agreement or Covenant exists (general scenario), the principle of
territoriality, as set forth in the Spanish laws shall apply (in this case, no connection
elements with any other national laws are established).
As regards co-ownership, Article 10.1 Civil Code is considered to be applicable. This Article
provides that property shall be governed by the laws of the country where the goods are
found. In this case, this would be the country of registration.
b) The European Union, through Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 (“Rome II”) and
Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 (“Rome I”), has uniformed, in situations which
involve conflict of national laws in civil and commercial matters, the rules to determine the
applicable law, both regarding contractual obligations (“Rome I”) and non-contractual
obligations (“Rome II”).
Accepting that the agreements of ownership can have a contractual origin (contractual
community) or a non-contractual origin (incidental communities without agreements between
the co-owners), this Working Group thinks that “Rome I” shall be applicable to the agreements
of co-ownership with a contractual origin, because the obligations derived from the intellectual
property rights are not excluded (Article 1 of the aforementioned Regulation) from the scope
of application of that Regulation.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
There are not other questions to be emphasized.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
An important question that, for this Group, should be harmonized, because of the doubts it
raises, is the one regarding the first place for the filing of an IP right (in particular, patents),
in the event that several applicants, with residence or domicile in different countries, jointly
file a patent application.
The Spanish Patent Act (Act 11/1986, of 20 March) states in its Article 122 that “in the
case of inventions made in Spain, patents may not be applied for in any foreign country
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until two months have elapsed after the patent has been applied for at the Spanish Registry
of Industrial Property (today, Spanish Office of Patents and Marks), unless the Registry
specifically authorizes otherwise. Such authorization may not under any circumstances be
given for inventions that are of interest for national defence, unless the Ministry of National
Defence gives special authorization”.
On the other hand, the Royal Decree 2424/1986 of October 10, 1986, on the application of
the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (Article 2) and the Royal Decree 1123/1995
of July 3, 1995, implementing the Patent Cooperation Treaty (article 3), state, respectively,
that when the applicants of a European Patent or an PCT application have their domicile or
headquarters in Spain, or their habitual residence or permanent establishment in Spain, and
do not claim the priority of a previous application in Spain, they must compulsorily file the
patent application at the Spanish Patent and Trademark Office.
This means that, if the invention is made by an applicant having his/her residence, domicile
or headquarters in Spain, the patent application that does not claim the priority of a previous
application in Spain, must be filed at the Spanish Patent and Trademark Office.
In the event that the invention had been made jointly by several inventors with establishment
in Spain and abroad, it would be necessary to study the Law of that state and to determine
what Law would be applicable under the International laws. It is very likely indeed that the
national laws of Patents provide rules similar to those foreseen in the Spanish Law, according
to which their residents or domiciled people must file the first patent application in their
respective territories.
For this reason, it will be difficult to find a solution to the problem without infringing any law.
Besides, if a patent application was filed in a different country from that of residence, in
breach of the national rules, this might have criminal consequences if the invention being the
subject matter of the patent application may be of interest for the national defence (Article
277 of the Spanish Criminal Code establishes punishments of prison from six months to two
years, for the person who has disclosed the invention being the subject matter of a secret
patent application, thus infringing the Patent , provided that this causes prejudice to national
defence). So, a harmonization in order to prevent this lack of legal certainty is urgent.
The problem has not been solved by the Agreement on 21 September 1960, for the mutual
safeguarding of secrecy of inventions relating to defence and for which applications for
patents have been made (Agreement supplementing the NATO Agreement, signed at Paris,
on 21 September 1960, for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of inventions relating to
defence and for which applications for patents have been made, ratified by Spain by
Instrument of 17 July 1987), since its Article 1 foresees only the obligation of the Governments
of safeguarding the secrecy of the inventions for which applications for patents have been
received under agreed procedures whenever the secrecy has been imposed on such
inventions in the interests of national defence by the Government, hereinafter referred to
as the “originating Government”, which was the first to receive an application for a patent
covering these inventions.. Nevertheless, this Agreement does not set the rules to determine
the “originating Government”.
This problem has not been solved either by the Convention for Application regarding Article
43 of the Framework Agreement of 27 July 2000 between France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Sweden and United Kingdom concerning patent applications and alike of interest for defence
(Framework Agreement between the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Italian Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and
Operation of the European Defence Industry). This Agreement just defines “Participant of
origin” as that participant in whose Intellectual Property Central Service a patent application
is filed, such application being the first one filed in any state in connection with the subject
matter of the application.
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Résumé
La réglementation de la copropriété est unique, indépendamment que celle-ci ait son origine dans
un acte volontaire ou involontaire, comme dans le cas d’un héritage.
En Espagne il n’existe pas de “sous-contratation” qui ne dérive pas d’un contrat. Il n’est pas
expressément prévu que le copropriétaire puisse charger un tiers la réalisation des activités propres
à l’exploitation de l’invention (sous-traitance), mais on peut interpréter que cela est en effet possible
pourvu que le copropriétaire assume le contrôle des tâches confiées aux tiers. Cette possibilité est
indépendante du fait que les licences soient exclusives ou non exclusives.
En Espagne il est possible de céder une quote-part pourvu que l’on respecte le droit de
préférence (droit de préemption ou de subrogation après la vente), qui limite l’entrée de nouveaux
indivisaires.
Quant à la capacité d’assumer une position dominante sur marché au moyen des accords
d’exploitation de droits de propriété intellectuelle en régime de copropriété, cela pourrait en effet
constituer un obstacle à la libre concurrence. Cependant, les lois applicables empêchent l’abus
de position dominante indépendamment que celle-ci résulte d’une copropriété, d’une licence ou
d’autres circonstances.
La réglementation espagnole qui régit la copropriété de droits est soumise au principe de territorialité
(avec soumission à ce qui est établi par les conventions et traités internationaux auxquels l’Espagne
est partie). La réglementation basique, d’application subsidiaire, est celle du Code Civil. Le
Règlement “Rome I” serait applicable aux contrats qui règlent le régime de copropriété.
La proposition du Groupe Espagnol en vue d’une future harmonisation consisterait à éclaircir les
incertitudes qui pose le dépôt d’une demande de brevet avec plusieurs inventeurs ou demandeurs
dont le domicile ou résidence est à des États différents, par rapport à l’obligation de déposer à
l’État de l’inventeur/demandeur.
Zusammenfassung
Die Regulierung der Mitinhaberschaft ist eine, und wird nicht gemäss ihrer Herkunft durch Willensakt
oder unfreiwillig, wie im Falle einer Erbschaft, unterschieden.
In Spanien erfolgt keine Vergabe von Unteraufträgen, die sich nicht von einem Vertrag ableiten. Es
ist nicht ausdrücklich geregelt, dass der Mitinhaber Dritten die Durchführung eigener Handlungen
hinsichtlich der Nutzung der Erfindung übertragen kann, es kann aber systematisch ausgelegt
werden, dass dies möglich ist, solange der Mitinhaber die Kontrolle über die an Dritte übertragenen
Tätigkeiten ausübt. Die Möglichkeit dieser Beauftragungen ist unabhängig davon, ob die Lizenzen
exklusiv oder nicht exklusiv sind.
In Spanien kann ein Inhaberschaftsanteil immer dann übertragen werden, wenn die Vor- und
Rückkaufsrechte berücksichtigt werden, die die Aufnahme neuer Teilhaber beschränken.
Hinsichtlich der Fähigkeit, eine dominante Position auf dem Markt durch Nutzungsvereinbarungen
von Urheberrechten oder gewerblichen Schutzrechten in Mitinhaberschaft zu erlangen, kann
dies tatsächlich ein Hindernis für den freien Wettbewerb darstellen. Die anwendbaren Gesetze
verhindern jedoch eine Ausnutzung der dominanten Position unabhängig davon, ob diese durch
Mitinhaberschaft, Lizenz oder andere Mittel erlangt wird.
Die spanische Gesetzgebung, die die Mitinhaberschaft von Rechten regelt, unterliegt dem Grundsatz
der Territorialität (wobei sie sich den Vorschriften von internationalen Vereinbarungen und Verträgen
unterwirft, bei denen Spanien Mitgliedsstaat ist). Für Spanien findet sich die Grundregulierung,
die hilfsweise anwendbar ist, im spanischen Zivilgesetzbuch. Die Verordnung „Rom I“ wäre auf
Verträge, die eine Mitinhaberschaft regeln, anwendbar.
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Der Vorschlag der spanischen Gruppe mit Blick auf eine zukünftige Harmonisierung besteht in der
Klärung der Ungewissheiten, die durch die Einreichung einer Patentanmeldung mit verschiedenen
Erfindern oder Antragstellern mit Wohnsitz oder Aufenthalt in verschiedenen Staaten in Bezug auf
die Verpflichtung, den Antrag in dem Staat des Erfinders/ Antragstellers zu stellen, aufgeworfen
wird.
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Sweden
Suède
Schweden
Report Q194
in the name of the Swedish Group
by Elsa ARBRANDT, Lydia LUNDSTEDT, Sara ULFSDOTTER, Jonas WESTERBERG and
Sanna WOLK
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
In Sweden only co-ownership of copyright is explicitly regulated by statute. According to
Sec. 6 of the Act (1960:729) on Copyright each co-author or anyone to whom its rights have
been transferred may enforce the copyright against infringers without the consent of the other
co-owners. This rule does not make any distinction based on the origin of the co-ownership
of the copyright.
As regards other IP rights such as designs, patents and trademarks there are no explicit
provisions in Swedish IP-laws on co-ownership. It is worth noting that the drafting committee
of the Swedish Patents Act (1967:837) refrained from taking a position on co-owned patents,
“since they should be seen in connection with rights under joint ownership in general”.
The Swedish Act on Joint Ownership (1904:48 p. 1) regarding corporeal personal property
may, in the absence of any expressed agreement to the contrary, be used analogously to
solve IP co-ownership related questions.
Alternatively, the general Partnership and Non-registered Partnership Act (1980:1102) may
be applicable on the legal relationship between co-owners. If the parties have entered into an
agreement on mutual work to exploit an IP right for a certain purpose most likely a partnership
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has been formed. According to the act, the rights and obligations under the partnership are
solely governed by an agreement between the parties. However, the act sets out certain
principles applicable where the agreement is silent about certain issues, e.g. liquidation or
the relationship to third parties, administration of the partnership’s business.
The Swedish group is of the opinion that the legal rules applicable to co-ownership should
not distinguish between different cases of origin, aside from the applicable law as discussed
in question 6.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
This question is not dealt with in the Swedish Patent Act and there is no publicly available case
law. The group has however noted an unpublished arbitration case where these questions
were adjudicated in the context of a sole license expressly limiting the licensor’s ability to
create arrangements which were tantamount to a further license. The Tribunal identified i.a.
the following aspects of a distributorship arrangement in deciding on whether it could be said
to involve licensing:
• The term of the distributorship agreement in relation to the term of the IP right and
specifically the possibility for the licensor to terminate;
• The degree of exclusivity for the distributor;
• The distributor’s influence on the specification of the products;
• Any transfer of IP rights or regulatory product registrations/permits to the distributor;
• Volume limitations or rather absence thereof.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
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Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
There are no explicit provisions as to co-owners’ right to grant licences to third parties. The
legal relationship between co-owners is dependent upon contractual regulations.
However, since a license involves a disposal of an IP right, the opinion in Swedish legal
doctrine as regards patent rights, design rights and copyright is that the acquisition of a
license from a single joint proprietor is not sufficient legal ground for use of the right. Thus, a
co-owner is normally not allowed to grant licences without consent of the co-owners. There is
no difference between a non-exclusive and an exclusive licence. The same reason is probably
applicable to trademarks.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
As mentioned there are no explicit provisions and the group does not know of any case
law regarding a co-owners right to transfer its share of the IP right. However, as regards
copyright, it is stated in the preparatory works of the Act on Copyright that copyright may be
transferred without the consent of the other co-owners. For other IP rights the Swedish doctrine
is divided. It may be argued that guidance should be sought in the preparatory work of the
Act on Copyright and in the preparatory work of the Act on Patents in respect of the pledging
of shares in a patent, where it is stated that each co-owner may independently transfer its
abstract share in the IP right without the prior consent of the other joint owners. On the other
hand, it may be argued that the prior consent of the other joint owners is required based on
the principles laid down in Sec. 6 of the Act on Joint Ownership and also in the Partnership
and Non-registered Partnership Act.
However, in the case of trademarks, it is more likely that there exist an understanding between
the parties to use the trademark for some kind of (business) activity which means that the rules
on non-registered partnerships apply. In such case may neither of the partners dispose of any
share of the trademark without the consent of the other partner.
The situation of a transfer of a part of a share of an IP right to a third party is even more uncertain.
However, as such a disposal would create an additional co-owner to the IP share there is
much to suggest, based on the principles of the Act on Joint Ownership and the Partnership
and Non-registered Partnership Act, that consensus is required for such a disposition. Further
on, as regards trademarks, taking into consideration the risk for degeneration and other
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potential damages on the trademark, it is the Swedish group assumption that it is not possible,
even in the case of a joint ownership.
Having said that, it shall be noted that a similar situation might arise in case of inheritance
of a co-owner’s IP share. Patents, trademarks, copyright and design rights are treated as any
other kind of property in terms of inheritance and if there is more than one heir to the coowner’s
estate the division of property between them follows the general laws on inheritance,
which in turn may create several more co-owners to a share in an IP right.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
This issue has not been dealt with by the Swedish legislator or Swedish courts or competition
authorities. In principle though, there is nothing excluding such acts or agreements from the
application of the Swedish competition rules.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
When determining the choice of law rule governing the co-ownership of IP rights co-existing
in different countries, it is important to distinguish between the law applicable to the internal
relationship between the co-owners, and the law applicable to the external relationship
between one or more co-owners and third parties. In Sweden, the law applicable to the coowners
external relationship with third parties is generally determined by the lex rei sitae,
which coincides with lex loci protectionis. In contrast, there is no specific choice of law rule
under Swedish international private law that applies to the internal relationship between
the co-owners, and the issue has not been addressed by the Swedish courts. Thus, it is
believed that the choice of the applicable law will most likely depend upon how the internal
relationship between the co-owners is characterized by the Swedish courts.
Assuming the co-owners have an agreement governing their internal relationship, the Rome I
Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations will be applicable (Rome I applies
to contracts entered into after December 17, 2009). Pursuant to Rome I, the parties are free
to choose the law applicable to their agreement. As national rules governing the relationship
between co-owners are not mandatory but apply only in default of an agreement between the
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co-owners, the co-owners are free to regulate their co-ownership relationship in accordance
with a law other than that of the country of protection. In the absence of a choice, the
applicable law is the law of country where the party effecting the characteristic performance
has its habitual residence. If that can not be determined, the contract is governed by the law
of the country with which it is most closely connected. Also, the characteristic performance
rule can be displaced if it is clear from all the circumstances that the contract is manifestly
more closely connected with another country.
The scope of the applicable law referenced under Rome I is limited to questions concerning the
contractual relationship between the parties, such as the contract’s interpretation (including
gap filling), performance, consequences of breach, the various ways of extinguishing
obligations, prescription and limitation of actions, and the consequences of nullity of the
contract. Questions that relate to the IP right as such (i.e. the IPR regime itself) are outside the
scope of the Regulation. Such questions encompass the creation, existence, and scope of the
right as well as its transferability through assignment, license, or succession. In Sweden, these
questions are subject to the lex protectionis.
The application of Rome I seems less clear where a co-ownership situation has arisen as a
result of an agreement between two or more persons but where the agreement does not
contain any explicit provisions dealing the co-owners internal relationship with respect to
the IPR. For example, a co-ownership situation may arise as a result of an assignment of
a share of an IP right to another person where the holder of right retains a share herself.
It may also arise as a result of an agreement between two or more parties to collaborate
to create a work or make an invention (e.g. a joint research agreement). In such situations,
a contractual relationship exists between the parties with regard to the creation of the coownership
situation but not necessarily with regard to how the internal relationship with
respect to the co-owned IPR should be regulated. If the law applicable to the contract creating
the joint ownership situation allows the contract to be interpreted in accordance with the
intention of the parties and the contract’s purpose, there may be some possibility to apply the
substantive IP law of the law applicable to the contract to fill in the gaps regarding the joint
owners’ internal relationship.
Also, if the co-owners entered into an agreement to create or use the jointly owned patents
for a common purpose, a simple partnership may be found to have arisen under the Swedish
Partnership and Non-registered Partnership Act. Under Swedish conflict of law rules, the law
of the country where the simple partnership conducts its primary business activities determines
whether a simple partnership has been created. The partes may not agree on whether a
simple partnership is formed or choose the governing law. Article 1(2)(f) Rome I excludes from
its scope of application questions governed by company law such as the creation, internal
organization, legal capacity, and winding up of the company or other body. If a simple
partnership has arisen under the Swedish Partnership and Non-registered Partnership Act, a
partner may not exploit jointly owned property used in the partnership for a partner’s own
benefit unless the other partners agree.
If a contractual characterization is not possible, it would seem likely that the exploitation,
license or assignment of a patent by one co-owner without the consent of the other coowner
would be characterized as a type of non-contractual obligation. In Sweden, the
Rome II Regulation governs the applicable law for non-contractual obligations. The choice of
applicable law would most likely depend upon whether the court characterizes an alleged
breach of an obligation imposed on a co-owner in relation to the other co-owner as a general
tort or an infringement.
To the extent that the non-authorized exploitation, licensing or assignment is characterized as
a tort, the applicable law under article 4 Rome II is the law of the country where the damage
occurred, which should coincide with lex protectionis. Under a tort characterization, the law
of the country where the damage occurred may be ousted by the law of the country of the
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co-owners’ habitual residence or by the law of another country which is manifestly more
closely connected due to a pre-existing relationship between the parties such as a contract
that is more closely connected with the tort. Also, the choice of law may be derogated from
by agreement.
To the extent the non-authorized exploitation, licensing or assignment is characterized as an
infringement, the applicable law under article 8 of Rome II is lex protectionis. The application
of this country’s law is mandatory and may not be displaced by other connecting factors or
be derogated from by agreement.
Consequently, a tort characterization would provide greater flexibility for a court to apply a
single country’s law where the joint patent ownership arose by contract but the contract did
not contain any express or implied obligations regarding the joint owners’ internal obligations
to each other. It could also provide greater flexibility where the joint ownership arose as result
of a common factual situation such as when two persons or more persons jointly inherit a
patent. In the latter case, the co-owners relationship arguably may be said to be manifestly
more closely connected to the country whose law is applicable to the decedent’s estate.
A co-ownership situation may arise between two or more persons where there is no common
factual situation such as where two or more persons acquire shares in the same bundle of IP
rights through separate and independent successions. In this case, the co-owners relationship
is most closely connected to the each country in which the patent is registered, and Rome II
would refer to the lex protectionis regardless of whether the alleged breach of the obligation
was characterized as a general tort or an infringement.
Finally, the question whether a person is an initial co-owner of an IPR is believed to be
governed in Sweden by lex protectionis. This follows from the fact that authorship and
inventorship status is closely linked to the grant or the creation of the right itself which is based
on a territorial approach. Pursuant to the Swedish Law on Judicial Jurisdiction Concerning
Certain Patent Cases (1978:152), which transforms the Enforcement Protocol of the European
Patent Convention, the (initial) ownership of a right to a European patent is governed by the
law of the state in which the employee is mainly employed. The application of the employee’s
law is mandatory, and the parties are not allowed to choose another applicable law. With
regard to non-European patents, the Rome I Regulation allows the parties to an employment
agreement to choose the applicable law governing initial ownership, but this choice may not
deprive the employee of the protection the mandatory provisions of law in the state where the
employee habitually carries out her work.
Leaving initial ownership aside, co-ownership to IPR will generally arise through a subsequent
transfer of a right. The parties are free to choose the law applicable to the to assignment
agreement under Rome I. As noted above, however, lex protectionis determines whether
rights are in fact transferable.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
To the extent possible, the members of AIPPI should work toward harmonized standards for
when co-inventorship or co-authorship arises, or that failing, a harmonized choice of law rule
that leads to the application of one country’s law.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
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The Swedish Group believes that harmonisation of the statutory rules of co-owned intellectual
property rights would be desirable. Divergent rules, national and international, create
uncertainty when intellectual property holders act across borders. It is therefore of great
importance to have legal rules as regards co-ownership. The Swedish group proposes the
following.
When an invention, design, trademark or copyrighted work is owned jointly, a natural starting
point, considering the basic principle of exclusivity on which all IP rights are founded, is that
all co-owners must agree on how the IP right should be used. For registered property, as
trademarks, patents and design rights, the starting point should be that the application must
be made jointly.
However, the Swedish Group is of the view that not every measure should require all
members‘ consent. A partner should be able to transfer or assign its entire share of the IP
right. Furthermore, each shareholder should be able to exploit the co-owned property in its
own business. On the other hand, this should not apply to trademarks, since the shareholders
uncontrolled use may lead to dilution of the mark and the registration may be repealed.
Further on, in situations where the co-owners are in disagreement, there should be a regulation
on the dissolution of co-ownership. Finally, when it comes to the law applicable to the coownership
relationship, the Swedish group is in favour of a choice of law rule distinguishing
between different cases of origin, i.e. whether there is a contractual relationship or common
factual situation between the co-owners.
Summary
There is no express regulation of co-ownership in the various IP acts, apart from the Act on Copyright
which states that each co-owner may enforce the copyright independently. Instead one is referred
to seek guidance from comments made in the legislative history of the IP acts and an analogous
application of the rules of the Act on Joint Ownership. In case the co-ownership is based on or
regulated by contract it can also be subject to the rules of the Partnership and Non-registered
Partnership Act. The Swedish group is in favour of a harmonisation, which provides clearer,
consensus oriented rules for the exploitation of co-owned IP rights and also ways of dissolving such
co-ownership in case the owners can not agree.
Résumé
Il n’y a pas de réglementation expresse de la co-propriété dans les différents actes de propriété
intellectuelle, à l’exception de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur, qui stipule que chaque co-propriétaire
peut appliquer le droit d’auteur en façon indépendante. Au lieu, il est donc nécessaire de consulter
des observations faites dans l’histoire législative de l’acte de propriété intellectuelle, ainsi qu’une
application par analogie des règles de la Loi sur la copropriété. Dans le cas de la co-propriété est
fondée sur ou réglementées par contrat, il peut également être soumis aux règles de la Loi sur le
partenariat et du partenariat non-enregistré. Le groupe suédois est en faveur d’une harmonisation,
qui fournit des règles plus claire et orientée vers consensus pour l’exploitation de la co-propriété
des droits de propriété intellectuelle, et aussi des moyens de dissolution de cette co-propriété dans
le cas où les propriétaires ne peuvent pas s’accorder.
Zusammenfassung
Es gibt keine ausdrücklichen Bestimmungen zur Regelung der Miteigentümerschaft in den
verschiedenen Gesetzen auf dem Gebiet des gewerblichen Schutz- und Urheberrechts, abgesehen
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von dem Urheberrechtsgesetz, das festsetzt, dass jeder Miturheber/Mitinhaber dazu berechtigt ist,
das Urheberrecht selbstständig geltend zu machen. Anstatt dessen ist man dazu nachgewiesen,
in den Kommentaren der Gesetzesmaterialien zu verschiedenen Immaterialgüterrechtsgesetzen
und auf Grund einer analogen Anwendung der Bestimmungen des Gesetzes über die
Miteigentümerschaft Wegleitung zu suchen. Im Falle die Miteigentümerschaft sich auf einen Vertrag
stützt oder durch einen Vertrag geregelt wird, kann sie auch den Bestimmungen des Gesetzes über
Handelsgesellschaften och Einfache Gesellschaften unterworfen werden. Die schwedische Gruppe
ist für eine Harmonisierung, die mehr deutliche, übereinstimmende Regeln über die Verwertung der
mitbesessene Immaterialgüterrechte als auch über die Auflösung einer solchen Miteigentümerschaft,
falls die Mitinhaber sich nicht einigen können, ermöglichen wird.
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Switzerland
Suisse
Schweiz
Report Q194
in the name of the Swiss Group
by Dr. Lorenza Ferrari Hofer (chairwoman),Denis F. Berger and Dr. Ulrike Heiroth
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Generally, Swiss law distinguishes two forms of co-ownership: joint ownership (art. 646
Civil Code, CC) and ownership in common (art. 652 CC). In respect of the differences
regarding the legal consequences of each form, the following should be pointed out.
A joint owner may sell or pledge his share without the consent of the other joint owners
because each joint owner owns a share of the right (art. 464 para. 3 CC). Therefore, the joint
owner is considered a normal owner regarding his share. Whereas the owner in common has
a right of ownership in the whole property and the whole property may only disposed of in
consent with all the other owners in common (art. 652 CC).
If the co-owners do not constitute voluntarily, meaning contractually, their co-ownership and its
extent, Swiss law imposes the legal form of co-ownership according to the situation the right
derives from; e.g. if two children inherit their parent’s car, they become automatically owners
in common regarding the car without being able to influence their form of co-ownership,
according to the Swiss rules on heritage.
On the other side, if co-ownership constitutes voluntary, the co-owners may agree that a share
of a co-owner must be sold to the others in case such co-owner becomes subject to a change
of ownership (pre-emption right or heritage).
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An ownership in common can only be terminated by cancelling the underlying contractual
form (i.e. the community of heirs) or by selling the co-owned according to art. 653 CC. A joint
owner, on the other hand, can be expelled in case he violates his obligation towards the other
joint owner(s) in a fundamental way, that a continuation of the joint ownership with such joint
owner cannot be expected from the other joint owners (art. 649b CC).
The specific rules applying to co-ownership of a patent, design, copyright or trademark
among the original co-owners do not govern the non-voluntary co-ownership, such as the coownership
among the successors of an original co-owner.
Division of a right in case of heritage
If a co-owner of such right dies, its heirs inherit the co-owned right as owner in common
according to art. 602 CC (community of heirs). However, the specific rules between them and
the other co-owners of the IP Right, which may differ if it is a patent, copyright, trademark or
design, remain unaltered and do not apply to the form of co-ownership of the heirs.
The provisions on the ownership in common only apply to the relationship among the heirs.
All the heirs together as owners in common succeed into the position of the deceased original
co-owner in relation to the other original co-owners of the IP Right and in respect of the coownership
(art. 33 para. 1 Patent Law, PL).
Only the right of the deceased co-owner of being mentioned as an inventor cannot be
inherited as it is a right attached solely to the inventor’s personality.
Co-ownership imposed by judgment
If an IP Right is awarded by a court to more than one party, e.g. if an inventor is subsequently
recognized as co-owner of a patent, it is again the situation the right derives from that
determines the form of the co-ownership and the relationship between the co-owners. As an
example, if the claimant is considered by award to be a co-inventor of the patent in question
then the legal relationship towards the other co-owners is what the Patent Law defines it to
be.
And if the claimant is considered by award to be an heir among other heirs of an inventor’s
co-owned patent, then the heirs’ relationship is what the rules on heritage (art. 602 CC) set
forth.
In this context it must be pointed out, that the right to claim ownership in a patent or any
other intellectual property rights can forfeit. If the right’s owner desists from claiming it for a
certain time, but then decides to claim it all the same, his behaviour can be considered an
abuse of rights, according the principle venire contra factum proprium (cf. art. 2 para. 2 CC).
However, because of the fatal consequences of the forfeit, that the right ceases to exist, forfeit
should not be presumed easily.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
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if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
Generally, the rules on the form of the co-ownership define the requirements which must be
met that a co-owner may exploit his share and to what extent. However, because the mutual
agreement of all co-owners is almost in all situations requested for any kind of exploitation of
the IP Right, in particular for the exploitation of a patent, it is not relevant whether the patent is
exploited by the patent owner himself or by third party through licensing or subcontracting.
As a matter of fact, in the specific case of patents, the co-owner of a patent has no
right to exploit the patent or his share unless all the co-owners have mutually agreed upon
according to Swiss law (art. 34 para. 2 PL). The extent of such exploitation if agreed upon
mutually is subject to the agreement among the co-owners.
Co-authors on the other hand, may exploit their individual shares if each share can be
exploited individually and without threatening the exploitation of the whole copyright (art. 7
para. 4, Copyright Law, CL).
If this separation is not possible all co-authors must agree upon the exploitation of the whole
copyright (art. 7 para. 2 CL).
Co-designers may only exploit their IP Right upon mutual agreement of all co-designers
(art. 11 Design Law, DL).
There are no specific rules on the co-ownership of trademarks. Therefore, the form of
co-ownership is based upon the situation the right derives from. The two possible forms are
ownership in common and joint ownership, and in absence of a clear determination by the
parties, the legal structure of the ownership in common applies.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
Under Swiss law, and with exception of the co-ownership in respect of copyright that can be
exploited separately, all co-owners must agree to any license of the commonly own rights. In
that sense, the nature of the license rights, exclusive or non-exclusive, is not relevant for the
legal construct of the co-ownership.
However, according to Swiss doctrine, the grant of non-exclusive licenses permitting a multiple
use of the co-owned patent may affect and limit the rights of the original owners. The number
of parties who co-own the patent together and therefore are allowed to exploit the patent
must remain the same, if one co-owner grants a license over his share to a third party.
Subsequently, the co-owner who grants the license must be excluded from the exploitation
(Calame, p. 187).
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In respect of copyright, an exclusive license by one co-owner does most likely not allow a use
without disturbance of the other co-owners and is therefore considered not to be permitted.
In this regard, the question arises whether a co-owner may subsequently withdraw his consent
to license the patent after the license agreement has already been concluded and which
consequences would result from such a withdrawal. This question points at how the coowners
have to exercise their rights towards a third party. According to art. 34 para. 2 PL,
a license may only be granted with the consent of all co-owners. On the other hand, one
co-owner alone may issue a claim against the infringer(s) of the co-owned patent (art. 33
para. 2 PL). To revoke a license agreement is a question of disposing of the whole patent and
not only one part. If the licensee infringes the patent, then one co-owner alone may file a suit
against the licensee. As long as the licensee does not infringe the patent, one co-owner may
not have the right to revoke the license agreement alone (except as agreed upon otherwise
in the license agreement). Such right must be executed upon the consent of all co-owners.
One co-owner who wishes to terminate the license agreement may only address the other
co-owners who disagree based on the rules that apply to the co-ownership.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
General
Only a structure of a joint co-ownership allows an independent assignment or a transfer
of the share of the co-owned IP Right to a third party. However, such form of ownership is
not presumed to exist, if it is not expressly chosen by the co-owners or created by award.
Furthermore, there are cases where law imposes joint ownership.
Further, it must be distinguished between the relationship between the co-owners of an IP
Right and the relationship between one co-owner and a third party to which this co-owner
transfers or assigns a part of his share of the co-owned IP Right.
Whatever the agreement on or the form of co-ownership of the IP Right between the third
party and the transferring or assigning co-owner may be, the relationship towards the other
original co-owners of the IP Right will not be affected and remains the same as the one chosen
by the initial co-owners or the one imposed by law.
Further, one share of the IP Right whether owned by one or more parties (i.e. heirs) can only
be exploited and disposed of in accordance with the rules applying to the co-ownership
among the original co-owners of the IP Right.
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The relationship between the original co-owners does not affect the relationship between
the co-owner and the third party to which this co-owner whishes to transfer its share. This
relationship is governed by the general rules of the assignment and transfer of rights and
claims, such as sale, donation, pledge and other rules only.
Exception: Patents
In respect of the co-ownership of patent right, an exception applies. Swiss Patent Law allows
the assignment and transfer of the share of one co-owner to a third party as well as its pledge
independently and without the prior consent of all other co-owners. However, such transfer
does again not affect the relationship between the original co-owners.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
Under Swiss law, effects on competition that result exclusively from laws governing intellectual
property are generally permitted and not subject to competition restrictions (art. 3 para. 2
Law on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition, KG). Therefore, the fact that several coowners
have exclusive rights on a patent or copyright and can exploit them to the exclusion
of third parties does not per se result in unlawful market restraint.
However, insofar as co-owners agree on other sensitive aspects, e.g. they directly or indirectly
fix the prices or allocate the market, such agreements, insofar as no justification exist, are
presumed to represent a restraint of competition and are generally considered unlawful (art.
5 cp. 3 KG).
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
Swiss conflict of law provides that the extent of intellectual property rights is governed by
the law of the country where the protection of the intellectual property rights is
requested (art. 110 Act on International Private Law, IPRG). This country is generally the
country which has the closest connection with the co-owned IP Right. However, this means that
the extent of the exploitation rights of the co-owners may vary depending of the countries in
which the co-owners exploit their commonly owned rights. This may represent a disadvantage
for the co-owners.
However, Swiss law allows a choice of law for the contracts concluded in respect of intellectual
property rights. Accordingly, co-owners, whose co-ownership was determined by contract –
which is often the case –, may submit their relationship, and the exploitation of their rights, to
the law of a country mutually agreed upon (art. 122 para. 2 IPRG).
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As a general rule and in absence of a choice of law, Swiss conflict of law provides for the
application of the law of the country where contract has the closest connection (art. 117
para. 1 IPRG). The closest connection is supposed to be where the party which provides for
the characteristic performance has his residence (art. 117 para. 2 IPRG). In respect of coowned
rights, it is not clear which party provides for the characteristic performance and no
precedents exist in this regard.
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
From the point of view of Swiss law, no other issues are relevant.
For the discussions to take place in Buenos Aires, the Swiss group wishes that the international
harmonization of the co-ownership rules and consequences as well as its implementation
should be a major target to be addressed to in the resolution.
Summary
Under Swiss law, the rules related to the co-ownership of IP Rights set forth what one co-owner’s
rights regarding his “share” of the co-owned IP Right and regarding the IP Right as whole are.
These legal solutions differ depending on which IP Right is co-owned. The Patent Law provides
a different form of co-ownership (as well as a well disputed form) than the Copyright Law, for
example. Therefore, if not contractually agreed upon, the co-ownership depends on which IP Right
is co-owned. While a co-author has a right to exploit his share (under certain circumstances), the
co-owner of a patent or the co-designer has no such right unless all the co-owners agree upon.
Eventually, the Trademark Law does not provide any form of co-ownership and the co-owners are
referred to the general form of ownership in common or joint ownership, depending on the situation
the rights derives from.
However, these different forms of co-ownership remain unaffected if, for example, a co-owner dies.
It must be distinguished between the relationship among the co-owners and the relationship among
the heirs. The heirs, all together, inherit the share of the deceased co-owner. They succeed, again
all together, into to the deceased’s position towards the other co-owners according to the rules
applicable to the respective form of co-ownership. Meanwhile, the relationship among the heirs
is governed by the Swiss inheritance law. As another example, if an inventor becomes imposed
by judgement as co-owner, then his relationship towards the pre-existing co-owners is what the
applicable rules related to the IP Right at hand defines it. This is particularly set forth in the Patent
Law where a co-owner may even pledge his share without the consent of the others. What is more,
if a co-owner assigns or sells his whole share or a part of his share, the successor will be vested
in the rights of the assignor or vendor towards the remaining co-owners. Again, the relationship
between the vendor of a whole share or a part of his share and the purchaser is what these two
parties may choose it to be.
The difficulties a co-owner is faced with regarding the exploitation of his share of the IP Right or
the fact, that only one co-owner can deny the exploitation of the whole right (id est of a patent),
do not automatically rise question regarding the competition rules. Under Swiss Law, effects on
competition that result exclusively from IP laws are generally permitted. In fact, the lack of a
contractually defined ownership, wherein the choice of law could be governed, could lead to
difficulties when the co-owned IP Right is infringed, for example by a co-owner. In such case, the
law of that jurisdiction applies where the protection against the infringement is requested.
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Résumé
Pour ce qui est du droit suisse, ce sont les conventions respectives au sujet de la propriété de
plusieurs sur une chose qui déterminent les droits de chaque propriétaire sur ses parts de la propriété
intellectuelle, ainsi que sur la propriété intellectuelle entière. Ces solutions légales diffèrent en
fonction de la propriété intellectuelle concernée. La loi sur les brevets, par exemple, prévoit une
autre forme (souvent controversée) de propriété de plusieurs sur une chose que le droit d’auteur.
Ainsi, à défaut de convention contractuelle contraire, la forme de la propriété de plusieurs sur une
chose dépend de la propriété intellectuelle concernée.
Alors qu’un coauteur a le droit d’exploiter (dans certaines circonstances) sa part du droit de la
propriété intellectuelle, un des propriétaires d’un brevet ou un des titulaires d’un droit de design ne
l’a pas, sauf si cela a été convenu avec les autres propriétaires ou titulaires. Le droit des marques
ne prévoit aucune forme définie de la propriété de plusieurs sur une chose. En conséquence, les
caractéristiques des titulaires du droit sont déterminées par les formes générales de la propriété
commune ou de la copropriété, en fonction du contexte dans lequel le droit est né.
Cependant, le décès d’un des titulaires du droit, par exemple, n’affecte aucune de ces formes de
la propriété de plusieurs sur le bien intellectuel. En revanche, il faut distinguer la relation entre
les titulaires du droit et celle entre les héritiers. Les successeurs héritent, tous ensemble, de la
part du défunt titulaire du droit. Les héritiers prennent, de nouveau tous ensemble, la place du
défunt titulaire du droit dans la propriété de plusieurs sur une chose, ceci étant déterminé par la
loi correspondante. La relation entre les héritiers est cependant définie par le droit successoral
suisse.
Si un inventeur, par exemple, est désigné comme titulaire d’un droit en commun par une décision
du tribunal, sa relation avec les autres titulaires est déterminée par la loi correspondante, relative
à la propriété intellectuelle concernée.
De telles conventions sont en particulier prévues par la loi sur les brevets. Selon elles, l’un des
titulaires a même le droit de prêter sur gage sa part sans le consentement des autres. Si l’un des
titulaires du droit envisage de céder ou de vendre sa part de la propriété intellectuelle, en totalité
ou en partie, l’acquéreur obtient, envers les autres titulaires du droit, les droits et la position de la
personne qui les cède ou les vend. La relation entre l’acheteur et le vendeur d’une part, totale ou
partielle, dépend cependant de la convention entre les deux parties.
Les problèmes qui peuvent se poser lors de l’exploitation d’une part de la propriété intellectuelle
ou le fait qu’un seul titulaire d’un droit puisse empêcher l’exploitation du droit intellectuel comme
un tout (soit du droit de brevets) ne soulèvent pas forcément des questions relatives au droit de la
concurrence. Selon le droit suisse, les restrictions au sujet du droit de la concurrence sont permises
à condition qu’elles résultent exclusivement d’une loi sur la protection de la propriété intellectuelle.
En cas de violation du droit de la propriété intellectuelle par un des titulaires, par exemple, le
manque d’une convention contractuelle, dans laquelle le droit applicable serait choisi, peut
effectivement entrainer des difficultés. Dans ce cas, les lois du tribunal compétent où la demande
de protection contre la violation a été formulée s’appliquent.
Zusammenfassung
Welche Rechte der einzelne Inhaber bezüglich seines „Anteils“ am gemeinschaftlichen Immaterialgut
sowie am Immaterialgut als Ganzes hat, werden im Schweizer Recht durch die jeweiligen
Bestimmungen betreffend das gemeinschaftliche Eigentum an Immaterialgüterrechten geregelt.
Diese gesetzlichen Lösungen unterscheiden sich je nachdem welches Immaterialgut betroffen ist.
Das Patentgesetz sieht beispielsweise eine andere Form (und kontrovers diskutierte Form) des
gemeinschaftlichen Eigentums vor als das Urheberrecht. Soweit also vertraglich nichts vereinbart
wurde, hängt die Ausgestaltung des gemeinschaftlichen Eigentums vom betroffenen Immaterialgut
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ab. Während ein Miturheber berechtigt ist, seinen Anteil (unter gewissen Umständen) zu verwerten,
hat ein Patentinhaber von mehreren oder einer von mehreren Rechteinhabern an einem Design
kein solches Recht, sofern nicht mit allen anderen Eigentümern vereinbart. Das Markenschutzgesetz
schliesslich sieht keine bestimmte Form von gemeinschaftlichem Eigentum vor und die mehreren
Rechteinhaber werden auf die allgemeinen Formen des Gesamt- bzw. Miteigentum verwiesen, je
nach Situation, aus welcher das Recht entstanden ist.
Allerdings beeinflusst beispielsweise der Tod eines der mehreren Rechteinhaber keine dieser
Formen des gemeinschaftlichen Eigentums an einem Immaterialgut. Es muss vielmehr zwischen
dem Verhältnis der Rechteinhaber untereinander und dem Verhältnis der Erben untereinander
unterschieden werden. Die Rechtsnachfolger erben alle gemeinsam den Anteil des verstorbenen
Rechteinhabers. Die Erben treten wiederum alle gemeinsam an den Platz des verstorbenen
Rechteinhabers gegenüber den übrigen Rechteinhaber. Dies tun sie in dem gemeinschaftlichen
Eigentumsverhältnis, welches das Gesetz für das betroffene Immaterialgut vorsieht. Das Verhältnis
der Erben untereinander wird schliesslich vom Schweizer Erbrecht bestimmt.
Sollte ein Erfinder beispielsweise per Gerichtbeschluss zu einem der mehreren Rechteinhaber erkannt
werden, so ist sein Verhältnis zu den bereits bestehenden Rechteinhabern ebenfalls dasjenige,
welches durch das entsprechende Gesetz für das entsprechende Immaterialgut vorgesehen ist.
Speziell im Patentgesetz ist eine Regelung vorgesehen, wonach ein Rechteinhaber seinen Anteil
sogar ohne Zustimmung der anderen verpfänden kann. Sollte nun ein Rechteinhaber unter mehreren
seinen Anteil oder einen Teil seines Anteils abtreten oder verkaufen, so erwirbt der Nachfolger die
Rechte und die Stellung des Übertragenden beziehungsweise Verkäufers gegenüber den anderen
Rechteinhabern. Das Verhältnis zwischen dem Käufer und dem Verkäufer eines Anteils oder eines
Teil des Anteils hängt wiederum von der jeweiligen Vereinbarung zwischen den beiden Parteien
ab.
Probleme, welche sich einem Rechteinhaber unter mehreren betreffend Ausübung seiner Rechte an
seinem Teil des Immaterialgutes oder der Tatsache stellen, dass ein einzelner Rechteinhaber die
Ausübung des Immaterialgüterrechtes als Ganzes (d.h. am Patenterecht) verhindern kann, müssen
nicht automatisch wettbewerbs- oder kartellrechtliche Fragen aufwerfen. Gemäss Schweizer Recht
sind wettbewerbsrechtliche Implikationen, welche sich ausschliesslich aus einem Gesetz zum Schutz
von Immaterialgüter ergeben, generell erlaubt.
Sollte das Immaterialgüterrecht zum Beispiel von einem der mehreren Rechteinhaber verletzt
werden, kann das Fehlen einer vertraglichen Regelung des Eigentumsverhältnisses, worin etwa eine
Rechtswahl getroffen werden könnte, tatsächlich zu Schwierigkeiten führen. In diesem Fall, gelten
die Gesetze des Gerichtstands, wo der Schutz gegen die Verletzung beantragt wird.
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Thailand
Thaïlande
Thailand
Report Q194
in the name of the Thai Group
by Chavalit UTTASART and Panisa SUWANMATAJAM
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Under the Thai law, the co-ownership of IP rights can be acquired either by being a coinventor
or co-creator, heritage, or an agreement.
There is no distinction under the law as to now the co-ownership of IP rights is acquired.
There is also no definition of the term “co-ownership” in the Patent Act B.E. 2522 (A.D. 1979)
(“Patent Act”), Trade Mark Act B.E. 2534 (A.D. 1991) (“Trade Mark Act”) or Copyright
Act B.E. 2537 (A.D. 1994) (“Copyright Act”). The Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand
(“CCC”) does not provide a definition for the terms “co-ownership” either.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
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to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
In Thailand, there is no provision governing on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of IP rights of co-ownership in trademark and copyright. Section 40 1 of the
Patent Act provides that in the absence of any provision to the contrary between the parties,
a co-owner of a patent may, separately, exercise the right to produce, use, sell, have in the
possession for sale, offer for sale or import the patented product or the patented process
without the consent of the other co-owners, but a co-owner of a patent may grant a license or
assign the patent only when it is consented by all co-owners.
Thus, if one of the co-owners of patent wishes to outsource or subcontract its right, no consent
of the other co-owners is required.
In the absence of any provision in the trademark and copyright laws relating to the co-owners’
right to outsource or subcontract its right, the general provisions on the co-ownership of rights
under the Civil and Commercial Code of Thailand (the “CCC”) apply. Under Section 1357 2
and Section 1360 3 of the CCC, a co-owner of trademark and copyright may exploit its right
by outsourcing and subcontracting its right as the act of outsourcing and subcontracting
should be deemed as exercising/using the IP right by the co-owner.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
Exclusivity or non-exclusivity is not a defined term under Thai Laws. Thus, the nature of
these two types of licenses is subject to contractual obligations under a contract. Thai law
is also silent on the number of licenses that one of the co-owners can grant to non-exclusive
licensees.
1
Section 40 – Subject to Section 42, in the absence of any provision to the contrary between the parties, a joint owner
of a patent may, separately, exercise the rights conferred under Section 36 and 37 without the consent of the other
joint owner, but he may grant a license or assign the patent only when it is consented to all joint owners. (the Patent
Act).
2
Section 1357 – Co-owner are presumed to have equal shares.
3
Section 1360 – Each co-owner is entitled to use the property in so far as such use is not incompatible with the rights of
the other co-owners. He is presumed to be entitled to a hare of the fruits proportionate to his share of the property.
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For the conditions of granting a license, according to Section 40 of the Thai Patent Act, unless
otherwise agreed between the co-owners, all co-owners are obliged to give their consent
prior to licensing a right in patent to a third party. Therefore, one co-owner may not license a
right in patent whether on a non-exclusive or exclusive basis to a third party without a consent
of all other co-owners, unless otherwise agreed between the co-owners.
Whilst the Trademark Act and Copyright Act are silent on whether consent of all co-owners
is required prior to licensing a right in trademark whether or a non-exclusive or exclusive
basis to a third party, under Section 1360 of the CCC, grant of the license by a co-owner
of the trademark or copyright on an exclusive basis should be considered as being contrary
to the right of the other co-owners and may not be done, whereas grant of the license by a
co-owner of the trademark or copyright on a non-exclusive basis may be arguable whether it
should be considered as being contrary to the right of the other co-owners.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
Under Section 40 of the Thai Patent, unless otherwise agreed between the co-owners, all coowners
are obliged to give their consent prior to transferring or assigning a right in patent to
a third party. Therefore, one co-owner may not assign a right in patent in whole or in part to
a third party without receiving the consent from all other co-owners, unless otherwise agreed
between the co-owners.
In the absence of any provision in the Trademark Act and Copyright Act on the transfer or
assignment of the trademark or copyright by a co-owner, Section 1361 4 of the CCC applies.
In applying, Section 1361 of the CCC, it is arguable whether a co-owner may transfer or
assign his part of the trademark right or copyright without the consent of the other co-owners
but may not transfer or assign the whole part of the trademark right or copyright without the
consent of the other co-owners.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
4
Section 1361 – Each co-owner may dispose of, mortgage, or create a change on, his share.
The property itself may be disposed of, pleaged, mortgaged or made subject to a change only with the consent of all
the co-owners.
However, if a co-owner has disposed of, pledged, mortgaged or created a charge on, the property without the
consent of all the other co-owners, and he subsequqently becomes the sole owner of it, such acts shall becomevalid.
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The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
The purpose of competition law is seen as the promotion of free competition. On the other
side, IP laws provide exclusive rights to inventors or creators. The owners of IP rights generally
wish to use their IP rights as a means to gain the benefit for their business. Often time,
exercising IP rights, especially in an exclusive basis, is seen as limiting free competition. Thus,
the tension between competition law and intellectual property law is so obvious.
Section 25 5 of the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 (1999) provides that a business operator
having the power over the market may not act in any of the following manners:
– unfairly fix and maintain the level of the purchase or sale price of goods or charge for
service; or
– impose conditions in the manner of unfairly forcing directly or indirectly other business
operators who are their customer to limited service, production, purchase, or sell of
goods or limit the opportunity to purchase or sell of goods or services; or
– intervene with the other business operators’ s business, etc.
The agreement of the co-owners prohibiting the licensing should not be seen as eliminating
the competitors from the market as it does not fall within the manners provided by Section 25
of the Trade Competition Act.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
As mentioned above, Section 40 and 41 of the Thai Patent Act specify the right of the coownership.
In the absence of the provision governing the co-ownership of rights in trademark
and copyright laws, the provisions governing the co-ownership of rights under CCC apply.
5
Section 25 – No business operator having power over the market shall act in any of the following manners:
1) To unfairly fix or maintain the level of the purchase or sale price of goods or charge for service;
2) To impose conditions in the manner of unfairly forcing, directly or indirectly, other business operator who is his
customer to limit service, production, purchase or distribution of goods, or to limit service, production, purchase or
distribution of goods, to receive or provide service, or to acquire credit facility from other business opeartor;
3) To unreasonably suspend, reduce or limit service, production, purchase, distribution, delivery, import into the
Kingdom, destroy or damage goods to reduce their volume to be lower than market demand;
4) To unreasonably interface with business operation of market demand
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7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
None.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
Each of the Patent Act, Trademark Act and Copyright Act should have provisions dealing with
the exploitation of the co-owner of the IP right. It may be necessary to have an international
agreement/convention on this issue, as a first step, so that member countries shall amend their
laws in compliance therewith.
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Turkey
Turquie
Türkei
Report Q194
in the name of the Turkish Group
by Gözde Colak, Muhlise Aydin, Mutlu Yildirim Köse,
Tuba Yüksel and Yasemin Kenaroglu
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
Co-ownership shall be governed by an agreement among the parties. However, it is necessary
to apply the relevant law in absence of such an agreement between the co-owners.
Co-ownership issue is regulated in Turkish IP legislation through direct or indirect references
to the relevant articles of Turkish Civil Code No. 4721 (TCC). Therefore, in absence of an
agreement between the co-owners, the provisions of Civil Code relating to co-ownership shall
be applied.
TCC regulates in its Articles 688 to 703, two types of co-ownership, which are called
“ownership in common” and “joint ownership”. Under joint ownership, more than one person
own a materially undivided asset as a whole with determined shares. The shares of the coowners
can be separately used, transferred, pledged or attached. According to Article 690
of TCC each co-owner in joint ownership is allowed to take any ordinary action regarding the
co-owned IP right on its own. However, article 691 requires majority of co-owners and shares
for important actions. Additionally, extraordinary actions require unanimity of the co-owners
under article 692.
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Ownership in common is a type of ownership where several persons, by virtue of the law or
specific agreements stipulated by the law, jointly own an asset under a partnership relation
between them. In ownership in common, the right of each partner covers every asset falling
under the partnership. Management or disposal of the jointly owned asset can in principle be
realised through the unanimity of the partners. Ownership in common shall be terminated upon
the transfer of the asset, the dissolution of the partnership or a transition to co-ownership.
Co-ownership of a patent
In absence of an agreement between the co-owners of a patent, the provisions of Civil
Code relating to “joint ownership” shall be applied (Art. 85 of DL 551). Accordingly, as a
general rule regardless of the origin of the ownership each co-owner may exercise his rights
arising from the patent only with the consent of the other co-owners. However, the following
exceptions apply:
– any co–owner may independently dispose his part, provided that the other co-owners
are notified especially with regard to their right preemption right,
– any co–owner may independently exploit the invention, provided that the other co-owners
are notified,
– any co–owner is permitted to take any action against the violation of the patent rights,
– any co–owner may initiate a civil or criminal action against third parties in case of an
infringement of patent rights, provided that the other co-owners are notified in order to
provide their participation to the case.
Co-ownership of a design
Designer (and his successors) is the owner of the design right in Turkish design law (Article
13 of Decree Law No: 554, hereafter “DL 554”). Co-ownership is available and regulated
as “joint ownership”.
Differentiation in origin of co-ownership does not constitute any difference regarding the rules
applied to co-ownership. Rights of co-owners of a design are stipulated in Article 13 of DL
554 without considering the origin of co-ownership.
Co-ownership of a trademark
The relevant rules of the Civil Code are also applied for the co-ownership on trademarks, in
absence of an agreement among the parties.
As mentioned in Articles 688 to 703 of the Civil Code, the Code makes distinction in the
applicable rules to the co-ownership of the right on the trademarks in case the origin of the
co-ownership is not voluntary but results from other situations, including the division of a right
in case of a heritage which is considered as being circumstance of the ownership in common.
Hence, according to the origin of the co-ownership right, the co-owned rights are subject to
either ownership in common or joint ownership.
Co-ownership of a copyright
According to the Law No. 5846 on Intellectual and Artistic Works (Copyright Law) the
applicable rules to the co-ownership of the copyright differs in ownership in common or joint
ownership. Legal definitions of co-ownership of copyright are as follow:
Multiple Authors: According to Article 9, if a work created jointly by more than one person
can be divided into parts, each person shall be deemed the owner of the part he created.
Union of Authors: According to Article 10, if a work created by the participation of more than
one person constitutes an indivisible whole, the author of the work is the union of the persons
who created it.
Joint ownership rules are applied for multiple authors while union of authors is subject to
ownership in common.
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2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
According to Article 85 of the Patent DL 551, each co-owner has a right to exploit. However,
the exploitation of the patent right does not cover the right to subcontract without the consent
of all co-owners; since a licence, to a third party, to work the invention shall be granted upon
decision made by all right holders jointly (Article 85 Patent DL 551). Moreover according to
the Article 88 of Patent DL 551 it is also stated that “Unless the agreement includes a provision
to the contrary, holders of contractual licenses may not transfer their rights conferred by a
license to other parties nor grant sub-licenses“
In design law, as long as notifying the others, each of the co-owners is allowed to use
and/or to sub-contract the design on its own. The co-owner who intends to use the co-owned
design only needs to inform the co-owners of his individual use and/or subcontracting, but
does not need to obtain their permission. (Article 13 of DL 554).
In trademark law, regarding the sub-contracting or out-sourcing of a co-owned trademark,
Turkish Law does not provide any specific rules and therefore the above-mentioned articles of
the Civil Code are applied to trademarks.
In copyright law, in case joint ownership is concerned each of the co-owners is allowed
to assign the whole or only part of his share to a third party without getting permission from
the others.
As to the granting licence, the provisions on usufructuary leases shall apply to non-exclusive
licenses and those on usufruct shall apply to exclusive licenses. Hence, non-exclusive licenses
may be granted by the majority of the co-owners and shares, where exclusive licenses may
be granted by the unanimity of the joint owners.
In case ownership in common is concerned the assignment or license may only be granted
with the consent of all co-owners. The Copyright Law makes a further distinction where the
acquisition of copyright is original or derivative.
Original Acquisition: According to Article 48 of the Copyright Law, the author or his heirs
may transfer to others the economic rights granted them by law, unrestricted or restricted as
regards duration, place or scope, with or without consideration. The authority only to exercise
the economic rights may also be granted to another person (license). Hence, the right to
exploit the copyright also covers the right to subcontract.
Derivative Acquisition: According to the Article 49 of the Copyright Law, a person who has
acquired an economic right or a license to exercise such right from the author or his heirs may
transfer such right or license to another person only with the written consent of the author or
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his heirs. Hence, the right to exploit the copyright does not cover the right to subcontract in
the absence of the written consent of the author or his heirs.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
In patent Law, license may only be granted with the consent of all co-owners. However, for
reasons of equity, in consideration of particular circumstances, the court may decide that one
of the parties alone should be authorized to grant such license. (DL 551, Art. 84)
In addition, the co-owners are entitled to grant both exclusive and non-exclusive licenses
as there are not any distinctions in the legislation between the exclusive and non-exclusive
licenses in terms of their results concerning co-ownership.
In design law, type of the license does not cause any difference in terms of co-ownership.
Same rules are applied for exclusive and/or non-exclusive licenses on co-owned design
shares.
Unanimous approval of the co-owners is required to grant a license on the design rights.
Under an unanimous approval, the co-owners can build an exclusive and/or non-exclusive
license on the design. Exceptionally, one of the co-owners could be entitled by the court to
grant an exclusive and/or non-exclusive license on the design without getting approval from
the other co-owners (Article 13 of DL 554).
In trademark law, the right to grant the license by a co-owner or joint owner is not
influenced by the differences of the nature of licenses. On the other hand, the above
mentioned differences on the nature of co-ownership influence the right to grant the license
by a co-owner in common or joint owner.
Under joint ownership, licensing of a trademark is to be effected by the majority of the coowners
and shares, whereas under ownership in common, the licensing of a jointly owned
trademark is to be effected by the unanimity of the joint owners.
According to Article 56 of the Copyright Law, the provisions on usufructuary leases shall
apply to non-exclusive licenses and those on usufruct shall apply to exclusive licenses.
Hence, under joint ownership, non-exclusive licenses may be granted by the majority of the
co-owners and shares, where exclusive licenses may be granted by the unanimity of the joint
owners.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
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In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
According to the Article 85 of the Patent Decree Law, the assignment of the total shares is
possible as well as the partial assignment of the co-owned shares.
In design law, each of the co-owners is allowed to assign their total share to a third party
without getting permission from the other co-owners. However, the co-owner who intends to
assign his shares has to apply to other co-owners first and to remind that they can use their
pre-emptive right on the design before third parties.
Partial assignment of the co-owned shares by a co-owner is not possible in Turkish design
law. (Article 40 of DL 554).
In trademark law, transfer of a share of a co-owned trademark is to be determined
pursuant to the above mentioned Articles of the Turkish Civil Code.
Under joint ownership, the shares of the co-owners can be separately transferred, pledged
or attached. Under ownership in common, partial transfer of the co-owned shares is not
possible.
In copyright law, either the transfer or assignment of the whole share of a co-owned
copyright or only part of the share of the co-owned copyright is possible, provided that
the relevant provisions applied to joint ownership, ownership in common and derivative
acquisition mentioned hereabove are fulfilled.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
According to the Turkish Competition Act, the abuse of the dominant position is prohibited.
The measures of the dominant position can be listed as market share, barriers to entry, vertical
integration, technological advantage, non-used capacity and the existence of intellectual
property rights. Accordingly, in cases where substitution is not effected, intellectual property
rights become very important since they may be used as tools of dominance. By this way
an initiative would easily access the distribution channels, open branches, give franchises,
establish sub partnerships, enter or not into license agreements.
At this stage the compulsory use of the IP right, specifically patent becomes very important.
If the (right holder) patentee does not use the invention, which is subject to a patent, then he
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shall announce by an application to the Institute that he is willing to grant licences provided
that the conditions are met. Otherwise, not using the invention and not granting licenses may
be considered as an abuse. Moreover, if the patent right holder (patentee) acts against the
general provisions of unfair competition while using the patent, he may be ordered to enter
into a licence agreement through a judicial decision (DL 551, Art.93).
That said we have to express that the violation of competition in respect of IP rights in Turkey
occurs in very exceptional circumstances.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
It is accepted that, if there is a contractual agreement between the co-owners and the parties
do not determine applicable law, the co-ownership of an IP Right may be ruled by the
national law of the country, which presents the closest connections with the IP Right. (Article
28 of Law on the International Private and Civil Procedure).
The country that presents the closest connection with the IP rights is determined in following
order:
• The country where the main place of business of the party, assigning or licensing the IP
right is located.
• In absence of the first option, the country where the party, assigning or licensing the IP
right resides.
• In case there is an employee-employer relation between the parties, the country of which
law is applied to that relation.
• In case of necessity, the country which presents closer connections with the IP Right.
Otherwise, according to Article 23 of International Private and Civil Procedure Law, the
intellectual property rights are subject to the law of the country where the protection is
requested.
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
The letter of consent issue should also be discussed in the resolution in order to determine
the conditions of granting letter of consent on a co-owned IP right with regard to prosecution
matters.
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II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
It is required to regulate the general principles through an international agreement in respect
of international harmonization of IP laws with regard to the co-ownership. The resolution will
be reached during EXCO could be submitted to the World Trade Organization as a guide for
international harmonisation of co-ownership in IP Laws.
Regarding the national harmonization general provisions of Civil Code should be taken
as reference in IP Laws. Given that essential reference is being made to general provisions
of Civil Code especially to the provisions regulating joint co-ownership and ownership in
common, a harmonisation of the rules to be applied the joint co-ownership and ownership
in common may be helpful in order to provide specific and clear rules with regard to the
exploitation, transfer or license of in each IP Law.
Summary
Under Turkish Law, there are explicit provisions in the patent, design and copyright laws with
regard to co-ownership; however, in trademark law the articles refer to the relevant Civil Code
provisions, whereas patent, design and copyright laws refer to the general principles in case there
are not any specific provisions. According to Turkish Civil Code, co-ownership is classified either
as joint ownership in which each co-owner owns a share of the right or as ownership in common
in which each owner has a right of ownership in the whole property. The rules on co-ownership of
intellectual property rights are applicable, in the absence of an agreement between parties.
Regarding the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting the exploitation of an IP right, there are
specific provisions in Patent and Design Decree Laws as in Patent Decree Law the consent of all
co-owners is required whereas in the Design Decree Law the co-owners are only required to inform
the others.
The nature of licenses has no different effects in terms of their results concerning co-ownership,
except for the copyright law.
In all IP rights, the assignment of the total shares is possible as well as the partial assignment of the
co-owned shares, except for design rights.
The abuse of the dominant position may be subject to the competition law in terms of IP Rights as
well.
The national law of the country that presents the closest connection is applicable if there is a
contractual agreement between the co-owners and applicable law is not determined by the
parties.
Résumé
Dans le Droit Turc, des dispositions explicites concernant la co-propriété existent dans le droit
sur brevets, sur les dessins et modéles et sur le de droit d’auteur; cependant, dans le droit sur les
marques, les articles renvoient aux dispositions correspondantes du Code Civil tandis que le droit
de brevet, de dessin/modèle et de droit d’auteur renvoient aux principles généraux dans la mesure
où il n’existe pas de dispositions spécifiques. D’après le Code Civil Turc, la co-propriété est classée
comme propriété indivise où chaque co-propriétaire a une part de droit ou comme propriété en
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commune où chaque propriétaire a le droit de propriété sur la totalité de la propriété. Les règles sur
la co-propriété des droits intellectuels sont applicable dans l’absence d’un accord.
Concernant la question d’externalisation ou de sous-traitance d’un droit de la Propriété Intellectuelle,
dispositions spécifiques existent dans les Décrets-Lois sur les Brevets sur les Dessins et modéles telles
que dans le Décret-Loi sur les Brevets le consentement de tous les co-propriétaires est requis tandis
que dans le Décret-Loi sur les Dessins et modéles les co-propriétaires sont seulement demandés
d’informer les autres.
A part pour le droit d’auteur, il n’existe pas de différences dans la nature de la licence en terme de
résultat concernant la co-propriété.
Dans tous les droits de Propriété Intellectuelle, le transfert de la totalité des parts et le transfert
partiel des parts co-possédés sont possibles.
L’abus de la position dominante peut également être l’objet du Droit de la Concurrance en terme
des droits de Propriété Intellectuelle.
Le droit national du pays qui présente le rattachement le plus fort est applicable dans le cas où
un accord n’existe pas entre les co-propriétaires et le droit applicable n’est pas déterminé par les
parties.
Zusammenfassung
Nach türkischem Recht gibt es im Patent-, Geschmacksmustergesetz und im Gesetz über Urheberrecht
eindeutige Bestimmungen im Hinblick auf Miteigentümerschaft; die Artikel des Markengesetzes
berufen sich jedoch auf die entsprechende Bestimmungen des bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches,
wobei das Patent-, Geschmacksmustergesetz sowie das Gesetzt über Urheberrecht, solange es
keine bensondere Bestimmungen gibt, sich auf allgemeine Grundsätze bezieht. Gemäss dem
türkischen bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch ist die Miteigentümerschaft sowohl als gemeinsamer Besitz,
wobei jeder der Miteigentümer einen Anteil des Rechts besitzt als auch aber als eine gemeinsame
Eigentümerschaft klassifiziert, wobei jeder von Miteigentümern einen Anspruch auf das gesamte
Eigentum hat. In Abwesenheit eines Vertrages sind die Regelungen des geistigen Eigentumsrechts
bezüglich der Miteigentümerschaft anzuwenden.
Bezüglich der Ausgliederung oder der Untervergabe der Verwertung von einem IP-Recht sind in
den Rechtsverordnungen über Patent und Geschmacksmuster besondere Bestimmungen vorhanden;
während in der Rechtsverordnung über Patente die Bewilligung aller Miteigentümer nötig ist,
werden in der Rechtsverordnung über Muster die Miteigentümer lediglich gefordert, die anderen
zu informieren.
Es gibt im Wesen der Genehmigungen, was ihre Folgen bezüglich der Miteigentümerschaft angeht,
keine Unterschiede, allerdings abgesehen von dem Gesetz über Urheberrecht.
Abtretung der gesamten Anteile sowie die teilweise Abtretung der Miteigentumsanteile sind in allen
IP-Rechten möglich.
Missbrauch durch beherrschende Stellung kann hinsichtlich der IP-Rechte auch dem Wettbewerbsrecht
unterliegen.
Falls eine vertragliche Vereinbarung zwischen den Miteigentümern vorhanden ist, dann ist das
nationale Recht des entsprechenden Landes anzuwenden und das anzuwendende Recht wird nicht
durch die Parteien bestimmt.
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United Kingdom
Royaume–Uni
Vereinigtes Königreich
Report Q194
in the name of the United Kingdom Group
by Michael Edenborough, Lucy Harrold, Paul Harris, Tom Faulnker,
Nicholas MacFarlane, Catriona Smith and James Tumbridge
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
The laws of the United Kingdom do not give rise to different types of co-ownership of IP Rights
based on the origins of the co-ownership.
Co-ownership might arise in a number of different ways. For example, the work in question
might be generated in a manner whereby two or more people are considered to be coauthors
(for copyright) or co-devisors (patents). Not all the IPRs regimes make express
provision governing who is to be considered co-creators of the particular right in question.
Further, regardless of who might be considered co-creators, commonly there are statutory
provisions that determine who are the first owners of the right in question. This might result
(for example in the case of copyright) in two co-authors who are both employed by the same
employer in the ownership being solely in the hands of the employer.
The law does distinguish between all forms of co-ownership as being either ownership as a
‘tenant in common’ or as a ‘joint tenant.’ The principal difference between these two forms
concerns the rules relating to survivorship. Under joint tenancy, if one co-owner were to
die, then his share automatically would be distributed amongst the remainder co-owners;
while in contrast under tenancy in common, if one co-owner dies, then his share devolves in
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accordance with his testimonial wishes, or if there is no will, then in accordance with the rules
of intestacy. Typically, IPRs jointly owned in a commercial context would be held as a tenancy
in common, but occasionally this might not occur, e.g. husband and wife scenarios, and
maybe for certain types of confidential information (e.g. personal as opposed to technical).
The UK law also permits for the legal and equitable titles to a right to be owned by different
people. For example, if there is a binding agreement to assign a right, but that agreement
has not yet been executed, or the execution was flawed so that there was a failure to transfer
the right in question, this could lead to co-ownership of the legal and equitable rights being
held by different persons until the title is untied back in one person.
We do not propose to take consideration of the position of partnerships that own an IPR as a
partnership asset. Such assets being subject to rules of partnership deeds and the rules in the
Partnership Act 1890; in particular, the operation of section 5, whereby permission granted
by one partner binds his fellow partners.
There is no strict legal definition of co-ownership governing IPR. The concepts applicable
arise from UK property law generally. Under UK law, all intellectual property rights (IPRs)
have their own framework either under statute or common law. The principal IPRs available
in the UK are:
Registered Rights:
Patents (UK and EP designating the UK)
Registered Designs (UK and Community)
Registered Trade Marks (UK and Community)
Equitable right – unregistered:
Confidential Information (excluding official secrets, which are governed by the Official Secrets
Act 1989)
Unregistered Rights:
Unregistered Designs (UK and Community)
Passing Off
Copyright
Co-owners may regulate their ownership by contract. As a general rule, contract overrides
the statutory provisions, save for the obvious exceptions like illegality. For an overview of
these IPRs and the rights and definitions of co-owners we would refer the reader to the answer
provided by the UK to question 194 at the Singapore ExCo 2007.
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
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We would refer the reader to the answer provided by the UK to question 194 at the Singapore
ExCo 2007 for the position in the UK on the rights of co-owners to exploit, and the ability
to licence their rights. Under the UK law outsourcing or subcontracting would be done by
operation of a licence.
As this question raises specific concern as to patents we respond in detail on the position
regarding patents in the UK:
Patents are governed by the Patents Act 1977. Other than by agreement to the contrary, those
who are jointly granted a patent, are each entitled to an equal undivided share in the patent
(section 36(1)) and to work the invention for their own benefit without accounting to the others
(section 36(2)). Therefore co-owners are free to agree amongst themselves how to work their
patent, and only fall back on the Patents Act when there is no agreement.
Pursuant to section 36(2)(a) & (b) of Patents Act 1977; where two or more persons are
proprietors of a patent, then, subject to the Act and any agreement to the contrary each of
them shall be entitled, by himself or his agents, to do in respect of the invention concerned,
for his own benefit and without the consent of or the need to account to the other or others,
any act which would apart from this subsection …, amount to an infringement of the patent
concerned.
At common law one co-owner cannot prevent any other co-owner from working the invention,
see Steers v Rogers [1893] AC 232. However, at common law, one co-owner acting alone
could not give a licence binding the other co-owner(s), although there appears to be no
authority directly on the point.
A co-owner of a patent may not grant a licence under the patent without the consent of the
other owners (section 36(3)) Henry Bros (Magherafelt) Ltd. v. Ministry of Defence [1997] RPC
693. Another person may supply a co-owner of a patent with an essential element for the
working of the invention, and such supply will not amount to an infringement of the patent
(section 36(4)). If a co-owner disposes of a patented product to any person, then that person
(and any other person claiming through him) is entitled to deal with the product in the same
way as if it had been disposed of by a sole registered proprietor (section 36(5)). The UK
group also wished to draw attention to the fact that our law differs from the USA in these
matters.
Therefore a sub-contractor, when acting as agent to a co-owner of a patent exploiting their IPR
is acceptable, save where a licence is necessary for the use of said sub-contractor. Likewise
in out-sourcing, if no licence is required it is acceptable in principle, but the UK believes such
arrangements will typically require a licence. Should a licence be required, and it be refused
by one co-owner as against another which frustrates the ability to work the invention, then an
application to the Comptroller of Patents can be made to resolve the dispute between the coowners;
the Comptroller having the power to make orders as between co-owners (section 37).
There have been cases where the Comptroller of Patents has given a co-owner the power to
grant licences without referring to the other co-owners. See for example, McGriskin’s Patent
(BL 0/36/99 and 0/135/00) where it was ordered that a newly determined co-owner (under
Patent Act s.37 proceedings) should be permitted to grant licences without agreement or
interference from the other co-owner, overriding section 36. See also Andrew’s Application
(BL 0/21/98). Further, the Court of Appeal in Hughes v Paxman [2006] EWCA Civ 818,
confirmed that under the Patent Act 1977 section 37, the Comptroller does have jurisdiction
to grant licences to a party approved of by only one co-owner. However, the broad discretion
exercised by the Comptroller of Patents is not available in all IPRs.
Note that the situation for other IPRs is often fundamentally different. Therefore, for example,
for copyright, one co-owner has no right to exercise the rights alone, not even if he accounts
to his co-owners for an appropriate share of the profits (Cescinsky v George Routlege & Sons
Ltd [1916] 2 KB 325).
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3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
The law of the UK in general draws no distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive
licences, in regard to the question posed. If a licence is permitted it may be either exclusive
or non-exclusive. We would refer the reader to the answer provided by the UK to question
194 at the Singapore ExCo 2007 for the position in the UK as to the right of co-owners to
grant licences.
Some of the UK’s legislation draws specific attention to the ability to have both exclusive
and non-exclusive licences, for example the Trade Mark Act 1994 in sections 28 – 31, which
recognises a difference between exclusive and non-exclusive licences; in that, subject to the
licence terms, the exclusive licence provides the same rights to the licensee as if the trade
mark had been assigned. Further, the UK’s copyright legislation in the Copyright Designs
and Patents Act 1998 makes certain infringements actionable by a non-exclusive licensee,
and like the trade mark legislation recognises that exclusive licensees may bring actions for
infringement without the owner.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
In the UK any assignment as described in the foregoing question is permissible by contract.
The English law permits parties to contract for anything that is not prohibited by statute,
commonly known as freedom of contract. If there were a dispute between owners as to the
ability to assign only a sub-share of the share presently owned by the co-owner, this could be
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eferred to the Court or in the case of patents the Comptroller for a determination under their
power set down in section 37 of the Patents Act referred to above in sub-question 2.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
The UK like elsewhere seeks to achieve a balance between the public interest in the limited
monopolies of IPRs, and the public interest in competition. The response to this sub-question
considers three areas of law; (1) European Union law on Competition, (2) UK law on
Competition, and (3) Compulsory licences in patents.
(1) European Union Law
IPRs are monopolies and restrict competition; as a result agreements which affect
the ownership and control of IPRs and the manner of their exploitation can breach
competition law in certain circumstances. In relation to European Union law the affect
upon competition by IPRs between member states is the paramount concern.
Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty prohibits, ‘as incompatible with the common market,’
agreements ‘that may affect trade between member states and have the object or effect
of preventing, restricting or distorting competition within the common market.’
However, agreements falling within Article 81(1) may be exempted under Article 81(3)
or, if they fall within the defined parameters of a block exemption for the particular
type of agreement, they may be automatically exempted. There are block exemptions
for licences of patents and/or know-how (the Technology Transfer block exemption
(Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 (OJ 2004 L123/11) which replaced
Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 as of 1 May 2004), for agreements concerning
research and development or specialisation and for vertical agreements).
Joint ventures that are ‘concentrative’ will in general avoid sanction (Commission control)
unless they are large enough to fall within the scope of Council Regulation (EC) No
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (ECMR), which
provides a largely self contained mechanism of control. Other joint ventures, termed ‘cooperative’
fall to be considered under Article 81 and any applicable block exemptions.
The Commission has issued a Notice concerning the assessment of horizontal cooperation
agreements under Article 81 (the Guidelines) (OJ 2001 C3/02).
Competition issues can arise in collaborative R&D agreements which result in IPRs
being co-owned. The Commission’s being concerned that collaborators (whether they
are actual or potential competitors) reduce competition. Such agreements, if between
large enough companies who are potential competitors, will in practice almost inevitably
contain restrictions which might on their face breach Article 81, irrespective of whether or
not the collaboration is undertaken by means of a separate joint venture vehicle.
The Commission accepts it is in the public interest to encourage co-operation in R&D and
in the exploitation of the results thereby generated, which requires a balanced approach
to the restrictions of Article 81. The Research and Development Block Exemption (the
R&DE) (Commission Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000 on the application of Article 81(3)
of the EC Treaty to categories of research and development (OJ 2000 L304/7)), reflects
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this approach. The R&DE exempting from Article 81 certain agreements for joint R&D
and joint exploitation (including assignments or licensing of intellectual property rights or
the communication of know-how to third parties) of the results of that R&D. However, the
R&DE applies only where the agreement meets certain criteria such as:
• All parties have access to the results of the joint R&D for the purposes of further
research or exploitation (Article 3(2), R&DE).
• Where the parties are not competing undertakings at the time the agreement is
entered into, the right to exploit the results may be limited to one or more technical
fields of application (Article 3(3)).
• The joint exploitation relates to results which are protected by intellectual property
rights, or constitute know-how, which substantially contribute to technical or economic
progress, and the results are decisive for (that is, central to) the manufacture of the
contract products or the application of the contract processes (Article 3(4)).
• Undertakings charged with manufacture by way of specialisation in production must
fulfil orders for supplies from all the parties, except where the R&D agreement also
provides for joint distribution (Article 3(5)).
• Where the parties are not competing undertakings, the R&DE will apply for the
duration of the R&D programme and for seven years afterwards if the results are to
be jointly exploited. If the parties are competing undertakings, that same period will
apply only if the parties’ combined market share does not exceed 25% of the market
for products capable of being improved or replaced by the contract products. In
either case, after the seven-year exploitation period, the exemption may continue to
apply indefinitely provided the parties’ continued production of the contract products
and other substitutable products does not exceed 25% of the total market for such
products.
All conditions under which undertakings pursue R&D are permitted, subject to certain
conditions and to the exclusion of certain hardcore restrictions, such as:
• A prohibition on challenges to the validity of intellectual property rights which the
parties hold in the EU and which are relevant to or protect the results of the R&D
(but provisions which allow a party to terminate the R&D agreement if its intellectual
property rights are challenged by the other are allowed).
• A prohibition on the putting of the contract products on the market, or the pursuit of
an active sales policy for them, in territories within the EU that are reserved for other
parties after the end of seven years from the time the contract products are first put
on the market in the EU.
• A requirement to refuse to meet demand from users or resellers in their respective
territories who would market the contract products in other territories within the EU.
Certain restrictions are specifically permitted:
• Setting production targets where the exploitation of the results includes the joint
production of the contract product.
• Setting sales targets and fixing prices to be charged to immediate customers where
the exploitation of the results includes the joint distribution of the contract products.
(Article 5(2), R&DE.)
(2) UK Law
UK competition law mirrors EU law to a great extent, the Chapter I prohibition under the
Competition Act 1998 which mirrors Article 81 is similarly subject to various exemptions.
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Although the substantive legal principles relevant to the application of the Chapter I
Competition Act prohibition to agreements and the Chapter II Competition Act prohibition
to conduct are similar or identical to those under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty
respectively, the licensing of IP rights may be different in some respects.
(3) Compulsory licences in patents
One method by which the UK deals with anti-competitive practices is that of compulsory
licences, per s.48 Patents Act 1977. Therefore in the scenario that patent holders choose
not to work an invention to suppress its use, or are failing to meet market demand third
parties can apply for compulsory licences to work the invention. Such applications
may also be applied for where one co-owner is preventing the other from working the
invention due to their need to licence a third party, in accordance with the case of
Hughes v Paxman [2006] EWCA Civ 818. Compulsory licences cannot be granted until
after three years from grant of the patent
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
The established UK law on determining jurisdiction generally applies to disputes regarding
the ownership of IPRs. Where such rights are not settled contractually between the parties,
jurisdiction will be decided upon established principles which the UK group feels are beyond
the scope of this paper. If the UK Courts decide to exercise jurisdiction then it would determine
the issue of ownership by reference to the relevant foreign law or laws based on the location
of creation.
With regard to the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980
(Rome Convention) the UK group consider that it is not applicable in all scenarios but can
be informative, and is part of UK domestic law by virtue of the Contracts (Applicable Law)
Act 1990. The Rome Convention sets out the rules for determining what substantive law
should be applied by courts when resolving contractual disputes, but does not extend to noncontractual
(such as tortious actions) obligations. Consequently, it would not assist in matters
such as passing off in the absence of a contractual relationship between the parties. In the
absence of an express choice of governing law, a court with jurisdiction will have to decide
which law to apply to the contract according to the conflict of law principles that apply in
that court’s jurisdiction. The Rome Convention harmonised the rules for establishing the law
applicable to contracts in the EU. Under the Rome Convention, parties are free to choose the
law to govern their contract. The governing law clause applies to a wide range of contractual
issues. It governs not only interpretation and performance, but also the consequences of
breach, including the assessment of damages and limitation (article 10).
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In the absence of party choice, Article 4 of the Rome Convention provides that a contract
will be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected. It will be
assumed that this will be the country where the party who is to effect the performance which
is characteristic of the contract has his habitual residence or, in the case of a corporate entity,
the country where is has its central administration.
It should be noted that, while an express choice of law cannot be overturned, challenges
can be made to it under the Rome Convention, which can have the effect of modifying the
applicable law, inter alia on the following bases:
• Where all the relevant elements are connected with another country other than the
applicable law.
• Where the choice of forum is different from the applicable law.
• Where the public policy of the forum is manifestly incompatible with the application
of the applicable law.
• Fraud, mistake, non-incorporation or other such grounds under general principles of
contract law.
The UK therefore uses established principles to determine applicable law and does not treat
IP differently from other matters when determining applicable law. It considers the same
principles should apply to Rome I (which does not at present apply to the UK).
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
The UK group consider the following issues have not been discussed – Renewals; Surrender;
Pre & Post Grant Amendment and Litigation.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
The UK Group would suggest that the removal of the right to co-own an IPR might raise
interesting discussion and present unique opportunities.
In general, the UK group believes that a co-owner should be subject to restrictions on his
freedom to deal with or to exploit a co-owned intellectual property right; otherwise he has
the power to destroy the value of that right. When no agreement can be reached between
co-owners, then jurisdiction to resolve such a stalemate should be conferred on, for example,
the Intellectual Property Office. The UK group also supports moves towards harmonising
these issues on an international basis, because differences in national laws can defeat the
expectations of rights owners who structure their relationship with co-owners based on their
own national law and the false assumption that the same applies elsewhere. It is the opinion
of the UK group that consideration of how to harmonise each IPR should be considered in
turn rather than as a whole, and we would recommend that process be commenced with
patents. However, the UK group considers harmonisation between Common and Civil law
jurisdictions presents problems as they do not all recognise the same rights, and there are
even differences as between common law jurisdictions, and jurisdictions that utilise a hybrid
system which mixes roman, civil and common law principles.
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Summary
The laws of the United Kingdom do not give rise to different types of co-ownership of IPRs dependant
upon the origin of the co-ownership. Regardless of the genesis of the work that is co-owned, there
are two different types of co-ownership, namely either as ‘tenants in common’ or as a ‘joint tenants,’
which affects the nature of survivorship rights. The UK also permits ownership of equitable and
legal titles, held by different persons.
Co-ownership is commonly regulated by contract, and freedom of contract makes almost any
arrangement permissible. The rights of co-owners to work inventions and licence rights do vary
based upon the IPR in question and the relevant governing statutory regime. In general co-owners
must agree to licence and sub-contract the IPR and may not act unilaterally, although they may seek
a decision of the Court to determine a dispute between themselves.
The interface between competition and IPRs is complex, and the law is greatly influenced by EU
law. The UK seeks to balance the public policy between the individual right and the public interest,
e.g. it is possible to request a compulsory licence to ensure patents are worked.
In general, the UK group believes that a co-owner should be subject to restrictions on freedom to
deal with a co-owned IPR; otherwise the value of that right may diminish.
Where co-owners are in different jurisdictions and disputes arise, the UK Courts determine ownership
by reference to the relevant foreign law or laws based on the location of creation.
The group supports moves towards harmonising these issues, because differences in national laws
can defeat the expectations of owners who structure their relationship with co-owners based on
their own national law. The harmonization of each IPR should be considered in turn, and we would
recommend that process be commenced with patents.
Résumé
Les lois du Royaume-Uni ne permettent pas différents types de copropriété des droits de propriété
intellectuelle selon l’origine de la copropriété. Quelque soit la genèse du travail qui est en
copropriété, il y a deux différents types de copropriété, soit “conjointe”, soit “solidaire”,’ ce qui
affecte la nature des droits du survivant. Le Royaume-Uni permet aussi que la propriété sur la valeur
et les titres de propriété soit détenue par différentes personnes.
La copropriété est habituellement gouvernée par les contrats, et la liberté contractuelle rend
presque tout arrangement possible. Les droits des copropriétaires d’exploiter et de concéder les
droits varient selon le droit de propriété intellectuelle en question et le régime légal applicable.
En général les copropriétaires s’accordent pour concéder et sous-contracter les droits de propriété
intellectuelle et ne peuvent agir de manière unilatérale, bien qu’ils puissent requérir une décision
du tribunal pour régler un conflit entre eux.
L’interface entre la concurrence et les droits de propriété intellectuelle est complexe, et le droit est
grandement influencé par le droit communautaire. Le Royaume-Uni cherche à équilibrer la politique
publique entre le droit individuel et l’intérêt du public, par exemple il est possible de requérir une
licence obligatoire pour s’assurer que les brevets sont exploités.
En général, le groupe du Royaume-Uni considère qu’un copropriétaire devrait être sujet à des
restrictions sur la liberté de traiter des droits de propriété intellectuelle en copropriété; autrement la
valeur de ce droit pourrait diminuer.
Là où les copropriétaires sont dans des juridictions différentes et qu’un conflit survient, les tribunaux
du Royaume-Uni déterminent le droit de propriété selon la ou les lois étrangères pertinentes sur la
base de la localisation de la création.
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Le groupe supporte les changements allant vers l’harmonisation de ces points, parce que les
différences entre les droits nationaux peuvent faire échouer les attentes des propriétaires, qui
structurent leurs relations avec les copropriétaires sur la base de leur propre droit national.
L’harmonisation de chaque droit de propriété intellectuelle devrait être considérée tout à tour, et
nous recommandons que ce processus débute par les brevets.
Zusammenfassung
Es gibt im englischen Recht keine verschiedenen Arten von Miteigentum bei Gewerblichen
Schutzrechten, welche von der Herkunft des Miteigentums abhängen würden. Unabhängig
von der Entstehung des im Miteigentum stehenden Werks gibt es zwei verschiedene
Varianten von Miteigentümern, nämlich entweder “Miteigentümer nach Bruchteilen” oder “
Gesamthandseigentümer” 1 . Diese unterscheiden sich in ihren rechtlichen Wirkungen im Todesfall
eines Miteigentümers. In dem Vereinigten Königreich ist auch das Eigentum an so genannten
Billigkeits-Titeln [equitable title] und Rechtstiteln anerkannt, die sich im Besitz mehrerer Personen
befinden.
Miteigentum ist meist vertraglich geregelt, und wegen des Prinzips der Vertragsfreiheit ist nahezu
jegliche Art von Vereinbarung zulässig. Die Rechte eines Miteigentümers bei Diensterfindungen
und Lizenzrechten unterscheiden sich je nachdem, auf welchem Gewerblichen Schutzrecht sie
basieren sowie dem einschlägigen Gesetzestext. In der Regel müssen Miteigentümer einer Lizenz
oder einem Untervertrag über das Gewerbliche Schutzrecht zustimmen und dürfen nicht allein über
ihr Miteigentum verfügen. Allerdings können sie die Entscheidung eines Gerichts einholen, um
Streitigkeiten zwischen ihnen beizulegen.
Die Berührungspunkte zwischen dem Kartellrecht und Gewerblichen Schutzrechten sind
vielschichtig und die gesetzlichen Vorschriften beruhen überwiegend auf Europäischem Recht. Das
Vereinigte Königreich bemüht sich darum, die Rechte Einzelner und das öffentliche Interesse in ein
angemessenes Gleichgewicht zu bringen. So ist es z.B. möglich eine Zwangslizenz zu erhalten um
sicherzustellen, dass Patente benutzt werden können.
Die Gruppe des Vereinigten Königreichs ist in der Regel der Ansicht, dass das Recht eines
Miteigentümers, frei über ein im Miteigentum stehendes Gewerbliches
Schutzrecht zu verfügen, Beschränkungen unterliegen sollte; anderenfalls könnte der Wert dieses
Rechts reduziert werden.
Wenn die Miteigentümer aus verschiedenen Rechtssphären stammen und es zu Streitigkeiten
kommt, entscheiden die Gerichte des Vereinigten Königreichs über das Eigentum gemäß dem
jeweils relevanten ausländischen Recht oder dem am Ort der Entstehung geltenden Recht.
Die Gruppe unterstützt die Bemühungen um eine Harmonisierung dieser Probleme. Die Unterschiede
in nationalen Gesetzgebungen können die Erwartungen der Eigentümer vereiteln, die ihre
Beziehung mit dem Miteigentümer jeweils nach ihrem eigenen nationalen Recht strukturiert haben.
Die Harmonisierung jedes einzelnen Gewerblichen Schutzrechts sollte der Reihe nach erfolgen.
Wir würden vorschlagen, dass Patente bei diesem Prozess den Anfang machen sollten.
1 Please note that there is no exact German equivalent to “tenants in common” and “joint tenants”.
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United States of America
États-Unis d’Amérique
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
Report Q194
in the name of the United States Group
by Michael S. Connor, Margaret A. Dobrowitsky, Bruce D. Gray; Dan Altman,
Michael McGurk and Andrew Sparkler
The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation
Discussion and Questions
Separate answers for patents, trademarks and copyrights are provided in this Report due to
substantive differences in the law pertaining to each type of right.
I) Analysis of the current substantive law
1) The regulation of co-ownership may depend on the origin of co-ownership.
It may be considered that, in case the object of an intellectual right (esthetical, technical or
commercial) is jointly created by two or more persons, the rules applicable to such a situation
may be different from those applicable in the situation when the co-ownership results from
the division of the same right among different persons as the consequence, for example, of
heritage or a division of a company.
Also, there may be the situations where the co-ownership is imposed in fact by one party
on the other in case of some technical creation (for example in case of the improvement or
modification of the previous creations which not always may result in the independent right).
Therefore, the groups are invited to indicate if, in their national laws, the rules related to the
co-ownership of IP Rights make any distinction in the applicable rules to the co-ownership of
an IP Right in case the origin of the co-ownership rights is not voluntary but results from other
situations, including the division of a right in case of a heritage.
In this context the Groups may also indicate if there are any legal definitions of co-ownership
of the IP Rights adopted in their countries and what these definitions are.
A. Patents
In the United States, patents have the attributes of personal property and are subject to the
general rules regarding the ownership and transfer of such property. See 35 U.S.C. § 261.
As a consequence, patents and patent applications may be assigned. 35 U.S.C. § 261. The
presumptive owner of a patent is the human inventor of the invention. This inventor may transfer
ownership of his interest in the patent by assignment to anyone (including a corporation or
other entity) and may in fact be under a legal duty to so by virtue of a contractual or other
obligation. 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 22.01 (1993). When two or
more individuals collaborate to create the invention, the individuals have joint ownership
rights in the patent. See CHISUM § 22.01. In the United States, no special legal theory
exists for situations in which co-ownership results from the division of the same right among
different persons as the consequence, for example, of heritage or a division of a company.
That is, the rights of co-owners of the patent rights are the same irrespective of the origin of
co-ownership.
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In addition to the above, in situations where the invention was made using U.S. Government
funding (e.g., under a government contract), the U.S. Government generally does not take
an ownership position in the patent, but has a paid-up license, and may require the patent
owner to license others on “reasonable terms.” See 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-03. To our knowledge,
the U.S. Government has not exercised its “march in” rights. Additionally, if an employee is
specifically hired by an employer to solve a specific problem, or was hired to exercise his
or her “inventive faculties,” the employer may own the rights in any resulting patents, even
without an assignment or employment agreement. However, it is often difficult to understand
the line between this situation and one where the employee is hired generally to do research.
See CHISUM § 22.03[2]. Also, the United States recognizes the “shop right” doctrine in which
“an employee who uses his employer’s resources to conceive an invention or to reduce it to
practice must afford to his employer a nonexclusive, royalty-free, non-transferable license to
make use of the invention, even though the employee subsequently obtains a patent thereon.”
CHISUM at § 22.03[3]. An employer with a shop right does not have an ownership interest
in the patent. Rather, the shop right allows the employer a defense to a charge of patent
infringement by the employee. See CHISUM at § 22.03[3].
B. Trademarks
Most of the case law in the trademark area regarding joint ownership seems to result from
the dissolution of an entity that previously owned the mark on its own. Examples of such
dissolution include, a company split into components, the dissolution of a joint venture, or the
dissolution of a marriage. When two parties agree to be joint owners of a trademark, they
can agree how to split up the good will and other rights. However, when dissolution is not
voluntary, it is difficult to divide up the rights in a trademark equally. If each of the parties
continues to use the mark, each would “of necessity use the mark to symbolize good will
different from that which the mark previously symbolized. This can lead to customer confusion
and deception and to impairment of the mark itself.” McCarthy § 16:42.
The modern view is that “good will behind a mark should be treated as an indivisible asset.”
McCarthy § 16:44. The parties need to agree, either a priori or after the fact, which parties
will derive what rights to use the trademark in a manner that does not lead to customer
confusion. Where the parties have not and cannot agree, the courts have taken different
approaches. In at least one extreme case, the court decided that the unfortunate result of the
parties’ refusal to compromise is that the court is forced to in effect extinguish the valuable
trademark rights of the joint venture. Durango Herald, Inc. v. Riddle, 719 F. Supp. 941, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d 1052 (D. Colo. 1988). Other cases, such as a number of different cases involving
the use of a band name after the original band was split up, tend to allocate the rights to a
specific party. In general, the courts may balance contractual expectations of the parties with
customer perceptions. McCarthy § 16:48.
C. Copyrights
There is a distinction between a work “made-for-hire” by an employee and a work made by
an independent contractor. If a work is co-authored by an independent contractor and an
employee, the copyright in the resulting work might be co-owned by the employer and the
independent contractor. But, the rights and responsibilities of the co-owners would be the
same as if they became co-owners through other means.
The relevant text from 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines works-made-for–hire, in part, as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
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Additionally, it should be noted that works prepared by the United States government are not
copyrightable.
Notwithstanding the above, the writers of certain works-for-hire are still entitled to receive
royalties in specific instances. For example, a composer for a television show or motion picture
may sell their works as works-for-hire, but as a customary aspect of the composer’s contract, the
composer still can receive public performance royalties from a performing rights organization
(ASCAP, BMI and SESAC in the United States).
2) A large debate, during the Singapore ExCo, took place with regard to the notion of the
exploitation of an IP right.
More specifically, the groups were highly divided on the issue of outsourcing or subcontracting
the exploitation of an IP right.
This question, particularly important in case of patents, relates particularly to the problem
of subcontracting when a co-owner of the patent who, in principle, and at least according
to the position expressed by AIPPI in its 2007 Singapore Resolution, has the personal right
to exploit his own part of the patent, specifically by manufacturing and selling the goods or
processes covered by the patent, needs to subcontract partially or totally the manufacturing
of the product covered by the patent.
No common position could be achieved by the Singapore ExCo in 2007 on the question
if the right to exploit the patent should also cover the right to subcontract, specifically the
manufacturing of all or part of the invention being the subject matter of the patent.
Therefore, the groups are invited to present the solutions of their national laws on this specific
point.
A. Patents
Under United States law, a co-owner of a patent may have the invention made for itself by a
third party without having to obtain the consent of the other co-owners(s) and without the duty
to account to the other co-owner(s) for any economic benefit realized. In licenses drafted by
United States attorneys, the grant of the right to make an invention will typically also state the
right of the licensee to have the invention made for the licensee by a third party (“the right to
make and have made”).
B. Trademarks
This question does not appear to be relevant to trademarks as they exist in the United
States.
C. Copyrights
A copyright includes the right to copy. This right generally would permit either co-owner to
have works produced that embody the underlying work.
A copyright is a bundle of rights and co-owners of a copyrighted work may license different
aspects of these rights, or all of them unilaterally, provided that there is no legal agreement
preventing such a license. Furthermore, such a license must be nonexclusive and is subject
to a duty to account to co-owners for a ratable share of profits from the license. 1 Nimmer
on Copyright §§ 6.10 & 6.11 (2006). Similarly, one joint owner may always transfer interest
in the joint work to a third party, subject only to the general requirements of a valid transfer
of copyright, under United States law. One joint owner does not have the power to transfer
the interest of another owner without the latter’s consent. 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 6.11
(2006). Finally, any transfer of copyright ownership that transfers the interests of both joint
owners must be unanimous among co-owners; an exclusive license is defined by the law as a
variety of transfer of the joint interests in the copyright and therefore, must be jointly agreed.
1 Nimmer on Copyright § 6.11 (2006).
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Examples of specific rights that are frequently sub-licensed include the right to reproduce the
work and the right to prepare derivative works.
3) The working guidelines established for the Singapore ExCo contained also the question
related to the possibility of the co-owner of an IP right to licence this right to third parties.
No distinction was, however, made in this context between a non-exclusive and an exclusive
licence.
No differentiation was also made on the number of licences which could be given by one
co-owner in case the non-exclusive licence would be permitted by the national law.
And if AIPPI adopted a resolution on the conditions of granting the licence, it also appeared
during the discussion at the ExCo that some different or more precise solutions could have
been obtained if the Working Committee had made a distinction between the nature of the
licence.
Therefore, in order to improve the work of the ExCo, the groups are invited to specify how the
differences in the nature of licenses (non-exclusive or exclusive) influence the solution of their
national laws in respect of the right to grant the licence by a co-owner of an IP Right.
A. Patents
A co-owner purporting to grant a licensee an exclusive license in an invention would in fact
convey no more than the excusive right (exclusive freedom from suit – sole license) under
the co-owner’s undivided interest in the invention. See Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA,
104 F.3d 341, 344 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Each co-owner’s ownership rights carry with them the
right to license others, a right that also does not require the consent of any other co-owner);
see also 35 U.S.C. § 262. In effect, this is a promise by the co-owner/licensor not to sue the
licensee, and a promise that the co-owner/licensor will not license other licensees, but would
not prevent a different co-owner from giving a license to third parties.
B. Trademarks
If the co-owners agree, they can license freely. If they do not agree, then sublicense is not
possible.
C. Copyrights
As for patents, a co-owner cannot license the exclusive right to a third party without the
cooperation of the other co-owner. However, unlike patents, there is an obligation to account
to the co-owner.
Rights can be granted on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis, but when granted non-exclusively,
the copyright owner still retains the right to directly license the work in question. See Answer
2(c) above that also addresses this issue.
4) One of the most difficult questions which appeared during the discussion at the Singapore
ExCo was the possibility to transfer or assign a co-owned share of an IP right.
And the problem seemed so complicated that finally the Working Committee decided to
withdraw its proposal for a resolution on this point.
In fact, the discussion showed that the solutions concerning the right to transfer or assign
may vary since there is a huge variety of situations related to the transfers of the co-owned
share.
Notably, one could imagine that the transfer is operated on the whole share of the co-owned
IP right, but it also could be simply an assignment of a part of the co-owned share, creating
therefore an additional co-owner of an IP right.
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And such transfer of a part of a share of an IP Right could be used to overcome the limitation
which could exist on the granting of licences by the co-owners.
The Groups are therefore invited to precise their position on the question of the transfer or
assignment of a share of the co-owned IP Right, taking into the consideration the different
situations which may occur (the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the
transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right).
A. Patents
Under 35 U.S.C. 261, patents are given “the attributes of personal property”. Section 261
states that applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, are assignable in law by an
instrument in writing, and that the applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives
may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his or her application for
patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States.
Under United States law, no differences exist with regard to the transfer of the whole share of
a co-owned IP Right or the transfer only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right. A
co-owner can transfer all or part of his co-ownership interest without the consent of any other
co-owners, and can impose contractual conditions on that transfer (e.g., no right to grant
licenses, etc.). See e.g., Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 344 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (“Each co-owner’s ownership rights carry with them the right to license others, a right
that also does not require the consent of any other co-owner.”) and HAROLD EINHORN,
PATENT LICENSING TRANSACTIONS § 1.02[1] (2008); see also 35 U.S.C. § 262. Such a
transfer would be of a proportionate undivided interest in the patent.
However, the transfer of less than all of the substantial rights (i.e., the right to make, use, sell,
and sue for infringement) associated with that proportionate undivided interest might well be
considered to be a license, even if the transfer is termed an “assignment.” For example, the
failure to transfer the right to sue for infringement with an alleged assignment might well be
considered to be an indication that the parties intended to transfer less than all substantial
rights in the ownership interest, and therefore result in the transfer being considered to be a
license, and not an assignment. See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891); Vaupel
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.p.A., 944 F.2d 870, 20 USPQ2d 1045 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
If all of the substantial rights associated with an ownership interest are transferred, and if the
obligation to refrain from licensing arises contractually, a U.S. court may well find that the
parties could have, and should have, also contractually prohibited or limited the assignment
of the patent right in a similar way, and that their failure to do so indicates an intent that
assignability should not be limited. Moreover, general legal principles of alienability of
personal property would result in any such contractual limitations being closely examined
and probably strictly construed against the party asserting nonassignability. However, U.S.
courts have fairly broad powers to provide equitable relief in the interest of justice, and
could possibly be convinced to enjoin or limit assignability if significant overreaching by the
assigning party could be shown.
B. Trademarks
Based on general principles, a co-owner may be able to transfer the rights as long as they
are subject to all the obligations that the co-owner has, and that all good will accompanies
the transfer. However, the consumer may expect the source of the product to be the original
joint owners and lead to consumer confusion, particularly when the other co-owner objects
to the transfer. Thus, the ability to transfer might be subject to the “balancing” of contractual
expectations and consumer perceptions, as discussed above.
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C. Copyrights
Rights are freely transferable. As mentioned above, the U.S. Copyright Act permits each coowner
to exploit their work without the consent of the other co-owner. This includes the right
to enter into non-exclusive licenses, subject only to the duty to account to the other co-owner
for their ratable share of profits. The only means by which co-owners can regulate, modify or
otherwise limit exploitation of the work, is through a written agreement.
Additionally, please refer to Question 2(c) from the original Report Q194, the relevant section
of which has been copied below and discusses the United States law governing termination
of copyrights.
Under Section 203 of the U.S. Copyright Act, “[i]n the case of any work other than a work
made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of
any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise
than by will, is subject to termination under [certain] conditions, and “notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future
grant” and such a termination will cause the terminated rights to revert to the author, authors,
and other persons owning termination interests . . . including those owners who did not join in
signing the notice of termination.” See U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 203, available at http://
www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap2.html#203. It should be kept in mind that the giving of
notice of termination is an area requiring procedural precision (e.g., it can be exercised only
35 years from publication of the work, or 40 years from the date of grant being terminated,
whichever is earlier, and compliance with other conditions), and in short, requires careful
study by itself even by U.S. practitioners otherwise well versed in copyright law. Nonetheless,
the primary purpose for mentioning it here in that there are specific provisions that apply to
the co-authors’ exercise of termination rights in respect of grants, whether those grants are
non-exclusive licenses or a transfer of a co-author’s interest. In particular, Section 203(a)(1)
provides that:, in the case of two co-authors, only the co-author that executed the grant, may
terminate that grant; and, in the case where two or more co-authors executed a grant, the
majority of the co-authors who executed the grant are required to effect a termination of that
grant.
5) The exercise of an IP right co-owned by two or more co-owners each of whom has in principle
the right to exploit the co-owned right, may also raise difficulties from the point of view of
competition rules.
The co-owned IP Rights may give the co-owners the dominant position on the market and their
agreement on the co-owned IP Rights (when for example it prohibits the licensing) may also
be seen as eliminating the competitors from the market.
The groups are therefore invited to explain if their national laws had to treat such situations
and what were the solutions adopted in those cases.
A. Patents
The concept of “joint monopolization” under which a group of entities might be found
collectively to possess monopoly power (whether due to a patent or otherwise) has generally
been rejected by the United States courts. American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S.
781 (1946). However, it is possible for an agreement concerning ownership of IP rights to
be challenged as anticompetitive under United States law as reflecting collusive conduct.
Agreements concerning patents are considered to be pro-competitive, or at least it is
considered by enforcement authorities that such agreements can have pro-competitive effects,
so that they are not per se anticompetitive. Such agreements would be examined under a
“rule of reason” approach by enforcement authorities and the courts to determine whether
the pro-competitive effects outweigh the anticompetitive effects, and upheld or struck down
depending upon the result of that analysis. For example, the mere fact that an agreement
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etween co-owners prohibits licensing may seem anticompetitive, but pro-competitive effects
(the facilitation of the co-owner’s entry into the marketplace themselves to compete with other
similar products) may outweigh the anticompetitive effects. Also, the assertion of a patent
known to be invalid, or a patent that was acquired through knowing and wilful fraud, may be
deemed to constitute attempted monopolization, regardless of whether the patent is singly or
jointly owned. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965).
The intellectual property and antitrust laws of the United States are intended to work in tandem
to promote consumer welfare and innovation. The United States has two antitrust enforcement
authorities with partially overlapping authority in civil cases: 1) the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”); and 2) the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). Guidance on
the interplay between the intellectual property and antitrust laws of the United States may be
found in the joint publications of the FTC and DOJ. In 1995, the FTC and DOJ jointly issued
“IP Licensing Guidelines”, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0558.pdf. In 2007. The FTC
and DOJ issued a joint report that confirmed the validity of the 1995 Guidelines (See “U.S.
Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights,
Promoting Innovation and Competition”, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
hearings/ip/222655.pdf).
B. Trademarks
The committee did not identify any antitrust issues specific to the law of trademarks.
C. Copyrights
It is difficult to control a market with a copyright because others are free to market different
expressions of the same idea covered by the copyright. However, it might be possible where
the particular expression has been adopted as a standard. In this context, it would be highly
fact-specific whether antitrust issues might arise.
There are certain situations within the United States Copyright Act where licensees must
obtain a compulsory license through the United States Copyright Office. This procedure is
described at the Copyright Office website, http://www.copyright.gov/licensing/ (and the
related “Circular 75: The Licensing Division of the Copyright Office,” available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ75.pdf) and states:
The Licensing Division in the Copyright Office administers the compulsory and statutory
licenses in the Copyright Act (title 17 of the U.S. Code). The division collects royalty fees
from cable operators for retransmitting television and radio broadcasts (section 111),
from satellite carriers for retransmitting “superstation” and network signals (section 119),
and from importers or manufacturers for distributing digital audio recording products
(see Report of Receipts). The division deducts its full operating costs from the royalty
fees and invests the balance in interest-bearing securities with the U.S. Treasury for later
distribution to copyright owners.
Also, it should be noted that the two main performance rights organizations in the United
States, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP) and Broadcast
Music, Inc. (“BMI”), operate under separate consent decrees with the United States Department
of Justice. ASCAP and BMI are responsible for collecting public performance royalties on
behalf of their respective members and also for protecting their members’ rights.
6) The groups are invited to investigate once more the question of the applicable law that could
be used to govern the co-ownership of various rights coexisting in different countries.
This point was left for further study by the paragraph 9 of the resolution adopted in
Singapore.
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And more specifically the Groups are requested to indicate if their national laws accept
that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is no contractual agreement between
the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of the country which presents the closest
connections with the IP Right.
If this is the case, what in the opinion of the Groups would then be the elements to take into
the consideration to assess this connection?
The Groups of the EU Countries are in this context asked to indicate if they consider that
Council Regulation of June 17, 2008 (No 593/2008), so called “Rome I” may be applicable
to the Co-Ownership agreements.
A. Patents
United States national laws accept that the co-ownership of an IP Right, even if there is
no contractual agreement between the co-owners, may be ruled by the national law of
the country which presents the closest connections with the IP Right. Under United States
law, patents are jurisdictional in scope and ownership/co-ownership of a US patent would
be decided in accordance with the law of individual states, provided that this does not
conflict with U.S. federal law. See CHISUM at § 22.03[5]. If called upon to adjudicate an
issue involving co-ownership rights in a non-U.S. patent, U.S. courts (assuming that the court
found that it had jurisdiction to hear the case) would likely attempt to apply the law of the
country that issued the non-U.S. patent. See CHISUM at § 21.02[1][h] (citing cases where
supplemental jurisdiction was not found to hear allegations relating to infringement of a non-
U.S. patent, in part because “the governing laws are different.”). A contract (license) would
be construed under the law of the jurisdiction stated in the contract unless the construction
under such law violates a public policy of the United States.
Ownership of a patent initially vests under the United States Patent Act in the inventor. 35
U.S.C. 101 states that “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title” Under 35
U.S.C. 116, several inventors may jointly apply for a patent even though they did not physically
work together at the same time, did not make the same kind or amount of contribution, and
did not each make a contribution to the technology contained in every claim of the patent
application. Under Rule 37 C.F.R. 1.45(a), joint inventors must apply for a patent jointly and
each must make the required oath and declaration: neither of them alone, nor less than the
entire number, can apply for a patent for an invention invented by them jointly.
B. Trademarks
It seems unlikely that U.S. courts would apply foreign law to a joint ownership situation.
C. Copyrights
One would expect U.S. courts to apply U.S. law to co-ownership issues when adjudicating
U.S. copyrights.
Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 104, all unpublished works are subject to the U.S. Copyright Act
without regard to the nationality or domicile of the author. Published works are subject to
protection under the U.S. Copyright Act if
(1) on the date of first publication, one or more of the authors is a national or domiciliary of
the United States, or is a national, domiciliary, or sovereign authority of a treaty party,
or is a stateless person, wherever that person may be domiciled; or
(2) the work is first published in the United States or in a foreign nation that, on the date of
first publication, is a treaty party; or
(3) the work is a sound recording that was first fixed in a treaty party; or
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(4) the work is a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work that is incorporated in a building or
other structure, or an architectural work that is embodied in a building and the building
or structure is located in the United States or a treaty party; or
(5) the work is first published by the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies, or by
the Organization of American States; or
(6) the work comes within the scope of a Presidential proclamation. 17 U.S.C. 104.
In most instances, acts of infringement that occur outside of the United States’ jurisdiction
are not actionable under the U.S. Copyright Act. 4 Nimmer on Copyright, “The Territorial
Limitations of the Copyright Act,” Vol. 4, § 17.02 (2006). This is because U.S. Copyright laws
do not have any extraterritorial operation. 4 Nimmer on § 17.02 (citing, in part, Subafilms
Ltd. V. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9 th Cir. 1994) (en banc),
Yount v. Acuff Rose-Opryland, 103 F.3d 830, 835 (9 th Cir. 1996) and Nintendo of Am., Inc.
v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 249 n.5 (9 th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 132 L. Ed. 2d 263
(1995)). In some instances, the finding of an act of infringement in a foreign jurisdiction can
form the basis for a finding of infringement when a subsequent act is committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States. 4 Nimmer on § 17.02. One example is when a defendant’s
song is found to be infringing, in an English court, from plaintiff’s song, it is possible that the
subsequent public performance of defendant’s song in the United States can then be held,
by a U.S. court, to infringe plaintiff’s copyright. 4 Nimmer on § 17.02 (citing Leo Feist, Inc., v.
Debmar Publishing Co., 232 F.Supp. 623 (E.D. Pa. 1964). Cf. National Enquirer, Inc. v. News
Group News, Ltd., 670 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Fla. 1987)).
7) Finally, the groups are also invited to present all other issues which appear to be relevant to
the question and which were not discussed neither in these working guidelines, nor in the
previous ones for the 2007 ExCo in Singapore.
A. Patents
There are no additional issues at this time.
B. Trademarks
The USPTO will accept applications for registration by joint owners.
C. Copyrights
The rules governing co-ownership of copyrights differ from those governing patents. Most
notably, co-owners have a duty to account to the other co-owner for their use of the copyrighted
work.
II)
Proposal for the future harmonisation
The groups are invited to present any recommendation that can be followed in the view of
the further harmonisation of national laws in the context of co-ownership, specifically on the
points raised by the working guidelines above in relation to the current state of their national
laws.
Note:
It will be helpful and appreciated if the Groups follow the order of the questions in their
Reports and use the questions and numbers for each answer.
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Summary
Patents: Under United States law, the rights of co-owners of the patent rights are the same
irrespective of the origin of co-ownership, for example, whether by means of heritage or a division
of a company. A co-owner of a patent may have the invention made for itself by a third party
without having to obtain the consent of the other co-owners(s) and without the duty to account to the
other co-owner(s) for any economic benefit realized. In licenses drafted by United States attorneys,
the grant of the right to make an invention will typically also state the right of the licensee to have
the invention made for the licensee by a third party (“the right to make and have made”)
A co-owner purporting to grant a licensee an exclusive license in an invention would in fact convey
no more than the excusive right under the co-owner’s undivided interest in the invention, which
would not prevent a different co-owner from giving a license to third party. No differences exist
under US law with regard to the transfer of the whole share of a co-owned IP Right or the transfer
only of the part of the share of the co-owned IP Right. A co-owner can transfer all or part of his
co-ownership interest without the consent of any other co-owners, and can impose contractual
conditions on that transfer.
The concept of “joint monopolization” under which a group of entities might be found collectively
to possess monopoly power (whether due to a patent or otherwise) has generally been rejected
by the United States courts. Agreements concerning patents are generally considered to be
pro-competitive. However, it is possible for an agreement concerning ownership of IP rights to
be challenged as anticompetitive under United States law as reflecting collusive conduct. Such
agreements are examined under a “rule of reason” approach by enforcement authorities and the
courts to determine whether the pro-competitive effects outweigh the anticompetitive effects, and
upheld or struck down depending upon the result of that analysis.
If called upon to adjudicate an issue involving co-ownership rights in a non-U.S. patent, U.S. courts
(assuming that the court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the case) would likely attempt to apply
the law of the country that issued the non-U.S. patent. A contract (license) would be construed under
the law of the jurisdiction stated in the contract unless the construction under such law violates a
public policy of the United States.
Trademarks: The parties need to agree, either a priori or after the fact, which parties will
derive what rights to use the trademark in a manner that does not lead to customer confusion. In
one extreme case in which the parties did not agree, a US court decided to extinguish valuable
trademark rights of a joint venture. If the co-owners agree, they can license freely. If they do not
agree, then sublicense is not possible. Based on general principles, a co-owner may be able to
transfer the rights as long as they are subject to all the obligations that the co-owner has, and
that all good will accompanies the transfer. However, the consumer may expect the source of the
product to be the original joint owners and lead to consumer confusion, particularly when the other
co-owner objects to the transfer. Thus, the ability to transfer a trademark under US law might be
subject to the “balancing” of contractual expectations and consumer perceptions.
Copyrights: If a work is co-authored by an independent contractor and an employee, the
copyright in the resulting work might be co-owned by the employer and the independent contractor.
But, the rights and responsibilities of the co-owners would be the same as if they became co-owners
through other means. The right to copy under the US Copyright Act would permit either co-owner to
have works produced that embody the underlying work. However, a co-owner cannot license the
exclusive right to a third party without the cooperation of the other co-owner. Unlike patents, there
is an obligation to account to the co-owner. Copyrights are freely transferable. The U.S. Copyright
Act permits each co-owner to exploit their work without the consent of the other co-owner, which
includes the right to enter into non-exclusive licenses, subject only to the duty to account to the
other co-owner for their ratable share of profits. The only means by which co-owners can regulate,
modify or otherwise limit exploitation of the work, is through a written agreement.
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It is difficult to control a market with a copyright because others are free to market different expressions
of the same idea covered by the copyright. However, it might be possible where the particular
expression has been adopted as a standard. In this context, it would be highly fact-specific whether
antitrust issues might arise. There are certain situations within the United States Copyright Act where
licensees must obtain a compulsory license through the United States Copyright Office. One would
expect U.S. courts to apply U.S. law to co-ownership issues when adjudicating U.S. copyrights.
Published works are subject to protection under the U.S. Copyright Act if one or more of the authors
is a national or domiciliary of the United States or a treaty party, or is a stateless person. Acts of
infringement that occur outside of the United States’ jurisdiction are not actionable under the U.S.
Copyright Act because U.S. Copyright laws do not have any extraterritorial operation. However, in
some instances, the finding of an act of infringement in a foreign jurisdiction can form the basis for
a finding of infringement when a subsequent act is committed within the jurisdiction of the United
States.
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Summary Report
Question Q194
The impact of co-ownership of intellectual property rights on their
exploitation
by Jochen E. BüHLING, Reporter General
Dariusz SZLEPER and Thierry CALAME, Deputy Reporters General
Nicolai LINDGREEN, Nicola DAGG and Shoichi OKUYAMA
Assistants to the Reporter General
Two years after the Executive Committee Meeting held in Singapore in October 2007, the AIPPI will
again study the impact of IP rights co-ownership on their exploitation.
- It is helpful to remind of the context in which this issue was placed on the agenda of the Executive
Committee Meeting to be held in Buenos Aires in October 2009.
The question was first considered at the AIPPI Executive Committee Meeting held in Singapore in
2007.
As underscored in the Working Guidelines, certain aspects of this question could not be studied in
Singapore. For this reason, the AIPPI decided to continue its review of the issue.
Thus, the points on which the AIPPI was unable to achieve a resolution were first subject of further
study.
Several additional questions were then added to these points, which emerged from discussions that
took place during the Executive Committee Meeting in Singapore in October 2007.
- The AIPPI’s continued study of an issue is always a complicated matter, as the Association - which
is based on the principle of voluntary work - cannot always obtain reports and responses from all
of its member Groups.
Accordingly, if one wishes to have comprehensive overview of the issues involved in IP rights coownership
and the impact of such co-ownership on their exploitation, it is necessary to consult both
the National Group reports prepared for the Executive Committee Meeting held in Singapore in
October 2007 as well as those prepared for the Executive Committee Meeting to be held in Buenos
Aires in October 2009.
Indeed, for the first Executive Committee Meeting in October 2007, 41 reports were prepared but
some groups, in particular the Australian, Bulgarian, Chinese, Columbian, Georgian, Indian and
Latvian Groups, did not submit a report for follow-up on this issue.
On the other hand, the Ecuadorian, Greek, Mexican and Romanian Groups, which did not submit
reports when this issue was first studied, this time prepared reports for the Buenos Aires Executive
Committee Meeting in response to the working guidelines.
In this way, anyone seeking a comprehensive overview of the impact that co-ownership of intellectual
property rights has on their exploitation is invited first to review the National Group reports and
this synthesis report prepared in anticipation of the Buenos Aires Executive Committee meeting,
and then to become familiar with the National Group reports and the synthesis report which were
submitted for the Singapore Executive Committee meeting in October 2007. These appear in the
2007 AIPPI yearbook and may be accessed through the AIPPI website.
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In view of this, please note that some groups which responded to both the 2007 and 2009
working guidelines have, in the context of their report for EXCO 2009, submitted the responses they
provided during the previous exercise.
This is specifically the case for the Italian Group, which expressly submitted its 2007 response, as
well as for a portion of the Swedish Group’s report.
Again, anyone interested in a comprehensive examination of this issue should refer to both reports
of the National Groups.
- The Reporter General received 40 National Group reports for the Buenos Aires Executive
Committee meeting scheduled for October 2009.
These reports were submitted by the Argentinean, Austrian, Belgian, Brazilian, Canadian, Chilean,
Czech, Danish, Ecuadorian, Egyptian, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian,
Indonesian, Israeli, Italian, Japanese, Malaysian, Mexican, Dutch, New Zealand, Norwegian,
Panamanian, Paraguayan, Peruvian, Filipino, Portuguese, South Korean, Romanian, Russian,
Singaporean, Swedish, Swiss, Thai, Turkish, British and American Groups.
Even where these reports do not offer a comprehensive presentation of substantive law in their
countries with respect to the issues presented, they provide at least a general outline of the
applicable rules as well as the perception that those working in the field of intellectual property
law have of these rules.
Thus, these reports are a valuable source of information regarding national laws in this field.
It is important to emphasise the exhaustive and in depth work that has been done, in particular by
the German, Belgian, British, French, Japanese, Dutch, Portuguese, Swedish, Swiss and American
Groups, which do not only set forth a statement of substantive law, but frequently explained the
theoretical support for the rules which exist in their countries.
- During discussions which took place at the Executive Committee Meeting in Singapore, the main
points of disagreement with regard to the issue of IP rights co-ownership related to the terms for
granting a license to these rights, the terms for the transfer of all or part of the jointly-owned rights,
and the question of applicable law.
Still, it seems that notwithstanding the additional study on the transfer of rights, the National Groups’
positions remain as conflicted as they were before the Singapore Executive Committee Meeting.
Thus, on all of these issues, the Working Commission’s job promises to be especially complex.
Statement of substantive law
1. The AIPPI examined whether the origin of co-ownership arising under the various intellectual
property rights could affect the solutions which are adopted to address such co-ownership.
The 40 reports received from the National Groups show that, generally speaking, the origin
of co-ownership has almost no influence on the way that such co-ownership is organised.
- Only the Greek Group’s report appears to state that, with respect to trademarks, a coownership
agreement must be filed at the time when the co-owned trademark is registered.
This involves a specific situation in the event such co-ownership is voluntary.
On another subject, the Brazilian Group indicates that some specific co-ownership rules have
been created regarding employees’ inventions.
However, those extraordinary solutions do not seem to have been adopted by other
countries.
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- It should also be noted that in the vast majority of countries across all continents, the rules
set forth in the Civil Code or under general law typically apply, as there are no specific rules
set forth in legislation relating to intellectual property rights.
Only countries such as Belgium, France, Netherlands and Malaysia for patents, or Italy for
copyrights, have rules which govern certain aspects of co-ownership.
The Groups’ reports emphasize, as seen in the German and Swiss Groups’ reports, on the
problems which arise from the absence of specific rules, since the general rules which apply in
their place are typically written to apply to physical objects and not to intangible property.
- Note that, while the origin of co-ownership has no impact on the way such co-ownership is
organised, its organisation must consider the type and nature of the intellectual property right
which is the subject of such co-ownership
As agreed in Singapore in 2007, AIPPI is in favour of adopting rules related to IP rights coownership.
- In this context, it is appropriate to consider whether, for certain intellectual property rights,
it would be useful if holders of these jointly owned rights were encouraged to file for their
publication co-ownership agreements or contracts at the time they file their application for
registration, or at least prior to their publication.
Such a rule would strengthen the subsidiary nature of the general system, would encourage
co-owners to organize the future exercise of their rights and would thereby serve to promote
legal certainty for third parties.
2. The second matter presented to the National Groups involved the issue of subcontracting the
exploitation of intellectual property rights.
Recall that in Singapore, specifically with regard to patents, AIPPI declared itself in favour of
a co-owner’s right to individually exploit the invention which is subject to the patent without
having to secure the consent of the other co-owners before engaging in such exploitation.
In this context, a specific question arose concerning a co-owner of a patent who does not
have the means to personally exploit the invention, but who could do so by subcontracting at
least a portion of the exploitation.
The discussions during the EXCO in Singapore revealed a serious division among the Groups
on this issue.
For this reason, AIPPI decided to broaden its study of this specific aspect of co-ownership.
The Groups’ answers can be divided into three groups:
- First, a significant majority of Group reports reasoned that, from the moment a coowner
has the right to personally exploit an intellectual property right - specifically a
patent - it must also have the right to subcontract such exploitation, even though such
subcontracting may be subject to certain conditions related to effective control over the
marketing of the products or processes which implement the patent.
This is the position held by the Argentinean, Canadian, Chilean, Czech, Egyptian,
German, Israeli, Norwegian, Panamanian, Portuguese, Romanian and Thai Groups.
In addition, citing the Japanese Group’s report, it recalls a 1938 case that appears to
state very specific terms for the authorisation of subcontracting, namely effective control
over subcontracting activities and the sale of products on the market by the co-owner of
the patent.
In this way, subcontracting is permitted only to the extent it provides a means for the coowner
to implement the right to exploit the invention.
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On the other hand, it should not serve as a pretext for a disguised license.
- The second group of countries are those which do not appear to allow subcontracting,
to the extent that either the co-owner does not have the right to individually exploit the
right without the consent of the other co-owners or, if such right exists, it is subject to strict
interpretation and requires wholly personal exploitation by the co-owner.
This appears to be the position of the Belgian, Estonian, Hungarian, Malaysian, Dutch,
Swiss and Turkish Groups.
In this regard, the British Report points out that two arguments can be supported, one
which affirms the legality of subcontracting and the other which emphasises the need
to obtain the consent of the co-owners. The Singapore Group believes that the lawful
nature of subcontracting without the consent of the other co-owners depends on its
significance.
- Lastly, the third group of countries which responded to the working guidelines consists
of those which do not appear to have rules on the issue, specifically Italy, Ecuador,
Paraguay and Sweden.
- We can therefore find that, if national legislation permits individual exploitation of an
intellectual property right by one co-owner without the need to seek the consent of the others,
this exploitation right must include the right to subcontract where such subcontracting is
necessary to give meaning to the individual right to exploitation.
However, the ability to subcontract must not serve as a pretext to grant licenses.
3. The Groups were also asked whether, with regard to licenses of intellectual property
rights, their national lawmaking body or case law recognizes distinctions between simple
and exclusive licenses of intellectual property rights, in relation to the conditions of their
authorisation by co-owners of an intellectual property right.
In this regard, it should be recalled that under the resolution adopted by the Executive
Committee in Singapore in 2007, the AIPPI stated in general that in order to grant licenses
of various intellectual property rights, it is necessary to obtain the consent of the other coowners.
- The Groups’ responses apparently show that only some countries recognise different solutions
based on the nature of the license. This is the case for France and Romania with regard to
patents.
Likewise, the German report states that it is necessary to obtain the consent of all co-owners
in order to grant an exclusive license.
But it also appears, at least in the case of France, that this difference is more theoretical than
practical.
One interesting solution seems to have been adopted under Italian law with regard to licenses,
since it is not the nature of the license but rather its term which changes the conditions for coowner
consent. Thus, for a license with a term lower than 9 years for a patent, the consent of
a qualified majority of co-owners is sufficient, while for a license whose term exceeds 9 years,
the unanimous consent of all co-owners is required.
- On the other hand, almost all Groups which responded to the working guidelines stated
that their national legislation and case law does not distinguish between the types of licenses
involved.
Again, the Groups affirm the position adopted by the Singapore Executive Committee
Meeting, emphasising that it is necessary to obtain the consent of the other co-owners to
grant a license on an intellectual property right.
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Thus, it appears that on this issue, a resolution adopted by AIPPI should unconditionally affirm
the position adopted in Singapore.
4. One of the main reasons for the AIPPI’s continued study of the impact of IP rights on their
exploitation arose from the Association’s failure to take a position on the issue of co-owned IP
rights’ transfer.
On this issue, the Groups appear to be as divided as they were at the Singapore Executive
Committee Meeting.
- The first group of countries, which permits the free transfer one’s share of intellectual property
rights (except for certain rights, as it is sometimes the case for trademarks or copyrights)
appears to be a majority.
Based on the various Group reports, this is the solution in Argentina, Chile, Denmark, Egypt,
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, Romania, Switzerland, United Kingdom and
Turkey, along with the United States, where this right to transfer seems to be a question of
principle.
- The second group of countries is made up of those which seem to accept the principle of
free transfer but subjecting it to certain conditions, and specifically provide for a pre-emptive
right to benefit the other co-owners.
This is the case in France, Hungary, Mexico, Norway, Peru and Portugal.
A special situation is mentioned out in the Swedish report, which states that if no solution has
been adopted under legislation or in case law, the preparatory work on the patent act seems
to indicate that such transfer is possible without the approval of the other co-owners.
- Finally, a significant group of countries apparently oppose free transfer, even with
conditions.
The reports from these countries explain that, as with licenses, the very nature of intellectual
property rights is in conflict with the ability to freely transfer a share held by one of the coowners
or a fraction of such share, since there is a risk of completely changing the initial
position of the co-owners.
The strongest position on this issue is expressed by the Japanese Group, but the Czech,
Mexican, New Zealand, Filipino, South Korean, Russian and Singaporean Groups state that
it is impossible to transfer a share of an intellectual property right without the consent of the
other co-owners.
- Thus, there appears to be a true difference in principle on this issue.
Perhaps the solution may be found by permitting such a transfer as long as it does not
substantially modify the position of the other co-owners and, possibly, by granting preemptive
rights.
However, there is concern that discussions on this issue will be particularly complex.
5. The working guidelines also addressed an issue which was not previously discussed by AIPPI
in the context of co-ownership of intellectual property rights, specifically the relationship
that may exist between co-ownership agreements and rules related to compliance with the
principle of free competition.
The Groups’ responses were nearly unanimous, stating that whether or not rules related to
competition may apply, their countries offered no examples of case law or specific rules
governing the issue of co-ownership from a competition point of view.
- Thus, it seems unlikely that the Working Commission can take a position on this issue, other
than setting forth a position in principle which complies with other resolutions taken by AIPPI
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on the issue of competition rules such as, for example, the 2005 resolution on question Q187
relating to limitations on intellectual property rights by competition law.
Nevertheless, it would be advisable to consider the issue of cooperative arrangements
leading to IP rights co-ownership because frequently, and especially with regard to patents,
the co-ownership of a patent for invention results from research jointly carried out by various
companies.
6. The final specific question under the working guidelines concerned the application of
international private law to the issue of co-ownership of intellectual property rights.
In this context, recall that whether AIPPI emphasized in its October 2007 resolution that coowners
of an intellectual property right should be allowed to choose the applicable law in
the event of disputes between co-owners, it recommended further study on the criteria for
determining applicable law and competent jurisdiction in the absence of agreement between
the co-owners.
Indeed, the study conducted by AIPPI in 2009 shows that there are major differences with
regard to the legal co-ownership structures which apply in various countries in the absence of
a specific agreement by co-owners of various intellectual property rights.
These differences, which concern all aspects of co-ownership, are a source of uncertainty and
pointless complications.
Yet these differences could be overcome if it were possible to apply a single law to coownership.
This was the meaning of the question that AIPPI posed to the National Groups.
Again, the Groups provided a wide variety of responses on this issue.
- First, most Groups seem to hold the view that co-ownership – that is to say, the proprietary
relations which exist among the various holders of an intellectual property right – must be
governed by the law of the country where protection for this right is sought.
This is the position of the Estonian, Finnish, German, Hungarian, Israeli, Dutch, Portuguese
and Swiss Groups.
- But we wonder whether these responses take into account the complexity of situations
arising from co-ownership since, as specifically emphasized in the Swedish report, it is
probably helpful to distinguish between internal relations among the co-owners and the
co-owners’ relations with third parties.
The Swedish Group believes that with regard to internal relations, the EU Regulation
dated 17 July 2008 (known as Rome I) could apply.
On the other hand, relations with third parties, especially the issue of enforceability of
rights, should be governed in the country where protection is sought.
- A relatively significant number of Groups also believes it should be possible to choose
the applicable law by determining which law has the closest link to co-ownership.
This seems to be the position taken by the Japanese, South Korean, Turkish and Romanian
Groups, as well as the American Group which nonetheless specifies that this rule cannot
apply with regard to co-ownership of trademarks.
If the Working Commission pursues this path and examines the choice of applicable law, it
should specify criteria for making this choice, which could be the original country of the right,
the nationality of the co-owners and perhaps the country where the original distribution of the
creation, which is the subject of the intellectual property right, took place.
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7. It is also important to note that a certain number of issues were already considered at the
Singapore Executive Committee Meeting in 2007 where, for example, the conditions for
bringing litigation and the conditions for maintaining and renewing intellectual property
rights were discussed.
The Groups do not appear to have highlighted more specific issues which would deserve
treatment even though, in their reports, they recognized that international harmonization of
rules is desirable, particularly on the issues of licensing and transferring intellectual property
rights.
Thus, it appears that these are the issues addressed by the working guidelines which evoked
the Groups’ interest.
8. Finally, we note that the Groups did not propose any specific solutions for such harmonization,
even where they expressed a desire to see such harmonization take place.
Therefore, the Working Commission must propose a resolution based on the results of the
evaluation of current substantive law.
Recommendations for the Working Commission
It goes without saying that the Working Commission can broaden the discussion which has been
ongoing since 2007 to include any other issue not explicitly addressed by the working guidelines
and this synthesis report.
But the Working Commission will give priority to the issues of:
- Subcontracting in the context of recognising the right - particularly for patents – for a coowner
of a patent to individually exploit an invention covered by such patent.
In addition, the Commission may propose criteria to address such subcontracting, which
appears to be accepted by a majority of the national AIPPI Groups.
- The transfer of a share of an intellectual property right and its potential limitations ,
keeping in mind the rules which have emerged during EXCO 2007, on the subject of
licenses of various intellectual property rights, which appeared to be approved by
AIPPI;
- Finally, the issue of international private law and the possibility of establishing a
common rule related to the choice of applicable law in the absence of a co-ownership
agreement.
The Commission may also consider whether it is desirable to state that, as long as the issue
of the choice of applicable law is not harmonized, it recommends that IP rights holders file a
co-ownership agreement no later than the time the rights are published.
However, given the variety of situations which give rise to co-ownership, such a rule should
not be mandatory in nature.
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Rapport de Synthèse*
Question Q194
L’influence de la copropriété des droits de propriété intellectuelle sur
leur exploitation
par Jochen E. BÜHLING, Rapporteur Général
Dariusz SZLEPER et Thierry CALAME, Adjoints du Rapporteur Général
Nicola DAGG, Nicolai LINDGREEN et Shoichi OKUYAMA, Assistants du Rapporteur Généra
Deux ans après le Comité Exécutif de Singapour qui s’est tenu en octobre 2007, l’AIPPI aura à
nouveau à se pencher sur la question de l’influence de la copropriété des droits de propriété
intellectuelle sur leur exploitation.
- Il est utile de rappeler le contexte dans lequel cette question a été mise à l’ordre du jour du Comité
Exécutif de Buenos Aires d’octobre 2009.
Pour la première fois, elle a été examinée à l’occasion du Comité Exécutif de l’AIPPI de Singapour
de 2007.
Mais comme l’a souligné l’orientation de travail, certains aspects du sujet n’ont pas pu être étudiés à
Singapour et c’est la raison pour laquelle l’AIPPI a décidé de continuer l’étude de cette question.
Ainsi, ce sont d’abord les points sur lesquels l’AIPPI n’a pas pu établir une résolution qui ont fait
l’objet de l’étude complémentaire.
Et à ces points, ont été ajoutées quelques questions supplémentaires résultant des débats qui ont eu
lieu lors du Comité Exécutif de Singapour d’octobre 2007.
- La continuation de l’étude d’une question de l’AIPPI est toujours une tâche complexe car
l’Association fondée sur le principe du travail volontaire ne peut pas toujours obtenir des rapports
et des réponses de tous les Groupes qui la composent.
En conséquence si l’on voulait avoir une vision complète de la problématique posée par la
copropriété des droits de propriété intellectuelle et l’impact de cette copropriété sur leur exploitation,
il serait nécessaire de se référer à la fois aux rapports des Groupes nationaux qui ont été établis
à l’occasion du Comité Exécutif de Singapour d’octobre 2007 et aux ceux établis pour le Comité
Exécutif de Buenos Aires d’octobre 2009.
En effet, pour ce premier Comité Exécutif d’octobre 2007, 41 rapports ont été établis mais certains
des groupes, et notamment les Groupes australien, bulgare, chinois, colombien, géorgien, indien
et lettonien, n’ont pas communiqué de rapport pour la continuité de cette question.
En revanche, les Groupes équatorien, grec, mexicain ou encore roumain, qui n’avaient pas adressé
de rapport à l’occasion de la première étude de la question, ont cette fois-ci, pour le Comité
Exécutif de Buenos Aires, bien établi des rapports en réponse à l’orientation de travail.
Ainsi, une personne qui souhaite avoir une vision complète de la problématique posée par
l’influence de la copropriété des droits de propriété intellectuelle sur leur exploitation est invitée
à examiner non seulement les rapports des Groupes nationaux et le présent rapport de synthèse
établis en vue du Comité Exécutif de Buenos Aires, mais également à prendre connaissance des
rapports des Groupes nationaux et du rapport de synthèse qui ont été communiqués pour le Comité
Exécutif de Singapour d’octobre 2007 et qui figurent tant dans l’annuaire de l’AIPPI de 2007 que
sur le site web de l’AIPPI.
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Dans ce contexte, il faut également rappeler que certains des Groupes qui ont répondu aux deux
orientations de travail en 2007 et en 2009 ont, dans le cadre de leur rapport pour l’EXCO de
2009, renvoyé aux réponses qu’ils ont données lors de l’exercice précédent.
C’est notamment le cas du groupe italien qui renvoie expressément à sa réponse de 2007 ainsi
qu’en partie le rapport du groupe suédois.
Là encore, une personne qui serait intéressée par l’étude complète de la question est invitée à se
référer aux deux rapports des Groupes nationaux.
- Le Rapporteur Général a reçu 40 rapports des Groupes nationaux en vue du Comité Exécutif de
Buenos Aires d’octobre 2009.
Il s’agit des rapports des Groupes argentin, autrichien, belge, brésilien, canadien, chilien, tchèque,
danois, équatorien, égyptien, estonien, finlandais, français, allemand, grec, hongrois, indonésien,
israélien, italien, japonais, malaisien, mexicain, néerlandais, néo-zélandais, norvégien, panaméen,
paraguayen, péruvien, philippin, portugais, sud-coréen, roumain, russe, singapourien, suédois,
suisse, thaïlandais, turc, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis.
Et ces rapports donnent sinon une présentation très complète de l’état du droit positif dans ces pays
par rapport aux questions qui ont été posées, au moins un aperçu général des règles applicables
et de la perception qu’en ont les professionnels du droit de la propriété intellectuelle.
Ces rapports constituent ainsi une précieuse source d’informations sur les droits nationaux en la
matière.
Et il convient de souligner le travail particulièrement complet et exhaustif qui a été fait notamment
par les Groupes allemand, belge, britannique, français, japonais, néerlandais, portugais, suédois,
suisse ou encore des Etats-Unis qui ont non seulement exposé l’état du droit positif mais ont souvent
expliqué les justifications théoriques des règles existant dans leurs pays.
- Lors des débats qui ont eu lieu au comité Exécutif de Singapour les principaux points de discorde
relatifs à la question de la copropriété des droits de propriété intellectuelle portaient sur les
conditions d’octroi d’une licence de ces droits, les conditions de transfert de la totalité ou d’une
partie des droits détenus en copropriété, ainsi que à la problématique de la loi applicable.
Il apparaît toutefois que nonobstant l’étude complémentaire notamment sur la question du transfert
des droits, les positions des Groupes nationaux sont toujours aussi opposées qu’elles ne l’étaient
avant le Comité Exécutif de Singapour.
Sur l’ensemble de ces points, la tâche de la Commission de travail s’annonce donc particulièrement
complexe.
L’état du droit positif
1. L’AIPPI s’est interrogée sur la question de savoir si l’origine de la copropriété dont relevaient
différents droits de propriété intellectuelle pouvait avoir une influence sur les solutions
adoptées pour régler cette copropriété.
Il résulte des 40 rapports des Groupes nationaux reçus que, d’une manière générale, l’origine
de la copropriété n’a presque aucune influence sur la manière dont cette copropriété est
organisée.
- Seul le rapport du Groupe grec semble indiquer qu’en ce qui concerne les marques, il est
nécessaire de déposer au moment de l’enregistrement de la marque en copropriété une
convention organisant cette copropriété.
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Ainsi, il s’agirait d’une situation particulière dans l’hypothèse où cette copropriété est
volontaire.
Et sur un autre terrain, le Groupe brésilien indique qu’en matière de créations des employées
il existe un régime spécifique de la copropriété.
Mais ces solutions exceptionnelles ne semblent pas être adoptées par d’autres pays.
- L’on doit également souligner que dans une très grande majorité des pays et cela, sur
tous les continents, ce sont en général les règles du Code civil ou du droit général qui
s’appliquent et qu’il n’y a pas de règles particulières dans les législations relatives aux droits
de la propriété intellectuelle.
Seuls les pays comme la Belgique, la France les Pays-Bas ou la Malaisie pour les brevets
ou l’Italie pour les droits d’auteur, connaissent des règles régissant certains aspects de la
copropriété.
Les rapports de Groupes soulignent, comme le fait par exemple le groupe allemand ou
suisse, la difficulté qui résulte de l’absence de règles spécifiques car les règles générales qui
s’appliquent à leur place ont été élaborées pour des objets corporelles et non pas pour les
biens immatériels.
- L’on peut observer que, si l’origine de la copropriété n’a pas d’influence sur la manière dont
cette copropriété est organisée, cette organisation doit prendre en compte le type et la nature
du droit de la propriété intellectuelle qui en fait l’objet.
Et l’on peut considérer que l’AIPPI est, ainsi que cela a été admis à Singapour en 2007, favorable
à l’adoption de règles relatives à la copropriété des droits de propriété intellectuelle.
- Dans ce contexte, il serait probablement souhaitable de s’interroger sur la question de savoir
si, pour certains droits de propriété intellectuelle, il ne serait pas utile que les titulaires de ces
droits détenus en copropriété soient incités à déposer à fin de leur publication les accords
ou les contrats de copropriété au moment du dépôt des demandes d’enregistrement de leurs
droits ou à tout le moins avant leur publication.
Une telle règle renforcerait le caractère subsidiaire du régime général, inciterait les
copropriétaires à organiser l’exercice futur de leurs droits et pourrait favoriser en conséquence
la sécurité juridique des tiers.
2. La seconde question qui était posée aux Groupes nationaux concernait le problème de la
sous-traitance de l’exploitation des droits de propriété intellectuelle.
Il faut rappeler qu’à Singapour, l’AIPPI s’est prononcée en faveur de ce que, notamment en
matière de brevet, chaque copropriétaire soit habilité à exploiter individuellement l’invention
faisant l’objet du brevet, sans avoir à requérir pour cette exploitation le consentement des
autres copropriétaires.
Dans ce contexte est apparue la question particulière de la situation d’un breveté copropriétaire
qui n’a pas les moyens d’exploiter personnellement l’invention et qui pourrait le faire en soustraitant
au moins une partie de son exploitation.
Les débats, lors de l’EXCO à Singapour, ont montré que cette question divisait sérieusement
les Groupes.
Et c’est la raison pour laquelle l’AIPPI a décidé d’approfondir l’étude de cet aspect particulier
de la copropriété.
L’on doit constater que les réponses des Groupes peuvent être divisées en trois ensembles.
- Tout d’abord, une grande majorité des rapports des Groupes considère que, du
moment qu’un copropriétaire a le droit d’exploiter personnellement le droit de propriété
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intellectuelle et, plus particulièrement, un brevet, il doit avoir également le droit de soustraiter
cette exploitation, même si cette sous-traitance peut être soumise à certaines
conditions relatives notamment au contrôle effectif de la commercialisation des produits
ou procédés mettant en œuvre le brevet.
C’est notamment la position des Groupes argentin, canadien, chilien, tchèque, égyptien,
allemand, israélien, norvégien, panamien, portugais, roumain, thaïlandais.
Et à cet égard, on peut citer le rapport du Groupe japonais, qui rappelle une jurisprudence
de 1938, qui semble avoir posé des conditions très précises pour autoriser la soustraitance,
à savoir le contrôle effectif des activités de sous-traitants et la vente des produits
sur le marché par le copropriétaire du brevet.
Ainsi, la sous-traitance serait admise dans la mesure où elle serait seulement un moyen
permettant au copropriétaire de mettre réellement en œuvre son droit d’exploiter
l’invention.
En revanche, elle ne devrait pas servir comme prétexte pour autoriser en fait une licence
déguisée.
- Le second groupe de pays est constitué de ceux qui apparaissent ne pas autoriser
la sous-traitance dans la mesure où, soit le copropriétaire n’a pas le droit d’exploiter
individuellement sans l’accord des autres copropriétaires, soit encore si ce droit existe,
il est d’interprétation stricte et impose l’exploitation entièrement personnelle par ce
copropriétaire.
Telle semble être la position des Groupes belge, estonien, hongrois, malaisien,
néerlandais, suisse, ou encore turque.
Le rapport britannique indique à cet égard que deux thèses peuvent être soutenues, l’une
affirmant la licéité de la sous-traitance et l’autre soulignant qu’il est nécessaire d’obtenir
l’accord des copropriétaires, et le Groupe singapourien considère que le caractère licite
de la sous-traitance en l’absence d’accord des autres copropriétaires dépendra de son
importance.
- Enfin, le troisième groupe de pays qui ont répondu à l’orientation de travail est constitué
de pays qui n’apparaissent pas avoir de règles sur la question, et c’est notamment le cas
de l’Italie, de l’Equateur, du Paraguay, ou encore de la Suède.
- On peut donc considérer que, si la législation nationale autorise l’exploitation individuelle
d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle par l’un des copropriétaires, sans solliciter nécessairement
l’accord des autres, ce droit d’exploiter doit couvrir le droit de sous-traiter lorsque cette soustraitance
est nécessaire pour donner un contenu à ce droit d’exploitation individuelle.
Mais, il ne faut pas que cette possibilité de sous-traiter serve de prétexte pour accorder des
licences.
3. Les Groupes ont été également interrogés sur la question de savoir si, en matière de licence
des droits de propriété intellectuelle, le législateur national ou la jurisprudence ont reconnu
des distinctions entre les licences exclusives ou des licences simples des droits de propriété
intellectuelle, quant aux conditions de leur autorisation par les copropriétaires d’un droit de
propriété intellectuelle.
Il faut, à cet égard, rappeler que, dans la résolution adoptée au Comité exécutif de Singapour
en 2007, l’AIPPI a considéré en général que pour octroyer les licences des différents droits de
propriété intellectuelle, il était nécessaire d’obtenir l’accord des autres copropriétaires.
- Il semble résulter des réponses des Groupes que seuls quelques pays connaissent une
différence de solutions en raison de la nature de la licence, et c’est le cas de la France et de
la Roumanie en matière de brevet.
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De même, le rapport allemand indique qu’il est nécessaire pour accorder une licence exclusive
d’obtenir l’accord de tous les copropriétaires.
Mais il apparaît également, qu’au moins en ce qui concerne la France, cette différence est
plus théorique que pratique.
Une solution intéressante semble être adoptée dans la législation italienne en ce qui concerne
les licences puisque ce n’est pas la nature des licences mais leur durée qui change les conditions
de l’accord des copropriétaires : ainsi, pour une licence ayant une durée inférieure à 9 ans en
matière de brevet, il suffit d’avoir l’accord d’une majorité qualifiée des copropriétaires, alors
que pour une licence dont la durée dépasse 9 ans, il est nécessaire d’avoir l’accord unanime
de tous les copropriétaires.
- En revanche, la quasi-totalité des Groupes qui ont répondu à l’orientation de travail indique
que leur législation nationale ou la jurisprudence ne fait pas de distinction selon le type de
licence.
Et, là encore, les Groupes confirment la position adoptée lors du Comité exécutif de Singapour,
en soulignant qu’il est nécessaire d’obtenir l’accord des autres copropriétaires pour accorder
une licence de droit de propriété intellectuelle.
Il semble donc que, sur ce point, la résolution que pourrait adopter l’AIPPI devra confirmer
purement et simplement la position adoptée à Singapour.
4. L’une des principales raisons pour laquelle l’étude de l’impact des droits de propriété
intellectuelle sur leur exploitation été continuée par l’AIPPI résultait de l’absence de prise de
position de l’Association au sujet de la problématique de transfert des droits de propriété
intellectuelle détenus en copropriété.
Sur ce point, les Groupes semblent aussi divisés qu’ils l’étaient lors du Comité exécutif de
Singapour:
- Le premier groupe de pays prévoyant la possibilité de céder librement sa quote-part des
droits de propriété intellectuelle (à l’exception de certains droits, comme c’est parfois le cas
des marques ou des droits d’auteur) semble majoritaire.
C’est la solution, ainsi qu’il résulte des rapports des Groupes, qui existe en Argentine,
Chili, Danemark, Egypte, Estonie, Finlande, Allemagne, Israël, Pays-Bas, Roumanie, Suisse,
Royaume-Uni, Turquie, ou encore aux Etats-Unis, où cette liberté de transfert semble avoir une
valeur de principe.
- Le second groupe de pays est constitué de ceux qui semblent accepter le principe de la
liberté de transfert mais le soumettent à certaines conditions, et notamment prévoient le droit
de préemption au bénéfice des autres copropriétaires.
C’est le cas de la France, la Hongrie, du Mexique, la Norvège, du Pérou, du Portugal.
Une situation particulière a été signalée par le rapport suédois qui indique que si aucune
solution n’a été adoptée dans la loi telle que votée et dans la jurisprudence, les travaux
préparatoires de la loi sur les brevets semblent indiquer qu’un tel transfert devrait être possible
sans l’autorisation des autres copropriétaires.
- Enfin, un important groupe de pays semble s’opposer à cette liberté de transfert, même sous
conditions.
Les rapports de ces pays expliquent que, comme pour la licence, la nature même des droits de
propriété intellectuelle s’oppose à ce qu’on puisse transférer librement la quote-part détenue
par l’un des copropriétaires ou une fraction de cette quote-part, car cela risque de changer
complètement la situation initiale des copropriétaires.
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La position la plus forte à ce sujet est exprimée par le Groupe japonais mais les Groupes
tchèque, mexicain, néo-zélandais, philippin, de Corée du Sud, russe ou singapourien,
indiquent qu’il est impossible de transférer la quote-part d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle
sans l’accord des autres copropriétaires.
- Il semble donc qu’il existe là une véritable différence de principe sur cette question.
Et peut-être que la solution pourrait être trouvée en prévoyant qu’un tel transfert serait possible
du moment où il change pas substantiellement la situation des autres copropriétaires et,
éventuellement, en leur accordant un droit de préemption.
Mais, il est à craindre que les débats soient particulièrement complexes sur ce sujet.
5. L’orientation de travail a abordé également une question, qui n’était pas auparavant discutée
par l’AIPPI dans le contexte de la copropriété de droits de propriété intellectuelle, à savoir les
relations pouvant exister entre les accords de copropriété et les règles relatives au respect du
principe de la liberté de la concurrence.
Les Groupes ont répondu d’une façon quasi-unanime que, si les règles relatives au problème
de la concurrence peuvent s’appliquer, il n’existe pas dans leur pays d’exemples de
jurisprudence ou des règles particulières régissant le problème de la copropriété du point de
vue des règles de la concurrence.
- Il apparaît donc peu probable de la Commission de travail puisse adopter une position
sur ce sujet autre qu’exprimer un postulat de principe conforme à d’autres résolutions prises
par l’AIPPI au sujet des règles de la concurrence, comme par exemple la résolution de
2005 sur la question Q187 relative aux limitations des droits de propriété par le droit de la
concurrence.
Il serait toutefois souhaitable de se poser la question des accords de coopération aboutissant
à la copropriété des droits de propriété intellectuelle puisque souvent, notamment en matière
de brevet, la copropriété d’un brevet d’invention est le résultat de la recherche effectuée en
commun entre différentes entreprises.
6. La dernière question spécifique qui a fait l’objet de l’orientation de travail était relative à la
problématique de l’application des règles du droit international privé à la question de la
copropriété de droits de propriété intellectuelle.
Dans ce contexte, il faut rappeler que si l’AIPPI a souligné dans sa résolution d’octobre
2007, que les copropriétaires d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle devraient être autorisés à
décider du choix d’une loi applicable au litige entre les copropriétaires, elle a recommandé
la poursuite de l’étude sur les critères de détermination de la loi applicable et de la juridiction
compétente en l’absence d’accord entre les copropriétaires.
En effet, l’étude menée en 2009 par l’AIPPI montre qu’il existe de grandes différences de
situations en ce qui concerne le régime légal de la copropriété, qui s’applique dans différents
pays en l’absence d’accord spécifique des copropriétaires des différents droits de propriété
intellectuelle.
Et cette divergence, qui concerne tous les aspects de la copropriété, est une source d’incertitude
et de complication inutile.
Or, cette divergence pourrait être surmontée s’il était possible d’appliquer à la copropriété
une seule loi.
Tel était le sens de la question posée aux Groupes nationaux de l’AIPPI.
Là encore, les Groupes ont apporté des réponses très variées à ce sujet.
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- Tout d’abord, l’on peut observer que la plupart des Groupes semblent avoir considéré
que la copropriété, c’est-à-dire les relations patrimoniales existant entre les différents
titulaires d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle, devra être régie par la loi du pays dans
lequel la protection pour ce droit est recherchée.
C’est notamment la position des Groupes estonien, finlandais, allemand, hongrois,
israélien, néerlandais, portugais et suisse.
- Mais l’on peut se demander si ces réponses prennent en compte la complexité des
situations résultant de la copropriété puisque, comme le souligne notamment le rapport
du groupe suédois, il serait probablement utile de faire la distinction entre les relations
internes des copropriétaires et le rapport de la copropriété à l’égard des tiers.
Et le groupe suédois considère que dans les relations internes, c’est notamment le
Règlement Communautaire du 17 juin 2008 appelé Rome I qui pourrait s’appliquer.
En revanche, les relations avec les tiers, c’est-à-dire notamment la question de l’opposabilité
des droits, devraient être régies par la loi du pays de la protection.
- Un nombre relativement important de Groupes considère également qu’il devrait être
possible de choisir la loi applicable en recherchant la loi qui présente le lien le plus étroit
avec la copropriété.
Cela semble être la position des Groupes japonais ou encore sud-coréen, turc, roumain,
ainsi que du Groupe américain qui précise toutefois que cette règle ne peut pas
s’appliquer en ce qui concerne la copropriété des marques.
Si la Commission de travail devait suivre cette voie et s’interroger sur le choix de la loi
applicable, il conviendrait alors de préciser les critères de ce choix qui pourraient être : le
pays d’origine du droit, la nationalité des copropriétaires ou peut-être le pays de la première
divulgation de la création faisant l’objet du droit de propriété intellectuelle.
7. Il faut également rappeler qu’un certain nombre de questions ont été déjà examinées lors du
Comité Exécutif de Singapour de 2007 où par exemple ont été débattues les conditions de
l’action en justice ou les conditions du maintien des droits de propriété intellectuelle.
Les groupes ne semblent pas avoir souligné de problèmes plus particuliers qui mériteraient
d’être traités, même si, dans leurs rapports, ils ont reconnu que l’harmonisation internationale
est souhaitable notamment sur la problématique des licences et du transfert des droits de
propriété intellectuelle.
Ainsi, il apparaît que ce sont bien les sujets qui ont été abordés par l’orientation du travail
qui ont suscité le principal intérêt des groupes.
8. Enfin l’on doit observer que les Groupes, même s’ils on exprimé le souhait de voir
l’harmonisation aboutir, n’ont pas proposé de solution particulière pour cette harmonisation.
C’est donc sur le résultat de l’évaluation du droit positif actuel que la Commission de travail
devra proposer une résolution.
Recommandations pour la Commission de travail
Il va de soi que la discussion qui continue depuis 2007 pourra être élargie par la Commission de
travail à tout autre sujet qui n’a pas été explicitement abordé par l’orientation du travail et le présent
rapport de synthèse.
Mais la Commission de travail pourrait traiter en priorité les questions de :
- La sous-traitance dans le contexte de la reconnaissance du droit, notamment pour le brevet,
d’exploiter individuellement l’invention couvert par le brevet dont on est copropriétaire ;
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Et la Commission pourrait proposer des critères auxquels devrait répondre une telle soustraitance
qui semble acceptés par une majorité des groupes nationaux de l’AIPPI ;
- Du transfert de la quote-part d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle et ses éventuelles
limitations ayant bien à l’esprit les règles dégagées lors de l’EXCO de 2007 au sujet des
licences des différents droits de propriété intellectuelle et qui semblent approuvées par
l’AIPPI ;
- Enfin, la question du droit international privé et de la possibilité d’établir une règle
commune relative au choix de la loi applicable en l’absence d’une convention de
copropriété.
La Commission pourrait également s’interroger sur la question de savoir s’il ne serait pas
souhaitable de prévoir que tant que la question du choix de la loi applicable ne sera pas
harmonisée, il est recommandé aux titulaires de droits de propriété intellectuelle de déposer
au plus tard au moment de la publication de leurs droits une convention de copropriété.
Toutefois, en tenant compte de la variété des situations dans lesquelles naît la copropriété,
une telle règle ne devrait pas avoir de caractère obligatoire.
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Zusammenfassender Bericht
Frage Q.194
Der Einfluss der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des
Geistigen Eigentums auf deren Verwendung
von Jochen E. BüHLING, Generalberichterstatter
Dariusz SZLEPER und Thierry CALAME, Stellvertreter des Generalberichterstatters
Nicolai LINDGREEN, Nicola DAGG und Shoichi OKUYAMA
Assistenten des Generalberichterstatters
Zwei Jahre nach dem in Singapur im Oktober 2007 abgehaltenen Treffen des Geschäftsführenden
Ausschusses wird die AIPPI wieder den Einfluss der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des geistigen
Eigentums auf deren Verwendung untersuchen.
- Es ist hilfreich, sich an den Kontext zu erinnern, in welchem dieses Thema auf die Tagesordnung
des Treffens des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses gesetzt wurde, das im Oktober 2009 in Buenos
Aires abgehalten wird.
Die Frage wurde zuerst beim Treffen des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses von AIPPI, abgehalten
in Singapur 2007, erörtert.
Wie in den Arbeitsrichtlinien unterstrichen, konnten bestimmte Aspekte dieser Frage in Singapur nicht
untersucht werden. Aus diesem Grund entschied AIPPI, die Klärung des Themas fortzusetzen.
So waren die Punkte, zu welchen AIPPI keine Entschließung erreichen konnte, zuerst Gegenstand
weiterer Untersuchung.
Mehrere zusätzliche Fragen wurden dann zu diesen Punkten hinzugefügt, welche sich aus
Diskussionen ergaben, die während des Treffens des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Singapur
im Oktober 2007 stattfanden.
- Die fortgesetzte Untersuchung eines Themas von AIPPI ist immer eine komplizierte Angelegenheit,
da die Vereinigung – welche auf dem Prinzip freiwilliger Mitarbeit basiert – nicht immer Berichte
und Antworten von all ihren Mitgliedsgruppen erhalten kann.
Falls jemand eine umfassende Übersicht über die Themen haben möchte, welche an der
Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des geistigen Eigentums und dem Einfluss solcher Mitinhaberschaft
auf deren Verwertung betroffen sind, ist es demzufolge notwendig, sowohl die Berichte der
Landesgruppen zu konsultieren, welche für das im Oktober 2007 in Singapur abgehaltene Treffen
des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses angefertigt wurden, als auch jene, welche für das in Buenos
Aires im Oktober 2009 abzuhaltende Treffen des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses angefertigt
wurden.
Tatsächlich wurden für das erste Treffen des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses im Oktober 2007
41 Berichte angefertigt, jedoch einige Gruppen, insbesondere die australische, bulgarische,
chinesische, kolumbianische, georgische, indische und lettische Gruppe reichten keinen Bericht
zum Wiederaufgreifen dieses Themas ein.
Andererseits fertigten die ecuadorianische, griechische, mexikanische und rumänische Gruppen,
welche keine Berichte einreichten, als das Thema zuerst untersucht wurde, diesmal Berichte für das
Treffen des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Buenos Aires als Antwort auf die Arbeitsrichtlinien
ein.
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Auf diese Weise ist jeder, der eine umfassende Übersicht über den Einfluss sucht, den Mitinhaberschaft
an Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums auf deren Verwertung hat, zuerst eingeladen, die Berichte
der Landesgruppen und diesen Synthesebericht durchzusehen, welcher in Erwartung des Treffens
des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Buenos Aires angefertigt wurde, und sich dann mit den
Berichten der Landesgruppen und dem Synthesebericht vertraut zu machen, welche für das Treffen
des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Singapur im Oktober 2007 eingereicht wurden. Diese
erscheinen im AIPPI-Jahrbuch 2007 und sind auf der AIPPI-Website abrufbar.
In Anbetracht dessen sei bemerkt, dass einige Gruppen, welche sowohl die Arbeitsrichtlinien 2007,
als auch die Arbeitsrichtlinien 2009 beantworteten, im Zusammenhang mit ihrem Bericht für EXCO
2009 die Antworten eingereicht haben, die sie während der vorherigen Übung vorgelegt hatten.
Dies betrifft insbesondere die italienische Gruppe, welche ausdrücklich ihre Antworten von 2007
einreichte, als auch einen Teil des Berichts der schwedischen Gruppe.
Nochmals sollte jeder, der an einer umfassenden Untersuchung dieses Themas interessiert ist, auf
beide Berichte der Landesgruppen zurückgreifen.
- Der Generalberichterstatter erhielt 40 Berichte von Landesgruppen für das für Oktober 2009
geplante Treffen des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Buenos Aires.
Diese Berichte wurden durch die argentinische, österreichische, belgische, brasilianische,
kanadische, chilenische, tschechische, dänische, ecuadorianische, ägyptische, estnische, finnische,
französische, deutsche, griechische, ungarische, indonesische, israelische, italienische, japanische,
malaysische, mexikanische, niederländische, neuseeländische, norwegische, panamaische,
paraguayische, peruanische, philippinische, portugiesische, südkoreanische, rumänischen,
russischen, singapurischen, schwedischen, schweizerische, thailändische, türkische, britische und
amerikanische Gruppe eingereicht.
Selbst wenn diese Berichte keine umfassende Präsentation des materiellen Rechts in ihren Ländern
bezogen auf die behandelten Themen darstellen, so bieten sie zumindest einen allgemeinen Umriss
der anwendbaren Regelungen, sowie des Verständnisses, das diejenigen, welche im Bereich des
Rechts des Geistigen Eigentums arbeiten, von diesen Regelungen haben.
So sind diese Berichte eine wertvolle Informationsquelle bezüglich der nationalen Rechte in diesem
Bereich.
Es ist wichtig, die erschöpfende und gründliche Arbeit hervorzuheben, die insbesondere durch
die deutsche, belgische, britische, französische, japanische, niederländische, portugiesische,
schwedische, schweizerische und amerikanische Gruppen geleistet wurde, welche nicht nur eine
Stellungnahme zu materiellem Recht darlegen, sondern häufig die theoretische Basis für die Regeln
erläutern, welche in ihren Ländern existieren.
- Während der Diskussionen, welche beim Treffen des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Singapur
stattfanden, bezogen sich die Hauptstreitpunkte in Bezug auf das Thema der Mitinhaberschaft
an Rechten des geistigen Eigentums auf die Bedingungen für die Erteilung einer Lizenz an diesen
Rechten, die Bedingungen für die Übertragung der gesamten oder eines Teils der gemeinsam
gehaltenen Rechte und die Frage des anwendbaren Rechts.
Rechten die Positionen der Landesgruppen so widersprüchlich gegeneinander stehen wie vor dem
Treffen des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Singapur.
So verspricht bei all diesen Themen die Arbeit des Arbeitsausschusses besonders komplex zu
sein.
Darstellung des materiellen Rechts
1. AIPPI untersuchte, ob der Ursprung der Mitinhaberschaft, welche unter den verschiedenen
Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums entsteht, die Lösungen beeinflussen könnte, welche auf solch
eine Mitinhaberschaft angewandt werden.
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Die 40 von den Landesgruppen erhaltenen Berichte zeigen, dass allgemein gesprochen
der Ursprung von Mitinhaberschaft fast keinen Einfluss darauf hat, wie Mitinhaberschaft
organisiert ist.
- Nur der Bericht der griechischen Gruppe scheint auszusagen, dass im Hinblick auf Marken
eine Vereinbarung über die Mitinhaberschaft zu der Zeit eingereicht werden muss, wenn die
gemeinsam gehaltene Marke registriert wird.
Dies umfasst eine spezifische Situation, falls solch eine Mitinhaberschaft freiwilliger Natur
ist.
Zu einer anderen Thematik weist die brasilianische Gruppe darauf hin, dass einige spezifische
Regelungen der Mitinhaberschaft bezüglich Erfindungen von Angestellten geschaffen worden
sind.
Jedoch scheinen jene außerordentlichen Lösungen nicht durch andere Länder angenommen
worden zu sein.
- Es sollte auch festgehalten werden, dass bei der großen Mehrzahl der Länder über
alle Kontinente hinweg die im bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch oder unter allgemeinem Recht
niedergelegten Regelungen typischerweise Anwendung finden, da es keine spezifischen
Regelungen gibt, welche in der Gesetzgebung bezogen auf Rechte des Geistigen Eigentums
enthalten sind.
Nur Länder wie Belgien, Frankreich, die Niederlande und Malaysia haben für Patente,
oder Italien für Urheberrechte, Vorschriften, welche bestimmte Aspekte der Mitinhaberschaft
regeln.
Wie in den Berichten der deutschen und schweizerischen Gruppe erkennbar , betonen die
Gruppenberichte die Probleme, welche aus der Abwesenheit von spezifischen Regelungen
entstehen, da die allgemeinen Regelungen, welche an ihrer Stelle Anwendung finden,
typischerweise geschrieben sind, um auf körperliche Objekte, und nicht auf immaterielles
Eigentum angewendet zu werden.
- Zu beachten ist, dass während der Ursprung der Mitinhaberschaft keinen Einfluss auf die
Weise hat, in welcher solche Mitinhaberschaft organisiert ist, deren Organisation den Typ und
die Art des Rechts des Geistigen Eigentums berücksichtigen muss, welches der Gegenstand
einer solchen Mitinhaberschaft ist.
Wie in Singapur 2007 vereinbart, befürwortet AIPPI die Einführung von Regelungen bezogen
auf Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums.
- In diesem Zusammenhang ist es angemessen zu bedenken, ob es für bestimmte Rechte
des Geistigen Eigentums sinnvoll wäre, wenn Inhaber dieser gemeinsam gehaltenen Rechte
ermutigt würden, zur Veröffentlichung Vereinbarungen oder Verträge über die Mitinhaberschaft
zu dem Zeitpunkt einzureichen, wenn sie ihre Anmeldung zur Registrierung einreichen, oder
zumindest vor deren Veröffentlichung.
Solch eine Regelung würde die subsidiäre Natur des allgemeinen Systems stärken, würde
Mitinhaber ermutigen, die zukünftige Ausübung ihrer Rechte zu organisieren, und würde
dadurch dazu dienen, Rechtssicherheit für Dritte zu fördern.
2. Das zweite Thema, welches den Landesgruppen präsentiert wurde, bezog die Frage des
Abschlusses von Unterverträgen für die Verwertung von Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums
ein.
Es sei daran erinnert, das AIPPI in Singapur spezifisch bezüglich Patente erklärte, das
Recht eines Mitinhabers zu befürworten, die Erfindung, welche Gegenstand des Patents ist,
individuell zu verwerten, ohne die Zustimmung der anderen Mitinhaber einzuholen, bevor er
solch eine Verwertung unternimmt.
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In diesem Zusammenhang entstand eine spezifische Frage bezüglich eines Mitinhabers eines
Patents, der nicht über die Mittel verfügt, die Erfindung persönlich zu verwerten, aber der
dies durch Abschluss von Unterverträgen über zumindest einen Teil der Verwertung erreichen
könnte.
Die Diskussionen während der Tagung des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Singapur
zeigten eine ernste Spaltung der Gruppen bei diesem Thema.
Aus diesem Grund entschloss sich AIPPI, seine Untersuchung zu diesem spezifischen Aspekt
der Mitinhaberschaft auszuweiten.
Die Antworten der Gruppen können in drei Gruppen aufgeteilt werden:
- Zuerst argumentierte eine signifikante Mehrzahl der Gruppen, dass von dem Moment
an, wo ein Mitinhaber das Recht hat, ein Recht des Geistigen Eigentums, spezifisch ein
Patent, persönlich zu verwerten, er auch das Recht haben muss, für solch eine Verwertung
Unterverträge abzuschließen, obwohl ein solcher Abschluss von Unterverträgen
bestimmten Bedingungen unterliegen kann, die sich auf die wirksame Kontrolle über die
Vermarktung der Produkte oder Verfahren beziehen, welche das Patent umfasst.
Diese Position wird von der argentinischen, kanadischen, chilenischen, tschechischen,
ägyptischen, deutschen, israelischen, norwegischen, panamaischen, portugiesischen,
rumänischen und thailändischen Gruppe eingenommen.
Zusätzlich ruft der Bericht der japanischen Gruppe einen Fall von 1938 ins Gedächtnis, der
sehr spezifische Bedingungen für die Autorisierung des Abschlusses von Unterverträgen
zu nennen scheint, nämlich wirksame Kontrolle über durch Unterverträge geregelte
Aktivitäten und den Verkauf von Produkten auf dem Markt durch den Mitinhaber des
Patents.
Auf diese Weise ist der Abschluss von Unterverträgen nur in dem Maß erlaubt, wie er Mittel
für den Mitinhaber vorsieht, das Recht, die Erfindung zu verwerten, zu implementieren.
Andererseits sollte es nicht als Vorwand für eine verdeckte Lizenz dienen.
- Die zweite Gruppe von Ländern sind jene, welche den Abschluss von Unterverträgen
nicht zu erlauben scheinen, bis zu dem Ausmaß, dass der Mitinhaber nicht die Befugnis
hat, das Recht individuell ohne Zustimmung der anderen Mitinhaber zu verwerten,
oder, falls solch eine Befugnis besteht, sie strenger Interpretation unterliegt und gänzlich
persönliche Verwertung durch den Mitinhaber erfordert.
Dies scheint die Position der belgischen, estnischen, ungarischen, malaysischen,
niederländischen, schweizerischen und türkischen Gruppe zu sein.
können. Eines bekräftigt die Rechtmäßigkeit des Abschlusses von Unterverträgen. Das
andere betont die Notwendigkeit, die Zustimmung der Mitinhaber zu erlangen. Die
Gruppe von Singapur meint, dass die rechtliche Natur des Abschlusses von Unterverträgen
ohne Zustimmung der anderen Mitinhaber von seiner Signifikanz abhängt.
- Schließlich besteht die dritte Gruppe der Länder, welche auf die Arbeitsrichtlinien
geantwortet haben, aus jenen, welche keine Regelungen zum Thema zu haben scheinen,
insbesondere Italien, Ecuador, Paraguay und Schweden.
- Es ist daher festzustellen, dass falls nationales Recht individuelle Verwertung eines Rechts
des Geistigen Eigentums durch einen Mitinhaber erlaubt ohne die Notwendigkeit, die
Zustimmung der anderen zu ersuchen, dieses Verwertungsrecht das Recht einschließen
muss, Unterverträge abzuschließen, wo dies notwendig ist, um dem individuellen Recht auf
Verwertung Bedeutung zu verleihen.
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Jedoch darf die Fähigkeit, Unterverträge abzuschließen, nicht als Vorwand zur Erteilung von
Lizenzen dienen.
3. Die Gruppen wurden auch gefragt, ob ihre nationale Gesetzgebung oder ihre Rechtsprechung
bezüglich Lizenzen an Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums Unterschiede zwischen einfachen und
ausschließlichen Lizenzen bezogen auf Bedingungen ihrer Autorisierung durch Mitinhaber
eines Rechts des Geistigen Eigentums erkennt.
Diesbezüglich sollte in Erinnerung gerufen werden, dass unter der durch den Geschäftsführenden
Ausschuss in Singapur 2007 angenommenen Entschließung AIPPI allgemein erklärte, dass
um Lizenzen an verschiedenen Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums zu gewähren, es notwendig
ist, die Zustimmung der anderen Mitinhaber zu erhalten.
- Die Antworten der Gruppen scheinen zu zeigen, dass nur einige Länder verschiedene
Lösungen im Hinblick auf die Art der Lizenz anerkennen. Dies trifft für Frankreich und Rumänien
bezogen auf Patente zu.
Gleichermaßen führt der deutsche Bericht an, dass es notwendig ist, die Zustimmung von
allen Mitinhabern zu erhalten, um eine ausschließliche Lizenz zu erteilen.
Aber es scheint auch so, zumindest im Fall von Frankreich, dass dieser Unterschied eher
theoretischer, als praktischer Natur ist.
Eine interessante Lösung scheint unter italienischem Recht bezüglich Lizenzen eingeführt
worden zu sein, da es nicht die Art der Lizenz, sondern eher ihre Dauer ist, welche die
Bedingungen für die Zustimmung der Mitinhaber verändert. So ist für eine Lizenz mit einer
Dauer von weniger als 9 Jahren für ein Patent die Zustimmung einer qualifizierten Mehrheit
der Mitinhaber ausreichend, während für eine Lizenz, deren Dauer 9 Jahre überschreitet, die
einhellige Zustimmung aller Mitinhaber erforderlich ist.
- Andererseits führten fast alle Gruppen, welche auf die Arbeitsrichtlinien antworteten, an,
dass ihre nationale Gesetzgebung und ihre Rechtsprechung nicht zwischen den betroffenen
Lizenztypen unterscheidet.
Wieder bekräftigen die Gruppen die durch den Geschäftsführenden Ausschuss in Singapur
eingenommene Position, indem sie betonen, dass es notwendig ist, die Zustimmung der
anderen Mitinhaber zu erhalten, um eine Lizenz an einem Recht des Geistigen Eigentums zu
erteilen.
Somit scheint es, dass zu dieser Frage eine durch AIPPI angenommene Entschließung
vorbehaltlos die in Singapur verabschiedete Position bekräftigen sollte.
4. Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums auf ihre Verwertung entstand aus dem Scheitern der
Vereinigung, eine Position zur Frage der Übertragung von gemeinsam gehaltenen Rechten
des Geistigen Eigentums zu verabschieden.
Zu dieser Frage scheinen die Gruppen so gespalten zu sein, wie sie es beim Treffen des
Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Singapur waren.
- Die erste Gruppe von Ländern, welche die freie Übertragung des eigenen Anteils an Rechten
des Geistigen Eigentums erlaubt (mit Ausnahme von bestimmten Rechten, wie es manchmal
für Marken oder Urheberrechte der Fall ist), scheint die Mehrheit zu sein.
Basierend auf verschiedenen Gruppenberichten ist dies die Lösung in Argentinien, Chile,
Dänemark, Ägypten, Estland, Finnland, Deutschland, Israel, den Niederlanden, Rumänien,
der Schweiz, dem Vereinigten Königreich und der Türkei, zusammen mit den Vereinigten
Staaten, wo dieses Übertragungsrecht eine Grundsatzfrage zu sein scheint.
- Die zweite Gruppe der Länder besteht aus jenen, welche das Prinzip der freien Übertragung
zu akzeptieren scheinen, aber es bestimmten Bedingungen unterwerfen, und spezifisch ein
Vorkaufsrecht zugunsten der anderen Mitinhaber vorsehen.
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Dies ist in Frankreich, Ungarn, Mexiko, Norwegen, Peru und Portugal der Fall.
Eine spezielle Situation wird im schwedischen Bericht erwähnt, welcher anführt, dass während
keine Lösung unter der Gesetzgebung oder in der Rechtsprechung eingeführt worden ist,
die Vorarbeit zum Patentgesetz anzuzeigen scheint, dass solch eine Übertragung ohne
Zustimmung der anderen Mitinhaber möglich ist.
- Schließlich lehnt eine signifikante Gruppe von Ländern die freie Übertragung, selbst mit
Bedingungen, offenbar ab.
Der Berichte dieser Länder erläutern, dass wie bei Lizenzen sich die tatsächliche Natur der
Rechte des Geistigen Eigentums in Konflikt mit der Möglichkeit befindet, einen durch einen
der Mitinhaber gehaltenen Anteil oder einen Teil eines solchen Anteils frei zu übertragen, da
es ein Risiko gibt, die anfängliche Position der Mitinhaber völlig zu verändern.
Die stärkste Meinung zu dieser Frage wird durch die japanische Gruppe ausgedrückt, aber
die tschechische, mexikanische, neuseeländische, philippinische, südkoreanische, russische
und singapurische Gruppen führen an, dass es unmöglich ist, einen Anteil an einem Recht des
Geistigen Eigentums ohne Zustimmung der anderen Mitinhaber zu übertragen.
- So scheint es eine echte grundsätzliche Differenz bei dieser Frage zu geben.
Vielleicht kann die Lösung gefunden werden, indem solch eine Übertragung erlaubt wird, so
lange sie nicht substanziell die Position der anderen Mitinhaber modifiziert, und vielleicht ein
Vorkaufsrecht dazu gewährt wird.
Jedoch gibt es Bedenken, dass Diskussionen zu diesem Thema besonders komplex sein
werden.
5. Die Arbeitsrichtlinien haben auch ein Thema angesprochen, welches vorhergehend nicht durch
AIPPI in Verbindung mit der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums diskutiert
wurde, nämlich die Beziehung, die zwischen Vereinbarungen über die Mitinhaberschaft und
Regeln in Bezug auf Übereinstimmung mit dem Prinzip des freien Wettbewerbs bestehen
kann.
Die Antworten der Gruppen waren fast einstimmig in der Aussage, dass gleich ob Regelungen
bezogen auf Wettbewerb gelten oder nicht, ihre Länder keine Beispiele der Rechtsprechung
oder spezifische Regelungen bieten, welche die Frage der Mitinhaberschaft vom Gesichtspunkt
des Wettbewerbs aus regeln.
- Somit scheint es unwahrscheinlich, dass der Arbeitsausschuss eine andere Position in dieser
Frage einnehmen kann, als eine prinzipielle Position darzulegen, welche mit anderen durch
AIPPI zur Frage von Wettbewerbsregelungen angenommenen Entschließungen übereinstimmt,
wie zum Beispiel der Entschließung zu Frage Q187 aus dem Jahre 2005 in Bezug auf
Beschränkungen von Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums durch Wettbewerbsrecht.
Dennoch wäre es empfehlenswert, die Frage von kooperativen Absprachen zu betrachten,
welche zur Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums führen, weil häufig, und
insbesondere mit Bezug auf Patente, sich die Mitinhaberschaft eines Patents für eine Erfindung
aus Forschungen ergibt, welche gemeinsam durch verschiedenen Unternehmen durchgeführt
wurden.
6. Die letzte spezifische Frage unter den Arbeitsrichtlinien betraf die Anwendung von
Internationalem Privatrecht auf die Frage der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des Geistigen
Eigentums.
Es ist in diesem Zusammenhang daran zu erinnern, dass obschon AIPPI in ihrer Entschließung
vom Oktober 2007 betonte, dass es Mitinhabern eines Rechts des Geistigen Eigentums
erlaubt sein sollte, das anwendbare Recht im Zuge von Streitigkeiten zwischen Mitinhabern
zu wählen, weitere Untersuchungen der Kriterien zur Bestimmung des anwendbaren Rechts
und der zuständigen Gerichte für den Fall empfahl, dass eine Vereinbarung zwischen den
Mitinhabern fehlte.
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Tatsächlich zeigt die durch AIPPI 2009 durchgeführte Untersuchung, dass es bedeutende
Unterschiede im Hinblick auf die rechtlichen Strukturen der Mitinhaberschaft gibt, welche in
verschiedenen Ländern in Abwesenheit einer spezifischen Absprache zwischen Mitinhabern
an verschiedenen Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums gelten.
Diese Unterschiede, welche alle Aspekte der Mitinhaberschaft betreffen, sind eine Quelle von
Unsicherheit und unnötigen Komplikationen.
Jedoch könnten diese Unterschiede überwunden werden, falls es möglich wäre, ein einziges
Recht auf die Mitinhaberschaft anzuwenden.
Dies war die Bedeutung der Frage, die AIPPI den Landesgruppen stellte.
Wieder lieferten die Gruppen eine große Vielfalt an Antworten zu diesem Thema.
- Erstens scheinen die meisten Gruppen der Ansicht zu sein, dass die Mitinhaberschaft,
also sozusagen die Eigentumsverhältnisse, welche zwischen den verschiedenen Inhabern
eines Rechts des Geistigen Eigentums bestehen, durch das Recht des Landes geregelt
werden muss, wo Schutz für dieses Recht gesucht wird.
Dies ist die Position der estnischen, finnischen, deutschen, ungarischen, israelischen,
niederländischen, portugiesischen und schweizerischen Gruppe.
- Es ist jedoch zu fragen, ob diese Antworten die Komplexität von Situationen berücksichtigen,
welche aus der Mitinhaberschaft entstehen, da, wie spezifisch im schwedischen Bericht
betont, es vielleicht hilfreich ist, zwischen internen Beziehungen zwischen den Mitinhabern
und den Beziehungen der Mitinhaber zu Dritten zu unterscheiden.
Die schwedische Gruppe glaubt, dass in Bezug auf interne Beziehungen die EU-
Verordnung vom 17. Juli 2008 (bekannt als Rom I) gelten könnte.
Andererseits sollten Beziehungen zu Dritten, insbesondere die Frage der Durchsetzbarkeit
von Rechten, nach dem Recht des Landes geregelt werden, wo Schutz gesucht wird.
- Eine relativ bedeutende Anzahl der Gruppen glaubt auch, dass es möglich sein sollte,
das anwendbare Recht zu wählen, indem bestimmt wird, welches Recht die engste
Verbindung zur Mitinhaberschaft hat.
Dies scheint die Position zu sein, welche durch die japanische, südkoreanische, türkische
und rumänische Gruppen, als auch die amerikanische Gruppe eingenommen wird,
welche gleichwohl spezifiziert, dass diese Regel bezogen auf die Mitinhaberschaft an
Marken nicht gelten kann.
Falls der Arbeitsausschuss diesen Weg weiterverfolgt und die Wahl des anwendbaren
Rechts untersucht, sollte er Kriterien herausarbeiten, um diese Wahl zu treffen, welche das
ursprüngliche Land des Rechts, die Nationalität der Mitinhaber und vielleicht das Land sein
könnten, wo die ursprüngliche Verbreitung der Schöpfung, welche den Gegenstand des
Rechts des Geistigen Eigentums bildet, erfolgte.
7. Es ist ebenfalls wichtig zu vermerken, dass eine bestimmte Anzahl an Themen bereits beim
Treffen des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses 2007 in Singapur erwogen wurde, wo zum
Beispiel die Bedingungen zur Einleitung von Gerichtsverfahren und die Bedingungen zum
Aufrechterhalten und Erneuern der Rechte des Geistigen Eigentums diskutiert wurden..
Die Gruppen scheinen keine weiteren besonderen Themen hervorgehoben zu haben,
welche eine Behandlung verdienen würden, obwohl sie in ihren Berichten anerkennen, dass
internationale Harmonisierung von Regeln wünschenswert ist, insbesondere zu den Themen
der Lizenzierung und der Übertragung von Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums.
So scheint es, dass die durch die Arbeitsrichtlinien angesprochenen Themen diejenigen sind,
welche das Interesse der Gruppen hervorgerufen haben.
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8. Schließlich ist anzumerken, dass die Gruppen keine besonderen Lösungen für solche
Harmonisierung vorgeschlagen haben, selbst wo sie einen Wunsch ausgedrückt haben, eine
solche Harmonisierung herbeizuführen.
Daher muss der Arbeitsausschuss eine Entschließung basierend auf den Ergebnissen der
Bewertung desgegenwärtigen materiellen Rechts vorschlagen.
Empfehlungen für den Arbeitsausschuss
Es versteht sich von selbst, dass der Arbeitsausschuss die Diskussion ausweiten kann, welche seit
2007 anhält, um weitere Themen einzuschließen, welche nicht explizit durch die Arbeitsrichtlinien
und diesen zusammenfassenden Bericht angesprochen wurden.
Aber der Arbeitsausschuss wird den folgenden Themen Priorität einräumen:
- Abschluss von Unterverträgen im Zusammenhang mit der Anerkennung des Rechts,
insbesondere für Patente, für einen Mitinhaber, individuell eine Erfindung zu verwerten,
welche durch dieses Patent abgedeckt ist.
Zusätzlich kann der Ausschuss Kriterien für den Abschluss von Unterverträgen vorschlagen,
was durch eine Mehrzahl der Landesgruppen akzeptiert zu sein scheint.
- Die Übertragung eines Teils eines Rechts des Geistigen Eigentums und deren potentielle
Beschränkungen unter Berücksichtigung der Regelungen, welche sich im Hinblick auf
Lizenzen an verschiedenen Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums während der EXCO 2007
entwickelt haben, und durch AIPPI anscheinend gebilligt wurden.
- Schließlich das Thema des Internationalen Privatrechts und die Möglichkeit, eine
gemeinsame Regelung hinsichtlich der Wahl des anwendbaren Rechts bei Fehlen von
Vereinbarungen über die Mitinhaberschaft zu schaffen.
Der Ausschuss kann auch erwägen, ob es wünschenswert ist zu erklären, dass solange das
Thema der Wahl des anwendbaren Rechts nicht harmonisiert ist, er empfiehlt, dass Inhaber
von Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums eine Vereinbarung über ihre Mitinhaberschaft nicht
später einreichen als zu dem Zeitpunkt, zu dem die Rechte veröffentlicht werden.
In Anbetracht der Vielfalt an Situationen, welche zu Mitinhaberschaft führen, sollte solch eine
Regelung jedoch nicht zwingend sein.
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Resolution
Question Q194BA
The impact of co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights on their
exploitation
AIPPI
Reminding that:
The impact of co-ownership of intellectual property rights on their exploitation is the subject of the
previous Resolution on Q194, adopted at the Singapore Executive Committee in 2007, in which
harmonized recommendations were arrived at in respect of inter alia:
1) The freedom of the co-owners to organize co-ownership arrangements in respect of co-owned
intellectual property rights.
2) The role of legal rules applicable to co-ownership should be a secondary legal authority, in
the absence of an agreement or when the relevant agreement does not resolve particular
questions.
3) The right to exercise the co-owned rights by co-owners individually or the right to grant licenses
to exercise co-owned rights to third parties, whereby the differences among intellectual
property rights were recognized.
4) The right of each co-owner to individually enforce the co-owned intellectual property rights,
subject to a duty to inform the remaining co-owners.
5) The right of each co-owner to individually take action to renew or otherwise maintain the coowned
intellectual property rights.
6) The right of the co-owners to decide on the choice of law and jurisdiction in connection with
the resolution of disputes among co-owners.
However, certain topics required further study by the national groups, which are addressed
herein.
Observing that:
1) Co-ownership of intellectual property rights may result, on the one hand, from Corealization
of intellectual creations (aesthetical, technical or commercial), in which the joint creators may
provide for the rules to co-own and thus to exploit, transfer, enforce or maintain intellectual
property rights, or on the other hand, from division of co-owned rights, like in inheritance,
labor relations, joint ventures or others, in which the co-owners are usually not in the position
to agree to such rules when becoming co-owners, but they are rather imposed by the law.
The vast majority of the national groups concluded that the circumstances under which the coownership
is created does not as such affect the relationship of the co-owners, and therefore
no further resolution is deemed necessary.
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2) The Singapore resolution held that co-owners can individually exploit patented inventions or
copyrighted works that can be separated from the overall composite work.
3) Outsourcing or subcontracting may be regarded as a form of individual patent exploitation,
particularly when a co-owning patent holder and his subcontractor or his outsourcing partner
have entered into an agreement providing that i) the co-owner controls and supervises the
activity of the subcontractor or the outsourcing partner and ii) the subcontractor or outsourcing
partner delivers all the products manufactured to the co-owner.
4) The Singapore resolution held that a patent license granted by an individual co-owner requires
consent from the remaining co-owners, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. For
trade marks and copyrights the Singapore resolution held that licenses cannot be granted
without consent. AIPPI has explored the question further, in order to analyze the situation
when the co-owners license the intellectual property rights on an exclusive, sole or nonexclusive
basis.
5) Assignment of co-owned intellectual property rights can sometimes affect the other co-owners
and may produce a negative impact on the co-owned intellectual property right. It seems
thus advisable that national laws provide for measures that are adequate to avoid that the
interests of the remaining co-owners are adversely affected by virtue of the assignment of a
property, which measures include first refusal rights.
6) National groups of AIPPI are in favor that the co-ownership relations are governed by a
single law and whereas the Singapore resolution held that the co-owners should be allowed
to decide on the choice of law in connection with resolution of disputes among co-owners, no
position was adopted for the situation where such choice has not been made.
Resolves that:
1) The Singapore resolution held that co-owners can individually exploit patented inventions or
copyrighted works that can be separated from the overall composite work.
When exercising the right of individual exploitation, the co-owners of these rights may be
allowed to perform outsourcing or subcontracting, without the need to seek authorization
from the other co-owners.
This outsourcing or subcontracting should be closely associated with the normal individual
exploitation by the co-owner, in particular:
a) The co-owner controls and supervises the relevant activity of the subcontractor or
outsourcing partner.
b) The subcontractor or outsourcing partner delivers all the products manufactured to the
co-owner.
2) The Singapore resolution is confirmed, in particular where it holds that patent rights that are
co-owned cannot be licensed individually without the consent of the other coowners, such
consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The fact that the intended license is exclusive, sole
or non-exclusive should be a factor, among others, when determining the reasonableness of
the withholding of the other co-owners’ consent to license the patent.
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3) Co-owners of intellectual property rights should be entitled to assign their ownership without
the need to obtain consent from the other co-owners. However, national laws should ensure
that if a co-owner assigns his or her ownership to a third party, the interests of the other coowners
are preserved. For that purpose national laws may provide for a right of first refusal
or other appropriate solutions.
4) For the sake of the legal certainty and inasmuch as the national laws are not harmonized
on the co-ownership of intellectual property rights, as was held in the Singapore resolution,
co-owners of an intellectual property right should be allowed to decide on the choice of law
and jurisdiction in connection with resolution of disputes among co-owners.
When the co-owners of an intellectual property right have not entered into an agreement or have
not specified the applicable law in their agreement, that relationship between the co-owners (such
as, regarding the right to license, exploit or assign etc.) should be governed by a single law.
In determining this single law, the principles of private international law should apply, preferably
by using the principle of closest connection. To this end, it is recommended that among the possible
factors for deciding such closest connection are the country where the co-owners are domiciled and
the place where the relevant right was predominantly created, first used or first filed.
In view of the importance and complexity of the issue of the law applicable to the relationship
between co-owners of intellectual property rights, AIPPI recommends that this issue should be
addressed in the context of international regulations and/or treaties.
The non-contractual relations between co-owners and third parties shall be governed by the law of
the country that confers protection or where the right may be enforced.
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Résolution
Question Q194BA
L’influence de la copropriété de droits de Propriété
Intellectuelle sur leur exploitation
L’AIPPI
Rappelant que:
L’influence de la copropriété des droits de propriété intellectuelle sur leur exploitation a été l’objet
de la précédente Résolution sur la Q 194, adoptée au Comité Exécutif de l’AIPPI de Singapour
en 2007, par laquelle certaines recommandations harmonisées ont été obtenues, telles que, entre
autres:
1) la liberté des copropriétaires d’organiser des accords de copropriété en relation avec des
droits de propriété intellectuelle détenus en copropriété;
2) le rôle des règles légales applicables à la copropriété en tant que source juridique supplétive
en l’absence d’accord ou lorsque l’accord est lacunaire ou n’apporte pas de réponse à cet
égard;
3) le droit d’exploiter les droits détenus en copropriété par les copropriétaires individuellement
ou le droit de concéder des licences d’exploitation des droits détenus en copropriété au profit
de tiers, pour lesquelles des différences entre les droits de propriété intellectuelle étaient
reconnues;
4) le droit de chaque copropriétaire de faire individuellement respecter les droits de propriété
intellectuelle détenus en copropriété, sous réserve de l’obligation d’en informer les autres
copropriétaires;
5) le droit de chaque copropriétaire de prendre toute action en vue du renouvellement ou, le cas
échéant, le maintien les droits de propriété intellectuelle détenus en copropriété; et
6) le droit des copropriétaires de décider du choix d’une loi et d’une juridiction en ce qui
concerne la résolution de leurs litiges.
Cependant, certains points nécessitaient de poursuivre une étude par les groupes nationaux,
lesquels sont traités par la présente.
Observant que:
La copropriété de droits de propriété intellectuelle peut résulter, d‘une part, de la réalisation
conjointe de créations intellectuelles (esthétique, technique ou commerciale), dans lesquelles les
créateurs conjoints établissent des règles en vue de les détenir en copropriété et, partant, en vue de
l’exploitation, du transfert, du respect ou du maintien de leurs droits de
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1) La copropriété de droits de propriété intellectuelle ou, d’autre part, de la division des droits
détenus en copropriété, comme étant la conséquence d’une succession, d’une relation de
travail, de joint-ventures, etc., à la suite de laquelle les copropriétaires se sont pas en mesure
de convenir de telles règles lors de leur accession à la copropriété ; ils seront ainsi plutôt
soumis à la loi. La grande majorité des groupes nationaux a conclu que les circonstances, dans
lesquelles la copropriété était créée, n’ont pas d’incidence sur la relation des copropriétaires
et, partant, une nouvelle résolution n’apparaît pas nécessaire.
2) La résolution de Singapour a retenu que les copropriétaires peuvent exploiter individuellement
des inventions brevetées ou des œuvres protégées par le droit d’auteur qui sont détachables
du reste de l’œuvre composite.
3) L’externalisation ou la sous-traitance peuvent être considérées comme une forme d’exploitation
individuelle du brevet, lorsque le titulaire du brevet et le sous-traitant ou le prestataire externe
ont conclu un accord stipulant que : i) le copropriétaire dirige et supervise l’activité du soustraitant
ou du prestataire externe ; et ii) le sous-traitant ou le prestataire externe livre tous les
produits fabriqués au copropriétaire.
4) La résolution de Singapour a retenu qu’une licence de brevet concédée par un seul
copropriétaire requiert le consentement des autres copropriétaires ; un tel consentement ne
devant pas être refusé de manière injustifiée. S’agissant des droits de marque et des droits
d’auteur, la résolution de Singapour a retenue que la licence ne peut pas être concédée sans
consentement. Dans ce contexte, l’AIPPI a approfondi la question pour examiner la situation
dans laquelle les copropriétaires ont donné en licence les droits de propriété intellectuelle de
manière exclusive, strictement exclusive ou non exclusive.
5) La cession de droits de propriété intellectuelle détenus en copropriété peut parfois affecter les
autres copropriétaires et avoir un impact négatif sur le droit de propriété intellectuelle détenu
en copropriété. Il semble, dès lors, recommandé que les lois nationales prévoient des mesures
appropriées pour éviter que les intérêts des copropriétaires restant ne soient défavorablement
affectés par l’effet de la cession d’une quote-part, lesquelles mesures doivent comprendre des
droits de préférence.
6) Les groupes nationaux sont favorables à ce que les relations de copropriété soient régies par
une loi unique, et alors que dans la résolution de Singapour, il était recommandé que les
copropriétaires devaient être libres de décider du choix de la loi en relation avec la résolution
des litiges entre copropriétaires, aucune position n’avait été adoptée pour le cas où un tel
choix n’aurait pas été fait.
Adopte la résolution suivante:
1) La Résolution de Singapour a reconnu que les copropriétaires peuvent exploiter individuellement
leurs inventions brevetées ou les œuvres qui peuvent être détachables du reste de l’œuvre
composite.
Lorsqu’ils exercent leur droit d’exploitation à titre individuel, les copropriétaires de ces droits
peuvent être libres d’externaliser ou de sous-traiter, sans avoir à rechercher l’autorisation des
autres copropriétaires.
Cette externalisation ou cette sous-traitance devrait être étroitement liée à l’exploitation
normale faite à titre individuel par un copropriétaire, en particulier, par le fait que:
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a) le copropriétaire dirige et supervise l’activité concernée du sous-traitant ou du prestataire
externe ; et
b) le sous-traitant ou le prestataire externe livre tous les produits fabriqués au
copropriétaire.
2) La résolution de Singapour est confirmée, notamment en ce qu’elle prévoit que les brevets
détenus en copropriété ne peuvent pas être donnés individuellement en licence sans le
consentement des autres copropriétaires, un tel consentement ne devant pas être refusé de
manière injustifiée. Le fait que la licence envisagée soit exclusive, strictement exclusive ou nonexclusive
peut être un facteur dans la détermination du caractère justifié du refus des autres
copropriétaires à donner le brevet en licence.
3) Les copropriétaires de droits de propriété intellectuelle devraient être habilités à céder
librement leur quote-part, sans avoir à obtenir le consentement des autres copropriétaires.
Cependant, les lois nationales devraient assurer que si un copropriétaire cède sa quotepart
à un tiers, les intérêts des autres copropriétaires soient préservés. A cette fin, les lois
nationales peuvent prévoir un droit de préférence ou toutes autres solutions appropriées.
4) Dans un but de sécurité juridique et dans la mesure où les lois nationales sur la copropriété
de droits de propriété intellectuelle ne sont pas harmonisées, ainsi que la résolution de
Singapour l’a retenu, les copropriétaires d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle devraient être
libres de décider du choix de la loi et de la juridiction en relation avec la résolution de leurs
litiges.
Lorsque les copropriétaires d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle n’ont pas conclu d’accord ou n’ont
pas spécifié la loi applicable à leur accord, ces relations (telles que celles relatives au droit de
concéder des licences, d’exploiter, de céder, etc.) devraient être régies par une loi unique.
Pour déterminer cette loi unique, les principes du droit international devraient être appliqués, de
préférence en utilisant le principe des liens les plus étroits. A cet effet, il est recommandé que parmi
les différents facteurs de détermination de tels liens les plus étroits figurent le pays dans lequel les
copropriétaires sont domiciliés et le lieu où le droit concerné a été, de manière prédominante, créé,
ou utilisé pour la première fois ou déposé pour la première fois.
Eu égard à l’importance et à la complexité de la question de la loi applicable aux relations entre
copropriétaires de droits de propriété intellectuelle, l’AIPPI recommande que cette question soit
traitée dans le cadre de règles et/ou traités internationaux.
Les relations non-contractuelles entre copropriétaires et des tiers doivent être régies par la loi du
pays qui confère la protection ou du lieu où le droit est mis en œuvre.
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Entschließung
Frage Q194BA
Der Einfluss der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des
Geistigen Eigentums auf deren Verwertung
AIPPI
Daran erinnernd, dass
der Einfluss der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des geistigen Eigentums auf deren Verwertung
bereits Gegenstand der früheren Resolution zur Frage Q194 war, die während der Sitzung des
Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses in Singapur im Jahre 2007 verabschiedet wurde, und dass in
dieser Resolution unter anderem die Vorschläge für eine Harmonisierung in Bezug auf folgende
Punkte gemacht wurden:
1) Die Freiheit der Mintinhaber, die Mitinhaberschaft in Bezug auf gemeinschaftliche Rechte des
geistigen Eigentums zu organisieren.
2) Gesetzliche Regelungen der Mitinhaberschaft sollten eine sekundäre Rechtsquelle darstellen,
falls die Mitinhaber keine Vereinbarung getroffen haben oder wenn die maßgebliche
Vereinbarung bestimmte Fragen nicht löst.
3) Das Recht die gemeinschaftlichen Rechte des geistigen Eigentums durch die Mitinhaber
individuell auszuüben und das Recht, das gemeinschaftliche Recht an dritte Parteien zur
Ausübung zu lizenzieren, wobei die Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Rechten des
geistigen Eigentums anerkannt wurden.
4) Das Recht jedes Mitinhabers, die gemeinschaftlichen Rechte des geistigen Eigentums individuell
durchzusetzen, sofern er die übrigen Mitinhaber über die Durchsetzung informiert.
5) Das Recht jedes Mitinhabers, die gemeinschaftlichen Rechte des geistigen Eigentums
individuell zu erneuern oder auf andere Weise aufrechtzuerhalten.
6) Das Recht der Mitinhaber über die Rechtswahl und den Gerichtsstand im Zusammenhang mit
Streitigkeiten aus der Mitinhaberschaft zu entscheiden.
Gleichwohl erforderten einige Themenbereiche eine weitere Untersuchung durch die nationalen
Gruppen. Diese werden hier aufgegriffen.
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In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass:
1) Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des geistigen Eigentums auf der einen Seite aus der
gemeinschaftlichen Realisierung von intellektuellen Schöpfungen (ästhetischen, technischen
oder kommerziellen) entstehen kann, wobei die gemeinschaftlichen Schöpfer die Regeln der
Mitinhaberschaft – also die Rechte zur Verwertung, zur Übertragung oder zur Durchsetzung
und Aufrechterhaltung der Rechte des geistigen Eigentums festlegen können, oder aber auf der
anderen Seite aus einer Teilung der gemeinschaftlichen Rechte, etwa im Falle eines Erbfalles,
aus arbeitsrechtlichen Verhältnissen, bei Joint-Ventures oder anderen Gelegenheiten, in
welchen die Mitinhaber normalerweise nicht über die Regeln der Mitinhaberschaft bestimmen
können, die zwischen ihnen gelten sollen, sondern ihnen diese Regeln vom Gesetz auferlegt
werden. Die große Mehrheit der nationalen Gruppen ist zu dem Ergebnis gekommen, dass
die Umstände als solche, unter denen die Mitinhaberschaft zustande gekommen ist, die
Beziehung der Mitinhaber untereinander nicht beeinflusst, so dass in dieser Hinsicht keine
weitere Resolution für notwendig gehalten wird.
2) Die Singapur-Resolution sich dafür ausgesprochen hat, dass Mitinhaber patentierte Erfindungen
oder urheberrechtlich geschützte Werke, die vom Gesamtwerk abgetrennt werden können,
individuell verwerten dürfen.
3) Outsourcing oder Auftragsvergabe (Subcontracting) als Unterform der individuellen
Patentverwertung angesehen werden können, insbesondere wenn ein Mitinhaber eines
Patents und sein Auftragnehmer oder Partner des Outsourcings eine Vereinbarung geschlossen
haben, welche beinhaltet, dass i) der Mitinhaber die Aktivitäten des Auftragnehmers oder
des Outsourcing-Partners kontrolliert und überwacht und dass ii) der Auftragnehmer oder
Outsourcing-Partner alle von ihm hergestellten Produkte ausschließlich an den Mitinhaber
liefert.
4) Die Singapur-Resolution sich dafür ausgesprochen hat, dass eine Patentlizenz, die von einem
einzelnen Mitinhaber erteilt werden soll, der Zustimmung der übrigen Mitinhaber bedarf und
dass diese Zustimmung nicht unbillig verweigert werden darf. Für Marken- und Urheberrechte
hat die Resolution festgelegt, dass die Lizenz nicht ohne Zustimmung erteilt werden kann. In
Anbetracht dessen hat die AIPPI diese Frage weiter untersucht und Situationen analysiert, in
denen die Mitinhaber die Rechte des geistigen Eigentums auf ausschließlicher, alleiniger oder
nicht-ausschließlicher Grundlage lizenzieren.
5) Die Übertragung eines gemeinschaftlichen Rechts bisweilen die anderen Mitinhaber
beeinträchtigen und negative Auswirkungen auf das gemeinschaftliche Recht haben kann.
Es erscheint daher ratsam, dass die nationalen Rechte angemessene Maßnahmen vorsehen,
um zu vermeiden, dass durch die Übertragung einer Rechtsposition, die Interessen der
übrigen Mitinhaber beeinträchtigt werden, wobei die Maßnahmen auch Vorkaufsrechte
einschließen.
6) Die Nationalen Gruppen der AIPPI befürworten, dass die Beziehungen zwischen Mitinhabern
einem einzelnen (nationalen) Recht unterliegen. Während in der Singapur-Resolution
empfohlen wurde, dass es den Mitinhabern erlaubt werden sollte, das auf die Streitigkeiten
zwischen den Mitinhabern anwendbare Recht zu bestimmen, wurde keine Position für den
Fall verabschiedet, dass keine Rechtswahl getroffen wurde.
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Verabschiedet die folgende Entschließung
1) Die Singapur-Resolution stellte fest, dass gemeinschaftliche Inhaber von patentierten
Erfindungen oder urheberrechtlich geschützten Werken, die vom Gesamtwerk abgetrennt
werden können, diese Rechte individuell verwerten können.
Bei der Ausübung des Rechts auf individuelle Verwertung kann den Mitinhabern dieser Rechte
das Outsourcing oder die Auftragsvergabe (Subcontracting) zugestanden werden, ohne dass
diese die Zustimmung der anderen Mitinhaber benötigen.
Dieses Outsourcing oder diese Auftragsvergabe (Subcontracting) sollten eng mit der normalen
individuellen Verwertung durch den Mitinhaber verknüpft sein. Das ist insbesondere dann der
Fall:
a) wenn der Mitinhaber die betreffenden Aktivitäten des Auftragnehmers (Subcontractors)
oder des Outsourcing-Partners kontrolliert und überwacht und
b) wenn der Auftragnehmer (Subcontractor) oder Outsourcing-Partner alle hergestellten
Produkte an den Mitinhaber liefert.
2) Die Singapur-Resolution kann bestätigt werden, insbesondere soweit sie bestimmt, dass
gemeinschaftlich gehaltene Patente nicht ohne Zustimmung der anderen Mitinhaber lizenziert
werden können, wobei die Zustimmung jedoch nicht unbillig verweigert werden darf. Ob
die beabsichtigte Lizenz eine exklusive, alleinige oder nicht-exklusive Lizenz ist, sollte einer
von mehreren zu berücksichtigenden Faktoren sein, wenn die Unbilligkeit der Verweigerung
bestimmt wird.
3) Den Mitinhabern von IP-Rechten sollte es erlaubt sein, ihre Inhaberschaft ohne Zustimmung der
übrigen Mitinhaber auf Dritte zu übertragen. Allerdings sollten nationale Gesetze sicherstellen,
dass die Interessen der anderen Mitinhaber gewahrt bleiben, wenn ein Mitinhaber seine
Mitinhaberschaft auf eine dritte Partei überträgt. Zu diesem Zweck können nationale Rechte
ein Vorkaufsrecht oder andere geeignete Lösungen vorsehen.
4) Um rechtliche Klarheit zu gewährleisten und soweit die nationalen Rechtssysteme in Bezug
auf die Rechte des geistigen Eigentums nicht harmonisiert sind, sollte es (wie es in Singapur
entschieden wurde) den Inhabern von Rechten des geistigen Eigentums gestattet sein, selbst
über die Rechtswahl und den Gerichtsstand für Streitigkeiten zwischen den Mitinhabern zu
entscheiden.
Falls die Mitinhaber eines Rechts des geistigen Eigentums keine Vereinbarung über ihre Beziehungen
getroffen haben oder wenn sie das anwendbare Recht in ihrem Vertrag nicht festgelegt haben,
sollten die Rechtsbeziehungen zwischen ihnen (also beispielsweise die Lizenzierungsbefugnis, das
Verwertungsrecht und das Recht, den Anteil zu übertragen) einem einzelnen (nationalen) Recht
unterworfen sein.
Um dieses (nationale) Recht festzustellen, sollten die Prinzipien des Internationalen Privatrechts
Anwendung finden, insbesondere das Prinzip der engsten Verbindung. Hierzu wird empfohlen,
dass unter den möglichen Faktoren zur Bestimmung der engsten Verbindung die folgenden
Gesichtspunkte berücksichtigt werden: das Land, in dem die Mitinhaber ihr Domizil haben, und der
Ort, wo das betreffende Recht hauptsächlich geschaffen, zuerst benutzt oder zuerst angemeldet
wurde.
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Im Hinblick auf die Bedeutung und Komplexität der Frage, welches Recht auf die Beziehungen
zwischen Mitinhabern von Rechten des geistigen Eigentums anwendbar ist, empfiehlt AIPPI, dass
das Thema im Zusammenhang mit internationalen Vorschriften und/oder Verträgen behandelt
wird.
Auf die nicht-vertraglichen Beziehungen zwischen Mitinhabern und dritten Parteien sollte das Recht
des jeweiligen Schutzlandes oder das Recht des Landes, in dem das Recht durchgesetzt werden
soll, angewendet werden.
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I.
QUESTION Q209
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement,
other Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
QUESTION Q209
Les Inventions de sélection – le critère d’activité inventive,
autres conditions de brevetabilité et étendue de la protection
FRAGE Q209
Auswahlerfindungen – das Erfordernis der erfinderischen Tätigkeit,
andere Patentierungsvoraussetzungen und Schutzbereich
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Working Guidelines
by Jochen E. BüHLING, Reporter General
Dariusz SZLEPER and Thierry CALAME, Deputy Reporters General
Nicolai LINDGREEN, Nicola DAGG and Shoichi OKUYAMA
Assistants to the Reporter General
Question Q209
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Introduction
1) A selection patent is a patent granted for making an inventive selection from a field that is
already known. Selection inventions may involve the selection of individual elements, sub-sets,
or sub-ranges, which have not been explicitly disclosed previously, within a larger known set
or range.
2) Selection patents have traditionally been seen in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries.
For example, a selection patent may involve a claim to a particular group of compounds
having certain advantageous properties, where that group is selected from a prior-disclosed
wide class of compounds, where that advantageous property is not possessed by the priordisclosed
wide class of compounds. Also, in the field of alloys, within a broadly defined
class of alloys, a specific range of compositions may give rise to a special property due to
a previously unknown mechanism such as newly discovered phase transition. Such a range,
if it is new, can form a selection invention. Finally, selection inventions can also be found in
engineering and manufacturing processes, where a special selection in a process of particular
operating conditions (e.g. temperature and pressure) within a known range produces
unexpected effects in the operation of the process or the properties of the resulting product.
Selection inventions may also be found in other technological areas, such as biotechnology,
material science and telecommunications.
3) Further, a new use may be considered to fall under the concept of selection invention or
at least to relate to this concept. Typically, a new use may be found for a known chemical
compound or material. It can be claimed as a “use” or a method or as a product intended for
such new use.
4) To be patentable an invention needs to be new, non-obvious or inventive, sufficiently disclosed,
and, of lesser importance to the current question, enabled. A selection patent is no different.
Selection patents can cause difficulties, however, both in terms of their patentability and their
enforceability. It has been suggested, in some jurisdictions, that selection patents constitute a
special case to “normal” rules on patentability.
5) As regards validity, a difficulty with selection patents may arise on how the patentee chooses
to craft his selection, both when attempting to define the selection from the wider class
(that had previously been disclosed) and when attempting to define the inventive feature of
the selection. Of course, the same principles of patentability still apply, but there may be
difficulties in applying these principles when the prior-disclosed group and the selection are
similar in terms of how they are named or defined.
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6) As regards infringement, the difficulty that arises is the same as that which arises with patents
claiming new uses for old products 1 , such as “Use of Product X as [new use]” (where product
X had been known for many years for an old use. The difficult issue (which is yet to be tackled
by the courts in many countries) is whether evidence of the intention of the infringer is required
to arrive at a finding of infringement of such a claim.
Previous work of AIPPI
7) AIPPI studied “Protection of groups of chemical substances and selection inventions” under
Q81. This study resulted in an interesting Summary Report and a very short resolution stating
essentially that the question of selection inventions should continue to be studied. Q84 entitled
“Selection inventions” was subsequently established, but no working guidelines and no group
reports were published.
Novelty
8) The founding principle upon which the novelty of a selection invention rests is that a general
disclosure is not to be regarded as a specific disclosure of everything embraced by the
general disclosure, thereby permitting claims to protect further discoveries within (or selected
from) the prior general disclosure. Of course, much depends upon the way in which the
patentee has crafted his claim. The issue is best considered by reference to an example.
Example 1
Say a prior art document discloses a chemical compound characterised by a specified
structure including a substituent group designated “R”. This substituent “R” is defined so
as to embrace a generic class of broadly-defined functional groups such as all alkyl or
aryl radicals, either unsubstituted or substituted by a halogen and/or a hydroxyl group,
although for practical reasons only a very small number of specific examples are given.
The (later) alleged invention consists of the selection of a particular radical or particular
group of radicals from amongst the generic class, where the selected radical or group of
radicals were not specifically disclosed in the prior-art document. The resulting compounds
are described as having a new, advantageous property, say as adhesives, not possessed
by the prior art examples.
9) While it may also relate to the question of inventive step or non-obviousness, merely finding a
new range or combination may not be considered to give rise to novelty. A different property
or advantage, or a similar advantage of unpredictable extent may be required if an invention
is to qualify as a novel selection invention.
Non-obviousness or Inventive Step
10) The law on inventive step will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Although we are beginning
to see a shift in the approaches taken by the courts around the world as to what is or what is
not obvious (most notably in the KSR decision in the USA), differences remain.
11) As regards selection patents, once it has been established that novelty arises in the particular
selection that the inventor has made, a patent for that selection will only be valid if the
selection is non-obvious or inventive.
12) Since a selection invention, when a patent is granted on it, cuts out a certain scope of
monopoly from the public domain accorded with the prior art, it may be justifiable to require
more data to support the purported inventive step, for example a higher level of criticality
1
Such claims will be familiar to European patent practitioners as MOBIL claims, following the EPO case MOBIL/Friction
reducing additive [1990] OJ EPO 93 or, in the pharmaceutical sector, as medical use claims.
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associated with the inventive level of the selection invention or superior results in comparison
with what was known prior to the invention.
Example 2
In the selection that the inventor has made in example 1, i.e. specific compound having
a particular radical, or group of specific compounds having a selection of particular
radicals, the resulting compounds may be:
i) neither described as having nor shown to possess any advantageous properties (as
adhesives) not possessed by the specific prior art examples;
ii)
iii)
described as possessing advantageous properties compared with the compounds
specifically referred to in the prior art, but these properties are ones which the
person skilled in the art would expect such compounds to possess, so that he is likely
to be led to make this selection; or
described as having advantageous (adhesive) properties but there are no indications
which would lead the person skilled in the art to this particular selection as opposed
to any other members of the generic class in order to achieve the advantageous
(adhesive) properties.
Sufficiency or Written Description Requirements
13) The new, inventive selection must also be sufficiently disclosed so that the skilled addressee
of the patent is able to put the invention disclosed in the patent into effect. The invention will
necessarily be required to be disclosed across the full breadth of the monopoly claimed.
Again, much depends on exactly how the patentee has defined his selection.
14) So as to ensure the grant of a valid patent, the patentee will want to strike a careful balance
between inventive step (by defining the advantage possessed by the selection so that it is as
far away from the prior art as possible) and sufficiency (so that all the members of the claimed
selection possess that advantage).
15) It can also be an issue at what timing experimental data supporting a selection invention
should be submitted to a patent granting authority. Because selection itself is the key to any
selection invention, the identification of prior art and data supporting the selection may
have to be included in the originally filed specification. Alternatively, it may be possible to
later submit experimental data that helps to distinguish the selection invention from prior art
by providing evidence of new advantages or superior results during prosecution before the
patent granting authority. It may also be possible that experimental data proving the existence
of inventive step or non-obviousness may be dealt with differently from that supporting the
breadth of a patent claim.
Infringement
16) As alluded to above, a difficult issue that arises with claims to products having a particular
advantageous property is the extent to which evidence of the advantageous property is
required for a finding of infringement. The advantageous property is often found by use of the
product, and the selection patent may be drafted either as: (i) a product claim, (which exploits
the selection’s advantageous property); or (ii) a use claim, claiming the use of the selection for
a new use (again which exploits the selection’s advantageous property). This is best illustrated
by our example above:
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Example 3
In the selection that our inventor has made, the claim extends to the use of a particular
compound arising from a selection as an adhesive (where the adhesive nature of the
compound is the advantageous property not possessed by the prior disclosed generic
class of compounds). A competitor manufactures the claimed compound and supplies it
with no instructions as to its use.
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
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5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
With Reference to the Examples
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
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have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
Note:
It will be helpful and appreciated if the Groups follow the order of the questions in their Reports and
use the questions and numbers for each answer.
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Orientations de travail
De Jochen E. BÜHLING, Rapporteur Général,
Dariusz SZLEPER et Thierry CALAME, Suppléants du Rapporteur Général,
Nicolai LINDGREEN, Nicola DAGG et Shoichi OKUYAMA, Assistants du Rapporteur Général
Question Q209
Les Inventions de sélection – le critère d’activité inventive, autres
conditions de brevetabilité et étendue de la protection
Introduction
1) Un brevet de sélection est un brevet accordé pour la réalisation d’une sélection inventive
dans un domaine déjà connu. Les inventions de sélection peuvent impliquer la sélection
d’éléments individuels, de sous-ensembles, de sous-plages qui n’ont pas été explicite¬ment
décrits précédemment à l’intérieur d’un ensemble ou plage connu plus vaste.
2) Les brevets de sélection ont traditionnellement été considérés dans les industries chimiques et
pharmaceutiques. Par exemple, un brevet de sélection peut impliquer une revendication d’un
groupe particulier de composés ayant une propriété avantageuse, ce groupe étant sélectionné
parmi une classe étendue de composés décrite précédemment, et cette propriété avantageuse
n’étant pas présente dans la classe étendue de composés décrite précédemment. Egalement,
dans le domaine des alliages, dans une classe d’alliages définie de façon large, une plage
particulière de compositions peut donner lieu à une propriété particulière due à un mécanisme
précédemment inconnu tel qu’une transition de phase nouvellement découverte. Une telle
plage, si elle est nouvelle, peut former une invention de sélection. Enfin, on peut également
trouver des inventions de sélection dans des processus d’ingénierie et de fabrication, quand
une sélection particulière de conditions opératoires spécifiques (par exemple de température
et de pression), à l’intérieur d’une plage connue, produit des effets inattendus dans la mise en
oeuvre du processus ou dans les propriétés du produit résultant. On peut également trouver
des inventions de sélection dans d’autres domaines techniques tels que la biotechnologie, la
science des matériaux et les télécommunications.
3) En outre, une utilisation nouvelle peut être considérée comme tombant dans le concept de
l’invention de sélection, ou au moins être liée à ce concept. Typiquement, une utilisation
nouvelle peut être découverte pour un composé ou matériau chimique connu. Elle peut
être revendiquée en tant qu’utilisation ou procédé, ou que produit destiné à cette utilisation
nouvelle.
4) Pour être brevetable, une invention doit être nouvelle, non évidente ou inventive, suffisamment
décrite et, bien que cela concerne moins la question en cours, pouvoir être mise en
oeuvre. Un brevet de sélection n’est pas différent. Les brevets de sélection peuvent toutefois
poser des problèmes, en ce qui concerne la brevetabilité et l’opposabilité. On a suggéré,
dans certains pays, que les brevets de sélection constituent un cas particulier par rapport aux
règles “normales” de brevetabilité.
5) En ce qui concerne la validité, une difficulté avec les brevets de sélection peut survenir dans
la façon dont le breveté choisit de définir sa sélection, à la fois en essayant de définir la
sélection à partir d’une classe plus étendue (qui a déjà été décrite) et en essayant de définir
la caractéristique inventive de la sélection. Bien sûr, les mêmes principes de brevetabilité
s’appliquent, mais il peut y avoir des difficultés d’application de ces principes quand le
groupe décrit antérieurement et la sélection sont identiques quant à la façon dont ils sont
nommés ou définis.
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6) En ce qui concerne la contrefaçon, la difficulté qui survient est la même que celle qui se
présente avec les brevets revendiquant des utilisations nouvelles de produits connus 1 , telles
que “utilisation du produit X comme [utilisation nouvelle]” (le produit X étant connu depuis de
nombreuses années pour un usage ancien). Le problème difficile (qui doit encore être traité
par des tribunaux dans de nombreux pays) est de déterminer si une preuve de l’intention
du contrefacteur est requise pour arriver à une incrimination de contrefaçon d’une telle
revendication.
Travaux antérieurs de l’AIPPI
7) L’AIPPI a étudié “la protection des groupes de substances chimiques et les inventions de
sélection” dans la question Q81. Cette étude a conduit à un rapport de synthèse intéres-sant
et à une très courte résolution affirmant essentiellement que la question des inven-tions de
sélection doit continuer à être étudiée. La question Q84 intitulée “Inventions de sélection”
a ensuite été proposée, mais aucune orientation de travail ni rapport de groupe n’a été
publié.
Nouveauté
8) Le principe de base sur lequel la nouveauté d’une invention de sélection repose est qu’une
description générale ne doit pas être considérée comme une description particulière de tout
ce qui est couvert par la description générale, permettant ainsi à des revendications de
protéger des découvertes ultérieures à l’intérieur de la description générale antérieure (ou
sélectionnées dans celle-ci). Bien sûr, cela dépend beaucoup de la façon dont le breveté a
rédigé sa revendication. Ceci sera mieux compris en relation avec un exemple.
Exemple 1
Considérons un document antérieur qui décrit un composé chimique caractérisé par une
structure spécifiée incluant un groupe substituant désigné par “R”. Le substituant “R” est
défini de façon à couvrir une classe générale de groupes fonctionnels définis de façon
générale tels que tous les radicaux alkyle ou aryle, substitués ou non substitués par un
halogène et ou un groupe hydroxyle, bien que, pour des raisons pratiques, seul un très
petit nombre d’exemples particuliers soit donné. La prétendue invention (ultérieure) consiste
en la sélection d’un radical particulier ou d’un groupe particulier de radicaux parmi ceux
de la classe générale, le radical ou le groupe de radicaux sélectionné n’étant pas décrit
spécifiquement dans le document antérieur. Les composés résultants sont décrits comme
ayant une propriété nouvelle et avantageuse, par exemple comme des adhésifs, propriété
qui n’appartient pas aux exemples de l’art antérieur.
9) Bien qu’il puisse également y avoir des liens avec la question de l’activité inventive ou
non évidence, la simple découverte d’une nouvelle plage ou combinaison peut ne pas
être considérée comme n’étant pas nouvelle. Une propriété ou un avantage différent, ou
un avantage similaire, dans une mesure non prévisible, peut être requis pour qualifier une
invention d’invention de sélection nouvelle.
Non évidence ou activité inventive
10) La jurisprudence sur l’activité inventive peut varier d’un pays à un autre. Bien que l’on
commence à voir un rapprochement des positions prises par les tribunaux dans le monde en
ce qui concerne ce qui est évident ou non (voir en particulier la décision KSR aux Etats-Unis),
des différences demeurent.
1
De telles revendications peuvent être familières aux usagers du brevet européen, telles que les revendications
MOBIL – voir la jurisprudence de l’OEB MOBIL/Friction reducing additive [1990] JO OEB 93 ou, dans le secteur
pharmaceutique, en tant que revendications d’utilisation thérapeutique.
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11) En ce qui concerne les brevets de sélection, une fois que la nouveauté a été établie pour la
sélection particulière que l’inventeur a effectuée, un brevet pour cette sélection sera valide
seulement si la sélection est non évidente ou inventive.
12) Puisqu’une invention de sélection, une fois qu’un brevet est accordé, enlève un certain domaine
de monopole du domaine public selon l’art antérieur, il peut être justifié de requérir plus de
données pour soutenir l’activité inventive éventuelle, par exemple un niveau plus élevé quant
au caractère critique associé au niveau inventif de l’invention de sélection ou de meilleurs
résultats par rapport à ce qui était connu avant l’invention.
Exemple 2
Dans la sélection que l’inventeur a faite dans l’exemple 1, c’est-à-dire un composé particulier
comportant un radical particulier ou un groupe de composés particuliers comportant une
sélection de radicaux particuliers, les composés résultants peuvent être :
i) jamais décrits comme ayant des propriétés avantageuses (en tant qu’adhésif) que n’ont
pas les exemples spécifiques de l’art antérieur ;
ii)
iii)
décrits comme ayant des propriétés avantageuses par rapport aux composés spécifiquement
mentionnés dans l’état de la technique, mais ces propriétés sont celles que l’homme de
l’art attendrait que de tels composés possèdent de sorte qu’il peut être conduit à effectuer
cette sélection ; ou
décrits comme ayant les propriétés avantageuses (adhésives) mais sans indication qui
conduirait l’homme de l’art à cette sélection particulière, contrairement à d’autres éléments
de la classe générale pour atteindre les propriétés avantageuses (adhésives).
Exigences de suffisance de description
13) La sélection nouvelle et inventive doit également être suffisamment décrite pour que l’homme
de l’art lisant le brevet puisse mettre en oeuvre l’invention décrite dans le brevet. L’invention
doit nécessairement être décrite sur toute l’étendue du monopole revendiqué. A nouveau,
beaucoup dépend de la façon précise dont le breveté a défini sa sélection.
14) Pour assurer la délivrance d’un brevet valide, le breveté voudra présenter un équilibre
soigneux entre l’activité inventive (en définissant l’avantage spécifique de la sélection de
sorte quelle soit aussi éloignée de l’art antérieur que possible) et la suffisance (de sorte que
tous les éléments de la sélection revendiquée possèdent cet avantage).
15) Ce peut également être un problème que de fixer le moment auquel des données
expérimentales soutenant une invention de sélection doivent être soumises à une autorité
délivrant des brevets. Comme la sélection elle-même est la clé de toute invention de sélection,
l’identification de l’art antérieur et de caractéristiques distinguant la sélection peut devoir
être incluse dans la demande de brevet initialement déposée. A titre de variante, on pourrait
admettre de soumettre ultérieurement des données expérimentales qui aident à distinguer
l’invention de sélection de l’art antérieur en fournissant la preuve de nouveaux avantages
ou de résultats meilleurs pendant la procédure auprès de l’autorité de délivrance de brevets.
On pourrait également admettre que des données expérimentales prouvant l’existence d’une
activité inventive ou d’une non évidence puissent être traitées différemment des données
soutenant la portée d’une revendication de brevet.
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Infringement
16) Comme on y a fait allusion ci-dessus, un problème difficile qui se pose avec des revendi-cations
de produit ayant une propriété avantageuse particulière réside dans la mesure dans laquelle
une preuve de la propriété avantageuse est requise pour la preuve de la contrefaçon. La
propriété avantageuse est souvent prouvée par l’utilisation du produit et le brevet de sélection
peut être rédigé sous forme de : (i) une revendication de produit (qui exploite la propriété
avantageuse de la sélection) ; ou (ii) une revendication d’utilisation revendiquant l’utilisation
de la sélection pour une utilisation nouvelle (à nouveau qui exploite la propriété avantageuse
de la sélection). Ceci sera plus clair dans le cadre de l’exemple ci-dessus :
Exemple 3
Dans la sélection que notre inventeur a effectuée, la revendication s’étend à l’utilisation d’un
composé particulier résultant d’une sélection en tant qu’adhésif (la nature adhésive du composé
étant la propriété avantageuse que ne possède pas la classe générale de composés de l’art
antérieur). Un concurrent fabrique le composé revendiqué et le livre sans instruction quant à
son utilisation.
Questions
Généralités
Les groupes sont invités à donner un résumé de l’état du droit en ce qui concerne un brevet visant
une invention de sélection dans leurs pays en relation avec ce qui suit :
1) Cadre légal des inventions de sélection
Quels types particuliers d’inventions sont admis dans le cadre du concept d’invention de
sélection et sont brevetables dans votre pays ? Avez-vous des exemples d’inventions de sélection
dans un domaine autre que la chimie, la pharmacie ou les sciences des matériaux.
2) Nouveauté
Les groupes sont priés d’indiquer tout problème qui devrait être pris en considération en ce
qui concerne la nouveauté des inventions de sélection. Par exemple, est-ce que le seul fait de
sélectionner une plage sur une description large de l’art antérieur suffit à rendre une invention
de sélection nouvelle ? Un avantage ou une utilisation différente ou le même avantage avec
une amélioration imprévisible est-il requis pour qu’une invention de sélection soit nouvelle ?
3) Activité inventive ou non évidence
Les groupes sont priés de présenter les exigences d’activité inventive ou de non évidence de
leurs pays. Si des données expérimentales sont utilisées pour conforter l’activité inventive ou
la non évidence, ces données peuvent-elles être soumises après le dépôt du brevet ? Y a-t-il
des conditions ou des limitations quant à la soumission tardive de données ?
4) Suffisance de description
Les groupes sont priés de présenter les critères de suffisance de description dans leur pays. Il
peut y avoir plusieurs aspects à cette question :
1) le seuil de suffisance ;
2) le délai autorisé pour la soumission de données expérimentales ;
3) le délai dans lequel les exigences de suffisance doivent être satisfaites ; et
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4) la portée d’une revendication qui peut être supportée par un nombre limité d’exemples
d’avantages affirmés ou prouvés.
En ce qui concerne le point (1), il est demandé d’indiquer dans quelle mesure tous les
membres de la classe sélectionnée par le breveté doivent présenter l’avantage requis
dans votre pays. Faut-il, de façon absolue, que tous les éléments de la classe sélectionnée
possèdent l’avantage concerné, ou bien le breveté est-il excusé si un ou deux exemples sont
en défaut ? Egalement, en ce qui concerne le point (4) ci-dessus, si une utilisation nouvelle est
présentée en tant qu’invention de sélection, suffit-il de revendiquer une plage ou une sélection
particulière de composants qui se sont avérés être associés à cette utilisation nouvelle, ou
faut-il nécessairement mentionner cette utilisation nouvelle dans les revendications ?
5) Contrefaçon
Si un certain avantage ou des résultats meilleurs ont été la raison de la délivrance d’un brevet
sur une invention de sélection, est-ce que cet avantage ou ce résultat meilleur doit être utilisé
implicitement ou explicitement par un tiers pour qu’une contrefaçon soit établie ?
Si une invention de sélection est revendiquée en tant qu’utilisation nouvelle, quelles sont les
exigences pour établir la contrefaçon ? Est-ce qu’un fabricant d’un produit qui peut être utilisé
pour l’utilisation nouvelle contrefait le brevet ? Est-ce que l’intention du contrefacteur présumé
joue un rôle dans la détermination de la contrefaçon ?
6) Fondement
Les groupes sont priés de donner un bref commentaire quant au fondement sur lequel est
basée la jurisprudence sur les inventions de sélection dans leurs pays, puis de considérer si
ce fondement est encore valide aujourd’hui alors que les techniques progressent.
En relation avec les exemples
7) Nouveauté
Dans l’exemple 1, est-ce que, dans votre pays, la description antérieure des composés
contenant la classe générale de radicaux antériorise une revendication visant un composé
particulier contenant un radical particulier ou un groupe de composés particuliers comprenant
une sélection de radicaux particulière ? Dans l’analyse, l’étendue de la classe générale
précédemment décrite de composés est-elle importante, c’est-à-dire est-ce que l’analyse serait
différente si la classe générale antérieure comprenait un million de compo-sés possibles (dont
très peu sont spécifiquement décrits) ou au contraire par exemple dix ?
8) Activité inventive ou non évidence
Dans l’exemple 2, est-ce que l’une quelconque des trois possibilités constituerait une base
d’activité inventive par rapport à l’art antérieur dans votre pays ? En outre, si par exemple le
scénario (iii) n’établit pas une activité inventive par rapport à l’art antérieur, quelle portée de
protection l’inventeur pourrait obtenir ? L’inventeur pourrait-il obtenir une protec¬tion pour les
produits en eux-mêmes (qui se trouvent avoir cette propriété avantageuse), ou est-ce qu’une
protection par brevet serait limitée à l’utilisation des produits pour la propriété avantageuse
(en tant qu’adhésif) n’appartenant pas à l’art antérieur et non évidente par rapport à celui-ci
?
9) Exigence de suffisance de description
Dans quelle mesure tous les membres de la classe sélectionnée par le breveté doivent
posséder l’avantage requis dans votre pays ? Y a-t-il une exigence absolue selon laquelle
toute la classe sélectionnée doit présenter l’avantage concerné, ou est-ce que le breveté est
excusé si un ou deux exemples ne marchent pas ?
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10) Contrefaçon
En relation avec l’exemple 3, dans quelle mesure est-il nécessaire de prouver la connaissance
de la propriété avantageuse de la sélection ou l’intention du contrefacteur quant à sa
fourniture pour démontrer la contrefaçon dans votre pays ?
11) Fondement
Les groupes sont priés de considérer, en relation avec les exemples 1 et 2, s’il importe de
déterminer l’effort produit par l’inventeur pour arriver à sa sélection pour obtenir un brevet
de sélection valide. La réponse à cette question est intimement liée à des considérations de
fondement sous-jacentes à la délivrance des brevets de sélection ou à l’équation incitation/
récompense impliquée. L’inventeur peut avoir dépensé beaucoup de temps et d’argent pour
tester de grands nombres de composés possibles couverts par la classe générique décrite
antérieurement, et la sélection particulière qu’il a effectuée peut constituer un bond en avant
dans le domaine. L’inventeur ne doit-il pas être récompensé pour ses efforts et obtenir une
protection ? Par contre, on pourrait soutenir que de telles considérations peuvent avoir été
pertinentes à une époque où les efforts de l’inventeur impliquaient effectivement de nombreuses
années de travail de laboratoire soigneux et difficile, mais sont maintenant de moins en moins
pertinentes à une époque de synthèse combinatoire quand de grandes variétés de composés
différents peuvent être fabriquées en très peu de temps. De telles considérations sont-elles
pertinentes ?
Harmonisation
12) Les groupes sont priés d’analyser quelles devraient être des règles harmonisées de
breveta¬bilité des inventions de sélection. En particulier, les points discutés en Q1-Q6 et les
exemples donnés en Q7-Q10 ci-dessus doivent être mentionnés.
13) Les groupes sont également priés de recommander tout sujet d’harmonisation non mentionné
au point Q11 ci-dessus.
14) Les groupes sont priés de souligner tout autre problème éventuel qui mérite une discussion
dans le cadre de l’AIPPI en ce qui concerne les inventions de sélection.
Note :
Merci de suivre l’ordre de questions et d’utiliser les numéros des questions dans vos réponses.
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Arbeitsrichtlinien*
von Jochen E. BüHLING, Generalberichterstatter
Dariusz SZLEPER und Thierry CALAME, Stellvertreter des Generalberichterstatters
Nicolai LINDGREEN, Nicola DAGG und Shoichi OKUYAMA
Assistenten des Generalberichterstatters
Frage Q209
Auswahlerfindungen – das Erfordernis der erfinderischen Tätigkeit,
andere Patentierungsvoraussetzungen und Schutzbereich
Einführung
1) Ein Auswahlpatent ist ein Patent, welches für eine erfinderische Auswahl aus einem Bereich
verliehen wird, der bereits bekannt ist. Auswahlerfindungen können die Auswahl von einzelnen
Elementen, Untergruppen oder Unterbereichen, welche zuvor nicht explizit offenbart worden
sind, innerhalb einer grösseren bekannten Gruppe oder eines grösseren bekannten Bereichs
einbeziehen.
2) Auswahlpatente sieht man traditionell in der chemischen und pharmazeutischen Industrie.
Zum Beispiel kann ein Auswahlpatent einen Anspruch auf eine bestimmte Gruppe von
Verbindungen mit bestimmten vorteilhaften Eigenschaften beinhalten, wobei diese Gruppe
aus einer vorher offenbarten breiten Klasse von Verbindungen ausgewählt wird und die
vorher offenbarte breite Klasse von Verbindungen diese vorteilhafte Eigenschaft nicht
besitzt. Auch kann im Bereich der Mischungen innerhalb einer breit definierten Klasse von
Mischungen eine spezifische Palette an Zusammensetzungen wegen vorher unbekannter
Mechanismen wie neu entdecktem Phasenübergang zu einer speziellen Eigenschaft führen.
Solch eine Palette kann, falls sie neu ist, eine Auswahlerfindung bilden. Schliesslich können
Auswahlerfindungen auch in der Verfahrenstechnik und bei Herstellungsverfahren auftreten,
wo eine spezielle Auswahl bei einem Verfahren mit bestimmten Betriebsbedingungen (z.B.
Temperatur und Druck) innerhalb einer bekannten Bandbreite unerwartete Wirkungen
hinsichtlich der Anwendung des Verfahrens oder der Eigenschaften des sich ergebenden
Produkts erzeugt. Auswahlerfindungen können auch in anderen technologischen Bereichen
gefunden werden, wie Biotechnologie, Werkstoffkunde und Telekommunikation.
3) Ferner kann eine neue Verwendung als unter das Konzept der Auswahlerfindung fallend oder
zumindest mit diesem Konzept in Beziehung stehend angesehen werden. Typischerweise kann
eine neue Verwendung für eine bekannte chemische Verbindung oder Material gefunden
werden. Sie kann als „Verwendung“ oder ein Verfahren oder als ein Produkt, welches für
solche eine neue Verwendung beabsichtigt ist, beansprucht werden.
4) Um patentierbar zu sein, muss eine Erfindung neu, nicht – nahe liegend oder erfinderisch,
ausreichend offenbart und, für die vorliegende Frage von geringerer Bedeutung, ausführbar
sein. Für ein Auswahlpatent gilt nichts anderes. Auswahlpatente können jedoch Schwierigkeiten
sowohl bezüglich ihrer Patentierbarkeit als auch ihrer Durchsetzbarkeit verursachen. Es ist in
einigen Rechtsordnungen vorgeschlagen worden, dass Auswahlpatente einen speziellen Fall
zu den „normalen“ Regeln für die Patentierbarkeit bilden.
5) Bezüglich ihrer Rechtsbeständigkeit kann eine Schwierigkeit bei Auswahlpatenten daraus
entstehen, wie der Patentanmelder seine Auswahl trifft, und zwar sowohl beim Versuch, die
Auswahl aus einer breiteren Klasse (die vorhergehend offenbart worden war) zu definieren
*
Übersetzt von Peter PAWLOY – Sonn und Partner PAe. (Österreich)
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als auch beim Versuch, das erfinderische Merkmal der Auswahl zu definieren. Natürlich
gelten noch die gleichen Prinzipien der Patentierbarkeit, aber es kann Schwierigkeiten bei der
Anwendung dieser Prinzipien geben, wenn die vorher offenbarte Gruppe und die Auswahl
bezüglich ihrer Benennung oder Definition ähnlich sind.
6) Hinsichtlich der Rechtsverletzung besteht die gleiche Schwierigkeit wie bei Patenten, welche
eine neue Verwendung für alte Produkte 1 beanspruchen, wie „Verwendung von Produkt X als
[neue Verwendung]“ (wobei Produkt X seit vielen Jahren für eine alte Verwendung bekannt
gewesen ist). Das schwierige Thema (welches noch durch die Gerichte in vielen Ländern
in Angriff genommen werden muss) ist, ob der Nachweis der Absicht des Rechtsverletzers
erforderlich ist, um zu einer Beurteilung als Verletzung eines derartigen Anspruchs zu
gelangen.
Frühere Arbeit der AIPPI
7) AIPPI untersuchte „Schutz von Gruppen von chemischen Substanzen und Auswahlerfindungen“
unter Q81. Diese Untersuchung ergab einen interessanten zusammenfassenden
Bericht und eine sehr kurze Entschliessung, welche im Wesentlichen aussagte, dass
die Frage der Auswahlerfindungen fortgesetzt untersucht werden sollte. Q84 mit dem
Titel „Auswahlerfindungen“ wurde in der Folgezeit aufgestellt, aber es wurden keine
Arbeitsrichtlinien und keine Gruppenberichte veröffentlicht.
Neuheit
8) Das Grundprinzip, auf welchem die Neuheit einer Auswahlerfindung ruht, besteht darin, dass
eine allgemeine Offenbarung nicht als eine spezifische Offenbarung für alles angesehen wird,
was durch die allgemeine Offenbarung umfasst wird, wodurch Ansprüche erlaubt werden,
um weitere Entdeckungen innerhalb (oder ausgewählt aus) der vorherigen allgemeinen
Offenbarung zu schützen. Natürlich hängt viel davon ab, wie der Patentinhaber seinen
Anspruch gefertigt hat. Das Thema wird am besten durch Verweis auf ein Beispiel erörtert.
Beispiel 1
Angenommen ein Dokument im Stand der Technik offenbart eine chemische Verbindung,
die durch eine spezifizierte Struktur gekennzeichnet ist, welche eine Substituentengruppe
mit der Bezeichnung „R“ einschliesst. Dieser Substituent „R“ ist so definiert, dass er eine
generische Klasse von breit definierten funktionellen Gruppen wie Alkyl- oder Arylresten,
entweder unsubstituiert oder durch eine Halogen- und/oder eine Hydroxylgruppe
substituiert umfasst, obwohl aus praktischen Gründen nur eine sehr kleine Anzahl an
spezifischen Beispielen angegeben wird. Die (spätere) angebliche Erfindung besteht in
der Auswahl eines bestimmten Rests oder einer bestimmten Gruppe von Resten aus der
generischen Klasse, wobei der gewählte Rest oder die gewählte Gruppe von Resten nicht
spezifisch in dem Dokument aus dem Stand der Technik offenbart war. Die sich ergebenden
Verbindungen werden so beschrieben, dass sie eine neue, vorteilhafte Eigenschaft, zum
Beispiel als Klebstoffe haben, welche die Beispiele nach dem Stand der Technik nicht
aufwiesen.
9) Während sich dies auch auf die Frage der Erfindungshöhe oder Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit
beziehen kann, mag das schlichte Auffinden einer neuen Reihe oder Kombination nicht so
angesehen werden, dass dadurch die Neuheit begründet wird. Eine andere Eigenschaft
oder ein anderer Vorteil, oder ein ähnlicher Vorteil von unvorhergesehenem Ausmass mag
erforderlich sein, falls eine Erfindung als neue Auswahlerfindung zu qualifizieren sein soll.
1
Solche Ansprüche werden den Praktikern im Rahmen Europäischer Patente als MOBIL-Ansprüche nach dem EPO-
Fall MOBIL/Friction reducing additive [1990] OJ EPO 93 oder im pharmazeutischen Sektor als medizinische
Verwendungsansprüche vertraut sein.
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Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit oder Erfindungshöhe
10) Das Recht zur Erfindungshöhe wird von Rechtsordnung zu Rechtsordnung variieren. Obwohl
man eine Verschiebung bei der Herangehensweise durch die Gerichte in der Welt bezüglich
dessen, feststellt was offensichtlich ist und was nicht (am auffälligsten in der KSR-Entscheidung
in den USA), verbleiben Unterschiede.
11) Was Auswahlpatente betrifft wird, sobald die Neuheit der bestimmten Auswahl, die der
Erfinder getroffen hat, festgestellt ist, ein Patent für die Auswahl nur rechtsbeständig sein, falls
die Auswahl nicht-offensichtlich oder erfinderisch ist.
12) Da eine Auswahlerfindung, wenn darauf ein Patent gewährt wird, einen bestimmten
Monopolbereich aus einem frei zugänglichen Bereich in Übereinstimmung mit dem Stand
der Technik heraus schneidet, kann es gerechtfertigt sein, mehr Daten zu verlangen, um die
behauptete Erfindungshöhe zu unterstützen, zum Beispiel einen höheren kritischen Grad in
Verbindung mit der Erfindungshöhe der Auswahlerfindung oder überlegenere Ergebnisse im
Vergleich mit dem, was vor der Erfindung bekannt war.
Beispiel 2
In der Auswahl, die der Erfinder in Beispiel 1 getroffen hat, also eine spezifische Verbindung
mit einem bestimmten Rest oder eine Gruppe von spezifischen Verbindungen mit einer
Auswahl von bestimmten Resten, können die sich ergebenden Verbindungen:
i) weder so beschrieben, noch dargestellt sein, dass sie vorteilhafte Eigenschaften (als
Klebstoffe) besitzen, welche die spezifischen Beispiele nach dem Stand der Technik
nicht aufweisen;
ii) so beschrieben worden sein, dass sie vorteilhafte Eigenschaften verglichen mit den
Verbindungen besitzen, auf die nach dem Stand der Technik besonders verwiesen
wurde, wobei aber diese Eigenschaften solche sind, die ein Fachmann von derartigen
Verbindungen erwarten würde, so dass er wahrscheinlich dahin geführt wird, diese
Auswahl zu treffen; oder
iii) so beschrieben worden sein, dass sie vorteilhafte (haftende) Eigenschaften aufweisen,
wobei es aber keine Anzeichen gibt, die einen Fachmann zu dieser bestimmten
Auswahl im Gegensatz zu einem anderen Mitglied der generischen Klasse führen
würden, um die vorteilhaften (haftenden) Eigenschaften zu erzielen.
Anforderungen an vollständige Offenbarung oder schriftliche Beschreibung
13) Die neue, erfinderische Auswahl muss auch vollständig offenbart sein, so dass der qualifizierte
Adressat des Patents in der Lage ist, die in dem Patent offenbarte Erfindung zu realisieren.
Es ist notwendigerweise erforderlich, dass die Erfindung über den vollen Umfang des
beanspruchten Monopols offenbart wird. Wieder hängt viel davon ab, wie der Patentinhaber
seine Auswahl genau definiert hat.
14) Um die Erteilung eines rechtsbeständigen Patents sicherzustellen, wird der Patentanmelder
sorgfältig einen Mittelweg zwischen Erfindungshöhe (durch Definieren des Vorteils, den die
Auswahl besitzt, so dass sie so weit wie möglich vom Stand der Technik entfernt ist) und
vollständiger Offenbarung (so dass alle Mitglieder der beanspruchten Auswahl diesen Vorteil
aufweisen) finden wollen.
15) Es kann auch ein Thema sein, zu welchem Zeitpunkt experimentelle Daten, die eine
Auswahlerfindung unterstützen, einer das Patent erteilenden Behörde vorgelegt werden
sollten. Weil die Auswahl selbst der Schlüssel zu jeder Auswahlerfindung ist, kann es sein,
dass die Identifizierung des Stands der Technik und Daten, welche die Auswahl stützen, in der
ursprünglich eingereichten Beschreibung enthalten sein müssen. Alternativ kann es möglich
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sein, experimentelle Daten später vorzulegen, die helfen, die Auswahlerfindung vom Stand
der Technik zu unterscheiden, indem sie Beweise für neue Vorteile oder überlegene Ergebnisse
während des Erteilungsverfahrens vor der das Patent erteilenden Behörde liefern. Es kann
auch möglich sein, dass experimentelle Daten, welche die Existenz der Erfindungshöhe oder
Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit beweisen, anders behandelt werden als die, welche die Breite eines
Patentanspruchs unterstützen.
Verletzung
16) Wie oben erwähnt, ist ein schwieriges Thema, welches bei Ansprüchen auf Produkte mit
einer besonders vorteilhaften Eigenschaft aufkommt, das Ausmass, bis zu dem ein Beweis
der vorteilhaften Eigenschaft erforderlich ist, um eine Verletzung festzustellen. Die vorteilhafte
Eigenschaft wird häufig durch Verwenden des Produkts gefunden und das Auswahlpatent kann
formuliert sein entweder als (i) ein Produktanspruch (welcher die vorteilhafte Eigenschaft der
Auswahl ausnutzt); oder (ii) ein Verwendungsanspruch, welcher die Verwendung der Auswahl
für eine neue Verwendung beansprucht (welche wiederum die vorteilhafte Eigenschaft der
Auswahl ausnutzt). Dies wird am besten durch unser Beispiel oben veranschaulicht:
Beispiel 3
In der Auswahl, die unser Erfinder getroffen hat, erstreckt sich der Anspruch auf die
Verwendung einer bestimmten Verbindung, welche aus einer Auswahl hervorgeht, als ein
Klebstoff (wobei der klebende Charakter der Verbindung die vorteilhafte Eigenschaft ist,
welche die vorhergehend offenbarte generische Klasse von Verbindungen nicht aufwies).
Ein Wettbewerber stellt die beanspruchte Verbindung her und liefert sie ohne Anweisung
bezüglich ihrer Verwendung.
Fragen
Allgemein
Die Gruppen werden gebeten, die rechtliche Position bezüglich eines Patents für eine
behauptete Auswahlerfindung in ihrer Rechtsordnung in Bezug auf die folgenden Aspekte
zusammenzufassen:
1) Rechtliche Entwicklungen bezüglich Auswahlerfindungen
Welche spezifischen Arten von Erfindungen werden unter dem Konzept der Auswahlerfindungen
anerkannt und sind in Ihrer Rechtsordnung patentierbar? Haben Sie Beispiele für
Auswahlerfindungen in einem anderen Bereich als den chemischen, pharmazeutischen oder
werkstofflichen Bereichen?
2) Neuheit
Die Gruppen werden gebeten, jeden Punkt zu diskutieren, der bezogen auf die Neuheit von
Auswahlerfindungen berücksichtigt werden sollte. Ist z.B. lediglich das Herausmeisseln eines
Intervalls aus einer breiten Offenbarung im Stand der Technik ausreichend, um die Neuheit
einer Auswahlerfindung herbeizuführen? Ist ein anderer Vorteil oder eine andere Verwendung
oder der gleiche Vorteil mit einer unvorhersehbaren Verbesserung für eine Auswahlerfindung
erforderlich, um die Neuheit zu begründen?
3) Erfindungshöhe oder Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit
Die Gruppen werden gebeten, die Anforderungen an Erfindungshöhe oder Nicht-
Offensichtlichkeit in ihrer Rechtsordnung zu diskutieren. Falls experimentelle Daten verwendet
werden, um die Anforderung der Erfindungshöhe oder Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit zu stützen,
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können sie nach der ursprünglichen Patentanmeldung eingereicht werden? Gibt es
Voraussetzungen oder Beschränkungen bezüglich der späten Einreichung von Daten?
4) Anforderungen an vollständige Offenbarung und/oder schriftliche Beschreibung
Die Gruppen werden gebeten, die Anforderungen an die vollständige Offenbarung oder
schriftliche Beschreibung in ihrer Rechtsordnung zu diskutieren. Diese Frage kann mehrere
Aspekte haben:
1) Die Schwelle für Vollständigkeit;
2) die zulässige Zeitvorgabe für die Einreichung von experimentellen Daten;
3) der Zeitrahmen, innerhalb dessen die Anforderungen an Vollständigkeit oder schriftliche
Beschreibung erfüllt sein müssen; und
4) die Breite des Anspruchsumfangs, die durch eine begrenzte Anzahl an Beispielen für
behauptete oder bewiesene Vorteile unterstützt werden kann.
Bezüglich Punkt (1) diskutieren Sie bitte, bis zu welchem Ausmass alle Mitglieder der durch
den Patentanmelder ausgewählten Klasse den erforderlichen Vorteil in Ihrer Rechtsordnung
aufweisen müssen. Gibt es ein absolutes Erfordernis, dass alle Mitglieder der ausgewählten
Klasse den relevanten Vorteil aufweisen, oder ist der Patentanmelder entschuldigt, falls ein
oder zwei Beispiele dahinter zurückbleiben? Ebenfalls bezogen auf Punkt (4) oben: Falls
ein neuer Nutzen als Auswahlerfindung behauptet wird, ist es ausreichend, eine bestimmte
Bandbreite oder Auswahl von Bestandteilen zu beanspruchen, von welchen gefunden wurde,
dass sie mit solch einem neuen Nutzen zusammenhängen, oder ist es notwendig, solch einen
neuen Nutzen in den Ansprüchen zu formulieren?
5) Verletzung
Falls ein bestimmter Vorteil oder überlegene Ergebnisse der Grund für die Erteilung eines
Patents auf eine Auswahlerfindung sind, muss solch ein Vorteil oder überlegenes Ergebnis
implizit oder explizit durch einen Dritten genutzt werden, um eine Verletzung zu begründen?
Falls eine Auswahlerfindung als neue Verwendung beansprucht wird, was sind die
Anforderungen, um eine Verletzung zu begründen? Würde ein Hersteller eines Produkts, das
für die neue Verwendung verwendet werden kann, das Patent verletzen? Spielt die Absicht
eines angeblichen Verletzers eine Rolle bei der Bestimmung der Verletzung?
6) Politik
Die Gruppen werden gebeten, einen kurzen Kommentar bezüglich der Politik abzugeben,
die hinter dem Recht bezüglich der Auswahlerfindungen in ihren Rechtsordnungen liegt. Es ist
dann zu erörtern, ob derartige politische Erwägungen heute noch gelten oder nicht, da die
Technologie weiter fortschreitet.
Mit Verweis auf die Beispiele
7) Neuheit
Würde in Beispiel 1 im Stand der Technik die Offenbarung der Verbindungen, die die
generische Klasse von Resten enthalten, einen Anspruch auf eine spezifische Verbindung mit
einem bestimmten Rest oder eine Gruppe von spezifischen Verbindungen mit einer Auswahl
aus bestimmten Resten in Ihrer Rechtsordnung vorwegnehmen? Spielt es in der Analyse
eine Rolle, wie breit die vorher offenbarte generische Klasse von Verbindungen ist? Fiele
die Analyse also anders aus, falls die vorher offenbarte generische Klasse aus 1.000.000
möglichen Verbindungen besteht (von welchen sehr wenige spezifisch offenbart waren), im
Gegensatz zu etwa lediglich 10?
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8) Erfindungshöhe oder Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit
Würde in Beispiel 2 eine der drei Möglichkeiten eine erfinderische Tätigkeit über den Stand der
Technik in Ihrer Rechtsordnung darstellen? Ferner, falls etwa Szenario (iii) eine erfinderische
Tätigkeit über den Stand der Technik darstellen würde, welchen Schutzumfang sollte der
Erfinder erhalten können? Sollte der Erfinder per se Schutz für die Produkte erhalten können
(die diese vorteilhafte Eigenschaft aufweisen), oder sollte jeder verfügbare Patentschutz auf
die Verwendung der Produkte für die vorteilhafte Eigenschaft (als Klebstoff) beschränkt sein,
die der Stand der Technik nicht aufwies und die demgegenüber nicht offensichtlich ist?
9) Anforderungen an vollständige Offenbarung und/oder schriftliche Beschreibung
Bis zu welchem Ausmass müssen alle Mitglieder der durch den Patentanmelder ausgewählten
Klasse den erforderlichen Vorteil in Ihrer Rechtsordnung aufweisen? Gibt es ein absolutes
Erfordernis, dass alle Mitglieder der ausgewählten Klasse den relevanten Vorteil aufweisen, oder
ist der Patentanmelder entschuldigt, falls ein oder zwei Beispiele dahinter zurückbleiben?
10) Verletzung
Mit Verweis auf Beispiel 3, bis zu welchem Ausmass ist der Beweis der Kenntnis der
vorteilhaften Eigenschaft der Auswahl, oder die Absicht des Verletzers bezüglich seiner
Lieferung erforderlich, um in Ihrer Rechtsordnung eine Verletzung zu begründen?
11) Politik
Die Gruppen werden gebeten in Bezug auf Beispiel 1 / 2 zu erwägen, ob es eine Rolle spielt,
wie viel Aufwand der Erfinder bei seiner Auswahl investiert hat, um ein rechtsbeständiges
Auswahlpatent zu begründen. Die Antwort auf diese Frage ist eng verwandt mit politischen
Erwägungen, die die Erteilung von Auswahlpatenten und den daran beteiligten Ausgleich
von Anreiz / Belohnung untermauern. Der Erfinder mag beträchtlich viel Zeit und Geld
beim Durchsuchen des ganzen Heeres an möglichen Verbindungen aufgewendet haben,
welche durch die im Stand der Technik offenbarte generische Klasse umfasst werden. Und
die bestimmte Auswahl, die er getroffen hat, mag einen Sprung vorwärts in diesem Bereich
darstellen. Sicher sollte der Erfinder für seine Anstrengungen belohnt werden und Schutz
erhalten? Andererseits könnte argumentiert werden, dass solche Erwägungen in einem
Zeitalter relevant gewesen sein mögen, als die Anstrengungen des Erfinders tatsächlich viele
Menschenjahre an sorgfältiger und akribischer Laborarbeit umfassten, aber nun in einem
Zeitalter von kombinatorischer Synthese zunehmend irrelevant sind, da eine grosse Vielfalt
von verschiedenen Verbindungen in einem Bruchteil der Zeit hergestellt werden kann. Sind
solche Erwägungen relevant?
Harmonisierung
12) Die Gruppen werden gebeten zu analysieren, was die harmonisierten Standards für die
Patentierbarkeit von Auswahlerfindungen sein sollten. Insbesondere sollte auf die oben in
Q1-Q6 diskutierten Themen und die in Q7-Q10 diskutierten Beispiele verwiesen werden.
13) Die Gruppen werden ebenfalls gebeten, Aspekte für Harmonisierung zu empfehlen, die in
Q11 oben nicht enthalten sind.
14) Die Gruppen werden gebeten, weitere denkbare Aspekte zu skizzieren, die es wert sind, in
der AIPPI bezüglich Auswahlerfindungen diskutiert zu werden.
Anmerkung:
Es wird hilfreich sein und geschätzt werden, wenn die Gruppen in ihren Berichten der Reihenfolge
der Fragen folgen und die Fragen und Nummern für jede Antwort verwenden.
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Argentina
Argentine
Argentinien
Report Q209
in the name of the Argentine Group
by Alicia Alvarez, Martín Bensadon, Mario Cisneros and Eduardo McCallum
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
There are no specific provisions as to Selection invention in the Patent Act and its regulations.
In the Guidelines for Examination, Part C, Annex I, paragraph 3.2. Guidelines for evaluating
inventive steps, two types of non-obvious selections are disclosed and exemplified: 1) the
invention involves the selection of particular operating conditions for a process, achieving
unexpected results 2) the invention involves the selection of certain specific compounds within
a known broad group having unexpected advantages.
Examples of selection may exist for mechanical inventions. A given dimension in mechanical
devices is susceptible of improvement and a reduced range for a defined dimensional
parameter may be selected from a broader range. We do not have any examples apart from
the chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields.
In theory, any product or process that is defined by a range, comprising such range an
extensive list of values, can be considered as susceptible of improvement by a selection
invention.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
Neither different advantage/use nor the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement
is required for a selection invention to be novel. Novelty is generally acknowledged if the
selected invention has not been specifically disclosed in the prior art.
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3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
There is and should be no difference in how inventive step is analyzed between selection
inventions and ordinary inventions. The focus of the evaluation is on whether a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have arrived at the same result with no inventive activity.
The inventive character of the invention has to be disclosed at the filing date. However, the
Patent Act allows filing corrections and new examples within 90 days as from the filing date
provided no new matter is added. New experimental data, supporting the inventive step of
the invention, can be submitted after the 90-day period provided no new matter is added, but
said new information will be kept separately from the final text of the granted patent
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
In Argentina, an invention shall be disclosed in a clear and complete way so as to allow
a person having ordinary skill in the art to carry it out.
The written description must allow a person having ordinary skill in the art to perform
the invention.
Generally, a claim will be considered supported by the written description unless there
are grounded reasons to consider that a person having ordinary skill in the art will not
be able to apply the teaching of the specification to the whole claimed subject matter.
(Guidelines. Part C. Chapter III, paragraph 6.3).
As an example, if an application is related to a rubber composition comprising several
ingredients and the applicant tries to introduce as further information that a new
ingredient can be added thereto, then such amendment should be rejected under Art. 19
of the Patent Act. Similarly, if an application addressed to a device ‘mounted on elastic
support members’ does not include any specific disclosure of said elastic members, the
applicant would be barred from adding further information pointing out that the elastic
members consist, or could consist, of helicoidal springs. (Guidelines, Part C, Chapter VI,
paragraph 4.5.3).
Nevertheless, if the Applicant can demonstrate that, within the frame of the invention, the
introduction of such new matter will be considered by a person of ordinary skill in the
art as an obvious clarification, said amendment could be allowed. (Guidelines, Part C,
Chapter VI, paragraph 4.5.4).
The Guidelines also provide several tests for the patent examiners to determine the
broadening of scope due to the addition of new matter.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
It is possible to submit corrections or adding new examples, without broadening the
original scope or adding new matter, within 90 days from the filing date. However,
adding experimental data is allowed at any time during prosecution provided it does not
add new matter. Nevertheless, said new information will not be included in the final text
of the application.
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3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
The sufficiency or written description requirement must be satisfied at the filing date.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
The breadth of the claims can be supported by a limited number of examples provided a
person having ordinary skill in the art assumes that the example would be representative
of the claimed subject matter. A person of ordinary skill in the art should not have to
perform undue experimentation or inventive effort to arrive at embodiments not disclosed
in specific examples but within the scope of the claims.
If a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, then, it should be specifically
claimed.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there
an absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage,
or is the patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item
4) above, if a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a
particular range or selection of components which have been found to be associated with
such a new utility or would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
A case of infringement will be established if the infringement performs the claimed subject
matter either implicitly or explicitly.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, the infringer should perform the claimed
subject matter.
The intention of the alleged infringer does not play any role in determining infringement
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
The Patent Act and the Executive Order (regulating decree) do not regulate selection inventions.
We consider that it would be advisable to have express provisions on selection inventions.
The need of clearness and certainty on provisions for selection inventions are more important
in new fields of technology, for example nanotechnology. In this case, developments are
heavily based on selection inventions that claim a sub-range in size or composition of an
equivalent but broader known range and a further problem comes from the infringement
perspective. The question to answer is whether the user of a nanotechnological invention
can be considered infringer of a prior patent claiming wider ranges; even when at the
moment of the filing of the prior patent the nanotechnological invention was unknown and
unforeseeable.
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This issue may have serious consequences for users and manufacturers of nanotechnology,
as the universe to check for non-infringement purposes would not only consist of patents
in the field of nanotechnological inventions, but also any other kind of patents with scope
broad enough to cover a wide range of sizes or compositions. For example, in performing a
freedom to operate analysis, third parties would need to take into account patents specifically
relevant to the field of the invention and also other patents that even if they were not filed
with the intention to cover nanotechnological invention, may cover part or the totality of the
technology under assessment. For example, the use of nanoparticles of SiC as reinforcement
in metals may infringe a patent protecting the use of SiC as filler in general —with particles in
the range of cero to microsizes— even when the use of these nanoparticles confers exceptional
properties to the composite not anticipated by the first applicant.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
A general disclosure does not invalidate novelty of a particular concept. In respect to the
novelty requirement, there are no differences if the prior disclosure includes a large or small
group of possible compounds.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
The cases described in (i) and (ii) would not constitute an inventive step over the prior art.
On the other hand, the case described in (iii) would constitute an inventive step, which could
allow protecting the product per se.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
All members of the class selected by the patentee should possess the advantage. A
representative number of examples is required. The number may vary according to the
technology field or to the chemical structure of the selected compounds.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
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Knowledge of the advantageous property of the selection or intention of the infringer is not
required to find infringement.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
A great technical effort may matter when deciding about compliance with the inventive step
requirement.
Summary
Argentina’s patent law does not specifically provide for the patentability of selection inventions.
However, when providing the standards for evaluating inventive step, the Argentine Patent Office’s
Guidelines expressly disclose and exemplify two types of non-obvious selection inventions. Novelty
of selection inventions is generally accepted if the selected invention has not been specifically
disclosed in the prior art, and the inventive step requirement is fulfilled if the creative process or its
results cannot be inferred from the state of the art in a way which is evident for a person having
ordinary skill in the art. The inventive character of the invention has to be disclosed at the filing
date. A selection patent will be considered infringed if the infringer performs the claimed subject
matter either implicitly or explicitly, regardless of the knowledge of the advantageous property of
the selection or intention by the infringer. The Group considers that the Patent Law should include
express provisions on selection inventions.
Résumé
La loi des brevets d’inventions argentine ne prévoit pas la possibilité de breveter les inventions de
sélection (selection inventions) de manière spécifique. Néanmoins, quand il s’agit de fournir les
standards pour évaluer l’activité inventive, le Registre des Brevets mentionne deux types d’inventions
de sélection non évidentes. La nouveauté des brevets de sélection est généralement accepté quand
l’invention de sélection na pas été révélé de manière spécifique dans l’art préalable (prior art),
et les conditions de l’activité inventive sont remplies quand ni le processus créatif ni ses résultats
peuvent être déduits par une personne qualifié. Le caractère inventif de l’invention doit être révélé
à la date de présentation du dossier. La performance de la matière objet de revendication –de
manière implicite ou explicite- sera considéré comme une infraction au brevet de sélection, sans
tenir compte de la connaissance par l’infracteur de sa propriété avantageuse ni de son intention. Le
Group considère que la Loi des brevets devrait inclure des dispositions spécifiques sur les inventions
de sélection.
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Zusammenfassung
Im Argentinischen Patentrecht wird nicht deutlich vorausgesehen dass eine Selektionserfindung ein
Patent bekommen darf. Aber, die Standards in den Patentamt geschriebenen Leitsatz zu erklären
wie die Erfindungshöhe studiert soll, ausdrücklich erfassen und beschreiben als Beispiel zwei Typen
nicht offensichtliche Erfindungen.
Neuheit von Selektionserfindungen wird meistens akzeptiert wenn die nicht besonders in frühere
Technik bekannt war, und die Erfindungshöhe ist akzeptiert nur wenn dass Erfindungsprozess
vom Experten nicht offensichtlich abgeleitet werden kann. Die Erfindungshöhe der Erfindung muss
offen gelegt werden schon als der Auftrag im Patentamt abgelegt wird. Man kann auffassen
dass ein Selektionspatent verletzt wird wenn der Rechtsverletzer stillschweigend oder deutlich
die beanspruchte Sache ausübt oder benutzt. Dass ist so auch wenn der Rechtsverletzer die
Eigenschaftsvorteile der Selektion kennt, und auch trotz der Rechtsverletzers Zweck. Die Gruppe
bedenkt dass das Patentrecht sollte deutliche Bestimmungen für Selektionserfindungen enthalten.
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Australia
Australie
Australien
Report Q209
in the name of the Australian Group
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
Selection inventions are not legislatively recognised in Australian law. Whilst the Australian
Patent Examiner’s manual discusses selection inventions as a species and case law considers
them, they are not specifically discussed or defined in the Commonwealth Patents Act 1990.
The criteria for a valid selection patent in Australia come from the English case of IG
Farbenindustrie AG’s Patents 1 (IG Farbenindustrie):
(a) the selection must be based on some substantial advantage gained or some substantial
disadvantage avoided;
(b) the whole of the selected members must possess the advantage in question; and
(c) the selection must be in respect of a quality of a special character which may fairly be
said to be peculiar to the selected group.
Item (c) above essentially requires that the advantage must be in respect of some non-obvious
quality of special character.
These criteria were recently discussed by the full bench of the Federal Court of Australia in
Ranbaxy Australia Pty Ltd v Warner-Lambert Company LLC (Ranbaxy) which stated that:
‘A patent application will overcome a prior publication, as a selection patent, if the following
criteria are met:
• there must be some substantial advantage to be secured by the use of the selected
members;
• the whole of the selected members must possess the advantage in question;
• the selection must be in respect of a quality or a special character, which can fairly be
said to be peculiar to the group; and
1. 1930 47 RPC 289.
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• the advantage possessed by the selected members must be clearly disclosed in the
specification. 2 ‘
The discussion in the Ranbaxy case appears to confirm the IG Farbenindustrie criteria and
also specifically refers to the suggestion in IG Farbenindustrie (at page 323, lines 29 – 41)
that there must be disclosure in the patent specification of the advantages provided by the
selected members (see question 4).
Selection inventions were recently considered by the Federal Court in the Australian Plavix
litigation 3 . In applying the IG Farbenindustrie principles, including as set out in the Ranbaxy
case, the Federal Court held that the claimed enantiomer was not a valid selection from the
compounds disclosed in the earlier racemic patents. The Court did not accept the advantages
in the claimed enantiomer were unexpected over those described in the racemic patents
(ie lack of novelty), and further, that isolating the enantiomer from the racemic mixture was
obvious as it involved a classic process being applied to a known compound to produce the
desired result (ie lack of inventive step). The decision is on appeal.
Whilst most selection inventions in Australia are directed to chemical, pharmaceutical and
material science inventions, the issue is not confined to these types of inventions. There is very
little Australian court case law on selection inventions other than chemical or pharmaceutical
inventions but the following English cases are considered to be part of Australian legal
precedence.
1. Clyde Nail Co Ld v Russell 4 is a case about a patent entitled ‘Improvements in the
manufacture of holdfasts, dog spikes and the like’. Prior to the date of the patent, the
method of manufacturing these articles from blanks cut from plain plates or strips and
headed by heading devices in a nail cutting machine was well known. The specification
explained that where blanks had formerly been cut from plain strips, the shape had not
been so arranged as to prevent waste, and that the invention might be regarded as the
selection of a particular shape of blank which was cut from a plain unribbed shape
without waste. Lord Parker, in considering the novelty of the claims stated:
A mere selection among possible alternatives is not subject matter. A selection to be
patentable must be a selection in order to secure some advantage or avoid some
disadvantage. It must be an adaptation of means to ends impossible without exercise
of the inventive faculty. It follows that in describing and ascertaining the nature of an
invention consisting in the selection between possible alternatives, the advantages to
be gained, or the disadvantages to be avoided ought to be referred to.
2. Bosch’s Application 5 refers to a patent directed to “Improvements relating to shuttle
armatures for dynamo electric machines”, the improvement claimed being the making of
each coverpiece and spindle in one piece of non-magnetisable steel. Evans SG stated:
A patent may, however, be granted for selecting the best material, the suitability of
which was not previously known, for a particular purpose… The test is whether the
selection involves invention…
There are a number of patents directed to different technologies that have been considered
by the Australian Patent Office.
2. (2008) IPR 449 at page 473.
3. Apotex Pty Ltd (formerly GenRx Pty Ltd) v Sanofi Aventis and Spirit Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Sanofi Aventis [2008]
FCA 1194.
4. (1916) 33 RPC 291.
5. (1909) 26 RPC 710.
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(a) Optical fibre cable
This decision of the Commissioner of Patents following a hearing in May 1995 (relatively
unusual in Australia) related to an optical fibre cable of generally known construction,
characterised by a certain range of dimensions (Australian patent number 597151). The
hearing officer initially found that the reported test results in the specification showed that
one of the test cables was within the claimed range of dimension, but failed to exhibit the
improved performance alleged for the selection. Also, another of the test cables, which
was outside the claimed range, was reported as exhibiting the improved performance.
The invention claimed was also anticipated by the prior disclosure of a specific working
example of such a cable with dimensions placing it within the claimed range. The claims
were amended to avoid the prior disclosure and the patent was granted as a selection
patent. The hearing officer made it clear that he doubted whether it was a proper
selection but gave the applicant the benefit of the doubt.
(b) Soft tissue product and method
The decision of the Commissioner of Patents considered whether a soft tissue product and
a method of making a soft tissue product constitute selection inventions 6 . The soft tissue
product had one or both external surfaces coated in a uniformly distributed solidified
deposit of wax and oil. The relevant claims were not excluded from being considered as
selection inventions, however, the delegate determined that the claims did not possess
the advantages described. He also commented that the claims did not uniquely identify
the class of materials or properties that would give rise to a proper selection.
(c) Method of killing or controlling weeds
The decision of the Commissioner of Patents found a valid selection in a petty patent
directed to:
‚A method of killing or controlling weeds, comprising applying to the weeds pressurised
hot water at a temperature substantially 75°C or above, wherein the pressurised hot
water is delivered at a pump pressure in excess of 200 psi and at a flow rate in excess
of 4 litres per minute‘ 7
The delegate stated:
‚in my view, the claims are directed to a patentable selection and are therefore not a
mere working direction or mere use of a known process. The claims are patentable firstly
because the prior art is generic and vague compared to the specific parameters set out
in the claims…. The claims are patentable secondly because there appears to be some
merit in the invention…Generally in my view, none of the informant’s evidence indicates
that it was known at the priority date that the particular selection of features as claimed
in the petty patent would have the beneficial effects described in the specification and
in the patentees evidence.‘
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
6. [2002] APO 44 (19 November 2002).
7. [1997] APO 34 (28 July 1997).
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Considerations of novelty for selection inventions are no different to novelty considerations
for any other type of invention. Thus, selection invention will lack novelty if anticipated by the
prior art.
To anticipate the patentee’s claim, the prior publication must contain clear and unmistakable
directions to do what the patentee claims to have invented ... A signpost, however clear,
upon the road to the patentee‘s invention will not suffice. The prior inventor must be
clearly shown to have planted his flag at the precise destination before the patentee 8 .
This is confirmed in the Australian Examiners Manual, which states that the basic level of
disclosure required to anticipate a claim to a selection is the same as for any other claim.
It suggests that the law of selection operates to exclude an objection to lack of novelty
in those circumstances where a class of compounds or things in a citation has not been
made – and thus their properties not known.
Thus:
(a) if the citation does not provide an enabling disclosure, there is no anticipation; and
(b) if any of the selected compounds have actually been made previously, a claim to that
selection lacks novelty.
It is understood that if a generic disclosure is broad, vague and/or speculative, then
that disclosure will not deprive a later claim of its novelty. Thus, a generic formula which
describes countless permutations and combinations of chemical formulae does not
constitute a disclosure of any particular chemical within the generic formula 9 .
(a) Where a specification gives instructions on making a compound, together with an
indication that it has been made (such as by indicating the melting temperature),
there is a high presumption that the disclosure of the compound is an enabling
disclosure which can deprive a later claim to that compound of novelty; and
(b) The disclosure of a named chemical compound with no indication of it having been
made, is nevertheless an enabling disclosure which can deprive a later claim to that
compound of novelty – if it can be said that the production of that compound can be
effected by any skilled chemist following the indications given; but
(c) If the disclosure of a named chemical compound is not an enabling disclosure, it
cannot deprive a later claim to that compound of novelty.
The court in EI Du Pont de Nemours (Witsiepe’s) Application also recognized the problem
that some of the broadly claimed chemicals might have unexpected properties which a
later researcher discovers and would want to patent 10 . The court suggested that the law
regarding selection patents has been developed to deal with that problem:
It has done so in the direction of recognising two objectives, first to protect the original
inventor, as regards the invention which he has made, but secondly to encourage
other researchers in the field to use their inventive powers so as to discover fresh
advantages and to treat the discovery of such advantages as inherent in selected
members of the group or class as a patentable invention.
Australian courts have recognised that selection patents might need special attention in
relation to novelty, however, they have not had the need to consider the issue. Instead,
Australian practice relies on the English law which can be summarised as follows:
8. General Tire & Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co Ltd, (1972) RPC 457 at pages 485, 486.
9. Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Myers Co 1 NZLR 192 at page 218.
10. (1982) FSR 303.
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The question of ‘selection’ arises when the invention claimed lies within a known field.
Before an invention may be regarded as a selection, there must exist a single prior
disclosure against which the claimed invention is compared. It is not necessary for the
prior disclosure to encompass all of the claim under consideration. Only that portion of
the claim which falls within the prior disclosure can have the selection test applied to it.
Any portion of the claim which falls outside the prior disclosure is subject to the normal
tests for lack of novelty and inventive step.
Australian case law on this point is restricted to chemical inventions such as Pfizer Inc
v Commissioner of Patents in which Pfizer’s application for an extension of term for a
patent was considered 11 . Claim 1 of the parent patent encompassed some 10 7 to 10 9
compounds. The compound on which the extension of term application was based is
voriconazole which is within the scope of the claims, but is not exemplified. Pfizer also
filed and was granted a ‘selection patent’ which has claims specifically to voriconazole.
To obtain an extension of term of a patent:
one or more pharmaceutical substances per se must in substance be disclosed in the
complete specification of the patent and in substance fall within the scope of the claim
or claims of that specification
The question before the court was whether voriconazole was ‘in substance disclosed’
and ‘within the scope of the claims’ of the parent patent. There was no dispute regarding
‘within the scope of the claims’, however, the Commissioner of Patents asserted that if
the selection patent was valid (ie involved an inventive step), the parent patent could not
have had voriconazole ‘in substance disclosed’.
The court held that the existence of the selection patent was irrelevant to the determination
of whether voriconazole was ‘in substance disclosed’ in the parent patent, voriconazole
was in substance disclosed and the extension of term was therefore granted.
This is perhaps contrary to the later discussion in Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S
[2008] FCA 559 in which a patent directed to citalopram was found not to disclose the
specific (+)-enantiomer which was claimed in a later patent.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
For a claim to be a valid selection it will be novel over the relevant prior art. However, the
mere fact that it is a selection does not render the claim inventive.
Kimberley-Clark World-Wide Inc v Arico Trading Australia Pty Ltd 12 discussed inventive step
in relation to selection inventions. The invention was directed to overcoming or substantially
ameliorating the disadvantages of earlier nonwoven laminates in personal care articles such
as disposable diapers, training pants, incontinent wear and feminine hygiene products. The
claims were found to be novel. It was argued that the invention lacked inventive step because
it merely described what those of ordinary skill in the art do conventionally. It was also
argued that the invention is, in effect, a selection from a known range of laminates. The
delegate of the Commissioner of Patents found that all the claims except one lacked inventive
step and he then commented:
11. [2005] FCA 137.
12. [2000] APO 15 (18 February 2000).
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‘The opponent also made submissions that the application was in substance, if not
in form, a selection from a known range of products, ie those disclosed by Brock or
Timmons (the prior art), but that it was not a valid selection. I think it is appropriate in this
context to apply the statement of the delegate in American Home Products Corporation
(unreported Patent Office decision on patent application number 16397/92, issued 28
September 2004):
- If a citation contains clear and unmistakable directions and an enabling disclosure,
then the application will prima facie lack novelty. Then, and only then, will it be
necessary to consider the question of selection. As I have already found that the
claims are novel over Brock, as well as Timmons, there is no need for me to determine
whether or not any such selection is valid, and I will not do so.’
Experimental data is often used to support a claim to inventiveness or non-obviousness.
Australian law on amendment after filing allows any amendment so long as the specification
will not then claim matter not in substance disclosed in the specification as filed. So,
theoretically, it is possible to submit or insert experimental data after the filing date of a patent
specification in Australia. It is highly likely that the Australian Patent Office would allow such
an amendment. The lack of experimental data at filing would not be likely to affect the novelty
or inventive step aspects of the invention.
However, if a patent amended in this way were to be challenged before the court system, it
would be expected that the patent’s validity may be questionable in terms of sufficiency and
enablement.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
Australian patent legislation requires that a patent specification must ‘describe the invention
fully, including the best method known to the applicant of performing the invention’. 13 The ‘full
description’ and ‘best method’ requirements are generally treated as separate requirements.
The current test for whether an invention is fully described is whether the disclosure will
enable the addressee of the specification to produce something within each claim without
new inventions or additions or prolonged study of matters presenting initial difficulty. 14 The
‘addressee of the specification’ is taken to be an informed reader with reasonable skill in the
trade. The specification is to be construed in light of the common general knowledge in the
field as at the priority date.
13. Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s40(2)(a).
14. Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd v Arico Trading International Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 1.
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In the case of a selection patent, the specification must describe the advantage possessed
or disadvantage avoided by the selected members. 15 As described in question 1, generally,
the whole of the selected members must possess the advantage or avoid the disadvantage in
question. 16 However, in the IG Farbenindustrie case (see question 1 above) it was suggested
in dicta that ‘one or two exceptions’ would be permitted. 17
A ‘best method of performance’ need not be a specific exemplification of an invention, simply
enough instructions for the skilled worker to put the invention into effect (enable) the claimed
invention. 18 There is no express requirement that experimental data be submitted with a patent
application in order to meet the test of full description.
The requirement of fully describing an invention must be satisfied when the patent is examined
by the Australian Patent Office. A lack of full description may be grounds for a third party to
oppose the patent application or have the patent revoked. However, a lack of sufficiency may
potentially be remedied at any time by amending the specification.
Each claim is separately considered for the purposes of full description but there is no current
requirement under Australian law that a claim has to be enabled over its full scope 19 nor that
every possible application of the invention has to work or to have been demonstrated to
work. 20 Where the claim is extremely broad but the specification has still enabled one specific
embodiment, the examiner could not object to the claim under full description in national
examination. 21
However, if a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, it is not sufficient simply to cite
examples found to be associated with a new utility. The advantage of the selection must
be clearly stated in the specification. This requirement was posited by Maugham J in IG
Farbenindustrie where his honour stated:
‘I must add a word on the subject of the drafting of the specification of such a patent.
It should be obvious, after what I have said as to the essence of the inventive step, that
it is necessary for the patentee to define in clear terms the nature of the characteristic
which he alleges to be possessed by the selection for which he claims a monopoly. He
has in truth disclosed no invention whatever if he merely says that the selected group
possesses advantages. Apart altogether from the questions of what is called sufficiency,
he must disclose an invention; he fails to do this in the case of a selection for special
characteristics, if he does not adequately define them. The cautions repeatedly expressed
in the House of Lords as regards ambiguity have, I think, special weight in relation to
selection patents.’ [footnotes omitted] 22
While the 3 main principles laid down in IG Farbenindustrie (described in question 1) appear
to reflect the law in Australia with respect to selection patents, the additional requirement that
the advantage of the selection be clearly stated in the specification (the ‘fourth requirement’)
is less certain, but there are strong grounds for arguing that it applies in Australia.
15. Patent Examiners Manual, [2.4.6.6.2].
16. IG Farbenindustrie at page 322-3; Ranbaxy at page 473.
17. IG Farbenindustrie at page 322-3.
18. Patent Examiners Manual, [2.11.3.3].
19. Lockwood v Doric [2004] HCA 58 at 83; Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd v Arico Trading International Pty Ltd (2001)
207 CLR 1 at [25].
20. Photocure v Queen’s University 64 IPR 314 at [107] and [109]; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co [2000]
FCA 316 at [77].
21. Patent Examiners Manual, [2.11.3.4].
22. IG Farbenindustrie at page 322-3.
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In the first instance of the Federal Court case Ranbaxy Australia Pty Ltd v Warner-Lambert Co
LLC 23 , Justice Young explicitly recognised, in the context of utility considerations, the stringent
requirements for a selection patent established in IG Farbenindustrie. He also cited and
appeared to endorse the ‘fourth requirement’ that the advantages gained, or disadvantages
avoided, by the selection must be expressly identified in the body of the specification:
‘Where the patent is a “selection patent,” there is an additional requirement for sufficiency
that the special advantage obtained from the selection must be stated in the specification.
More generally, the advantage resulting from the invention must be stated whenever
failure to do so leaves the invention inadequately defined.’ 24
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
Australian patent legislation gives the patentee the exclusive right to exploit or authorise
others to exploit the patented invention. 25 The meaning of exploit, with respect to a patented
product, includes making, selling or using the product, or keeping the product for any of those
things. If the selection patent claims a product, then exploiting the product in any way referred
to in the definition of ‘exploit’ is likely to constitute infringement, regardless of whether the
advantage or superior result which formed the reason for the grant is utilised.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement?
If a selection is claimed as a new use, the invention must be limited to that use in the claim. 26
This ‘use’ claimed would be treated as an essential ‘integer’ of the claim. To establish
infringement under Australian law, the patentee must show that the infringer has taken each
and every essential integer of the claim. 27 If they have, then there is infringement, but if not all
of the essential elements have been taken, then there is no infringement. Further, one cannot
avoid infringement by:
• taking not only all of the essential integers of the claim but adding additional elements to
the allegedly infringing product or process; or
• using a mechanical equivalent for any of the essential integers of the claim.
In examining the essential elements of a claim to determine if there has been an infringement,
what is done is to determine the ‘pith and marrow’ of the claims. This has been described as
taking the ‘essence of substance of the invention underlying the mere accident of form’. Finally,
in construing the claims, the scope of a claim is not determined merely by the literal words of
a claim. Rather, a purposive or common sense approach should be applied, that is:
‘…whether persons with practical knowledge and experience in a kind of work in which
the invention was intended to be used, would understand the strict compliance with the
particular descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was intended by the patentee
to be an essential requirement of the invention so that any variant would fall outside
the monopoly claimed, even though it could have no material effect upon the way the
invention worked.’ 28
Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe the patent?
23. (No 2) (2006) 71 IPR 46 at page 137.
24. Ranbaxy Australia Pty Ltd v Warner-Lambert Co LLC at [4-155].
25. Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s13(1).
26. Lahore, Patents, Trade Marks and Related Rights, [15,165].
27. Populin v HB Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 41 ALR 471.
28. Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183, per Lord Diplock at 242-243; followed by the High Court
of Australia in Populin v HB Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 41 ALR 471.
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For the reasons outlined above, mere manufacture of a product may not directly infringe a
claim for a new use of that product. However, Australian patent law provides that if the ‘use
of a product’ would infringe the patent, supply of that product would amount to contributory
infringement. 29 Unless the manufacturer is the patentee or licensee of the patent, the act of
supply will constitute patent infringement if use of the product supplied would infringe the
patent. ‘Use of a product’ means:
(a) if the product is only capable of one reasonable use, having regard to its nature of
design – that use;
(b) if the product is not a staple commercial product – any use of the product, if the supplier
had reason to believe that the person would put it to that use; or
(c) in any case – the use of the product in accordance with any instructions given for the use
of the product, or any inducement to use the product given to the person by the supplier
or contained in an advertisement published by or with the authority of the supplier. 30
Case law on what constitutes the ‘use of a product’ for the purposes of contributory
infringement remains somewhat scarce. A supply of a product by a manufacturer would be
an infringement if supplied with instructions to use the product in a way that would constitute
patent infringement. If the product is not a ‘staple commercial product’, the supply of that
product would be an infringement if the supplier had reason to believe that the person would
put it to the infringing use.
The recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Northern Territory v Collins 31 provides
some guidance on the meaning of the word phrase ‘staple commercial product’ in contributory
patent infringement proceedings. As Justice Hayne stated:
‘If [a product] is in fact supplied commercially for various uses, it is a staple commercial
product and the supplier of such a product is not to be held liable as an infringer because
the person to whom the product is supplied uses it in a way that infringes, even if the
supplier has reason to believe that it may be used in that way.’
The High Court refused to interpret the test for contributory infringement in a way that would
expand a patentee’s rights where the act of supply is not otherwise an infringement. It seemed
concerned to avoid tipping the balance in favour of patentees at the expense of the right of
a supplier of goods to freely trade in goods which have a variety of lawful commercial uses.
A person that supplies a commercial product that has a variety of uses is unlikely to infringe,
except where the supplier either instructs or induces the infringing use, or advertises the
product with such instructions or inducement.
Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
The intention of the alleged infringer is not usually an element to be considered in the
determination of infringement. As noted above, infringement occurs where a patented
invention has been exploited, and in the cases of making, selling or using a claimed product,
intention does not play a role.
Intention has at least a theoretical role to play in considering aspects of contributory
infringement. Where use of a product would infringe, supply of that product will also infringe
in the circumstances described above. Where the product supplied is not a ‘staple commercial
product’, the state of mind of the supplier is stated to be relevant in the second limb of the
test for contributory infringement. That is, the supplier’s belief as to the use that the infringing
29. Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s117(1).
30. Patents Act s117(2).
31. Northern Territory v Collins [2008] HCA 49 (Unreported, 16 October 2008).
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product will be put to is relevant to a finding of contributory infringement in relation to a ‘nonstaple’
commercial product. However, given the High Court’s broad interpretation of ‘staple
commercial product’ in Northern Territory v Collins, these seem little scope for a finding of
contributory infringement based on this limb.
Intention may be important when considering certain defences, for example, the springboarding
exemptions for otherwise infringing acts done solely for the purpose of obtaining regulatory
approval. While ignorance of the existence of the patent is not a defence to infringement, it
will have an impact on the liability as to damages. The court may refuse damages where it is
satisfied that the respondent was not aware and had no reason to believe, at the date of the
infringement, that a patent for the invention existed. 32
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
There has been little discussion of selection inventions in Australian cases and they are not
referred to in the patent legislation. As such, there is little discussion of the policy behind
selection inventions which is peculiar to Australia, and that discussion which does take
place usually makes reference to UK authorities. The Australian Federal Court, 33 and the
Australian Patent Examiners Manual, 34 each quoting a different UK case, suggest that the law
of selection inventions has developed to recognise two objectives: maintaining the protection
of the original inventor, and encouraging other researchers in the field to discover fresh
advantages. The Australian group considers both objectives are desirable and remain valid
as the underlying rationale for granting selection patents. The Australian group considers that
the conventional law in force in Australia adequately provides for selection patents.
With Reference to the Examples
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group of
specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction?
A claim to a specific compound will not have been anticipated by the prior disclosure of the
generic class of radicals, unless the specific compound had been previously disclosed by way
of identification or example.
Furthermore a group of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals would
not be anticipated if the following criteria for a selection invention were satisfied:
(a) the selection must be based on some substantial advantage gained or some substantial
disadvantage avoided;
(b) the whole of the selected members must possess the advantage in question; and
(c) the selection must be in respect of a quality of a special character which may fairly be
said to be peculiar to the selected group.
In the analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is –
32. Patents Act s 123(1).
33. Apotex Pty Ltd (formerly GenRx Pty Ltd) v Sanofi-Aventis [2008] FCA 1194 (Unreported, Gyles J, 12 August 2008),
[77].
34. Patent Examiners Manual, [2.4.6.6].
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i.e. would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
In relation to a claim to a specific compound which is anticipated by the prior disclosure
of the generic class, the number of members of the prior disclosed generic class would be
irrelevant. This would also be the case for a group of specific compounds, although inevitably
the selected group would need to be greater than 1 and smaller than 10 if the prior disclosed
generic class had only 10 members.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction?
Possibility (i) would not constitute an inventive step over the prior art.
Possibility (ii) would not constitute an inventive step over the prior art, but it would be a matter
of evidence of the skilled person’s expertise.
Possibility (iii) would constitute an inventive step over the prior art.
Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the prior art, what scope
of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor be able to obtain
protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous property), or should
any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for the advantageous
property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior art?
Under Australian law where scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step, the practice is
to allow the patentee of the selection protection for the products per se. This leads to the
potential need for cross-licensing between the patentee of the generic compounds and the
patentee of the selected compounds.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
All members of the class selected must possess the advantage 35 . While the IG Farbenindustrie
case suggests that ‘one or two’ exceptions would be permitted, this was dicta and does not
represent the law in Australia as recently restated in Ranbaxy.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
A finding of infringement is not dependent on knowledge of the advantageous property
of the selection. ‘Exploitation’ in the sense described in question 4 supports a finding of
infringement. If the compound in Example 3 is the subject of a claim of a granted patent,
use of the claimed compound will infringe the patent. The competitor who manufactures the
claimed compound may therefore be open to an allegation of contributory infringement. The
intention of the competitor is unlikely to be relevant. The competitor may avoid a finding of
contributory infringement if the claimed compound has more than one reasonable use or is
35. IG Farbenindustrie, Ranbaxy.
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supplied commercially for various uses, provided that, in addition to an absence of instruction
as to its use, there is no inducement to use the product whether given directly to the person(s)
supplied or contained in the competitor’s advertising.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
It is irrelevant how much effort has been invested by the inventor to arrive at a selection
when determining whether a valid selection patent should be granted. The Australian group
considers that the considerations relevant to the grant of any patent should depend on the
traditional criteria, such as novelty and inventive step, which have equal application today
as they have previously.
A selection patent must satisfy the same criteria that all other valid patents must satisfy
including novelty (subject to comments made above), inventive step, manner of manufacture,
utility, fair basis, sufficiency and enablement. The degree of effort involved, and to what end
that effort is deployed, to define the selection may be relevant to considerations of inventive
step. Otherwise, the degree of effort is irrelevant to the determination of validity of a selection
patent.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
The Australian group considers that it is not necessary to treat selection inventions as a
separate class of inventions that require a specific set of rules or different application of
generally applicable legal principles. The Australian group considers that the matters set out
in question 11 above are the appropriate criteria to the grant of any patent. While there may
be a case for harmonisation, it is in relation to more fundamental criteria, such as, and for
example, the concepts of novelty and inventive step, rather than selection inventions as a sui
generis class of inventions.
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Austria
Autriche
Österreich
Report Q209
in the name of the Austrian Group
by Helmut Sonn and Philipp Weinzinger
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
The expression “selection invention” is used for a selection of specific dimensions, ranges of
values or parameters within (prior) larger areas based on new characteristics and properties
which have not been known. “Selection inventions” are considered to be synonymous for
“improvement inventions”.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
State of the art for a selection invention is usually a generic case wherein one or more larger
parameters are disclosed whereas the selection relates to a smaller area within the large
parameter range. If the selection, i.e. the subarea is not explicitly and quantitatively present in
the state of the art then the selection is new. A generic formula can not anticipate the concrete
newer embodiment.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
In order to be considered inventive a selection invention has to contain a new technical
teaching. Surprising utilities and effects of the selection are a requirement. If only (obvious)
alternative means for a certain embodiment, e.g. an apparatus, are used which are known for
the same purpose no inventive step will be acknowledged. Likewise, the simple optimisation
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of parameters using known techniques in order to improve an earlier broader disclosure is
not inventive.
In the chemical field the selection of a new compound of a general pre-disclosed formula is
considered inventive if it is particularly valuable and surprising for the skilled man in the art.
If the invention lies in the selection of new parameters the new parameter range has to relate
to a new and unexpected advantageous effect in order to solve a specific goal. These effects
are required to be restricted to the new inventive selected range. The new selected range has
to directly correlate with the inventive and surprising effect.
Special additional criteria also exist that can indicate inventive step, e.g. if in the state of the
art the selection has actually been discouraged.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
Since selection inventions are particularly required to show a surprising effect over the broad
generic prior art it is necessary to support these effects in the application. A generalisation
over the effective area is not allowed. It is advisable that the application contains a sufficient
disclosure to support the complete new inventive range. If however the application only
contains one specific example, e.g. only one chemical compound, there is a risk that a
broader generic expression would be considered to lack support. Although, a generalisation
is possible over specific examples, the claimed range should at least plausibly relate to the
new inventive effect.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
With regard to literal infringement, showing that the infringement of the third party embodiment
also has the inventive effect is not necessary. Literally falling within the claimed scope is
sufficient. However, lack of the inventive effect might compromise patentability resulting
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in (partial) nullity of the patent if challenged in nullity proceedings. Regarding equivalent
infringement, a third party embodiment which does not have the inventive effect is very
unlikely to fall into the area of equivalence.
If a new use is claimed by the selection invention the granted patent will only cover said use.
The manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use does not infringe as long as
he does not participate in indirect infringement (e.g. promoting the product for said patented
use). Indirect infringement is a case wherein the intention of a producer may play a role in
determining infringement
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
Selection inventions reward and promote further developments without diminishing a prior
broader teaching and the earlier specialized examples (which must not be comprised in
the younger selection invention). A selection invention is always an isolation of a specific
noteworthy characteristic (or combination of some characteristics), that may be similar or
even more surprising than the discovery of the prior broader field. Both, the generic older
and the selected younger embodiments may contain an inventive achievement which is to be
rewarded by a patent.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The selection of a specific compound would be considered novel over the generic class of
radicals as long as the specific compound is not contained in the prior disclosure. For the
analysis of novelty alone it does make no difference how many compounds are contained
in the prior disclosure - however this might be relevant for inventive step. Also sometimes
in newer decisions a tendency can be felt to include an “inventive step influence” when
evaluating novelty similar to the European practice: in case of a selection of a parameter
range a selection invention should be distinctively apart from the prior disclosed parameter
values.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
(i) Without a new effect and thus without a new surprising technological development the
selection will be considered obvious over prior art.
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(ii) The advantageous effect need to be surprising and if the effect of the selection is
foreseeable and predictable from prior teaching the selection would be considered
obvious.
(iii) Only those effects which relate to certain claim features can support inventive step. If
those effects can also be traced back to features of the prior art of the generic class,
these effects do not support inventive step. The simple discovery that the prior generic
disclosure as a whole has an unknown advantageous effect does not render an (artificial)
selection non-obvious.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
In the case of selection inventions which require surprising effects in a specific range of
values, generalisations outside of the area for which the surprising effects are disclosed in the
specification are not supported. A requirement to restrict the claims to only those embodiments
for which the new effects have been shown is likely. If obvious examples (embodiments
without the advantageous effect) fall within the claim range the whole claim becomes
obvious. Sufficient support of the whole claim scope is more a matter of inventiveness than
of sufficiency of disclosure and written description requirements where it is generally agreed
that it is possible that the effects of a whole range may become plausible from a limited set
of examples.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
In example 3 a competitor manufactures the claimed product as such and although no
instructions for its (new) use have been supplied the products as such may fall into the claim
scope of product claims. However, if only the use is claimed the competitor would not infringe
the patent by simple provision of a product. Also since no instructions are supplied no indirect
infringement will apply.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
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The necessity for a selection invention to show a new surprising contribution over the art does
not suffer or benefit from any specific methods used to arrive at the invention. Therefore it is
of little consequence if the selection invention was made due to laborious research, a stroke of
luck or genius. Still, evidence of long laborious work in order to arrive at the invention might
support the position that the selection is indeed non-obvious starting from prior art.
Summary
The Austrian standard for selection invention is very close to the European practise which is well
streamlined and accepted. One difference lies in the distinction between novelty and inventive
step wherein the European standard for novelty contains some requirements of non-obviousness
(“qualitative novelty”). In Austria the separation between novelty and inventive step is stricter
distinguished but also with some European influence, e.g. novelty may also require that the selection
is distinctively apart from prior disclosure example values. Further European influences in Austria
might be expected. Nevertheless, to obtain a clearer view on novelty and inventive step it would be
beneficial if the influence of inventive step into the area of novelty would be limited or avoided.
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Belgium
Belgique
Belgien
Report Q209
in the name of the Belgian Group
by F. Leyder, G. Leherte, B. Dauwe, E. De Gryse, and N. D’Halleweyn (chairman)
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
• General remark
Selection patents are not mentioned in the Belgian patent law. Patentability of a selection
invention has to be considered in the same way as any other invention, more in particular
the selection invention has to be examined in the same way regarding the requirements
of novelty, inventive step, industrial application, etc.
Since there are no express provisions regarding selection inventions in the Belgian patent
law, it is to be expected that a judge will follow the case law of the Boards of Appeal
(BoA) and the Guidelines for examination of the European Patent Office (EPO) when
confronted with the patentability of a selection invention.
Selection inventions are defined as a category of inventions which deal with a selection
of individual elements, sub-sets or sub-ranges, which have not been disclosed in the prior
art, within a larger known set or range.
• Concept of selection invention and patentability
A selection invention is distinguished from a new use invention, and a new use of a
known compound would normally not be considered as falling under the concept of
selection invention. In the discussion below the term “selection invention” will only refer to
an invention which deals with a selection of individual elements, sub-sets or sub-ranges,
and not to a “new use of a known compound” invention.
It is believed that the issue of new use inventions is a different issue than the issue of
selection inventions. However, for completeness, it is noted that the Belgian patent law
contains the express provision that the patentability of any substance or composition,
comprised in the state of the art, for use in a method for treatment of the human body
or animal body by surgery or therapy and in a diagnostic practice on the human or
animal body, is not excluded provided that its use for any such method is not comprised
in the state of the art. In other words a first medical use can be protected by a purpose-
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limited product claim in the form of ‘substance or composition x for use in any medical
method’.
The European Patent Convention (EPC) also specifically regulates the patentability of a
second medical use (article 54(5) EPC). This article was introduced in the EPC 2000 to
eliminate any legal uncertainty on the patentability of further medical uses; a second
medical use can now be protected by a purpose-limited product claim in the form of
‘substance or composition x for use in a specific medical method’. Even though the
Belgian patent law does not contain a similar provision, it is to be expected that a
Belgian national judge will also allow a second medical use claim and that a similar
article will be added in the Belgian law in the future.
• Field of technology
In theory, selection inventions could occur in any field of technology, but in practice it
is difficult to find examples in a field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material
science fields.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
In determining the novelty of a selection, it has to be decided whether the selected elements
are disclosed in an individualized (concrete) form in the prior art. Any prior art disclosure is
novelty-destroying if the subject matter claimed can be inferred directly and unequivocally
from that disclosure, including features which for the skilled person are implicit in what is
explicitly disclosed.
In addition, the selection must not be an arbitrary selection, in particular in the sense that a
purpose (“purposive selection”) may be required.
The case law of the BoA of the EPO distinguishes two types of cases:
(A) chemical substances and groups of substances in respect of general formulae;
(B) sub-ranges in respect of continuous numerical ranges, whether wider or
overlapping.
As to selection on the basis of a general formula, the case law has developed the principle
of selection of two distinct elements from two lists. a class of chemical compounds defined
only by a general structural formula having at least two variable groups did not specifically
disclose each of the individual compounds which would result from the combination of all
possible variants within such groups (T181/82).
In the case of a sub-range selected from a broad numerical range of the prior art, said
sub-range is considered novel if each of the following three criteria are satisfied (T279/89):
the selected sub-range is narrow compared to the known range; the selected sub-range is
sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and from the
endpoints of the known range; the selected range is not an arbitrary specimen of the prior
art, i.e. not a mere embodiment of the prior art, but another invention (purpose of selection,
new technical teaching). Further, in the case of overlapping ranges of claimed subject-matter
and the prior art, novelty is destroyed by an explicitly mentioned endpoint of the known
range, explicitly mentioned intermediate values or a specific example of the prior art in the
overlap, or when the skilled person would necessarily contemplate working in the range of
overlap and/or when the skilled person would consider the area of overlap as directly and
unambiguously disclosed in an implicit manner in the prior art.
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• Range
Merely carving a range out of a broad prior art disclosure is not sufficient to make a
selection invention novel. As explained above, the selected range should not be an
arbitrary selection of the prior art. A purpose (new technical teaching) that is not directly
and unambiguously disclosed to the skilled person by the prior art may be required to
make a selected sub-range novel.
• Advantage/use/improvement
A different advantage or use, or the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement,
could be the required new technical teaching for a selection invention to be novel, in the
sense that it confirms that the selection is not an arbitrary one, provided, as mentioned
above, that it is not directly and unambiguously disclosed to the skilled person by the
prior art.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
• The requirements for inventive step are the same for selection inventions as for any and
all inventions.
When applying for a national Belgian patent application there is no substantive examination
and patents are granted automatically if the formal requirements are fulfilled. There is
however a search report drawn up by the EPO, with an opinion on the patentability;
in response, it is possible to file comments, which might comprise experimental data
to backup the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements. Further, during nullity
proceedings before a Belgian court any documents or data can be submitted to support
the case.
For completeness, it is noted that during the examination proceedings of a European
patent application, experimental data filed after the initial patent filing may be taken
into account when assessing the inventive step, provided they support some property
or advantage that was implied by or at least related to the technical problem initially
suggested in the application as filed (T184/82, T386/89; Guidelines C-IV, 11.10). The
presence of such data in the file will be mentioned on the cover page of the published
European patent specification.
• Prerequisites or limitations on the late submission of data
As mentioned above, late submission (i.e. after the filing date) of data is acceptable only
if they support some property or advantage that was implied by or at least related to the
technical problem initially suggested in the application as filed.
During nullity proceedings before a Belgian court the normal procedural rules apply
regarding the submission of evidence.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
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1) the threshold for sufficiency;
The “sufficiency” and/or “written disclosure” requirements are the same for selection
inventions when compared to any other invention. The application must disclose the
invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried by a person
skilled in the art.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
Regarding the allowable timing for submission of experimental data, reference is made
to question 3 above.
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
The requirement of sufficiency of disclosure must be fulfilled by the application as filed.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
According to the Belgian patent law, the claims must define the matter for which protection
is sought, and must be clear and concise and supported by the description. Further the
scope of protection is determined by the content of the claims, wherein the description
and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims. The breadth of claim scope is not
necessarily influenced by giving only a limited number of examples of asserted or proven
advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
A certain utility of a range of components could have been used only to establish that the
selection was not an arbitrary one, and does not necessarily have to be incorporated in the
claim.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
• Relevance of advantage/superior result
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent (on
a selection invention), it could have been used only to establish that the selection was
not an arbitrary one (in support of its novelty), or possibly also to establish the inventive
step. In both cases, and to the extent such advantage or superior result has not been
incorporated as a mandatory requirement in the claims, said advantage or superior result
does not have to be utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established.
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• New use
The requirements to establish direct infringement of a claim regarding the new use of a
known feature, or product, or device, etc will be the same as for any other invention.
It will have to be proven that the alleged infringer applies the features of the claim, i.e.
uses the known feature or product or device, etc in the same new way as specified in the
claim. It is noted that article 27 § 1 of the Belgian Patent Act which deals with rights of
the patentee only relates to products and to methods, and does not mention new uses,
but it is believed that new use claims can be treated in the same way as method claims
since a new use claim can generally also be formulated as a method characterized by
the new use of the known feature, or product, or device, etc.
A manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use will not necessarily infringe
the patent. The question here will be a question of indirect or contributory infringement. An
express provision regarding contributory infringement can be found in article 27, §2 of the
Belgian Patent Law (28 March 1984):
The patent shall also confer on its owner the right to prevent all third parties not having his
consent from supplying or offering to supply on Belgian territory a person other than parties
entitled to exploit the patented invention with means, relating to an essential element of that
invention, for putting it into effect in the territory, when the third party knows, or it is obvious
in the circumstances, that those means are suitable and intended for putting that invention
into effect in that territory.
The preceding subparagraph shall not apply when the means are staple commercial
products, except when the third party induces the person supplied to commit acts prohibited
by paragraph 1.
Persons performing the acts mentioned in article 28, sub a) until sub c), shall not be considered
to be entitled to exploit the invention, within the meaning of the first part of this paragraph.
According to the ruling in the Senseo-case (Court of Appeal Antwerp 8 November 2005),
under Belgian Patent Law, it is not required that the alleged infringer actually uses the
means supplied for committing acts that amount to a direct infringement. In that case, the
court acknowledged in very clear wordings the independent nature of the contributory
infringement. However, the very straightforward way in which the Antwerp Court of Appeal
decided in favour of the independent nature of the contributory infringement raised questions
in Belgian doctrine (E. De Gryse, Straffe Koffie (met een laagje schuim)!’, note under Antwerp
8 November 2005, Ing. Cons. 2005/5, 532).
Further, according to the above mentioned ruling, the means supplied need to be understood
not only as “suitable” but also as “intended for putting the invention into effect”. In particular
the condition that the supplier of the means knows or that it is obvious in the circumstances that
said means are “intended” for exploiting the invention indicates that at least the possibility of
a subsequent exploitation of the invention is required. Yet, the law does not expressly require
that the (potential) exploitation would amount to a direct infringement. Moreover, the law
does not require that the potential exploitation would be made by the immediate purchaser.
In its ruling of 8 November 2005, the Court of Appeal of Antwerp decided therefore that the
exploitation by the final user – who was different from the immediate purchaser (distributors/
retailers) – does suffice.
For more details about contributory infringement, reference is made to AIPPI Q204.
In case of a claim for a new use of a known product, the question will be whether the known
product is a commercial staple product. If it is, a further question will be whether the supplier
of the known product knows or whether it is obvious in the circumstances that said known
product is “intended” for exploiting the invention. If the answer is positive, then under normal
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circumstances there could be indirect infringement of a new use claim by manufacturing a
product.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
As set out above there are no express provisions on selection inventions in the Belgian Patent
Act. However, it is believed that the case law of the BoA of the EPO regarding selections
inventions are also applicable to Belgian national patents, and it is not considered necessary
to have express provisions on selection inventions in the Belgian Patent Act.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group of
specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction?
No, a novel selection should, in principle, even be possible by specifying a group of “a few”
species within a generic formula, and even if the number of theoretical permutations was
small.
An associated issue is to what extent such a generic disclosure can be considered to have
actually “reproducibly” disclosed and individualised a specific “product” by merely “listing”
it. Consideration should also be given in this respect to new (computerized) means for
generating extensive listings of radicals and their permutations.
In the analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is –
i.e. would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
No
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction?
(I) If the resulting compounds are neither described as having nor shown to possess any
advantageous properties (as adhesives) not possessed by the specific prior art examples,
the selection is not novel, since the selection appears to be arbitrary.
(II) If the resulting compounds are described as possessing advantageous properties
compared with the compounds specifically referred to in the prior art, but these properties
are ones which the person skilled in the art would expect such compounds to possess,
so that he is likely to be led to make this selection, the selection is either: not novel, if the
example is interpreted in the sense that these properties are directly and unambiguously
disclosed to the skilled person, including features which for the skilled person are implicit
in what is explicitly disclosed in the prior art document; or not inventive, if these properties
are obvious to the skilled person from what is expressly mentioned in the prior art.
(III) If the resulting compounds are described as having advantageous (adhesive) properties
but there are no indications which would lead the person skilled in the art to this particular
selection as opposed to any other members of the generic class in order to achieve the
advantageous (adhesive) properties, the selection is novel and inventive.
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Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the prior art, what scope
of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor be able to obtain
protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous property), or should
any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for the advantageous
property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior art?
To the extent the products per se are novel and inventive, the inventor should be able to
obtain protection for them, as well as (in separate claims) for the use of the products for the
advantageous property. Only if the products per se were not patentable should the protection
be limited to the new use.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
Yes, according to the case law of the BoA all members of the class must posses the relevant
advantage in order for the claim to be novel (in as far as the advantage is considered to be
a requirement for the selection not to be arbitrary) and inventive (in as far as the advantage
is a requirement for the selection to be inventive).
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
To the extent the selection invention is validly claimed as a product, evidence of the knowledge
of the purpose of the selection is not required, and the supply of the product would be an
infringement. If the particular compound per se is known and if the claim extends to the use
of the particular compound as an adhesive, and if a competitor manufactures the claimed
compound and supplies it with no instructions as to its use, the question is whether there is
indirect or contributory infringement – see Q4 above.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Effort is not relevant and is not an additional criterion (beyond novelty and inventive step)
for patentability. It is the group’s opinion that an effort criterion would not be a suitable
consideration for assessing inventive step; certain jobs require much effort but no inventive
activity, and hence such jobs should not be rewarded with a patent.
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Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
It is the group’s opinion that no particular harmonised standards are necessary for selection
inventions since the existing law and the prevailing concepts on novelty and inventive step
can be applied for selection inventions by logical thinking, where necessary using the case
law of the EPO.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
The group does not have any further recommendations for harmonisation
Summary
There are no express provisions regarding selection inventions in the Belgian patent act. Patentability
of a selection invention has to be considered in the same way as any other invention, more in
particular the selection invention has to be examined in the same way regarding the requirements
of novelty, inventive step, industrial application, etc. It is to be expected that a national judge
will follow the case law of the Boards of Appeal (BoA) and the Guidelines for examination of the
European Patent Office (EPO) when confronted with the patentability of a selection invention.
Résumé
La loi belge sur les brevets d’invention ne contient pas de stipulations explicites en ce qui concerne
les inventions de sélection. La brevetabilité d’une invention de sélection doit être considérée de la
même manière que toute autre invention, plus particulièrement l’invention de sélection doit être
examinée de la même manière en ce qui concerne les exigences de nouveauté, d’activité inventive,
d’application industrielle, etc. Un juge national est susceptible de suivre la jurisprudence de la
Chambre de Recours et les Directives relatives à l’examen pratiqué à l’Office européen des brevets
lorsqu’il est confronté avec la brevetabilité d’une invention de sélection.
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Brazil
Brésil
Brasilien
Report Q209
in the name of the Brazilian Group
by João Luiz D’Orey Vianna and Antonio Maurício Pedras Arnaud
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
To be patentable, inventions in Brazil must attend the general patentability requirements
of novelty, inventive activity and industrial applicability and not fall into the specific legal
prohibitions of articles 10 (defining matter not considered to be invention) and 18 (specific
exclusions of patentability) of Law 9279/96.
Selection patents are not listed in either article 10 or 18 and are thus subjected to the general
patentability requirements.
We are aware of a Court Action raised before the District Court of Rio de Janeiro, under
number 2004.51.534476-1, author being Ishiara Sangyo Kaisha LTD, against the Brazilian
Patent Office, asking to invalidate the administrative act that rejected the patent application.
The Court Action is still pending.
There are several selection patents that have been issued by the Brazilian Patent Office
(BPO).
Currently, there are no guidelines in force regarding examination procedures for this kind of
inventions. The BPO has announced that this topic, amongst others, will be subjected to public
hearings in order to evaluate parameters to take into account for soon to be implemented
guidelines.
Hence, the fate of these inventions in our country is undeterminable since it will depend on
the opinion of the Examiner appointed for a particular case.
Although it is more frequent to talk about selection patents when dealing with the chemical
pharmaceutical area, to some extent, the concept of “selection” might be envisaged as
applicable to any technical field.
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2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
Any specific feature not disclosed in the prior art, even if within a generic definition, should
be considered to be novel.
Any issues regarding different advantages or uses, or the same advantage with an
unpredictable improvement, are to be discussed regarding inventive step.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
Inventive step is present whenever, for a person skilled in the art, an invention is seen as not
deriving in an evident or usual manner from the state of the art.
The claimed subject-matter in the selection patent must not be directly inferred by someone
skilled in the art from the teachings of the prior art. According to our practice and law, it is
not possible to add subject-matter to an already filed application; the application as filed
must contain enough data (including experimental data) to back up the scope of what is
claimed. Experimental data can be offered to the Examiner as further explanatory arguments
that will support the inventiveness, however such data cannot be inserted into the pending
specification as such.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
Regarding the threshold for sufficiency (item 1 above) our law does not bring specific
definitions. However, in practice, the Examiners have been demanding full disclosure in the
specification in support not only of the description of the radicals but also of the advantageous
properties of the particular selection as opposed to any other members of the generic class.
As already commented upon replying to the above Question 3, the application as filed
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must contain enough data (including experimental data) to back up the scope of what is
claimed. Experimental data can be offered to the Examiner as further explanatory arguments
that will support the inventiveness, however such data cannot be inserted into the pending
specification as such.
The claimed subject-matter must be fully backed up by the initial disclosure, not being possible
to add supporting examples at a later prosecution stage.
According to our practice, it is not necessary to mention the utility in the claim. However, the
specification must clearly define the unexpected results obtained with the inventive matter.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
We are not aware of any Court Action involving possible infringement of selection patents.
In principle, in order to rule for the existence of infringement, infringement of the elements
of at least one independent claim of the patent in question must occur. The doctrine of
equivalents is also applicable in our jurisdiction.
Independently of the fact that the selection invention is based on a new use, we would dare to
say (not having any known to us Court Action on the matter) that in order to infringe a given
selection patent the infringer would have to explicitly use the object of the invention.
To characterize infringement of the new use selection patent it is necessary to use it intentionally
for the same purpose. Therefore, the manufacturer of a product will not infringe a new use
selection invention unless he practices or contributes to the practice of the invention for that
particular purpose.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
Our Law is silent concerning selection patents and, as explained above on Q1, therefore
patents should be issued for inventions attending the general patentability requirements and
not falling into the prohibitions of articles 10and 18 of Law9279/96.
However, in more recent years, we have been observing an ever increasing stricter interpretation
on behalf of the BPO as to the concepts of inventive step and sufficiency of description,
paralleling the Governmental policies clearly favorable to the generic industries.
The examination of inventions within the pharmaceutical art has been further and specifically
made more complex by having the Brazilian FDA conducting examination on the merits of
patent applications independently of that already made by the BPO; The Brazilian FDA´s
examination standards are more restrictive than those already applied by the BPO.
The current policy applied by FDA is not to allow selection patents or second medical use
patents.
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With Reference to the Examples
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
According to the BPO’s practice, if the specific compound is not described in itself within the
prior disclosure, novelty would have been preserved.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
Regarding example 2, the possibility that would constitute an inventive step over the prior art
would be that as defined in scenario (iii).
The protection afforded would cover the product per se. The enforceability of this product
claim would depend on the interpretation of the judge on a case by case basis. We stress
once more that we do not have case law decision to base our comments on.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
There must be full support in the disclosure for the claims of the patent.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
We are not aware of any Court actions pending or Case Law in our country dealing with
possible infringement of selection patents.
To characterize infringement of the new use selection patent it is necessary to use it intentionally
for the same purpose. Therefore, the manufacturer of a product will not infringe a new use
selection invention unless he practices or contributes to the practice of the invention for that
particular purpose.
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11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
The Brazilian group considers such considerations relevant and the effort, time consumed,
investment made into the development of the selection invention should all be taken into
consideration upon evaluating its patentability. However, what really determines the validity
the selection patent is the new effect brought about by the invention.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
Summary
Brazilian IP Law does not have any statutory bar against the patentability of selection inventions
and the BR patents that have been already issued, for covering such inventions in different technical
fields, were allowed as complying with the general requirements of novelty, inventive activity and
industrial applicability, after being submitted to the same substantive examination guidelines
applied to non-selection inventions.
Although the concepts of absolute novelty, inventive activity and industrial applicability are those
applied to inventions other than selection inventions, the selection inventive matter needs to
have all its possible particular embodiments clearly and fully disclosed in the specification. The
specification, as originally filed, should contain also all the data (including experimental data)
necessary and sufficient to clearly define the non-expected and superior results obtained from the
selection inventive matter.
To be infringed, a selection patent must have the invention, or an equivalent technical solution, as
defined in at least one independent claim, exploited by a non-authorized third party. In the case
of a selection invention based on a new use of a certain product, the manufacturer of the product
will not infringe the selection patent unless he uses or contributes to the use of the product by a
non-authorized third party.
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Since BR IP Law 9279/96 is silent concerning selection inventions, patents are issued for such
inventions which comply with the general patentability requirements and which do not fall within
the prohibitions of articles 10 (defining matter not considered to be an invention) and 18 (specific
exclusions of patentability).
However, all patents referring to the pharmaceutical field are submitted to a second examination on
the merits by the Brazilian FDA (ANVISA), after having received the allowance from the Patent Office.
The examination standards applied by said BR Agency, particularly regarding inventive activity,
are more restrictive than those applied by the Brazilian Patent Office. Further, the current policy
applied by the Brazilian FDA is not to allow selection patents or second medical use patents.
Résumé
La loi brésilienne n´a pas aucune interdiction contre la brévetabilité des inventions de séléction et les
brevets brésiliens déjà octroyés qui couvrent ces inventions en différents domaines techniques, ont
été autorisés si obéissant les caractères de nouveauté, activité inventive et application industrielle,
après avoir observé les mêmes orientations substatives d´examen appliqués aux inventions en
générale.
Quoique les caractères de nouveauté absolue, activité inventive et application industrielle soient
ces appliqués a tous les inventions, les inventions de sélections doivent avoir tous ces particularités
claires et totalement ouvertes dans les espécifications. L´espécification, comme originellement
déposée, doit aussi contenir toute information (inclus des informations experimentales) nécéssaires
et suffisantes pour définir clairement les résultats non-espérés et supérieurs obténus de la sélection
inventive.
Pour être enfreindre, un brévet de séléction doit avoir une invention, ou une solution technique
equivalente, comme défini au moins dans une des revendications, exploités par un tiers nonautorisé.
Dans le cas d´une invention de selection fondée dans un nouvel usage d´un certain
produit, le producteur n´enfreindre le brevet de sélection a moins qu´il utilise ou contribu pour
l´utilisation du produit par un tiers non-autorisé.
Considérant le silence de la loi brésilienne de propriété industrielle par rapport aux inventions
de sélection, les brévets pour ces inventions sont octroyés si accomplis les conditions générales
de brévetabilité et si elles ne retombent dans les prohibitions de l´article 10 de la Loi de
Propriété Industrielle (ce qui ne constitue une invention) et l´article 18 (exclusions espécifiques de
brévetabilité).
Néamoins, tous les brévets pharmaceutiques sont submis a un second examen de fond fait par
l´Agence de Vigilance Sanitaire Brésilienne (ANVISA), après avoir reçu l´autorisation de l´INPI. Les
standards d´éxamen de l´Agence, particulièrement en relation à l´activité inventive, est plus strict
que celui de l´INPI. En plus, la politique actuelle appliqué par l´ANVISA c´est de ne pas autoriser
les brevets de selections et de second usage medicales.
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Canada
Canada
Kanada
Report Q209
in the name of the Canadian Group
by Bill Mayo and France Côté
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
Selection patents are not specifically referred to in the Canadian Patent Act, but they have
been recognized by the Canadian courts in a number of cases. Provided the claimed selection
is novel, inventive and has utility it will be patentable in Canada. Recently, the Supreme Court
of Canada considered selection patents in the case of Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi Synthelabo
Canada Inc. (2008 SCC 61) [Apotex v. Sanofi].
While virtually every case involving a selection patent that has gone before the courts in
Canada has been in the chemical or pharmaceutical fields, the Supreme Court in Apotex
v. Sanofi noted that the doctrine of genus and selection patents is not restricted to the
pharmaceutical industry and is of general applicability (Paragraph 99, Apotex v. Sanofi).
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
The three-part test set out in I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.’s Patents, Re (1930), 47 R.P.C. 289
(Eng. Ch. Div.) [I.G. Farbenindustrie] has been cited in several Canadian decisions, including
by the Supreme Court in Apotex v. Sanofi. According to this test, the conditions which must be
satisfied in order for a selection to be considered proper subject matter for a patent are:
(1) there must be a substantial advantage provided by the selected members;
(2) the whole of the selected members (subject to “a few exceptions here and there”) must
possess the advantage; and
(3) the selection must be in respect of a quality of a special character peculiar to the selected
group.
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Also, the Manual of Patent Office Practice, published by the Canadian Intellectual Property
Office, provides the following guidance in section 11.12:
A selection from members of a previously known class of substances may be patentable if the
substance selected is unobvious and affords a new and useful result. There must be a special
advantage arising from the selected substance and any advantage, novel property or use
must be fully characterized in the description. The substance should be defined in an explicit
manner within the claim.
Whether the advantage relied upon will be sufficient to support a selection patent will
depend on the facts of the case. In the right circumstances an unpredicted improvement in a
characteristic mentioned in the genus patent could be considered novel and inventive. By way
of example, in the case of Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Ranbaxy 2008 FCA 108, the Federal Court
of Appeal found that a patent claiming atorvastatin was a valid selection over an earlier
patent claiming the racemate and its two enantiomers on the basis that atorvastatin had an
unexpected level of activity (para 46):
In my opinion, there can be no doubt that the 546 patent is a selection patent. It covers
the lactone, acid and pharmaceutically acceptable salts of atorvastatin, one of the many
compounds covered by the 768 and 893 patents. The basis for the patent is that the compounds
claimed therein display a special advantage, namely the surprising and unexpected inhibition
of cholesterol biosynthesis, i.e. greater than twofold.
However, merely carving a range out of a broad prior art disclosure is not sufficient to make
a selection invention novel unless there is a special and unexpected advantage disclosed that
was not previously known.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
With respect to obviousness, in Apotex v. Sanofi, the Supreme Court restated the four step
test for obviousness set out in Windsurfing International Inc v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain)
Ltd ([1985] RPC 59 (CA)):
1) (a) Identify the notional “person skilled in the art”;
(b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of that person;
2) Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if that cannot readily be done,
construe it;
3) Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as forming part of the
“state of the art” and the inventive concept of the claim or the claim as construed;
4) Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed, do those differences
constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art or do they
require any degree of invention?
The Court accepted that an “obvious to try” test could be applied (citing United Kingdom
and United States cases), but warned that the test must be approached cautiously. There must
be evidence to convince a judge on a balance of probabilities that the issue is “very plain”
or “more or less self-evident that what is being tested ought to work.” Mere possibility that
something might turn up is not sufficient. The Court stated that the “obvious to try” test would
arise in the fourth step above, and that the test may be appropriate to apply in areas where
advances are often achieved by experimentation, such as in the pharmaceutical industry.
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The following non-exhaustive list of questions to take into consideration when applying an
“obvious to try” test was set out:
• Is it more or less self-evident that what is being tried ought to work? Are there a finite
number of identified predictable solutions known to persons skilled in the art?
• What is the extent, nature and amount of effort required to achieve the invention? Are
routine trials carried out or is the experimentation prolonged and arduous, such that the
trials would not be considered routine?
• Is there a motive provided in the prior art to find the solution the patent addresses?
It is possible to submit experimental data to back up the inventiveness of a selection after the
Canadian patent filing date. However, if the data is required to establish utility or that there
was a sound prediction of utility, experimental data obtained after the filing date cannot be
relied on. This is because utility must be established or have been soundly predicted as of the
Canadian filing date.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
The disclosure requirement for a selection patent was recently considered by the Federal
Court of Appeal in Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Ranbaxy 2008 FCA 108, which held that “the
patentee need not disclose anything more than the surprising and unexpected advantage
of the selection. No data or other evidence to support that assertion is required within
the patent. However, to the extent that the patentee is attempting to establish the utility
of a selection by relying upon evidence of sound prediction, there may be an obligation
to disclose in the patent the underlying facts and the line of reasoning which support the
prediction: see Glaxosmithkline Inc. v. Pharmascience Inc. 2008 FC 593, at para. 71.
As stated in the I.G. Farbenindustrie test, the whole of the selected members must possess
the advantage, subject to “a few exceptions here and there”.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
There is no requirement for experimental data to be included in an application at the time
of filing or prior to patent issuance to support a selection patent, so long as there is a
description of the invention (i.e. the claimed compounds and the unexpected advantages
they confer) and how it works (i.e. how to make and use the selected compounds).
However, if the validity of the patent is challenged, the patentee may be required to show
that they had experimental data establishing the utility (i.e. the unexpected advantage) or
that formed the factual basis of a sound prediction. Moreover, it is considered by many to
be good practice to include supporting data for the selection in the application.
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
Although the written description can be amended up to the time of issuance, no new
subject matter may be added.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
Since the utility of a claimed invention can be based on a sound prediction, the claims
can be supported by a limited number of examples provided that the inventors had
a factual basis and an articulable and sound line of reasoning from which it can be
inferred that all of the selected members will have the unexpected advantage.
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Based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanofi v. Apotex, the advantage on
which the selection is based must be in the patent description but it does not have to be
recited in the claims. The selected components claimed, however, must all provide the
advantage.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there
an absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage,
or is the patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item
4) above, if a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a
particular range or selection of components which have been found to be associated with
such a new utility or would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
Since the advantage does not have to be incorporated into the claims, it is possible to have
infringement without the advantage or superior result being utilized. For example, a patent
claiming a compound selected from a genus based on an particular advantage would be
infringed by any use of the compound regardless of whether the advantage is realized.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
Patents claiming a new use of a known compound or product are generally not considered
to be selection patents. In such cases, the new use is included in the claims. Accordingly,
there can only be infringement if the product is used for the claimed use. The intention of
the alleged infringer does not play a role in the determination of infringement. Intention can,
however, play a role in an action for inducing infringement.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
As with other types of inventions, the policy underlying selection patents is to encourage
research and the advance of technology. More specifically, it is to encourage further research
within a previously disclosed genus, notwithstanding the previous disclosure of that genus.
This general policy remains valid notwithstanding technological changes, provided that the
right balance is struck between what is routine and what it inventive. The challenge is how to
apply the law of selection patents as the technology advances.
With Reference to the Examples
Example 1
Say a prior art document discloses a chemical compound characterised by a specified
structure including a substituent group designated “R”. This substituent “R” is defined so
as to embrace a generic class of broadly-defined functional groups such as all alkyl or
aryl radicals, either unsubstituted or substituted by a halogen and/or a hydroxyl group,
although for practical reasons only a very small number of specific examples are given. The
(later) alleged invention consists of the selection of a particular radical or particular group of
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adicals from amongst the generic class, where the selected radical or group of radicals were
not specifically disclosed in the prior-art document. The resulting compounds are described
as having a new, advantageous property, say as adhesives, not possessed by the prior art
examples.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of radicals would not
anticipate a claim to a specific compound provided that the specific compound had an
unexpected advantage that is unique as compared to the generic class and provided that the
selected compound could be made by a person skilled in the art based on the prior disclosure
with routine experimentation. In the context of selection patents, the Supreme Court, in Apotex
v. Sanofi, stated that there is no prior disclosure if the genus patent does not disclose the
special advantages of the invention covered by the selection patent.
Since the issue is whether the unexpected advantage on which the selection is based was
previously disclosed, it should not make any difference whether the generic class consisted of
1,000,000 or ten members. There can be a selection, in theory, even from a class of two.
Indeed, in the Apotex v. Sanofi case discussed above, twenty one examples from the earlier
genus ‘875 patent were made and tested, one of which was the relevant racemate. It was
held that there was no evidence that a person skilled in the art would know, from reading the
‘875 patent, the specific beneficial properties associated with the more active dextro rotatory
isomer and that it would be less toxic than the racemate or levo rotatory isomer or any of the
other compounds made and tested. Accordingly, the enantiomer of the selection patent was
not anticipated.
Example 2
In the selection that the inventor has made in example 1, i.e. specific compound having a
particular radical, or group of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals,
the resulting compounds may be:
i) neither described as having nor shown to possess any advantageous properties (as
adhesives) not possessed by the specific prior art examples;
ii)
described as possessing advantageous properties compared with the compounds
specifically referred to in the prior art, but these properties are ones which the person
skilled in the art would expect such compounds to possess, so that he is likely to be led
to make this selection; or
iii) described as having advantageous (adhesive) properties but there are no indications
which would lead the person skilled in the art to this particular selection as opposed to
any other members of the generic class in order to achieve the advantageous (adhesive)
properties.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
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e able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
i) In the first scenario, claims to the selected compounds would be invalid for failing to
disclose any advantageous properties over the prior art and, therefore they would not be
inventive.
ii)
In the second scenario, the selection of the claimed compounds would be obvious if it
was plain and self-evident to the person of ordinary skill in the art that those compounds
would possess the specified advantageous properties. If such a person would merely
have expected that they might possess those properties, then the selection may not be
found to be obvious.
iii) In the third scenario, the compounds would likely be found to be non-obvious since
the person of skill in the art would not be lead to the selected members as having the
advantageous properties. In this scenario, however, the invention would more likely be
considered a new use of a known compound rather than a selection from the prior art,
assuming the use as an adhesive is unrelated to the old use. The consequence of this is
that claims to the selected members would have to include a limitation relating to the new
use, i.e. the inventor should not be able to claim the products per se.
If the inventor attempted to claim the products per se on the basis of a selection patent, then
the claims to those compounds should be found invalid if indeed there was nothing that would
lead the skilled person to this particular selection as opposed to any other members of the
generic class. In order to have a proper selection, the advantages on which the selection
is based must be unique to the selected compounds as compared to the generic class as
a whole. If one would expect the entire generic class from the prior art to have adhesive
properties, then there is no selection. In this situation, however, it may be open to the inventor
to claim the generic class on the basis of a new use.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
As noted above, there is case law suggesting that the patentee would be excused if one or
two members of the class selected fall short (I.G. Farbenindustrie). However, this may depend
on the facts of the case. If, for example, the selection is of one compound, then it would
obviously have to have the advantage. The same is likely true of a small class consisting of
a few members.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
If the claims are to the product per se, then there would be infringement. The knowledge or
intention of the infringer is not a relevant consideration. If, however, the claims include the
use of the claimed compounds as an adhesive and the compounds could be used for other
purposes (i.e. old uses), then the competitor would not be directly infringing the patent unless
it was itself using the compounds as adhesives.
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The competitor may be found to be inducing and procuring infringement by a third party if
(AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare), 2001 FCT 1264, [2001]
F.C.J.; affirmed 2002 FCA 421):
(i) there is direct infringement by a third party
(ii) he direct infringement was influenced by the competitor such that without such influence
the infringement would not have taken place; and
(iii) the influence must knowingly be exercised by the competitor, such that the competitor
knows that his influence will result in the completion of the act of infringement
In order for there to be a finding of inducing infringement, all three elements must be
present.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
In Canada, the question of how much effort was involved in coming up with the claimed
invention may come up in the context of obviousness. More specifically, was the claimed
invention something that, while not previously disclosed, was obvious to try. The Supreme
Court of Canada in Apotex v. Sanofi considered the question of whether an invention could
be invalid on the basis that it was “obvious to try” in the context of a selection patent. In short,
the Court stated that there may be circumstances, depending on the facts of the case, where
an invention could be found obvious on the basis that it was obvious to try and described
some of the factors that should be taken into account, which included the amount of effort
required to achieve the invention. Accordingly, the amount of effort expended is not, in and
of itself, determinative of the question of inventiveness. How significant a factor it will be will
depend on the circumstances of the case. The relevant passages from the Apotex v. Sanofi
decision are as follows:
[69] If an “obvious to try” test is warranted, the following factors should be taken into
consideration at the fourth step of the obviousness inquiry. As with anticipation, this list is not
exhaustive. The factors will apply in accordance with the evidence in each case.
(1) Is it more or less self-evident that what is being tried ought to work? Are there a finite
number of identified predictable solutions known to persons skilled in the art?
(2) What is the extent, nature and amount of effort required to achieve the invention? Are
routine trials carried out or is the experimentation prolonged and arduous, such that the
trials would not be considered routine?
(3 Is there a motive provided in the prior art to find the solution the patent addresses?
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[70] Another important factor may arise from considering the actual course of conduct which
culminated in the making of the invention. It is true that obviousness is largely concerned with
how a skilled worker would have acted in the light of the prior art. But this is no reason to
exclude evidence of the history of the invention, particularly where the knowledge of those
involved in finding the invention is no lower than what would be expected of the skilled
person.
[71] For example, if the inventor and his or her team reached the invention quickly, easily,
directly and relatively inexpensively, in light of the prior art and common general knowledge,
that may be evidence supporting a finding of obviousness, unless the level at which they
worked and their knowledge base was above what should be attributed to the skilled person.
Their course of conduct would suggest that a skilled person, using his/her common general
knowledge and the prior art, would have acted similarly and come up with the same result.
On the other hand, if time, money and effort was expended in research looking for the result
the invention ultimately provided before the inventor turned or was instructed to turn to search
for the invention, including what turned out to be fruitless “wild goose chases”, that evidence
may support a finding of non-obviousness. It would suggest that the skilled person, using his/
her common general knowledge and the prior art, would have done no better. Indeed, where
those involved including the inventor and his or her team were highly skilled in the particular
technology involved, the evidence may suggest that the skilled person would have done a
lot worse and would not likely have managed to find the invention. It would not have been
obvious to him/her to try the course that led to the invention.
The Supreme Court also made the following comments in respect of this issue:
[64] While I do not think the list is exhaustive, the factors set forth by Kitchin J. and adopted
by Lord Hoffmann in Lundbeck, referred to at para. 59 of these reasons, are useful guides in
deciding whether a particular step was “obvious to try”. However, the “obvious to try” test
must be approached cautiously. It is only one factor to assist in the obviousness inquiry. It is
not a panacea for alleged infringers. The patent system is intended to provide an economic
encouragement for research and development. It is well known that this is particularly
important in the field of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.
[66] For a finding that an invention was “obvious to try”, there must be evidence to convince
a judge on a balance of probabilities that it was more or less self-evident to try to obtain the
invention. Mere possibility that something might turn up is not enough.
Summary
Selection patents are recognized in Canada. Provided the claimed selection is novel, inventive
and has utility it will be patentable in Canada. Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada considered
selection patents in the case of Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi Synthelabo Canada Inc. (2008 SCC 61)
[Apotex v. Sanofi].
The three-part test set out in I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.’s Patents, Re (1930), 47 R.P.C. 289 (Eng. Ch.
Div.) [I.G. Farbenindustrie] has been cited in several Canadian decisions, including by the Supreme
Court in Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi Synthelabo Canada Inc. (2008 SCC 61):
(4) there must be a substantial advantage provided by the selected members;
(5) the whole of the selected members (subject to “a few exceptions here and there”) must possess
the advantage; and
(6) the selection must be in respect of a quality of a special character peculiar to the selected
group.
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Merely carving a range out of a broad prior art disclosure is not sufficient to make a selection
invention novel unless there is a special and unexpected advantage disclosed that was not
previously known.
Résumé
Les brevets de sélection sont reconnus au Canada. Dans l’éventualité où la sélection revendiquée
est nouvelle, inventive et utile, elle sera brevetable au Canada. Récemment, La cour suprême du
Canada a considéré les brevets de sélection dans la cause de Apotex Inc. v. Synthelabo Canada
Inc. de Sanofi (SCC 2008 61) [Apotex v. Sanofi].
Le test en trois parties est énuméré dans I.G. Brevets de Farbenindustrie A.G., Re (1930), 47 R.P.C.
289 (l’Eng. Ch. Divisions.) [I.G. Farbenindustrie] a été cité dans plusieurs décisions canadiennes,
incluant par La cour suprême dans Apotex Inc. v. Synthelabo Canada Inc. de Sanofi (SCC 2008
61):
(1) il doit y a un avantage substantiel fourni par les membres choisis;
(2) la totalité des membres choisis (sujet à « quelques exceptions ici et là ») doit posséder
l’avantage; et
(3) le choix doit être à l’égard d’une qualité d’un caractère spécial particulier au groupe choisi.
Le simple découpage d’une gamme hors d’une divulgation d’art antérieur de portée plus large, est
insuffisant pour rendre nouvelle une invention de sélection à moins qu’il y ait un avantage spécial
et inattendu qui n’était pas précédemment connu.
Zusammenfassung
Auswahlpatente werden in Kanada anerkannt. Vorausgesetzt, dass die beanspruchte Auswahl
neu, erfinderisch und gewerblich verwertbar ist, kann sie in Kanada patentiert werden. Der oberste
Gerichtshof Kanadas (Supreme Court of Canada) hat kürzlich im Fall Apotex Inc. gegen Sanofi
Synthelabo Canada Inc. (2008 SCC 61) [Apotex gegen Sanofi] Auswahlpatente berücksichtigt.
Die dreiteilige Prüfung im Fall I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.’s Patents, (1930), 47 R.P.C. 289 (Eng.
Ch. Div.) [I.G. Farbenindustrie] wurde in mehreren kanadischen Entscheidungen angeführt, unter
anderem auch vom Supreme Court im Fall Apotex Inc. gegen Sanofi Synthelabo Canada Inc.
(2008 SCC 61):
(7) die ausgewählten Teile müssen einen erheblichen Vorteil bereitstellen;
(8) sämtliche ausgewählten Teile (vorbehaltlich „einiger weniger Ausnahmen hier und dort“)
müssen den Vorteil besitzen; und
(9) die Auswahl muss sich auf eine besonders charakteristische Qualität beziehen, die der
ausgewählten Gruppe eigen ist.
Das bloße Herausarbeiten eines Bereichs aus einer breit definierten Voranmeldung reicht nicht aus,
um eine Auswahlerfindung neu zu machen, es sei denn, es wird ein besonderer und unerwarteter
Vorteil offengelegt, der zuvor nicht bekannt war.
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Chile
Chili
Chile
Report Q209
in the name of the Chilean Group
by Felipe Claro and Fernando López
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
There is no a definition about the selection invention in our Chilean IP Law.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
In the Chilean IP Law article 33 establishes:
“Article 33.- An invention is considered new, when it does not exist earlier in the state of the
art. The state of the art comprises everything that has been disclosed or made available to
the public, in any place of the world by means of a publication, sale or commercialization,
use or any other means, before the filing date of the patent application in Chile or of the
priority claimed according to article 34 (twelve months).
It shall also constitute state of the art the content of national applications for patents or utility
models as originally filed, whose filing date is earlier than the one indicated in the above
provision and which have been published on that date or on a later date.”
With this regard, the Chilean Patent Office follows the same criteria used by the European
Patent Office. A general concept lacks of novelty regarding to a specific concept. For
example, copper annul the novelty of metal, but metal does not annul the novelty of copper.
This is applied because the prior art of metal concept is not disclosed the copper concept,
and the cooper concept is new over the metal concept.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
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equirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
In order to demonstrate inventive step of a specific concept, it is necessary to show any
surprising effect, for example experimental data. The experimental data must be submitted
when the patent application is filed. If the experimental data is submitted after that date, then
this is considered as new matter exceeding the content of the original application.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
The Chilean Patent Office request experimental data of the invention compared with the
prior art in order to demonstrate the surprising effect. Usually, this is complied with a
least one example. But, only one example normally is not enough in order to demonstrate
the surprising effect and it is necessary to include many examples in the application.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
The examples or experimental data must be submitted when the patent application is
filed
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
There is no time frame in order to comply with sufficiency or written description
requirements. The application must be filed with all the requirements in the specification,
particularly the description and examples. It is no possible to file additional description
or examples after filing the application
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
The claim scope must be supported by the examples disclosed in the description. There
is no limit in the number of examples or experimental data.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
It is not recommendable that the Applicant files only one or two examples, since their claims
could not be supported in those examples. The Chilean Patent Office requests that all the
ranges of the claims must be properly supported by the examples. For that reason, it is
recommendable to file several examples in the application.
Regarding to the new utility, paragraph (e) of article 37 establishes:
“Article 37. The following will not be considered invention and thus will be excluded from
patent protection:
e) The new use, change of form, change of dimensions, change of proportions or change
of materials of goods, objects or elements already known and employed for determined
purposes. However, the new use of goods, objects or elements can constitute an invention
susceptible of protection whenever such new use solves a technical problem which did not
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have previously an equivalent solution, and complies with the requirements referred to in
article 32 (novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability) and when it further requires
changes in dimensions, proportions or materials of the article, object or known element to
obtain said solution to such technical problem. The claimed new use will have to be proven
by means of experimental evidence in the patent application.”
For the above reason it is possible to protect in Chile use claims per se, but those claims must
be supported by examples.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
In our Chilean IP Law there is no defined infringement with regard to selection invention.
Article 52 establishes:
“Article 52. A fine, for fiscal benefit, of 25 to 1000 monthly tax units will be imposed upon:
A) Those who maliciously manufacture, use, offer or introduce into the market, import or are
in possession of a patented invention for commercial purposes. This will be understood
notwithstanding the provision of subparagraph 5 of article 49.
B) Those who, for commercial purposes, use a non patented object, or whose patent has
expired, or has been cancelled and using in such object indications corresponding to a
patent or simulating such indications.
C) Those that maliciously, for commercial purposes, use a patented process.
D) Those that maliciously imitate or use an invention pending application, unless the patent
is finally rejected.
Those condemned according to this article will have to pay the trial cost and damages caused
to the owner of the patent.
Tools and elements directly used in the commission of any of the crimes mentioned in this
article and the objects produced illegally will be confiscated. Illegally produced objects will
be destroyed. In case of tools or elements used, the competent court will decide their destiny,
and may order their destruction or their charitable distribution.
Recidivism within five years from the date of a fine will be subject to another fine which can
not be inferior to double of the first one. The maximum amount that can be imposed is 2,000
monthly tax units.”
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
A modification in our IP LAW is required, with the objective to defend in due form the
selection inventions, because Courts considers as an infraction everything that it is described
in article 52 (see the answer to question 6).
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7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
As explained in the answer to question 2, general concept does not annul the novelty of a
specific concept. If in the application there is an example with a new and surprising advantage,
then under the Chilean practice, the application has novelty with respect to the prior art.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
In example (i) there is no advantage in view of the prior art, then the application lacks of
inventive step. In example (ii) the Chilean Patent Office would use the inventive step definition
under article 35 of our IP Law: An invention will be considered as having inventive step when
it is non-obvious for a person skilled in the art and it is not an evident result of the state of
the art. For this reason, the example (ii) lacks of inventive step. In the example (iii) there is
inventive step for same reason of the definition of article 35.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess the
requisite advantage in your jurisdiction?
All members of the class selected by the Applicant must have surprising effect in order to
comply with the invent step requisite.
Is there an absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage,
or is the patentee excused if one or two examples fall short?
The applicant must show examples for each selected class in order to support non-obviousness
in those selected class.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous property of the selection, or intention of the
infringer as to its supply, is not required to find infringement in our jurisdiction.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
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grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
The years of research and development are not considered if the applicant does not have the
possibility to demonstrate a surprising effect in her/her invention.
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China
Chine
China
Report Q209
in the name of the Chinese Group
by Longbu Zhang, Lungtin International IP Agent Ltd.
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
A selection invention refers to an invention made by selecting for purpose a smaller range
of options or individual option not mentioned in the prior art from a larger range of options
disclosed in the prior art.
According to above definition, a selection invention is just as a sub-solution, particular
solution or preferable solution of the solution described in the prior art. Therefore, a selection
invention can be regarded as (similar to) a dependent claim of an independent claim, as
shown in the figure 1.
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The selection inventions may be sorted by the following two types:
1) Selection inventions by choosing a range of dimensions, parameter and component etc.
Example 1:
A composition Y with improved thermal stability, characterized by the use of a specified
minimum content of a component X in the composition Y.
Example 2:
A method for quickly and softly cooking eggs, characterized by keeping the temperature
of water containing said eggs at 60-80 degrees Celsius.
2) Selection inventions by choosing among a number of known possibilities of a feature.
Example 1:
Prior Art: A table consisting of a board, and four metal legs connected with said board
by connecting members.
Selection Invention: A foldable table consisting of a board, and four metal legs connected
with said board by hinges.
Example 2:
Prior Art: A composition comprising active component A and any one auxiliary material
of class C”.
Selection Invention: A high-effective composition comprising active component A and the
auxiliary materials b and c of class C.
We do not have any case of selection inventions in a field other than chemical,
pharmaceutical or material science fields yet because we didn‘t collected it
intentionally.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
Generally, novelty means that, before the filing date of the application, no identical
invention had been publicly disclosed in publications in the country or abroad or had
been publicly used or made known to the public by any other means in the country, nor had
any other person filed previously with the Patent Office an application which described the
identical invention and was published on or after the said date of filing.
If their technical fields, technical problems to be solved, technical solutions, and their expected
effects are substantially the same, they (the invention and one reference) shall be regarded
as identical inventions. In determining the novelty of an application, the examiner first of all
determines whether the technical solution of the application being examined is substantially
the same as that of the reference document. When an application is compared with the
contents disclosed in the reference document, if the technical solution defined in a claim
therein and the technical solution disclosed in the reference document are substantially the
same, and the person skilled in the art from the solutions can conclude that both of them can
be applied to the same technical field, solve the same technical problem, and have the same
expected effects, then they can be regarded as identical inventions or utility models.
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In patent document (claim), an invention is described as or defined by a combination of
technical features.
With regard to selection inventions by carving or limiting a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure, the original range doesn’t take away the novelty of the new range according to
the criterion of examination of novelty (3.2.4 Numerical Value and Numerical Range). It can
be explicated that said new range makes a distinct feature for the selection invention and
make it novel. That means a different advantage or use, or the same advantage with an
unpredictable improvement is not required for a selection invention to be novel.
However, without the different advantage or use stated in the description, the examiner maybe
deny the novelty of the whole solution merely dependent on the new range with the reason of
simple obvious replacement of features without no different advantage or use, although he/
she often deny its inventiveness with the same reason.
Two criteria which can be used in the judgment of novelty of selection inventions are given
below.
1) Specific (Lower Level) Term and Generic (Upper Level) Term
The disclosure in the specific (lower level) term takes away the novelty of the invention
defined in the generic (upper level) term. For example, a product “made of copper”
disclosed in a reference document takes away the novelty of an invention for the same
product “made of metal”. However, the disclosure of the product made of copper does
not take away the novelty of an invention for the same product made of other specific
metal.
On the other hand, a disclosure in generic (upper level) term does not take away the
novelty of an invention defined in specific (lower level) term. For example, a product
“made of metal” disclosed in a reference document does not take away the novelty of an
invention for the same product “made of copper”. For another example, if the difference
between the claimed invention and a reference document lies merely in that “chlorine” is
used in the invention to replace “halogen” or another specific halogen “fluorine” in the
reference document, the disclosure of “halogen” or “fluorine” in the reference document
does not take away the novelty of the invention which is defined by “chlorine”.
2) Numerical Value and Numerical Range
If the claimed invention has a technical feature defined by numerical values or a continuous
numerical range, such as the dimensions of a component, temperature, pressure, and the
content of components in a composition, while all other technical features are identical
with those in the reference document, then the determination of novelty shall be conducted
according to the following rules.
(1) The two end points of the numerical range disclosed in the reference document take
away the novelty of the invention in which the above-defined technical feature has
discrete numerical values including one of the said two end points, but does not take
away the novelty of the invention in which the above-defined technical feature is a
numerical value at any point between the said two end points.
Example: a method for making titanium dioxide photocatalyst, wherein the drying
temperature is 40ºC, 58 ºC, 75 ºC , or 100 ºC . If the reference document disclosed
a process for making titanium dioxide photocatalyst wherein the drying temperature
is 40 ºC -100 ºC , it takes away the novelty of said claim in the case that the drying
temperature is 40 ºC or 100 ºC , but does not take away the novelty of said claim
in the case that the drying temperature is 58 ºC or 75 ºC .
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(2) Where the numerical values or numerical range of the above-defined technical
feature fall within the range disclosed in the reference document and do not have
any common end point with it, the reference document dose not take away the
novelty of the claimed invention.
Example 1:
A piston ring for internal combustion engine, characterized in that the diameter of the
piston ring is 95 mm. If the reference document disclosed a piston ring of 70-105 mm
in diameter used in internal combustion engine, it does not take away the novelty of the
said claim.
Example 2:
An ethylene-propylene copolymer, characterized in that the polymerization degree is
100-200. If the reference document disclosed an ethylene-propylene copolymer in which
the polymerization degree is 50-400, it does not take away the novelty of the said
claim.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
Generally, Inventiveness of invention means that, as compared with the existing technology
before the date of filing, the invention has prominent substantive features and represents
notable progress.
Because a selection invention is as just a sub-solution/preferable solution/particular solution
as stated above, so the assessment of selection inventions is relatively simple.
In assessment of the inventiveness of selection invention, the main factor to be considered is
whether the selection can bring about unexpected technical effect.
If a selection invention produces unexpected technical effect, the invention has prominent
substantive features and represents notable progress, and thus involves inventiveness.
Example: in a prior art document disclosing the production of thiochloroformic acid, the
proportion of catalytic agent of carboxylic acid amide and/or urea to 1 mol raw material
mercaptan is more than 0 and less than or equal to 100 % (mol). In the given example, the
amount of the catalytic agent is 2% (mol)-13% (mol), and it is indicated that the productivity
starts to increase from 2 mol% of the amount of catalytic agent. Moreover, the skilled person
generally turns to increase the amount of catalytic agent in order to improve productivity.
In the selection invention concerning a process for producing thiochloroformic acid, less
amount of catalytic agent is used (0.02%(mol)-0.2% (mol)), but the productivity is increased
by 11.6%-35.7%, greatly exceeding the expected productivity, and moreover, the processing
of reactant is also simplified. All of these show that the technical solution selected by the
selection invention has produced unexpected technical effects and thus the selection invention
involves inventiveness.
In the judgement of inventiveness of a selection invention, if experimental data used to back
up the inventiveness is needed, the data should be given in the original filing documents.
The experimental data submitted after initial patent filing maybe admitted and helpful for the
examination on this selection invention, for example in the case of overcoming a prejudice,
but they wouldn’t be adopted into the patent documents to be published.
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4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
The description of selection inventions should be clear, completed and enablement according
to explanations on the requirement of description of application for invention in the Guidelines
for Examination.
The contents of the description of selection invention shall be clear, and specifically shall
disclose the technical problem the invention aims to solve and the technical solution adopted
to solve the problem; and state, with reference to the background art, the unexpected effect
or new use of the selection invention. The said technical problem, technical solution and
unexpected effect or new use shall be adapted to one another and free of contradiction or
irrelevancy.
A complete description of selection invention shall include all the technical contents which are
necessary for understanding and carrying out the invention, as follows:
(1) the contents that are needed for determining whether or not the invention possesses
novelty, inventive step and practical applicability, such as the technical problem to be
solved by the invention, the technical solution adopted to solve the problem, and the
advantageous effects of the invention; and
(2) the contents that are needed for carrying out the invention, such as the mode for carrying
out the technical solution adopted to solve the technical problem of the invention.
For a selection invention that overcomes a prejudice, the description shall explain why the
invention is said to have overcome the prejudice, the difference between the new technical
solution and the prejudice, and the technical means adopted to overcome the prejudice.
The description shall enable a person skilled in the art to carry out the invention. It means
that the person skilled in the art can, in accordance with the contents of the description, carry
out the technical solution of the invention, solve the technical problem, and achieve said
unexpected technical effect.
The description shall clearly set forth the technical solution of invention, describe in detail
the specific modes for carrying out the invention, and entirely disclose the technical contents
necessary for understanding and carrying out the invention, to such an extent that a person
skilled in the art can carry out the invention. If the examiner can reasonably doubt that the
invention does not meet the requirement of sufficient disclosure, he will invite the applicant to
make a clarification.
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The following are examples of the circumstances in which the technical solution described in
the description is regarded as unable to be carried out due to lack of technical means to solve
the technical problem and achieve the expected technical effects:
(1) The description sets forth a technical means, but the means is so ambiguous and vague
that a person skilled in the art cannot concretely implement it according to the contents
of the description;
(2) The description sets forth a technical means, but a person skilled in the art cannot solve
the technical problem of the invention and achieve said unexpected technical effects by
adopting the said means;
(3) The subject matter of an application is a technical solution consisting of several technical
means, but one of the means cannot be implemented by a person skilled in the art
according to the contents of the description; and
(4) The description sets forth a concrete technical solution but without experimental evidence,
while the solution can only be established upon confirmation by experimental result.
For example, in general, the invention of a new use for a known compound requires
experimental evidence in the description to validate the new use and effects thereof;
otherwise, the requirement of enablement can not be met.
(5) The technical solution sought to be protected including multiple possibilities, but one or
more of them cannot be implemented or cannot achieve said unexpected effect,
Therefore, there is an absolute requirement that all of the selected class in a selection
invention possess the relevant unexpected effect or advantage effect. And it is obvious that
the experimental data which supports a selection achieving the said expected technical
effects should be given in the original description of the selection invention. Otherwise, the
application for patent for a selection invention will be rejected due to uncompleted and/
or non-enablement. In some cases, in which the examiner ask for such experimental data
in Office Action and there are no any doubt on it, for example in the case of overcoming a
prejudice, the experimental data submitting after the filing day may be accepted and helpful
for the grant of patent for the selection invention, but they wouldn’t be adopted into the patent
documents to be published.
With regard to the claims of selection inventions, it can be as reasonably broad as it can
be supported by a number of examples in the description, if only there is no doubt that the
person skilled in the art can not, in accordance with the contents of the description, carry out
the technical solution of the invention, solve the technical problem, and achieve the expected
technical effects.
The claim of selection invention shall be based on the description, and shall define clearly
and concisely the scope for which protection is sought in terms of the technical features of
the invention. If a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, it would suffice to claim
a particular range or selection of components which have been found to be associated
with such a new utility, when the description gives the clear statement in relative modes or
embodiments. It is not necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims although it may be
allowed.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
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the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
About scope of protection and Infringement of selection inventions, the following is our
comments.
As shown in figure 2, because a selection invention is just as a sub-solution, particular solution,
or preferable solution, so the scope of protection for selection invention is within the scope of
solution of the prior art.
Using the claim-analyzing method of features-congregating, figure 2 shows a example of
protection scopes of technical solution of prior art and those of related selection invention. In
this example, the technical solution of the prior art has the feature A and feature B, and the
selection invention is made by choosing a known possibility b among the known possibilities
of feature B. As shown in figure 2, the protection scope of the technical solution of the prior
art is the overlapped region (A+B) of the region A (extension of feature A) and the region B
(extension of feature B), the protection scope of the selection invention (A+b) is the overlapped
region of the region A (extension of feature A) and the region b (extension of feature b). Since
the feature b is selected from the known possibilities of feature B, the region b is within the
region B, and the scope of protection for the selection invention (A+b) is certainly fallen into
the scope of protection for the prior art (A+B).
Therefore, the selection invention is dependent with the prior art. If there is a patent granted
for the said prior art, the patent makes limitation on the implementation of the related selection
inventions. That means the implementation of the selection invention infringes the patent
granted for the said prior art.
On the other hand, if a patent is also granted for the selection invention, it also makes
limitation on the implementation of the prior art. That means any one including the patentee
of the prior art, can not implement the sub-solution, particular solution or preferable solution
defined by the selection invention.
Furthermore, if a third part implement the sub-solution, particular solution or preferable
solution defined by the selection invention, it infringes both the patent of the prior art and the
patent of the selection invention.
In China, the court uses the principal of all feature-covering to judge infringement. If an
implementation (a product, a method or an application) contains all of the features (in claim)
of an invention, an infringement is established. Otherwise, no infringement is established if
an implementation (a product, a method or an application) don’t contain all of the features
(in claim) of an invention. There is no special treatment for selection invention on judgement
of infringement as I know. That means said principal is also adapted on judgement of
infringement of selection inventions.
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Therefore, a certain advantage or superior result doesn’t have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established although such advantage
or superior results are the reasons for the grant of a patent on a selection invention. That
means that the advantage or superior result is not necessary for judgement of infringement
of selection inventions. However, logically, an implementation (a product, a method or an
application) that contains all features of a selection invention does possess those advantages
or superior results that are the reasons for the grant of a patent on a selection invention,
unless the selection invention is counterfeited.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, the requirements to establish infringement
should be come from those for the patent type of applying or use invention. When a product
made by a manufacturer is obvious to the claimed new use, or has specification or indication
for the claimed new use, or actually be used for the claimed new use and make loss of
the patentee of the selection invention, the manufacturer infringes the patent. Therefore, the
intention of manufacturer (alleged infringer) plays an important role of the fact of infringement,
which is certainly also a role in the determination of infringement.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
Selection inventions usually occur in the technical fields of chemical, pharmaceutical and
material science. Nowadays, patentability and infringement about selection inventions
become more and more important in pharmaceutical industry. However there is no policy
that lies behind the law in China as I know. And there is not much research on this issue. So
the discussion/research on this Title organized by AIPPI is timely and helpful.
With Reference to the Examples
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The following is our opinion on novelty of the invention by selecting specific compounds,
which is provided by Mrs. Xiaoyin Wu and translated into English.
the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of radicals anticipate
doesn’t take away novelty of the invention by selecting a specific compound having a
particular radical, or group of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals.
In the analysis of novelty, it doesn’t matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of
compounds is. But it may be a role in the analysis of inventiveness.
Please also refer to the answer of Q2.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
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property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
In example 2, the scenario (i) and scenario (ii) don’t constitute an inventiveness over the prior
art in China. However, the scenario (iii) may constitute an inventiveness over the prior art in
China.
The following is our suggested claim that may be granted:
Claim 1: A chemical compound, its structure include a substituent group designated “R”, said
substituent “R” is defined so as to embrace a generic class of broadly-defined functional
groups such as all alkyl or aryl radicals, either unsubstituted or substituted by a halogen
and/or a hydroxyl group, characterized in that said compound consists of the selection of a
particular radical or particular group of radicals from amongst the generic class.
With reference to the answers to Q1 and Q5, the claim 1 protect a product, a chemical
compound, with said structure and particular radical or particular group of radicals. The
advantageous property of the chemical compound is stated in the description but not in the
claim 1. And logically, a same product (with said structure and particular radical or particular
group of radicals) does possess the advantageous property stated in the description. Any one
who manufactures this product does infringe the patent of product, no matter whether the
product is used for the advantageous property (as an adhesive).
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
The description of selection inventions should be clear, completed and enablement according
to explanations on the requirement of description of application for invention in the Guidelines
for Examination.
The contents of the description of selection invention shall be clear, and specifically shall
disclose the technical problem the invention aims to solve and the technical solution adopted
to solve the problem; and state, with reference to the background art, the unexpected effect
or new use of the selection invention. The said technical problem, technical solution and
unexpected effect or new use shall be adapted to one another and free of contradiction or
irrelevancy.
A complete description of selection invention shall include all the technical contents which are
necessary for understanding and carrying out the invention, as follows:
(1) the contents that are needed for determining whether or not the invention possesses
novelty, inventive step and practical applicability, such as the technical problem to be
solved by the invention, the technical solution adopted to solve the problem, and the
advantageous effects of the invention; and
(2) the contents that are needed for carrying out the invention, such as the mode for carrying
out the technical solution adopted to solve the technical problem of the invention.
For a selection invention that overcomes a prejudice, the description shall explain why the
invention is said to have overcome the prejudice, the difference between the new technical
solution and the prejudice, and the technical means adopted to overcome the prejudice.
The description shall enable a person skilled in the art to carry out the invention. It means
that the person skilled in the art can, in accordance with the contents of the description, carry
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out the technical solution of the invention, solve the technical problem, and achieve said
unexpected technical effect.
The description shall clearly set forth the technical solution of invention, describe in detail
the specific modes for carrying out the invention, and entirely disclose the technical contents
necessary for understanding and carrying out the invention, to such an extent that a person
skilled in the art can carry out the invention. If the examiner can reasonably doubt that the
invention does not meet the requirement of sufficient disclosure, he will invite the applicant to
make a clarification.
The following are examples of the circumstances in which the technical solution described in
the description is regarded as unable to be carried out due to lack of technical means to solve
the technical problem and achieve the expected technical effects:
(1) The description sets forth a technical means, but the means is so ambiguous and vague
that a person skilled in the art cannot concretely implement it according to the contents
of the description;
(2) The description sets forth a technical means, but a person skilled in the art cannot solve
the technical problem of the invention and achieve said unexpected technical effects by
adopting the said means;
(3) The subject matter of an application is a technical solution consisting of several technical
means, but one of the means cannot be implemented by a person skilled in the art
according to the contents of the description; and
(4) The description sets forth a concrete technical solution but without experimental evidence,
while the solution can only be established upon confirmation by experimental result.
For example, in general, the invention of a new use for a known compound requires
experimental evidence in the description to validate the new use and effects thereof;
otherwise, the requirement of enablement can not be met.
(5) The technical solution sought to be protected including multiple possibilities, but one or
more of them cannot be implemented or cannot achieve said unexpected effect,
Therefore, there is an absolute requirement that all of the selected class in a selection
invention possess the relevant unexpected effect or advantage effect. And it is obvious that
the experimental data which supports a selection achieving the said expected technical
effects should be given in the original description of the selection invention. Otherwise, the
application for patent for a selection invention will be rejected due to uncompleted and/
or non-enablement. In some cases, in which the examiner ask for such experimental data
in Office Action and there are no any doubt on it, for example in the case of overcoming a
prejudice, the experimental data submitting after the filing day may be accepted and helpful
for the grant of patent for the selection invention, but they wouldn’t be adopted into the patent
documents to be published.
With regard to the claims of selection inventions, it can be as reasonably broad as it can
be supported by a number of examples in the description, if only there is no doubt that the
person skilled in the art can not, in accordance with the contents of the description, carry out
the technical solution of the invention, solve the technical problem, and achieve the expected
technical effects.
The claim of selection invention shall be based on the description, and shall define clearly
and concisely the scope for which protection is sought in terms of the technical features of
the invention. If a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, it would suffice to claim
a particular range or selection of components which have been found to be associated
with such a new utility, when the description gives the clear statement in relative modes or
embodiments. It is not necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims although it may be
allowed.
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10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
In example 3, if the chemical compound is claimed as used as adhesive, when the same
product (with said structure and particular radical) made by a manufacturer is obvious for
use as an adhesive, or has specification or indication for the use of adhesive, or actually be
used as adhesive and make loss of the patentee of the selection invention, the manufacturer
infringes the patent. Therefore, the intention of manufacturer (alleged infringer) plays an
important role of the fact of infringement, which is certainly also a role in the determination
of infringement.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Generally, no matter how much effort the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in
order to found a valid selection patent in the present Chinese patent law system. It is difficult
to assess and make thing complex. Furthermore, there is no any barrier to granting patents
for selection inventions in the system.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
The definition, type, novelty, inventiveness should be the harmonised standards for the
patentability of selection inventions.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
N/A
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
The judgement of non-selection invention that looks like infringing the patent of prior art
discussed in Q10 above. Refers to the “special case in pharmaceutical” in the paper titled
“Patentability and Infringement of Selection Inventions”.
Note:
The above opinions about selection inventions and relative explanation and explication to Articles,
Rules, Provisions, Descriptions and Examples in the Chinese legal documentations are only come
from the author’s knowledge and experiences, and relative understanding to those in said Chinese
legal documentations. They should be only as reference if there is any official text and document
related to selection inventions.
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Czech Republic
République Tchèque
Tschechische Republik
Report Q209
in the name of the Czech Group
by Petra Korejzová
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
Inventions based on special selection of certain working conditions from the known scope
that brings unexpected effects or qualities of the resulting product are considered to fulfill the
conditions of inventive step. Any other examples of selection inventions are not available.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
Merely carving a range out of a broad prior art disclosure is not sufficient. Acceptable solutions
must fulfill the longtime expected solutions of an old problem by solving the disadvantages of
the prior art that for a long time have discouraged from further research.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements
it cannot be submitted after initial patent filing. Hence, there are not any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data.
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4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
With respect to item (1) there is an absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess
the relevant advantage. With respect to item (4) it would be necessary to recite a new utility
in the claims.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
An advantage or superior results which were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention have to be implicitly or explicitly utilized by a third party for an infringement
to be established. The manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use does
not infringe the patent. The intention of an alleged infringer does not play any role in the
determination of infringement.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
In our jurisdictions there are not any particular conditions or stipulations on selection inventions.
A selection invention must always fulfill the conditions given by the law.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
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possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The selection invention has to disclose compounds, which must have a new, advantageous
property not possessed by the prior art examples specifically disclosed either from 1,000,000
possible compounds or only 10 compounds.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
If a selection invention contains the resulting compounds described as having advantageous
properties that constitute an inventive step over the prior art the inventor should be able to
obtain protection for the products per se.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
All of the selected class should possess the relevant advantage.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Even if the infringer supplies the product with no instructions as to its use the infringement will
be found.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
The considerations as mentioned in Q11 are not relevant.
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Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
The harmonised standards for the patentability should be based above all on the legal
conditions for an invention. That means the conditions of patentability, i.e. the novelty and the
inventive step or non-obviousness
Summary
The Czech National Group has taken the following standpoint to the principal issues raised in the
Question Q 209:
As regards the novelty of selection inventions the acceptable solutions must fulfil the conditions of
novelty laid down by the Law. The proof backing up the inventive step or non-obviousness is to
be submitted by the initial patent filing and there are not any prerequisites or limitations on the
late submission of experimental data. With regard to the written description there is an absolute
requirement that all examples possess the relevant advantage. According to our jurisdiction if
novelty has been confirmed for the particular selection that the inventor has made a patent for that
selection will only be valid if the selection is non-obvious or inventive.
In principle it is set down that the selection inventions are no different in terms of their patentability
from the regular inventions.
Résumé
Le groupe tchèque de l’AIPPI a adopté l’attitude suivante en relation aux issues principales de la
question Q209.
En ce qui concerne la nouveauté de l’invention, il faut que la solution acceptable remplisse les
conditions de nouveauté statuées par la loi. La preuve de l’activité inventive ou de la non-évidence
doit être démontrée par la demande de brevet originale; aucunes conditions rigoureuses ou
limitations n’existent pour la présentation postérieure des données expérimentales. Quant à la
description en écrit, il y a une requête absolue que tous les exemples contiennent la caractéristique
correspondante. Selon la jurisprudence tchèque, dans le cas que la nouveauté a été confirmée pour
la sélection particulière et qu’on a accordé à l’inventeur un brevet pour cette sélection particulière,
ce fait va être considéré comme valable quand la sélection en question n´est pas évidente et remplit
le critère de l´activité inventive.
Il faut constater qu’en principe les inventions de sélection ne diffèrent pas des inventions habitueles
quant aux conditions de leur brevetabilité.
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Zusammenfassung
Die tschechische Landesgruppe der AIPPI hat den nachstehenden Standpunkt zu den Hauptprinzipien
der Frage Q209 angenommen.
Was die Neuheit der Auswahlerfindungen betrifft, die annehmbare Lösung muss die durch das
Gesetz festgelegte Neuheitsbedingungen erfüllen. Den Nachweis der erfinderischen Tätigkeit
oder der Nichtoffenbarkeit soll die ursprüngliche Patentanmeldung enthalten; es existieren keine
strenge Forderungen oder Begrenzungen betreffend die nachträgliche Vorlegung der Experimentalangaben..
Mit Rücksicht auf die schriftliche Beschreibung gibt es eine absolute Bedingung, dass
alle Beispiele die entsprechende Charakteristik der Erfindung enthalten müssen. Gemäss der
tschechischen Rechtssprechung im Falle, wenn man die Neuheit der bestimmten Selektion, für
welche dem Erfinder das Patent erteilt wurde, bestätigt hat, wird diese Tatsache gelten und zwar
unter der Bedingung, dass die Selektion das Charakter der erfinderischen Tätigkeit aufweist und
nicht als offenbar betrachtet ist.
Soweit es sich um die Patentfähigkeisbedingungen handelt, weichen die Auswahlerfindungen im
Prinzip von den gewöhnlichen Erfindungen nicht ab.
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Denmark
Danemark
Dänemark
Report Q209
in the name of the Danish Group
by Ulla Callesen KLINGE, Torsten NØRGAARD, Holm SCHWARZE and Ejvind CHRISTIANSEN
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
The Danish Patents Act does not provide for selection inventions as a specific class or concept
of inventions; consequently the general criteria for patentability also apply to selection
inventions as defined herein. Nevertheless, the guidelines for examination by the Danish
Patent and Trademark Office define selection inventions as inventions that deal with the
selection of individual elements, subsets, or sub-ranges, which have not been explicitly
mentioned, within a larger known set or range. This definition and the specific guidelines for
substantive examination of selection inventions by the Danish Patent and Trademark Office
are identical to the corresponding Guidelines for the Examination in the EPO (in the following
“Guidelines”). Even though the authors are not aware of any specific Danish case law related
to selection inventions within technical fields other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material
science fields, the above definition does not make any reference to any specific technical field,
and inventions that may be termed selection inventions are conceivable in all technical fields.
Furthermore, the EPO Boards of Appeal have indeed applied the tests available for selection
inventions to other technical fields, e.g. to the issue of inventive step in relation to the length
of a freight container (T 1215/02), or the question of novelty of a given relationship between
the paced rate of a pacer and a corresponding sensor output (T 526/98, r. 5.2-5.9).
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
For selection inventions, the novelty requirements are the same as for other inventions.
Novelty is specifically dealt with in Guidelines, Section C.IV. Thus subject matter derivable
directly and unambiguously from a prior art document including any features implicit to a
person skilled in the pertinent art is not novel (“explicit disclosure”) Also, if in carrying out
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the teaching of a prior art document, the skilled person would inevitably arrive at a result
falling within the terms of the claim, the invention is not novel (“implicit disclosure”) Novelty of
selection inventions is dealt with more specifically in C.IV.9.8.
(i)
Decisive is whether the selected elements are disclosed in an individual form in the
prior art (T 12/81). If a selection from two or more lists has to be made in order to
arrive at a specific combination or features then the resulting combination of features,
not specifically disclosed in the prior art, confers novelty (the “two-lists” principle). This
principle has been followed in a great number of later decisions and has recently also
been accepted by the Danish High Court (“atorvastatin”). Said decision is presently
under appeal with the Danish Supreme Court.
(ii) A sub-range selected from a broader numerical range of the prior art is considered
novel, if each of the following three criteria is satisfied (T 198/84, T 279/89):
(A) The selected sub-range is narrow compared to the known range;
(B) The selected sub-range is sufficiently far removed from any specific examples
disclosed in the prior art and from the end-points of the known range;
(C) The selected range is not an arbitrary specimen of the prior art; i.e. not a mere
embodiment of the prior art, but another invention (purposive selection, new technical
teaching).
An effect occurring only in the claimed sub-range cannot in itself confer novelty on that subrange.
However, such a technical effect occurring in the selected sub-range, but not in the
whole of the known range, can confirm that criterion c) is met, i.e. that the invention is novel
and not merely a specimen of the prior art. The meaning of “narrow” and “sufficiently far
removed” has to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The new technical effect occurring
within the selected range may also be the same effect as that attained with the broader
known range, but to a greater extent.
(III) In the case of overlapping ranges, the same principles apply for the assessment of
novelty as in other cases, e.g. selection inventions (T 666/89). It has to be decided which
subject-matter has been made available to the public by the whole content of a prior
art disclosure. As to overlapping ranges of physical parameters, novelty is destroyed by
an explicitly mentioned end-point of the known range, explicitly mentioned intermediate
values or a specific example of the prior art in the overlap. It must also be considered
whether the skilled person would seriously contemplate applying the technical teaching
of the prior art document in the range of overlap. The criteria mentioned in (ii) above
can be applied analogously for assessing the novelty of overlapping numerical ranges (T
17/85). As far as overlapping chemical formulae are concerned, novelty is acknowledged
if the claimed subject-matter is distinguished from the prior art in the range of overlap by
a new technical element (new technical teaching), (T 12/90), e.g. a specifically selected
chemical residue which is covered in general terms by the prior art in the overlapping
area, but which is not individualised in the prior art document. If this is not the case, then
it must be considered whether the skilled person would seriously contemplate working
in the range of overlap and/or would accept that the area of overlap is directly and
unambiguously disclosed in an implicit manner in the prior art (T 536/95). If the answer
is yes, then novelty is lacking.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
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For a selection invention, the inventive step requirements are the same as for other inventions.
Inventive step is specifically dealt with in Guidelines C IV, 11, and selection inventions are
specifically dealt with in section C IV, 11.11. If the selection is connected to a particular
technical effect, and if no hints exists leading the skilled person to the selection, then an
inventive step is accepted (this technical effect occurring within the selected range may
also be the same effect as attained with the broader known range, but to an unexpected
degree). If the skilled person would not have made the selection or would not have chosen the
overlapping range in the hope of solving the underlying technical problem or in expectation
of some improvement or advantage, then the claimed matter involves an inventive step. As
for other inventions, experimental data which are used to back up the inventive step can be
submitted after initial patent filing. It is a prerequisite for such late filings that the later filed
data supports statements made in the initial patent specification or are related to statements
made therein.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
In principle an invention is sufficiently disclosed if at least one way is clearly indicated
enabling the person skilled in the art to carry out the invention. However, this is only
the case if it allows the invention to be performed in the whole range claimed rather
than only in some members of the claimed class. Usually several embodiments will thus
be required to be shown to possess the stated effects or advantages. Said principle
applies also to selection inventions. There is no absolute requirement that the stated
effects are possessed by each and every embodiment ( T 292/85), and thus a single of
few embodiments may fall short. The limit for “failing” embodiments will be established
on a case by case basis, with due regard to the pertinence of the prior art.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
Experimental data may be post-filed provided, however, that the data support an effect
already disclosed in the application as filed, or clearly related to the disclosed effect, see
answer to sub-question 3
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
The requirement for sufficiency must be satisfied in the application as filed. Thus it is not
allowed to add the disclosure of a “new” effect not disclosed either explicitly or implicitly
in the application as filed. However, an effect not disclosed in the application as filed
may be acceptable, if said effect is derivable from or is related to the originally disclosed
effect. For instance in relation to a new medicament the evidence for a reduced toxicity,
although not disclosed in the application as filed, may nonetheless be accepted as data
supporting the patentability since toxicity is related to the development of a medicament.
In the above mentioned atorvastatin case , improved handling properties were deemed
to be sufficiently related to an originally disclosed pharmacological effect, both by the
EPO (T 229/97) and the Danish High Court, the decision being under appeal with the
Danish Supreme Court.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
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please see above under sub-question 1). If a new utility, i.e. a new technical effect, is
asserted as a selection invention, said effect does not have to be stated in the claims.
Thus if a limited number of compounds – not disclosed specifically in the prior art - from a
general disclosure has been shown to possess a novel technical effect, said compounds
may be claimed as such.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
For a selection invention also the requirements for sufficiency and/or written description are
no different than for other inventions and follow the principles adopted by the European
Patent Office. Please note, however, that the question of sufficiency has – as far as the Danish
Group is aware - not been dealt with in validity proceedings before the Danish courts and
thus no case law addressing this issue exists.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
The starting point for evaluation of infringement is always the claims. If there is not a literal
infringement of the claims, infringement “by equivalence” would probably presuppose that
the advantage or superior result was achieved in order for infringement to be found.
It is questionable whether a “new use” can always be regarded as a selection invention.
Anyway, infringement of any “new use” patent probably presupposes that the “new use” is
utilized by the infringer or at least actively induced. In one recent case (“fexofenadine”) a
generic company was ordered by the Bailiff’s court to delete certain paragraphs relating to
the patented new use from the package insert. A confirmatory action is pending.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
There is no “law” on selection inventions in Denmark and therefore no “policy”. Selection
inventions shall be evaluated on their merits under the normal patentability criteria, as
explained above with reference to the Guidelines.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
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would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The novelty in the Example 1 situation should be decided as stated under question 2 ) i.e.
if there is no implicit disclosure and if appropriate the “two-list” principle applies there is
novelty for the compound or group, in principle independently of the width of the prior
disclosure. Only the definition of “R” is of importance. However, all,things aside novelty of
a selection invention will be easier to establish from a very broad generic class than from a
narrow generic class.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
Reference is made to the Annex to Chapter IV, part C, of the Guidelines. In Example 2 in the
Working Guidelines, possibility iii) will constitute an inventive step over the prior art, whereas
possibilities i) and ii) will probably not. The scope of protection obtainable would be product
protection. If the compound is a medicament, also protection for the 1st and 2nd medical use
is obtainable.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
The requirement is that the experimental evidence allows the invention to be performed in the
whole range claimed rather than only in some members of the claimed class. Usually several
embodiments will thus be required to be shown to possess the stated effects or advantages.
There is no absolute requirement that the stated effects are possessed by each and every
embodiment, and thus a single or few embodiments may fall short. The limit will be established
on a case by case basis depending on the pertinent prior art.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Again, the starting point is the terms of the claims. It is unlikely that the alleged infringer would
market the product without knowledge of the advantageous property, but some kind of active
inducement would probably be required in order to establish infringement. The issue relates
to the concept of contributory infringement, and reference is therefore made to the Danish
group report on Q204.
If a similar product was by chance on the market prior to the priority date of the patent
(without being novelty destroying), marketing could continue absent any inducement to utilize
the “new use”.
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11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Since there is no “special policy” underlying patentability of selection inventions, no special
rules apply (or should apply).
Generally speaking, the efforts of the inventor are seldom relevant to scope of protection and
to an infringement but might in rare cases be used as a “secondary consideration” in support
of inventive step in all kinds of inventions.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
Generally, the Danish group is of the opinion that there should be no fundamental difference
between the criteria for patentability of selection inventions and the corresponding criteria for
any other type of invention. Consequently, the normal criteria for patentability should apply
also to selection inventions. Nevertheless, certain tests that aid the examination of a patent
application or patent as regards these criteria are considered useful. In particular, the Danish
group considers the tests for patentability discussed in the above items, ia. with reference to
the Guidelines, as being suitable.
Summary
The Danish Patents Act does not provide for selection inventions as a specific class or concept of
inventions; consequently the general criteria for novelty, inventive step and sufficiency of disclosure
also apply to selection inventions. The specific criteria for patentability and sufficiency of disclosure
applied by the Danish authorities are very much aligned with the criteria applied by the EPO as
defined in the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO. Similarly, the question of infringement is
generally dealt with as for other inventions, i.e. the starting point for evaluation of infringement is
always the claims. If there is not a literal infringement of the claims, infringement “by equivalence”
would probably presuppose that the advantage or superior result was achieved in order for
infringement to be found.
Résumé
L’acte danois sur les brevets d’invention ne porte pas sur les inventions de sélection comme classe
spécifique ou notion d’inventions; en conséquence les critères généraux de nouveauté, d’activité
inventive et de divulgation suffisante s’appliquent aussi aux inventions de sélection. Les critères
spécifiques de brevetabilité et suffisance de divulgation appliqués par les autorités danoises
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sont très alignées aux critères appliqués par l’OEB comme définis dans les directives relatives à
l’Examen pratiqué à l’OEB. De même, la question de contrefaçon est généralement traitée comme
celle d’autres inventions, c’est-à-dire que le point de départ de l’évaluation de contrefaçon se
base toujours sur les revendications. Dans le cas où il n’y a pas de contrefaçon littérale des
revendications, la contrefaçon « par équivalence » supposerait probablement que l’avantage ou le
résultat supérieur soit accompli afin de pouvoir démontrer la contrefaçon.
Zusammenfassung
Das dänische Patentgesetz enthält keine Vorschriften über Auswahlerfindungen als besondere Klasse
oder Begriff von Erfindungen; folglich finden die allgemeinen Kriterien für Neuheit, Erfinderisch
Tätigkeit und Offenbarung auch auf Auswahlerfindungen Anwendung. Die einzelnen von den
dänischen Behörden angewandten Kriterien für die Erfüllung der Patentierungsvoraussetzungen und
vollständigen Offenbarung stimmen weitestgehend mit den entsprechenden beim EPA angewandten
Kriterien überein, wie sie in den Richtlinien für die Prüfung im EPA definiert sind. Entsprechend
wird die Frage der Patentverletzung ebenfalls so wie bei anderen Erfindungstypen behandelt, d.h.
der Ausgangspunkt für die Untersuchung von Verletzungsfragen sind immer die Patentansprüche.
Wenn keine wortsinngemässe Verletzung der Patentansprüche vorliegt, würde eine „äquivalente“
Patentverletzung wahrscheinlich voraussetzen, dass der Vorteil oder die verbesserten Resultate
tatsächlich erzielt wurden, damit eine Verletzung vorliegt.
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Ecuador
Equateur
Ecuador
Report Q209
in the name of the Ecuadorian Group
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction?
There is no patentability prohibition or exception for Selection Inventions within our Andean
Community legislation; hence, they might get protection in any field covered by the application
(pharmaceutical, mechanical, etc.).
The Andean Patent Manual recognizes Selection Inventions related to the chemical field, in
regards with the application of specific ranges and parameters defining a process. There is
no other reference to Selection Inventions in other fields.
Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a field other than chemical, pharmaceutical
or material science fields?
No examples of Selection Inventions, other than those in the mentioned fields, have been
disclosed.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
According with the general rule on novelty, there should not be identical rules priory disclosed;
therefore, pre-existence of similar documents does not affect this patentability requisite.
For the subject matter we should consider that general disclosure does not destroy novelty of
a particular element falling within this expression, but a specific element does destroy novelty
of a general claim including it.
According with the Andean Manual of Patents, if a formula has a list of specific substituents, the
selection of one of the possibilities when there is only one list of alternatives for a substituent,
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is considered lacking of novelty. However, if a selection is made from two or more lists of
substituents to achieve the goal of the claim, in such a case, this does achieve with the novelty
requisite.
For example, in the case of Markush formulas overlapping them; that is to say, if there is a
sub-group of compounds common to both of them, but prior art does not describe any specific
compound in this sub-group, novelty is objected because compounds claimed are within prior
art and does not show any new technical effect.
Advantages are not related with the novelty requisite in our legislation.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
The requisites of a patent application, state that all data necessary for the understanding
of the scope of the patent, should be included. However, is considered the possibility that
inventive step (usually in face of an objection made by the Examiner), be demonstrated by
two means:
• experimental data
• arguments
In the praxis, experimental or comparative data is indispensable to demonstrate inventive
level of an application, due to strict criteria of the Ecuadorian Patent Office.
Due to the above, there are no pre-requisites or limitations regarding late remittal of data
data.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short?
If it is a novel Markush formula, inventive level lies in the fact that all compounds of the subgroup
show an effect or technical property non-described in the prior art and, furthermore,
that this effect be unexpected (better result or different result to that of prior art). It is also
necessary that all compounds within the formula, show inventive level. In short, if inventive
level is grounded on a technical effect, all possible compounds of the Markush formula,
should show similar inventive level.
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Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would
it suffice to claim a particular range or selection of components which have been found to
be associated with such a new utility or would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in
the claims?
Inventive level requisite is not fulfilled if it is demonstrated that a technical effect is not shown
in a part of the claim (i.e. a kind of substituent that makes the compound insoluble or toxic
because it is instable). In such a case, there would not be inventive level in the whole of the
compounds of the Markush formula; therefore, it is recommended that applicant restrain to
those compounds showing activity.
If the new utility is related to the technical effect, then, it is necessary to specify such utility
within the claims.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
Protection falls over the subject covered by the patent granted; therefore, the advantage
or superior result shall be implicit or explicitly used by a third party to establish an
infringement.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
There is a patentability exception within our legislation for new and second uses; therefore,
in general, these kinds of applications are not granted.
In the other hand, uses individually considered (Swiss Type) are not subject of protection, due
to the argument that only products or procedures can be protected.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
The policy of the Patent Office lies on objecting these applications, arguing they refer to an
excessive number of possibilities; hence, is hard for the Examiner to analyze such ample
scope of options. That is way, it is usually recommended to limit breadth of the protection,
especially to those compounds of the group showing novelty and inventive level.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group of
specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction?
In example 1, prior disclosure of a generic class of radical would not anticipate the presence
of specific compounds; or groups of specific compounds.
By the contrary, a particular expression does destroy novelty of a general compound.
If the specific compounds have substituents listed and there is only one list of possibilities
of substitution, this invention lacks of novelty. However, if there are two or more lists of
substituents, this requisite is fulfilled.
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In the analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is –
i.e. would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The analysis of compounds existent as from a general formula is different, because it is not
only verified the presence or non-presence of a substituent in particular but the influence of
this substituent in the obtainment of the solution to the problem proposed.
As we mentioned, a too wide list of possibilities imply objections from the Patent Office;
hence, it is recommendable limiting the claims to compounds or groups of compounds, which
do achieve with patentability requisites.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain?
The scope of protection might be obtained for the specific compound as well as for the
product obtained from it.
Should the inventor be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have
this advantageous property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use
of the products for the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not
obvious over the prior art?
Protection is limited to the use of the product in connection with the advantageous property.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess the
requisite advantage in your jurisdiction?
If it is a novel Markush formula, inventive level lies on the fact that all compounds of the
sub-group show an effect or technical property non-described in the prior art, and that this
effect be unexpected (better result or result different to the prior art). In the other hand, it is a
requirement that all compounds within the formula show inventive level.
Is there an absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage,
or is the patentee excused if one or two examples fall short?
If a part of the claim has no technical effect, there is no inventive level in the whole of
compounds of the Markush formula.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Protection falls over the subject covered by the patent granted in connection with the unexpected
technical effect; there are no quantitative parameters in our legislation to determine the level
of protection or intention of the infringer to violate the rights of third parties.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
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grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection?
For the effects of the protection of a patent in general and mainly of a selection, our legislation
does not consider the time and effort invested by the inventor. It is important that the application
fulfill with the conditions regarding novelty and inventive level, above stated.
On the other hand, it could be argued that such considerations may have been relevant in an
age when the inventor’s efforts actually involved many man-years of careful and painstaking
laboratory work, but are now increasingly irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis
when large varieties of different compounds can be manufactured in a fraction of the time.
Are such considerations relevant?
Actually, these considerations are not relevant. They would be relevant if present patent
system in Ecuador and within the Andean Community (CAN) were changed, as protection
would be granted to the effort of the inventor -independently from the result- that differs from
the actual regime.
Due to the regulative tradition of the countries members of the CAN, and mainly due to
political conditions of Ecuador, protection to the effort of the inventor is little probable.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
Regulations applicable in Ecuador and in the Andean sub-region, do not consider express
regulations regarding to selection inventions. The only parameter on this regard is the
Andean Manual of Patents, which refer to standards for the analysis and interpretation of
the examiners of patent application in the CAN, which contains very restrictive criteria over
patentability of selection inventions.
The standards to be harmonized might be the number of compounds of the sub-groups.
Shall all be novel and inventive? Or is there an open possibility for one or several of them
do not fulfill with this requisites, under the condition they contribute to the better final result
(unexpected effect) ado) of the other compounds?
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
The possibility that patentability of selection inventions were expressly included within
regulative wording could also be analyzed. This, because in Andean Community countries
there is too much room left for the discretion of examiners, who, in general, are against the
patentability of these kinds of applications.
A similar situation is faced with polymorphs, which are not protected despite they are not
within any patentability prohibition nor exception.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
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Estonia
Estonie
Estland
Report Q209
in the name of the Estonian Group
by Margus SARAP
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
There are no list of the specific types of the invention which are recognized under the concept
of selection invention. The invention must be novel, have an inventive step and industrially
usable.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
It is not sufficient to carve a range out of a broad prior art disclosure. It is necessary to show
different advantage or different use. It is possible to protect the novel use of the invention
which is not described in the prior art.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
The subject matter of the invention must be disclosed in the patent application on the filing
date of the patent application. If the experimental data is submitted in the later stage then
they must not introduce a new matter. If the amendments will include essential features of
the invention which were not included in the description of the invention, drawings or other
illustrative material on the filing date of the patent application the Patent Office may refuse the
amendments. However there are neither specific examples to give nor the appeal decisions
to comment.
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4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
The specification of the invention must contain all essential features on the filing date of
the patent application. However there is possibility to amend the specification before the
publication of the patent application.
After the publication of a patent application (18 months from filing or if the priority is claimed
then from the priority date) the applicant cannot make such corrections or amendments which
extend the scope of patent protection.
The scope of the protection applied for in the claims must be supported fully with the description
.i.e. all features in the claims must be discussed in the description and must be supported by
the experimental data if necessary.
As there are no such good practical examples, then it is difficult to bring out which is the
practice in Estonia. Which concerns point 4) then the number of examples must be sufficient
in the extent that proves the advantages of new utility. If one example shows the range or
selection of components in such way that the novelty can be recognised then the one example
is sufficient.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
To establish an infringement the third party must have utilized such an advantage or superior
result, if this is not the case then it is difficult to prove the infringement. However as there are
not court cases therefore it is difficult to foresee the process.
If there is claimed a new use of the product then there is no infringement by manufacturer
of the product who has used the product for differently. However in case if the infringement
proceeding is started the defendant must prove that the product is not used as claimed.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
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The intention of an alleged infringer does play a role in case of right of prior use. For example
if a person who, prior to the filing of a patent application for an invention by another person,
has, in good faith and independently of the applicant, used the same invention for industrial
application in the Republic of Estonia, may continue to use the invention retaining the same
general nature of application. Use is in good faith unless the user knew or should have known
that the filing of a patent application for the invention was intended.
The right of prior use also belongs to a person who has, in good faith, made serious
preparations for the industrial application of an invention in the Republic in Estonia.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
Basically the Estonian Patent Law is based on the suggestion of the harmonisations and
therefore the statements or opinions of the examiners or judges will be relatively close to
European Patent Office or Board of Appeal opinions and decisions.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
There will be problem in examination in first step as the examiner may oppose the prior art
disclosure of generic glass of compounds, however if the invention consists of the selection
of a particular radicals or particular groups of radicals which are not specifically disclosed
in prior art document and new, advantageous properties are described then the novelty will
be recognized.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
The possibility i) constitutes an inventive step over prior art. In all other cases the inventive
step may questioned.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
The extent will be interpreted based on the level of knowledge of a person skilled in the
art at the time of filing the patent application whereas the description, drawings and other
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illustrative material will be used to interpret the extent and wording of patent claims. In
addition the subject matter of the invention, for which patent protection is applied, must be
in words a clear, concise and short manner and presented as a set of essential features of
the invention.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
By reference to example 3 it is difficult to give any suggestions or opinions because there are
no court cases or examples to which refer. Probably it will be difficult to show that there is
infringement because the manufacture/infringer has not given the instructions to compound
use. If the compound is not protected itself and only the use is protected then the potential
infringer may be the person who uses this compound as an adhesive not the manufacturer
of the compound.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
These considerations may be relevant.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
Summary
Problems arising with selection invention are not very remarkable in Estonia because there have,
until now, been no infringement cases discussed in the courts. In addition the Estonian Patent Office
uses the examination guidelines of the European Patent Office as guidance. Therefore it very often
happens that problems arising during examination proceedings before the EPO must also be solved
in relevant examination here. If there are problems with selection invention in the EPO then the
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same problems will probably be in Estonia as well. Very often it is suggested that the same route
be followed through examination.
Résumé
Les problèmes se posant avec l’invention de sélection ne sont pas très remarquables en Estonie
car il y a, jusqu’à présent, eu aucuns cas de contrefaçon d’examinés dans les tribunaux. En outre
l’Office Estonien de Brevets utilise comme guide les directives d’examen de l’Office Européen
de Brevets. C’est pourquoi il arrive souvent que les problèmes se posant durant les procédures
d’examen devant l’OEB doivent être aussi résolus lors de l’examen ici. S’il y a des problèmes avec
l’invention de sélection à l’OEB alors probablement les mêmes problèmes surviendront aussi en
Estonie. Très souvent il est suggéré de suivre la même voie à travers l’examen.
Zusammenfassung
Die im Zusammenhang mit der Auswahlerfindung entstehenden Probleme sind in Estland nicht so
beachtenswert, da bisher keine Verletzungsfälle gerichtlich erörtert worden sind. Darüber hinaus
werden als Anleitung im Estnischen Patentamt die Richtlinien für die Prüfung des Europäischen
Patentamts eingesetzt. Deshalb kommt es sehr oft vor, dass die Probleme, die während des
Prüfungsvorgangs in der EPO entstehen, auch während der Prüfung hier zu lösen sind. Falls es mit
der Auswahlerfindung in der EPO Probleme gibt, dann wird es wahrscheinlich dieselben Probleme
in Estland geben. Sehr oft wird empfohlen, dieselbe Prüfungsroute einzuhalten.
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Finland
Finlande
Finnland
Report Q209
in the name of the Finnish Group
by Karri Leskinen, Saija–Leena Asikainen, Pia Hjelt, Tord Langenskiöld,
Emma Tiainen, Arja Weckman and Niklas Östman
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction?
As a general remark the Finnish AIPPI Group notes that there are neither specific provisions
of law nor established case law on selection inventions in Finland. Therefore, it is not possible
to make any absolute conclusions on their scope.
In Finland there are two types of selection inventions:
1) inventions that are identical to a prior art invention except for at least one feature that
is expressed as a species, while the corresponding feature in the prior art invention is
expressed as a genus, and
2) inventions where certain embodiments are selected from a broader range of numeric
features and which claim a limited numeric range.
According to the Finnish Patents Decree, Section 14, inventions shall relate to one of the
following categories: product, apparatus, process or use. Although a new use of a known
embodiment could be considered in some cases as a selection invention, use claims as such
are not treated as selection inventions in Finland, but as a separate invention category.
However, second medical uses can be considered as exceptions to this rule as they are
selection inventions from first medical uses.
Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a field other than chemical, pharmaceutical
or material science fields?
Selection inventions are not limited to chemical inventions, but there is a limited number of
examples from other fields. Generally it can be said that selection from a broader range of
numeric features can relate to any technical field.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
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disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
In general Finland follows the practice recognized by the EPO. Thus, an individual element
or a sub-set selected from a known set of elements is novel if the selected elements are not
disclosed in an individualized form in the prior art (EPO BOA decision T 12/81) and selection
of a sub-range from a numerical range must fulfill the three requirements disclosed in the EPO
BOA decision T 279/89:
1) the selected sub-range is narrow;
2) the selected sub-range is sufficiently far removed from the preferred embodiments of the
known range; and
3) the selected range is not an arbitrary sub-range of the known range, but another invention,
i.e. the technical effect on the sub-range must be different from the technical effect in the
broad range (purposive selection).
Further, it is said in the guidelines for Examination in the National Board of Patents and
Registration of Finland that a mere selection of equal alternatives is not allowed. However,
it is not absolutely clear whether a different advantage or the same advantage with an
unpredictable improvement is required for a selection invention to be novel or is it only a
question of inventive step.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction.
A different advantage or the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement is required
for a selection invention to be non-obvious. According to the Guidelines for Examination, the
selection should provide a new and surprising effect in order to it be considered to involve
an inventive step.
Further, a selection is may be considered as non-obvious, if person skilled in the art would not
have found the solution by a reasonable amount of routine experimentation.
If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness requirement can
it be submitted after initial patent filing?
Yes.
Are there any prerequisites or limitations on the late submission of data?
No.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
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With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
1) In general, the Finnish Patents Act section 8 discloses that the description shall be
sufficiently clear to enable a person skilled in the art, with the guidance thereof, to carry
out the invention. It is not an absolute requirement that all members of the class selected
by the patentee should possess the requisite advantage. Thus, the patentee is excused if
one or two examples fall short. However, in selection invention this requirement is or at
least should be stricter than with normal inventions.
2) During the prosecution of the patent application applicants are allowed to file additional
experimental data in order to support inventive step. Thus, applicants can support their
argumentation with additional experimental data of the different advantage or the same
advantage with an unpredictable improvement that is required for a selection invention
to be non-obvious.
3) Sufficiency and written description requirements must be satisfied on filing the application.
Late filed documents cannot be used for these purposes.
4) In general broad claims can be supported by a limited number of examples of asserted
or proven advantages.
If a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, it would not suffice to claim a particular
range or selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new
utility. As mentioned above, the selection should provide a new and surprising effect in order
to it be considered to involve an inventive step. However, it would be possible to formulate
such claim as use claim.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
No, there is no general requirement that the advantage or the superior result would have to
be utilized by a third party for an infringement to be established.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
To establish infringement of a use claim, the alleged infringer should either use the product
for the claimed purpose or offer it for said purpose, in which case the intention of an alleged
infringer would play a role.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
–
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7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group of
specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction?
No, if the selected particular radical, or the group of specific compounds is not disclosed in
an individualized form in the prior art. However, in a new patent application it would not
be allowable to claim the group of specific compounds broadly and only disclaim those
compounds that are specifically disclosed in the prior art document.
In the analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is –
i.e. would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
Yes, it may matter. The selection may be considered less obvious the more compounds the
prior disclosed generic class would contain.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction?
(i) No, (ii) no, (iii) possibly yes.
Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the prior art, what scope
of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor be able to obtain
protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous property), or should
any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for the advantageous
property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior art?
If in scenario (iii) all or most of the compounds disclosed in the prior art would possess
adhesive properties, then there would not be selection but only an invention relating to a new
use, which would have to be protected with use claims.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
No specific rules or case law for this question.
However, for selection inventions there should be an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class should possess the relevant advantage, because this property has been the
reason for accepting the claims.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
The knowledge of the patent or any advantageous property disclosed therein is not required
to find infringement. However, to establish infringement of a use claim, the alleged infringer
should either use the product for the claimed purpose or offer it for said purpose.
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11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Although the inventor should be rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection, the time and
money spent to make the invention should not automatically be relevant when considering
patentability of the results. Especially, if the invention has been made by lucky chance, it
should not be automatically considered as less important than an invention that has been
made by hard work. This kind of considerations should not necessarily be controlling, because
many times inventions are formulated as selection inventions only after the patent application
has been filed and the patent Examiner has found novelty destroying prior art for the broad
claims. In this respect selection inventions are no different from other inventions.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
The acceptance of use claims in general should be harmonized. Also the novelty criteria needs
harmonization, at the moment it is not absolutely clear whether an unpredictable improvement
is required for a selection invention to be novel or is it only a question of inventive step.
Because novelty in selection inventions manifests itself in somewhat unusual ways, it would be
good to combine novelty and inventive step criteria when assessing selection inventions.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
–
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
The question of equivalence: should those features that define the selection be interpreted
based on equivalence or should equivalence in selection inventions relate only to those
features that do not form part of the selection. For example, if the invention relates to coated
glass and it is the specific coating that is selected from a general class of glass coatings,
could equivalence interpretation relate only to the glass material but not to the coating?
Summary
The Finnish AIPPI Group notes that there are neither specific provisions of law nor established
case law on selection inventions in Finland. It is proposed that the acceptance of use claims in
general should be harmonized. Also the novelty criteria need harmonization. At the moment it is
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not absolutely clear whether an unpredictable improvement is required for a selection invention
to be novel or is it only a question of inventive step. It would be good to combine novelty and
inventive step criteria when assessing selection inventions. Further discussion within AIPPI is needed
regarding equivalence and selection inventions.
Résumé
La Groupe AIPPI finlandaise notifie que il n’y a ni provisions de loi spécifiques ni loi de cause établie
sur des inventions de sélection en Finlande. Il est proposé que l’acceptation des revendications
de utilisation devrait en général être harmonisée. Aussi des critères de nouveauté ont besoin de
l’harmonisation. Pour le moment il n’est pas absolument clair si une amélioration imprévisible
est nécessaire pour une invention de sélection pour être nouvelle, ou s’agit-il seulement d’une
étape inventive. Il serait bien de combiner des critères de nouveauté et de l’étape inventive pour
l’évaluation des inventions de sélection. Discussion supplémentaire sur équivalence et des inventions
de sélection est nécessaire.
Zusammenfassung
Die finnische AIPPI stellt fest, dass es weder spezifische Gesetzbestimmungen noch eine
eingebürgerte Rechtsprechung betreffend Auswahlerfindungen in Finnland gibt. Es wurde
vorgeschlagen, dass die Gewährung von Anwendungsansprüchen im allgemeinen harmonisiert
werden sollte. Auch die Neuheitskriterien bedürfen Harmonisierung. Zur Zeit ist es nicht unbedingt
klar, ob ein unvorhersehbarer Fortschritt erforderlich ist, damit eine Auswahlerfindung neu ist, oder
ob es dabei nur um die Frage der erfinderischen Leistung geht. Es wäre gut, bei der Beurteilung von
Auswahlerfindungen die Kriterien der Neuheit und der Erfindungshöhe zu verbinden. Eine weitere
Diskussion betreffend die Äquivalenz und Auswahlerfindungen ist erforderlich.
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France
France
Frankreich
Question Q209
au nom du Groupe français
par Sabine Agé, Jacques Armengaud, Yves Bizollon, Gérard Dossmann,
Jean-Pierre Esson, Pierre Gendraud, Florent Guilbot, Guillaume Henry, Amandine Métier,
Denis Monegier du Sorbier, Isabelle Romet, Laure Sarlin et Grégoire Triet
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
Ont été jugées valables des revendications portant sur des inventions de sélection dans
les domaines de la chimie, de la pharmacie et de la science des matériaux (sélection de
composés, d’une composition ou d’une formulation, d’un procédé ou d’une nouvelle utilisation),
mais aussi dans le domaine mécanique (sélection d’un dispositif).
À titre d’exemple, ont été jugés brevetables:
– un outil pour travailler le sol dont les dents présentent une valeur angulaire sélectionnée
(TGI Paris, 5 juillet 2000, PIBD n° 710-III-611; TGI Paris, 26 avril 2000, inédit);
– une couche pour bébé dont les attaches présentent une surface sélectionnée (TGI Paris,
5 juin 1996, PIBD n° 619-III-515).
Au regard de la jurisprudence, est considérée comme une invention dite « de sélection » une
invention dont la ou les caractéristique(s) sont choisies parmi un ensemble déjà connu, en
raison de l’effet technique particulier qu’elles procurent.
Une n ième application (thérapeutique ou non-thérapeutique) n’est pas une invention de
sélection, à moins qu’elle résulte d’une sélection dans une application générale déjà connue.
À titre d’exemple, l’utilisation d’un composé comme désherbant sélectif pour certaines cultures
céréalières peut être considéré comme une invention de sélection si ce composé était utilisé,
dans l’art antérieur, comme herbicide total.
La sélection, pour une catégorie de composés ou compositions connus, d’une application qui
n’est pas enseignée par l’art antérieur, suffit à caractériser la nouveauté de cette sélection (TGI
Paris, 9 novembre 1989 et CA Paris, 5 février 1992, Interphyto c. Rhône Poulenc Agrochimie,
inédits, ; TGI Paris, 6 juillet 1978, PIBD n° 221-III-225 ; TGI Paris, 17 octobre 1974, PIBD n°
146-III-138).
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2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
Selon l’article L 611-10 du code de la Propriété Intellectuelle français, les inventions sont
brevetables si elles sont, entre autres conditions, nouvelles. L’article L.611-11 précise que
«une invention est considérée comme nouvelle si elle n’est pas comprise dans l’état de la
technique», en spécifiant que «L’état de la technique est constitué par tout ce qui a été rendu
accessible au public avant la date de dépôt de la demande de brevet par une description
écrite ou orale, ou un usage ou tout autre moyen».
Les tribunaux français définissent l’antériorité destructrice de nouveauté comme suit:
«Une antériorité, pour être valablement opposée, doit présenter tous les moyens caractéristiques
de l’invention brevetée réunis de la même façon pour y remplir la même fonction et aboutir
aux mêmes résultats».
(CA Paris 14 juin 1984, PIBD n°407 III-87 ; CA Paris 12 septembre 2001, inédit)
Cette définition de l’antériorité destructrice de nouveauté, ancienne et constante, est appliquée
pour apprécier la nouveauté d’une invention de sélection, quelle qu’en soit la catégorie.
Invention de sélection de composés ou de dispositifs
Cette catégorie d’invention de sélection consiste à sélectionner un ou plusieurs composés ou
une famille comprenant un nombre restreint de composés présentant une propriété ou une
qualité particulière.
Une telle invention est considérée comme nouvelle, au regard d’une antériorité divulguant
une plage générale de composés susceptible d’englober le ou les composés ou la famille de
composés de l’invention, si :
– cette antériorité ne divulgue pas le ou les composés sélectionnés ou la famille particulière
de composés sélectionnée,
– les composés antérieurs n’ont pas les qualités et les propriétés attribuées aux composés
particuliers sélectionnés.
(TGI Paris, 9 novembre 1989, PIBD n°474 III-188:
«Mais attendu qu’une divulgation générique ne peut détruire la nouveauté d’un exemple
spécifique relevant de cette divulgation»
TGI Paris, 20 février 2008, PIBD n° 874-III-301 ; TGI Paris, 17 octobre 1974, PIBD n°148 -II-
138 ; TGI Paris, 24 novembre 1972, PIBD n° 101-III-98 ; TGI Paris, 20 avril 1972,PIBD n°90-
III-271 ; CA Dijon, 22 avril 1971, PIBD n°68-III-303)
Invention de sélection d’une composition ou formulation
Une invention de sélection portant sur une composition ou une formulation est définie par une
combinaison de différents composés/éléments, éventuellement selon certaines proportions.
Pour cette catégorie d’inventions de sélection, une antériorité sera considérée comme
destructrice de nouveauté si elle enseigne l’ensemble des éléments de la composition, soit la
combinaison de tous les éléments de l’invention dans les mêmes proportions (si celles-ci sont
revendiquées).
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Des proportions sont privées de nouveauté si une antériorité les divulgue à l’identique ou
enseigne des intervalles qui recouvrent ceux de l’invention.
(CA Paris, 31 octobre 2003, Crea/Eurixim, inédit:
«Mais considérant que …, il subsiste que la fourchette des proportions respectives des
composants telle que figurant à la revendication 1 n’est pas enseignée par l’antériorité
THIBONNET ; qu’il en résulte que ce brevet ne saurait détruire la nouveauté de la revendication
1 qui sélectionne des proportions particulières des composants du produit»
TGI Paris, 19 juin 1980, PIBD n° 273-III-27:
«Attendu outre que […] le brevet Mond et le brevet AMP mettant essentiellement en valeur
l’inclusion du niobium dans l’alliage, niobium qui, d’après les deux brevets, et dans
la fourchette qu’ils déterminent, améliore la structure de l’alliage ; qu’il importe peu, la
brevetabilité n’étant pas attachée au résultat, que le brevet Mond n’ait pas expressément
défini tous les avantages résultant de cette inclusion du niobium dès lors que ces avantages
découlaient de celle-ci;
Attendu que le brevet de la société AMP antériorisé par le brevet Mond est donc nul.»
TGI Paris, 26 janvier 1996, PIBD n° 610-III-247 ; CA Paris, 14 juin 1984, PIBD n° 407-III-84)
Ainsi, une invention de sélection portant sur une composition, définie par ses propriétés
intrinsèques, est considérée comme nouvelle si aucune antériorité:
– ne décrit ces propriétés (même pour une composition définie plus généralement),
– ne divulgue la composition revendiquée dans tous ses éléments et proportions.
(CA Paris, 27 octobre 1988, PIBD n° 449-III-74 ; TGI Paris, 13 juillet 1988, PIBD n° 448 III
588).
Invention de sélection de procédé
Un procédé comportant des étapes sélectionnées, au regard des étapes plus généralement
définies par l’art antérieur, est nouveau si l’effet technique obtenu au moyen des étapes
sélectionnées n’était pas inhérent à la mise en œuvre d’un procédé décrit, de façon plus
générale, dans l’art antérieur (TGI Paris, 19 avril 1984, PIBD n° 354-III-223).
Conclusion
La nouveauté d’une invention de sélection s’apprécie selon les critères classiques appliqués
à toutes les inventions : une antériorité est destructrice de nouveauté si elle enseigne tous les
moyens caractéristiques de l’invention brevetée, agencés de la même façon, pour remplir la
même fonction et aboutir au même résultat.
La jurisprudence requiert, en outre, qu’il soit démontré, de préférence dans le brevet, que les
éléments de l’ensemble décrit dans l’art antérieur, dans lequel l’invention a été sélectionnée,
ne présentent pas les propriétés ou qualités associées à l’invention de sélection.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
Selon l’Article L. 611-14 du Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle «une invention est considérée
comme impliquant une activité inventive si, pour un homme du métier elle ne découle pas
d’une manière évidente de l’état de la technique». Tout comme pour la nouveauté, le critère
d’activité inventive s’applique également aux inventions dites de «sélection».
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Les critères retenus par les Tribunaux Français pour admettre l’activité inventive d’une invention
de sélection sont essentiellement les suivants:
– un effet nouveau ou amélioré,
– l’existence d’un préjugé ou de difficultés techniques,
– un enseignement écartant l’homme du métier de la sélection revendiquée.
La démonstration d’un effet technique nouveau ou amélioré n’est cependant pas suffisante. Il
faut que cet effet technique:
– ne découle pas de l’état de la technique,
– et qu’il soit démontré dans le domaine revendiqué.
Pour la démonstration de l’effet technique nouveau ou amélioré, les juridictions françaises
prennent en compte des essais produits au cours de la procédure judiciaire, que ce soit en
première instance ou en appel.
C’est ainsi que la Cour d’Appel de Paris a rappelé, dans le cas d’une invention portant sur
une sélection de proportions pour une composition, qu’il ne peut y avoir «d’invention » «que
dans la mesure où, cette fourchette de proportions, au demeurant très large, serait lié à un
effet nouveau qui ne découlerait pas de l’état de la technique» (CA Paris, 31 octobre 2003,
PIBD n° 780-III-87).
Le défendeur avait pu démontrer, dans cette affaire, que certains des essais du titulaire
du brevet montraient que le même effet technique était obtenu à l’extérieur de la gamme
revendiqué ; et que, selon ses propres essais, cet effet technique n’était pas atteint pour
des proportions identiques à celles revendiquées. La Cour d’appel a donc estimé que les
compositions de l’état de la technique avaient une fonction identique à ceux du brevet.
Elle a jugé, en conséquence, dans la mesure où il n’existait aucune difficulté technique à
vaincre, que les proportions revendiquées ne procédaient d’aucune activité inventive.
La démonstration d’un effet technique ou d’un effet amélioré n’est cependant pas suffisante
en elle-même.
La Cour d’appel de Paris a jugé que, malgré la preuve de résultats «remarquables», la
sélection d’un antibiotique parmi six pénicillines découlait de manière évidente de l’état de la
technique, un document antérieur enseignant que les formes lévogyres qui correspondaient
à l’antibiotique revendiqué étaient connues pour être plus actives (CA Paris, 17 octobre
1980, PIBD n° 292-III-267). La Cour d’appel a constaté qu’il n’existait pas d’obstacle d’ordre
psychologique ou technique ayant pu dissuader l’homme du métier.
La Cour d’appel de Paris a, aussi, estimé qu’il n’y a pas d’activité inventive à modifier des
pourcentages dans une faible mesure, dans la mesure où, au regard de l’antériorité invoquée,
l’homme du métier savait que, dans une composition du type revendiqué, il convenait
d’augmenter la quantité d’un élément. Pour la Cour d’appel, ce simple transport d’industrie
découlait de manière évidente de l’état de la technique (CA Paris, 27 octobre 1988, PIBD
n° 449-III-74).
La démonstration de l’existence d’un effet technique combiné à l’existence d’un préjugé
technique, de difficultés, de directions éloignant de l’invention, peuvent justifier l’activité
inventive.
La démonstration d’un effet technique, même s’il est obtenu pour certains des membres de la
famille dans laquelle la sélection est opérée, peut justifier d’une activité inventive, s’il apparaît
que les directions préférentielles indiquées dans les antériorités n’étaient pas de nature à
orienter l’homme du métier vers le produit revendiqué (TGI Paris, 9 novembre 1989, confirmé
par CA Paris 5 février 1992, inédits)
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L’activité inventive peut aussi être justifiée par:
– les difficultés à mettre en œuvre la sélection revendiquée, qui peuvent être démontrées
par le temps écoulé entre la découverte du produit et sa nouvelle application;
– l’existence d’un préjugé technique;
– le caractère imprévisible de la découverte de la nouvelle application (TGI Paris, 6 juillet
1978, PIBD n° 221-III-325).
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
La question de la suffisance de description d’une invention de sélection est liée à la
démonstration de l’activité inventive.
En premier lieu, il est clair que la description doit être suffisante pour faire apparaître la
sélection revendiquée:
– la sélection doit être décrite, par la description du brevet, dans sa structure (produit,
composition avec ses proportions, application): des sélections revendiquées a posteriori
ne devraient pas être jugées suffisamment décrites;
– l’effet technique sur lequel se fonde la sélection doit aussi être compris de la description:
un effet non divulgué dans le brevet ne devrait pas pouvoir justifier l’activité inventive de
la sélection.
Ces exigences doivent être remplies à la date de dépôt du brevet.
Lorsque ces exigences sont remplies, la démonstration de l’effet annoncé ou de son importance
doit pouvoir être possible à tout moment pour justifier de l’activité inventive. C’est ce qui
résulte des décisions précitées.
Il ressort, en particulier, de la décision de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 31 octobre 2003
(voir page 4 du présent rapport), que les Tribunaux français peuvent juger que l’invention
de sélection ne fait pas preuve d’activité inventive si l’effet annoncé n’est pas obtenu pour
toutes les proportions revendiquées ou si l’effet identique justifiant la sélection est obtenu à
l’extérieur des proportions revendiquées.
La prise en compte d’un effet technique pour justifier l’activité inventive d’une sélection,
n’implique pas, cependant, que cet effet technique soit revendiqué, sauf dans le cas d’une
nouvelle application.
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5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
L’appréciation de la contrefaçon de revendications protégeant une invention de sélection est
régie par les mêmes règles que celles applicables aux autres catégories de revendications.
Pour l’appréciation de la contrefaçon à l’identique, l’effet technique et le résultat procurés
par les moyens incriminés ne sont pris en compte que si ces éléments font partie des
caractéristiques de la revendication.
Si les caractéristiques de la revendication ne sont pas reproduites à l’identique, la fonction
des moyens incriminés et leurs résultats seront pris en compte selon les principes définis
par la jurisprudence pour la contrefaçon par reproduction des moyens essentiels et la
contrefaçon par équivalence. Ainsi, dans le cas d’une revendication de produit dont l’une
des caractéristiques définit une plage de concentration de l’un des constituants (par exemple
«10 à 15 % du composé x»), sans mentionner aucun effet technique ou résultat spécifique,
l’effet technique et le résultat du produit incriminé ne seront pas pris en compte si celui-ci
contient le constituant mentionné dans la revendication dans une proportion comprise dans
l’intervalle revendiqué. Par contre, si le constituant en cause se trouve dans une proportion
sortant de la plage définie par la revendication, les Tribunaux sont amenés à prendre en
compte l’effet technique et les résultats de la composition incriminée et du constituant précité
pour rechercher si les conditions de la contrefaçon par reproduction des éléments essentiels
de l’invention ou par équivalence sont satisfaites (CA Paris, 10 janvier 2007, inédit).
La reproduction d’une revendication portant sur la nouvelle application d’un produit connu
est établie si le produit argué de contrefaçon est utilisé conformément à cette application.
La fabrication d’un produit susceptible d’être utilisé conformément à la nouvelle application
revendiquée ne constitue un acte de contrefaçon que si les conditions de la contrefaçon par
fourniture de moyen sont satisfaites.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
La jurisprudence des Tribunaux français montre que l’appréciation de la validité et de la
contrefaçon des inventions de sélection n’est pas soumise à un régime particulier, mais suit les
règles de droit commun en la matière. Il n’est ainsi pas apparu utile ou opportun d’appliquer
des critères d’appréciation particuliers à ce type d’invention.
With Reference to the Examples
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
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Selon l’appréciation de la nouveauté par les tribunaux français, un document décrivant
des composés définis par une classe générale de substituants ne privera de nouveauté une
revendication portant sur un groupe spécifique de composés comprenant des substituants
spécifiques que s’il enseigne tous les moyens caractéristiques des composés revendiqués,
réunis de la même façon pour remplir la même fonction et aboutir au même résultat.
Le nombre de composés entrant dans la plage générale déjà connue ou l’amplitude de cette
plage sont évoqués par plusieurs décisions, sans être retenus comme des indices suffisants
de nouveauté de la sélection.
Même si les composés de l’art antérieur comprennent une plage assez limitée de substituants,
un composé comprenant des substituants sélectionnés dans cette plage sera jugée nouveau,
si, par ailleurs :
– l’antériorité ne décrit pas les propriétés de ces substituants sélectionnés ;
– il est démontré que les autres composés de la plage plus large enseignée par l’antériorité,
même s’ils sont peu nombreux, ne possèdent pas cette propriété.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
La sélection porte sur un produit spécial ayant un radical particulier ou un groupe de composés
résultant d’une sélection de radicaux particuliers.
Si les produits revendiqués n’ont jamais été décrits ou présentés comme possédant des
propriétés avantageuses en tant que produits adhésifs, leur sélection devrait répondre au
critère d’activité inventive.
Une telle position a été retenue par le Tribunal de grande instance de Paris un jugement du
6 juillet 1978 (PIBD n° 221-III-325) : les propriétés d’herbicide sélectif du produit revendiqué
alors que la famille générale avait été décrite pour ses propriétés d’herbicide total, ont conduit
le Tribunal à juger que cette sélection faisait l’objet d’activité inventive.
Si les produits sélectionnés sont décrits comme possédant des propriétés avantageuses par
rapport aux produits expressément mentionnés dans l’état de la technique mais que ces
propriétés sont celles attendues pour de tels produits par l’homme du métier, un Tribunal
devrait juger qu’ils sont dépourvus d’activité inventive.
C’est la position qui a été adoptée en particulier pour des compositions dont les composants
étaient présents dans des proportions légèrement différentes de celles de l’art antérieur: la
Cour d’Appel a considéré que ces modifications étaient évidentes pour l’homme du métier
(CA Paris, 17 octobre 1980, PIBD n° 292-III-267 : les propriétés de l’amoxyciline, sélectionnée
dans un groupe d’antibiotiques connus, notamment la concentration plasmatique qu’elle permet
d’obtenir et son comportement pharmacinétique, ne suffisent pas à justifier d’une activité
inventive, les épimères du type revendiqué étant généralement plus actifs en thérapeutique).
Si le produit revendiqué est décrit comme présentant des propriétés avantageuses notamment
adhésives, il peut être jugé comme faisant preuve d’activité inventive à défaut d’indication
conduisant l’homme du métier à cette sélection particulière, au regard d’autres sélections
possibles dans la classe générique (CA Paris, 5 février 1992, précité: les antériorités
«n’étaient pas de nature à orienter l’homme du métier vers ce produit et tendaient même à
l’en éloigner»).
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9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
Une revendication portant sur une composition dont certaines caractéristiques résultent de
plages de valeurs peut être jugée nulle pour insuffisance de description si l’effet technique
qui a justifié la sélection de cette plage de valeurs n’est pas justifié pour certaines des valeurs
qu’elle comprend (Cass. Com. 10 mars 1980, Dossiers Brevets, V, n° 2) : le champ de
protection de la revendication est, dans ce cas, limité aux exemples de réalisation décrits ou
à la portée de l’homme du métier.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Si la revendication porte sur l’application comme adhésif d’un composé sélectionné dans un
ensemble connu, la fabrication du composé sélectionné et son offre en vente, sans instruction
quant à son utilisation, pourrait être qualifiée de contrefaçon par fourniture de moyen sous les
conditions suivantes, applicables à tous les cas de contrefaçon par fourniture de moyen:
– le fabricant sait, ou les circonstances rendent évident, que le composé sera utilisé comme
adhésif;
– si le composé se trouve couramment dans le commerce, le fabricant incite la personne à
qui il livre à utiliser le composé comme adhésif.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Il n’est pas opportun de s’attacher, pour apprécier la brevetabilité des inventions de sélection,
aux efforts requis pour y parvenir, dans la mesure où ce critère subjectif n’est pas pris en
considération pour apprécier la brevetabilité des autres inventions.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
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14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
Le Groupe français n’estime pas utile de créer des critères de brevetabilité propres aux
inventions de sélection, dont la validité doit être appréciée au regard des règles de droit
commun applicables notamment en matière nouveauté et d’activité inventive.
La quasi-totalité des brevets dont les litiges sont soumis aux Tribunaux Français sont des
brevets Européens. Le groupe Français a exposé la position des Tribunaux Français au regard
des inventions de sélection. Bien que les motivations adoptées par les Tribunaux Français ne
soient pas toujours identiques à celles de l’Office Européen des Brevets, les résultats, en ce
qui concerne l’appréciation de la brevetabilité, sont sensiblement les mêmes pour des cas
similaires.
Les brevetés doivent pouvoir continuer à revendiquer une invention de sélection sous forme
de revendication de produit (composé, composition, formulation, dispositif) ou de procédé, si
elle répond par ailleurs aux critères de validité de droit commun.
Le recours systématique à des revendications de seconde application, pour protéger ces
inventions de sélection, n’est, en particulier, pas souhaité : la preuve de la contrefaçon de
ce type de revendication requiert en effet la preuve de l’utilisation du produit ou procédé
sélectionné, selon l’application revendiquée ; alors que l’utilisation du produit sélectionné
est inopérante pour démontrer la contrefaçon d’une revendication portant sur ce produit, si
toutes ses caractéristiques sont par ailleurs reproduites.
Summary
The French Group does not consider as useful to define specific patentability requirements for
selection inventions, the validity of which should be appreciated from the viewpoint of the common
law rules.
Novelty: A prior art document destroys novelty if it teaches all the means characterizing the
patented invention, arranged in the same manner, fulfilling the same function and leading to the
same result.
Inventive step: The following requirements have been accepted:
– a new or enhanced effect;
– an technical prejudice or some arising technical problems;
– a teaching leading away the man skilled in the art away from the claimed selection.
Disclosure: The claimed selection should be disclosed with regard to its structure (product,
composition along with proportions, application); the technical effect on which the selection is
based should also be included in the disclosure.
Infringement: For products or devices, the technical effect and the result provided by the incriminated
means should be taken into account only in case that these elements belong to the characterizing
part of the claim or in order to apply the doctrine of equivalent.
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Résumé
Le Groupe français n’estime pas utile de créer des critères de brevetabilité propres aux inventions
de sélection, dont la validité doit être appréciée au regard des règles de droit commun.
La nouveauté: une antériorité est destructrice de nouveauté si elle enseigne tous les moyens
caractéristiques de l’invention brevetée, agencés de la même façon, pour remplir la même fonction
et aboutir au même résultat.
L’activité inventive: les critères suivants ont été retenus
– un effet nouveau ou amplifié,
– l’existence d’un préjugé ou de difficultés techniques,
– un enseignement écartant l’homme du métier de la sélection revendiquée.
La description: La sélection doit être décrite dans sa structure (produit, composition avec ses
proportions, application) ; l’effet technique sur lequel se fonde la sélection doit aussi être compris
de la description. .
La contrefaçon: Pour des produits ou dispositifs, l’effet technique et le résultat procurés par les
moyens incriminés ne sont pris en compte que si ces éléments font partie des caractéristiques de la
revendication ou pour juger de l’équivalence.
Zusammenfassung
Die französische Gruppe erachtet es nicht als hilfreich, eigenständige Patentierbarkeitskriterien
für Auswahlerfindungen aufzustellen, da deren Gültigkeit nach allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätzen
beurteilt werden sollte.
Neuheit: Eine Vorveröffentlichung/-benutzung ist neuheitsschädlich, wenn sie alle charakteristischen
Merkmale der patentierten Erfindung offenbart, die auf dieselbe Art und Weise implementiert
werden, um dieselbe Funktion zu erreichen und dasselbe Ergebnis zu erzielen.
Erfinderische Tätigkeit: die folgenden Kriterien sollten beachtet werden
• eine neue oder verbesserte Wirkung
• das Vorhandensein/Überwinden eines Vorurteils oder technischer Schwierigkeiten
• eine Lehre, die den Fachmann von der beanspruchten Auswahlerfindung wegführt
Die Beschreibung: Die Auswahlerfindung muß in ihrem Aufbau (Produkt, Zusammensetzung in ihren
Mengen – oder Größenverhältnissen, Anwendung) beschrieben sein; die technische Wirkung, auf
welche sich die Auswahlerfindung begründet, muß auch in der Beschreibung enthalten sein.
Die Verletzung: Bei Gegenständen oder Vorrichtungen ist die durch den Verletzungsgegenstand
erzielte technische Wirkung nur insoweit zu berücksichtigen, als diese Bestandteile Teil der
kennzeichnenden Merkmale sind oder um die Äquivalenz zu beurteilen.
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Germany
Allemagne
Deutschland
Report Q209
in the name of the German Group
by Jochen Ehlers, Jan Dombrowski and Karsten Koeniger
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
With regard to the situation in Germany, first it must be noticed: Although there has been
a discussion on ‚selection inventions’ for decades in Germany, the term is hardly used by
German courts. Especially the German Federal Supreme Court obviously sees no reason to
create a special term or name for this kind of inventions and to appraise them according to
common (special) standards.
Under German law, the possibility that a selection invention in terms of the Working Guidelines
is patentable is not restricted to certain kinds of inventions. For example, regarding a machine
for which in the prior art it was stated that the radius of a first circular element was smaller
than the radius of a second circular element, the German Supreme Court found a solution
new, according to which the first radius was smaller than the second, but bigger than half of
the second (Federal Supreme Court, 19.05.1981, GRUR 1981, 812, 814 – Etikettiermaschine;
Federal Supreme Court, 27.06.1972, BlfPMZ 1973, 170 - Legierungen).
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
As we understand the German Federal Supreme Court’s latest case law, it is to be distinguished
between a numeral limitation of a disclosed range of quantity or weight and the selection
from a group of chemical compounds that was disclosed by a chemical structural formula.
The numeral limitation of a disclosed range alone does not, in general, establish novelty.
According to the Federal Supreme Court’s decision ‚Inkrustierungsinhibitoren’ of 1999, the
specification of a range of quantity or weight is a simplified notation of the numerous possible
values between the upper limit value and the lower limit value. Explicitly contradictory
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to the case law of the European Patent Office (e.g. EPO, 10.09.1991, T 666/89, GRUR
Int. 1994, 59, 61 – Waschmittel), the Federal Supreme Court stated that, therefore, the
comprehensive numeral specification of a range in a document, contained, in general, a
likewise comprehensive disclosure of all possible subranges.
The Federal Supreme Court stated, exceptions to this rule were possible only under special
circumstances the applicant had to prove. It was of no importance if certain subranges were
designated as advantageous, purposeful or preferred (Federal Supreme Court, 07.12.1999,
GRUR 2000, 591, 593-594 – Inkrustierungsinhibitoren). The Federal Supreme Court decided
that the range from 15,000 to 290,000 that was claimed in the patent, was anticipated by
a prior art document that had disclosed the range form 500 to 2,000,000. The Federal
Supreme Court did not explain what such ‘special circumstances’ might be. However, the
Federal Supreme Court referred to an article in which it had been stated that such formally
comprised variants should not be regarded as disclosed, that could not be manufactured
according to the state of the art.
To understand the Federal Supreme Court’s case law, it must be pointed out that according
to the German case law the question what is disclosed by a (prior art) document regarding
novelty is to be assessed by the same standards that apply when assessing the admissibility
of amendments of a patent application, i.e. if there is subject matter which extends beyond
the content of the application as filed (Federal Supreme Court, 19.05.1981, GRUR 1981, 812,
814 – Etikettiermaschine). Regarding the admissibility of amendments of a patent application
the Federal Supreme Court repeatedly stated that, by specifying a certain range, all the
values between the limit values and all subsets were sufficiently disclosed. (Federal Supreme
Court, 12.05.1992, GRUR 1992, 842, 845 – Chrom-Nickel-Legierung). The Federal Supreme
Court admitted the limitation of a range that had been disclosed by ‘up to 50 ppm’ in
the patent application as filed, to ‘less that 10 ppm’ (Federal Supreme Court, 20.03.1990,
GRUR 1990, 510, 512 – Crackkatalysator). The Federal Supreme Court stated that regarding
the question if a patent application could be amended by limitation of the claim, it was
of no importance, if something had been designated in the description as advantageous,
purposeful or preferred (BGH, 20.03.1990, GRUR 1990, 510, 512 – Crackkatalysator).
Regarding chemical compounds the Federal Supreme Court stated in his ‘Olanzapin’ decision
of 2008 that, by communicating a structural formula, the single compounds covered by
that structural formula were not disclosed as such. For a single compound to be disclosed
specifications were required that enable, just like that, the person skilled in the art to ‘get the
substance in the hands’. This would, generally, require further information especially for its
individualisation. A single compound that was not explicitly designated could be regarded
as disclosed only if the person skilled in the art did ‘read it although it was not written’. This
would be the case, for example if the person skilled in the art knew the single compound as
the usual realisation of the given structural formula and did thus understand immediately that
the single compound was meant, too.
The Federal Supreme Court stated it regarded its decision regarding chemical formulas to
be in line with the European Patent Office’s case law (e.g. EPO, 19.02.2003, T 940/98
‘Diastereomere’), according to which only such technical teachings destroyed novelty,
that disclosed a substance as an inevitable result of a described method or in specified,
individualised form (Federal Supreme Court, 16.12.2008, X ZR 89/07 – Olanzapin).
The finding of properties, effects and advantages that had not been recognised before,
cannot, according to German case law, establish novelty of a chemical substance that had
been known and identified and was producible (cf. Federal Supreme Court, 17.01.1980,
GRUR 1980, 283, 285 – Terephthalsaeure; cf. Federal Supreme Court, 11.07.1985, GRUR
1986, 163, 164 – Borhaltige Staehle). If the selected substance is known, the applicant can
only seek protection for the surprising properties as a use patent.
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3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
Regarding the inventive step requirement, too, the general rules apply. A ‘selection’ is
considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not
obvious to a person skilled in the art. Especially there is an inventive step if the selection
invention, from the perspective of the person skilled in the art at the priority date, has a special,
surprising or not foreseeable effect or property (cf. Federal Patent Court, 22.04.2008, 5 W
(pat) 431/07). This certain effect or property (of the selected range or variant, respectively)
must be documented in comparison to the range or variant not selected (Federal Patent Court,
02.05.2007, 5 W (pat) 406/06). If there is no surprising technical effect, the inventive step,
according to the general rules, must be denied (cf. Federal Supreme Court, 20.3.2001, GRUR
2001, 730 – Trigonellin).
Regarding chemical compounds, the Federal Supreme Court stated in the ‚Olanzapin’
decision of 2008, the assessment of the inventive step was not always based on the ‘closest’
prior art. Only by hindsight it became recognizable which prior art document came closest
to the invention and how the inventor could have started to reach the solution according
to the invention. The selection of the starting point needed a justification that normally was
established by the effort of the person skilled in the art to find a better solution for a certain
purpose. The Federal Supreme Court expressed that a prior art document that contains a
structural formula that covers the single compound is not necessarily the starting point for the
assessment of the inventive step. Even if, by hindsight, an invention appears to be a selection
from a group of chemical compounds, which had been published before, this selection is not
necessarily the inventive achievement that has to be examined.
The Patent Office can at any time demand evidence that the effect that is purported in the
patent application can be reached (Federal Supreme Court, 20.03.1990, GRUR 1990, 510,
512 – Crackkatalysator). Accordingly experimental data can be submitted after initial patent
filing, too. This should be true for selection inventions, too.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
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(1) The threshold for sufficiency of disclosure of the invention is, internationally compared,
low. The Federal Supreme Court repeatedly invalidated patents, whose applications had
deficiencies regarding the disclosure, denying novelty or inventive step (Federal Supreme
Court, 01.07.1997, Bausch, Nichtigkeitsrechtsprechung in Patentsachen Bd. 1, S. 394 –
Kabelnebenstöreffekte). The Federal Supreme Court stated it was not necessary to enhance
the requirement of sufficiency of disclosure in order to prevent the application of unfinished
inventions. If there were doubts if the purported effect could be reached within a whole range,
the Patent Office could at any time demand evidence (Federal Supreme Court, 20.03.1990,
GRUR 1990, 510, 512 – Crackkatalysator). However, if it is found that certain variants do not
have the purported advantage, the patentability must be, insofar, denied.
(2)/(3) Where required, the applicant must proof that the invention had been workable at the
application or priority date. However, this proof does not have to be given in the initial filing
documents (Federal Supreme Court, 14.03.1972, GRUR 1972, 541 – Imidazoline).
(4) If the patentability of the invention is based on certain advantages, these advantages
have to be explained by the applicant and, if there are doubts, to be proved by experimental
results. If the claimed substance is a group of many compounds, comparative experiments can
be demanded. These comparative experiments may have to be directed to such a number
of compounds (representatives of the group) that it seems plausible that the effect would also
occur for the other members of the group (Schäfers in Benkard, Patentgesetz, 10. Aufl., 2006,
§ 46, 17). A patent claim that is directed to a product does not have to specify the utility or
purpose. However, if the patent claim is directed to a certain use, this use must be specified
in the patent claim.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
If it is a product patent that has been granted for the selection invention, it is irrelevant for
the question of infringement, what the intent for the production was or if the advantages are
utilised.
However, if the selection invention is protected only by a use patent, a (direct) infringement
requires that the utilisation of the certain advantage or superior results is reached or at least
concretely prepared. Acts that precede the actual use are covered by the protection only if
they ‘obviously arrange’ the product for the protected use. Such an ‘obvious arrangement’
can be established, for example, by the addition for the instructions for use or a dosage
recommendation (Federal Supreme Court, 21.11.1989, GRUR 1990, 505 – Geschlitzte
Abdeckfolie).
The pure making of a product that is suitable for the protected use does not establish
infringement. This is also true for the making with the intent to later use the product in the
protected way.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
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There are no specific requirements with respect to patentability of selection inventions in
Germany. The general fundamental Rules are applicable. An invention is deemed to be
new, if the subject matter of the invention did not belong to the state of the art at the priority
date. If a “selection invention” belonged at the priority date to the state of the art, because
a more general teaching was known which “included” the selection, is to be determined in
accordance with the understanding of the relevant technical expert.
In order to explain this principle vividly: The two claims “1. Method. 2. Apparatus.“ claim
all methods and all devices, however, they do not disclose all methods and all devices at
the same time. Namely, an expert does not get the precise ideas which are necessary for
“disclosing” particular devises and methods immediately and without further thinking. The
patentability of selection inventions are determined in accordance with this criterion – it is
decisive if an expert understands the particular disclosure.
In view of these general criterions it becomes clear why the German Federal Court of Justice
did not provide particular case law with respect to “selection inventions”. These thoughts are
still valid, even though technology has changed.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
Example 1: Say a prior-art document discloses a chemical compound characterised by
specified structure including a substituent group designated “R”. The substituent “R” is defined
so as to embrace a generic class of broadly – defined functional groups such as all alkyl
or aryl radicals, either unsubstituted or substituted by a halogen and/or a hydroxyl group,
although for practical reasons only a very small number of specific examples are given. The
(later) alleged invention consists of the selection of a particular radical or particular group of
radicals from amongst the generic class, where the selected radical or group of radicals were
not specifically disclosed in the prior-art document. The resulting compounds are described
as having a new, advantageous property, say as adhesives, not possessed by the prior-art
examples.
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
According to case law of the German Federal Court of Justice (“Bundesgerichtshof”) and
German Federal Patent Court (“Bundespatentgericht”), the invention in Example 1 is novel.
Example 1 falls into the category “selection from a group of chemical compounds which are
disclosed by a chemical structural formula”.
In Example 1 the state of the art is determined inter alia by substituent R, which embraces all
alkyl or aryl radicals. Because there is an indefinite number of such alkyl or aryl radicals, the
simply reference of this group does not constitute prior publication prejudicial as to novelty
with regard to a specific alkyl or aryl radical. If a chemical substance is given a general
name this can be prejudicial to the novelty of its sub-groups. However this is not the case if
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this general nature of the name means that a person skilled in the art does not realise that this
specific sub-group is meant. Thus, if a chemical compound is only given a general name – as
is the case with all alkyl and/or aryl radicals, of which there is an indefinite number – this
does not disclose all individual specific alkyl and/or aryl radicals. The more alkyl and/or aryl
radicals that exist, the less likely a person skilled in the art will be able to discover the specific
sub-group using the general name.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
Example 2: In the selection that the inventor has made in example 1, i.e. specific compound
having a particular radical, or group of specific compounds having a selection of particular
radicals, the resulting compounds may be:
(I) neither described as having nor shown to possess any advantageous properties (as
adhesives) not possessed by specific prior art examples;
(II) described as possessing advantages properties compared with the compounds
specifically referred to in the prior art, but these properties are ones which the person
skilled in the art would expect such compounds to possess, so that he is likely to be led
to make this selection; or
(III) described as having advantages (adhesives) properties but there are no indications
which would lead the person skilled in the art to this particular selection as opposed to
any other members of the generic class in order to achieve the advantageous (adhesives)
properties.
If one assumes that the subject described in Example 1 is novel the following will be the
case:
(I) does not entail an inventive step. A selective invention is only based on an inventive step
if the selection is not obvious to a person skilled in the art on the basis of the state of
the art. The selected range or the selected sub-group does not possess any particularly
advantageous and/or surprising effect and/or property. Thus, (i) is merely an arbitrary
selection of an individual sub-group which does not possess any advantageous effect
and is hence not inventive.
(II) does not entail an inventive step either. However, although the selective sub-group has a
particularly advantageous effect, this is obvious to the skilled person.
(III) does entail an inventive step. Here the selected sub-group has a particularly advantageous
effect which is not obvious to a person skilled in the art according to the state of the art.
Thus the selection was not obvious to the skilled person. In (iii) it is only possible to protect
the specific use of the sub-group.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
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Sufficiency of disclosure within the meaning of German patent law does not require all
alkyl and/or aryl radicals which possess a particularly advantageous effect to be named
individually. It is sufficient for the sub-group of the alkyl and/or aryl radicals which have this
effect to be disclosed as such. However, if individual and/or aryl radicals of the disclosed
sub-group do not possess these effects there is no inventive step.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Example 3: In the selection that our inventor has made, the claim extends to the use of a
particular compound arising from a selection as an adhesive (where the adhesive nature of
the compound is the advantageous property not possessed by the prior disclosed generic
class of compounds). A competitor manufactures the claimed compound and supplies it with
no instructions as to its use.
This is not a patent infringement under German law.
If only the specific use of a substance is protected by the selective invention, under German
law simply offering and/or manufacturing the substance which is suitable for this purpose is
not a literal infringement of patent law. Further, a use patent is not infringed literally if a third
party which has manufactured and/or offered the substance knew of the advantageous use
or intended to use the substance later for the protected use. A patent has only been infringed
if the third party acts so as to prepare the substance appropriately. Appropriate preparation
covers actions which make it clear that the product is suitable for the protected use. For
example, there is a literal patent infringement if the instructions for use state that the product
may only be used for the purpose protected by patent. The mere fact that the instructions for
use do not expressly issue a warning stating that the product may not be used for purposes for
which it has not been patented, cannot per se constitute a literal patent infringement. There
is only a duty to state that a certain use would constitute a patent infringement if this follows
from the principles of contributory patent infringement.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
In Germany it has been traditionally irrelevant, how much effort an inventor has spent in order
to find the invention. A sudden inspiration is as patentable as the result of difficult thoughts.
Different from US-patent law, which determines in accordance with the “written description
requirement” to what extend at the time the invention was made the inventor had invented
what is claimed, in accordance with German patent law it is not the subjective view oft he
inventor which is decisive, but the objective view of the skilled expert, i.e. a third party.
Legal certainty for the public is an important aspect n Germany, and avoid for the inventor
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(oriented at the extend of the effort spent) is less decisive. The skilled reader of a published
patent application shall be able to rely on his assumption, that only those subject matters can
be patented, which he understands upon reading the application. The same criterion is valid
with respect to the analysis of the state of the art. Everything what an expert understands
upon reading a prior art document cannot be subject of a patent. This criterion is also valid
for selection inventions.
The thoughts which are raised within this question are indeed irrelevant in Germany.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
The German group AIPPI believes that the German Federal Court of justice has been right
in not establishing a special dedicated case law for selection inventions. If a selection from
a larger interval, which is known in the art, may be new or not, is to be determined upon
the criterion, if an expert would have acknowledged the selection within the larger interval
without thinking, if he has been looking for a solution to a particular technical problem.
The German group AIPPI is of the opinion that a selection is known from a previously published
larger interval if an expert upon studying the prior art publications had acknowledged the
selection as a solution of the underlying technical problem with thoughts, which are oriented
at an implied object and its solution.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
The German group AIPPI believes that the before mentioned summarized criterion in
accordance with the German case law provides a basis for harmonization.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
The German group AIPPI has no further suggestions in this respect.
Summary
German law does not have any specific criteria for the patentability of inventions which according
to the working guidelines are “selection inventions”. An invention is considered to be novel if its
subject matter does not form part of the state of the art at the priority date. It depends on the
understanding of the person skilled in the art whether a selection invention forms part of the state of
the art in the light of a more general prior teaching comprising the selection invention. A selection
is based on an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person
skilled in the art.
The contrast thereto, the European Patent Office has developed specific criteria for the patentability
of selection inventions. However, the German Group is of the opinion that the German Federal
Supreme Court very rightly has not developed specific case law for selection inventions.
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Résumé
La loi allemande ne connaît pas de critères particuliers à l’égard de la brevetabilité des inventions
qui sont des « inventions de sélections » selon les directives de travail. Une invention est considérée
comme nouvelle si son objet n’est pas compris dans l’état de la technique à la date de priorité.
Qu’une invention de sélection fasse partie ou non de l’état de la technique au vue d’un enseignement
antérieur plus générale comportant l’invention de sélection dépend du point de vue de l’homme
du métier. Une sélection est basée sur une activité inventive si celle-ci ne peut pas être déduite par
l’homme du métier de façon évidente de l’état de la technique.
Au contraire, l’Office européen de brevets a établi des critères particuliers pour la brevetabilité des
inventions de sélection. Or, le group allemand considère que la Cour fédérale de justice allemande
a raison de n’avoir pas établi la jurisprudence particulière en ce qui concerne les inventions de
sélection.
Zusammenfassung
Das deutsche Recht kennt keine besonderen Kriterien hinsichtlich der Patentfähigkeit von
Erfindungen, die gemäß den Arbeitsrichtlinien als „Auswahlerfindungen“ anzusehen sind. Eine
Erfindung gilt als neu, wenn ihr Gegenstand am Prioritätstag nicht zum Stand der Technik gehörte.
Ob eine Auswahlerfindung deshalb zum Stand der Technik gehört, weil eine allgemeinere, die
Auswahlerfindung umfassende Angabe offenbart war, richtet sich nach dem Verständnis des
Fachmanns. Eine Auswahl beruht auf einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit, wenn sie sich für den Fachmann
nicht in naheliegender Weise aus dem Stand der Technik ergibt.
Im Gegensatz dazu hat das Europäische Patentamt spezielle Kriterien für die Patentfähigkeit von
Auswahlerfindungen entwickelt. Die Deutsche Landesgruppe ist allerdings der Auffassung, dass
der deutsche Bundesgerichtshof zu Recht für Auswahlerfindungen keine spezielle Rechtsprechung
geschaffen hat.
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Germany
Allemagne
Deutschland
Frage Q209
im Namen der Deutschen Landesgruppe
von Jochen Ehlers, Jan Dombrowski and Karsten Koeniger
Auswahlerfindungen – das Erfordernis der erfinderischen Tätigkeit,
andere Patentierungsvoraussetzungen und Schutzbereich
Fragen
Allgemein
Die Gruppen werden gebeten, die rechtliche Position bezüglich eines Patents für eine
behauptete Auswahlerfindung in ihrer Rechtsordnung in Bezug auf die folgenden Aspekte
zusammenzufassen:
1) Rechtliche Entwicklungen bezüglich Auswahlerfindungen
Welche spezifischen Arten von Erfindungen werden unter dem Konzept der Auswahlerfindungen
anerkannt und sind in Ihrer Rechtsordnung patentierbar? Haben Sie Beispiele für
Auswahlerfindungen in einem anderen Bereich als den chemischen, pharmazeutischen oder
werkstofflichen Bereichen?
Im Hinblick auf die Situation in Deutschland ist zunächst Folgendes festzustellen: Obwohl
es in Deutschland seit Jahrzehnten eine Diskussion über „Auswahl¬erfindungen“ gibt, wird
der Begriff von der deutschen Rechtsprechung kaum verwendet. Insbesondere der deutsche
Bundesgerichtshof sieht offenkundig keinen Anlass, für diese Art von Erfindungen eine
besondere Gruppenbezeichnung zu schaffen und sie nach gemeinsamen Maßstäben zu
beurteilen.
Die Möglichkeit, dass eine Auswahlerfindung im Sinne der Arbeitsrichtlinien patentfähig
ist, ist im deutschen Recht nicht auf bestimmte Arten von Erfindungen beschränkt. Der
Bundesgerichtshof hat beispielsweise bei einer Maschine, für die im Stand der Technik
angegeben war, dass bei zwei bestimmten kreisförmigen Elementen der Radius des einen
kleiner als der des anderen sollte, eine Lösung als neu betrachtet, nach welcher der eine
Radius kleiner als der andere, aber größer als dessen Hälfte war (BGH, 19.05.1981, GRUR
1981, 812, 814 – Etikettiermaschine; BGH, 27.06.1972, BlfPMZ 1973, 170 - Legierungen).
2) Neuheit
Die Gruppen werden gebeten, jeden Punkt zu diskutieren, der bezogen auf die Neuheit von
Auswahlerfindungen berücksichtigt werden sollte. Ist z.B. lediglich das Herausmeisseln eines
Intervalls aus einer breiten Offenbarung im Stand der Technik ausreichend, um die Neuheit
einer Auswahlerfindung herbeizuführen? Ist ein anderer Vorteil oder eine andere Verwendung
oder der gleiche Vorteil mit einer unvorhersehbaren Verbesserung für eine Auswahlerfindung
erforderlich, um die Neuheit zu begründen?
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Nach unserem Verständnis der aktuellen Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs ist im
deutschen Recht zwischen der zahlenmäßigen Eingrenzung eines offenbarten Mengen- oder
Gewichtsbereichs und der Auswahl aus einer durch eine chemische Strukturformel offenbarten
Gruppe chemischer Verbindungen zu unterscheiden.
Allein die zahlenmäßige Eingrenzung eines offenbarten Bereichs kann die Neuheit im
allgemeinen nicht begründen. Nach der Entscheidung „Inkrustierungsinhibitoren“ des
Bundesgerichtshofs aus dem Jahre 1999 stellt die Nennung eines Mengenbereichs oder
Gewichtsbereichs eine vereinfachte Schreibweise der zahlreichen möglichen, zwischen
dem oberen und dem unteren Grenzwert liegenden Zwischenwerte dar. In ausdrücklichem
Widerspruch zu der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Patentamts (z.B. EPA, 10.09.1991,
T 666/89, GRUR Int. 1994, 59, 61 – Waschmittel) hat der Bundesgerichtshof erklärt, die
umfassende numerische Bereichsangabe in einem Dokument enthalte daher grundsätzlich
auch eine gleichermaßen umfassende Offenbarung aller denkbaren Unterbereiche.
Ausnahmen von diesem Grundsatz kämen nur unter besonderen vom Anmelder näher
darzulegenden und gegebenenfalls zu beweisenden Umständen in Betracht. Ohne Bedeutung
sei, ob bestimmte Teilbereiche als vorteilhaft, zweckmäßig, oder bevorzugt gekennzeichnet
seien (BGH, 07.12.1999, GRUR 2000, 591, 593-594 – Inkrustierungsinhibitoren). Nach der
Entscheidung des Bundesgerichtshofs war daher im konkreten Fall der im angegriffenen
Patent beanspruchte Bereich von 15.000 bis 290.000 durch den in der Vorveröffentlichung
offenbarten Bereich von 500 bis 2.000.000 vorweggenommen. Worum es sich bei solchen
„besonderen Umständen“ handeln könnte, hat der Bundesgerichtshof nicht ausdrücklich
erklärt. Der Bundesgerichtshof hat allerdings auf einen Aufsatz Bezug genommen, in dem
erklärt worden war, dass insbesondere solche formal erfassten Varianten als nicht offenbart
anzusehen seien, die nach dem Stand der Technik noch nicht hergestellt werden konnten.
Zum Verständnis der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshof ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass sich
der Offenbarungsgehalt eines Dokuments bei der Neuheitsprüfung nach der Rechtsprechung
des Bundesgerichtshofs nach denselben Maßstäben bestimmt wie der Offenbarungsgehalt
einer Patent¬anmeldung bei der Prüfung der die Zulässigkeit von Änderungen begrenzenden
Ursprungsoffenbarung (BGH, 19.05.1981, GRUR 1981, 812, 814 – Etikettiermaschine). Im
Hinblick auf die Zulässigkeit von Änderungen einer Patentanmeldung hat der Bundesgerichtshof
mehrfach erklärt, dass mit der Angabe eines bestimmten Bereiches grundsätzlich alle
innerhalb der Grenzwerte liegenden Zwischenwerte und alle daraus beliebig gebildeten
Teilmengen ausreichend offenbart seien (BGH, 12.05.1992, GRUR 1992, 842, 845 –
Chrom-Nickel-Legierung). So hat der Bundesgerichtshof in einem Patenterteilungsverfahren
die Einschränkung eines in der ursprünglichen Patentanmeldung offenbarten Bereichs von
„bis zu 50 ppm“ auf „weniger als 10 ppm“ zugelassen (BGH, 20.03.1990, GRUR 1990,
510, 512 – Crackkatalysator). Für die Frage der eine Beschränkung des Patentanspruchs
im Erteilungsverfahren erlaubende Offenbarung der Erfindung spiele es insbesondere keine
Rolle, ob etwas in der Beschreibung gegenüber anderen offenbarten Lösungen als vorteilhaft,
zweckmäßig oder bevorzugt bezeichnet sei (BGH, 20.03.1990, GRUR 1990, 510, 512 –
Crackkatalysator).
Im Hinblick auf chemische Verbindungen hat der Bundesgerichtshof in der Entscheidung
„Olanzapin“ aus dem Jahre 2008 erklärt, durch die Mitteilung einer Strukturformel seien die
darunter fallenden einzelnen Verbindungen als solche nicht offenbart. Zu der Offenbarung
der einzelnen Verbindung bedürfte es Angaben, die den Fachmann ohne weiteres in die Lage
versetzten, den betreffenden Stoff in die Hand zu bekommen. Um eine einzelne Verbindung
dem Fachmann „in die Hand zu geben“, bedürfe es in der Regel weitergehender Informationen
insbesondere zu ihrer Individualisierung. Als offenbart könne eine nicht ausdrücklich genannte
einzelne Verbindung nur dann gelten, wenn der Fachmann sie „mitlese“, etwa weil sie ihm
als die übliche Verwirklichungsform der genannten Strukturformel geläufig ist und sich ihm
daher sofort als jedenfalls auch gemeint aufdränge, wenn er die Strukturformel lese. Der
Bundesgerichtshof sieht sich mit dieser allgemeinen Beurteilung des Offenbarungsgehalts
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chemischer Formeln im Wesentlichen in Einklang mit der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen
Patentamts (z.B. EPA, 19.02.2003, T 940/98 „Diastereomere“), nach der nur solche
technischen Lehren neuheitsschädlich seien, die einen Stoff als zwangsläufiges Ergebnis eines
vorbeschriebenen Verfahrens oder in spezifischer, d.h. individualisierter, Form offenbaren
(BGH, 16.12.2008, X ZR 89/07 – Olanzapin).
Das Auffinden bisher nicht erkannter Eigenschaften, Wirkungen und Vorteile kann nach
der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs auch bei chemischen Stoffen die Neuheit eines
bekannten, eindeutig identifizierten und bereits herstellbaren Stoffes nicht begründen (vgl.
BGH, 17.01.1980, GRUR 1980, 283, 285 – Terephthalsäure; vgl. BGH, 11.07.1985, GRUR
1986, 163, 164 – Borhaltige Stähle). Ist der ausgewählte Stoff als solcher vorbekannt, so
verbleibt dem Anmelder nur die Möglichkeit, dessen überraschende Eigenschaften über ein
Verwendungspatent unter Schutz zu stellen.
3) Erfindungshöhe oder Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit
Die Gruppen werden gebeten, die Anforderungen an Erfindungshöhe oder Nicht-
Offensichtlichkeit in ihrer Rechtsordnung zu diskutieren. Falls experimentelle Daten verwendet
werden, um die Anforderung der Erfindungshöhe oder Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit zu stützen,
können sie nach der ursprünglichen Patentanmeldung eingereicht werden? Gibt es
Voraussetzungen oder Beschränkungen bezüglich der späten Einreichung von Daten?
Auch im Hinblick auf das Erfordernis der erfinderischen Tätigkeit gelten die allgemein
gültigen Grundsätze. Eine „Auswahl“ beruht auf einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit, wenn sie sich
für den Fachmann nicht in naheliegender Weise aus dem Stand der Technik ergibt. Die
erfinderische Tätigkeit ist insbesondere dann zu bejahen, wenn die Auswahlerfindung aus
der Sicht des Fachmanns zum Prioritätszeitpunkt eine besondere, überraschende oder nicht
vorhersehbare Wirkung oder Eigenschaft hat (vgl. Bundespatentgericht, 22.04.2008, 5 W
(pat) 431/07). Diese bestimmte Wirkung oder Eigenschaft (des auswählten Bereichs bzw. der
ausgewählten Variante) muss – im Vergleich zu dem nicht ausgewählten Bereich bzw. den
nicht ausgewählten Varianten – dokumentiert werden (Bundespatentgericht, 02.05.2007, 5
W (pat) 406/06). Liegt ein überraschender technischer Effekt nicht vor, sondern erstreckt
sich die erzielte Wirkung auf das zu Erwartende, so wird nach allgemeinen Grundsätzen
die Patentfähigkeit in der Regel zu verneinen sein (vgl. BGH, 20.3.2001, GRUR 2001, 730
– Trigonellin).
Im Hinblick auf chemische Verbindungen hat der Bundesgerichtshof in der Entscheidung
„Olanzapin“ aus dem Jahre 2008 erklärt, bei der Prüfung auf erfinderische Tätigkeit müsse
nicht stets der „nächstkommende“ Stand der Technik zugrunde gelegt werden. Ein Vorrang
eines nächstkommenden Standes der Technik bestehe nicht. Erst aus rückschauender Sicht
werde erkennbar, welche Vorveröffentlichung der Erfindung am nächsten kommt und wie
der Entwickler hätte ansetzen können, um zu der erfindungsgemäßen Lösung zu gelangen.
Die Wahl des Ausgangspunktes bedürfe daher der Rechtfertigung, die in der Regel in dem
Bemühen des Fachmanns liege, für einen bestimmten Zweck eine bessere Lösung zu finden,
als sie der bekannte Stand der Technik zur Verfügung stelle. Der Bundesgerichtshof hat damit
zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass bei einer einzelnen Verbindung, die unter eine vorveröffentlichte
Strukturformel fällt, diese Vorveröffentlichung keineswegs zwingend als Ausgangspunkt für die
Prüfung auf erfinderische Tätigkeit zu wählen ist. Selbst wenn die Erfindung also im nachhinein
als Auswahl aus einer vorveröffentlichten Gruppe von chemischen Verbindungen erscheint,
wird diese Auswahl nicht zwingend als die zu prüfende erfinderische Leistung angesehen.
Der Nachweis, dass der in der Patentanmeldung behauptete Erfolg herbeigeführt werden
kann, kann vom Patentamt jederzeit verlangt werden (BGH, 20.03.1990, GRUR 1990, 510,
512 – Crackkatalysator). Das dürfte auch für Auswahlerfindungen gelten.
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4) Anforderungen an vollständige Offenbarung und/oder schriftliche Beschreibung
Die Gruppen werden gebeten, die Anforderungen an die vollständige Offenbarung oder
schriftliche Beschreibung in ihrer Rechtsordnung zu diskutieren. Diese Frage kann mehrere
Aspekte haben:
1) Die Schwelle für Vollständigkeit;
2) die zulässige Zeitvorgabe für die Einreichung von experimentellen Daten;
3) der Zeitrahmen, innerhalb dessen die Anforderungen an Vollständigkeit oder schriftliche
Beschreibung erfüllt sein müssen; und
4) die Breite des Anspruchsumfangs, die durch eine begrenzte Anzahl an Beispielen für
behauptete oder bewiesene Vorteile unterstützt werden kann.
Bezüglich Punkt (1) diskutieren Sie bitte, bis zu welchem Ausmass alle Mitglieder der durch
den Patentanmelder ausgewählten Klasse den erforderlichen Vorteil in Ihrer Rechtsordnung
aufweisen müssen. Gibt es ein absolutes Erfordernis, dass alle Mitglieder der ausgewählten
Klasse den relevanten Vorteil aufweisen, oder ist der Patentanmelder entschuldigt, falls ein
oder zwei Beispiele dahinter zurückbleiben? Ebenfalls bezogen auf Punkt (4) oben: Falls
ein neuer Nutzen als Auswahlerfindung behauptet wird, ist es ausreichend, eine bestimmte
Bandbreite oder Auswahl von Bestandteilen zu beanspruchen, von welchen gefunden wurde,
dass sie mit solch einem neuen Nutzen zusammenhängen, oder ist es notwendig, solch einen
neuen Nutzen in den Ansprüchen zu formulieren?
(1) Die Anforderungen an eine ausreichende Offenbarung einer Erfindung sind in
Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich verhältnismäßig gering. Der Bundesgerichtshof hat
wiederholt Patente, die auf Anmeldungen mit Offenbarungs- und Klarheitsmängeln basieren,
aufgrund mangelnder Patentfähigkeit (Neuheit und erfinderische Tätigkeit) für nichtig erklärt
(BGH, 01.07.1997, Bausch, Nichtigkeitsrechtsprechung in Patentsachen Bd. 1, S. 394 –
Kabelnebenstöreffekte). Der Bundesgerichtshof hat erklärt, um der Gefahr der Anmeldung
unfertiger Erfindungen vorzubeugen, bedürfe es keiner Verengung des Offenbarungsbegriffs.
Denn bei Bedenken, ob wirklich innerhalb eines gesamten Bereichs das behauptete Ergebnis
erreicht werden kann, könne das Patentamt jederzeit vom Anmelder den Nachweis verlangen,
das mit den unterschiedlichen Mengen tatsächlich der behauptete Erfolg herbeigeführt werden
kann (BGH, 20.03.1990, GRUR 1990, 510, 512 – Crackkatalysator). Wenn sich ergibt, dass
bestimmte Varianten den behaupteten Vorteil nicht haben, ist die Patentfähigkeit allerdings
insoweit zu verneinen.
(2)/(3) Der Anmelder muss gegebenenfalls nachweisen, dass die Erfindung am Anmeldeoder
Prioritätstag ausführbar war. Der Nachweis muss aber nicht schon in den ursprünglichen
Anmeldungsunterlagen geführt werden (BGH, 14.03.1972, GRUR 1972, 541 – Imidazoline).
(4) Soweit die Patentfähigkeit der Erfindung auf bestimmte Vorteile gestützt wird, sind die
Vorteile vom Anmelder darzulegen und, wenn sich Zweifel ergeben, durch Versuchsergebnisse
nachzuweisen. Wenn es sich bei einem beanspruchten Stoff um eine Gruppe von vielen
Verbindungen handelt, können Vergleichsversuche verlangt werden, die sich auf solche und
so viele Verbindungen (Vertreter der Stoffgruppe) erstrecken, dass es glaubhaft erscheint,
dass nach den aus den Versuchen gewonnenen Ergebnissen die geltend gemachte Wirkung
auch bei den übrigen der zu der Gruppe gehörenden Verbindungen eintritt (Schäfers in
Benkard, Patentgesetz, 10. Aufl., 2006, § 46 Rn. 17).
Der auf ein Erzeugnis gerichtete Patentanspruch braucht grundsätzlich den Verwendungszweck
nicht anzugeben. Richtet sich der Patentanspruch allerdings nur auf eine bestimmte
Verwendung, so ist diese zwingend im Patentanspruch anzugeben.
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5) Verletzung
Falls ein bestimmter Vorteil oder überlegene Ergebnisse der Grund für die Erteilung eines
Patents auf eine Auswahlerfindung sind, muss solch ein Vorteil oder überlegenes Ergebnis
implizit oder explizit durch einen Dritten genutzt werden, um eine Verletzung zu begründen?
Falls eine Auswahlerfindung als neue Verwendung beansprucht wird, was sind die
Anforderungen, um eine Verletzung zu begründen? Würde ein Hersteller eines Produkts, das
für die neue Verwendung verwendet werden kann, das Patent verletzen? Spielt die Absicht
eines angeblichen Verletzers eine Rolle bei der Bestimmung der Verletzung?
Wenn auf die Auswahlerfindung ein Erzeugnispatent erteilt worden ist, kann es für die Frage
der Verletzung keine Rolle spielen, in welcher Absicht beispielsweise die Herstellung des
Erzeugnisses erfolgt oder ob die von der Erfindung erstrebten Vorteile tatsächlich erzielt
werden oder nicht.
Wird die Auswahlerfindung allerdings nur durch ein Verwendungspatent geschützt, so ist
es Voraussetzung für die (unmittelbare) Verletzung, dass das Erreichen des patentgemäßen
Zwecks, also eines bestimmten Vorteils oder eines verbesserten Ergebnisses, zumindest
konkret vorbereitet wird. Handlungen, die der eigentlichen Verwendung vorausgehen, sind
daher nur dann von Schutz erfasst, wenn sie das Erzeugnis für die geschützte Verwendung
„sinnfällig herrichten“. Die „sinnfällige Herrichtung“ kann beispielsweise in der Beigabe einer
Gebrauchsanleitung oder einer Dosierempfehlung bestehen. Dies gilt für alle Arten von
Erzeugnissen (BGH, 21.11.1989, GRUR 1990, 505 – Geschlitzte Abdeckfolie).
Die Herstellung eines Erzeugnisses, das für die geschützte Verwendung geeignet ist, stellt
allein noch keine Verletzung dar. Dies gilt auch für die Herstellung in der Absicht, das
hergestellte Erzeugnis später für die geschützte Verwendung benutzen zu wolle
6) Politik
Die Gruppen werden gebeten, einen kurzen Kommentar bezüglich der Politik abzugeben,
die hinter dem Recht bezüglich der Auswahlerfindungen in ihren Rechtsordnungen liegt. Es ist
dann zu erörtern, ob derartige politische Erwägungen heute noch gelten oder nicht, da die
Technologie weiter fortschreitet.
Es gibt keine besonderen Erfordernisse für die Patentierbarkeit von Auswahlerfindungen.
Es gelten die allgemeinen Grundsätze. Eine Erfindung gilt als neu, wenn ihr Gegenstand
am Prioritätstag nicht zum Stand der Technik gehörte. Ob eine „Auswahlerfindung“
am Prioritätstag deshalb zum Stand der Technik gehörte, weil eine allgemeinere, die
Auswahlerfindung umfassende Bereichsangabe offenbart war, richtet sich nach dem
Verständnis des angesprochenen Fachmannes.
Um es plastisch auszudrücken: Die beiden Ansprüche „1. Verfahren. 2. Vorrichtung.”
beanspruchen zwar alle Verfahren und Vorrichtungen, offenbaren sie aber nicht zugleich. Denn
ein Fachmann erhält nicht die für die Offenbarung erforderlichen konkreten Vorstellungen,
einzelne, speziell konkretisierte Vorrichtungen und Verfahren unmittelbar und ohne weiteres
Nachdenken zu erkennen. An diesem Maßstab bemisst sich auch die Patentfähigkeit von
Auswahlerfindungen.
Aufgrund dieser allgemeinen Grundsätze wird auch klar, warum der Bundesgerichtshof sich
in seinen Entscheidungen nicht zu einer gesonderten Diskussion über „Auswahlerfindungen“
veranlasst sah.
Diese Erwägungen sind auch heute noch zutreffend, obwohl sich die Technologie weiterhin
verändert.
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7) Neuheit
Würde in Beispiel 1 im Stand der Technik die Offenbarung der Verbindungen, die die
generische Klasse von Resten enthalten, einen Anspruch auf eine spezifische Verbindung mit
einem bestimmten Rest oder eine Gruppe von spezifischen Verbindungen mit einer Auswahl
aus bestimmten Resten in Ihrer Rechtsordnung vorwegnehmen? Spielt es in der Analyse
eine Rolle, wie breit die vorher offenbarte generische Klasse von Verbindungen ist? Fiele
die Analyse also anders aus, falls die vorher offenbarte generische Klasse aus 1.000.000
möglichen Verbindungen besteht (von welchen sehr wenige spezifisch offenbart waren), im
Gegensatz zu etwa lediglich 10?
Example 1: Say a prior-art document discloses a chemical compound characterised by
specified structure including a substituent group designated “R”. The substituent “R” is defined
so as to embrace a generic class of broadly – defined functional groups such as all alkyl
or aryl radicals, either unsubstituted or substituted by a halogen and/or a hydroxyl group,
although for practical reasons only a very small number of specific examples are given. The
(later) alleged invention consists of the selection of a particular radical or particular group of
radicals from amongst the generic class, where the selected radical or group of radicals were
not specifically disclosed in the prior-art document. The resulting compounds are described
as having a new, advantageous property, say as adhesives, not possessed by the prior-art
examples.
Nach der deutschen Rechtssprechung des Bundesgerichtshofes und des Bundespatentgerichts
ist in Beispiel 1 der Erfindungsgegenstand neu. Der Gegenstand von Beispiel 1 unterfällt
der Fallgruppe “Auswahl aus einer durch eine chemische Strukturformel offenbarte Gruppe
chemischer Verbindungen”.
In Beispiel 1 wird der Stand der Technik unter anderem von dem Substituenten R bestimmt,
der sämtliche Alkyl- und/oder Aryl- Radikale umfasst. Aufgrund der unbestimmten Vielzahl
solcher Alkyl- und/oder Aryl- Radikale liegt in der allgemeinen Angabe dieser Gruppe keine
neuheitsschädliche Vorveröffentlichung hinsichtlich eines konkreten Alkyl- und/oder Aryl-
Radikals. Zwar kann eine lediglich allgemein gehaltene chemische Stoffbezeichnung auch
deren Untergruppen neuheitsschädlich vorwegnehmen, dies gilt jedoch nicht, wenn dem
Fachmann durch diese allgemeine Formel gar nicht die Erkenntnis vermittelt wird, es sei gerade
die konkrete Untergruppe gemeint. Wird also eine chemische Verbindung lediglich mit einer
allgemeinen Stoffbezeichnung, wie sämtlich Alkyl- und/oder Aryl- Radikale bezeichnet, von
denen eine unbestimmte Vielzahl existiert, so sind hiervon nicht auch alle einzelnen konkreten
Alkyl- und/oder Aryl- Radikale offenbart. Je mehr Alkyl- und/oder Aryl- Radikale bestehen,
desto weniger wird anzunehmen sein, dass der Fachmann die konkrete Untergruppierung
aufgrund der allgemeinen Formel und/oder Bezeichnung auffinden konnte.
8) Erfindungshöhe oder Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit
Würde in Beispiel 2 eine der drei Möglichkeiten eine erfinderische Tätigkeit über den Stand der
Technik in Ihrer Rechtsordnung darstellen? Ferner, falls etwa Szenario (iii) eine erfinderische
Tätigkeit über den Stand der Technik darstellen würde, welchen Schutzumfang sollte der
Erfinder erhalten können? Sollte der Erfinder per se Schutz für die Produkte erhalten können
(die diese vorteilhafte Eigenschaft aufweisen), oder sollte jeder verfügbare Patentschutz auf
die Verwendung der Produkte für die vorteilhafte Eigenschaft (als Klebstoff) beschränkt sein,
die der Stand der Technik nicht aufwies und die demgegenüber nicht offensichtlich ist?
Example 2: In the selection that the inventor has made in example 1, i.e. specific compound
having a particular radical, or group of specific compounds having a selection of particular
radicals, the resulting compounds may be:
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(I)
neither described as having nor shown to possess any advantageous properties (as
adhesives) not possessed by specific prior art examples;
(II) described as possessing advantages properties compared with the compounds
specifically referred to in the prior art, but these properties are ones which the person
skilled in the art would expect such compounds to possess, so that he is likely to be led
to make this selection; or
(III) described as having advantages (adhesives) properties but there are no indications
which would lead the person skilled in the art to this particular selection as opposed to
any other members of the generic class in order to achieve the advantageous (adhesives)
properties.
Geht man davon aus, dass der Gegenstand des Beispiels 1 neu ist, gilt Folgendes:
Im Fall von (i) liegt keine erfinderische Tätigkeit vor. Eine Auswahlerfindung beruht lediglich
dann auf einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit, wenn sich die Auswahl für den Fachmann nicht in
naheliegender Weise aus dem Stand der Technik ergibt. Dem ausgewählten Bereich oder
der ausgewählten Untergruppe kommt keine besonders vorteilhafte und/oder überraschende
Wirkung und/oder Eigenschaft zu, Es handelt sich daher bei (i) lediglich um eine willkürliche
Auswahl einer einzelnen Untergruppe, die im Verhältnis zur Obergruppe über keinerlei
vorteilhafte Wirkung verfügt und somit nicht erfinderisch ist.
Im Falle von (ii) liegt ebenfalls keine erfinderische Tätigkeit vor. Zwar kommt der ausgewählten
Untergruppe eine besonders vorteilhafte Wirkung zu. Diese liegt jedoch für den Fachmann
nahe.
Der Gegenstand von (iii) beruht auf einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit. In diesem Falle kommt
der ausgewählten Untergruppe zum einen eine besonders vorteilhafte Wirkung zu, die zum
anderen für den Fachmann nach dem Stand der Technik auch nicht nahe lag. Die Auswahl
war somit für den Fachmann nicht naheliegend. Bei (iii) kann jedoch lediglich die konkrete
Verwendung der Untergruppe geschützt werden.
9) Anforderungen an vollständige Offenbarung und/oder schriftliche Beschreibung
Bis zu welchem Ausmass müssen alle Mitglieder der durch den Patentanmelder ausgewählten
Klasse den erforderlichen Vorteil in Ihrer Rechtsordnung aufweisen? Gibt es ein absolutes
Erfordernis, dass alle Mitglieder der ausgewählten Klasse den relevanten Vorteil aufweisen, oder
ist der Patentanmelder entschuldigt, falls ein oder zwei Beispiele dahinter zurückbleiben?
Für eine hinreichende Offenbarung im Sinne des deutschen Patentrechts ist es nicht
erforderlich, dass sämtliche Alkyl- und/oder Aryl- Radikale, denen die besonders vorteilhafte
Wirkung zukommt, einzeln ausdrücklich genannt werden. Ausreichend ist vielmehr, dass die
Untergruppe der Alkyl- und/oder Aryl- Radikale, denen diese Wirkung zukommt, als solche
hinreichend offenbart ist. Sollten einzelne Alkyl- und/oder Aryl- Radikale der offenbarten
Untergruppe diese Wirkungen nicht zukommen, fehlt es jedoch an der erfinderischen
Tätigkeit.
10) Verletzung
Mit Verweis auf Beispiel 3, bis zu welchem Ausmass ist der Beweis der Kenntnis der
vorteilhaften Eigenschaft der Auswahl, oder die Absicht des Verletzers bezüglich seiner
Lieferung erforderlich, um in Ihrer Rechtsordnung eine Verletzung zu begründen?
Example 3: In the selection that our inventor has made, the claim extends to the use of a
particular compound arising from a selection as an adhesive (where the adhesive nature of
the compound is the advantageous property not possessed by the prior disclosed generic
class of compounds). A competitor manufactures the claimed compound and supplies it with
no instructions as to its use.
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Nach deutscher Rechtslage liegt bei Beispiel 3 keine Patentverletzung vor.
Ist lediglich die konkrete Verwendung eines Stoffes durch die Auswahlerfindung geschützt,
liegt allein im bloßen Anbieten und/oder Herstellen des für die Verwendung geeigneten
Stoffes nach deutschem Recht keine Patentverletzung. Ebenso liegt eine Verletzung des
Verwendungspatents nicht bereits dann vor, wenn ein Dritter im Falle des Herstellens und/
oder Anbietens des Stoffes Kenntnis von der vorteilhaften Verwendung hatte oder dabei
die Absicht hatte, den Stoff später für die geschützte Verwendung benutzen zu wollen. Eine
Patentverletzung liegt erst dann vor, wenn der Dritte Handlungen vornimmt, mit denen der
Stoff für die geschützte Verwendung sinnfällig hergerichtet wird. Ein sinnfälliges Herrichten
erfasst solche Handlungen, die deutlich machen, dass das Erzeugnis für die geschützte
Verwendung geeignet ist. So liegt beispielsweise eine Patentverletzung vor, wenn eine
Gebrauchsanweisung zur patentgeschützten Verwendung anhält. Allein der Umstand,
dass die Gebrauchsanweisung jedoch nicht ausdrücklich vor einer patentverletzenden
Verwendung warnt, kann keine Patentverletzung begründen. Eine Pflicht zur Kennzeichnung,
dass eine bestimmte Verwendung eine Patentverletzung darstellt, kann sich allenfalls aus den
Grundsätzen der mittelbaren Patentverletzung ergeben.
11) Politik
Die Gruppen werden gebeten in Bezug auf Beispiel 1 / 2 zu erwägen, ob es eine Rolle spielt,
wie viel Aufwand der Erfinder bei seiner Auswahl investiert hat, um ein rechtsbeständiges
Auswahlpatent zu begründen. Die Antwort auf diese Frage ist eng verwandt mit politischen
Erwägungen, die die Erteilung von Auswahlpatenten und den daran beteiligten Ausgleich
von Anreiz / Belohnung untermauern. Der Erfinder mag beträchtlich viel Zeit und Geld
beim Durchsuchen des ganzen Heeres an möglichen Verbindungen aufgewendet haben,
welche durch die im Stand der Technik offenbarte generische Klasse umfasst werden. Und
die bestimmte Auswahl, die er getroffen hat, mag einen Sprung vorwärts in diesem Bereich
darstellen. Sicher sollte der Erfinder für seine Anstrengungen belohnt werden und Schutz
erhalten? Andererseits könnte argumentiert werden, dass solche Erwägungen in einem
Zeitalter relevant gewesen sein mögen, als die Anstrengungen des Erfinders tatsächlich viele
Menschenjahre an sorgfältiger und akribischer Laborarbeit umfassten, aber nun in einem
Zeitalter von kombinatorischer Synthese zunehmend irrelevant sind, da eine grosse Vielfalt
von verschiedenen Verbindungen in einem Bruchteil der Zeit hergestellt werden kann. Sind
solche Erwägungen relevant?
In Deutschland spielt es traditionell keine Rolle, wie hoch der Aufwand des Erfinders zum
Auffinden der Erfindung war. Ein technischer Geistesblitz wird ebenso patentiert wie das
Ergebnis mühevoller Überlegungen. Anders als beispielsweise im US-amerikanischen
Patentrecht, bei dem das „written description requirement“ darauf abstellt, in welchem
Umfang zum Erfindungszeitpunkt der Erfinder Erfindungsbesitz besaß, wird im deutschen
Patentrecht nicht auf die subjektive Sicht des Erfinders, sondern auf die objektive Sicht des
Durchschnittsfachmanns, also eines Dritten abgestellt. Im Vordergrund steht weniger ein am
Maßstab des Bemühens orientierter Belohnungsgedanke, sondern mehr die Rechtssicherheit
für die Öffentlichkeit. Ein fachkundiger Leser einer offengelegten Patentanmeldung soll sich
darauf verlassen können, dass nur diejenigen Gegenständ einer Anmeldung zu einem
Patent erteilt werden können, die in der Gesamtheit der Anmeldungsunterlagen offenbart
sind. Der gleiche Maßstab gilt für die Beurteilung des Standes der Technik: Alle Kenntnisse,
die ein Fachmann aus einer Veröffentlichung gewinnen kann mögen für eine Patentierung
ausscheiden. Dieser Maßstab gilt auch für Auswahlerfindungen.
Die in der Frage aufgeworfenen Überlegungen sind in Deutschland in der Tat irrelevant.
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Harmonisierung
12) Die Gruppen werden gebeten zu analysieren, was die harmonisierten Standards für die
Patentierbarkeit von Auswahlerfindungen sein sollten. Insbesondere sollte auf die oben in
Q1-Q6 diskutierten Themen und die in Q7-Q10 diskutierten Beispiele verwiesen werden.
Die Deutsche Landesgruppe ist der Auffassung, dass der Deutsche Bundesgerichtshof zu
Recht für Auswahlerfindungen keine spezielle Einzelrechtsprechung geschaffen hat. Ob eine
Auswahl aus einem im Stand der Technik bekannten Intervall neu ist oder nicht, bemisst sich
daran, ob ein Durchschnittsfachmann ohne Nachzudenken die Auswahl aus dem größeren
Intervall erkannt hat, wenn sie sich ihm als eine vorstellbare Realisierung zur Lösung einer
technischen Aufgabe darstellt.
Die Deutsche Landesgruppe ist insgesamt der Auffassung, dass eine Auswahl dann mit dem
die Auswahl umfassenden Bereich neuheitsschädlich aus dem Stand der Technik bekannt
ist – und demnach keine Erfindung mehr sein kann – wenn der Fachmann beim Studium
der Vorveröffentlichung die Auswahl mit Überlegungen, als Lösung des zugrundeliegenden
Problems zu erkennen vermag, die an eine für den Fachmann erkennbar implizierten Aufgabe
und deren Lösung orientiert sind.
13) Die Gruppen werden ebenfalls gebeten, Aspekte für Harmonisierung zu empfehlen, die in
Q11 oben nicht enthalten sind.
Die Deutsche Landesgruppe ist der Auffassung, die in der vorstehenden Antwort
zusammengefassten Erwägungen der deutschen Rechtsprechung stellen eine Grundlage für
eine Harmonisierung dar.
14) Die Gruppen werden gebeten, weitere denkbare Aspekte zu skizzieren, die es wert sind, in
der AIPPI bezüglich Auswahlerfindungen diskutiert zu werden.
Die Deutsche Landesgruppe hat keine weiteren Vorschläge in dieser Hinsicht.
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Hungary
Hongrie
Ungarn
Report Q209
in the name of the Hungarian Group
by Marcell KERESZTY, Judit KERÉNY, Zoltán KOVÁRI, Daisy MACHYTKA–FRANK,
Attila MÁNDI, Imre MOLNÁR, Tivadar PALÁGYI, Imre RAVADITS,
Éva SOMFAI, Zsolt SZENTPÉTERI and Miklós TAR
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
Inventions recognized under the concept of selection inventions in Hungary are those based
on an inventive selection of individual elements, sub-sets, or sub-ranges, which have not been
explicitly disclosed previously from a larger known group, set or range (in the following:
generic class).
Selection inventions are patentable in all technical fields in Hungary, provided that the general
patentability criteria are met. Selection inventions are usually in the chemical, pharmaceutical
or material science fields, and there are very few examples of selection inventions in other
technical areas. One of the most typical selection inventions is a single compound selected
from a broad group of compounds.
In relation to inventions based on a new use of a chemical compound or material, three
alternatives are conceivable:
a) The chemical compound or material was explicitly disclosed in the prior art and a new
use thereof has been found.
These inventions relate usually to second or subsequent medical uses or indications,
and are generally not considered to fall under the concept of selection invention (in
the following: “new use of a known compound”). We still deal with this case
in some points of our report, as such inventions are somewhat related to the concept of
selection inventions.
b) The chemical compound or material is within the generic class without being explicitly
disclosed in the prior art, and a new use is the basis of the selection.
This is a classical selection invention (in the following: “new use of a selected
compound”).
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c) The chemical compound or material was explicitly disclosed in the prior art and a range
of general ways of use is the generic class.
This is also considered to fall under the concept of selection invention. If a range of
general ways of use of a known chemical compound or material is known in the prior
art, an invention relating to a particular “usage” or “dose” of e.g. a medical product is
regarded as a selection invention relating to that particular use of the given product (in
the following: “selected use of a known compound”).
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
A selection invention is considered to be novel if the selected elements, sub-sets or sub-ranges
have not been explicitly disclosed previously, and their disclosure can not be directly and
unequivocally derived from the generic class.
Advantages, unpredictable improvements are not relevant to novelty.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
A selection invention is based on an inventive step if the selection exhibits advantages, superior
results or unpredictable improvements such as new utility not disclosed for the generic class.
Experimental data can be used to back up the inventive step requirement and it can be
submitted even after the filing date. However, at least a qualitative reference to said
experimental data must be present in the application on the filing date.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
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1) the threshold for sufficiency
All members of the class selected by the patentee are required to possess the requisite
advantage in Hungary. As the advantage is the basis of the selection, being also the
essence of the inventiveness, this is an absolute requirement, none of the examples may
fall short.
High probability has to be showed that a range selected from a generic class possesses
the requisite advantage. The required threshold for sufficiency varies depending on the
given technical field. If e.g. a temperature range is selected from a much broader range,
it has to be evidenced at least via examples that some values of this selected temperature
range possess the requisite advantage. In case of a group of selected compounds
covered by a generic formula, limited generalisation is allowed, and practically only the
exemplified compounds and their closest analogues can be claimed.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
Experimental data can be filed during the pendency of an application, i.e. even after the
filing date. Furthermore, experimental data can also be filed during nullity proceedings.
Such data can serve to distinguish the selection invention from the prior art by providing
evidence of advantages, superior results or unpredictable improvements.
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied;
Sufficiency or written description requirements must be satisfied on the filing date.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages
According to a long established Hungarian practice, at least one example is required for
each practical “sub-range” in the claimed range of possible embodiments in order that
the claimed scope is sufficiently supported by the description. The applicable sub-ranges
are generally determined by the practice of the Hungarian Patent Office. The number of
examples must be enough to evidence that the selection works indeed.
Generally, the more examples are given, the more well-founded support is present for
the claimed scope.
If a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular
range or selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a
new utility or would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
a) The invention relates to a “new use of a known compound”: it is necessary
to recite the utility in the claims (typically: Swiss type claims).
b) The invention relates to a “new use of a selected compound”: it is sufficient
to claim a particular range without reciting the utility (typically: product protection
claims).
c) The invention relates to a “selected use of a known compound”: it is
necessary to recite the utility in the claims, as this utility is the basic inventive feature
(typically: dosage claims).
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
No.
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If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
a) The claimed invention relates to a “new use of a known compound”:
manufacturer is not infringing.
b) The claimed invention relates to a “new use of a selected compound”:
manufacturer is infringing.
c) The claimed invention relates to a “selected use of a known compound”:
manufacturer is not infringing.
As to points a) and c), manufacturing might qualify as a contributory infringement (if all the
conditions of contributory infringement are fulfilled), for which the same legal consequences
apply as for direct infringement. In such cases the intention of the alleged infringer may play
a role (see AIPPI Resolution Q204).
Furthermore, a patent owner may also request an injunctive relief
– against any person whose services are used for the infringing activities, and
– against acts directly threatening with infringement.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
The policy according to answer to Q1 above is presently valid in Hungary. This policy seems
not to be affected by the development of technology. The general examination and nullification
rules apply to patenting selection inventions. However, generally speaking, inventive step is to
be substantiated more profoundly in these cases. On the other hand, there is only a sporadic
case law in Hungary for patenting selection inventions and for enforcing these patents.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
According to the Hungarian practice, the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the
generic class of radicals usually does not anticipate any claim to a specific compound having
a particular radical, or group of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals.
With reference to Q2 above, the analysis of novelty is not influenced by how wide the prior
disclosed generic class of compounds is.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
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property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
Scenario (i) would certainly constitute an inventive step over the prior art in Hungary, which
is not the case for scenarios (ii) and (iii) as there are no distinguishing advantages in those
cases.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
See our answer to Q4(1) above.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
No such knowledge is required to find infringement in Hungary.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
In the opinion of the Hungarian Group, the extent of efforts as such should not be taken
into account in the granting procedure, as this aspect is not “rewarded” for other types of
inventions either. The general examination rules should apply to the selection inventions.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
For novelty, inventive step and sufficiency the harmonised standards should be in line with the
answers to Q2 to Q4 above.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
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Summary
Selection inventions are patentable in all technical fields in Hungary, provided the general
patentability criteria are met. A selection invention is based on an inventive step if the selection
exhibits advantages, superior results or unpredictable improvements such as a new utility not
disclosed for the generic class. All members of the selected range are required to possess the
requisite advantage. At least one example is to be disclosed for each practical “sub-range” in the
selected range of possible embodiments in order that the claimed scope is sufficiently supported
by the description. The number of examples must be enough to evidence that the selection works
indeed.
Résumé
Les inventions de sélection sont brevetables en Hongrie dans tous les domaines techniques, à
condition de satisfaire aux critères généraux de brevetabilité. Une invention de sélection est fondée
sur une activité inventive si la sélection présente des avantages, des résultats supérieurs ou des
améliorations imprévisibles tels qu’un usage nouveau encore non exposé pour la classe générique.
Tous les membres de la gamme sélectionnée doivent posséder l’avantage revendiqué. Il faut exposer
au moins un exemple pour chaque sous-ensemble de l’ensemble sélectionné des applications
possibles afin que l’objectif revendiqué soit fondé de manière suffisante sur la description. Le
nombre des exemples doit être suffisant pour mettre en évidence que la sélection est véritablement
opératoire.
Zusammenfassung
Auswahlerfindungen sind patentierbar auf allen technischen Gebieten in Ungarn, wenn die
Erfindung sonst der allgemeinen Kriterien der Schutzfähigkeit entspricht. Die Auswahlerfindung
beruht auf erfinderischer Tätigkeit, wenn die Auswahl Vorteile, vorzüglichere Eigenschaften
oder unvorsehbare Verbesserungen, wie z.B. eine neue, auf die generelle Klasse bisher nicht
beschriebene Anwendung aufweist. Alle Ausführungsformen des ausgewählten Bereiches
müssen den gewünschten Vorteil besitzen. Es ist mindestens ein Beispiel für jeden praktischen
“Unterbereich” in dem ausgewählten Bereich der möglichen Ausführungsformen zu präsentieren,
damit die Beschreibung den beanspruchten Schutzumfang ausreichend unterstützt. Die Anzahl der
Beispiele soll genügend sein um die Funktionsfähigkeit der Erfindung beweisen zu können.
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Indonesia
Indonésie
Indonesien
Report Q209
in the name of the Indonesian Group
by Arifia J. Fajra
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
According to our National Law of Intellectual Property Rights, on the Articles 1 (2) of
Indonesian Paten Law no. 14/2001, it is stated that “Invention shall mean an Inventor’s idea
that is poured in any activity of solving a specific problem in the field of technology, either
in the form of a product or process, or an improvement and development of a product or a
process.”
“An improvement of a product” may be made from an inventive selection from field that is
already known.
With respect to the subject matter of invention, Indonesian Patent Law no. 14/2001 only
stipulates concerning the patentability requirement of a patent (Article 2 (1)) and some criteria
for invention that shall not be granted (Article 7).
Quotes Article 2 (1) :
A Patent shall be granted to an Invention, which is novel, involves an inventive step and is
susceptible of industrial application.
Quotes Article 7 :
A Patent shall not be granted to an Invention regarding:
a. any process or product of which the announcement and use or implementation contravenes
the prevailing rules and regulations, religious morality, public order or ethics;
b. any method of examination, treatment, medication, and/or surgery applied to humans
and/or animals;
c. any theory and method in the field of science and mathematics; or
d.
i. all living creatures, except micro-organism
ii. any biological process which is essential in producing plant or animal, except nonbiological
process or microbiological process.
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Therefore, the are no provision stipulating concerning the specific types of inventions that are
recognized under the concept of selection invention (from a field that is already known) and
are patentable in our jurisdiction.
In our experience, generally the selection invention is in a filed of chemical, pharmaceuticals,
and material science fields. However, selection inventions can also be found in engineering
and manufacturing processes, biotechnology, and telecommunications
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
According to the Article 3 of Indonesian Paten Law no. 14/2001, it is stated that:
(1) An Invention shall be considered novel, if at the date of filing of the Application said
Invention is not the same with any previous technological disclosure.
(2) A technological disclosure as referred to in paragraph (1) is one which has been
announced in Indonesia or outside Indonesia in writing, by a verbal description or by a
demonstration, or in other ways, which enable a skilled person to implement the Invention
before;
a. the Filling Date, or
b. the priority rate.
(3) The previous technological disclosure as referred to in paragraph (1) includes the
documents of Applications filed in Indonesia, which have been published on or after
the Filing Date of Application being substantively examined and which have a Filing
Date that is prior to the Filing Date or priority date of Application being substantively
examined.
To make a selection invention to be novel, it is not sufficient only by merely carving a range
out of a broad prior art disclosure an invention. It is required as well a different advantage/
an improvement technical effects or use, or the same advantage with an unpredictable
improvement.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
According to the Article 2 (2-3) of Indonesian Paten Law no. 14/2001, it is stated that:
(2) An Invention shall be considered to involve an inventive step if said Invention does not
constitute something that is obvious to a person skilled in the art.
(3) The evaluation of whether or not an Invention constitutes something that is obvious must
be made taking into account the state of the art at the time the Application is filed or
which has existed at the time the first Application was filed, in case the Application is
filed on the basis of a Priority Right.
The experimental data used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness requirement
should be submitted when filing a patent application, or at the latest before the pending
patent application is granted. Provided that such experimental data does not extend the
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scope of invention as originally filed, and does not result in a different technical effects as
original filed.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
With respect to the written description requirements in our jurisdiction, Indonesian Patent Law
no. 14/2001, stipulates concerning the unity of invention, the amendment of invention, the
division of a patent application.
Quote Article 21:
Each Application may be filed for one Invention only, or a number of Inventions that constitute
a unity of
Invention.
Article 35: Amendment of an Application
An Application may be amended by revising the description and/or the claims, provided
that such amendments do not expand the scope of Invention applied for the original
Application.
Article 36:
(1) An Applicant may request that an Application be divided if the said Application contains
a number of Inventions that do not constitute a unity of Invention as referred to in Article
21.
(2) The division of an Application as referred to in paragraph (1) may be filed separately in an
Application or more, provided that the scope of protection applied for in each Application
does not expand the scope of protection applied for in the original Application.
(3) The request for the division of an Application as referred to in paragraph (1) may be filed
at the latest before the original Application is granted a decision as referred to in Article
55 paragraph (1) or Article 56 paragraph (1).
(4) The request for the division of an Application as referred to in paragraph (1) and (2)
which has fulfilled the requirements as referred to in Article 21 and Article 24 shall be
deemed to have been filed on the same date with the original Filing Date.
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(5) In the case an Applicant does not file the request for the division of an Application
within the period as referred to in paragraph (3), the substantive examination shall
only be conducted on the Inventions as stated in the sequence of claims in the original
Application.
All the amendment of specification should not extend the scope of invention as originally filed,
and should be filed, at the latest, before the patent application is granted.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
Yes, it should be explicitly utilized by a third party for an infringement to be established.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement?
The requirement to establish infringement is if the new use could be easily obvious from the
people skilled the art when reading the prior art.
Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe the patent?
Yes, if the invention only claimed the new use for a patent product, and such product has been
considered having the same composition with the prior art, and the method for manufacturing
of said product is also claimed by the prior art.
Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
Yes, the intention of an alleged infringer also plays role in the determination of infringement.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
The selection invention is actually intended to motivate the inventor to be more creative in
inventing and improving/developing a new technology or inventions based on the prior
technology, by solving the previous technical problem which can not be solved by the prior
technology it self. However, the concept of selection may not solely be used to claim a part
of technology which is not explicitly stated some part of invention that caused by the default
of the prior inventor
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group of
specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction?
Yes, the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of radicals could
anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group of specific
compounds having a selection of particular radicals. However, it will depend on how specific
that the compounds containing generic class disclosing the specific compound is, particularly
in the embodiments of its compounds. The compound that is having class that too generic,
for instance, the Marshkush formula (which is effectively concealed than clearly point out),
Desideratum or “free beer” claims, and claims which having to much parameter, could give
disadvantages to the compounds containing the generic class, since they are not clearly point
out the claimed subject matter.
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In the analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is –
i.e. would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000 possible compounds (very few
of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely, say, 10, would result in the
differ analysis. As cited above, the prior art disclosed generic class consisted of 10 possible
compounds will be clearly point out the more specific embodiment compound. Such prior art
could more advantageously anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular
radical, or group of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals than the
prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000 possible compounds.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction?
Scenario (iii) would constitute an inventive step over the prior art.
Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the prior art, what scope of
protection should the inventor be able to obtain?
The scope of protection that inventor should be able to obtain is a new improved product/
composition, or a new use of the compound/products.
Should the inventor be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have
this advantageous property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use
of the products for the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not
obvious over the prior art?
The inventor should be able to obtain protection for the products per se, and including a new
use of products for the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not
obvious over the prior art.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
All of the selected class should posses the relevant advantage.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Even the competitor supplies the claimed product without the instructions as to its use, however,
by manufacturing such claimed product, the competitor’s product could be considered
partially infringing the claimed invention.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
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ewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Such considerations are relevant enough, provided that those efforts are really invested by
the inventor in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
A Patent shall be really granted to an Invention, which is novel, involves an inventive step and
is susceptible of industrial application.
The compound that is having class that too generic, for instance, the Marshkush formula
(which is effectively concealed than clearly point out), Desideratum or “free beer” claims,
and claims which having to much parameter, could give disadvantages to the compounds
containing the generic class, since they are not clearly point out the claimed subject matter.
Such type of claims should be avoided and not allowed.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
- The significant limitation of scope of generic compounds in granted patent.
- The importance of “the susceptible of industrial application” criteria of a patent as one
of the patentability requirement.
Note:
It will be helpful and appreciated if the Groups follow the order of the questions in their Reports and
use the questions and numbers for each answer.
Summary
According to our National Law of Intellectual Property Rights, the most important aspect in judging
the patentability criteria in patent is that an invention should be novel, involves an inventive step
and applicable to industrial application. These requirements are valid for all kind of inventions in
any activity of solving a specific problem in the field of technology, either in the form of a product
or process, including “improvement and development” of a product or a process.
Presently our country does not have any further specific patent law related to selection inventions.
The selection invention is actually intended to motivate the inventor to be more creative in inventing
and improving/developing a new technology or inventions based on the prior technology, by
solving the previous technical problem which can not be solved by the prior technology it self.
However, the concept of selection may not solely be used to claim a part of technology which is not
explicitly stated in some part of invention that was caused by the default of the prior inventor.
In our opinion, to make a selection invention to be novel, it is not sufficient only by merely
carving a range out of a broad prior art disclosure an invention. It is required as well a different
advantage/an improvement technical effects or use, or the same advantage with an unpredictable
improvement (involves inventive step), wherein those improvements should be applicable to industrial
application.
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Italy
Italie
Italien
Report Q209
in the name of the Italian Group
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
In the Italian jurisdiction, selection inventions are recognized according to principles which
are essentially in line with the principles set forth by the Guidelines and the Case Law of the
Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office.
Examples of selection inventions are conceivable also in the mechanical and electrical fields.
For instance, in these fields selection inventions may concern individuation of specific physical
parameters, geometrical features, functional features, arrangements of parts, etc. within the
area of more general or broader disclosures
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
This group feels that the approach of the Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office
concerning the recognition of novelty should be followed also for selection inventions.
According to such approach, mere novelty should be acknowledged if the carved range is
unambiguously distinct from the prior art disclosure and embodies a purposive selection.
Inventive step should be evaluated separately.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
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According to the Italian IP code (Article 172 CPI), the description may be integrated with
experimental data, additional supporting examples, etc., during the prosecution the patent
application before the Italian Patent and Trademark Office, provided that the content of the
patent application is not thereby extended (Article 76 CPI). Once it is granted, the patent can
only be limited (under Article 79 CPI) and nothing else should be added.
This group feels that inventive step or non-obviousness of a selection invention may rely on
unpredictable technical effects or advantages in terms of either quality or quantity displayed
by the selected area.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
With respect to the threshold for sufficiency, this group feels that the extent of data
which should be provided in support to the alleged advantages must be commensurate
with the selection area in order that sufficiency of description be acknowledged; the
data provided should be statistically relevant in order to make the asserted advantage
credible for substantially all the members of the selected area.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
Submission of experimental data subsequent to the date of filing of the patent application
is allowable only if directed to support inventive step.
Submission of experimental data after the date of filing of the patent application with the
purpose of curing insufficiency of disclosure should be not admitted.
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
Sufficiency of disclosure should be complied with on the filing date of the patent
application.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
See above under point 4)1)
With regard to the question whether it would be necessary to recite in the claims the new
utility which is provided in support of the selection invention, this group feels that it is not
necessary if the claim regards a compound or a group of compounds which respond to
the novelty and inventive step requisites, allowing protection to product(s) as such.
However, according to the provisions of the Italian Law n. 78/2006 (Articles 3 and 4)
which implements the EC Directive on biotechnological inventions, the claims should
in any case recite the new biological utility if the object of the invention is an isolated
element of the human body or a DNA sequence.
If the selection invention concerns a new use of a known product, the new utility should
be recited in the product claim.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there
an absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage,
or is the patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item
4) above, if a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a
particular range or selection of components which have been found to be associated with
such a new utility or would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
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5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
It is the opinion of this group that if a selection invention is defined by a product claim directed
to a product as such, it would not be necessary for an infringement to be established that the
advantage or superior results that were the reasons for the grant of the patent be implicitly
or explicitly utilized.
Anyway, in the Italian jurisdiction, there is a consistent part of doctrine and case law according
to which such use should be put into practice by a third party for acknowledging infringement
because claims directed to a compound are always interpreted as bound to the use disclosed
in the patent application.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
This group feels that the policy underlying selection inventions is considered to be still valid
today vis-à-vis the continued advance of technology as many economically valuable products
and processes are results of selection operated in a wide area of generally known technical
information.
Moreover, selection inventions are considered to be a useful tool to limit the monopolistic
effects connected with broad speculative patent claims; in this respect, the cross-licensing
provisions on dependent patents contained in Italian law (Article 71 CPI) would favour an
equitable solution
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The answer to the first part of the question is NO.
As regards the second part, the number of compounds which are specifically disclosed
in support of the generic class representing the embodiments of the prior art, the number
of compounds falling within the prior general disclosure, on one side, and the number of
compounds which define the selected area, on the other side, are all relevant factors for
assessing novelty of a selection invention
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
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prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
The answer with regard to the question referring to example 2 are as follows: only scenario
(iii) would constitute an inventive step over the prior art.
With regard to all the other issues raised in this question, refer to the answers to question 5.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
The extent to which the members of the selected class possess the relevant advantage depends
on the broadness of the selected area; anyway, the data provided should be statistically
relevant in order to make the asserted advantage credible for substantially all the members
of the selected area.
Regarding the case where one or two examples fall short, this group is not aware of any
Case Law. The opinion of this group is that in case the number of examples that support the
selected area is statistically relevant, the fact that one or two compounds are shown not to
possess the relevant advantages should not cause invalidity of the claim. Italian judges would
probably exclude these one or two compounds from the scope of protection of the granted
claim by way of interpretation
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
In the Italian jurisdiction there is no specific provisions regarding contributory infringement
(as defined, for instance, in Art. 26 of the text of the Agreement on Community Patent,
Luxembourg 15.12.1989) and evidence therefor; however, the case law has considered in
several occasions indirect infringement.
The extent of evidence of the knowledge of the manufacturer of the infringing end use of the
product(s) he supplies is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and depends on the level of
information which are available to the manufacturer with regard to the relevant market.
General principles regarding evidence deriving from the Civil Code should apply.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
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irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
In the Italian jurisdiction, elements regarding how much efforts or painstaking laboratory
work is involved in reducing to practice any invention is irrelevant. This group is of the opinion
that the patent system should essentially reward inventiveness and, therefore, other factors
such as economical investment, costs and the way through which the invention is achieved
should not play a decisive role.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
As regards novelty and inventive step, this group is of the opinion that the practice and the
Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office should be adopted as a
standard for harmonization.
As regards sufficiency and written description requirements, further efforts should be devoted
in order to reach a reasonable harmonization among the different jurisdictions.
This would be important in particular for patent applications claiming priority from different
countries, and for achieving a reasonable level of consistency among the decisions in the
different jurisdictions
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
An item that could be taken into consideration for harmonization purposes and might
require further study is the establishment of common general criteria for the definition of the
dependency relationship between a patent for a selection invention and the patent from
which the selection is operated.
Summary
Selection inventions are patentable in the Italian jurisdiction according to principles which are
consistent with those adopted by the European Patent Office.
Novelty, inventive step and sufficiency of disclosure for selection inventions are recognized by
following essentially the same approach as for any other invention. The law allows integration of
the original application with additional experimental data and examples during the prosecution,
provided this does not have the effect of curing insufficiency of disclosure or of extending the
content of the original patent application.
In general, the claims of a selection invention should recite the new utility only if the selection
invention regards a new use of a known compound. However, if the selection invention regards a
DNA sequence or an isolated element of the human body, the utility must always be indicated into
the claims.
Infringement of a selection invention does follow the same rules as infringement of any other
invention, i.e. it is established in relation to the language of the claims. Contributory infringement,
although not specifically defined by the law, may nerveless be considered by the Court as indirect
infringement under certain specific conditions.
The Italian group feels that further harmonization with regard to selection invention should concern
a common standard of sufficiency of disclosure end written description requirements. Further study
could be devoted to the dependency relationship between the selection invention patent and the
patents wherefrom the selection is operated.
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Japan
Japon
Japan
Report Q209
in the name of the Japanese Group
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
According to the Working Guidelines, a selection invention is the selection of (i) individual
elements; (ii) sub-sets or; (iii) sub-ranges, which have not been explicitly disclosed previously
within a larger known set or range (Item 1 of the Working Guidelines).
In Japan, the patentability of a selection invention included in the category of above-mentioned
(i), (ii) or (iii) is discussed mostly in the chemical field, such as compounds, pharmaceuticals,
glass and resin compositions.
However, with regard to the issue of (iii) above, there are some legal precedents in other
technical field. For examples, in the case “a method for determining the amount of explosive
charge used in simultaneous confined blasting” or “a vibration control device”, the relationship
between selection of specific controlled variables or selection of specific numerical range
and patentability was the point of dispute (However, patentability has not been found in
either case). Therefore, with regard to the inventions which are defined by sub-range, even
in fields of other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science, selective inventions can
be found.
In Japan, however, the patentability of inventions defined by a numerical range is often
assessed by inventiveness in which optimization through numerical limitation is the main
question. In that sense, discussion over patentability of inventions defined by a numerical range
is often separated from the discussion of the patentability of selection inventions, because in
the latter, novelty from the standpoint of selection should be taken into consideration.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
Where prior arts simply show generic and inclusive or provide a large number of various
alternatives, and where there is no clear evidence to support the concrete effects of a specific
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alternative or combination (herein collectively referred to as ‚alternative‘), then a selection
invention claiming said specific alternative is often deemed to be novel and patentable. The
main reason for finding novelty of the selection invention in this case is that said specific
alternative has not been substantially disclosed by the prior document. In such cases,
different effects or same but unforeseeable and significant effects are not so important to find
novelty.
In Japan, however, when patentability of an invention is asserted on the ground that it is a
selection invention, different effects or same but unforeseeable and significant effects are
often strictly required to find patentability. It is because, in Japan, as stated in several old
court decisions, the patentability of selection inventions is considered as follows.
„With respect to a prior invention which expresses all or some of its structural elements as
a generic concept, a ‚selection invention‘ refers to an invention which is expressed with a
subordinate concept contained within that generic concept and which selects as its structural
elements those which have not been specifically disclosed in the publication of the prior
invention. Where this invention succeeds in generating a prominent effect not disclosed in
publications describing the prior invention; that is, an effect which is qualitatively different or
which is qualitatively the same but remarkable and outstanding compared to the effect of the
prior invention; said invention shall merit the admission of patentability as an invention which
is independent and separate from the prior invention.“ (1985 (Gyo-ke) No. 51)
The JPO Examination Standards show similar idea as described in the decision. In this
regards, when the applicant or right holder clearly asserts that the invention is a selection
invention, „a significant effects not disclosed in the prior arts; that is, different effects or same
but remarkable and outstanding effects compared to the effects led by the prior invention“ is
strictly required in the practice to find the patentability.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
There are no special criteria for determining inventive step in a selection invention. Rather,
decisions are made according to the same criteria applied to the normal inventive step in
other types of patents. However, as stated in the response to ‘Novelty’ above, when making
a clear assertion that the invention is a ‘selection invention’, there is a tendency in Japan to
rely on legal precedents and to require that there be an effect which is qualitatively different
or qualitatively the same but remarkable and outstanding, as well as strictly requiring the
description of said effect in the specification.
The admissibilty to submit experimental data to back up the inventive step after initial
patent filing depends upon the details provided in the specification and in subsequent
data submissions. This rule is basically the same for selection inventions and other types of
inventions.
For example, experimental data to prove an effect for which there is no description whatsoever
in the specification, or experimental data to prove an effect which, despite being described
in general terms, cannot be foreseen based on the common general technical knowledge of
a person skilled in the art, usually cannot be submitted after the initial patent filing. On the
other hand, submission of experimental data may be permitted subsequent to filing where
the performance of an effect which is similar to the alternative already described in the
specification serves to validate technical common knowledge with respect to the effect of a
different alternative which can be inferred based on the common technical knowledge of a
person skilled in the art.
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However, as stated above, when making a clear assertion that the invention is a ‘selection
invention’, there is a stricter requirement to adequately describe the experimental data in the
initial patent application and it is generally difficult to assert patentability via the subsequent
submission of experimental data because the selection invention is itself a selection of a
specific range of components from a range of components which has already been disclosed
and, as such, its patentability is very closely related to its advantageous effect.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
Selection inventions are subject to almost the same level of written description requirements
as non-selection inventions. However, in addition, selection inventions are required
to describe where their advantage lies relative to a prior invention (i.e. whether they
possess an inventive step) and in many cases they must describe experimental data to
prove this assertion
In order to assert or prove an advantage within the scope of a claim it is generally
necessary to provide enough embodiments in the specification to enable a person skilled
in the art to understand that said advantage can be acheived throughout the entire scope
of the claim. On the other hand, even if the number of specific embodiments disclosed in
the specification would be limited, this does not immediately mean that the scope of the
claim will be restricted. Under the JPO’s present operating guidelines, if an embodiment
shows that the a part of claimed invention does not have any advantage, it is not
permitted to claim the scope including such an embodiment. Inventions characterized by
numerical limitations are also required to prove the advantage thorough the entire scope
being claimed.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
Unless otherwise specified, experimental data must be appeared in the specification
at the time of filing and it is not possible to remedy insufficient descriptions by way
of subsequent experimental data submissions. However, if a person skilled in the art
is able to infer an advantage relative to a prior invention based on the description
in said specification or drawings, the advantage which has been argued and proven
by the applicant using experimental data in a post-filed written argument etc. may be
considered.
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
Said requirements must be satisfied upon filing of the application.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
Even when asserting a new utility, it is enough to claim a particular range or selection of
components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility and then it
is not usually necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
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would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
When a patent is granted for a substance, infringement of that patent occurs regardless of the
application in which the substance is used by a third party, and this judgment is also applied
to selection inventions as long as they are protected under a substance patent. Accordingly,
if a certain substance is patented as a selection invention, the act of manufacturing or selling
the substance is considered to be an infringement of that patent regardless of whether or
not the certain advantage or superior results which constituted the reason for the selection
invention are being utilized.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
The requirements for establishing infringement when a selection invention is claimed as a new
use are considered to be the same as those for establishing infringement of a common utility
patent. In other words, if a new use is patented for a certain product, any conduct involving
the manufacture or sale of products indicating that use would be deemed to constitute
infringement of the patent, and this also applies to situations where a selection invention is
claimed as a new use. Therefore, the act of manufacturing or selling products to be used for
the new use which indicate said use will infringe upon the patent, but the act of manufacturing
or selling products to be used for the new use which do not indicate said use will not infringe
upon the patent.
However, even the act of manufacturing or selling the product without indicating the use is
considered to infringe upon the patent when carried out in the knowledge that the party to
which the product is being supplied is using the product for the new use, although there are
no relevant legal precedents to date. In this sense, the intention of the alleged infringer plays
a role in the determination of infringement.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
No policy discussions have been held in Japan on how to handle selection inventions during
the prior implementation of the substance patent system or at any other time. It is therefore
unclear as to whether there were any policies behind the legislation relating to selection
inventions.
The problem with selection inventions per se is currently perceived to be a practical or
operational issue of whether or not they correspond to inventions described in publicly-known
documents (mainly patent documents).
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
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possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
If the prior invention was a very wide generic concept consisting of 1,000,000 compounds,
then a selection invention within that range would typically be readily admitted. Contrarily,
if the prior invention was very limited and contained, for instance, 10 compounds, then the
selection invention would typically be very hard to admit. That is because the extent to which
the contained compounds are limited determines how easy it is to confirm the properties of
compounds not disclosed in the prior invention.
The matter of whether or not a selection invention will be realized is therefore influenced by
how widely the prior invention is disclosed.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
Example (i) and (ii) would not constitute an inventive step but example (iii) would. Admitting
inventive step in example (iii) would result in the granting of a patent right with respect to not
only the product limited to that use but also to products not limited to that use. As such, the
subject of patent protection for products not limited to that use would be the products per se.
The scope of patent protection is, in principle, determined according to the description of
the patent claims (literal interpretation of each of the structural components and the doctrine
of equivalents) and this principle applies to both use inventions and selection inventions.
However, speaking in more specific terms, actions such as estoppel may occur as a result of
descriptions which are excessively limited or details of assertions made during examination,
and the scope of the patent protection may be subject to a limited interpretation due to
elements other than the actual structural elements described in the patent claim. This type
of specific interpretations also applies to the normal scope of protection and is not applied
exclusively to selection inventions.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
As is the case in example 2, even a general explanation of the invention’s advantages in the
specification would have to be demonstrated with a considerable number of embodiments in
order to satisfy the sufficiency requirement. On the other hand, even if the number of specific
embodiments disclosed in the specification would be limited, this does not immediately mean
that the scope of the claim will be restricted. Under the JPO’s present operating guidelines, if
an embodiment shows that the a part of claimed invention does not have any advantage, it
is not permitted to claim the scope including such an embodiment.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
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Even if a competitor has manufactured the claimed compound and supplied it with no
instructions as to its use, the act of manufacturing and selling the compound in the knowledge
that the party to which the product is supplied is using the product as an adhesive is
considered to infringe upon the patent. Therefore, in example 3, evidence of the knowledge
of advantageous property of the selection or intention of the infringer as to its supply would
be required to find infringement.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
With respect to examples 1 and 2, the matter of how the novelty and inventive step are
established in Japan is outlined in the responses to questions 7 and 8 above. In both cases,
the amount of effort invested in arriving at a selection does not constitute an element for
decision on patentability.
In Japan, the notion of ‘selection invention’ has been recognized by the courts of law, and the
JPO has also published the examination guidelines based on such courts’ decisions. However,
none of these precedents or guidelines admits any special treatment for ‘selection invention’.
The question of how much effort was invested in arriving at a selection is, in most cases,
equivalent to the question of how much trials and errors were made, and activities of trials
and errors in themselves are not considered creation of technical idea. Thus, in Japanese
practice, the amount of expended effort is not considered a contributing factor in grant of a
patent.
As a matter of policy, because ‘failures’ as such within the trial-and-error process are in
themselves of no positive use, granting a patent right simply on the basis of numerous failures
is beyond the power of the granting authorities and requires amendment to Japan’s patent
law, and we do not believe such an amendment would be able to gain public support.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
• Decisions on patentability should be made with the emphasis on whether or not the
subject invention exhibits an unforeseeable advantageous effect relative to the prior
invention, such as an effect which is qualitatively different or qualitatively the same but
remarkable and outstanding. In regards to decisions on novelty in particular, novelty
should be admitted when the prior invention does not specifically disclose the subject
selection invention, while decisions on whether or not the prior invention contains a
specific disclosure should be made in consideration of the common general technical
knowledge of a person skilled in the art, and not all matters which can be included in a
generally-worded description should be deemed as a specific disclosure.
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• The specification upon filing of the application must, in order to facilitate clear
understanding of the reasons for selecting the specific range and alternatives, contain
a description of data relating to the operational effect in support of said reasons. The
addition of other experimental data relating to said operational effect in order to further
support an assertion of inventive step shall essentially be taken into account even when
submitted during the examination process.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
• When asserting a qualitatively different effect as the advantageous effect: (1) is it
necessary to prove that the area lying outside of the selected range does not contain
said qualitatively different effect, or; (2) is it necessary to prove that the selected range
does not contain an effect which is qualitatively the same as that of the area lying outside
of the selected range?
• Does the criteria for determining the patentability of the selection invention differ
according to whether or not the inventors or applicants of the cited patented invention
and the selection invention are the same?
• In a selection invention for a new compound for pharmaceutical use, data relating to
pharmacological activity has been described in the specification upon filing but will an
assertion of inventive step indicating additional data on stability and adverse effects
in order to assert patentability in relation to the cited invention which discloses an
inclusive range (class) having the same pharmacological activity be admitted during the
examination process?
• Does the exercise of a patented selection invention (species patent) infringe upon the
cited patented invention (genus patent)? Also, does the exercise of a cited patented
invention which overlaps with the patented selection invention infringe upon the patented
selection invention?
• While the patenting of a new antigenic protein may result in the automatic granting of
a patent to its generic antibody, an invention of an antibody which targets a disease
involving the same antigen and which was designed to be used as a pharmaceutical
drug to counter said antigen has been admitted as being completely different from the
aforementioned generic antibody patent in terms of selectivity, humanization technology
and stability and has been granted a patent. Although the relationship between this
type of generic antibody invention and an antibody invention designed for use as a
pharmaceutical drug also ostensibly constitutes a species-genus relationship, should it be
deemed a selection invention and does the exercise of such specific antibody for use as
a pharmaceutical drug infringe upon the patent covering generic antibody?
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Mexico
Mexique
Mexiko
Report Q209
in the name of the Mexican Group
by Hedwig Lindner and Nahanny Canal
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
In Mexico, there are no laws, regulations or jurisprudence that expressly mentions selection
inventions. However, generally the Mexican Institute for Industrial Property (IMPI) follows
the criteria of the European Patent Office for determining whether selection inventions are
patentable. Therefore, a Mexican patent for a selection invention will normally be granted, if
the same invention is the subject of an EP patent.
We are not aware of examples of selection inventions in fields other than chemical or
pharmaceutical.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
To meet the novelty requirement, the applicant must do more than carve a range out of a
broad prior art disclosure.
Generally, IMPI follows the Guidelines for Examination of the EPO regarding the novelty
of selection inventions. These guidelines mention that a sub-range selected from a broader
numerical range of the prior art is considered novel, if each of the following three criteria is
satisfied:
• The selected sub-range is narrow compared to the known range.
• The selected sub-range is sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed
in the prior art and from the end-points of the known range.
• the selected range is not an arbitrary specimen of the prior art, i.e. not a mere embodiment
of the prior art, but another invention (e.g. a purposeful selection or new technical
teaching).
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The fact that an effect occurs only in the claimed sub-range does not, by itself, confer novelty
on that sub-range. However, a technical effect that occurs within the broader known range
may still be novel if it occurs to a greater degree within the selected range.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
IMPI generally follows the Guidelines for Examination of the EPO in deciding whether a
selection invention contains an inventive step, or is non-obvious. These guidelines state:
• The subject matter of a selection invention differs from the closest prior art to the extent
that it represents a selected sub-set or sub-range.
• There is an inventive step if the selection relates to a particular technical effect, and
if there are no hints that would lead a skilled person to the selection. (This technical
effect may be an effect attained within the broader known range, but to an unexpected
degree.)
• The examiner must inquire whether the skilled person would have made the selection,
or would have chosen the overlapping range, in the hope of solving the underlying
technical problem, or in expectation of some improvement or advantage. If not, the
claimed matter involves an inventive step.
Ideally, experimental data should be submitted with the description of the invention, as part of
the application. If necessary, the applicant can submit experimental data during prosecution
of the application. However, this data must relate to the description of the invention in the
original application. In other words, the applicant may not use experimental data to expand
the scope of the original claims, when considered as a whole.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
The description of the invention must be sufficiently clear and complete that it will be
fully understood by a person with average skill in the art, and where appropriate, it
must serve as a guide that a person with average skill in the art may use to practice the
invention. The description must also provide the best method known to the applicant of
practicing the invention when this is not clear from the description itself.
Normally, all members of the class selected are required to possess the requisite
advantage.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
As noted above, experimental data should be submitted with the description of the
invention, when the application is filed. However, there is no rule against the late
submission of experimental data – as long as the data does not expand the scope of the
original claims, when considered as a whole.
3) Time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be satisfied:
There is no express provision as to the time frame within which the sufficiency or written
description requirements must be satisfied. Therefore, it is preferable to satisfy the
sufficiency or written description requirements at the time of the application, if viable.
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3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
There is no express provision as to the time frame within which the sufficiency or written
description requirements must be satisfied. Therefore, it is preferable to satisfy the
sufficiency or written description requirements at the time of the application, if viable.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
Under Mexican law, the scope of the patent right is determined solely by the accepted claims.
The rest of the specification serves only to interpret these claims. Citing this provision, IMPI
has held that only literal infringement of a patent is prohibited. If the plaintiff proves literal
infringement, it need not show that the defendant obtained the advantage or superior result
which justified the granting of the patent. The mere manufacture or sale of the patented
product is enough.
There should be no infringement if a product has uses other than the new use covered by the
patent – as long as the defendant did not explicitly intend for the product to be used for the
new use.
The defendant’s intent is relevant only if the defendant is accused of selling an infringing
product. If the defendant is accused of manufacturing an infringing product, its intentions are
irrelevant.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
IMPI follows EPO examination criteria because the patent provisions of the Mexican Industrial
Property Law broadly resemble the corresponding laws of the member states of the European
Patent Organization.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
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The selection of compounds in Example 1 would be considered novel because the compounds
were not explicitly mentioned in the prior art document.
In determining novelty, IMPI will use the “two-lists principle” mentioned in the EPO Guidelines
for Examination. In other words, a selection from a single list of specifically disclosed elements
does not confer novelty. However, if a selection must be made from two or more lists of a
certain length to arrive at a specific combination of features, the resulting combination of
features, while not specifically disclosed in the prior art, is novel. In the pharmaceutical field,
for example, there is novelty if the selection invention results from the selection of specific
substituents from two or more “lists” of substituents in a known generic formula.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
In Example 2, only scenario (iii) constitutes an inventive step over the prior art. Normally,
the patent protection available would be limited to the products used for the advantageous
property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over, the prior art.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
All members of the class selected by the patentee must possess the requisite advantage. The
patentee is not excused if one or two examples fall short
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
To prove infringement of a use claim (Example 3), the patentee must show that its competitor
is directly or indirectly suggesting the claimed use.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
The validity of a selection patent does not depend on the amount of effort inventor has
invested in arriving at the selection.
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Netherlands
Pays-Bas
Niederlande
Report Q209
in the name of the Dutch Group
by Bas Berghuis van Woortman (chairman), Jaap Bremer, Ricardo Dijkstra, Lars
Huisman, András Kupecz, René Raggers, Paul Steinhauser, Ruud van der Velden and
Anne Marie Verschuur.
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
In accordance with the Working Guidelines, a selection invention is the selection of individual
elements, sub-sets, or sub-ranges, which have not been explicitly disclosed previously, within
a larger known set or range. In other words, a selection invention is directed to a species
of a genus that was already disclosed in the prior art. For patentability, the selection of the
sub-range of subject matter must have an improved technical effect. Selection inventions are
common in the pharmaceutical field, biotechnology, material science and chemistry. The
Dutch group found no examples in Dutch case law of selection inventions in other fields, such
as electronics or mechanics.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
Selection inventions deal with the selection of individual elements, subsets, or sub-ranges,
which have not been explicitly or implicitly mentioned, within a larger known set or range.
For novelty of a selection, it is required to determine whether the selection is disclosed in an
individualised (concrete) form in the prior art. The Dutch Courts follow the decision practice of
the EPO in this respect. Notably, the Court of Appeal in The Hague appears to have applied
an even stricter test for potentially novelty-destroying prior art by ruling in a recent case
(28 February 2008, docket no. 2007/272) concerning novelty of an enantiomer vis-à-vis a
racemic mixture, that the enantiomer was novel, since no one had prepared the enantiomeric
pure substance or had actually ‘had it in hand’ yet at the priority date.
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Selection from a single list of specifically disclosed elements does not confer novelty. Selection
from two or more lists of elements to come to a specific combination of features not specifically
disclosed in the prior art, confers novelty. An example of the above principle is the selection
of a specific chemical from a known generic formula having two or more lists of substituents
(e.g. R1 and R2, and wherein R1 and R2 can be H, Cl, OH, COOH, F etc.), whereby the
selected compound is the result of selection of specific substituents from the two or more lists
of substituents (e.g. wherein R1 = H and R2 = Cl).
A sub-range selected from a broader numerical range of the prior art is considered novel,
if a) the selected sub-range is narrow compared to the known range, b) if the selected subrange
is sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and
from the endpoints, and c) if the selected range is not an arbitrary specimen of the prior
art, but another invention (purposive selection, new technical teaching). The new technical
effect occurring within the selected range may also be the same effect as that attained with
the broader known range, but to a greater extent. For novelty, requirement c) is met when
the effect is a different effect, not necessarily a surprising effect (the latter being a matter of
inventive step).
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
For selection inventions, the normal test for inventive step applies. Dutch courts normally
apply the problem-solution-approach. This means that the selection must not be obvious to the
skilled person departing from the closest prior art and the objective technical problem.
Experimental data to back up the inventive step requirement can in principle be submitted
after the initial patent filing. Such experimental data can for instance be submitted
during opposition proceedings before the EPO and also during court proceedings in the
Netherlands. Experimental data can even be submitted during court proceedings in appeal,
as appeal proceedings in the Netherlands are de novo proceedings. The other party in
court proceedings can however object to late submission of experimental data on procedural
grounds, e.g. in the event that the data are submitted at the very last moment and the late
submission qualifies as a violation of due process or a violation of the principle of hearing
both sides of the argument.
For an example of late submission of data, see Court of Appeal of The Hague, 21 February
2008, docket no. 06/1466 (Ranbaxy v. Warner-Lambert), relating to a patent in which a
small group of compounds was selected from a large group of compounds and protected
(inter alia) atorvastatin. It was stated in the patent that the compounds in the selected group
possessed a surprising (improved) anti-cholesterol activity. This surprising activity was made
plausible on the basis of new tests, submitted after filing during the examination procedure of
the EPO. These new tests were accepted by the EPO and the Court of Appeal of The Hague
also accepted the surprising (improved) activity on this basis.
On a side note, the Dutch group notes that in Court of Appeal of The Hague 27 January
2009, case no. 105.005.369 (Sahajanand v. Angiotech), relating to the selection of the
compound paclitaxel for the coating of a drug eluting stent, it was decided that the patent
did not have to contain experimental data to prove that the product indeed works (although
the other party in court proceedings is allowed to submit experimental data proving that
the product does not work). Experimental data were however submitted after filing by the
patentee during opposition proceedings before the EPO.
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4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
The sufficiency of disclosure requirement in the Dutch Patent Act is the same as the
requirements under article 83 EPC. First of all, the Dutch group notes that it is not aware
of any case law invalidating a selection invention patent on the ground of lack of a
sufficient disclosure. In general, it may therefore be said that the sufficiency of disclosure
requirement does not go beyond what is examined by the EPO during prosecution and
that the threshold as such is not very high. For selection inventions, the threshold is not
expected to be substantially higher than for other inventions.
The position of the Dutch Courts regarding sufficiency of disclosure in general is that
if a skilled person, based on the description supplemented with his common general
knowledge is able to carry out the invention, the invention is enabled. There is no
additional requirement and the case law essentially requires an invention to “work”. The
Court of Appeal held in a recent case (27 January 2009, Sahajanand/Angiotech, cited
above, par. 11.2) that if the patent granting authority deems a patent “to work” it is up
to the plaintiff to show that it does not “work”.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
Presenting data to back up sufficiency of disclosure after initial filing is subject to the
same criteria as the filing of data for inventive step. Hence, reference is made to the
answer to Q3 above.
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
Although the Dutch Group is unaware of any case law to affirm this, the Dutch group
believes that the sufficiency of disclosure requirement entails that a skilled person should
be able to carry out the selection invention. The decisive date for fulfilling the sufficiency
requirement is the date of filing or priority.”
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
Again, in the absence of concrete case law, in principle, the Dutch Group believes that
experimental data to support a selection is not required, as long as the selection (and its
claimed benefits) actually works.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
There is no requirement in Dutch patent law that all elements of a claimed group must possess
the claimed advantages. There is a reasonable balance to be found. However, as a general
rule, the Dutch Group believes that for selection inventions (which are inventive due to the
advantages of the selected species) the requirements may be somewhat stricter, especially
where it concerns a narrow selection.
Further, the essential features of an invention must be disclosed in sufficient detail, so the
person skilled in the art knows how to put the invention into practice. Depending on the
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facts of the particular case, a single example may suffice - even where a very broad field is
claimed - where the patent contains sufficient information to allow the person skilled in the art,
using his common general knowledge, to perform the invention over the whole area claimed
without undue burden and without needing inventive skill. Reference is made to District Court
of the Hague 4 February 1998, BIE 1999, 13
The Dutch Group understands the last part of Question 4 to refer to the situation in which a
new use is the sole inventive aspect of a “selection” invention. As a preliminary remark, the
Dutch Group notes that this is not a real “selection invention” as explained above, but rather
an invention relating to a further use. Within the originally disclosed genus, the selected
compound or group of compounds would be nothing but non-inventive variants.
From this it follows, that claiming the novel (and inventive) use of a compound selected from
a genus which was disclosed for another purpose should be done in the form of a use-claim.
If the new use were to be claimed as a product per se claim, this would mean that the (prior
art relevant for the) genus would take away the inventive step of the species being nothing
but a non-inventive variant.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
In the absence of case law on this issue, the Dutch Group notes that a selection patent
might lead to a claim for a novel product, which is inventive due to a certain unexpected
improvement over the disclosed genus. The scope of protection of such product claim is
determined in accordance with art. 69 EPC and the Protocol. The essence of a product claim
is that it covers all uses of the product. According to the Dutch Group, it follows from this that
it is irrelevant whether or not an infringer makes use of the advantage or superior result of a
selected product.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
In the absence of case law on this issue, the Dutch Group notes that the requirements to
establish infringement of a use claim are not different than the requirements for any other
(method) claim. The scope of protection is to be determined in accordance with art. 69 and
the Protocol. The intention of an alleged infringer does not play a role.
Pursuant to section 73(1) of the Dutch Patent Act 1995, there is an indirect infringement if
the infringer offers or supplies any means regarding a material aspect of the invention for
application of the invention to any third party who does not have permission from the patentee
to use the invention. In the case of indirect infringement, it is a requirement that the infringer
knows, or that it is evident considering the circumstances, that those means are suitable and
intended for that application. Reference is made to Question 10 for further examples.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
The policy behind the law on selection inventions has relatively recently been expressed in a
decision of the Court of Appeal of The Hague (the specialized Dutch appeal court for patent
matters). If one would assume all species within a known genus to be publicly available, even
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a species with e.g. a surprisingly better effect would not be patentable as the known genus
would be considered novelty destroying. This would not stimulate research into improvements
within the known genus and, moreover, an undesired reward would be granted for the broad
and speculative claiming of a genus. Such consequences are deemed undesirable (see Court
of Appeal The Hague, 28 February 2008, docket no. 2007/272; with reference to Singer/
Stauder (2000), art. 54 - 10; see also Singer/Stauder, The European Patent Convention
(2003), art. 54 - 10).
The Dutch group sees no reason why such policy considerations would not still be valid today.
In particular the stimulation of research into improvements remains desirable.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
For the basic principles regarding the assessment of novelty, please refer to the answer to
Question 2.
Regarding the example: In case the prior art discloses a group of compounds only by the
disclosure of a generic formula, a specific compound (or groups of compounds) is considered
novel as long as the specific compound was not specifically disclosed in said prior art. In
other words, as long as the specific compound or the group of specific compounds is not
specifically exemplified in the prior art, the invention is considered to be novel. It does not
matter whether the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000 possible compounds
as opposed to 10.
(i) No; (ii) No; (iii) Yes.
For the scope of protection of a patented invention as under (iii), see the answer to Q5
above.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
Reference is made to the answer to Question 4 above.
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10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Example 3 would in any case not amount to direct infringement, since this would require
that all features of the claim are adopted by the infringer, either literally or by means of
equivalence. The claim in example 3 extends to the use of the compound as an adhesive and
there can thus only be direct infringement if the compound is used as an adhesive. The mere
manufacture and supply of the compound as such does not infringe the claim directly.
However, the question arises whether the supply of the compound under circumstances
may contribute to infringement and, hence, should be considered an indirect infringement.
Pursuant to section 73(1) of the Dutch Patent Acts 1995, there is an indirect infringement
if the infringer offers or supplies any means regarding a material aspect of the invention
for application of the invention to any third party who does not have permission from the
patentee to use the invention. Additionally, it is a requirement that the infringer knows, or that
it is evident considering the circumstances, that those means are suitable and intended for
that application.
Therefore, with regard to example 3, it must first be assessed whether the compound as such
qualifies as ‘a means regarding a material aspect of the invention’. It has been suggested in
the literature that all features of the claims of a patent are material aspects of the invention.
Following this suggestion, the offering or sale of the compound in example 3 would be
considered a means regarding a material aspect of the invention. However, outside the
context of selection inventions, the Supreme Court has ruled that only those features that
distinguish the invention from the state of the art are material aspects of the invention (the
Senseo case). It is as of yet not known whether the courts would adopt such strict criterion
also when dealing with indirect infringement of a selection invention. If they would do so, it
does not seem likely that, with regard to example 3, the courts would consider the compound
as such a means regarding a material aspect of the invention. After all, one could argue
that the use of the adhesive property distinguishes the claim from the prior art and not the
compound itself.
Furthermore, in order to find indirect infringement in example 3, the compound should in any
case be offered or sold for application of the invention (by whom is not relevant), whilst the
manufacturer knows, or while it is evident considering the circumstances, that those means
are suitable and intended for that application. However, it is not a requirement that the
infringing use of the compound is being promoted or advertised (as it is not in example 3).
There should thus only be some (objectified) knowledge of the patent and the possibility of
infringement. The patentee would not have to bring evidence of this knowledge on the part of
the manufacturer, if such knowledge can be deduced from the circumstances of the case.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
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irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
The amount of effort invested by the inventor as such is not relevant for the question whether
or not a selection patent is valid (compare also District Court The Hague 28 May 2008,
reg. nos. AWB 06/8641 OCT95 and AWB 07/3972 OCT95, in respect of a request for a
supplementary protection certificate). Like other inventions, selection inventions need to meet
objective criteria in order to qualify for patent protection; the amount of effort invested is, to
the contrary, a subjective criterion. Patentability is to be assessed from the perspective of the
skilled person, not the actual inventor.
For purposes of completeness, the Dutch group notes that secondary indicia (such as long
felt need, age of documents and the overcoming of a prejudice) may be taken into account
as auxiliary indications for inventive step when objective evaluation of the prior art does
not provide a clear picture. The presence of such secondary indicia however needs to be
established on the basis of objective evidence, and not (solely) on the basis of the efforts of
the actual inventor.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
Throughout this document, the Dutch Group has emphasised the scarcity of case law on
selection inventions in the Netherlands. Many of the Dutch Group’s answers are based on
case law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office. As such, the Dutch Group
expects considerable “harmonisation” of the Dutch and the EPO approaches. In the absence
of this, this Dutch group would encourage such harmonisation with a view to legal certainty.
The Dutch Group does not believe that the amount of effort invested by the inventor should
play a part in assessing the validity of a patent. Like other inventions, selection inventions
need to meet objective criteria (reference is also made to Question 11).
Apart from the issues already raised in the Questions and Working Guidelines, there are
no additional recommended issues for harmonisation or other potential issues that the Dutch
Group believes would merit discussion with AIPPI.
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New Zealand
Nouvelle–Zélande
Neuseeland
Report Q209
in the name of the New Zealand Group
by Julie Ballance
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
In theory, any selection invention could be patentable provided that it falls within the definition
of “invention” from the Patents Act 1953 (the Act). “Invention” is defined in section 2 of the Act
as:
“any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant of privilege within
section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies and any new method or process of testing applicable
to the improvement or control of manufacture; and includes an alleged invention.”
The selection must also satisfy the test set out in IG Farbenindustrie AG’s Patent [1930] 47
RPC 289:
i) the selection must be novel;
ii) substantially all the members of the sub-class must possess an advantage or avoid a
disadvantage; and
iii) the selection must be for “a quality of special character” which is peculiar to the selection
and is not obvious to an expert.
The IG Farbenindustrie AG’s Patent test was approved in New Zealand by the Court of
Appeal in Beecham Group Limited’s (New Zealand / Amoxycillin Application) [1982] FSR
181 (also reported as Beecham Group v Bristol Myers [1981] 1 NZLR 600) and followed in
Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1983] NZLR 385. The Court in Beecham
also indicated that a “mere scintilla” of invention is sufficient to provide patentable subject
matter. These tests are used by the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand to assess
selection inventions.
In most instances selection inventions relate to chemical inventions, but the issue of selection
is not confined to chemical inventions (see e.g. Clyde Nail Co Ld v Russell, (1916) 33 RPC
291 (mechanical) and Bosch’s Application, (1909) 26 RPC 710 (electrical)). Although both
these applications were refused, the courts stated that selection inventions are patentable
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in the mechanical and electrical fields provided they show an advantage or avoid a
disadvantage.
More recently a clear statement was issued by the UK Court of Appeal in Hallen v Brabantia
[1991] RPC. 195, p 217, that a mechanical selection invention is a possibility. However, there
is no specific case law in New Zealand on this point.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
The novelty of any invention is assessed using the test from The General Tire & Rubber
Company v The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company Limited and Others [1972] RPC 457. In
order to anticipate an invention, a prior art document must provide clear and unmistakable
directions to do what the patentee claims to have invented:
“To anticipate the patentee’s claim the prior publication must contain clear and unmistakable
directions to do what the patentee claims to have invented... A signpost, however clear, upon
the road to the patentee’s invention will not suffice. The prior inventor must be clearly shown
to have planted his flag at the precise destination before the patentee.”
This test was discussed and approved by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Beecham
Group Limited’s (New Zealand / Amoxycillin Application) [1982] FSR 181.
In the Beecham case, Beecham Group Limited applied for a patent relating to amoxicillin (a
semi-synthetic penicillin) which had been found to have outstanding levels of absorption into
the human body in comparison with related semi-synthetic penicillins. Bristol-Myers opposed
the patent application on the grounds of prior publication and obviousness, relying on the
prior publication in New Zealand of a British patent owned by Beecham. The opposition
succeeded on both grounds and was appealed to the High Court. The High Court overturned
the Assistant Commissioner’s decision and directed that the patent be sealed. This decision
was in turn appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The prior art relied on by Bristol-Myers was a British patent in the name of Beecham that was
directed to a broad group of semi-synthetic penicillins. The Court held that the prior art patent
did not provide clear and unmistakable directions to make amoxycillin because it did not give
full and explicit directions for the entire process of preparing the compound. The Court stated
that even though it was common ground that a skilled chemist could resolve the necessary
issues to manufacture the compound by following routine methods, this was not enough for
the invention to be considered as “published” in New Zealand:
“If such a compound has not been made before, its properties often cannot be predicted with
any confidence; and where that is the case we do not consider that the invention claimed can
fairly or accurately be described as “published,” even if a skilled chemist would realise that
to make the compound by routine means would be practicable. A making of the compound
and a discovery of its properties is necessary before the “invention” has occurred and can
be published.”
The Court referred to the judgement of Buckley LJ in E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Witsiepe’s)
Application [1981] FSR 377 in support of this view. The E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.
judgement also considered a selection invention, and Buckley LJ stated that:
“Something which has never yet been made can clearly not have been ‘known or used;’ nor
can it, in my view, be properly described as ‘known’ if it has been no more than predicted
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as a theoretically possible chemical compound. The fact that the special qualities of the
compound…were unknown until they were discovered by the applicants emphasises that
that compound, although it was chemically predictable, was not a known substance until the
applicants made it.”
In summary, the Court in Beecham held that prior publication requires that the compounds
have to be made, even if a skilled chemist would understand that the compound could be
made by routine means.
However, the requirements set out in IG Farbenindustrie AG’s Patent (see Q1 above) still must
be met for a selection invention to be valid.
Therefore, the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand will consider the disclosure of the
prior art specification and claims as a whole when assessing novelty.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
Inventive step is not considered in New Zealand during examination; however, it is a ground
for opposition of an application and a patent once granted.
The issue of obviousness / inventive step was discussed in Beecham and the Court indicated
that even if a selection invention is along an obvious line of research, this may not make the
selection invention obvious:
“The pursuit of one of a number – perhaps many – obvious lines of research may produce
a signal or particularly valuable discovery. In deciding on patentability it would seem to
us regrettable, and not in accord with a primary purpose of patent law, to have to rule
this out automatically in the name of obviousness. We think that the pursuit of an obvious
line of research, in the synthesising and testing of a new chemical compound, may be held
to culminate in an invention which is not obvious and does involve an inventive step, if a
sufficiently distinctive advantage is discovered.”
The Court accepted that a selection invention must have an advantageous character over
the group as a whole. In the case of amoxycillin, this advantage was the extremely high
bioavailability via the oral administration route:
“We think that it was shown to be more than merely rather better than known penicillins and
that the degree of advantage could not have been predicted.”
In addition to the issue of inventive step during opposition / revocation proceedings, the test
used to assess selection inventions (IG Farbenindustrie, see Q1 above) includes a step that
assesses obviousness:
iii) the selection must be for “a quality of special character” which is peculiar to the selection
and is not obvious to an expert.
Therefore, in theory, an application could be refused on the grounds that the selection was
obvious to an expert.
If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness requirement can
it be submitted after initial patent filing?
Additional information in support of any aspect of a selection invention may be filed with the
Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand any time before acceptance. After the application
has been accepted, no additional information may be submitted in support of the patent
unless opposition or revocation proceedings are in progress.
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4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
Section 10(3) of the Act stipulates the requirements for sufficiency:
Every specification:
a) shall particularly describe the invention and the method by which it is to be performed;
and
b) shall disclose the best method of performing the invention which is known to the
applicant and for which he is entitled to claim protection; and
c) shall end with a claim or claims defining the scope of the invention claimed.
The specification should describe the invention and the best method of performing the
invention known to the applicant at the time of filing.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
Additional supporting information such as experimental data may be filed at any time
as a part of submissions during prosecution of the application prior to acceptance, or as
evidence during opposition or revocation proceedings.
Pre-acceptance: The inclusion of new experimental data in the specification itself would
however be dependent on whether it was fairly based on the specification as originally
filed and/or on the disclosure in any priority document. Any lack of fair basis would
affect the entitlement to the orginal filing date and/or the priority date.
Post-acceptance: Much more stringent provisions (s40) preclude the addition of any
material which is not by way of disclaimer, correction, or explaination, or which, other
than to correct an obvious mistake, is not in substance claimed or described in the
specification before amendment.
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
As stated above, the specification must describe the best method of performing the
invention known at the time of filing, and must particularly describe the invention and the
method by which it is to be performed.
An assessment for sufficiency is part of the examination process and is also a ground for
opposition and revocation proceedings.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
In New Zealand, claims are entitled to be broader than the disclosure in the specification,
provided that the scope of the claim is within a reasonable scientific prediction and
could be determined by a person skilled in the art without any undue experimentation
or further inventiveness. This test was established in Olin Matheson Chemical Company
Corporation and others v Biorex Laboratories, [1970] RPC 157.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short?
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The applicant must demonstrate in the specification that the desired selection has an
advantage, or avoids a disadvantage, over the prior art (as per the Farbenindustrie test, see
Q1 above). The applicant should show that substantially all members of the selection possess
the advantage/avoid the disadvantage. A few exceptions would, in theory, not be enough
to invalidate the patent. However, if a substantial number of the selection did not possess the
advantage (or avoid the disadvantage), then it is likely that the patent application will fail.
Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would
it suffice to claim a particular range or selection of components which have been found to
be associated with such a new utility or would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in
the claims?
If a new use of a known compound is found, provided the compound itself was not specifically
disclosed in the specification or claims of the prior document, the claims of the selection could
be directed to both the compound and the use.
However, if the invention is only the new use, the claims could not be directed to the compound
and could only claim the use. In addition, since the language ‘for use’ is not considered
limiting on the scope of the claims, any new use would have to have some kind of therapeutic
application to enable the new use to be claimed in a second medical use (Swiss-type) claim
format.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
There is no definition of infringement in the Act and there are no New Zealand cases that
consider infringement of a selection invention. However, we believe that the test used to assess
infringement for a selection invention would be identical to that for any other invention.
New Zealand uses ‘purposive construction’ as established in Catnic Components Ltd v Hill
and Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183 to construe claims when assessing infringement:
“The specification, and, in particular, its claims must be construed purposively…to determine
its essential features. If it then appears that the alleged infringement falls entirely within the
words of some claims, no further question arises: the patent is infringed. However, if what is
alleged to infringe is some variant of what is claimed, the questions must be looked at more
closely: there will be infringement if, but only if:
i) the variant has no material effect upon the way the invention works;
ii) it was obvious to a skilled reader, at the time of publication, that this was so; and
iii) it would be apparent to any skilled reader that the words of the claim from which the
variant departs could not have been intended to exclude such minor variations.”
Each and every integer from the claim must be present in the alleged infringing article for
there to be infringement.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement?
The test for infringement would not change.
Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe the patent?
Because use claims in New Zealand are restricted in the medical area to the second medical
use type format, it may be necessary to show that the allegedly infringing manufacturer had
the intent to “use compound X in the manufacture of a medicament for treating Y”. This is
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untested in New Zealand. In that and other areas the extent to which, if any, the manufacturer
procured an infringing use in New Zealand would be a determining factor (Whangapirita v
Allflex (1995) 5 NZBLC 103).
Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
The intention of the alleged infringer is considered. Under s68(1) of the Act it is a defence if
the alleged infringer can prove that they were unaware of the existence of the patent:
In proceedings for the infringement of a patent, damages or account of profits shall not be
awarded against a defendant who proves that at the date of the infringement he was not
aware, and had no reasonable ground for supposing, that the patent existed; and a person
shall not be deemed to have been aware or to have had reasonable grounds for supposing
as aforesaid by reason only of the application to an article of the word “patent”, “patented”,
or any word or words expressing or implying that a patent has been obtained for the article,
unless the word or words are accompanied by the words “New Zealand” or the letters “NZ”
and by the number of the patent.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
Since New Zealand’s Patents Act is based on the previous United Kingdom Act (1949), New
Zealand’s interpretation of selection inventions has followed precedent developed in the
United Kingdom. The reasons for allowing selection inventions are to foster innovation and to
encourage further development of potentially useful compounds. In addition, allowing selection
inventions prevents the grant of monopolies for extremely broad groups of compounds.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The prior disclosure of the generic compounds would not be sufficient to destroy novelty
provided that the compounds of the selection had not been specifically disclosed in the
specification or the claims. If, for example, a dependent claim or an example in the specification
expressed the selected compounds as a preferred embodiment, then the selection would be
invalid.
If the number of compounds in the prior disclosure was very large, the arguments in favour of
a selection of compounds possessing an advantage not possessed by the other compounds
would carry more weight and the additional supporting evidence may not be necessary. If
only a small number of compounds were included with the prior disclosure, it would be harder
to argue in favour of the selection. Evidence or supporting information may be required to
show that the advantage is not possessed by the other compounds. Such a situation would be
assessed by the examiner on a case-by-case basis.
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8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
Option (i): the selection would not possess a “quality of special character” as per (iii) of the
Farbenindustrie test.
Option (ii): the selection may be considered to be obvious and may not be a valid selection
as per (iii) of the Farbenindustrie test.
Option (iii) would be a valid selection and would probably constitute an inventive step. If the
selected compounds have not been specifically described in the prior art, then the selection
invention should be valid.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
See answer to Q4 above.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
If the patent includes claims to the compound itself, then the manufacturer does not
need knowledge of the advantageous property – manufacturing the compound will be
infringement.
If the manufacturer is aware during manufacture that the product will be used as an adhesive,
this may be enough to prove infringement, even if no instructions are supplied. In some cases,
instructions may not be required, because it will be obvious what the product is to be used
for (for example, because of packaging or the type of retailer in which it is sold). However,
there needs to be some degree of certainty that infringement will occur (Nu-Pulse NZ v Milka
–Ware (ANZ) 14/10/99 HC Hamilton CP8/97).
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
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irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
The effort of the inventor in creating the invention may be admissable evidence in defending
the validity of a patent. However it may be unhelpful to the patentee especially if the inventor
was not clearly a notional skilled addressee with the requisite common general knowledge
and indeed it may be helpful to the other side if it could be shown for example that the
inventor was unaware of relevant prior art (Hickman v Andrews [1983] R.P.C.147).
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
The New Zealand Patents Act 1953 is somewhat out of step with patent legislation in other
jurisdictions, for example, inventive step is not assessed in New Zealand during examination
and local novelty, rather than relative or absolute novelty, is used when establishing prior
publication. These issues need to be addressed before New Zealand can harmonise any
standards in assessing the patentability of selection inventions.
A Patents Bill is currently before Parliament and the above two issues, among others (such as
a specific exclusion of methods of medical treatment), should be addressed in the new Act.
However, a new Patents Act has been awaited for quite some time and it is not likely that the
new Act will come into force before the end of 2009.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
None.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
None.
Summary
A selection invention must comply with the definition of an invention (manner of new manufacture)
in the New Zealand Patents Act 1953. Further, the selection must satisfy the IG Farbenindustrie test.
That is, the selection must be novel; substantially all the members of the sub-class must possess an
advantage or avoid a disadvantage; and the selection must be for “a quality of special character”
which is peculiar to the selection and is not obvious to an expert. Local novelty not absolute novelty
is assessed in New Zealand. Further, inventive step is not assessed during examination in New
Zealand, but it is part of the IG Farbenindustrie test and a selection invention could be refused on
this basis.
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Norway
Norvège
Norwegen
Report Q209
in the name of the Norwegian Group
by Anette Robsahm Røhmen
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
In Norway there are no limitations on the types of inventions that can be patentable as
selection inventions. There are no specific rules or regulations relating to selection inventions,
they are generally treated in the same way as other inventions.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
The Norwegian Guidelines for Examination state that a document takes away the novelty
of any claimed subject-matter derivable directly and unambiguously from that document,
including any features that to a person skilled in the art are implicit from what is expressly
mentioned in the document.
The limitation to subject-matter “derivable directly and unambiguously” from the document is
important. This consequence with regard to what can be considered novel corresponds to the
term „reasonable technical difference“, which stems from a decision of the Second (Appeals)
Division of the Norwegian Patent Office. Thus, when considering novelty, it is correct to
interpret the teaching of a prior art document as embracing well-known equivalents, even if
these are not explicitly disclosed in the document.
The background for this decision was to ensure that patenting should not unreasonably limit
the utilization of known technical solutions.
The Norwegian Guidelines for Examination have no section specifically dealing with the
novelty of selection inventions and the above basic rules are relevant to the novelty evaluation
also for selection inventions.
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Norway acceded to the EPC effective 1st January, 2008, and it must be expected that the
number of national applications will decrease, and that the EPO will grant most of the patents
that will apply in Norway. Thus, over time, any differences between EPO and Norwegian
Patent Office practice will gradually lose importance.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
Experimental data can be submitted after filing in Norway. Such data should not extend the
scope of the application. New effects can only be taken into account if they are implied by
or at least related to the technical problem initially suggested in the application as originally
filed.
In his textbook on Norwegian patent law, “Patentrett”, professor Are Stenvik, the leading
scholar, says at p. 218 that in principle it is also in these cases a question whether the
information is sufficient, i.e. if the general disclosure (of the prior art) is clear and complete
enough to enable a skilled person to exploit the particular variant. The line should be drawn
between, on the one side variants which only formally are comprised by the general description
(theoretical possibilities) and on the other side variants which are comprised by the actual
technical operating rules the skilled person can derive from the prior art (actual possibilities). If
the general part of the patent specification and the common general knowledge are sufficient
for a skilled person to manufacture and exploit the particular variant, the invention must be
considered to be anticipated, otherwise not.
Professor Stenvik also argues, at p. 219 loc.cit. that a concrete/specific evaluation should be
performed as to whether a skilled person, based on prior art, would consider that the subject
matter of the later application was a real possibility or not.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
There are no specific rules about sufficiency or about the requirements applying to written
descriptions for selection inventions in Norway. Generally, Norway follows the practice of the
EPO regarding sufficiency of disclosure.
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5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
It will probably not be necessary that the advantage is utilised, for an infringement to be
established.
In case of claims on a new use, establishing infringement requires use or the offer to use the
method. The manufacture of a product that may be used for the new use will not infringe.
However, the Norwegian Patents Act has provisions on contributory infringement that are
harmonised with CPC art. 26, and thus offering or supplying means (including products
that may be used for a new patented use) to exploit the invention may, if the conditions are
fulfilled, constitute an infringement. The intention of the alleged contributory infringer does
not play a role, but his actual or presumed knowledge about the suitability of the means
and the intention of the offeree or recipient does. In the case of staple goods, establishing
infringement requires that the offeror/supplier seeks to induce the offeree/recipient to commit
acts that constitute infringement. It should be noted that these provisions apply generally, and
not only to selection inventions.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
Norway is committed by the EEA agreement (protocol 28, article 3 no. 4) to follow the
material provisions of the EPC and has, in recent years, adapted to EPO practice. Effective
1st January 1008, Norway became a member of the EPC, but this has not changed practice
in this field.
Selection inventions are not treated specifically in the Patents Act or regulations and the
sections of EPO’s Guidelines for Examination treating selection inventions have not been
implemented in the Norwegian Guidelines for Examination.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The specific compound must be specified in the prior disclosure in order to destroy the novelty
of the invention. Conversely, it is not possible to claim a class of specific compounds whilst
disclaiming only such compounds as are expressly mentioned in prior art disclosures. The size
of the class or group is not important for the analysis.
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8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
The answers for each of the three scenarios are: (i) no, (ii) no, and (iii) possibly.
In Norway, the inventor would be able to obtain protection for the products per se. The
protection is not limited to the use of the products for the advantageous property.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
There are no specific rules or case law on this issue. One would assume, however, that an
absolute requirement should apply that all of the selected class should possess the advantage
that was the reason for granting the patent.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Evidence of knowledge of the advantageous property is not required. This follows from the
fact that even evidence of knowledge of the patent is not required. As to the question of intent,
see the answer to Q 5 above (contributory or indirect infringement).
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Such considerations are not usually taken into account in Norwegian practice. However,
for inventions which may be classified as “pioneer inventions”, the scope of protection is
traditionally wider, ie. greater extent of equivalence protection. This is, however, not related
to the effort the inventor has invested, but rather the magnitude of the technical progress
contributed by the invention (size of the leap forward). The group believes that the order of
the efforts made should not be a criteria when deciding whether patent protection should be
awarded.
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Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
The Norwegian group believes that the EPC and practice of the EPO constitute the obvious
basis for further international harmonisation of the patentability requirements that should
apply to selection inventions.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
N/A.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
The impact of range limits that are not supported by experimental data should be discussed.
Should the range given in a prior art document destroy the novelty regardless of whether the
values in the range are supported by experiments, or should its impact rely on determining
if the average person skilled in the art would apply the teaching in the prior art document in
the full range?
Also the issue of the scope of protection under the doctrine of equivalents is important. Should
those elements of the invention that are “selected” be included in the equivalents assessment,
or should they be excluded from it?
Summary
In the Norwegian Patents Act there are no provisions dealing specifically with selection inventions.
There is very little case law on the subject. The Norwegian group believes that the EPC and the
EPO’s practice constitute the best starting point for further harmonisation. Harmonisation appears
to be most needed in the areas of novelty, especially the impact of range limit values, and of the
scope of protection, especially the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents to those features
of the claim that are “selected”. With regard to the issue of inventive step, the Norwegian group
believes that the resources invested by the inventor to achieve the selection claimed, should not be
of importance.
Résumé
Il n’y a pas, dans la loi norvégienne sur les brevets d’invention des régles sur les inventions de
sélection, et la jurisprudence est très limitée. Le groupe norvégien considère que la CBE et la
pratique de l’OEB constituent le meilleur point de départ pour une harmonisation ultérieure. Il
semblerait que les domaines dans lequels une harmonisation ultérieure sera la plus opportune
sont le domaines de la nouveauté, particuliérement en ce qui concerne l’importance des valeurs
limite des plages de valeurs, et le domaine de la portée de la protéction, et notamment la question
de l’applicabilité de la doctrine des équivalents aux traits “sélectionnés”. En ce qui concerne la
question de l’activité inventive, le groupe norvégien considére qu’il n’est pas opportun d’attacher
importance aux efforts de l’inventeur pour achever la sélection revendiquée.
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Zusammenfassung
Es gibt im norwegischen Patentgesetz keine Sonderregelungen für Auswahlerfindungen,
und die Rechtssprechung hat sich auch kaum hiermit befasst. Die norwegische Gruppe ist der
Auffassung, dass die EPÜ und die Praxis des EPA den besten Ausgangspunkt für weitere
Harmonisierungsmassnahmen bilden. Harmonisierung scheint besonders erforderlich zu sein in
den Bereichen der Neuheit, insbesondere die Bedeutung der bereichsbegrenzenden Werte, und
des Schutzumfangs, insbesondere die Verwendung der Äquivalenzlehre auf den „ausgewählten“
Eigenschaften des Anspruchs. Im Hinblick auf die erfinderische Tätigkeit ist die norwegische Gruppe
der Meinung, dass den Ressourcen, die vom Erfinder investiert sind, um die Auswahl zu erreichen,
keine Bedeutung zukommen sollte.
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Panama
Panama
Panama
Report Q209
in the name of the Panamanian Group
by Rolando Candanedo N. and Jessica A. de Jaén
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
Inventions that comply with the requirements of novelty, industrial applicability and inventive
step are subject of inventions. Therefore, in theory any selection invention be that in any field
such as chemical, pharmaceutical or material science field may be recognized as invention
and subject to patentability if complies with the mentioned requirements.
No specific examples were found in fields different to chemical or pharmaceutical.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
Novelty would be examined with respect to any disclosed information prior to the application
of the selection invention. In this sense, novelty would be affected if only the selection invention
is carved out of a broader description; this is not enough to argue novelty of the invention.
The inventions are defined by our IP Law as an idea applicable to the solution of a technical
determined problem. The examiners would ask if there is a previous document published?,
and if the current application of the selection invention has all the technical characteristics
(explicit or implicit)? If the answer to these questions is positive, the invention would lack
novelty. Therefore, it may not be patentable an unpredictable improved advantage to the
previous advantage found, as the advantage of the selection invention may be an implicit
characteristic of the previous one.
For the selection invention to have novelty it would have to be a selection of the broader
description with either a different advantage or use. However, it is important how the claims
are drafted and what type of selection is made from the previous application. For example,
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in case of a broad range (temperature, pressure, etc.) the selected invention would have
novelty if:
– the particular range have not been specifically described in the state of the art
documents,
– the state of the art does not specify in its examples the range of the selection invention,
– the range is very limited in comparison with the original broad range and is not close to
either of the ranges described in the prior art.
In chemistry, a general formula does not destroy the novelty of a compound or subgroups of
compounds. However, specific compounds shall destroy the novelty of general formulas. If the
prior art describes a proceeding in which a compound is derived, then this compound would
lack novelty. However, the applicant of the selection invention may prove that the examiners
would not inevitable derive the compound from the proceeding, even though the technical
examiner would follow all the proceedings of the prior invention. In this case, the prior state
of the art would not destroy the novelty of the compound.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
The unexpected effect is the key to inventive step in a selection invention. The originality of
the solution proposed by the selection that shows a different path from the previous proposed
solutions of the state of the art is what is required to meet the inventive step in this kind of
patents.
In case of a compound, the selection of a subgroup would meet the inventive step requirement
if all the subgroup shows an effect o technical property that is not described in the previous
art of the state.
If the state of the art report is not favorable to the applicant, he can defend the inventive step
of the selection invention after publication of the report in the IP Bulletin, within the next two
months. Documents to support the arguments can be provided.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
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By the time of the filing of the application, the requirement is to file a document that can be
considered the description of the invention.
However, sufficiency of written description for selection patents has not been discussed
deeply. The description just has to fulfill the requirement of being clear and provide sufficient
elements for a well versed person in the technical field to practice it. The comprehensions of
the invention permits to the technical person evaluate the possible advantage of the invention,
and thus, the novelty and inventive step of it.
The description and claims in itself must be discussed for the selection inventions.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
Although the Patents Office grants the registration of a selection invention after considering
that the invention complies with novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability, it is not a
guarantee that the owners of the patents may consider that their rights are affected by the
selection invention.
The infringement of a usual patent falls on the infringer of the product or the process. In the
case of selection invention, the matter that is protected is precisely an advantage or different
result over the state of the art known. Therefore, we consider that by analogy the unauthorized
use of such advantage or result is punished due to infringement, be that implicitly or explicitly.
It would fall on the owner of the selection invention to prove the alleged infringement.
Regarding new use, infringement would constitute the unauthorized use. The manufacturer of
a product (owner of the patent) that may be used for obtaining the new use would have to
proof in a judicial action that infringement to the patent has occurred.
The intention of the alleged infringer does not play any role in the determination of infringement,
due to the fact that all unauthorized use would be punished.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
Behind the acceptance for registration of selection inventions is the protection of the inventor’s
rights over their investigation and creation of a new solution to a technical problem, as long
as it complies with the requirements of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability.
We consider that this policy will continue in the future. However, as the owners are trying
to extend the protection of their inventions for exploitation of their exclusive rights for longer
time with selection inventions, it may be possible that in the future the law would determine a
shorter period of protection for selection inventions, further in the medical areas (medicines,
drugs or surgical) to reach the consumers. The advance of the technology would only increase
the time speed of the development of new inventions, and thus, the governments may take this
into account to develop policies of shorter protections.
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7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The general rule is that a general formula does not destroy the novelty of a subgroup of
compounds included in such.
In the specific example 1, the generic class of radicals would anticipate the claims for a
particular radical or group o radicals depending on the disclosed number of compounds.
If the generic class consisted on 1,000,000 were very few were specified, it would not
affect the novelty of the selection invention, provided that the selection could not have been
anticipated by the technical person in the field.
However, if the disclosed generic class only consist of 10, it is possible that implicitly or
explicitly the selection consists of disclosed matter, and thus, would lack novelty.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
In example 2, the results (i) and (ii) would lack inventive step.
In this case only the results (iii) would constitute an inventive step over the prior art. There is
not a declared position from the Patents Office regarding if the resulting products per se may
form part of the scope of protection.
However, as our IP Law allows protecting both products and use, we do not oversee any
objection as to protect both the products per se and the use of them to obtain the advantageous
property.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
There is no conclusion reached regarding this matter by the Patents Office. However, for the
selection invention to have inventive step the advantageous or new properties are vital.
Therefore, we believe all the selected class should possess the relevant advantage. Although
the selection would not have been anticipated by the examination of the previous state of the
art, the advantageous property is the common element of selecting such group; and thus, all
the selection should possess it.
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10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
In example 3, the knowledge or intention would be enough to prove infringement, as the
competitor is manufacturing the claimed compound.
If the selection patent has been drafted as a product claim, the fact that the competitor
manufactures the product would be enough to prove infringement.
If the claims are drafted as a use of the selection for a new use, then the competitor
manufacturing proceedings would be cause of infringement.
Our IP Law provides that infringement would be caused by a person who manufactures or
assembles a product protected by patent; commercializes or circulates a product manufactured
or assembled without authorization; or uses a patented procedure all of it without the consent
of the owner. Criminal and Civil actions are available.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
If the selection invention do not comply with the requirements of novelty, inventive step and
industrial applicability it would be irrelevant the efforts of the inventor.
As we said before, the selection invention is protected considering the solution provided to
a technical problem. In this equation the inventor’s effort does not form part of what is taken
into consideration when protection is provided by a patent.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
1) Selection inventions: it should be accepted the selection on any type of field, as an advance
in the protection of developments in all fields.
2) Novelty in a selection invention.
Should not be affected if:
• Is not implicitly or explicitly derived from the state of the art.
• The examiner would not have reached the selection by the description of the state of the
art.
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• The selection consists of a range not specified (temperature, etc, not described, nor
specified in examples, nor close to the selection).
May be affected if:
• The state of the art description is very limited. As in Example 1 with few compounds, the
selection may fall under examples or implicitly the description in the state of the art.
3) Inventive step: both the product of the selection and the use of such selection to obtain the
advantageous property may be allowed for patent. However, all the selection should have
the advantageous or new properties, which is the key to the protection of such selection.
4) Written description requirements:
a) The description should specify the advantageous property in the selection. The claims
should contain any new utility associated with this new selection.
b) The applicant for a selection invention should have the opportunity to file additional
documents to support the selection and its advantages if the examiners required so
when examining the application, by notification from them and a term for providing
the information. If not by the time of the examination, then by the time of the examiner’s
observations to the state of the art report. This documentation would form part of the
application, but not necessarily form part of the description.
5) Policies:
a) Selection inventions should be allowed protection for the benefit of research and
development in any field. However, to minimize the possibility of extension of the owner’s
rights by filing selection inventions, a shorter protection should be studied. Considering
also, the fast development in research in some areas with the actual technology
available.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
Recommendation:
To standardize the requirements for selection inventions as for the documents required and
time frame for filing such.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
It would be useful a guideline for registering selection inventions, as for the breath of
description and drafting of claims.
Summary
Selection inventions are protected in Panama as long as complies with novelty, inventive step and
industrial applicability. Although each case should be specifically studied upon examination, the
general rule is that the selection invention should have an advantageous or new property from the
broader description; that each element selected should show that advantageous property; and,
that this advantage falls apart from the already known state of the art with a solution to a technical
problem. The protection may be granted to the product per se or the use of the selected elements
that produces the new advantage. Requirements are yet to be delimited with the harmonization
of the laws regarding additional documentation to support the selection. However, infringement is
well advanced with the punishment of any act of manufacturing (the product of the selection) or the
use of the advantage obtained from the selected elements.
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Résumé
Les inventions de sélection sont protégées au Panama pourvu qu’elles aient les caractéristiques de
nouveauté, activité inventive et applicabilité industrielle. Même si chaque cas doit être spécifiquement
étudié, la règle générale établit que l’invention de sélection doit avoir une qualité avantageuse
ou nouvelle dans la description générale; chaque élément sélectionné doit montrer cette qualité
avantageuse, qui doit être différent de l’élément moderne déjà connu et offrir une solution à un
problème technique. La protection peut être conférée à un produit per se ou à l’usage des éléments
sélectionnés qui produit la nouvelle avantage. Les formalités et conditions doivent encore être
délimitées avec l’harmonisation des lois à propos de la documentation additionnelle pour appuyer
la sélection. Cependant, la contrefaçon est réglée avec la punition de toute fabrication (du produit
de la selection) ou tout usage de l’avantage obtenue des éléments selectionnés.
Zusammenfassung
Die Auswahlerfindungen werden in Panama geschützt so lang wie kommt oder erfüllen mit Neuheit,
schöpferischem oder einfallsreichen Schritt und industrieller Anwendbarkeit nach. Obwohl jeder Fall
ausdrücklich auf Prüfung studiert werden sollte, ist die allgemeine Regel, dass die Auswahlerfindung
eine vorteilhafte Eigenschaft oder eine neue Eigenschaft von der breitesten Beschreibung haben
sollte, dass jedes Element, das ausgewählt wird, auf diese vorteilhafte Eigenschaft hinzuweisen, und
dass dieser Vorteil als es total anders ist, ausser dem schon wohlbekannt und letzte Technologie,
mit einer Lösung zu einem technischen Problem fällt. Der Schutz kann „pro Se“ zum Produkt gewährt
werden, der die Verwendung von den ausgewählten Elementen, die den neuen Vorteil produziert
oder verursacht. Die Anforderungen sind noch immer nicht mit der Harmonisierung der Gesetze
hinsichtlich der zusätzlicher Dokumentation abgegrenzt werden, um die Auswahl zu unterstützen.
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Paraguay
Paraguay
Paraguay
Report Q209
in the name of the Paraguayan Group
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
There aren’t any types of patentable selection inventions in our jurisdiction. Our Patents Law
doesn’t admit any kind of second use to be patentable, (Art. 5 Patents Law Nº 1630/2000,
consequently, we do not have any examples.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
No, a range out of a broad prior art disclosure is not enough to make a selection novel. No,
a different advantage or use, or the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement is
not enough for a selection to be novel.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
No, experimental data is not required since selection inventions are not patentable in our
jurisdiction. There aren’t any prerequisites or limitations since the submission of data is not
regulated for selection inventions.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
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1) the threshold for sufficiency;
Since our Law doesn’t admit Selection Inventions, there isn’t any range for the description
requirements. Consequently, our legislation does not regulate if the class selected by the
patentee is required to possess the relevant advantages for the whole class or for only
a part of it.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
Experimental data is not required, since selection inventions are not protectable.
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
There is no time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must
be satisfied, since selection inventions are not protectable.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
A new utility doesn’t suffice to claim a particular range or selection of components which
have been found to be associated with such a new utility. Recite a new utility in the claims is
not enough either.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
Infringement of selection inventions is not possible, since they are not patentable.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
New use is expressively not patentable according to our Patents Law, Art. 5. A manufacturer
of a product that may be used for the new use infringes the patent. No, the intention of an
alleged infringer does not play any role in the determination of infringement.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
With Reference to the Examples
Our Patents Law finds its grounds in the German Patents legislation. We believe that such policy
considerations are not updated anymore, since the number of genuine new pharmaceutical
products is decreasing and most of the new products are selection inventions that should be
protected depending on their novelty for each case. We consider that we must re-study this
issue in order to not compromise public health.
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7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
Yes, the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of radicals anticipate
any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical or group of specific compounds
having a selection of particular radicals in our jurisdiction. In the analysis, it doesn’t matter
how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is, it doesn’t make any difference
the quantity of the possible compounds.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
None of the three options could be considered as an inventive step over the prior art in our
jurisdiction. The inventor shouldn’t be able to obtain protection to the use for the advantageous
property, as an adhesive, not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior art, since the
TRIP’S only regulates the granting for products or processes and not for uses.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
Our jurisdiction doesn’t admit Selection Inventions, therefore, the extent of the members of the
class selected by the patentee required to possess the requisite advantage is not regulated
in our jurisdiction.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
There isn’t any extent since it isn’t regulated; it will eventually be for judicial appreciation
considering that this issue is not included in our Patents legislation.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
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compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
It shouldn’t matter how much effort the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in
order to found a valid selection patent. We consider that the inventor should be rewarded
for his efforts and obtain protection, always in case that the selection invention implies all the
requirements to be patentable and not a mere intent to try to extend the patent life.
Such consideration is still relevant today.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
With respect to Q1-Q6, we consider that selection inventions should be registered, respecting
the government’s policy in regards to public health. With respect to the items discussed in
examples in Q7-Q10, we consider that Scenario iii) is the most suitable for our country.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
We have no further recommendations.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
We have not any other potential issues.
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Peru
Pérou
Peru
Report Q209
in the name of the Peruvian Group
by Maria del Carmen Arana
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Why and how can selection inventions be justified?
Selection inventions are justified because although they are based on the knowledge priory
disclosed in the estate of the art, these ones comprise an important advance in such state of
the art (as they involve improved technical results), which is the result of the inventive activity
of the human being, who was able to select and verify, among thousands of possibilities,
one or a group, in particular, having a notably superior technical effect of improvement with
respect to the general invention (Inventive Level), which has never been explicitly developed
or disclosed (even as examples) in the state of the art (Novelty) and which can be used to
solve a problem or to satisfy any need in the society (Industrial Application).
Selection inventions are typically justified by the submittal of comparative assays, in which
significative differences are verified, being a technical proof of superiority of the “selection
invention” against the “general invention”, and they are useful for the society.
2) Which is the basis for the protection of a patent in the light of the prior art from which the
claimed invention was selected?
The basis is on the argument of the “selection invention” concept, which states that although
this selection invention is comprised in a prior invention (belonging to the state of the art),
has characteristics, which are not expressly described in said state of the art. In this kind
of patents, the Examiner states, for example, that claim 1 is an invention selection from the
compound of Formula (I) of document D4. He indicates this given that in order to achieve said
compound (as claimed) selecting from different substituents of document D4 (for example) has
been necessary. 1
The basis of this reasoning to protect selection patents is justified by the following
consideration: that a person skilled in the art would not have foreseen or performed the
chosen selection, which consists of providing the improved effect. Therefore, said selection
involves amendments, which are neither obvious nor suggested for a skilled person in the art
and consequently meets the inventive level requirement of Article 18 of Decision 486 of the
Andean Community Commission 2 (See too Nota 1).
1 Docket: 560-2003/OIN, Title: Compound of amides of substituted 3-amino-thyeno[2,3-b]pyridino-2-carboxilic acid
and procedures to prepare them. Filing date: June 4, 2003. Granting date: October 31, 2007.
2 Docket: 885-2003/OIN, Title: New derivative medicaments of aminoindazol and pharmaceutical compositions
comprising them. Filing date: September 1, 2003. Granting date: July 3, 2008
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3) Which are the conditions by which a selection invention must be considered novel and not
obvious?
a. Novelty conditions.- From the “selection inventions” as granted, which have been
reviewed, we can consider at least one condition: that the “selection invention” be not
expressly indicated in the “general invention” of the state of the art. For example, (i) the
selection invention cannot incorporate any example of the embodiment shown in the
general invention 3 (also see Note 2) and (ii) the “selection invention” cannot define “any
limit”, which is common with the “general invention” whereby said “common limit” value
would have already been explicitly pointed out in the state of the art. 4 (Also see Note 1)
b. Non-obviousness conditions.- From the “selection inventions” as granted, which have
been reviewed, we can consider at least one condition: that the elements included in
the “selection invention” must have at least one ostensibly higher technical advantage
against the state of the art. For example, if the “general invention” (claiming alkyl C1-
C20) shows examples of the embodiment, wherein it is indicated that the compounds with
alkyl C1 and alkyl C3 have an activity of 50 and 45 units, respectively: the “selection
invention” claiming the compounds with alkyl C4 to alkyl C6 must demonstrate that the
compounds with alkyl C4, alkyl C5 and alkyl C6 have an activity that in the 3 cases
(either only three claimed compounds are claimed) be higher than 75 units (See notes 1,
2 and 3).
4) Does the disclosure criteria need to be led?
If to completely support the invention, the scope claimed by a “selection invention” must
be entirely supported by examples of the embodiment contained in the Specifications of
the applied invention, that is to say, differing from the “general inventions”, in the “selection
inventions” the Applicant cannot perform generalizations of the examples (as occurring in the
“general inventions”, in which the existing proofs for alkyl C1 and alkyl C4 can be eventually
extrapolated to alkyl C1-C10); that is to say, if the “selection invention” provides examples
for alkyl C2 to alkyl C4 in its set of claims, the scope cannot be extended. For example, alkyl
C2-C5 (even when the general invention of the state of the art demonstrates alkyl C2-C5 and
claims alkyl C1-C10). (See Note 3).
5) Who must has the load of the proof to show that the conditions are met or not: the Applicant
or the Examiner?
The Applicant has the load of the proof because it must remit to the administrative authority
technical-experimental data demonstrating that the “selection invention” has notably improved
effects compared to the “general invention” of the state of the art. If the Applicant does not test
the improved technical effect, the Examiner considers the invention obvious and therefore, the
invention would not meet the inventive level.
In case of patent infringements, the load of the proof is held by that one who affirms the facts
which supports his intention or that one who refutes another one by submitting new facts. In
cases related to procedure patents, the load of the proof is held by the alleged infringer (Art.
104 L.D. 1075. dated 06/28/2008; Decision 486 Art. 240).
3 Docket: 383-2003/OIN. Title: Phenyllmidazolidine derivatives and preparation process. Filing date: April 15, 2003.
Granting date: December 5, 2008
4 Docket: 383-2003/OIN. Title: Composition comprising 8-hydroxy-5-[(1R)-1-hydroxy-2-[[(1R)-2-(4-methoxyphenyl)-1-
methylethyl]amino]ethyl-2-(1H)-quinoline and budesonide. Filing date: February 26, 2004. Granting date: January
12, 2009.
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6) Is there any special rule to examine the patentability of a selection invention?
There is no any particular rule for the analysis of this kind of inventions, even more, in some
resolutions, this kind of patents have been granted without explicitly state that they deal with
selection inventions. (See Notes 1 a 4.)
Of note is that in our legislation there is no rule which explicitly refers to some special
regulation to analyze the patentability of a selection invention. This kind of inventions is not
mentioned in the law either.
In the “Guideline for the analysis of invention patent applications in Industrial Property
offices of the Andean Community countries” (MESP-CAN), this kind of inventions is explicitly
mentioned but none rule for the patentability of those ones is developed.
7) Must the equivalence doctrine be applied to?
In our legislation, there is no any rule comprising neither the existence of equivalent inventions
nor any kind of criteria determining the proper manner by which this kind of patents must be
analyzed. In the MESP-CAN, there is an indirect reference about “the kind of materials which
is comprised in an invention”, which could refer some criteria of the equivalence theory to
analyze the inventive level of patent in general but in this item, there is no references about
selection inventions. In the resolutions of infringements and nullities of general patents, there
is no uniform application of some concept similar to the equivalence in the light of the skilled
person in the art. In the analyzed patents of invention, there are cases in which the theory of
the “equivalence” is not enough.
We consider that currently, the theory of the “equivalence” must not be applied in Peru as
it would involve an extension to equivalent embodiments through the substitution of one or
more elements of the patent which use another elements complying with the same function
and which provide the same results while the invention is based on the contributions to the
state of the art and is in the content of the claims. It cannot be extended. Moreover, for the
skilled person in the art, substituent elements would be deduced from the claims, which would
involve a scope, which means going beyond of the claims or adding non patentable material
or not falling within the scope of the protection as originally invoked.
8) If it is the case, is there any special defense opened to the infringers in these cases?
There is no any special protection.
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Philippines
Philippines
Philippinen
Report Q209
in the name of the Philippine Group
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction?
Our patent law on patents is patterned according to the European Patent Convention (EPC)
of the European Patent Office (EPO) since January 1,1998 and there are two (2) types of
invention recognized under the said concept of selection invention and these are:
– Selection invention may involve the selection of individual elements, subsets, or subranges,
which have not been explicitly disclosed previously, within a larger known set
or range. Second medical use which can be considered as selection invention from first
medical uses is no longer patentable in view of the recent Cheaper Medicine Act of the
Philippines which took effect on July 04,2008.
– Selection invention directed to numeric features may relate to any technical field but
mostly are directed to chemical invention. Thus, selection invention allows patenting of
compounds, which fall within disclosure of earlier patent if:
1) Compounds not specifically disclosed in earlier patent, and
2) Compounds have unexpected advantages over those compounds specifically
disclosed in earlier patents.
Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a field other than chemical, pharmaceutical
or material science fields?
Yes, selection invention may relate to a broader range of numeric features in any technical
field but mostly are directed to chemical inventions. Thus, selection invention allows patenting
of compounds, which fall within disclosure of earlier patent if:
– Compounds not specifically disclosed in earlier patent, and
– Compounds have unexpected advantages over those compounds specifically disclosed
in earlier patents.
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2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
Novelty in respect to selection of invention in our country have the same criteria as in European
Patent Office (EPO) as mentioned above, thus we have 3 criteria for novelty of selection of
sub-range, which should be:
– Narrow
– Not close to known value(s)
– Different technical field.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction.
Under our Rule 206 of Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), an invention involves an
inventive step if, having regard to prior art it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art at a
time of the filing date or priority date of the application claiming the invention. (See also Sec.
26, Republic Act 8293 or IP Code).
If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness requirement can
it be submitted after initial patent filing?
If a technical effect is alleged and an alleged solution to the obviousness problem is
qualitatively disclosed without quantitative experimental evidence, it is possible that such
evidence may be provided during examination and yes, it can be submitted after the initial
patent filing if so required by the Examiner in defining the patentability of the case.
Are there any prerequisites or limitations on the late submission of data?
There is no prerequisites or limitations on late submission of data provided that the applicant
well respond to the action within the prescribed period set by the office.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
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would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
Under our jurisdiction, the application shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently
clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. (Sec. 35.1 of R.A.
8293)
Also, the application must define the matter for which protection is sought; be clear and
concise and be supported by the description of the invention. (Sec. 36.1 of R.A. 8293)
The terms of the claims determine the extent of the protection conferred by a Philippine patent
or application; clarity of claim is of the utmost importance. The claims do not, however, stand
in isolation and are not to be interpreted in a strictly literal sense.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
As for claims involving products or apparatuses the advantage or superior result does not have
to be implicitly or explicitly utilized by a third party for an infringement to be established.
As for claims involving methods, processes such advantage or superior result should be
utilized by a third party for an infringement. This would also be the case “if use claims were
considered to selection inventions”.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
In order to establish infringement of a “use claim”, the alleged infringer should either use
the product for the claimed purpose or offer it for the said purpose and the intention of the
alleged infringer would play a role.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group of
specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction?
No if the selected compound even if covered by the generic compounds display individualism,
i.e. the compound has not been produced in the prior art.
In the analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is –
i.e. would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
Yes, it does matter.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain?
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No, possibilities (i), (ii) and (iii) will not constitute an inventive step over the prior art.
Should the inventor be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have
this advantageous property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use
of the products for the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not
obvious over the prior art?
Under our law, products per se if not new is not patentable but the use of the product which
have advantageous property not provided by the prior art may be protected.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
No specific rules and Examiner’s discretion will be used instead.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
The knowledge of the advantageous property as disclosed therein is not required to find the
infringement and to establish infringement of a use claim; the alleged infringer should either
use the product for the claimed purpose or offer it for this purpose.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
Items 11 to 14 will be answered after the discussion (Please note the public health issue
of the Philippines against international standards for the patentability of selection invention
regarding the Cheaper Medicines Act or Republic Act 9502 – Universally Accessible Cheaper
Medicine Act of 2008).
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Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Report Q209
in the name of the Portuguese Group
by Fernando Ferreira Magno, Alberto Canelas, Ana Ferreira Silva, Maria do Carmo
Fernandes, Ricardo Henriques and Pedro Alves Moreira
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
The Portuguese legislation governing the protection of inventions through patents, the Industrial
Property Code approved by Decree-Law No. 36/2003 of 5 March 2003 (IPC) and amended
by Decree-Law No. 318/2007 of 26 September 2007, Decree-Law No. 360/2007 of 2
November 2007 and Law No. 16/2008 of 1 April 2008, does not foresee any provisions
referring to or typifying selection inventions.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
In view of the specific nature of selection inventions, the uniform assessment of the requirements
of patentability, it should be taken into account that the selection invention cannot be
specifically described in elements of prior art, e.g. in an earlier patent.
Thus, the selection of a range may be considered as an invention, provided that the general
requirements of patentability are met. If the substance is already known, it will be necessary
to demonstrate a new advantage thereof or the existence of an improvement which may be
classified as a surprising result.
Therefore, the selection of a range may be considered as a new invention and is not required
to present an advantage or improvement.
The new use is relevant for the purpose of determining whether the invention is novel,
whenever it relates to a substance comprised in the state of the art which is used in methods
for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy, since the law expressly
provides for this.
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In general, other improvements are not considered for the purpose of determining if the
invention is novel, whether for inventions either in the chemistry field or in other fields.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
In accordance with Portuguese legislation, the requirements of patentability are established
by the patent application date, meaning that the inventive step is assessed by reference to
that date. However, provided that it is necessary for clarification purposes, experimental data
should be permitted as a rule after the filing of the patent application.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
The description requirements are general and the law does not provide any specific
requirement with respect to selection patents.
Regarding the description requirements, the Portuguese law foresees that the description
must indicate briefly and clearly, without any reservations or omissions, everything that
constitutes the subject matter of the invention, containing a detailed explanation of at least
one embodiment of the invention, in such a way that it may be executed by any person skilled
in the art.
The description must be attached to the patent application and Portuguese law does not
provide for the voluntarily filing thereof at a later date. It may happen that the examination
concludes that the patent cannot be granted, in which case the applicant is notified of the
examination report, accompanied by all the documents cited therein, granting the applicant
the right to reply to the objections within a term of two months. In view of this right to reply,
we believe that the applicant would be able to file a reformulated description containing
information which clarifies the one previously submitted, in order to remedy the objections
raised.
Regarding item (1), Portuguese law does not require the existence of any advantage.
As far as item (4) is concerned, if a new application/use is asserted as a selection invention,
the new use must be indicated in the claims.
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5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
The use or advantage must be explicitly realised to provide the existence of infringement. The
use as the purpose to which the invention relates must result from the circumstances in which
the manufacture of the product is carried out, intention being one of the factors to be taken
into consideration when assessing the act of manufacture, if it can be proven.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
Not applicable.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
Portuguese legislation does not foresee any reference making it possible to conclude the
existence of a quantitative anticipation criterion.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
Scenario (iii) constitutes an inventive step over the prior art, the inventor obtaining protection
for the products per se.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
There is no absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant
advantage.
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10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
It is not strictly necessary to prove knowledge and intention of the infringer as to supply; other
circumstances may be taken into account for the purpose of finding infringement.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Portuguese law does not foresee any reference concerning the assessment of the effort of the
inventor. The inventor shall be rewarded by the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, as
happens with any other patent.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
It is considered that no harmonisation of standards shall be necessary, as the provision of the
law is already mentioned in the special cases of patentability of inventions relating to the use
of substances or compositions comprised in the state of the art in methods for treatment of the
human or animal body by surgery or therapy, the relevant legal provisions corresponding to
Article 54 (4) and (5) of the European Patent Convention.
However, it is considered justifiable to include in the patent file any experimental data or other
to back up the novelty and/or inventive step (for example, data demonstrating the advantages
of the invention or its non-obviousness). However, such data should not be included in the
description of the patent application.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
Not applicable.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
Regarding the working of a selection patent, issues concerning the dependence between
a selection patent and the prior art patent from which it derives could be discussed and
clarified, as well as the regulation of possible licences.
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Note:
It will be helpful and appreciated if the Groups follow the order of the questions in their
Reports and use the questions and numbers for each answer.
Summary
The Portuguese legislation governing the protection of inventions through patents, the Industrial
Property Code does not foresee any provisions referring to or typifying selection inventions.
The description requirements are general and the law does not provide any specific
requirement with respect to selection patents.
The use or advantage must be explicitly realised to provide the existence of infringement.
It is considered that no harmonisation of standards shall be necessary, as the provision of the
law is already mentioned in the special cases of patentability of inventions relating to the use
of substances or compositions comprised in the state of the art in methods for treatment of the
human or animal body by surgery or therapy.
Résumé
La législation portugaise qui régit la protection des inventions par brevets, le Code de
la Propriété Industrielle, ne contient pas de dispositions qui se réfèrent à ou typifient les
inventions de sélection.
Les exigences relatives à la description sont générales et la loi ne prévoit pas d’exigences
spécifiques par rapport aux brevets de sélection.
L’utilisation ou l’avantage doit être réalisé explicitement afin d’établir l’existence d’une
contrefaçon.
Il est considéré qu’aucune harmonisation de critères n’est nécessaire, étant donné que la
disposition légale est déjà mentionnée dans les cas spéciaux de la brevetabilité des inventions
portant sur l’utilisation de substances ou compositions comprises dans l’état de la technique
pour la mise en œuvre de méthodes de traitement chirurgical ou thérapeutique du corps
humain ou animal.
Zusammenfassung
Das portugiesische Recht beschützt die Erfindungen durch die Patentierung derselben.
Deshalb sind in der portugiesischen Gesetzgebung über den gewerblichen Rechtsschutz keine
Massnahmen inbegriffen im Hinblick auf Auswahlerfindungen oder auf ihrer Qualifizierung.
Die Bedingungen einer Offenlegung sind allgemein und es werden keine spezifische
Bedingungen eingeführt in Bezug auf Auswahlpatente. Ihre Benutzung oder Vorteil müssen
ausdrücklich stattfinden um von Verletzung reden zu können.
Man ist der Meinung dass keine harmonisierte Standards nötig sind, da in den spezialen
Fällen der Patentierbarkeit von Erfindungen die Gesetzgebung schon erwähnt ist in Bezug
auf die Benutzung von, im Stand der Technik inbegriffene, Zubereitungen und Stoffe bei
Behandlungsmethoden des menschlichen oder tierischen Körpers mittels Chirurgie und
Therapie.
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Republic of Korea
République du Corée
Republik Korea
Report Q209
in the name of the Korean Group
by Casey Kook-Chan An
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
There are no specific limitations to technical fields or types of selection inventions in relation
to their recognition and protection under the Korean law. However, selection inventions seem
to have been at issue only in chemical, pharmaceutical and material science fields.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
Under Korean pratice, a selection invention is defined as an invention which is comprised
partially or entirely of features (species) which are selected from a broader (generic) disclosure
of the prior art. For a selection invention to be patentable, i) the species must not be specifically
disclosed in the prior art, and ii) each of its species must give rise to qualitatively different
or quantitatively remarkable effects over those of the prior art. The above two factors are
divided into requirements for novelty (requirement i) and inventive step (requirement ii). Even
though a selection invention results in remarkably advantageous effects, the patentability of
the selection invention shall not be acknowledged if it does not meet the novelty requirement
(requirement i). However, the standard for “specific disclosure” in requirement i) is not yet
firmly settled. That is, the relevant court decisions have not been consistent on this issue.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
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The selection invention should provide qualitatively different or quantitatively remarkable
effects. The selection invention’s specification should clearly describe such effects. However,
it is not obliged to describe experimental data in the specification to show such effects. If there
is a reasonable doubt about the effects, then the applicant can submit such substantiating
evidence after the application has been filed (same for general inventions). On the other
hand, an effect of a selection invention that is not described in the original specification
cannot be proven by a document submitted after filing the application.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
As noted with respect to Q3 above, the description requirements are considered to be
met if the specification of the selection invention clearly provides qualitatively different or
quantitatively remarkable effects. That is, experimental data specifically confirming such
effects or comparison results against prior art do not need to be described in the original
specification. However, such effects should be clearly and sufficiently described so that a
person of ordinary skill in the art can understand the effects. There is no concrete standard
with respect to “clear and sufficient” descriptions of an effect. However, according to the
relevant court precedents, a mere description such as “very superior in view of the prior art”
does not meet the description requirements.
As to Item (1), the Korean courts consistently require that all species of a selection invention
must give rise to qualitatively different or quantitatively remarkable effects in view of the prior
art. As to Items (2) and (3), experimental data can be submitted after the application has been
filed, e.g. in the course of examination. However, the description requirements are assessed
based on the original specification. Further, supplementing an insufficient description may be
considered as adding new matter, which is not allowed. As to Item (4), if a selection invention
is characterized in finding a new use, then such use must be included in the claim description.
However, a compound limited by its use is not allowed since this is deemed as claiming the
compound per se, and claiming the “use” itself (so-called “use claim”) is also not allowed.
Thus, a product claim directed to a composition (including compound) limited by its use or a
process claim is used.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
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If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
If a selection invention relates to a new use that is recited in a claim, then infringement is
established if a product has the same use as the selection invention. The intent of an infringer
is not a factor for determining infringement. Further, “inducement of infringement” is not
recognized in Korea. However, if a patent is directed to a product invention, then the act of
making or selling certain articles used exclusively for producing the patented product may
be deemed as an “indirect infringement.” If the patent relates to a process invention, then the
act of making or selling certain articles used exclusively for working said process invention
may also constitute an “indirect infringement.” However, since the selection invention often
has uses other than the claimed use, the possibility of establishing indirect infringement is
quite low.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
Selection inventions have been protected in Korea to promote technological advancements and
developments of fundamental inventions. This is in line with the purpose of the Korean Patent
Act. However, since the inventors and/or applicants of selection and prior art inventions are
identical in many cases (thus potentially being usable to extend patent rights), some may view
that the selection inventions tend to have a negative impact upon the industrial development.
This is one of the reasons why the patentability of selection inventions is examined more strictly.
Further, since selection inventions became easier to obtain with the evolution of technology,
this may be a contributing factor of why they are examined more strictly.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The novelty of example 1 can be assessed differently on a case-by-case basis. In the past, if
the compound of a selection invention was not described as a specific example in the prior
art, then the novelty was often recognized. However, the scope of “specific disclosure” of the
prior art for deniying the novelty of a selection invention has been recently expanded. Thus,
the novelty of a selection invention is no longer easily recognized. The following factors are
considered in determining novelty:
i) whether there is any literal description on the selection invention in the prior art;
ii) whether a person of ordinary skill in the art can directly recognize the existence of the
selection invention in view of the descriptions in the prior art and the technical common
knowledge at the time of filing;
iii) whether examples of the selection invention and the examples of the prior art are
substantially identical. The number of individual species (compounds) that fall under the
generic class of the prior art is not explicitly mentioned as a factor for deciding novelty
(although it seems to affect the decision to some extent).
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8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
In example 3, the inventive step seems to be recognized only in case of Item (iii). As noted
with respect to Q4, if a patent is granted with possessing sufficient inventiveness, then the
scope of protection is limited to the case when the compound is used according to the
claimed use (as an adhesive in the above example).
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
As noted with respect to Item (1) of Q4, it is required that all species of a selection invention to
give rise to qualitatively different or quantitatively remarkable effects in view of the prior art.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
As noted with respect to Q5, according to the Korean Patent Act, the act of manufacturing and
supplying a related compound without any directions on its use (as in example 3) cannot be
considered as constituting patent infringement. If the compound is an article that is exclusively
used for the claimed use of the selection invention (i.e., producing an adhesive), then this
constitutes an indirect infringement.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
A patent awards its inventor for disclosing his/her invention to the public and contributing to
the technical development. Thus, such an award is for the value of the disclosed technology,
and not for the effort and time spent by the inventor. As noted with respect to Q6, selection
inventions became easier to obtain with technical developments. This should be considered
on a case-by-case basis in determining the inventive step of a selection invention. On the
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other hand, such technical developments may be irrelevant to and should not affect the
rationale for protecting selection inventions.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
It is necessary to harmonize the standards for assessing the novelty (Q2 and Q7) of selection
inventions. There are cases in which a selection invention is denied patent protection as
lacking novelty, although it possesses unexpected and remarkable effects (and, thus, an
inventive step). Thus, a clear and consistent standard seems to be necessary. Further, since
international trades are rapidly growing, there appears to be a need to harmonize the
infringement standards of selection inventions (Q5 and Q10).
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
Harmonization should be made in the manner of reading/determining the scope of the prior
art teachings. The cases discussed in Q12 in which the court denies the novelty of a selection
invention notwithstanding the possibility for the invention to meet the inventive step requirement,
results from an overly broad recognition of teachings in the prior art reference. There should
be a clear guideline as to how broadly a prior art teaching should be determined beyond
explicit teachings in the prior art reference.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
There are questions as to whether or not a selection invention should be protected beyond the
regular norm of the patent system, i.e. whether selection inventions should be protected under
special/exceptional rules which are not applied to other types of inventions. The Committee/
AIPPI may wish to discuss on this issue.
Summary
For a selection invention to be patentable, i) the species must not be specifically disclosed in the
prior art (novelty), and ii) each of its species must give rise to qualitatively different or quantitatively
remarkable effects over those of the prior art (inventive step). The standard for “specific disclosure”
in requirement i), however, does not seem to have been firmly settled yet. This may result in cases
where a selection invention satisfying the inventive step requirement in item ii) fails to satisfy the
novelty requirement in item i). Such situation should be contradictory to the purpose of the patent
system – protecting innovative technologies.
All species of a selection invention as defined in the claims must give rise to qualitatively different
or quantitatively remarkable effects in view of the prior art. There should not be an exception to this
rule in view of the notion of the protection of selection inventions.
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Romania
Roumanie
Rumänien
Report Q209
in the name of the Romanian Group
by Doina Tuluca
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction?
In Romania the following types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection
inventions:
A) a particular case from a general disclosure which includes the particular case; or
B) a subfield selected from a field disclosed in a document in the state of the art,
C) an element or a limited number of elements selected from a known larger class.
According to the Romanian Patent law, Chapter II an invention having a subject matter of any
technology field shall relate to a product, process or use.
Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a field other than chemical, pharmaceutical
or material science fields?
No, we have not any examples of selection inventions in a field other than chemical,
pharmaceutical or material science fields.
Although a selection, within a process, of those technical parameters contained in a known
range, which produces unexpected effects on the carrying out of the process or on the
properties of the product obtained can relate to any technical field.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
The Romanian patent law, in generally, has similar provisions as EPC.
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The claimed invention is new, if it refers to:
a) a particular case, and the document in the state of the art has in view a general disclosure
which includes the particular case; or
b) a subfield selected from a field disclosed in a document in the state of the art, on condition
that the subfield is narrow and it is not close to known values and has a different technical
effect; or
c) an element or a limited number of elements selected from a known larger class.
Further, in the Implementing Regulation of the Romanian patent Law, it is said that according
to a generic claim, an invention is not new if the document in the state of the art comprises a
specific example and said claim relates to a general disclosure that also includes that specific
example, and the technical equivalents of the features of the claimed invention shall not be
taken into account when examining the novelty
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction.
The provisions of the Romanian patent law from the point of view of inventive step are the
following:
• the inventive step of an invention shall be assessed in connection with the technical
problem it solves and with the claimed invention taken as a whole, by comparing the
same with the state of the art. The analysis of the inventive step shall be performed only
for the claims fulfilling the novelty condition.
• an invention is deemed to involve an inventive step if it is particularly in one of the
following situations:
a) a selection, within a process, of those technical parameters contained in a known
range, which produce unexpected effects on the carrying out of the process or on
the properties of the product obtained;
b) a selection within a very large group of compounds of known chemical combinations
of those that have unexpected advantages;
The selection is not considered as non-obvious if a person skilled in the art, having access to
the whole state of art, would find the solution based on his experience and daily routine.
If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness requirement can
it be submitted after initial patent filing?
Yes.
Are there any prerequisites or limitations on the late submission of data?
Yes, the late submission of data should have to be done until such time as a decision is
made.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
The invention shall be disclosed in the patent application in a manner sufficiently clear
and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. The specification of
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the patent application should contain sufficient technical information to allow a person
skilled in the art to carry out the invention as claimed, without any inventive step, and if
it allows the third parties to understand the contribution the claimed invention brings to
the state of the art. The clear and complete disclosure of the invention has in view the
patent application considered in whole, including the description, claims and drawings,
as the case may be
The written description has to disclose how the patentee solved an objective problem and
the special qualities and advantages of the selected compound in comparison with those
of the multitude of components from which it was selected.
The selected compound must be pointed out through its chemical name and structure.
The patentee must indicate the general formula from those he selected the compound.
A skilled person having access to the whole state of the art, general knowledge in the
technical field which the technical problem solved in the invention on the relevant date
belongs to, has knowledge of the invention and all the documents cited in the patent may
assess the sufficiency of disclosure.
The Romanian group opinion is that all members of the class selected by the patentee
have to possess the requisite advantage so that it is as far away from the prior art.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
The advantages of selected compound and the experimental data for proving these
advantages have to be included in description and have to be filed with the patent
authority at the filing date of the patent application.
It is possible to later submit experimental data that helps to distinguish the selection
invention from prior art but, the latest, until a decision for granting the patent is made.
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
The sufficiency or written description requirements must be satisfied at the regular filing
date. The patentee may modify the description until a decision for grant is made but the
changes do not extend beyond the disclosure of the invention of the patent application
on the filing date.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
If a new utility is asserted as a selection invention it is sufficient to claim the selected
components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility in the
claims.
Usually a single example may suffice to cover the breadth of claimed scope of protection
if the person skilled can carry out the claimed invention.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
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5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If the invention refers to a product the advantage or superior result does not have to be
implicitly or explicitly utilized by a third party for an infringement to be established.
If the invention is for a new use, the advantage or superior result utilized by a third party it
is not consider an infringement if the alleged infringer use the product in a different way that
the selection invention as it was claimed.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
The implicit or explicit utilization in whole or in part of a selection invention granted for a new
use, as it was claimed, is an infringement.
The manufacturer of a product does not infringe the patent for new use if the product is not
claimed as such in the patent.
In case the competitor who manufactures the claimed selected compound supplies it with no
instructions, it can be assumed from the circumstances that the product is likely to be used to
infringe the patent. In this case, manufacturing the product may be considering contributory
infringement.
If the manufacturer of a product makes it at the order of a third party who intend to use for
the claimed new use, the last one infringes the patent.
The intention of an alleged infringer does not play any role in determination of the infringement.
According to the Romanian Civil law only the infringement is punished. However, the intention
may play a role in the assessment of the casual connection between the contributory action
and the direct infringement.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
In Romania the law which is applicable to selection inventions corresponds to the law and
practice of the EPC. The last developments in different areas of technology show the increased
occurrence of selection inventions from the state of art. The policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions is to encourage the applicants to file for such invention which stimulate
the competition.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group of
specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction?
No, the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of radicals does
not anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical if in the prior
document this compound has not been disclosed explicitly (namely, formula, etc.).
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In the analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is –
i.e. would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
No, in analysis of novelty it does not matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of
compounds is.
Which does matter is that compound be explicitly disclosed in the prior document by a
specific example referring to the selected compound.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction?
In Romania the third (iii) possibility constitutes an inventive step over the prior art.
Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the prior art, what scope
of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor be able to obtain
protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous property), or should
any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for the advantageous
property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior art?
The inventor could obtain protection for the products per se because the compound has
unpredictable advantageous property as adhesive. The inventor can also claim the new use
as adhesive in the same patent.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
There is no specific rule in the Romanian law.
The Romanian group opinion is that an absolute requirement could be that all members of the
class selected by the patentee have to possess the requisite advantage because this property
has been the reason for accepting claim.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
The knowledge of any advantageous property disclosed by the claimed selection is not
required to find infringement. In Romania there is no provision for establishing infringement
for of a use claim.
Extending the provisions for establishing infringement for product or process or a product
covered by process, we may say that the alleged infringer should use the product for the
claimed scope or offer it for that scope. Any document which proves that the manufacturer
knew the advantageous property of the selection could be evidence in assessing of the casual
connection between the contributory action and the direct infringement.
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11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?$
Yes, the efforts of the inventor matter and he should be rewarded.
In order to more completely understand the complexities of the development of a individual
selected chemical compound, the inventor must provide in description the technical challenges
and a brief history of the progress made in the area to arrive at the new selected compound.
More specifically, the background information gives an overview of problems connected with
the disadvantages of prior art and the methods of compounds development.
The research and development of chemical compounds is extremely difficult, and there are
a vastly greater number of failures than successes. Numerous problems had to be solved
in the unpredictable and difficult area of drug design; including interaction with a number
of unspecified other compounds of unknown structure to yield an individual compound for
solve the objective problem raised. All of this is understood and appreciated by the skilled
person.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
The rules for examination selection inventions are different from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and
a lot of contrary decisions have been taken by the patent authorities and courts referring to
the same selection invention.
In order to avoid such contrary decisions the Romanian group considers harmonizing the
standards for the patentability of selection inventions with EPC.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
See Q 12.
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Summary
In Romania the following types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection
inventions:
A) a particular case from a general disclosure which includes the particular case; or
B) a subfield selected from a field disclosed in a document in the state of the art,
C) an element or a limited number of elements selected from a known larger class.
Although a selection, within a process, of those technical parameters contained in a known range,
which produce unexpected effects on the carrying out of the process or on the properties of the
product obtained can relate to any technical field.
The Romanian group opinion is that all members of the class selected by the patentee have to
possess the requisite advantage so that it is as far away from the prior art.
The advantages of selected compound and the experimental data for proving these advantages
have to be included in description and have to be filed with the patent authority at the filing date
of the patent application.
It is possible to later submit experimental data that helps to distinguish the selection invention form
prior art but latest until a decision for grant the patent is made.
The sufficiency of written description requirements must be satisfied at the regular filing date. The
patentee may modify the description until a decision for grant is made but the changes do not
extend beyond the disclosure of the invention of the patent application on the filing date.
If a new utility is asserted as a selection invention it is suffice to claim the selected components
which have been found to be associated with such a new utility in the claims.
Usually a single example may suffice to cover the breadth of claimed scope of protection if the
person skilled can carry out the claimed invention.
The knowledge of any advantageous property disclosed by the claimed selection is not required to
find infringement. In Romania there is no provision for establishing infringement for of a use claim.
Extending the provisions for establishing infringement for product or process or a product covered
by process we may say that the alleged infringer should use the product for the claimed scope of
offer it for that scope. Any document which proves that the manufacturer knew the advantageous
property of the selection could be evidence in assessing of the casual connection between the
contributory action and the direct infringement.
The rules for examination selection inventions are different from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and a lot
of contrary decision had made by the patent authorities and courts referring to the same selection
invention.
In order to avoid such contrary decisions the Romanian group considers harmonizing the standards
for the patentability of selection inventions with EPC.
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Résumé
En Roumanie sont reconnues en tant qu’inventions de sélection les types d’inventions suivants :
a) un cas particulier d’une divulgation générique comprenant ledit cas ; ou
b) un sousdomaine sélécté d’un domaine plus large déjà divulgué dans un document de l’art
antérieur ;
c) un élément ou un certain nombre d’éléments qui sont sélectés d’une classe plus large.
Bien qu’une sélection, au sein d’un procès, de certains paramètres techniques compris dans une
gamme connue, produisant des effets inattendus sur le développement du processus ou sur les
propriétés du produit, elle peut se rapporter à tout domaine technique.
L’opinion du groupe roumain est que tous les éléments de la classe sélectionnée par l’inventeur
doivent posséder les avantages exigés de façon que l’invention soit suffisamment éloignée de l’art
antérieur.
Les avantages du produit sélectionné et les données expérimentales faisant la preuve de ces
avantages doivent être compris dans la description de la demande de brevet et doivent être
déposés auprès des offices des brevets à la date de dépôt de la demande de brevet.
Il est possible d’enregistrer à une date ultérieure des données expérimentales qui aident à distinguer
l’invention sélectée de l’art antérieur mais au plus tard lors de l’issue de la décision de délivrance
du brevet.
Les exigences concernant le caractère suffisant ou la description écrite de l’invention doivent être
satisfaites à la date ordinaire du dépôt. Le demandeur peut modifier la description avant l’issue
de la décision de délivrance du brevet compte tenu que les modifications doivent être faites de
manière que l’objet de l’invention ne s’étende pas au-delà du contenu de la demande de brevet à
la date du dépôt.
Si un nouveau produit est soutenu en tant qu’invention de sélection alors il est suffisant d’indiquer
les composantes sélectées dont l’association a été constatée à ce nouveau produit dans les
revendications.
Généralement, un seul exemple peut être suffisant pour assurer l’étendue de la protection requise
si un homme de métier peut mettre en œuvre l’invention revendiquée.
La connaissance d’une propriété avantageuse divulguée par la sélection revendiquée ne constitue
pas un acte de contrefaçon. En Roumanie il n’y a pas de dispositions légale pour déterminer la
contrefaçon d’une revendication d’utilisation.
En étendant les dispositions requises pour établir la contrefaçon d’un produit ou d’un procédé ou
d’un produit obtenu par un procédé on peut dire que le présumé contrefacteur devrait utiliser le
produit conformément à l’objet revendiqué ou l’offrir en vente à cette fin. Tout document prouvant
que le fabricant a été au courant des propriétés avantageuses de la sélection peut servir d’évidence
pour estimer le rapport entre l’action contributive et la contrefaçon directe.
Les règles d’examen des inventions de sélection sont différentes d’une juridiction à l’autre et les
autorités compétentes dans le domaine de brevets et les tribunaux ont pris bien des décisions
contraires au sujet de la même invention de sélection.
Pour éviter telles décisions contraires, le groupe roumain envisage d’harmoniser les critères de
brevetabilité concernant les inventions de sélection selon CEB.
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Zusammenfassung
In Rumänien werden folgende Erfindungstypen im Rahmen des Begriffs der Auswahlerfindungen
anerkannt:
a) Ein Einzelfall einer allgemeinen Offenbarung, welche den Einzelfall einschließt; oder
b) ein Teilgebiet eines in einem Dokument des Standes der Technik offenbarten Gebietes,
c) ein Element oder eine begrenzte Anzahl aus einer bekannten größeren Klasse ausgewählter
Elemente.
Trotzdem kann eine Auswahl jener in einem bekannten Abschnitt enthaltenen technischen Parameter,
die unerwartete Auswirkungen auf die Ausführung eines Verfahrens oder auf die Eigenschaften der
erhaltenen Produkte haben, jedwelchem technischen Gebiet angehören.
Es ist die Auffassung der rumänischen Gruppe, dass alle Elemente der vom Patentanmelder
ausgewählten Klasse den erforderlichen Vorteil aufweisen müssen, sodass sie gleich weit vom
Stand der Forschung angesiedelt sind.
Die Vorteile der ausgewählten Verbindung und die experimentellen Daten zum Beweis dieser Vorteile
sind in die Beschreibung einzugliedern und bei der Patentbehörde am Tag der Patentanmeldung
einzureichen.
Ein nachträgliches Einreichen experimenteller Daten, die es erleichtern die Auswahlerfindung
vom Stand der Technik abzugrenzen, ist möglich, jedoch spätestens, bis zum Zeitpunkt des
Erteilungsbescheides.
Die Erfordernisse der Vollständigkeit und der schriftlichen Beschreibung müssen zum Zeitpunkt
des regulären Einreichens erfüllt sein. Der Erfinder kann die Beschreibung ändern, solange kein
Bescheid zur Patenterteilung vorliegt, wobei die Änderungen aber die Offenbarung der Erfindung
in der Patentanmeldung zum Einreichzeitpunkt nicht überschreiten.
Wird ein neuer Nutzwert als eine Auswahlerfindung beansprucht, so genügt es, in den
Patentansprüchen die ausgewählten Komponenten zu beanspruchen, für die herausgefunden
worden ist, dass sie mit dem neuen Nutzwert in Zusammenhang stehen.
Gewöhnlich kann ein einziges Beispiel genügen, die Breite des beanspruchten Patentschutzumfangs
zu decken, wenn die beanspruchte Erfindung vom Fachmann durchgeführt werden kann.
Die Kenntnis jedwelcher vorteilhaften, durch die beanspruchte Auswahl offenbarten Eigenschaft
ist für die Feststellung einer Patentschutzverletzung nicht erforderlich. In Rumänien gibt es keine
gesetzliche Bestimmung zur Feststellung der Verletzung des durch einen Verwendungsanspruch
gewährten Patentschutzes.
Durch Erweiterung der Bestimmungen zur Feststellung der Patentschutzverletzung für ein Produkt
oder ein Verfahren oder ein durch das Verfahren gedecktes Produkt, kann gesagt werden,
dass der vermeintliche Patentschutzverletzer das Produkt zum beanspruchten Zweck verwenden
oder es für diesen Zweck anbieten sollte. Jedwelches Dokument, das unter Beweis stellt, dass
der Erzeuger die vorteilhafte Eigenschaft der Auswahl kannte, könnte Beweismaterial darstellen
für die Feststellung des ursächlichen Zusammenhangs zwischen der Beitragshandlung und der
unmittelbaren Patentschutzverletzung.
Die Regeln zur Prüfung von Auswahlerfindungen unterscheiden sich von einem Zuständigkeitsgebiet
zum anderen und es sind zahlreiche gegenteilige Entscheidungen von Patentbehörden und Gerichten
in Sachen derselben Auswahlerfindung getroffen worden.
Um solchen gegenteiligen Entscheidungen vorzubeugen, zieht die rumänische Gruppe die
Harmonisierung der Normen betreffend die Patentierbarkeit von Auswahlerfindungen mit dem EPÜ
(Europäischen Patentübereinkommen) in Betracht.
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Russia
Russie
Russland
Report Q209
in the name of the Russian Group
by Alexander SOBOLEV
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
The Russian Federation is one of the sparse examples of jurisdictions where protection of
exclusive rights for inventions can be sought under the provisions of either the Civil Code, Part
IV before the Russian Patent Office (FIPS) or Eurasian Patent Convention (EAPC) before the
Eurasian Patent Office (EAPO). However, validity and infringement matters concerning both
Russian and Eurasian patents (except for administrative annulment procedure pursuant to Art.
53 of Patent Instruction to EAPC) shall be considered under the provisions of the national
legislation.
Pursuant to both the national Civil Code and EAPC, the concept of a selection invention is
statutory strictly limited to a compound. It is noteworthy that the old Rules effective under
the old national Law recited a “chemical compound” while the Rules under EAPC currently
in force recite “an individual compound” without further spelling out its nature. As concerns
inventions related to subject-matters other than a chemical compound, that result from cutting
out a certain interval from the prior-disclosed numeric range protection of such inventions may
also be sought within the context of a concept of a “broader/narrower” (or “genus/species”)
invention which, quite unfortunately, is not literally provided for in the national or regional
legislation.
Generally speaking, the regional EAPO legislation deals with the issues pertinent to selection
inventions in a more comprehensive manner than does the national legislation, i.e. Civil
Code, Part IV. It appears that the approach to treating selection inventions exercised by the
Russian Patent Office is governed to a greater extent by the existing practice than by statutory
provisions. This is evident from the fact that neither Civil Code, Part IV, nor old Rules, nor
new Regulations under the Civil Code which are yet to be approved contain any special
provisions related to examination of a selection invention for compliance with the requirement
for novelty.
No, we are not aware of any examples of selection inventions in a field other than chemical,
pharmaceutical or material science fields.
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2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
No, merely carving a subset of compounds from a broad prior art disclosure is not sufficient
to impart novelty to an alleged selection invention. In general, the fact that a compound
that falls within the broad prior art structural formula has not been specifically disclosed
as produced and studied is prerequisite to recognizing an alleged selection invention as
complying with the requirement for novelty.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
A surprising advantage (technical effect) over the rest of the compounds that fall within the
broad structural formula is prerequisite to recognizing an alleged selection invention as
complying with the requirement for inventive step. Usually, the surprising advantage consists
in a new advantageous/superior property that is exhibited by the compounds according to
the alleged selection invention and that was not formerly known for the broader prior art
group of compounds. The new property may well be qualitative or quantitative in nature. In
the latter case, the extent of quantitative differences is critical. Surely, quantitative differences
that fall within the range of an experimental error would not count.
Yes, experimental data can be submitted after initial patent filing to back up the compliance
with the inventive step requirement. Submitting new experimental data will generally serve
the purpose of backing up the feasibility of attaining the technical effect as set forth in the
specification. However, the applicant is entitled to bring up a new surprising effect and to
furnish experimental evidence in favour of feasibility of attaining it.
No special prerequisites or limitations on the late submission of data apply.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
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Pursuant to the existing practice in the Russian Patent Office, the body of information provided
in the specification should be sufficient to back up the feasibility of putting the claimed
invention into effect and the feasibility of accomplishing the intended use within the entire
scope of what is claimed. Under EAPC, the above requirement is somewhat different. One
more provision applies, namely the specification should contain information on methods and
means using which the claimed invention can be put into effect while accomplishing the
specified intended use and attaining the expected technical effect.
Generally speaking, furnishing supplementary experimental evidence in the course of
examination is allowable, especially if this new evidence serves the purpose of corroborating
the feasibility of attaining the specified technical effect. In case of a specific class of compounds
selected from a wider range, the technical effect will generally be intimately linked to their
new utility.
Item 1) No absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage
exists. However, the threshold for sufficiency may vary. Where the advantage (technical
effect) of a selected class is a qualitative one (a new property) furnishing experimental
evidence related to a few of the members of the class, preferably including the marginal
members would probably suffice to corroborate an assertion that the new property is inherent
in all members of the selected class. Where the advantageous effect consists in superiority
expressed in quantitative terms, more exhaustive experimental evidence may be needed to
back up an assertion that the specified quantitative effect is peculiar to all members of the
selected class.
One way or another, the specification shall contain comparative examples that testify to the
fact that the claimed compounds possess a new qualitative or quantitative characteristic while
other compounds belonging to a broader prior disclosed class lack it. If prior art contains
information on the quantitative characteristics of the prior disclosed compounds and the
assay conditions are comparable to those used to quantify the characteristics of the selected
compounds providing such information would most likely suffice.
Item 2)
Item 3)
Item 4) As a rule a new utility shall be explicitly recited in the claims.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
With Reference to the Examples
By providing for allowability of protection of selection inventions by a patent, the legislator is
obviously pursuing the goal of stimulating science progress. Any research into new properties
of materials and compounds is always a long and costly one and in order to encourage
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esearch and to reach a fair balance between the interests of a patentee claiming a selection
invention and public interests it is essential to grant monopoly that is comparable in scope to
the monopoly granted to a holder of an earlier patent drawn to a broadly defined class of
compounds. Furthermore, given the absolute protection granted to chemical compounds or
substances, interests of the holder of the earlier patent from which the selection was made
should be also taken into consideration. In fact, the balance to be reached is a trilateral one
as the selection invention would be economically dependent on the earlier broad patent and
commercial use of the selection invention without permission of the patentee of the broad
patent is statutory prohibited.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
A selected compound belonging to the prior disclosed generic class shall be deemed to meet
the requirement for novelty once it was not described as a specially produced and studied
one. In general, the number of compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class
does not count.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
Scenario i) definitely does not constitute an inventive step.
Scenario ii) does not literally fall within the established algorithm for assessing inventive
step of a selection invention. The above algorithm both under Russian and EAPO practice
explicitly refers to a new qualitative or quantitative property that the prior disclosed group is
not known of. However, existence of a hint at the allegedly new property is most likely to be
treated as destroying inventive step.
Scenario iii) does constitute an inventive step. However, bearing in mind the concept of
absolute protection of a compound protection granted to compounds making up the selection
invention will be limited to their use for a new advantageous property.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
The assertion that all members of the subset selected by the applicant posses the requisite
advantage shall be well-grounded. Of course, no reliable thumb rule concerning sufficiency
of supporting evidence exists.
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10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Such considerations as satisfaction of an existing need, complexity of a problem to be
solved, substantial contribution to technical progress, long-term research that brought about
the positive result etc. are literally provided for in the EAPO Rules as indirect arguments in
favour of non-obviousness. Although existing combinatorial chemistry techniques and highthroughput
screening technologies have substantially reduced the burden of searching for
new compounds with desired properties in terms of man-years spent costs involved in such
research are ever growing.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
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Singapore
Singapour
Singapur
Report Q209
in the name of the Singapore Group
by Winnie THAM and Jason CHAN
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction?
Background Law
The Singapore Patents Act (“SPA”) does not specifically recognise a category of “selection
inventions”. However, such inventions are not excluded from patentability provided they meet
the general conditions of patentability that an invention must be novel, possess an inventive
step and be industrially applicable.
In Singapore, the usual understanding of a selection invention is that of a later filed patent
based on a selection of compounds from those have been described in wider and more
general terms in the earlier patent. The selection invention typically covers a group of members
which have a particular advantage and peculiar character which is unique to the members
within that group.
A new use of a known compound may be patentable under the SPA, but this is usually not
considered within the understanding of “selection inventions”. Nonetheless, it may be of
interest and we set out the relevant provision namely Section 14(7) of the SPA below:
In the case of an invention consisting of a substance or composition for use in a method of
treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy or of diagnosis practised on the
human or animal body, the fact that the substance or composition forms part of the state of
the art shall not prevent the invention from being taken to be new if the use of the substance
or composition in any such method does not form part of the state of the art.
Thus far, there is no specific case law in Singapore regarding selection patents nor are there
any guidelines issued by our Patent Office. However, UK case law is considered to have
persuasive value in Singapore. Although it is not binding, recent cases in UK such as Dr
Reddy’s Laboratories v Eli Lilly [2008] EWHC 2345 (Pat), may be used
as a guide in future should this issue arise in Singapore.
Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a field other than chemical, pharmaceutical
or material science fields?
No.
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2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
General Law on Novelty
The general statement of law with regard to novelty in Singapore is as follows. An invention
shall be taken to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art (s 14(1) of the SPA).
Section 14(2) and (3) of the SPA provides that the state of the art shall be taken to comprise all
matter which at the time before the priority date of the invention has been made available to
the public (in Singapore or elsewhere) by written or oral description, use or in any other way,
and includes, in certain circumstances, matter contained in an earlier patent application,
whose priority date predates that of the invention.
Singapore courts have cited with approval the judgment of the Court of Appeal in General
Tire and Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co Ltd [1972] RPC 457
at 485-486. In the latter case the Court of Appeal said:
“If the prior inventor’s publication contains a clear description of, or clear instructions to do or
make, something that would infringe the patentee’s claim if carried out after the grant of the
patentee’s patent, the patentee’s claim will be shown to lack the necessary novelty”.
The point of reference is that known as of the date of publication of the prior art, read in the
light of common general knowledge.
There is also a requirement that the disclosure must be ‘enabling’, i.e. sufficient so as to enable
the skilled addressee to put the invention into practice: Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s
Application [1991] RPC 485.
Novelty for Selection Inventions
As mentioned above, UK case law may be instructive in Singapore, and therefore relevant in
ascertaining patentability of selection inventions.
The criteria for a classical ‘selection invention’ were set out in the UK case of IG
Farbenindustrie, and approved in Du Pont. Following these criteria, in order to be a
valid selection invention:
• a patent must be based on some substantial advantage (or avoidance of a substantial
disadvantage) attributable to the selected members;
• the whole of the selected class must have that advantage; and
• the selection must be in respect of a character that can fairly be said to be peculiar to the
selected group.
However, these criteria may cover not only novelty but inventive step issues.
The recent UK case of Dr Reddy’s -v- Eli Lilly is helpful with regard to the issue
of novelty. In that case, the learned Judge Floyd J referred to the recent UK decision on
enantiomers in Generics v Lundbeck [2008] EWCA Civ 311. In that case, it was
held that a general ‘Markush’ formula does not necessarily destroy the novelty of all the
compounds contained within in it. Given the large number of compounds disclosed by such
a formula, “attention would focus on the compounds actually described”. Moreover, such
a disclosure cannot be said to contain “a clear description of, or clear instructions to do or
make, something which would infringe the patentee’s claim.” On the facts, Floyd J decided that
none of the prior art cited against Eli Lilly’s patent, including a ‘Markush’ formula that covered
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olanzapine, destroyed the novelty of the patent because olanzapine was not specifically
named or exemplified. Neither was olanzapine obvious in light of the prior art cited.
Floyd J also expressed, in obiter, doubt whether satisfying the criteria in IG Farbenindustrie,
would prevent a finding of anticipation if there had been a specific prior disclosure.
Hence, if Singapore adopts a similar position, it would appear that there must not be
any specific prior disclosure of any member of the selected group, even if it has a special
advantage. Carving a range out of a broad prior art disclosure may be sufficient in respect
of novelty, provided that there has been no specific disclosure of the selected group.
The requirement of a different advantage or use or same advantage with an unpredictable
improvement appears to be directed more towards the issue of inventive step. In considering
novelty, the main issue centres on whether or not the compound has been disclosed.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
General Law on Inventive Step
The general law on inventive step for patents generally also applies to selection inventions.
Section 15 of the SPA provides that an invention must involve an inventive step. An “inventive
step” is, in turn, defined as one which is:
[N]ot obvious to a person skilled in the art, having regard to any matter which forms part
of the state of the art by virtue only of section 14(2) and without having regard to section
14(3).
The state of the art under s 14(2) of the SPA is not only relevant to the discussion of novelty,
but is also considered when determining whether an invention is ‘obvious’ for the purposes
of adjudicating inventive step.
For an invention to qualify for inventive step a person skilled in the art must not be able to
apply known processes forming part of the state of the art to the manufacture of the claimed
product. ‘obviousness’ must be assessed with reference to the state of knowledge existing at
the date of the patent.
Singapore courts have endorsed and accepted the oft-cited four-step “Windsurfing test” laid
down by the English Court of Appeal in Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur
Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] RPC 59 (“Windsurfing”) at 73–74 (and adopted
by the court in Merck & Co Inc v Pharmaforte Singapore Pte Ltd [2000] 3
SLR 717 at [50]):
There are, we think, four steps which require to be taken in answering the jury question. The
first is to identify the inventive concept embodied in the patent in [the] suit. Thereafter, the
court has to assume the mantle of the normally skilled but unimaginative addressee in the art
at the priority date and to impute to him what was, at that date, common general knowledge
in the art in question. The third step is to identify what, if any, differences exist between the
matter cited as being “known or used” and the alleged invention. Finally, the court has to
ask itself whether, viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention, those differences
constitute steps which would have been obvious to the skilled man or whether they require
any degree of invention.
Experimental Data
Under the SPA, there is a requirement that a patent specification cannot be amended in a
manner which would result in subject-matter being added to the specification. Therefore,
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if experimental data is to form part of the specification, it must be included at the time of
filing.
It may be possible to refer to experimental data during the course of prosecution. There are
however, no guidelines as to when such data may be taken into account, and this may be in
the discretion of the Examiner in considering arguments in the response.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
Singapore does have sufficiency requirements in respect of patents. The sufficiency
requirement is set out in Section 25(4) of the SPA states that:
The specification of an application [for a patent] shall disclose the invention in a manner
which is clear and complete for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the
art.
In the case of Ng Kok Cheng v Chua Say Tiong, the phrase “clearly and
completely” contemplates that the patent specification need not set out every detail
necessary for the performance of the invention, but can leave the skilled man to use his
skill to perform the invention.
Furthermore, the test of sufficiency has been referred to in the local case of First
Currency Choice Pte Ltd v Main-Line Corporate Holdings Ltd and
Another Appeal [2008] 1 SLR 335; [2007] SGCA 50:
[T]he disclosure must enable the invention to be performed to the full extent of the
monopoly claimed: see Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 [at] 48.
Whether the specification is sufficient or not is highly sensitive to the nature of the
invention. The first step is to identify the invention and decide what it claims to enable the
skilled man to do. Then, one can ask whether the specification enables him to do it. …
There are also two further considerations.
First, the specification of the patent must embrace an embodiment of the invention asserted
in each of the claims with sufficient particularity to enable the invention to be understood
and carried into effect by those in the industry without making further inventions or
prolonged study of the matter. The specification must be set out clearly and fairly so
that any individual desirous of carrying out the invention may obtain full knowledge of
its practical aspects. But, it is not necessary that the specification be so detailed that
this notional individual can perform the invention without any trial or experiment at all.
Second, the description of the invention should not be unnecessarily difficult to follow,
and must not contain any traps or seriously misleading statements which the reader
cannot correct (see Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 13(3) (LexisNexis, 2007) at para
160.367).
The skilled person is taken to be trying to make the invention work. If the skilled person
would quickly realise that one method would work and another would fail, the specification
is not insufficient because the claim is expressed in terms broad enough to include both
methods.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
Experimental data cannot be submitted after filing to fulfil the requirement of sufficiency.
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3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
The patent specification per se must meet the requirement of sufficiency at the time of
filing. It is not possible to amend the patent specification to add new matter after filing.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short?
The monopoly in the claim must be coextensive with the novelty. Hence, the claim cannot be
broader than the scope of the class of members with the asserted or proven advantages.
If novelty and inventiveness lies in a particular requisite advantage, then all the selected
class should possess that novelty and the description should be sufficiently clear and
complete. However, the specification does not have to be complete in every single detail. The
specification must be set out clearly and fairly so that any individual desirous of carrying out
the invention may obtain full knowledge of its practical aspects. Trial or experimentation is
permissible, and if a skilled person is able to correct and work the invention despite the fact
that one or two examples fall short, the description may be sufficient.
Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would
it suffice to claim a particular range or selection of components which have been found to
be associated with such a new utility or would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in
the claims?
It would depend on the nature of the invention. If the “selection invention” is a new use
of a known compound, then the new use must be expressed in the claims. The novelty of
the invention must be co-extensive with the monopoly. If however the selection invention
comprises compounds within a certain range which have not been disclosed before, it may
not be necessary for the utility to be expressed.
Generally speaking, there is a requirement for industrial applicability under the SPA, namely
all patents must be industrially applicable or useful in some way.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
It does not have to be implicitly or explicitly utilised by a third party for infringement to be
established. Whether or not infringement is proven is dependent on the scope of the claims
and whether the alleged infringing act reads on the claims.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
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As selection inventions are not treated as a separate category under the SPA, it is difficult to
express any particular policy which underpins selection inventions.
In terms of policy considerations, the Singapore Group considers that there may be an
“evergreening” concern that selection patents may lead to double patenting or extending the
time limit of exclusivity.
On the other hand, this must be balanced with protection for patent owners who should
be rewarded if their inventions can satisfy the requirements of novelty, inventive step and
industrial applicability. If selection inventions can satisfy these criteria, then the inventions
should not be deprived of protection. The issue of double patenting then would not arise.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
If novelty can be established, then it should not matter whether there is 1,000,000 possible
compounds as opposed to 10 compounds. However from a practical perspective, it may
be harder to establish novelty, and indeed inventive step, if the selection is made from 10
compounds.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
It would appear that only Scenario (III) would be considered to have inventive step. The
inventor should be able to claim the product per se provided it is novel and inventive. Even if
you include the advantageous property, it would not confer novelty if the product has already
been disclosed. The claim must be defined (even if to the product per se) to ensure that all
members of the class have this advantageous property.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
Please see Q4 above.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
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Establishing product patent infringement does not require proving knowledge and intention.
For process patent, it must be shown that the infringer knew or that it was obvious to a
reasonable person in the circumstances that use of the process would be an infringement of
the patent. Whilst there is no provision for contributory infringement under SPA, knowledge
or intention may remain relevant in relation to claims of joint tortfeasorship or conspiracy to
infringe.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
As mentioned above, selection inventions are not treated as a separate category under
the SPA, and it is difficult to articulate any particular policy which underpins selection
inventions.
However, the Singapore group has discussed possible policy considerations in this area. First,
one consideration may be whether such inventions are deserving of, or merit protection. With
the advance of technology and scientific tools available to industry, it may be more difficult to
establish that there is inventive step in certain inventions if the invention may be derived from
a systematic (albeit laborious) process of trial and error.
If the technology is available to make selection inventions more easily discoverable, then
should protection exist for such inventions?
However, it does appear that our law in Singapore has safeguards to ensure that the invention
merits protection. To illustrate, in assessing inventive step, it is established in case law that
if various techniques and processes were available which the man skilled in the art thought
were worth trying out to yield beneficial results, or if the same could be said to be ‘lying in
the road’ for the research worker to use, then it may be easier to establish that the invention
is obvious.
(See Merck & Co, Inc v Pharmaforte Singapore Pte Ltd
[2002] 2 SLR 515; [1999] SGHC 323).
With regard to effort that the inventor has invested, the Singapore Group is of the view that
this in itself is not necessarily relevant to the question of inventive step. However, in cases
where the effort and investment is great, it may be more difficult it is to show that the invention
is obvious because that information would not be in the “common general knowledge” of the
person skilled in the art or not so readily available.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
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13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
The Singapore Group is of the view that selection inventions should not have a different
e.g. higher standard of patentability than other types of inventions. Currently in Singapore,
selection inventions are treated in the same manner as other inventions.
However, it might be useful to have some guidelines as to novelty, inventive step and
sufficiency in this area of selection inventions as they are in a special category. There should
also be consensus on how novelty and inventive step should be interpreted, particularly since
these issues are closely related. For example, should the particular advantage or utility of the
selection invention be considered when assessing the question of novelty?
The Singapore Group also considers that the issue of infringement of selection inventions
may merit further consideration as to what comprises infringement of a selection invention,
particularly when the peculiar characteristic or advantage of the selection invention is not
offered as a feature of the alleged infringing product.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
The Singapore Group is of the view that the issues mentioned above on harmonisation would
merit further discussion.
Summary
Under Singapore Patents Law, selection inventions are not treated differently in terms of patentability
criteria from other types of inventions. Briefly, a selection invention is considered novel if it has not
been disclosed in the prior art, regardless of whether it has the specified advantage or peculiar
property of the selection invention. For inventive step, the selection invention must not be obvious
to a person skilled in the art. There is also a requirement that the specification shall disclose
the invention clearly and completely so that it may be performed by a person skilled in the art.
Experimental data may be not be added to the patent specification but may be submitted in the
response to the Examiner.
The Singapore Group is of the view that selection inventions should continue be treated in the same
manner as other types of inventions as above. However, guidelines as to how novelty, inventive step,
sufficiency and infringement may be assessed is worthy of further discussion and harmonisation.
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South Africa
Afrique du Sud
Südafrika
Report Q209
in the name of the South African Group
by Alexis APOSTOLIDIS (Partner – Adams & Adams)
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
There is very little case law in South Africa concerning selection inventions and the nature
of the invention that may form a selection invention. From the few cases that have raised the
issue of a selection invention, each invention has related to chemically related products such
as Amoxycillin®, pigments and pesticidal preparations.
In the case of Helios Ltd v Letraset Ltd, 1970 BP 495 (T) the following was stated:
“In saying that I am not overlooking the class of so-called “selection patents”, which are
recognised mainly, if not solely, in the field of chemistry. When there has been a disclosure,
in general terms, of a class of chemical compounds, covering a vast number of variants, it
may be possible for someone who has found some new, special and useful property in one
of the variants, which is not possessed by the class as a whole, to obtain a valid patent for his
discovery, despite the prior general disclosure (See Halsbury, 3rd Edition, Vol 29 pp. 28 to
29; Blanco White, op cit. at pp. 104 to 105; TerrelI & Shelley, 10th Edition pp. 118 to 119.)
But in such a case the selection must be inventive. And there can be no selection patent where
there has been nothing more than a selection from a small number of variants, specifically
mentioned in the prior disclosure. In Halsbury, 3rd Edition, Vol. 29 p. 51 note (6) it is said
that, except in chemical cases, the number of possible variants is too small for the selection of
any one to be patentable. (See also the Esso case 1960 R.P.C. at p. 56 where the Master of
the Rolls said that certain subject matters, like pieces of mechanism, do not lend themselves
to the notion of patentable selection). And, indeed, it was not suggested by Counsel for the
plaintiff that the patent before us was a selection patent.
Should selection inventions be patentable in South Africa, there is no reason why such
protection should be limited to a particular technical field.
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2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
There is no case law in South Africa that sets out clearly the requirements for the patentability of
selection inventions. To the extent that the question of selection inventions has been considered
by South African courts, they have been considered with reference to the “Maugham” rules
set out in the case of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.’s Patents, (1930) 47 RPC 289. The rules may
be set out as follows:
(a) The selection patent to be valid must be based on some substantial advantage to be
secured by the use of the selected members;
(b) The whole of the selected members must possess the advantage in question; and
(c) The selection must be in respect of a quality of a special character which can fairly be
said to be peculiar to the selected group.
Whether or not these rules form part of South African law is still an open question.
Our court of first instance in Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v British Titan Products,
1974 BP 82, considered the so called “Maugham” rules and decided that it was not necessary
to determine whether they formed part of South African law or not.
In our higher courts, hearing appeals from the court of first instance with respect to patent
matters, the court in the case of Ciba-Geigy AG v EI Dui Pont Nemours and Co., 1973 BP
377 (T), stated that if the statements made by Maugham, J. with respect to selection inventions
“apply at all in our law” then the statements relate to obviousness and not to anticipation.
In the case of The B-M Group (Proprietary) Limited v Beecham Group Limited, 1980 BP
343 (A) the court, in appeal, had occasion to consider the question of selection inventions.
Disappointingly the court simply assumed that the conditions set out in the Maugham rules
formed part of South African law.
Assuming that the Maugham rules indeed applied in South African law, the court went on to
say that:
“The essence of inventiveness of such a patent in our law would be the discovery (i.e. the further
step) that the “selected members” all have some substantial, special, peculiar advantage over
the other, unselected members that was not obvious having regard to what was common
knowledge at the effective date. It is the latter feature that distinguishes “the selection” from
being mere verification resulting “from the systematic investigation or research” into the
compounds of the originating patent.”
It therefore appears from the above cases that the patentable subject matter of a selection
invention lies in the substantial, special and peculiar advantage of the selection. From an
anticipation point of view, if the selection has not been specifically identified and the associated
advantages thereof have not been disclosed in a prior art document, such selection will in all
likelihood not be anticipated by the prior art document. Accordingly it would appear that a
different advantage or use with respect to the selected species is required.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
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Inventive step with respect to selection inventions is discussed above. In general the test for
inventiveness is that which was developed in the case of Ensign-Bickford (Sa) Pty Ltd V Aeci
Explosives 1998 BIP 271 (SCA) and involves the following enquiry:
(a) What is the inventive step said to be involved in the patent in suit;
(b) What was, at the priority date, the state of the art relevant to the step;
(c) In what respect does the step go beyond, or differ from, the state of the art;
(d) Having regard to such development or difference, would the taking of the step be obvious
to the skilled man.
South Africa is a non examining country and therefore the opportunity to submit data to
substantiate inventive step do not exist. Such data may also in all likelihood not be acceptable
in our courts should the validity of a patent be tested, in this context, with regard to obviousness.
It may however be submitted to support an argument of commercial success although it must
be noted that such evidence cannot establish inventiveness if there is none.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
The legal position with respect to the question of sufficiency is as follows:
The question as to whether a specification contains sufficient information to enable a skilled
person to carry out the invention is a question of fact, the skilled person being presumed to
know the relevant art. The relevant section in the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978 reads
as follow:
“(1) Any person may at any time apply in the prescribed manner for the revocation of a patent
on any of the following grounds only, namely-
…(e) that the complete specification concerned does not sufficiently describe, ascertain and,
where necessary, illustrate or exemplify the invention and the manner in which it is to be
performed in order to enable the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art of
such invention…”
In the case of Unilever LTD v Colgate-Palmolive Co., 1977 BP 200 and Nelton and Another v
Pacnet 1977 BP 87 (A) there appeared to be a relaxation of the court’s attitude to sufficiency
in favour of the patentee such that a “specification should not be held to be insufficient if the
persons to whom it is addressed would be able to produce the article or carry out the process
claimed, without any difficulty and with the aid of simple or routine experiments not requiring
any prolonged research or enquiry.”
Insofar as to why an invention works, reference is had to the case of Lego M Lemelstreich
Limited v Hydro-plan Engineering Limited, 1961 BP 1 (CP), the following passages bearing
repetition:
“The first ground is that the complete specification does not fully describe and ascertain the
invention and the manner in which it is to be performed. In particular it is alleged that there
is no theoretical or other basis given in the specification for stating that the baffle tip width is
. Accordingly, it is alleged, that the patentee has failed to make the nature of invention and
how to perform it clear and intelligible.
I have some difficulty in understanding this ground in the light of the particularisation thereof.
I do not appreciate why a theoretical analysis is a prerequisite for enabling a person skilled
in the art to put an invention into use. For this purpose it seems to me not to be necessary
to say why a specific configuration has been selected or why the parameters selected are
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advantageous. All that is required is that the patentee must describe the invention and the
method by which it is to be performed. The enquiry involves a question of fact, namely, whether
to a person skilled in the art, the specification contains proper instructions for enabling the
invention to be put into use.
This is an issue to be determined preferably by the addressees of the specification. The
patentee is required, only, to describe in what manner the invention is to be performed.
The inventor need not theorise or explain how the method works. He may not even know
himself how the method works. The inventor patents a process or article and not its scientific
explanation. Even if a theory is given (unnecessarily) and it proves to be wrong, this will
not render the specification insufficient unless there is evidence that an addressee would be
materially misled.”
The date on which sufficiency is to be ascertained for purposes of a South African patent is
the date on which the patent application is published since it is at this date that the skilled
addressee should be able to carry out the invention without further instruction. In respect of
International Applications designating South Africa, the date of publication is the date that
the international application is published.
In respect of international applications the South African national phase application could
only be supplemented for purposes of sufficiency by way of amendment and in all likelihood
such subject matter would be considered to constitute new matter or matter not in substance
disclosed in the specification prior to amendment with the result that its introduction by way
of amendment would not be allowed.
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
See above. Although no distinction is made in South African law between the levels of
information required from a sufficiency point of view for an invention verse a selection
invention, it is recommended that the specification be drafted with the Maugham rules
in mind.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
There is no South African case law on this issue. In all likelihood, the validity of the breadth
of claim scope which is supported by a limited number of examples is dependent upon
whether the skilled person could apply the invention to the subject matter included within
the ambit of the claim but not exemplified in the specification without undue research,
development and experimentation.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short?
From the case law discussed herein and with reference to the Maugham rules a court would
in all likelihood require all members of the selected class to possess the requisite advantage.
Furthermore, should one or two of the members of the selected class not possess the requisite
advantages, the patent would be exposed to the ground of revocation on the basis that the
invention as illustrated or exemplified in the complete specification concerned cannot be
performed or does not lead to results and advantages set out in the complete specification.
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Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would
it suffice to claim a particular range or selection of components which have been found to
be associated with such a new utility or would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in
the claims?
There is no South African case law in this respect. It would appear, however, that if the novel
and inventive aspect of the invention is indeed the new utility, then this should be repeated
in the claim.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
Save where the advantage is an integer of the claim to the selection invention, implicit use by
an alleged infringer will in all likelihood suffice to establish infringement.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
The above question goes to the issue of contributory infringement which was dealt with under
Q197 by the South African group.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
With Reference to the Examples
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
For purposes of novelty and in the light of what has been said hereinbefore as long as the
selected group of radicals all possess the new peculiar or special advantage then it is unlikely
that the prior art document will be considered as an anticipation for purposes of selection
inventions.
The larger the class from which the selection is made the less likely the selection is to be found
non obvious. It is doubtful whether the size of the class will be determinative of novelty.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
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In all likelihood, only the third instance would constitute an inventive step. In the first case there
is no advantage to the selection and the selection would not have passed the test for novelty.
In the second instance and in the light of what has been said hereinbefore, it is unlikely that
the inventive step, i.e. making the selection, would be considered to be inventive.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
See above.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
For a claim directed to the novel use specifically it will be necessary for the alleged infringer
to make, use, exercise, dispose of or offer to dispose of the invention for the intended use. In
the absence thereof, the question arises as to whether there is contributory infringement. The
latter and the requirements therefor were dealt with by the South African group in Q197.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Such considerations do not striclty form part of an assessment of the inventiveness related to a
selection made, although, as with the matter of commercial success, they may be considered
to add to an argument that inventiveness exists based on the test set out above.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
It is felt that harmonisation should be achieved in respect of the industrial areas to which
selection patents may apply i.e. chemical verse mechanical. Harmonisation in respect of
sufficiency, the manner in which novelty is to be treated and the test for inventiveness should
also be uniform.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
Nothing further to add.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
Nothing further to add.
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Spain
Espagne
Spanien
Report Q209
in the name of the Spanish Group
by Pío Orviz Díaz, Montse García-Moncó, Luis-Alfonso Duran, Jorge Llevat,
Antonio López, Lluis Vilalta, Santiago Jordà, Rafael Pi, Eduard Ferregüela,
Antonio Castán, Jesús Muñoz-Delgado, Francisco Bernardo, Manuel Illescas,and
Anna Autó
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
Neither the Patent Act (Law 11/1986 of 20 March) currently in force, nor the previous Industrial
Property Act (Royal Decree-Law of 26 July 1929, the consolidated wording of which was
approved by Royal Decree of 30 April 1930) defines or provides for selection patents. Their
patentability has nevertheless been acknowledged by the Courts inter alia in the judgment
handed down by Section 15 of Barcelona Court of Appeal on 12 June 2001 (“Amlodipina”)
and the rulings delivered by that same Court on 18 October 2007 and 17 March 2008
(“Atorvastatina”), in which the requirement of novelty in selection patents and its governing
criteria established by the European Patent Office both in the Guidelines for Examination
(Chapter IV) and the decisions issued by the Boards of Appeal, are analysed at length.
On the other hand, the patentability of selection inventions is expressly included in both the
Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (EPO, Chapter IV, section 9.8) and
in the Guidelines for Examining Patent Applications in the Spanish Patent and Trademark
Office (SPTO, Part E, section 6.4.9: “…referring to subject matter selected from an earlier
disclosure in the art”). Examples of selection are given in both sets of guidelines as selection
of a sub-range from a broader numerical range of the prior art and selection of previously
disclosed elements from two or more lists of elements.
Although most selection patents belong to the chemical and pharmaceutical sector, they
can occur in other technical fields with claims of any category, i.e., product, use or process
claims.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
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the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
The criteria followed in the Guidelines for Examining Patent Applications in the SPTO (October
2006 edition) are virtually identical to those described in the EPO Guidelines.
According to those Guidelines, there are two groups of selection inventions:
The first group is comprised of inventions consisting of the selection of individual components
not disclosed in an enabling fashion in a prior generic disclosure.
The second group is comprised of inventions in which a sub-set or sub-range included within
or overlapping with the set or range described in the prior art is selected. This sub-range
must:
(i)
be narrow compared to the known range;
(ii) be sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and
from the end-points of the known range;
(iii) not be an arbitrary selection of the prior art.
The Spanish Courts have confirmed the applicability of these criteria in establishing the
novelty of a selection patent, specifically, in the judgments handed down by Barcelona Court
of Appeal on 18 October 2007 and 17 March 2008 in the “Atorvastatina” case, in which
the novelty of a selection made from two lists is moreover acknowledged.
There is no case-law in Spain regarding the two specific sub-questions. In principle, pursuant
to the SPTO Examination Guidelines, it would not suffice to merely carve a range out of a
broad prior art disclosure if that selection were arbitrary, i.e., there would not be any technical
advantage. There is no reason why this technical advantage should necessarily differ; it could
involve an unpredictable improvement on a known advantage. Nevertheless, these criteria
are actually more suitable for identifying inventive step than for establishing novelty.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
The inventive step requirements applicable to a selection invention are the same as those
that apply to any other invention. There must therefore be proof that the patent offers a nonobvious
solution to a technical problem.
According to SPTO practice, experimental data may be submitted following the initial patent
filing provided that it supports a technical advantage already set out in the description of
the patent, for example, to back up the reformulation of the objective problem solved by the
invention in cases in which the prior art reveals that a similar solution was already known.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
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4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
According to the European and Spanish examination guidelines, an expert in the field must
be able to recreate the invention by following the patent instructions.
(1) The threshold for having to submit specific data demonstrating sufficiency is marked out
by anything which does not form part of or is not directly derivable from the common general
knowledge. For the purposes of sufficiency it is not necessary to demonstrate that all members
of the selected class possess a certain advantage. This is not a requirement for demonstrating
sufficiency; rather it is a relevant criterion for determining inventive step.
(2) & (3) Sufficiency in the description is a criterion which must be fulfilled upon filing the patent
application. Therefore, unlike in the case of experimental data to back up the requirement
of inventive step, it is not possible to submit experimental data after the original filing of the
application.
(4) As explained in section (1), the fact that broad claims must be supported by a sufficient
number of representative examples demonstrating a certain advantage is not relevant in
demonstrating sufficient disclosure; rather, it determines inventive step. In any event, it must
be possible to use product claims in order to protect an invention based on the selection of
products that have a new utility. It would make no sense to limit the invention to use claims,
nor to make it obligatory to specify the utility in the claims.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
As explained in the answer to the previous question, there is no reason why an invention
with product claims should mention the advantage or superior result in the claims. As with
any other patent, infringement of a selection patent, be it literal or by equivalence, should
refer to the subject matter of the patent, defined by the claims. Consequently, if the claim in
a selection patent includes a product which implies an advantage or improvement, but that
advantage or improvement does not form part of the claim, it will not be necessary for a third
party to be aware of, or seek to exploit, the new advantage or superior result ensuing from
the selection in order for infringement to be declared. It would suffice for the third party to
make any use or carry out any of the acts comprised within the scope of the holder’s exclusive
rights in respect of the product constituting the subject matter of the patent for infringement
to be declared.
In the EPO and SPTO guidelines, a use invention is considered to be a specific type of process
invention, not a particular case of product selection invention. In process patents, pursuant to
Article 50 of the Patent Act, it would constitute direct infringement both (i) using the process
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or offering it for use when the third party knows, or the circumstances make it obvious, that
the process cannot be used without the consent of the patent proprietor (Article 50.b); and
(ii) offering, placing on the market or using the product obtained directly by the patented
process, or the importation or possession of said product for any of these purposes (Article
50.c)
If a new use is claimed in a patent (regardless of whether or not it is a selection patent),
manufacturing a product that could be applied for that use might constitute infringement,
although it would be necessary to prove that the product is intended to be used for the
purpose and under the conditions expressed in the claim (Barcelona Court of Appeal Ruling
of 24 January 2008 in the “trifluorometano” case). However, no clear criterion has been
established by the Courts regarding whether offering such products would constitute direct
infringement (offering the process as per the aforementioned Article 50.b) or whether it should
be considered indirect infringement (Article 51: the supplying of means to put the patented
invention into practice or contributory infringement).
Generally speaking, in both direct and indirect infringement of a use patent, the demonstration
of the intention of the infringer helps establishing infringement. In the case of direct infringement,
the infringer is aware, or the circumstances make it obvious that he is aware, that the use
of the means offered is prohibited. In the case of indirect infringement, the infringer knows
that the means that he offers are suitable for putting the invention into practice, and that,
moreover, the purpose of those means is the patented invention.
As established in the aforementioned judgment, in the use patents (both selection patents
and otherwise), the scope of protection is limited to the use of the product, since it is the
use what justifies the existence and validity of the Patent and also determines infringement.
Only if it is proven that the manufacturer of the (already known) product manufactures it for
the use described and claimed in the Patent, can infringement be held to exist. Otherwise,
if it is argued that the manufacture of the product per se constitutes infringement, while the
product might be intended for other uses known prior to the priority date of the patent,
the manufacturer of the product might (effectively) sustain that the prior use of that product
destroys the novelty of the patent.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
Selection inventions are a paradigmatic example of what the patent system represents in the
knowledge economy, namely, promotion of technological progress by granting an exploitation
monopoly in exchange for disclosure that allows the development of new inventions based on
earlier ones. Selection patents additionally favour the exploitation of innovations, since they
promote the negotiation of cross-licenses between innovators.
The patentability requirements for selection inventions should be the same (and not more) as
those applicable to any other invention.
With Reference to the Examples
Example 1
Say a prior art document discloses a chemical compound characterised by a specified
structure including a substituent group designated “R”. This substituent “R” is defined so
as to embrace a generic class of broadly-defined functional groups such as all alkyl or
aryl radicals, either unsubstituted or substituted by a halogen and/or a hydroxyl group,
although for practical reasons only a very small number of specific examples are given. The
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(later) alleged invention consists of the selection of a particular radical or particular group of
radicals from amongst the generic class, where the selected radical or group of radicals were
not specifically disclosed in the prior-art document. The resulting compounds are described
as having a new, advantageous property, say as adhesives, not possessed by the prior art
examples.
Example 2
In the selection that the inventor has made in example 1, i.e. specific compound having a
particular radical, or group of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals,
the resulting compounds may be:
(i)
neither described as having nor shown to possess any advantageous properties (as
adhesives) not possessed by the specific prior art examples;
(ii) described as possessing advantageous properties compared with the compounds
specifically referred to in the prior art, but these properties are ones which the
person skilled in the art would expect such compounds to possess, so that he is likely
to be led to make this selection;
(iii) or described as having advantageous (adhesive) properties but there are no
indications which would lead the person skilled in the art to this particular selection
as opposed to any other members of the generic class in order to achieve the
advantageous (adhesive) properties
Example 3
In the selection that our inventor has made, the claim extends to the use of a particular
compound arising from a selection as an adhesive (where the adhesive nature of the
compound is the advantageous property not possessed by the prior disclosed generic class
of compounds). A competitor manufactures the claimed compound and supplies it with no
instructions as to its use
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The generic description of R radicals does not anticipate any specific compound. It would
only do so if the resulting specific compound is explicitly and in an enabling way disclosed in
the description, i.e., if it describes the manner in which the compound is obtained and gives
information on its analytical characterisation. The number of theoretical compounds (be it
1,000,000 or only 10) implicitly included in the generic class previously described by means
of the R radicals and the combination thereof is therefore irrelevant.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
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art?
Inventive step is only possible in case (iii). In cases (i) and (ii) the selection might be novel but,
since it does not provide an advantage with respect to the generic disclosure, it is considered
an arbitrary selection, devoid of inventive step.
If the specific compounds are novel (not explicitly disclosed in the prior art in an enabling
fashion), they may be protected through any kind of claim, including a claim directed to a
product per se. Only where the specific compounds had already been disclosed in the prior
art must the applicant limit his invention to the novel and non-obvious use of the compounds.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
As explained in the answer to question 4, possession of an advantage is not a requirement
of sufficiency of the description; rather it is an inventive step requirement.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Example 3 describes a purported selection invention claiming the new use of a compound
as an adhesive, which a third party manufactures and supplies with no instructions as to its
use.
As has been established in the answer to Q5, in order to determine that a selection patent
claiming a new use has been infringed, it is necessary to prove that the compound has been
manufactured and sold for the use that was described and claimed in the patent.
Consequently, in order to declare that the patent has been infringed, not only would it be
necessary to demonstrate the manufacture and marketing of the compound in question, but
also that it is to be used for the purpose and under the conditions expressed in the claim
(as per the recent judgment handed down by Barcelona Court of Appeal on 24 January
2008).
By applying these considerations to the case in hand, we could affirm that in order to secure a
declaration of infringement, it would be necessary to prove that a competitor is manufacturing
and marketing the disputed compound for use as an adhesive.
Thus, the compilation of evidence would have to focus on demonstrating that the compound
is being manufactured and marketed as an adhesive (which presupposes a knowledge of
its adhesive property) using advertising material, information describing the product or the
sector in which it is distributed, etc. In that regard, despite not giving instructions regarding
use of the compound, if, from the information on the product, advertising thereof or any other
means it can be gathered that the competitor is offering that product for use as an adhesive,
the infringement could be deemed proven.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
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have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
The validity of patents (either selection patents or otherwise) is determined by compliance
with the substantive criteria governing patentability (basically, novelty, inventive step and
industrial application), not the effort invested by the inventor or the technology available to
him whilst working on the invention.
The role of patents in the promotion of innovation is clearly seen in the continuous development
of more powerful and sophisticated technologies, which contribute to the generation of new
inventions. Nevertheless, all technology has a finite life-cycle and its productivity declines
over time. This is the case of combinatorial chemistry, which is far from being a standard
and systematic source of new inventions (either selection inventions or otherwise) nowadays.
The process of innovation in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector goes far beyond the use
of a certain kind of technology. It is not an automatic trial and error process involving millions
of compounds, inevitably leading to the selection of some of those compounds for the treatment
of an illness. In reality, it is a long and complex process in which one of the fundamental factors
is the level of creativity of the researchers who, in order to design and invent new medicines,
must have a broad knowledge of the prior art and be capable of establishing hypotheses on
the relationship between the structure and the activity of the chemical compounds. The new
chemical compounds must also undergo a series of tests (pharmacological, toxicological,
pharmaceutical, clinical), which allow the identification of characteristics of the compounds
facilitate the detection of potentially patentable advantages.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
Selection patents are merely a type of patent. Beforehand, it is necessary to harmonise the
general criteria governing patentability and, in particular, the tools for analysing inventive
step. It is important to maintain homogeneous criteria in all of the jurisdictions, in order to
establish a clear threshold separating what is “obvious to try” from what implies identifying
and describing an unexpected technical effect, and thus a patentable solution to a problem.
In that regard, the disparity of criteria of the different European courts is surprising.
It is also necessary to harmonise the requirements of sufficiency of the description and
clearly differentiate them from those of inventive step, particularly as regards the necessary
experimental support.
Regarding the particular aspects of selection inventions, it would be useful to clarify the
references usually made to the existence of a technical advantage (which is normally related
to inventive step) as a criterion for considering a selection made from a numerical range as
novel and not arbitrary.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
Being European, the fundamental reference point for our group is EPO case-law. We believe
that the EPO contributes elements for the international harmonisation of other aspects of
selection patents, and we recommend studying the possibility of applying the EPO’s criteria
in other jurisdictions.
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14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
A type of patents which are particularly relevant in the pharmaceutical field and merit
discussion are those medical use inventions wherein further selections are made from already
known uses: specific clinical indications, patient groups, dosages, patterns of administration,
etc.
Summary
Selection inventions are a good example of the effectiveness of the patent system and they play an
important role in promoting innovation.
There is no specific regulation in Spain relating selection patents, nor a legal definition of this
kind of inventions. Nevertheless, the case-law has recognised and defined them and the Spanish
Patent and Trademark Office has adopted guidelines practically identical to the Guidelines for
Examination in the European Patent Office in relation with this kind of inventions.
Thus, the patentability criteria established in the Spanish law for any invention apply equally to
selection inventions.
Regarding novelty in particular, two groups of selection inventions can be recognized, (i) inventions
consisting of the selection of individual components not disclosed in an enabling fashion in a prior
generic disclosure and (ii) inventions in which a sub-set or sub-range included within or overlapping
with the set or range described in the prior art is selected.
The existence of a technical advantage or of an improvement is not a requirement for demonstrating
sufficiency in the description, rather, it is used to demonstrate that a technical solution involves an
inventive step.
The Spanish Group considers it necessary to harmonise the interpretation and application of
the patentability criteria of selection inventions, but also of patents in general, particularly those
regarding the assessment of inventive step.
Résumé
Les inventions de sélection sont un bon exemple de l’efficacité du système de brevets et ont un rôle
important pour fomenter l’innovation.
Il n’existe pas en Espagne de régulation spécifique sur les brevets de sélection, non plus qu’une
définition légale de ce type d’inventions. Toutefois, la jurisprudence s’est occupée de les reconnaître
et de les définir et l’Office Espagnol des Brevets et des Marques a adopté des directrices
pratiquement identiques à celles de l’Office Européen des Brevets relativement à l’examen de ce
type d’inventions.
Par conséquent, ont doit appliquer aux inventions de sélection les mêmes critères de brevetabilité
établis dans la législation espagnole pour toute invention.
Quant à la nouveauté en particulier, on reconnaît deux types d’inventions de sélection, (i) celles
qui consistent en des entités individuelles non divulguées de façon explicite et exécutable dans
une divulgation générique antérieure et (ii) celles qui partent d’un sous-groupe ou sous-rang choisi
parmi un rang décrit dans l’état de la technique.
L’existence d’un avantage ou perfectionnement dans ce type de brevets n’est pas une condition
requise indispensable pour considérer que le mémoire descriptif contient une divulgation suffisante,
mais sert à démontrer que la solution technique proposée implique une activité inventive.
Le Groupe Espagnol estime nécessaire d’harmoniser l’interprétation et l’application des critères de
brevetabilité des brevets de sélection, mais également des brevets en général, en particulier de
ceux relatifs à la détermination de l’activité inventive.
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Zusammenfassung
Auswahlerfindungen sind ein gutes Beispiel für die Wirksamkeit des Patentsystems und als solche
spielen sie eine bedeutende Rolle bei der Stimulierung von Erfindungen.
In Spanien gibt es allerdings weder spezifische Bestimmungen zu Auswahlerfindungen noch hat
der Gesetzgeber diese Art von Erfindungen definiert. Allerdings hat sich die Rechtssprechung der
Anerkennung wie auch der Definition von Auswahlerfindungen angenommen und das Spanische
Patent- und Markenamt hat im Zusammenhang mit der Prüfung dieser Art von Erfindungen eine
Reihe von Richtlinien erlassen, die denen des Europäischen Patentamts praktisch gleichkommen.
Aus diesem Grund gelten für Auswahlerfindungen hinsichtlich ihrer Patentierbarkeit dieselben
Kriterien, die in der spanischen Gesetzgebung auch für alle anderen Arten von Erfindungen
gelten.
Insbesondere hinsichtlich der Neuheit werden zwei Arten von Auswahlerfindungen anerkannt:
(i) diejenigen, die aus nicht explizit offenbarten und in einer früheren, generischen Offenbarung
ausführbaren Einzelerfindungen bestehen, und (ii) diejenigen, die sich durch eine aus dem Stand
der Technik ausgewählten Untergruppe oder niedrigeren Rangstufe gebildet werden.
Das Vorhandensein eines Vorteils oder einer Verbesserung ist bei dieser Art von Patenten keine
unerläßliche Voraussetzung für die Annahme, daß die Beschreibung eine ausreichende Offenbarung
enthält, sondern für den Beweis, daß die vorgeschlagene, technische Lösung eine erfinderische
Tätigkeit beinhaltet.
Die Spanische Gruppe hält es für erforderlich, daß die Auslegung und Anwendung der
Patentierungskriterien nicht nur bei Auswahlerfindungen harmonisiert werden sollten, sondern
bei Patenten generell, und zwar insbesondere diejenigen Kriterien, die mit der Bestimmung der
erfinderischen Tätigkeit in Verbindung stehen.
Abstracto
Las invenciones de selección son un buen ejemplo de la eficacia del sistema de patentes y tienen
un papel importante en el fomento de la innovación.
En España no existe una regulación específica de las patentes de selección, ni una definición legal
de este tipo de invenciones. Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia se ha ocupado de reconocerlas y
definirlas, y la Oficina Española de Patentes y Marcas ha adoptado unas directrices prácticamente
idénticas a las de la Oficina Europea de Patentes en relación con el examen de este tipo de
invenciones.
Por tanto, a las invenciones de selección les son aplicables los mismos criterios de patentabilidad
establecidos en la legislación española para cualquier invención.
En cuanto a la novedad en particular, se reconocen dos tipos de invenciones de selección, (i) las
que consisten en entidades individuales no divulgadas de forma explícita y ejecutable en una
divulgación genérica anterior y (ii) las que parten de un subgrupo o subrango elegido entre un
rango descrito en el estado de la técnica.
La existencia de una ventaja o mejora en este tipo de patentes no es requisito indispensable para
considerar que la descripción contiene una divulgación suficiente, sino para demostrar que la
solución técnica propuesta implica una actividad inventiva.
El Grupo Español estima necesario que se armonicen la interpretación y aplicación de los criterios
de patentabilidad de las patentes de selección, pero también de las patentes en general, en
particular los relacionados con la determinación de la actividad inventiva.
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Sweden
Suède
Schweden
Report Q209
in the name of the Swedish Group
by Dag HEDEFÄLT, Ida CHRISTENSEN, Katarina DAHLENBORG,Ulf DAHLGREN, Bengt DOMEIJ,
Ivan HJERTMAN, Birgitta LARSSON and Cecilia THAM
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Introduction
Like patent law in other countries Swedish patent law is based on international agreements, such
as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention), the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT), the European Patent Convention (EPC) and the Agree¬ment on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
Some countries have constitutional regulations or apply general principles of law according to
which international agreements may become part of their national law without requiring further
measures. Other countries as e.g. Sweden, other Nordic countries and common law countries
apply a different order according to which a specific national regulation is required for a self
executing effect of treaties to which the country in question has adhered.
In view of the above observations, international agreements for patents ratified by Sweden are
incorporated into the Swedish Patents Act and its ancillary regulations. It follows that Swedish
courts and other national authorities apply the Swedish Patents Act and its ancillary regulations,
i.e. international agreements for patents can not be referred to as such by applicants or litigating
parties.
The EPC and the development within the European Patent Office have been given particular weight
by the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court and the Swedish Supreme Court.
Sweden is a Member State of the European Union (EU). Thus the EU legislation applies for Sweden
as defined in the Swedish Act (SFS 1994:1500) in the same manner as for other EU member
states: EU Directives are to be implemented into Swedish law, whereas EU Regulations are directly
applicable.
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
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Selection inventions are recognized as a special category of inventions in the Swedish case
law and in the Guidelines issued by the Swedish Patent and Registration Office (Guidelines
part B5 1:1). Selection inventions can e.g. be sub-intervals selected from a known numerical
interval or particular chemical compounds selected from a larger group of compounds. In
order to be patentable, the selection must be associated with an improvement in a known
technical property. If a different technical use has been found for a known product or process,
this would typically not be regarded as a selection invention.
The Swedish group is not aware of any Swedish case law concerning selection inventions in
a field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields.
When the prior art is a patent, the legal effect of a patent on a selection invention is not
different from that of a dependent patent in any field.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
A selection invention should be relatively limited in proportion to prior art, but does not
need to have a different advantage or use, or the same advantage with an unpredictable
improvement to be novel.
Issues that can be relevant for the consideration of novelty:
• A specific combination of features, each of which has been selected from a relatively
long list is considered to be novel (the “two-lists principle”) (see Case Law of the Board
of Appeal of the European Patent Office 5 th ed., Dec. 2006, part I.C.4.1). A selection
from a single list of specifically disclosed elements does not possess novelty. However,
exceptions are made within the field of chemistry, in that a selection from a single list
does possess novelty when either (i) the list is long and examples or any directions of
preparation are missing or (ii) the list is extremely long.
• A sub-range selected from a broader numerical range of the prior art is considered to be
novel if each of the following criteria is fulfilled: the sub-range is narrow, sufficiently far
removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and from the end-points of
the known range, and the selected range is not an arbitrary specimen of the prior art (see
Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 5 th ed., Dec. 2006,
part I.C.4.2.1 and the Swedish Court of Patent Appeals number 05-333).
• For a selection invention to be novel, the features of the selection invention should not
have been clearly implicitly described in the prior art.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
Experimental data which is used to back up the inventive step requirement can be submitted
after initial patent filing. Generally, the purpose of the submission of such experimental data
is often to provide evidence that the subject-matter is able to solve the technical problem in
the manner that is stated in the application as filed. More particularly, in the case of selection
inventions the aim is usually to prove advantageous or superior effects as compared to what
is disclosed by the prior art.
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Prerequisite: In order for such late-submitted experimental data to be taken into account in the
decision regarding the requirement of inventive step, a prerequisite is that in the application
as filed there must already be certain support (at the minimum a statement) concerning
the effects which are to be proved by said experimental data. On the contrary, if the latesubmitted
experimental data would fail to back up the statements in the application as filed,
and instead for example would show that the subject-matter involves a new technical effect or
constitutes a solution of a new/different technical problem as compared to what is disclosed
in the application as filed, said data would not be taken into account when deciding whether
the inventive step requirement is fulfilled. See Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the
European Patent Office, 5 th ed., Dec. 2006, part I.D.4.4 regarding T386/89. See also the
Swedish Court of Patent Appeals number 90-185, where late-submitted experimental data
in combination with data present in the application as filed showed sufficiency of disclosure
(support from the description as filed) and evidence of an unexpected effect, which resulted
in the fulfilment of an inventive step.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
In general, the requirements for sufficiency and written description requirements are the same
as for any invention. There are no specific requirements for selection inventions in Swedish
case law, but the presumption is that an invention based on a selection has to face higher
requirements.
The Swedish Group has discussed the different aspects mentioned:
(1) The threshold for sufficiency is established in Section 8 of the Swedish Patents Act: “[…]
The patent application shall contain a description of the invention […] The description
shall be so clear as to enable a person skilled in the art to carry out the invention
with guidance thereof. […]”. The fact that the invention relates to a chemical compound
does not imply that a specified use must be disclosed in the patent claim. However, the
description must disclose a use of the compound.
Swedish practice also provides that the invention shall be sufficiently disclosed across the
full breadth of the claim. Regarding the question if there is an absolute requirement that
all embodiments possess the relevant advantage, see comments Q9, below.
(2) Experimental data for submission regarding sufficiency and written description
requirements are handled differently from data to support existence of inventive step.
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When an application for a patent is filed, the process of making the invention must
have been completed. The requirement of sufficiency of disclosure ensures that a patent
is only granted if there is a corresponding contribution to the state of the art. Such a
contribution is not present as long as the person skilled in the art is not able to carry out
the invention.
(3) The decisive date for fulfilling the sufficiency requirement is the date of filing or priority, as
the case may be. Deficiencies in this respect cannot be remedied during the proceedings
before the Swedish Patent and Registration Office. (Please see EPO: G 0002/03)
(4) Absolute product protection, i.e. claiming the product per se, is allowable also for a
“selection invention” but it depends on the prior art situation. If the selection is a narrow
group with a new utility within a broad prior art scope then claiming the product per
se is acceptable. However, if the prior art is overlapping or almost overlapping with the
“selection” and the product is not considered to be new, then the invention needs to be
claimed in the form of the new use, i.e. use claims. (cf. “second medical use claims” and
“non-medical use claims”).
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
While a certain advantage or superior results may be important for obtaining a patent for
a selection invention, it will not be necessary for establishing patent infringement that the
advantage or superior results actually are utilised by the infringer. Thus, in principle, the use
of a selection invention, irrespective of whether an advantage or superior results are achieved
or not, is enough for establishing infringement.
In case of a patent that relates to a new use, it will be necessary for establishing infringement
that the infringer actually uses the invention. The same principles as for other patents apply
to inventions claimed as a new use. If a party, e.g. a manufacturer of a product that may be
used for the new use does not himself use the invention, the question whether he has infringed
the patent should be assessed according to the same principles as contributory infringement.
Patent infringement is assessed on objective grounds. Thus, the intention of an infringer is not
relevant for the question of infringement as such, but may be relevant for the assessment of
damages and other remedies. However, if the principles for contributory infringement are
applied in relation to a patent for a new use the intention may play a role.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
The concept of “selection invention” is not specifically mentioned in the Swedish Patents
Act. It is also not specifically mentioned in the EPC. The concept of “selection invention” is
however mentioned in the Examination Guidelines at the EPO as well as in the Examination
Guidelines at the Swedish Patent and Registration Office. Such Guidelines do not have the
force of law, but they nevertheless constitute the current applicable practice at the patent
offices. Accordingly, it is recognised in practice that there is a category of inventions termed
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“selection inventions”. The general requirements for patentability apply of course also for
selection inventions.
It has been decided by the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court that the EPO practice is
leading for the Swedish patent practice. Accordingly, Swedish practice in regard to selection
inventions is based on and follows EPO case law.
With Reference to the Examples
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
The invention is considered to be novel if the subject-matter is a specific compound or a
group of specific compounds, whereas the prior art discloses a family of compounds defined
only by a general structural formula including this specific compound or group of specific
compounds (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 5th ed.,
Dec. 2006, part I.C.4.1.2). That is, provided that the specific compound or the group of
specific compounds is not preferred or exemplified in the prior art, the invention is considered
to be novel. It does not matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is
(see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 5th ed., Dec. 2006,
part I.C.3.2.6, first paragraph).
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
In example 2, scenario (iii) would constitute an inventive step over the prior art while scenarios
(i) and (ii) would lack an inventive step according to Swedish practice. In scenario (iii), the
inventor should be able to obtain protection for the products per se, i.e. an absolute product
protection. No limitation has to be made to the use of the products for the advantageous
property.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
The Swedish group has not found any Swedish case law regarding selection inventions and
non-working embodiments. In general, we presume that the requirements on a selection
invention are higher.
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EPO Case Law has addressed sufficiency versus inventive step and stated that if a claim
comprises non-working embodiments, this may have different consequences, depending on
the circumstances. If a technical effect is expressed in a claim and thereby constitutes a real
technical feature, there may be lack of sufficient disclosure. Otherwise, if the effect is not
expressed in a claim but rather is part of the problem to be solved, it may be a question of
whether a given problem is solved by all embodiments falling under the claim, which results
in a problem of inventive step (T0602/05), which also refers to G 1/03.
EPO Case Law has also addressed non-working embodiments in relation to the use of
disclaimers. In G1/03 and G2/03 the Enlarged Board disagreed with the view that
disclaimers may be used for merely excluding non-working embodiments (Case Law of the
Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 5th ed., Dec. 2006, part II B,1.2.1a). The
Enlarged Board held that a claim comprising non-working embodiments might have different
consequences, depending on the circumstances. According to the Enlarged Board, where there
were a large number of conceivable alternatives and the specification contained sufficient
information on the relevant criteria for finding appropriate alternatives over the claimed range
with reasonable effort, the inclusion of non-working embodiments was of no harm. However,
care should be taken if non-working embodiments give rise to lack of reproducibility of the
claimed invention since this might become relevant under the requirements of inventive step
or sufficiency of disclosure as discussed above.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Example 3 is typically a contributory infringement situation and should be assessed as
such, irrespective of whether it concerns a selection invention or not. Since the product in
the example may be used for various purposes – old use and new use – in order to find
infringement it will normally be necessary for the right owner to provide evidence that the
manufacturer of the compound had knowledge of the advantageous property of the new use.
Since in the example there is an alternative – old – use it will probably also be necessary
for the right owner to provide evidence that the manufacturer induces third party to use the
advantageous properties of the compound. If no other evidence can be provided to prove
inducement, the absence of instructions as to the use of the compound may result in the
finding of non-infringement.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
The basic consideration under European and accordingly Swedish practice is that it is the
final claimed invention that is judged as to patentability. The road to get to the invention on
the part of the inventor, whether that was “by inspiration or by transpiration”, is in principle
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irrelevant. However it may be an argument for inventive step if it can be shown that the prior
art shows that much effort had been made to solve the problem behind the claimed invention,
but that no positive result had been reached.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
The Swedish group is of the opinion that the general principles of patentability – novelty,
inventive step and industrial applicability – shall apply also for selection inventions. Neither
the EPC, nor the Swedish Patents Act mention selection inventions, and the Swedish Group
does not want specific regulations in the patent law regarding selection inventions.
When applying the patent law and practically assessing novelty and inventive step for
selection inventions, special guidelines are necessary (as is the case for other special types
of inventions, such as biotechnical inventions). It is of course desirable that such guidelines
are harmonized all over the world. The Swedish Group has found the EPO practice, as
discussed above, to be a balanced one and suggest this to be a good starting point for
further discussion.
For instance, a selection invention should be relatively limited in proportion to prior art,
but not necessarily have a different advantage or use, or unpredictable improvement, to
be novel. A specific combination of features, selected from a relatively long list should be
considered novel. A selection from a single list of specifically disclosed elements is however
not novel. There should be exceptions within the field of chemistry, in that a selection from
a single list can possess novelty under certain circumstances. A sub-range selected from a
broader numerical range of the prior art should be considered to be novel if: the sub-range
is narrow, sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and
from the end-points of the known range, and the selected range is not an arbitrary specimen
of the prior art. Novelty should require that the features of the selection invention were not
implicitly described in the prior art.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
The question of harmonizing the views on establishing infringement is important for all kinds
of patents, so also for patents on selection inventions. This should preferably be part of further
discussions.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
Summary
The Swedish group is of the opinion that the general principles of patentability – novelty, inventive
step and industrial applicability – shall apply also for selection inventions. There should not be any
specific regulation in patent law for selection inventions. When applying the law and practically
assessing novelty and inventive step for selection inventions, special guidelines are necessary, which
should be harmonized. The Swedish Group has found the EPO practice to be a balanced one and
suggest this to be a good starting point for further discussion.
The question of harmonizing the views on establishing infringement should preferably also be part
of further discussions.
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Résumé
Le groupe suédois est d’avis que les principes généraux de brevetabilité – nouveauté, activité
inventive et application industrielle - doivent également s’appliquer aux inventions sélectives. Une
réglementation spécifique sur les inventions de sélection n’est pas indispensable au sein de la loi
relative aux brevets. En appliquant la loi et en procédant à la vérification des critères de nouveauté et
d’activité inventive s’agissant d’inventions de sélection, des lignes directrices sont nécessaires, cellesci
devant être harmonisées. Le groupe suédois a conclu que la pratique de l’OEB est équilibrée et
suggère que celle-ci soit le point de départ de discussions plus approfondies.
Il serait également souhaitable de poursuivre les discussions sur la question de l’harmonisation des
points mettant en évidence un acte de contrefaçon.
Zusammenfassung
Die Schwedische Gruppe ist der Meinung, dass die allgemeinen Grundsätze der Patentierbarkeit
– Neuheit, Erfindungshöhe und industrielle Anwendbarkeit – auch für Auswahlerfindungen zur
Anwendung kommen müssen. Im Patentgesetz sollte es für Auswahlerfindungen keine besondere
Regelung geben. Bei Anwendung des Gesetzes und praktischer Bewertung der Neuheit sowie
des erfinderischen Fortschritts sind bei Auswahlerfindungen besondere Richtlinien erforderlich, die
harmonisiert sein sollten. Die Schwedische Gruppe hat die EPO Praxis als ausgewogen erachtet und
schlägt diese als guten Ausgangspunkt für weitere Diskussionen vor.
Die Frage der Harmonisierung der Auffassungen bei der Festlegung von Patentverletzungen sollte
vorzugsweise ebenfalls Teil von weiteren Diskussionen sein.
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Switzerland
Suisse
Schweiz
Report Q209
in the name of the Swiss Group
by Konrad Becker, Jan D’haemer, Thomas Kretschmer, Sava V. Kulhavy, Paul Pliska,
Beat Rauber, Cornelis Schüller, Hannes Spillmann, Michael Störzbach and
Marco Zardi (chairman)
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
According to Swiss law, there is no limitation with regard to the technical field of application
of selection inventions. In addition to the typical fields of chemical compounds and
pharmaceuticals, it is envisageable that selection inventions could also apply to a variety of
other technical fields.
Specific examples include a spacer for a multiple pane insulating glazing assembly (EP 0
852 280 B1) and a dynamic mixing head for continuous operation (EP 0 689 865 B1) in the
mechanical field, and a singlemode lightwaveguide-coupling element (WO99/08141) in the
optical / telecommunication field.
Other technical fields include, for example, the food sector and biotechnology, where
composition ranges, Markush claims and process parameters are very common.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
In terms of novelty, the Swiss approach is compatible with that at the EPO, and references will
be made to the European Patent Office (EPO) Case Law and Guidelines for Examination.
A first aspect to consider when assessing novelty is the availability (or disclosure) of the
information in the prior art: the prior art is considered to disclose both express and implied
content, such as, for example, a product that would inevitably result from a disclosed process
(T 666/89).
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Also, it should be emphasised that a selection from a single list of specifically disclosed
elements generally does not confer novelty. However, novelty may arise for a combination
of features when the selection is derived from “two or more lists of a certain length” (the socalled
“two list principle”, T12/81, T427/86).
A sub-range selected from a broader numerical range of the prior art is considered novel if
each of the following criteria is satisfied (T198/84; T279/89): 1) the selected sub-range is
narrow compared to the known range; 2) the selected sub-range is sufficiently far removed
from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and from the end-points of the known
range; and 3) the selected range is not an arbitrary specimen of the prior art, but a purposive
selection (i.e. another invention). Points 1) and 2) are decided on a case–by-case basis. As
for point 3) it is accepted that a technical effect occurring in the selected sub-range, but not in
the whole of the known range, can confirm that the criterion is met. Such technical effect need
not be different to that which is found in the whole range: it could simply be an improvement
of a known technical effect. The technical effect need not be surprising either, as this is a
requirement for inventive step, not for novelty.
The same principles apply in the case of overlapping ranges. In this case, novelty is destroyed
by an explicitly mentioned end-point of the known range (T240/95), explicitly mentioned
intermediate values or a specific example of the prior art in the overlap (Guidelines C-IV,
9.8(iii)). Also, another aspect to be considered is whether the skilled person “would seriously
contemplate” applying the technical teaching of the prior art document in the range of overlap.
If he would do so, then no novelty exists. Again, this concept should not be confused with
that used in the assessment of inventive step. In the assessment of novelty, there is no issue
as to whether the skilled person would have tried that range in the expectation of success,
but more simply whether he would have considered applying the technical teaching in that
range (T26/85).
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
Also in terms of inventive step/obviousness, the Swiss approach is compatible with that at the
EPO. Again, reference will be made to the EPO Case Law and Guidelines for Examination.
In particular, if the selection is connected to a particular technical effect, and if no hints exist
leading the skilled person to the selection, then inventive step is recognised. The technical
effect of the claimed range can but does not need to be different to that which occurs in the
broader known range. Important is that it is unexpectedly different or it is the same but of an
unexpected degree (Guidelines C-IV, 11.11).
In the case of overlapping ranges, it should also be considered whether the skilled person
would have been guided by the state of the art to choose the range of overlap in the hope of
solving the technical problem or would have expected some improvement or advantage.
In the case of European patents validated in Switzerland, experimental data backing the
inventive step requirement, though recommended, need not to be present in the specification
as filed, since supporting data can be submitted to the EPO in the course of the grant
procedure. In the opinion of the Swiss group, however, the particular technical effect should
be explicitly disclosed in the application as filed.
The Swiss patent office does not examine inventions for novelty and inventive step. Lack of
experimental data supporting the inventiveness of an invention is not detected by the patent
office. After grant, third parties may challenge the patentability of an invention in Court. In
this case, any necessary experimental data can be provided during invalidity proceedings to
prove the non-obviousness of the invention.
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4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
Generally speaking, the specification should disclose the invention in a manner
sufficiently clear and complete for the person skilled in the art to be able to carry out the
whole subject-matter of the claims without undue burden, availing himself of common
general knowledge and the literature cited in the description. In other words, to avoid an
objection for insufficiency of disclosure, the disclosure must be enabling. Insufficiency of
disclosure also arises when the successful outcome of the invention, although possible,
is merely linked to chance; or when the skilled person is left without guidance to choose
among a large range of options, only a few of which are leading to the invention; or
when he must carry out a great number of trials and experiments, when he must choose
without guidance among various assay/measurement methods, and different results are
obtained depending on the method chosen, and the like.
The skilled person, when assessing sufficiency of disclosure, has knowledge of the
invention as disclosed and is aware of documents cited in the patent and the common
general knowledge in the art (T6/84; T171/84).
In the opinion of the Swiss group, it is not necessary that all the members of the narrower
selection from a known broader class possess the requisite distinguishing advantage.
Some examples may fall short of this requirement. This principle is also confirmed by the
Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, Chapter D V 4.4.1.
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
Experimental data are not necessary for supporting sufficiency of disclosure.
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
From, the above, it follows that the time frame within which sufficiency or written
description requirements must be satisfied is the filing date.
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
In theory, one example may suffice to cover the whole breadth of the claimed scope of
protection so long as it enables the skilled person to perform the invention over the whole
claimed range (T435/91). A claim is considered to be supported unless there are reasons
to believe that the skilled person would be unable to extend the invention to the scope of
the claims on the basis of the description exercising routine methods.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
A claim to a chemical product defined by one or more parameter range/value/element
selection need not include the use or advantage conferred by that range/value/element
selection(s).
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5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
It depends on the subject-matter and/or the wording of the claim. If the claim is directed
to a product, then the particular type of use of the product by the alleged infringer is not
determinant in the evaluation of infringement.
If the claim is directed to a new use of a product, then it may be necessary to prove that the
alleged infringer uses the product in a certain way (for example, at a certain concentration),
to obtain the effect connected with the claimed new use.
A manufacturer of a product that may or may not be used according to the claimed new use
does not infringe the patent if the product is not claimed as such in the patent. However, it may
be a different case if the product is not a staple product and if it can be reasonably assumed
from the circumstances that the product is likely to be used to infringe the patent. In this latter
case, manufacturing the product may in fact be considered contributory infringement.
Pursuant to Swiss case law and literature, there must be a sufficiently close (adequate) causal
connection between the contributory action and the direct infringement. Swiss courts commonly
use the formula that the contributory action must objectively have favoured the occurrence
of the direct infringement in light of the ordinary way things go and the experience of life.
According to precedents of Swiss courts this is the case if, for example, means are explicitly
offered for an infringing use or if means may only be used in such a manner. On the other
hand, an adequate causal connection is denied if a non-infringing staple product is (mis)used
for committing a direct infringement of an intellectual property right. In between these rather
clear cases lays a grey area in which it must be assessed on a case-by-case basis whether
in light of the ordinary way things go and the experience of life it had to be expected that
the respective contributory action objectively favoured a direct infringement (DFT 129 III 588,
wherein DFT is the acronym for Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal).
The intention on the part of the person supplied is not relevant for determining whether
an action constitutes a contributory infringement or not. Under Swiss case law subjective
elements as such are not a prerequisite for liability as contributory infringer. Therefore,
knowledge of infringement or intention is not taken into account. They may, however, play a
role in the assessment of the causal connection between the contributory action and the direct
infringement. Pursuant to an obiter dictum in DFT 129 III 588 such connection is sufficiently
close if the contributor knows or should know both that the supplied means are suitable for an
infringing use and that the supplied person intends such use.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
The Swiss group is of the opinion that the law and practice which is applicable to selection
inventions in Switzerland, which corresponds to the law and practice in all contracting states
of the EPC, is appropriately based on the principle of giving adequate protection to such
inventions. The policy behind the applied law has an increased importance in view of the
developing technology which tends to be more and more a selection from the ever growing
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state of the art. Furthermore heavy and increasing competition in closely related areas of
technology significantly increases the occurrence of selection inventions.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
No, the genus does not anticipate the species, unless such species is mentioned in the prior
art (e.g. in the examples).
Yes, the size of a class of compounds is determinant in the assessment of novelty, as well as
the number of such classes which are involved in the claimed features of the alleged invention
(the “two list principle”, as already mentioned in response to Q2).
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
Inventive step could be found in the case of (iii). As already mentioned before, it is not
necessary that the advantageous property of the selection is different from that of the broader
known range for the purpose of novelty. Inventive step can be conferred by a greater degree
of such advantage. Inventive step would be recognised if such greater degree was found to
be unexpected in that particular selection and there were no pointers hinting towards such a
selection. Under these circumstances, also case (i) could be inventive. Case (ii) would not be
inventive as it is stated that such properties were to be expected in that selection.
As already mentioned, the inventor of a selection invention should be able to obtain protection
for the products per se, i.e. the protection should not be limited to the use of the products.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
As stated in the response to Q4, item 1, it is not necessary that all the members of the narrower
selection from a known broader class possess the requisite distinguishing advantage. Some
examples may fall short of this requirement.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
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As already mentioned in Q5, under Swiss case law, subjective elements as such are not a
prerequisite for liability as contributory infringer. Therefore, knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection or intention of the infringer as to its supply is not taken into account.
They may, however, play a role in the assessment of the causal connection between the
contributory action and the direct infringement. Pursuant to an obiter dictum in DFT 129 III
588 such connection is sufficiently close if the contributor knows or should know both that
the supplied means are suitable for an infringing use and that the supplied person intends
such use.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
In the opinion of the Swiss group the above considerations are not essential in connection
with the assessment of patentability for selection inventions.
The effort invested in arriving at the selection is accounted for in the requirements already in
place for novelty and inventive step. Such strict requirements, in fact, constitute a safeguard
against the possibility of claiming an arbitrary selection from the prior art, as they entail that
a certain inventive effort must have been exercised to arrive at the selection of the invention.
Other criteria, such as the time involved to arrive at the invention and financial investment, are
not considered prima facie evidence of patentability, but rather as mere indicia.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
The Swiss group is of the opinion that the existing law consisting of the EPC and the practice
of the EPO should be the basis for harmonised standards for the patentability of selection
inventions.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
Not applicable in view of our answer to Q11.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
Range limiting values are often given as such without any basis in experimental data. Most
often, they are merely values for defining the scope of protection in the claims. According to
the case law of the Boards of Appeal in the EPO, such values are given the same significance
as values given by way of the examples, i.e. they may destroy novelty of a range of an ulterior
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invention. However, such limiting values actually are merely allegations, or assertions of the
inventor. Hence, it is the position of the Swiss group that range limiting values not having a
basis in exemplary embodiments shall not necessarily be considered novelty destroying, i.e.
it shall not be appropriate to give them the same importance in examining an ulterior patent
application as values of exemplary embodiments. Guiding principle for assessing novelty in
a case of overlapping ranges between a claim and a prior art document shall be whether
a person skilled in the art, would, in the light of all technical facts at his disposal seriously
contemplate applying the technical teaching of the prior art in the range of overlap.
Decision T 26/85 of Board of Appeal 3.5.1 in the European Patent Office explicitly mentions
that values of a range may “appear at least at first sight to be speculative and of a less
practical relevance than others. This applies in particular to the parts lying near the limits of
the claimed range.” (T 26/85, Reasons for the decision, point 7.)
The Swiss group is of the opinion that range limiting values per se should be given the same
importance as any other unspecified value within the range.
Summary
According to Swiss law, there is no limitation with regard to the technical field of application of
selection inventions.
In terms of novelty and inventive step, the Swiss approach is compatible with that at the European
Patent Office. More in particular, the main principles underlying the assessment of the novelty
of selection inventions are that: the prior art is considered to disclose both express and implied
content; novelty may arise for a combination of features when the selection is derived from “two
or more lists of a certain length” (the so-called “two list principle”); a sub-range selected from a
broader numerical range of the prior art is considered novel if each of the following criteria is
satisfied: 1) the selected sub-range is narrow compared to the known range; 2) the selected subrange
is sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and from the
end-points of the known range; and 3) the selected range is not an arbitrary specimen of the prior
art, but a purposive selection (i.e. another invention).
In the case of overlapping ranges, the same principles apply and novelty is destroyed by an
explicitly mentioned end-point of the known range, explicitly mentioned intermediate values or a
specific example of the prior art in the overlap. Also, another aspect to be considered is whether
the skilled person “would seriously contemplate” applying the technical teaching of the prior art
document in the range of overlap. If he would do so, then no novelty exists.
For the assessment of inventive step, if the selection is connected to a particular technical effect,
and if no hints exist leading the skilled person to the selection, then inventive step is recognised.
The technical effect of the claimed range has to be unexpectedly different or the same but of an
unexpected degree with respect to the technical effect that occurs in the broader known range.
In the case of overlapping ranges, it should also be considered whether the skilled person would
have been guided by the state of the art to choose the range of overlap in the hope of solving the
technical problem or would have expected some improvement or advantage.
The requirements of sufficiency of disclosure are met when the specification discloses the invention
in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the person skilled in the art to be able to carry out
the whole subject-matter of the claims without undue burden, availing himself of common general
knowledge and the literature cited in the description. In the opinion of the Swiss group, it is not
necessary that all the members of the narrower selection from a known broader class possess the
requisite distinguishing advantage. Some examples may fall short of this requirement.
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In the assessment of infringement of a selection invention, the way a product is used by an alleged
infringer might be determinant only in case the allegedly infringed claim is directed to a new use of
such a product. A manufacturer of a product that may or may not be used according to the claimed
new use does not infringe the patent if the product is not claimed as such in the patent. However, it
may be a different case if the product is not a staple product and if it can be reasonably assumed
from the circumstances that the product is likely be used to infringe the patent. In this latter case,
manufacturing the product may in fact be considered contributory infringement. In particular, this
would be the case if the contributory action has objectively favoured the occurrence of the direct
infringement in light of the ordinary way things go and the experience of life. The intention on the
part of the person supplied of an infringing product is not relevant for determining whether an
action constitutes a contributory infringement or not.
The Swiss group is of the opinion that the law and practice which is applicable to selection inventions
in Switzerland, which corresponds to the law and practice in all contracting states of the EPC, is
appropriately based on the principle of giving adequate protection to such inventions and should
be the basis for harmonised standards for the patentability of selection inventions. For the Swiss
group, the relevance of range limiting values not having a basis in exemplary embodiments, as
novelty destroying values for a subsequent selection invention, should merit further discussion within
the AIPPI.
Résumé
Selon la loi Suisse il n’existe pas de limitation en ce qui concerne le champ technologique des
inventions de sélection.
En termes de la nouveauté et de l’activité inventive l’approche Suisse est compatible avec celle
appliquée par l’Office Européen des Brevets. En particulier, les principes fondamentaux pour
évaluer la nouveauté des inventions de sélection sont que; l’art antérieure est considéré démontrer
une contenue explicite et implicite; la nouveauté peut venir d’une combinaison d’éléments quand
la sélection est faite à partir de ‘deux ou plus de listes d’une certaine longueur’ (le soit disant
«principe des deux listes »); un sous-domaine de valeurs sélectionné parmi un domaine de valeurs
générale connu de l’état de la technique est néanmoins considérée comme nouvelle si chacun
des critères suivants s’appliquent: 1) le sous-domaine de valeurs sélectionné doit être étroit en
comparaison avec le domaine général connue, 2) le sous-domaine de valeurs sélectionné doit être
suffisamment éloigné du domaine connu qui a été illustré par des exemples spécifique démontré
dans l’art antérieur et des points limites du domaine connu; et 3) la zone choisi ne dois pas être
prise au hasard dans l’état de la technique, c’est-à-dire qu’il ne doit pas s’agir d’un simple mode
de réalisation de l’invention faisant l’objet de la description antérieure, mais d’une autre invention
(sélection effectuée dans un certain but).
Dans le cas ou les plages se chevauchent, les mêmes principes s’appliquent et la nouveauté est détruite
par un point limite spécifiquement mentionné de la plage connue, par des valeurs intermédiaires
explicitement mentionnées ou par un exemple de l’art antérieure qui tombe dans le chevauchement.
Un autre aspect à considérer est si l’homme du métier ‘envisagerait sérieusement’ a appliquer
l’enseignement technique dévoilé dans le document antérieur dans le domaine de chevauchement.
Dans le cas ou la réponse a cette question est positive il n’existe pas de nouveauté.
Pour l’évaluation de l’activité inventive, en cas ou la sélection est liée a un certain effet technique
et pourvu qu’il n’existe pas des indications qui conduisent l’homme du métier en direction de
la sélection, l’activité inventive est reconnue. L’effet technique dans le domaine revendiqué doit
être inattendu ou si l’effet est identique l’ampleur doit être inattendue en comparaison avec l’effet
technique connu dans le domaine général. Dans le cas de chevauchement de domaines, on devrait
de nouveau se poser la question si l’homme du métier guidé par l’art antérieur serait apte à choisir
le domaine chevauché en espérant résoudre le problème technique ou s’il s’attendait à trouver un
avantage inattendu.
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La condition de suffisance d’exposée est satisfaite quand la description démontre l’invention de
façon suffisamment claire et complète pour qu’un homme du métier puisse exécuter tous ce qui
est couvert par les revendications sans effort excessif en utilisant les connaissances général et la
littérature citée dans la description. Le groupe Suisse est d’avis qu’il n’est pas nécessaire que tous
les membres d’une sélection étroite d’un domaine général possèdent l’avantage réclamé. Quelques
exemples ne démontrant pas l’avantage serait admis.
Dans l’évaluation de la contrefaçon d’inventions de sélections, la façon dont le produit est utilisé par
le contrefacteur allégué ne peut être déterminante que dans le cas ou la revendication prétendue
être contrefaite est dirigé vers une nouvelle application d’un tel produit. Le fabricant d’un produit
qui peut ou ne peut pas être utilisé comme dans la nouvelle utilisation revendiqué dans le brevet
ne peut contrefaire le brevet si le produit n’est pas revendiqué comme tel dans le brevet. Par contre,
cela peut être différent si le produit n’est pas une matière première et si on peut raisonnablement
assumer en vue des circonstances que le produit est probablement utilisé pour contrefaire le brevet.
Dans ce dernier cas, fabriquer le produit peut être considéré comme
contrefaçon contributif. En particulier, cela s’avère être le cas si l’action de contribution a objectivement
favorisé l’occurrence de la contrefaçon directe en vue de la façon normal du déroulement des
affaires et de l’expérience de la vie.
L’intention de la personne recevant un produit qui fait contrefaçon n’est pas considérée comme
importante pour déterminer si l’action constitue contrefaçon contributif ou pas.
Le groupe Suisse est d’avis que la loi et la pratique des inventions de sélection comme utilisée
actuellement en Suisse et qui correspond avec la loi et la pratique appliquée dans les autres pays
membre de la CBE, est basé sur le principe de fournir une protection adéquate pour une telle type
d’inventions et que cela devrait formée la base d’un standard d’harmonisation pour les inventions
de sélections.
Pour le groupe Suisse, l’importance des points limites des plages de valeurs qui ne sont pas
basés sur des exemples, et qui sont considéré comme nuisible pour la nouveauté d’une prochaine
invention de sélection, mérite discussion au sein de l’AIPPI.
Zusammenfassung
Gemäss Schweizer Recht gibt es keine Begrenzung bezüglich technischem Anwendungs¬gebiet
von Auswahlerfindungen.
In Bezug auf Neuheit und erfinderische Tätigkeit ist die schweizerische Haltung in Einklang
mit jener des Europäischen Patentamts. Insbesondere sind die wichtigsten Grundsätze für die
Beurteilung der Neuheit von Auswahlerfindungen wie folgt: Eine Offenbarung des Standes der
Technik wird bezüglich ausdrücklichem und implizitem Inhalt in Betracht gezogen; Neuheit kann
durch Kombination von Merkmalen entstehen, wenn die Auswahl aus „zwei und mehr Listen einer
gewissen Länge“ abgeleitet ist (das sogenannte „Zwei-Listen-Prinzip“); ein aus einem breiteren
Zahlenbereich des Standes der Technik ausgewählter Unterbereich wird als neu betrachtet, wenn
jede der folgenden Bedingungen erfüllt ist: 1) Der ausgewählte Unterbereich ist im Vergleich zum
bekannten Bereich klein; 2) der ausgewählte Unterbereich ist genügend weit von irgendwelchen
spezifischen Beispielen des Standes der Technik und von den Endpunkten des bekannten Bereichs
entfernt; und 3) der ausgewählte Bereich ist nicht ein willkürliches Beispiel des Standes der Technik,
sondern eine zielgerichtete Auswahl (d.h. eine andere Erfindung).
Im Fall von überlappenden Bereichen gelten die gleichen Grundsätze, und die Neuheit wird
durch einen ausdrücklich erwähnten Endpunkt des bekannten Bereiches, ausdrücklich erwähnte
Zwischenwerte oder ein spezifisches Beispiel des Standes der Technik im Überlappungsbereich
zerstört. Eine ebenso zu berücksichtigende Sichtweise ist, ob eine Fachperson „ernsthaft in
Betracht ziehen“ würde, die technische Lehre des Dokumentes des Standes der Technik im
Überlappungsbereich anzuwenden. Wenn er dies täte, dann gibt es keine Neuheit.
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Beurteilung der erfinderischen Tätigkeit: Falls die Auswahl mit einer besonderen technischen
Wirkung verknüpft ist und falls keine Hinweise vorhanden sind, die die Fachperson zur Auswahl
hinführen, so wird erfinderische Tätigkeit anerkannt. Die technische Wirkung des beanspruchten
Bereichs muss unerwartet verschieden sein, oder bei gleicher Wirkung sich in einem unerwarteten
Ausmass mit Bezug auf die technische Wirkung unterscheiden, welche im bekannten breiteren
Bereich vorhanden ist. Im Falle überlappender Bereiche sollte auch berücksichtigt werden, ob die
Fachperson durch den Stand der Technik geleitet worden wäre, den Überlappungsbereich in der
Hoffnung auf die Lösung des technischen Problems auszuwählen, oder ob sie eine Verbesserung
oder einen Vorteil erwartet hätte.
Die Bedingungen für eine genügende Offenlegung werden erfüllt, wenn die Beschreibung die
Erfindung so klar und vollständig darlegt, dass die Fachperson in der Lage ist, den gesamten
Gegenstand der Ansprüche ohne übermässigen Aufwand auszuführen, nur gestützt auf allgemeines
Wissen und die in der Beschreibung zitierte Literatur. Gemäss der Meinung der Schweizer Gruppe
ist es nicht notwendig, dass alle Mitglieder einer engeren Auswahl einer bekannten breiteren
Klasse den besonderen Vorteil besitzen, der die Auswahl vom Stand der Technik unterscheidet.
Einige Beispiele können ausserhalb dieser Bedingung liegen.
Bei der Beurteilung einer Verletzung einer Auswahlerfindung wird die Art und Weise, wie
ein Produkt vom angeblichen Verletzer verwendet wird, nur dann entscheidend sein, falls der
angeblich verletzte Anspruch auf eine neue Verwendung eines solchen Produktes gerichtet ist.
Ein Hersteller eines Produktes, dass gemäss der beanspruchten neuen Verwendung oder auch
anderweitig gebraucht werden kann, verletzt das Patent nicht, wenn das Produkt als solches nicht
beansprucht ist. Der Fall könnte hingegen anders liegen, falls das Produkt nicht ein Standard-
Produkt ist und falls aus den Umständen vernünftigerweise angenommen werden kann, dass das
Produkt wahrscheinlich unter Verletzung des Patents verwendet werden wird. Im letzteren Fall
kann die Herstellung des Produktes tatsächlich als mittelbare Verletzung (Beihilfe zur Verletzung)
betrachtet werden. Dies wird insbesondere der Fall sein, wenn diese Beihilfe objektiv gesehen
das Vorkommen der unmittelbaren (direkten) Verletzung im Licht des gewöhnlichen Verlaufs der
Dinge und der Lebenserfahrung unterstützt. Die Absicht von Seiten der Person, die das verletzende
Produkt erhält, ist nicht von Bedeutung für die Feststellung, ob eine Handlung mittelbare Verletzung
darstellt oder nicht.
Die Schweizer Gruppe ist der Meinung, dass auf Auswahlerfindung anwendbares Gesetz und Praxis
in der Schweiz, die Gesetz und Praxis in allen Mitgliedstaaten des EPÜ entsprechen, zweckdienlich
auf dem Grundsatz beruhen, angemessenen Schutz für solche Erfindungen zu gewähren und
die Grundlage für harmonisierte Grundsätze für die Patentierbarkeit von Auswahlerfindungen
darstellen. Aus Sicht der Schweizer Gruppe verdient die Bedeutung von bereichsbegrenzenden
Werten, die nicht auf beispielhaften Ausführungsformen des Standes der Technik beruhen, als
neuheitsschädliche Werte für eine spätere Auswahlerfindung weitere Diskussion im Rahmen der
AIPPI.
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Turkey
Turquie
Türkei
Report Q209
in the name of the Turkish Group
by Emre Kerim YARDIMCI, Erkan SEVINC
Ayse Ildes ERDEM, Onur MUTLU and Ertan YILDIZ
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
There is no specific referral to selection inventions in the Turkish patent law DL 551, its
regulations or the case law. However, Turkey is a member state to the EPC (European Patent
Convention) since Nov. 2000 and already ratified EPC2000. In principle, articles from the
EPC supersede corresponding articles of the national law, should any conflict arise. As a
consequence of eight years of implementation, there is no litigation about selection inventions
in Turkey yet. All the following questions are replied in this respect.
All applications, that cover selections from prior art, no matter which field they belong to, are
examined according to the selection invention criteria of EPO Examination guidelines.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
There is no specific referral to the novelty requirements of selection inventions in the Turkish
patent law DL 551. Nevertheless, it is believed that EPO Guidelines for selection inventions
clearly define novelty aspect of the same. These inventions shall be considered novel if
a) the selected sub-range is narrow compared to the known range;
b) the selected sub-range is sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed in
the prior art and from the end points of the known range;
c) the selected sub-range is not an arbitrary specimen of the prior art, i.e. not a mere
embodiment of the prior art, but another invention (purposive selection, new technical
teaching).
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3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
There is no specific referral to non-obviousness of selection inventions in the Turkish patent
law DL 551, its regulations or the case law. In general, if the selection is connected to a
particular technical effect, and if no hints exist leading the skilled person to the selection, then
an inventive step is accepted (this technical effect occurring within the selected range may
also be the same effect as attained with the broader known range, but to an unexpected
degree). If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step requirement, it shall be
submitted at initial filing. Late submission of data may be allowed only for experimental data
that might be required by the Examiner.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
There are neither explicit provisions in Turkish Patent Law nor the case law concerning the
sufficiency or written description requirements in selection inventions.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
There is no specific referral to the patentability or infringement requirements of selection
inventions in the Turkish patent law DL 551. However, selection patents are dealt in the same
way with other patents.
If such advantages or superior results are explicitly utilized by a third party, then infringement
shall be established. While infringement alleges shall be dealt with in a case-by-case basis,
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even an implicit referral to said advantages or superior results may also lead to establishment
of infringement.
In particular, if such selection pertains to a new use of a particular selection of broader
range of materials (e.g. compounds), any party manufacturing said product shall not be
immediately rendered as an infringer as long as said manufacturer, does not indicate -implicitly
or explicitly- an intention or does not offer a benefit in the same way as the advantages or
superior results mentioned in the selection patent. The intention or offer is likely to be sought
in e.g. instructions on packaging of the product, prospectus, user manual, commercials etc.
In case the selection relates to a method, and more specifically a parameter (e.g. temperature,
pressure etc.) implemented in such method, alleged infringers intention is sought whether he
has purposively selected the range or he has unavoidably and/or unintentionally selected
such sub-range in his process. If the selection is unavoidably used, this might lead to revocation
of the selection patent due to the “one way street” (so called bonus effect) situation, which
renders the selection invention not involving inventive step. On the other hand, if such selection
is purposive, infringement shall be established against the user of said selection.
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
There is no policy that could be mentioned for selection inventions in the Turkish patent law
DL 551.
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
In the view of the absence of any legal ground within the Turkish patent law DL 551, or
any jurisprudence or doctrinal opinion in this regard, the question of whether general prior
disclosure of a class of radicals would be regarded as a specific disclosure is to be decided
by the Courts. In this regard, although, the Court might be willing to take into consideration
EP Law as well as its jurisprudence, it is nevertheless not bound by EP decisions. On the other
hand, the question of wideness of the prior disclosed generic class will be analyzed in view
of the EP Law and jurisprudence as well.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
Among the three possibilities;
i) would not be considered as constituting an inventive step
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ii)
would not be considered as constituting an inventive step
iii) would be considered as constituting an inventive step as there are no implicit or explicit
indications or additional justifiable data which would lead the person skilled in the art to
the advantageous property.
Scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the prior art, however the inventor shall
not be able to obtain protection for the products per se. The protection shall be limited to the
use of the products for the advantageous property (i.e. as an adhesive) not possessed by, and
not obvious over the prior art.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
There is no specific referral to such an issue in the case law.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
The compound itself mentioned in example 3 is selected from a generic list of compounds and
found to be useful as an adhesive as a new use. A juridical prosecution shall most likely seek
for evidence proving that the alleged infringer addresses the compound’s use as an adhesive
or an additional ingredient used widely for preparation of adhesives. Such evidence may
be any indication such as instructions on packaging of the product, catalogues or any public
disclosure such as commercials or prospectus. Jurisdiction shall be of the opinion that product
is directed to a use for utilizing the alleged advantages of the claimed selection and establish
the infringement against that manufacturer.
On the other hand, commercial activities of the purchaser mentioned above may also be
subject to establishment of infringement even though said purchaser is not the manufacturer of
the compound. The preconditions for the manufacturer, such as evidence for intention of using
said compound as an adhesive, shall apply mutatis mutandis to the purchaser for establishing
infringement judicium under Art. 136(b) of the DL 551 which reads:
Art. 136. The following acts shall be considered infringement of rights conferred by a/
Patent...
b/ Selling, distributing or commercializing in any other way, or importing for such purposes
of products or keeping them in possession for commercial purposes or using by applying such
products, manufactured as a result of an infringement, where the person concerned knows or
should know that such products are imitations in whole or, in part..
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
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ewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
While there is no specific reference or otherwise referral to selection inventions in the Turkish
patent law DL 551, it is believed that how much effort the inventor has spent shall be irrelevant
in terms of patentability. Criteria on patentability of inventions have been well defined in the
law and no such exclusion or privilege shall be granted to selection inventions. The Patent
Office or the Courts shall consider experimental data sufficient to prove inventiveness of
subject matter rather than considering the efforts, time or money spent by the inventor.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
With regards to the patentability of selection inventions, Turkish group is of the opinion
that selected sub-range should be sufficiently narrow compared to the known range and be
sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and also from
the end-points of the known range. The selection shall be a purposive selection.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
While patentability of selection inventions is subject to special terms, conditions for establishing
infringement to selection patents shall be clearly mentioned in respective laws.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
N/A.
Summary
There is no specific referral to selection inventions in the Turkish patent law DL 551, its regulations or
the case law. On the other hand, Turkey is a member state to the European Patent Convention. Hence,
the European practice applies at least for patents that enter through EPC in terms of patentability
of selection inventions. For granted patents on selection inventions, the protection shall be limited
to the new use of the products for the advantageous property not possessed by, and not obvious
over the prior art. On the other hand, it is further believed that criteria on patentability of inventions
have been well defined in the law and no privilege shall be granted to selection inventions. A Patent
Office or a Court shall consider experimental data sufficient to prove inventiveness of subject matter
rather than considering the efforts, time or money spent by the inventor. Finally, while patentability
of selection inventions is subject to special terms, it is believed that conditions for establishing
infringement to selection patents shall also be clearly mentioned in respective laws.
Résumé
Il n’y a pas référence spécifique aux inventions de sélection dans la loi turque sur les brevets DL 551,
ses règlements ou la jurisprudence. D’autre part, la Turquie est un Etat membre de la Convention sur
le Brevet Européen. D’où, la pratique européenne s’applique au moins pour les brevets d’invention
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qui entrent par le biais de la CBE en terme de brevetabilité des inventions de sélection. Pour les
brevets d’invention accordés sur les inventions de sélection, la protection sera limitée à la nouvelle
utilisation des produits pour la propriété avantageuse non possédée par, et non évidente par
rapport à l’art antérieur. D’autre part, on pense que les critères sur la brevetabilité des inventions
ont été bien définis dans la loi et aucun privilège ne sera accordé aux inventions de sélection.
Un Office des Brevets ou une Cour considéreront des données expérimentales suffisantes pour
prouver le niveau inventif du sujet plutôt que considérer les efforts, le temps ou l’argent dépensé
par l’inventeur. Finalement, tandis que la brevetabilité des inventions de sélection est soumise à des
termes spéciaux, on pense que les conditions pour établir une violation des brevets de sélection
seront également clairement spécifiées dans les lois respectives.
Zusammenfassung
Im Türkischen Patentrecht (DL 551), den bezüglichen Verordnungen bzw. der bisherigen
Rechtsprechung gibt es keine spezielle Bezugnahme auf Auswahlerfindungen. Andererseits ist
die Türkei aber ein Mitgliedstaat des Europäischen Patentübereinkommens. Daher wird bezüglich
der Patentierbarkeit von Auswahlerfindungen, zumindest bei auf Grund des EPÜ eingereichten
Patenten, die europäische Praxis angewandt. Bei auf Auswahlerfindungen erteilten Patenten
sollte sich der Schutz auf die, im vorliegenden Stand der Technik nicht vorhandene und nicht
im vorliegenden Stand der Technik als vorteilhafte Eigenschaft offensichtliche, neue Verwendung
der Produkte beschränken. Weiterhin wird die Ansicht vertreten, dass die Kriterien bezüglich
der Patentierbarkeit der Erfindungen im Gesetz deutlich definiert werden müssen und dabei den
Auswahlerfindungen keinerlei Privilegien gewährt werden darf. Ein Patentamt oder ein Gericht
hat nicht die vom Erfinder aufgewendete Arbeit, Zeit und Geld zu berücksichtigen, sondern
sollte vielmehr das auf Versuchen aufgebaute Datenmaterial zum Beweis der Erfingungshöhe des
Gegenstandes der Erfindung zur Kenntnis nehmen. Trotz der Tatsache dass die Patentierbarkeit
der Auswahlerfindungen besonderen Bedingungen unterliegt, wird schliesslich der Standpunkt
verteten, dass die Gegebenheiten einer Verletzung einer Auswahlerfindung offen und deutlich in
den bezüglichen Gesetzen niedergeschrieben werden sollen.
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United Kingdom
Royaume–Uni
Vereinigtes Königreich
Report Q209
in the name of the United Kingdom Group
by Barbara Cookson, Paul England, Stephen Jones, Ian Karet,
Gareth Morgan, David Knight, Richard Miller, Clare Nicholson,
Christopher Pratt, Michelle Pratt, Tony Rollins, Simon Sellars, Alex Wilson, Ian Wood
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction? Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a
field other than chemical, pharmaceutical or material science fields?
The principle of selection inventions was recognised as a matter of English patent law in the
case of IG Farbenindustrie’s Patent 1 , where it was held that a selection of compounds from
a previously-disclosed broader range of compounds could constitute the subject matter of a
valid patent if the compounds had not previously been made and also if it could be shown
that:
1.1 the selection was based on substantial advantage resulting from the use of the selected
members;
1.2 substantially all members of the selected class possessed the advantage in question;
and
1.3 if the selection was in respect of a quality of a special character, that it could fairly be
said to be peculiar to the selected group.
That is to say, following that case English law accepted the principle that selection patents
were valid, provided that it could be established that the inventiveness of the application
resided in the selection of elements from a previously-disclosed broader group containing
those elements.
There had been some argument following the introduction of the Patents Act 1977 2 that the
concept of selection patents should be disregarded in favour of a novelty-based analysis
and, in particular, in treating such inventions in terms of whether the prior art provided an
enabling disclosure of the selected elements. Some commentators have noted that the IG
Farbenindustrie case pre-dates the current Patents Act 1977 and the development of use
1 (1930) 47 RPC 289
2 1977, c.37
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claims to protect new uses of known materials. Furthermore, there is no equivalent practice
before the EPO where a selection from a single list of specifically disclosed elements does not
confer novelty 3 . However, a recent decision of the High Court in Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (UK)
Ltd v Eli Lilly & Company Ltd 4 has affirmed the English position on selection patents. Although
there is no separate topic called “selection patents” under the Patents Act 1977, Mr Justice
Floyd confirmed in Dr Reddy’s that the basic principles of selection inventions as explained in
the IG Farbenindustrie case have survived the introduction of the 1977 Act.
In the Dr Reddy’s case, Mr Justice Floyd concluded the following points (at paragraph 109
of the judgment):
• In relation to lack of novelty, it is doubtful in the light of the EPO jurisprudence whether a
newly discovered effect complying with the three principles set out above could overcome
a finding that a compound was specifically disclosed in a prior document (although Mr
Justice Floyd decided it was not necessary for him to come to a final conclusion on this
question).
• Whether or not that is so, provided there is novelty on conventional grounds, inventiveness
is to be decided according to ordinary principles.
• The existence of an advantage possessed by the selected compound will be relevant to
the overall assessment of obviousness, but is not an essential prerequisite.
• Compliance with the three principles in IG Farbenindustrie’s Patent is equally not an
essential requirement for inventive step to be found.
The UK-IPO Guidelines 5 are consistent with the EPO approach and make no exception from
the novelty requirement for selection inventions.
If a selection invention is considered to be one which claims specifically a product only
previously disclosed in a generalised sense, there does not seem to be scope for the finding
of such inventions outside the chemical field, including genes.
A second class of selection invention arises in respect of ranges and these can occur in a
wider range of technologies.
Decided cases on selection patents before the English courts have been concerned with the
following types of subject matter:
• Azo and aromatic amine chemicals used as dyestuffs (IG Farbenindustrie’s Patent);
• Polymers made by polymerisation using a glycol with terephthalic acid 6 ;
• Corkscrews coated with polytetrafluoroethylene to reduce friction (although the Court of
Appeal held that the specification did not meet the requirements of the IG Farbenindustrie
test in this case) 7 ;
• Atorvastatin, a cholesterol synthesis inhibitor 8 ; and
• Olanzapine, a widely-prescribed anti-psychotic agent (Dr Reddy’s).
3 EPO Guidelines C IV 9.8
4 [2008] EWHC 2345 (Pat)
5 Manual of Patent Practice – Patents Act 1977, 2.18 to 2.20
6 E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.’s (Witsiepe’s) Application [1982] FSR 303
7 Hallen Co. v Brabantia (UK) Ltd [1991] R.P.C. 195
8 Ranbaxy UK Ltd v Warner-Lambert Company [2005] EWHC 2142 (Patents)
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2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
Following the reasoning in Dr Reddy’s and EPO practice, for a selection to be considered
novel, the prior disclosure from which the selection is made must not specifically disclose the
invention in “individualised form”. For example, a prior disclosure of a range of chemical
compounds, say containing a specific category of functional group, may discuss that range
with reference to a few particular examples of the functional group in question. A later
selection of a chemical having a different and as-yet undisclosed functional group should be
construed as novel.
The teaching brought into the public domain by the prior disclosure would likely focus on
those compounds explicitly described, the remainder of the class being no more than a
theoretical penumbra around those compounds.
Mr Justice Pumfrey summarised the position in Ranbaxy saying 9 “[u]nless the later patent states
what the advantage possessed by the selected class is, it is merely an arbitrary selection
among things already disclosed, and will lack novelty”. In that case Mr Justice Pumfrey held
that one of the patents in issue could not be a valid selection patent because no advantage
other than that claimed by the disclosed materials was claimed for the invention of claim 1.
A specific advantage is more a matter for the inventiveness analysis of question 3 below.
Mr Justice Pumfrey’s approach means that novelty is in part dependent on the advantage.
Indeed the Du Pont case indicates that the selection can be from one or two compounds.
The EPO Guidelines 10 state that an effect occurring only in the claimed sub-range cannot in
itself confer novelty on that sub-range.
The practice of the UK Intellectual Property Office (“UK IPO”) in examining patent applications 11
suggests that “the size of the class from which a member or members have been chosen is not
relevant to the question of novelty of a selection invention”, which accords with the judgment
in Ranbaxy.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
The English law position on obviousness has recently been explained and restated in
the judgment of Jacob LJ in the case of Pozzoli v BDMO SA 12 . The test for analysing the
inventiveness of an invention is as follows:
(1) (a) Identify the notional “person skilled in the art”
(b)
Identify the relevant common general knowledge of that person;
9 At paragraph 64
10 EPO Guidelines, 9C IV 9.8(ii)
11 At http://www.ipo.gov.uk/practice-sec-003.pdf (paragraph 3.92), referring to the House of Lords decision in Du
Pont de Nemours & Co (Witsiepe’s) Application [1982] FSR 303.
12 [2007] EWCA Civ 588
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(2) Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if that cannot readily be done,
construe it;
(3) Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as forming part of the
“state of the art” and the inventive concept of the claim or the claim as construed;
(4) Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed, do those differences
constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art or do they
require any degree of invention?
The question of obviousness will be considered on the facts of each case. The court will
consider the weight to be attached to any particular factor in the light of all the relevant
circumstances. These may include such matters as the motive to find a solution to the problem
the patent addresses, the number and extent of the possible avenues of research, the effort
involved in pursuing them and the expectation of success.
Following the judgement in Dr Reddy’s, it is these “ordinary principles” which are to be
followed in assessing the inventiveness of a selection invention.
It is believed that there must be a single, cohesive invention in the selection for which patent
protection is sought. To attain the level of inventiveness, a patentee must do more than
simply extract a subset of a prior disclosure. How this is demonstrated would be a matter for
evidence in each circumstance, but it must be more than simply slicing up a previous range
into smaller elements.
It is likely that the reasoning required would be defined in terms of an advantage or special
character exhibited by the selection, but a newly discovered effect demonstrated in a selection
- a special character not shared by the broader range - is not an essential requirement to be
satisfied before a selected compound or class can be deemed inventive. (In practice, it might
be difficult to argue inventiveness of a selection over the prior art without some advantage
to go on.) Furthermore, it is suggested that the advantage or other reasoning for making the
selection should be disclosed at the time the application is filed.
According to the UK IPO practice manual, “the advantage relied upon to justify a selection
invention should be clearly disclosed in the specification at the time of filing if it would not
otherwise be apparent to a person skilled in the art.” 13 In Glaxo Group Ltd’s Patent 14 , the
Patents Court held that unexpected bonus effects not described in the specification could not
form the basis of a valid claim to a selection invention. If there is no statement of advantage in
the specification at the time of filing, it may not normally be added later, since to do so would
likely infringe section 76 Patents Act 1977, which prohibits the introduction of subject matter
extending beyond the application as filed. According to Mr Justice Pumfrey in Ranbaxy 15 ,
“after-discovered advantages are highly unlikely to be capable of supporting inventiveness”.
Whilst the advantage itself should be suggested in the application, it may be the case that
factual evidence in support of such a proposition may be adduced later in the prosecution
of the application, or indeed in court when addressing the issue of validity or infringement.
This is the practice before the European Patent Office, and is also believed to be the case at
the UK IPO.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
13 http://www.ipo.gov.uk/practice-sec-003.pdf (paragraph 3.91)
14 [2004] RPC 43
15 At paragraph 72 (see note 6 supra)
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1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
(a) A patent will be insufficient if the specification does not disclose the invention clearly
enough and completely enough for it to be performed by a person skilled in the art (who
is assumed to be equipped with the common general knowledge in his field).
For an “ordinary” product claim, the technical contribution to the art is the product, and
it is only that product which needs to be enabled. However, when considering selection
patents, one is looking at products which have already been disclosed (albeit in terms of
a broad range), and the claim is no longer to an “ordinary” product. According to the
jurisprudence in Dr Reddy’s, in such circumstances there is a requirement for a sufficient
disclosure of the advantage which is alleged to have been identified by the selection.
The decision in IG Farbenindustrie was that all members of the selected class must possess
the advantage in question, although strict compliance with this criteria was doubted in Dr
Reddy’s. There is general authority in the case of Genentech 16 that finding a few marginal
examples do not work will not be enough to attach the claim. Therefore, it is possible
that there is no absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant
advantage. On a related note, it is permissible for some, but not an appreciable number,
members outside of the selected class to demonstrate the advantage; any more than a
very small number outside of the claimed class though would render the purpose of the
selection pointless.
(b) Experimental data may be submitted at any point during the course of prosecution
proceedings, although it may not be permitted to be included in the text of the patent
application if it could be construed as added subject matter, for which see the discussion
in the response to Question 3.
(c) The period for putting an application for a patent in order is given in Rule 30 of the Patents
Rules 2007 17 as four years and six months from the application date or other priority
date, subject to any delays in the examination process. However, current backlogs at
the UK-IPO mean that applications are not all being examined within that period and in
that case the compliance period ends 12 months after the first examination report. Any
defects in the application to do with sufficiency, inventiveness, novelty, or any formality
requirements must be satisfied within this compliance period. There is no compliance
period in the EPO.
16 [1989] RPC 147
17 http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patentrules2007.pdf
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(d) In answer to the final part of the question, given that the case law now suggests that a
newly discovered effect is not an essential requirement to establish inventiveness for a
selection invention, it is probably reasonable to conclude that the claims of the selection
patent do not need to describe any associated advantages: it should be sufficient to
merely claim the selected range of elements. A reason for having made the specific
selection should be suggested in the application (if not in the claims directly). It is
probably advisable to disclose the advantage of the selection, but not to limit the scope
of protection to the advantage.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
Patent infringement in England and Wales is governed by section 60 Patents Act 1977.
Under this legislation, a person infringes a patent if he undertakes a restricted act without
the permission of the proprietor of the patent. The list of restricted acts includes, where the
invention is a product, making it, disposing of it, offering to dispose of it, using it, importing
it, or keeping it, whether for disposal or otherwise. It is also infringement to provide a means
for putting the invention into effect, so-called indirect infringement.
Whether or not an act amounts to patent infringement depends only on the scope of the
claims. If the claims merely define a product without reference to any advantage, then a
person undertaking any restricted act in respect of that product, regardless of whether the
advantage is being utilised, will be liable for patent infringement.
The question of what activity amounts to infringement in respect of “new use” claims in
relation to product claims is not clear as a matter of English law, because it may be difficult
to ascertain when a product which might have been used for an earlier known use is actually
being applied towards the newly-claimed use. With “new use” product claims, the only
difference in the behaviour of the potential infringer is in the mind: there is no way of telling
which purpose the product is being used for. The intention of an alleged infringer is irrelevant:
if a restricted act is undertaken, then liability attaches. Patent infringement is an objective
question and does not require that a person is aware that he is infringing.
In contrast, if the infringement relates to process claims, evidence would be necessary that
the product was being marketed in the UK in the knowledge that such use would be an
infringement or there must be objective evidence from a reasonable person that offering the
product for that use would obviously be an infringement in the circumstances. Such evidence
may be found in directions in packaging inserts etc.
Given this point, a “new use” patent could prevent someone from doing what they had done
before since the act of infringement is assessed exclusively on the physical acts undertaken,
not the reasons for doing so, thus denying the user their previous right to work the old use
of the product. It has been suggested by certain commentators that if selection patents are
not to interfere with the legitimate existing activities of others, it may be necessary to limit
the scope of the monopoly granted (possibly to the making, using, and commercial supply of
the thing for the specified use) or to modify the defence of prior use. This conflict may further
be resolved by drafting the claims exclusively as pure product claims with no allusion to
any use or advantage. However, this may mean that invention falls foul of the inventive step
requirement.
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6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
Since selection inventions are not, today, treated any differently from other inventions, there is
no distinct policy to support them. Selection patents appear to have any significance only in
relation to claims to substances. As Jacob LJ says a “patent can only be granted for a novel
substance if the patentee specifies a use for it (absent this he has simply not made an invention
at all -- has added nothing to human knowledge).” 18 The approach taken to the assessment of
novelty in the UK and at the EPO is very finessed in that it requires the prior disclosure to be
enabling. This, taken with the assessment of a prior art document at the date of its publication,
ensures that generalised disclosures do not destroy novelty in selections.
The general policy in permitting selection patents is the same as will have been adopted
in various other jurisdictions. An initial discovery leads to a generic disclosure of elements
having a certain set of qualities. A subsequent discovery finds that a subset of the generic
disclosure has qualities other than envisaged in the initial discovery, but that initial discovery
may preclude a claim for patent protection in respect of the subsequent discovery.
In order to properly incentivise research and development, at the core of the relationship
between patent holder and State, this barrier has been penetrated, if not removed, by the
introduction of the concept of selection patents.
It has been of particular application to those working in the chemical and specifically the
pharmaceutical fields, where the generic disclosure can embrace millions of permutations.
Blocking these from further study weighs heavily against the public interest. Allowing patent
protection to arise in subsets of the initial range, provided that the subsets have not been
explicitly disclosed, prevents large tracts of compounds from lying inaccessible and otherwise
exposing researchers to the risk of a patent infringement claim.
The recent affirmation of the concept by the High Court would suggest that this reasoning
is deemed to still be applicable in the present day. This is perhaps because as technology
develops, researchers are becoming equipped with new ways in which to apply previouslydisclosed
methods and materials, and they need access to those in order to properly exploit
the fruits of their labour.
With Reference to the Examples
7) Novelty
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group
of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction? In the
analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is – i.e.
would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
In determining the novelty of a claim to a specific compound having a particular radical,
or to a group of specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals, in the light
of a prior disclosure of compounds containing a generic class the first point to consider is
whether any of the compounds which fall within the scope of the new claim are disclosed
in an individualised form in the prior art. If any of the compounds have been individualised
18 H. Lundbeck A/S v. Generics (UK) Limited & Ors, Arrow Generics Limited, Teva UK Limited and Teva Pharmaceuticals
Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 311 (affirmed at [2009] UKHL 12)
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in the prior art, then the new claim lacks novelty. If a selection from two or more lists has
to be made in order to arrive at a specific combination of features claimed, which are not
specifically disclosed in the prior art, the subject matter of the new claim is novel.
The novelty analysis would not be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of
1,000,000 possible compounds or very few. For example, it is established case law in the
EPO that if the prior art discloses a chemical compound containing a single asymmetrical
carbon atom in a racemic mixture, this does not disclose in an individualised form the d- or
l- enantiomers. Thus, novelty of the d- or l- enantiomers is not destroyed by the description
of the racemates.
(see T12/81, OJ 8/1982, 296, and the Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent
Office, section C 9.8, and Dr Reddy’s v Eli Lilly [2008] EWHC 2345, T 0296/87 Hoechst
Enantiomers).
In this particular Example, a claim directed to the selection of a particular radical or particular
group of radicals from amongst the generic class of chemical compounds (where the selected
radical or group of radicals are not specifically disclosed in the prior-art document) would
be novel.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
In Dr Reddy’s, as set out in response to question 1 above, Floyd J concluded the following in
relation to the inventive step or non-obviousness:
“i) …
ii) …provided there is novelty on conventional grounds, obviousness is to be decided
according to ordinary principles.
iii) The existence of an advantage possessed by the selected compound will be relevant to
the overall assessment of obviousness, but is not an essential pre-requisite.
iv) Compliance with Maugham J’s principles in IG Farbenindustrie’s Patent is equally not an
essential requirement for inventive step to be found.”
The English law test for assessing obviousness (Pozzoli) is set out in response to question 3
above and repeated below:
(1) (a) Identify the notional “person skilled in the art”
(b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of that person;
(2) Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if that cannot readily be done,
construe it;
(3) Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as forming part of the
“state of the art” and the inventive concept of the claim or the claim as construed;
(4) Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed, do those differences
constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art or do they
require any degree of invention?
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As explained in response to question 3, this test will be considered on the facts of each case.
We apply steps (2)-(4) of the Pozzoli test above to the three scenarios in Example 2 below:
Example 2, scenario (i): Not inventive
(2) The inventive concept is the resulting compounds from the selection that the inventor
has made of a “specific compound having a particular radical, or group of specific
compounds having a selection of particular radicals”.
(3) There are no differences - the resulting compounds are “neither described as having
nor shown to possess any advantageous properties (as adhesives) not possessed by the
specific prior art examples”.
(4) Not applicable on the basis that no differences were identified at step (3) above.
Example 2, scenario (ii): Not inventive
(2) The inventive concept is the resulting compounds from the selection that the inventor
has made of a “specific compound having a particular radical, or group of specific
compounds having a selection of particular radicals” and that are “described as
possessing advantageous properties compared with the compounds specifically referred
to in the prior art…”.
(3) The differences are that the resulting compounds from the selection possess “advantageous
properties compared with the compounds specifically referred to in the prior art”.
(4) The differences would be obvious to the person skilled in the art on the basis that “…these
properties are ones which the skilled person in the art would expect such compounds to
possess, so that he is likely to be led to make this selection”.
Example 2, scenario (iii): Inventive
(2) The inventive concept is the resulting compounds from the selection that the inventor
has made of a “specific compound having a particular radical, or group of specific
compounds having a selection of particular radicals” and that are “described as
possessing advantageous (adhesive) properties but there are no indications which
would lead the person skilled in the art to this particular selection as opposed to any
other members of the generic class in order to achieve the advantageous (adhesive)
properties”.
(3) The differences are that the resulting compounds from the selection possess “advantageous
(adhesive) properties”.
(4) The differences would not be obvious to the person skilled in the art on the basis that “…
there are no indications which would lead the person skilled in the art to this particular
selection as opposed to any other members of the generic class in order to achieve the
advantageous (adhesive) properties”.
Further, if say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the prior art, what scope
of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor be able to obtain
protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous property), or should
any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for the advantageous
property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior art?
It has been said 19 that:
“Selection patents are usually concerned with chemical processes, but the question of
obviousness is not essentially different from that which arises in other kinds of inventions.
As Maugham J pointed out [in IG Farbenindustrie’s Patent]:
19 Terrell on the Law of Patents, 16th edition, at 7-89
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“If the selected compounds being novel, possess a special property of an
unexpected character…I cannot see that the inventive step essentially differs
from the step in producing a new result by a new combination of well-known
factors (cranks, rods, toothed wheels and so forth) employed in mechanics in
the construction of a new machine.” 20
Following the Court of Appeal in Generics (UK) v H Lundbeck A/S 21 , Floyd J concluded in Dr
Reddy’s that “...a general formula with multiple substituents chosen from lists of some length will
not normally take away the novelty of a subsequent claim to an individual compound” 22 .
On that basis, the inventor should be able to obtain protection for the products per se.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
On the basis of the IG Farbenindustrie’s Patent and Pharmacia v Merck it would appear that
all members of the class selected by the patentee must possess the requisite advantage.
The following requirements were laid down by Maugham J in IG Farbenindustrie’s Patent 23 :
“… it is necessary for the patentee to define in clear terms the nature of the characteristic
which he alleges to be possessed by the selection for which he claims monopoly. He
has in truth disclosed no invention whatever if he merely says that the selected group
possesses advantages. Apart altogether from the question of what is called sufficiency,
he must disclose an invention; he fails to do this in the case of a selection for special
characteristics, if he does not adequately define them” (emphasis added).
One of the three conditions that Maugham J set out in IG Farbenindustrie’s Patent 24 is that “all
members of the selected class possessed the advantage in question” (emphasis added).
In Pharmacia v Merck 25 , Aldous LJ said:
“…Thus if the invention is a selection of certain compounds, in order to secure an advantage
or avoid some disadvantage, not only must the specification contain sufficient information
on how to make the compounds, it must also describe the advantage or how to avoid
the disadvantage. Further the compounds monopolised by the claim must all have that
advantage or avoid the disadvantage. The same principle applies where the claim is to
a class of compounds. To be sufficient, the specification must identify the characteristics
of the class and a method of manufacture. Further all the claimed compounds must in
substance have the characteristics of the class…” (emphasis added).
However, in Dr Reddy’s 26 , Floyd J said, albeit obiter dictum:
“The first problem to be met by a classical selection case is that the Patent does not even
assert any quality for olanzapine [(a widely prescribed anti-psychotic agent used for
the treatment of schizophrenia)] which is of a special character not shared by the whole
class. The advantages alleged are only over individual members of the disclosed class.
20 (1930) 47 RPC 289 at 321
21 [2008] EWCA Civ 311
22 [2008] EWHC 2345 (Pat) at 94
23 (1930) 47 RPC 289 at 323
24 (1930) 47 RPC 289 at 322, 323
25 [2002] RPC 41 at 55-56
26 [2008] EWHC 2345 (Pat) at Appendix 2, para. 2
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There is no disclosure of whether olanzapine is special in this regard, or whether this is
a property shared by a large part of the class. I accept DRL’s submission that this is not
enough for a valid selection patent.”
The reference to “a large part of the class” in an appendix to the judgment in Dr Reddy’s
could mean that the position under English law is that a patentee is excused if one or two
examples fall short of the relevant advantage.
Floyd J also said, in relation to insufficiency, that “I think that Jacob LJ [, in his judgment in H
Lundbeck A/S v Generics (UK) Ltd & Ors.,] was leaving open for future consideration special
cases, of which selection is an example” 27 .
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Section 60 of the Patents Act 1977 provides:
“60(1) a person infringes a patent for an invention if, but only if, while the patent is
in force, he does any of the following things in the United Kingdom in relation to the
invention without the consent of the proprietor of the patent, that is to say -
(a) where the invention is a product, he makes, disposes of, offers to dispose of, uses or
imports the product of keeps it whether for disposal or otherwise;
…
(2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a person (other than the proprietor
of the patent) also infringes a patent for an invention if, while the patent is in force
and without the consent of the proprietor, he supplies or offers to supply in the
United Kingdom a person other than a licensee or other person entitled to worth the
invention with any of the means, relating to an essential element of the invention,
for putting the invention into effect when he knows, or it is obvious to a reasonable
person in the circumstances, that those means are suitable for putting, and are
intended to put, the invention into effect in the United Kingdom.
[(3) Subsection (2) above shall not apply to the supply or offer of a staple commercial
product unless the supply or the offer is made for the purpose of inducing the person
supplied or, as the case may be, the person to whom the offer is made to do an act
which constitutes an infringement of the patent by virtue of subsection (1) above.]
(emphasis added)”
The House of Lords has held that liability for patent infringement is absolute 28 . Knowledge of
the advantageous property of the selection, or intention 29 of the infringer as to its supply, is
irrelevant in relation to direct infringement pursuant to section 60(1).
However, knowledge of the advantageous property of the selection is relevant in relation to
indirect (contributory) infringement pursuant to section 60(2).
In addition, innocence may also prevent an award of damages or an order for an account of
profits, even where lack of knowledge is irrelevant to a finding of infringement 30 .
27 [2008] EWHC 2345 (Pat) at 121
28 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v HN Norton [1996] RPC 76
29 If a person who intended to infringe a patent did not in fact do so, he would not be taken to have infringed. But
proof of an intention to infringe in the future, which did not amount to an actual act of infringement, may justify an
injunction to restrain infringement. (Terrell on the Law of Patents, 16th edition, at 8-10)
30 Section 62(1) Patents Act 1977
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11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
Effort is not a relevant factor for assessing validity in non-selection patents. We see no reason,
moral or practical, for treating selection patents any differently.
The amount of effort may, however, be an indicia of validity, but should not be a decisive
factor.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
First, it must be agreed whether or not the concept of selection as a separate type of invention
should be accepted. The EPO has shunned selection patents. This may be the way forward, so
that, rather than an approach being adopted that special rules apply for selection inventions,
the standard rules of patentability apply.
There are however good policy reasons for treating selection inventions as a separate topic
(for the reasons set out in question 6). If so, it would be helpful to harmonise standards
regarding the definition of a selection invention, what can be considered novel and standards
of proof for the inventive step.
13) Groups are also asked to recommend any issues for harmonisation not referred to in Q11
above.
None.
14) Groups are asked to outline any other potential issues that merit discussion within AIPPI as
regards selection inventions.
An issue that potentially merits discussion is whether a selection invention can subsist in other
areas of technology, for example, in a mechanical case. This issue was raised in a summary
judgment application before the UK-IPO (in Secretary of State for Defence v Farrow Systems
Ltd, 15 February 2008) and arises from the following comment made by Slade LJ in Hallen
v Branbantia 31 :
“We agree with the judge that the well-known parts of Maugham J’s judgment … were
directed to a chemical patent and care must be taken when applying them to a mechanical
patent. Nevertheless, in the case of chemical selection patent, it might not be necessary
for all the compounds in the broad class actually to have been made (they could be very
31 [1991] RPC 195
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numerous) so long as their formulae and common properties were ascertained. Thus,
though being merely ‘notional’ compounds, they might still qualify as a broad class from
which a selection patent stemmed. By analogy, we are not wholly persuaded that in
the case of a mechanical patent a broad identifiable combination of known mechanical
parts and substances commonly used therewith (e.g. oil) might never constitute a broad
class from which a selection patent might stem, even though that combination did not yet
physically exist.”
Summary
Under English law there is no separate class of selection patents. Nevertheless selection patents
exist and have been held valid.
Novelty of a selection patent depends on the selected class having an advantage of some sort
over the previously-disclosed broader group. In assessing inventiveness, “ordinary principles” of
patentability are followed. There must be a single, cohesive invention in the selection (i.e. an
advantage or special character exhibited by the selection). This invention should be disclosed at the
time the application is filed; otherwise the application may fail for insufficiency.
The intention of the alleged infringer is irrelevant to the question of infringement - whether or not an
act amounts to patent infringement depends only upon the scope of the claims.
Résumé
En droit anglais, il n’existe pas une catégorie distincte pour les brevets de sélection. Néanmoins,
les brevets de sélections existent et ont été reconnus valides.
La nouveauté d’un brevet de sélection reposera sur le fait pour le groupe sélectionné d’avoir un
avantage particulier sur le groupe connu dont il est issu. Pour l’évaluation de l’inventivité, les
principes ordinaires de brevetabilité sont appliqués. L’invention de la sélection doit être unique et
particulière à la sélection (i.e. un avantage ou une caractéristique spéciale doit être révélé par la
sélection). L’invention ne devra être révélée qu’une fois la demande remplie. A défaut, la demande
pourrait échouer pour insuffisance.
La question de l’intention du contrefacteur présumé n’a aucune influence sur la question de la
contrefaçon. Déterminer si un acte est une contrefaçon de brevet dépendra uniquement de l’étendu
de la demande.
Zusammenfassung
Nach englischem Recht gibt es fuer Auswahlpatente keine spezielle Patentklasse. Trotzdem existieren
Auswahlpatente und gelten als gueltig.
Die Neuheit eines Auswahlpatents haengt davon ab, ob die ausgewaehlte Klasse irgendeinen
Vorteil gegenueber der zuvor bekanntgegebenen weiteren Gruppe hat. Bei der Bewertung der
Erfindung werden die “gewoehnlichen Prinzipien” der Patentfähigkeit angewendet. In der Auswahl
muss eine einzelne, zusammenhaengende Erfindung stecken (z.B. ein Vorteil oder ein spezieller
Charakter, der durch die Auswahl herausgestellt wird). Die Erfindung sollte zeitgleich mit dem
Einreichen der Anmeldung bekanntgegeben werden; anderenfalls könnte das Patent nicht erteilt
werden.
Die Absicht des angeblichen Verletzers ist irrelevant im Zusammenhang mit der Frage einer
Rechtsverletzung – ob eine Patentverletzung vorliegt, haengt allein von dem Umfang des Anspruchs
ab.
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United States
États-Unis d’Amérique
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
Report Q209
in the name of the United States Group
by John Osha (Chair), William Ellis (Co-Chair), Rick Neifeld, Janet MacLeod,
Drew Meunier, Jeffrey Bergman, David Chernek, Leslie MacDonell and Gau Bodepudi
Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement, other
Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
Questions
General
Groups are asked to give a summary of the legal position as regards a patent for a purported
selection invention in their jurisdiction in relation to the following:
1) Legal developments on selection inventions
What specific types of inventions are recognized under the concept of selection invention and
are patentable in your jurisdiction?
Answering directly, any selection invention claimed in an application meeting the requirements
for patentability under U.S. law is patentable. U.S. statutory law does not refer expressly
to selection inventions, but rather provides that “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,” may be
patented, subject to additional requirements. 35 USC § 101. Thus, any selection invention
defining a useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter may be patentable
in the United States if it meets the other substantive requirements: novelty (lack of anticipation),
non-obviousness, written description, enablement, and best mode. 35 USC §§ 102, 103,
112. Novelty, non-obviousness, and sufficiency of description under U.S. law are addressed
in responses to other questions.
Recent legal developments in the United States impact the patentability of selection inventions.
The U.S. Supreme Court case KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), unquestionably
made it more difficult to establish the non-obviousness of any invention, including selection
inventions. While KSR dealt with a mechanical invention, it reset the standard for obviousness
determinations for all inventions.
Under KSR, an examiner or a court may go beyond the express teachings of references to
consider “the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art”
and “the inferences and creative steps a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ” in
determining if the selection would have been obvious. Id. at 1740-41. Thus, KSR relaxed a
former strict requirement for proof relating to inferences.
KSR also states that the success of one of “a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, .
. . is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense,” and if so, is
not patentable. Id. at 1742. The foregoing passage limits the probative value of the number
of elements in a genus in determining obviousness of selected species.
KSR also allows a claim to be held obvious based upon an “obvious to try” standard, stating
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that the lower court “conclude[d], in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious
merely by showing that the combination of elements was ‘obvious to try.’” Id. This statement
in KSR was not specific to the mechanical invention at issue. In fact, the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (“the Board”) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
latched onto this statement in a rare precedential decision in a biotechnology case, Ex parte
Kubin, stating that “‘obvious to try’ may be an appropriate test in more situations than we
previously contemplated.” 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410. The Board’s decision in Ex parte Kubin
was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“the Federal Circuit”),
the appellate court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent matters in the United States. The
Federal Circuit heard oral arguments in January 2009 and is expected to render its decision
sometime this year.
That said, selection invention patents continue to issue from the USPTO, typically in the areas of
chemistry, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology. This is primarily because these technological
areas are recognized by the courts as unpredictable art fields. See Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s
Labs, Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“To the extent an art is unpredictable, as
the chemical arts often are, KSR’s focus on these ‘identified, predictable solutions’ may present
a difficult hurdle because potential solutions are less likely to be genuinely predictable.”).
Post KSR, the obviousness determination still requires two distinct elements: (1) motivation;
and (2) reasonable expectation of success. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty.,
Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Failure to proffer sufficient proof of either
element leads to a conclusion of non-obviousness. Id. (finding no prima facie obviousness
because defendant could not show either motivation to select the inventors’ chosen starting
compound or any expectation that the inventors’ chosen modifications would succeed). In
the unpredictable fields of chemistry and biology, it is easy to see the logic and effectiveness
of an argument for patentability premised on a lack of reasonable expectation of success.
Accordingly, many, though certainly not all, selection invention patents issue because the
prior art does not provide a basis for one skilled in the art to reasonably expect success in
obtaining the invention as claimed.
Do you have any examples of selection inventions in a field other than chemical, pharmaceutical
or material science fields?
After KSR, it is less likely for a selection invention in the more predictable art fields to be found
patentable. However, a recent opinion of the Federal Circuit explained that, while “KSR
cautioned us to not be too rigid …, we may still consider evidence of teachings to combine
(and, presumably, not to combine) because, according to the Supreme Court, they ‘capture[]
a helpful insight’ into the obviousness inquiry.” Anderson Corp. V. Pella Corp., No. 2007-
1536, 2008 SL 4927431, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 19, 2008). Presumably, a teaching “not to
combine” a selected element of a disclosed list of elements, would enable a claim to that
selected element to be found non-obvious and therefore patentable.
2) Novelty
Groups are asked to discuss any issues that should be considered with respect to the novelty
of selection inventions. For example, is merely carving a range out of a broad prior art
disclosure sufficient to make a selection invention novel? Is a different advantage or use, or
the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement required for a selection invention
to be novel?
I.CLAIMS TO COMPOUNDS
In United States Patent Law, it is well established that the disclosure of a genus in the prior
art is not necessarily a disclosure of every species that is a member of that genus. In fact,
there may be many species encompassed within a genus that are not disclosed by a mere
disclosure of a genus.
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However, there are cases in which prior disclosure of a genus class anticipates a claimed
species within that genus. To determine whether a prior-disclosed genus class anticipates
a claimed species, a case-by-case analysis needs to be conducted. Although there is no
clear-cut answer, there are a number of factors that are typically taken into account when
determining whether a prior-disclosed genus class anticipates a claimed species within that
genus.
A. If the claimed species is well delineated in the prior-disclosed genus class, there is a
greater probability the claimed species will be anticipated.
When the compound is not specifically named, but instead it is necessary to select
portions of teachings within a reference and combine them, e.g., select various
substituents from a list of alternatives given for placement at specific sites on a generic
chemical formula to arrive at a specific composition, anticipation can only be found if
the classes of substituents are sufficiently limited or well delineated. For example, if a
prior art reference discloses a class of compounds and expressly spells out a definite and
limited class of compounds that enables a person of ordinary skill in the art to at once
envisage each member of the limited class, then anticipation will most likely be found.
But if the members of the class cannot be envisioned, the reference will likely not be found
to anticipate the claimed species.
To illustrate, where a broad generic formula of the prior art describes a near infinite
number of compounds, and the claim-at-issue is limited to a structure with only one
variable substituent, one of ordinary skill in the art would likely not “at once envisage”
the claimed subject matter of the reference.
To determine whether one of ordinary skill in the art is able to “at once envisage”
the specific compound within the generic chemical formula, one of ordinary skill in
the art must be able to draw the structural formula or write the name of each of the
compounds included in the generic formula before any of the compounds can be “at
once envisaged.”
B. If the prior-disclosed genus class is a large class, there is a smaller probability the claimed
species will be anticipated.
In general, if the genus includes an untold number of species, then anticipation will less
likely be found. As an example, the genus alkaline chlorine or bromine solution has
been found to not anticipate the species alkali metal hypochlorite, since the genus would
include an untold number of species. As another example, where the prior art discloses
a generic chemical formula wherein X, Y, Z, P, and R- represent either hydrogen or alkyl
radicals, R a side chain containing an OH group, this formula, without more, would not
anticipate a claim to 7-methyl-9-[d, l”-ribityl]-isoalloxazine, because the generic formula
encompassed a vast number and perhaps even an infinite number of compounds.
C. If the prior-disclosed genus class includes a limited number of compounds, there is a
greater probability the claimed species will be anticipated.
A very small genus can be a disclosure of each species within the genus. Hence, the
disclosure of a small genus may anticipate the species of that genus even if the species
are not themselves recited. In particular, where the genus embraces a very limited
number of compounds closely related to one another in structure, then anticipation will
more likely be found.
As an example, where a prior art reference teaches a generic formula embracing a
limited number of compounds closely related to each other in structure, and the properties
possessed by the compound class of the prior art was that disclosed for the claimed
compound, anticipation will likely be found.
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On the other hand, if the genus class would not embrace a very limited number of
compounds closely related to one another in structure so as to describe each such
compound as surely as if they were identified in the reference by name, then the claimed
species will likely not be anticipated.
D. If the prior-disclosed genus class includes a preference or provides guidance that
points to the claimed species, there is a greater probability the claimed species will be
anticipated.
Disclosure of a chemical genus in a reference may anticipate a claimed species compound
where the reference states preferences for the genus or provides guidance that point to
the specific compound. For example, if the reference discloses preferred substituents
for X, Y, Z, >P,< R, and R” as follows: where X, P, and R” are hydrogen, where Y and
Z may be hydrogen or methyl, and where R is one of eight specific isoalloxazines, and
disclosed a limited generic class consisting of about 20 compounds, where the claimed
compound was 1 of these 20 compounds, the reference effectively described the claimed
compound and the reference anticipated the claims.
But if the prior art does not disclose a “pattern of preferences” that would limit the
species to a narrow class of compounds, then the claimed species will likely not be
anticipated. For example, for a prior art reference that disclosed a free base compound
(MATTPCA) in combination with a preferred salt (hydrochloride), the prior art reference
did not anticipate a patent that claimed the free base compound in combination with a
different salt (specifically, a bisulfate salt of a dextrorotatory enantiomer of the free base
compound (clopidogrel, MATTPCA)). The prior art reference did not state a “pattern of
preferences” that would limit the generic formula of MATTPCA in the prior art reference
to a narrow class of compounds that includes the compound as claimed (MATTPCA’s
d-enantioner bifulfate salt).
Furthermore, there is likely no anticipation if the reference’s disclosure is so broad as to
be meaningless and provides no insight on how to create a product with the beneficial
properties of claimed species. For example, if a reference discloses millions of possible
compounds, where no combination of the reference’s preferred compounds would
yield the claimed compound and where none of the reference’s preferred compounds
resembles the claimed compound, then anticipation will likely not be found.
E. If the species claim covers a discovery of a property or function not disclosed in the
prior art genus-disclosure, there is a smaller probability the claimed species will be
anticipated.
If the claimed species covers a property or function not disclosed by the prior-disclosed
genus class, then the claimed species may not be anticipated. A court in the United
States noted that, generally speaking, there is nothing unobvious in choosing some
among many indiscriminately, but where the choice is based on a discovery that some
compounds, falling within a prior art genus have special significance, then the species
claims will likely not be anticipated.
F. If experimentation is necessary to arrive at the claimed species from the prior-disclosed
genus class, there is a smaller probability the claimed species will be anticipated.
In determining whether anticipation of a claimed species exists, courts in the United
States may ask whether additional experimentation was necessary to arrive at the
claimed species from the prior-disclosed genus class. As an example, there is likely
no anticipation where one would have to experiment with a large number of possible
intermediates referred to in the prior art reference and successfully piece together the
necessary ones to come up with the one generic formula out of a total of twenty-seven
generic formulae and then would have to experiment further to discover the specific
structure of Red 40.
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II. CLAIMS TO RANGES
A. A specific example in the prior art which is within a claimed range anticipates the
range.
When, as by a recitation of ranges or otherwise, a claim covers several compositions,
the claim is anticipated if one of them is in the prior art. For example, claims to titanium
(Ti) alloy with 0.6-0.9% nickel (Ni) and 0.2-0.4% molybdenum (Mo) were anticipated by
a graph in a Russian article on Ti-Mo-Ni alloys, because the graph contained an actual
data point corresponding to a Ti alloy containing 0.25% Mo and 0.75% Ni and this
composition was within the claimed range of compositions.
B. Prior art which teaches a range overlapping or touching the claimed range anticipates if
the prior art range discloses the claimed range with “sufficient specificity.”
When the prior art discloses a range which touches or overlaps the claimed range,
but no specific examples falling within the claimed range are disclosed, a case-by-case
determination must be made as to anticipation. In order to anticipate the claims, the
claimed subject matter must be disclosed in the reference with sufficient specificity to
constitute an anticipation under the statute. What constitutes a “sufficient specificity” is
fact dependent. If the claims are directed to a narrow range, and the reference teaches
a broad range, depending on the other facts of the case, it may be reasonable to
conclude that the narrow range is not disclosed with “sufficient specificity” to constitute
an anticipation of the claims.
For example, a reference temperature range of 100-500 degrees C did not describe
a claimed range of 330-450 degrees C with sufficient specificity to be anticipatory.
Further, while there was a slight overlap between the reference’s preferred range (150-
350 degrees C) and the claimed range, that overlap was not sufficient for anticipation.
The question of “sufficient specificity” is similar to that of “clearly envisaging” a species
from a generic teaching.
C. Prior art which teaches a value or range that is very close to, but does not overlap or
touch, the claimed range does not anticipate the claimed range.
Anticipation under § 102 can be found only when the reference discloses exactly what
is claimed. For example, claims to titanium (Ti) alloy with 0.8% nickel (Ni) and 0.3%
molybdenum (Mo) were not anticipated by, although they were held obvious over, a
graph in a Russian article on Ti-Mo-Ni alloys in which the graph contained an actual data
point corresponding to a Ti alloy containing 0.25% Mo and 0.75% Ni.
III. CLAIMS FOR NEW USES
A claim for a new use of an old compound is novel unless it is exactly disclosed in the prior
art.
A. If the claimed species is actually disclosed in the prior-disclosed genus class, then there
is a greater probability the use of the claimed species will be anticipated.
If there is a specific disclosure of a claimed species, even if in a list, then it is not the
case where a broad genus is disclosed without reference to the potentially anticipating
species. In this scenario, there is a greater chance of anticipation of the claimed use.
For example, where a patent-at-issue concerned a method of preventing and treating
skin disorders by topical application of a composition with ascrobyl palmitate as an
ingredient, a prior art reference that taught topical application of a composition that
included ascrobyl palmitate as one “among many others” anticipated some of the claimsat-issue.
B. If the prior-disclosed genus class lists a species compound for a given purpose
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and if the species compound is claimed for a different purpose, then the claimed use may
not be anticipated.
Even if the species compound is disclosed in the prior-disclosed genus class, anticipation
of the use is not necessarily automatic. For example, where you have a method of using
a compound to treat a specific disease and the prior art discloses the compound for
another use, then a claim to a new use for the species may not be anticipated.
To illustrate, where a patent claims a method of treating a disease (urolithiasis) by
administering an effective amount of 4-amino-1-hydroxybutane-1,1-biphosphonic acid,
the species claim was not anticipated by a prior art reference that disclosed various
biphosphonic acids including 4-amino-1-hydroxybutane-1,1-biphosphonic acid, but
stated that the disclosed compounds are suitable for the production of cosmetic and
pharmaceutical preparations. Since the reference did not suggest the claimed therapeutic
use, it did not anticipate the claimed use of the species.
3) Inventive step or non-obviousness
Groups are asked to discuss the inventive step or non-obviousness requirements in their
jurisdiction. If experimental data is used to back up the inventive step or non-obviousness
requirement can it be submitted after initial patent filing? Are there any prerequisites or
limitations on the late submission of data?
The general issues related to inventive step or non-obviousness are described below. Similar
to the response for Q2 novelty / anticipation, non-obviousness for selection patents is taken
on a case-by-case basis.
In assessing obviousness under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained;
and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Objective evidence of nonobviousness,
such as commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
also may be relevant, shedding light on the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject
matter sought to be patented. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court held in the KSR decision that
if a person can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.
The patentability of a claim to a specific compound or subgenus embraced by a prior art
genus is analyzed no differently than any other case by the USPTO. In the case of a prior art
reference disclosing a genus, the USPTO is required to look at the following criteria:
(A) the structure of the disclosed prior art genus and that of any expressly described species
or subgenus within the genus;
(B) any physical or chemical properties and utilities disclosed for the genus, as well as any
suggested limitations on the usefulness of the genus, and any problems alleged to be
addressed by the genus;
(C) the predictability of the technology; and
(D) the number of species encompassed by the genus taking into consideration all of the
variables possible.
Once the structure of the disclosed prior art genus and that of any expressly described
species or subgenus within the genus are identified, the Examiner is required to make explicit
findings on the similarities and differences between the closest disclosed prior art species
or subgenus of record and the claimed species or subgenus including findings relating to
similarity of structure, chemical properties and utilities. The Examiner should then consider
all relevant prior art teachings and determine whether it would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the relevant art to select the claimed species or subgenus from the disclosed
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prior art genus. This analysis includes considering whether the prior art teaches away from
the claimed species or subgenus.
With respect to numerical ranges, differences in concentration or temperature will not support
the patentability of subject matter encompassed by the prior art unless there is evidence
indicating such concentration or temperature is critical. Where the general conditions of a
claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not considered inventive to discover the optimum or
workable ranges by routine experimentation. Again, the Examiner is required to consider all
relevant prior art teachings, including prior art that teaches away from the claimed range,
and determine whether it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art
to select the claimed range.
An obviousness rejection for a selection invention can be overcome by providing evidence
that the claimed invention yields unexpectedly improved properties or properties not present
in the prior art. Experimental data can be provided in the form of an affidavit after the initial
patent filing that includes test results demonstrating that unexpected properties exist for the
claimed species. These test results can be created after the filing of the application and
their submission is not generally considered to raise new matter. There are no prerequisites
or limitations on the late submission of experimental data. For example, the specification
does not need to disclose proportions or values as critical for applicants to present evidence
showing the proportions or values to be critical.
4) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
Groups are asked to discuss the sufficiency or written description requirements in their
jurisdiction. There may be several aspects to this question:
1) the threshold for sufficiency;
2) the allowable timing for submission of experimental data;
3) the time frame within which sufficiency or written description requirements must be
satisfied; and
4) the breadth of claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of
asserted or proven advantages.
With respect to item 1), please discuss to what extent all members of the class selected by
the patentee are required to possess the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction. Is there an
absolute requirement that all of the selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the
patentee excused if one or two examples fall short? Also, with respect to item 4) above, if a
new utility is asserted as a selection invention, would it suffice to claim a particular range or
selection of components which have been found to be associated with such a new utility or
would it be necessary to recite such a new utility in the claims?
United States patent law requires that the specification provide a written description of
the invention, an enabling disclosure, and disclosure of the best mode of carrying out the
invention:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph.
The written description requirement is distinct from the enablement provision, which requires
disclosure of sufficient information to allow one of skill in the pertinent art to make and use
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the claimed invention in the absence of undue experimentation, and the best mode provision,
which requires disclosure of the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out the
invention.
In order to comply with the written description requirement, the specification must reasonably
convey to one of ordinary skill in the art that, as of the filing date of the application, the
inventor was in possession of the claimed invention. Possession may be shown by a
description of an actual reduction to practice of the invention, or by a description of relevant
identifying characteristics of the invention. Descriptive means include words, structures,
figures, diagrams, and formulas.
The issue of adequacy of written description may arise in assessing whether an original claim
is supported by the specification as filed, or whether a claimed invention is entitled to priority
of an earlier application. More typically, however, it arises in the context of whether a newly
added or amended claim is supported by the specification as filed.
Adequacy of written description is determined on a case-by-case basis and is a question of
fact. A literal description of a species or a numerical range is generally sufficient to support
the species or range. However, the subject matter of the claim need not be literally described
in the specification if the disclosure reasonably conveys to one skilled in the art that the
inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter.
A claim to a genus or a subgenus generally requires sufficient written description of a
representative number of species. In some cases, a claim to a subgenus may be supported by
disclosure of a genus and a species falling within the subgenus. In particular, a disclosure that
describes a species may be found to support a claim to a subgenus or genus if the disclosure
conveys characteristics common to all species. For chemical and biotechnological inventions,
a description of a representative number of species by relevant identifying characteristics
such as structure, or functional characteristics accompanied by a correlation of structure with
function, is required to satisfy the written description requirement for a subgenus or genus.
The “representative number” of species is inversely proportional to the predictability of the
art.
The patent statue prohibits the introduction of new matter into the specification of an
application, and thus adequate written description for the claimed subject matter must be
present in the application as filed.
However, experimental evidence to overcome a rejection of obviousness of a species in
view of prior art disclosing a genus may be submitted after filing. Evidence of unexpected
advantages or superior properties may be submitted by affidavit or declaration. The
evidence must be commensurate in scope with the claimed invention. However, evidence of
unexpected results for a single species within a subgenus, or a portion of a claimed range,
may be sufficient if the skilled artisan could identify a trend or determine a basis to conclude
that other species within the subgenus would exhibit the same results.
If a new utility is asserted as the basis for a selection invention and the particular range or
selection of components is otherwise novel and nonobvious, the utility need not be recited in
the claims. However, if the range or components are otherwise known in the art, it would be
necessary to recite the new utility. If the components are not disclosed in the art but the prior
art provides a different reason to select the claimed species, subgenus, or range, a recitation
of utility (i.e., a method of use claim) would be necessary.
5) Infringement
If a certain advantage or superior results were the reasons for the grant of a patent on a
selection invention, does such advantage or superior result have to be implicitly or explicitly
utilised by a third party for an infringement to be established?
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Assuming the advantage or result is not directly claimed, the answer is no. Under U.S. law,
advantages and/or superior results may be relevant to the obviousness inquiry. However,
once issued, infringement is determined based on the wording of the claims themselves, not
on the results or advantages achieved.
Notwithstanding this general rule, the advantages or results may affect the infringement
determination in two ways. First, if a doctrine of equivalents analysis is applied to the
pertinent element, a court would be unlikely to find an accused product or method to be
within the scope of equivalents if the corresponding element in the accused product or method
does not achieve the stated advantage or result (i.e., it would be considered more than an
“insubstantial difference”). Second, if an issue of claim construction arises as to one or more
term in the pertinent element of the claim, a Court during a Markman Hearing (a hearing
to determine claim scope) will, where rational interpretation permits, strive to construe the
element in a way limited to elements that achieve the alleged advantage or result.
Bald statements of advantages and results in apparatus claims are not given weight in claim
construction under U.S. law. However, a resourceful claim drafter may be able craft an
apparatus claim that directly claims an advantage or result. Similarly, such limitations may be
incorporated into processes or method of use claims. Where a result or advantage is directly
claimed, the accused product or method would need to obtain the result or advantage in
order to infringe.
If a selection invention is claimed as a new use, what are the requirements to establish
infringement? Would a manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use infringe
the patent? Does the intention of an alleged infringer play any role in the determination of
infringement?
If the selection invention is validly claimed as a new use, the use would be required for
infringement. A manufacturer of a product that may be used for the new use would be liable
for infringement, if at all, under the theory of indirect infringement. Indirect infringement first
requires that there be direct infringement by some party. It then takes two forms: contributory
infringement and inducement to infringe.
Contributory infringement liability arises when one “sells within the United States . . . a
component of a patented machine . . . knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2005). .Thus, in
order to prove contributory infringement a patentee must show that an alleged contributory
infringer “knew that the combination for which its components were especially made was
both patented and infringing.” Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054,
1061 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In addition, the patentee must show that the alleged contributory
infringer’s components have no substantial non-infringing uses.
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2005) states, “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.” A finding of inducement requires both an underlying instance
of direct infringement and a requisite showing of intent. However, the Federal Circuit has
not resolved what level of intent is required. See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys.,
Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the
alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his
actions would induce actual infringements.”). But see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Proof of actual intent to cause the acts which
constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.”)
Intention of the accused infringer does not play any role in the determination of infringement.
The intention of the accused infringer is relevant, if at all, only to the amount of damages
awarded if infringement is found. U.S. law permits actual damages for patent infringement
to be increased up to three times in cases where willful infringement is found (to establish
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willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid
patent.)
6) Policy
Groups are asked to give a short commentary as to the policy that lies behind the law on
selection inventions in their jurisdictions, and then to consider whether or not such policy
considerations are still valid today as technology continues to advance.
The policy consideration behind granting patents on selection inventions is ultimately the
same consideration for the granting of all patents, namely, to encourage innovation. If
inventors received no protection for their innovations, the inventor would have little reason
to develop new technologies. Similarly, if inventors of new species of use, products, and
processes developed from an analysis of a known genus were provided no protection, the
impetus for analyzing what is known in the art would be less.
The U.S. policy on patentability of selection inventions reflects a desire to have a single
standard for patentability, regardless of category of invention. Thus, selection inventions are
not specifically denominated as such, and are subject to no specific additional requirements
for patentability. However, the policy of considering the degree of predictability of the
subject matter area as part of the novelty and obviousness inquiries, particularly when taken
in view of KSR, reflects a desire to tie patentability as closely as possible to the real-life
expectations and abilities of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art. U.S. policy in this
area thus strives to achieve a balance between encouraging innovation from within known
areas of technology while avoiding usurping obvious and common-sense selections from the
public domain.
From the infringement standpoint, the primary policy consideration is to have a clear delineation
of claim scope so that patentees and third parties alike can make informed business decisions.
This consideration is borne out by a system that limits the claims to a particular advantage,
result, or use only when such advantage, result or use is explicitly recited in the claim in
limiting fashion. Moreover, for the same reason, U.S. policy avoids introducing a requirement
for intent by the infringer to achieve the particular advantage, result, or use (except in the case
of inducement to infringe which necessarily involves intent of the inducer) as to do so would
introduce limitations beyond the wording of the claims themselves.
The policy considerations above continue to be relevant and valid today.
With Reference to the Examples
7) Novelty
Example 1
Say a prior art document discloses a chemical compound characterised by a specified
structure including a substituent group designated “R”. This substituent “R” is defined so
as to embrace a generic class of broadly-defined functional groups such as all alkyl or
aryl radicals, either unsubstituted or substituted by a halogen and/or a hydroxyl group,
although for practical reasons only a very small number of specific examples are given. The
(later) alleged invention consists of the selection of a particular radical or particular group of
radicals from amongst the generic class, where the selected radical or group of radicals were
not specifically disclosed in the prior-art document. The resulting compounds are described
as having a new, advantageous property, say as adhesives, not possessed by the prior art
examples.
In example 1 would the prior disclosure of the compounds containing the generic class of
radicals anticipate any claim to a specific compound having a particular radical, or group of
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specific compounds having a selection of particular radicals in your jurisdiction?
A prior disclosure of compounds containing a generic class of radicals would not necessarily
anticipate a claim to a specific compound having a particular radical or group of specific
compounds having a selection of particular radicals. In the above examples, since the
substituent embraces a generic class of broadly-defined functional groups, the selected radical
or group of radicals were not specifically disclosed in the generic class, and the resulting
compounds have new, advantageous properties not possessed by the prior art examples, all
of these factors weigh in favor of a finding of no anticipation of the claimed species.
In the analysis, does it matter how wide the prior disclosed generic class of compounds is –
i.e. would the analysis be different if the prior disclosed generic class consisted of 1,000,000
possible compounds (very few of which were specifically disclosed) as opposed to merely,
say, 10?
Yes, the breadth of the prior-disclosed generic class of compounds is relevant to the anticipation
analysis. The greater the number of compounds in the prior-disclosed generic class, the less
likely the claimed species compound will be anticipated by the prior-disclosed generic class
of compounds.
8) Inventive step or non-obviousness
In example 2 would any of the three possibilities constitute an inventive step over the prior
art in your jurisdiction? Further, if, say, scenario (iii) does constitute an inventive step over the
prior art, what scope of protection should the inventor be able to obtain? Should the inventor
be able to obtain protection for the products per se (that happen to have this advantageous
property), or should any patent protection available be limited to the use of the products for
the advantageous property (as an adhesive) not possessed by, and not obvious over the prior
art?
With regard to Scenario (i), the alleged invention would likely be considered obvious
because the disclosure indicates nothing to distinguish the claimed species from the genus.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, despite the fact that the specification does not describe
any new advantageous properties over the compounds specifically disclosed in the prior
art, the inventors could provide evidence in prosecution that the claimed species possesses
unexpected properties to demonstrate that the claimed species is not obvious.
In Scenario (ii), the advantageous properties would be expected by one skilled in the art.
The claimed species would be considered obvious if it is just combining prior art elements
according to known methods to yield predictable results. Thus, the alleged invention would
likely be considered obvious. In this case, assuming that the prior art demonstrates that one
of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to use the claimed species or that the claim
species is predictable, it would be difficult to use unexpected properties to overcome the
obviousness rejection.
In Scenario (iii), there are advantageous properties, and nothing in the prior art would indicate
to a person skilled in the art to select the claimed species for the advantageous property. In
such a case, a finding of non-obviousness may be supported, as the advantageous property
may not be inherent in the prior art, and the results of the combination would not be expected
by one skilled in the art. Evidence to support the unexpected property could be provided in
the original application or provided during prosecution as discussed above.
With regard to protection that may be obtainable, the composition itself may not be
patentable. As noted above, an old composition is not patentable just because of a newly
discovered property or use. However, claims directed toward processes or methods of using
the composition may be patentable, where such processes and methods are directed take
advantage of the unexpected property (i.e., methods using the compound in the same uses as
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disclosed in the prior art would not be patentable, as the compound and the use are already
disclosed). An adhesive comprising the particular species would also be likely patentable.
9) Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
To what extent are all members of the class selected by the patentee required to possess
the requisite advantage in your jurisdiction? Is there an absolute requirement that all of the
selected class possess the relevant advantage, or is the patentee excused if one or two
examples fall short?
As discussed in Q4, evidence of an unexpected advantage for a single species may be
sufficient to support the patentability of a subgenus if there is a basis for the skilled artisan to
conclude that other species would exhibit the same advantage. However, if the scope of the
claims includes a significant number of inoperative embodiments and undue experimentation
would be required to determine the operative embodiments, the claims would be deemed
nonenabled.
10) Infringement
By reference to example 3 to what extent is evidence of the knowledge of the advantageous
property of the selection, or intention of the infringer as to its supply, required to find
infringement in your jurisdiction?
Assuming direct infringement occurs, contributory infringement may be found on the part of
the manufacturer if it is aware that the compound is especially made or especially adapted
for use in an infringement, and the compound is not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use. Intent is not required for contributory
infringement.
Again assuming direct infringement occurs, inducement to infringe may be found on the part
of the manufacturer if intent to infringe can be shown.
11) Policy
Groups are asked to consider, in respect of example 1 / 2, whether it matters how much effort
the inventor has invested in arriving at his selection in order to found a valid selection patent.
The answer to this question is closely related to the policy considerations that underpin the
grant of selection patents and the incentive / reward equation involved. The inventor may
have expended considerable time and money in trawling through the whole host of possible
compounds encompassed by the prior disclosed generic class, and the particular selection
that he has made may constitute a leap-forward in the field. Surely the inventor should be
rewarded for his efforts and obtain protection? On the other hand, it could be argued that
such considerations may have been relevant in an age when the inventor’s efforts actually
involved many man-years of careful and painstaking laboratory work, but are now increasingly
irrelevant in an age of combinatorial synthesis when large varieties of different compounds
can be manufactured in a fraction of the time. Are such considerations relevant?
In general, the manner in which the invention was made is not relevant to patentability. As
set forth in 35 U.S.C. §103, “[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which
the invention was made.” However, evidence of extensive efforts may be relevant to a
determination of nonobviousness, e.g., to show that one of ordinary skill in the art would not
have had a reasonable expectation of success based upon the prior art.
With specific reference to the chemical arts, and examples 1 and 2 above, if the species of
compounds having advantageous properties not possessed by the prior art examples are in
fact non-obvious in view of the disclosure of the genus, there is no policy reason precluding
their patentability. This remains true regardless of the amount of time and resources expended
in uncovering the new species compounds.
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The ultimate policy rationale behind the patent system is to encourage innovation. If an
inventor is denied a patent because the inventor did not engage in many years of careful and
painstaking laboratory work, the entire ethos of the patent system is called into question. The
question of whether a particular product, process, or use is patentable should depend on the
novelty and nonobviousness of the product, process, or use. While the time and resources
spent developing a particular product, process, or use may be a secondary consideration
in assessing patentability (to show what would or would not have been obvious to a skilled
artisan), the policy of encouraging innovation would be undermined by a system that rewarded
patents based primarily (or even in part) on the amount of time and resources spent.
Harmonisation
12) Groups are asked to analyse what should be the harmonised standards for the patentability of
selection inventions. In particular, the items discussed in Q1-Q6 and the examples discussed
in Q7-Q10 above should be referred to.
The patentability of selection inventions should be based upon a single, clear standard of
patentability that is applicable to all inventions. The time and effort needed to identify the
selection should not be a quid pro quo for patentability. The standard for patentability of
selection inventions should, as with all inventions, consider what is actually taught by the
prior art (for example, a limited genus with common properties versus a genus containing an
infinite number of compounds) in light of how the members of that genus would realistically
be understood by a person of ordinary skill in that art.
Infringement of claims to selection inventions should be determined based upon the language
of the claims themselves. Thus, if a specific property or use is claimed, it should be limiting,
and if it is not claimed, it should not be limiting. To do otherwise greatly complicates the
infringement analysis and creates unnecessary cost and uncertainly in the marketplace.
Intent of the infringer to obtain a claimed property or to perform a claimed use should not be
a requirement of proof for infringement. A requirement of intent by the infringer obfuscates the
infringement analysis, adds economic cost and uncertainty, and encourages litigation.
A harmonised standard is needed on the questions of 1) when it is necessary to disclose
advantageous features of a selection invention and 2) when it is necessary to provide
evidence of such advantageous features. The lack of conformity on this point among the
various jurisdictions is harmful to the patent system overall, introduces uncertainty, and invites
unintentional loss of rights.
Summary
U.S. law does not denominate selection inventions as a distinct category of invention. Selection
inventions are considered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and the
United States Federal Courts under the same criteria (statutory subject matter, written description,
enablement, best mode, novelty, and non-obviousness) as any other invention. However, a significant
body of case law has evolved to determine how these criteria are applied to selection inventions.
Most importantly to this topic, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (“KSR“) changed the required analysis for determining obviousness and
made it more difficult to patent selection inventions (and other types of inventions) even where the
prior art does not explicitly teach the advantageous properties of the claimed selection. Because
of the recent nature of the KSR decision, guidance from the Federal Courts on precisely how KSR
affects patentability of selection inventions is limited as of this date.
Novelty and non-obviousness are considered in the context of the degree of predictability of the
subject matter area being claimed. Thus, in general, it is more difficult to obtain a patent to
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a selection invention in a “predictable“ art area (e.g., mechanics, electronics) than in an “unpredictable“
art area (e.g., chemistry, biotechnology).
Unlike many other jurisdictions, the U.S. law does not require evidence of advantageous properties
of a selection invention to be presented in the application as filed. Rather, such evidence is
permitted to be submitted in the form of a declaration after the application is filed. The evidence
may be, for example, test data prepared after the date of filing the application, comparing the
claimed selection or species to a genus or distinct species identified in the prior art by the USPTO
examiner.
In the infringement context, infringement is determined based upon the language of the claims
without a per se limitation to any advantageous property relied upon to distinguish the prior art.
Of course, if the advantageous property or, for example, a new use of a known compound is
recited directly in the claim, then such property or use is a limitation for purposes of determining
infringement. Further, any arguments made or evidence presented to distinguish the prior art may
be relevant to claim construction (determining the proper meaning and scope of the claim) and to
analysis of infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents.
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Summary Report
Question Q209
Selection Inventions – The Inventive Step Requirement,
Other Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection
by Jochen E. BüHLING, Reporter General
Dariusz SZLEPER and Thierry CALAME, Deputy Reporters General
Nicolai LINDGREEN, Nicola DAGG and Shoichi OKUYAMA
Assistants to the Reporter General
Background
The Executive Committee of AIPPI has included on the agenda of the 2009 AIPPI ExCo
Meeting the issue of so-called “selection inventions”. As discussed further in this report, the
selection invention regime essentially allows for patenting of inventions which fall within an
earlier disclosure under certain circumstances. The subsequent selection invention is therefore
usually borne out of an earlier, more generically-defined, disclosure. A selection patent may
involve, for example, the selection of individual elements, sub-sets, or sub-ranges, which have
not been explicitly disclosed previously, within a larger known set or range.
AIPPI previously studied “protection of groups of chemical substances and selection inventions”
under Q81. The resulting summary report indicated that the question of selection inventions
should continue to be studied. Although Q84 entitled “selection inventions” was subsequently
established, no further working guidelines or Group reports were published. Therefore, the
Committee’s view is that the question of selection inventions is a pertinent and relevant issue
in the context of patentability, and an issue which (for reasons which shall be explored later
in this report) requires greater harmonisation across Groups.
As highlighted by the Working Guidelines issued by the Reporter General, selection patents
have traditionally been seen in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries – for example,
a selection patent may involve a claim to a particular group of compounds having certain
advantageous properties, where that group is selected from a prior-disclosed wide class of
compounds, and where that advantageous property is not possessed by the prior-disclosed
wide class of compounds. Furthermore, a new “use” may be considered to fall under the
concept of a selection invention or at least to relate to this concept – for example, a new
use may be found for a known chemical compound or material – and it may potentially be
claimed as a “use” or a method, or as a product intended for such new use.
This report looks at a number of areas where there are significant discrepancies between
countries as to the approach to selection inventions (including the patentability requirements
and the scope of protection available), where there is a need for greater harmonisation,
including proposals as to which areas should be harmonised.
The questions posed to the AIPPI National Groups have been met with a good level of
interest. In total, the Reporter General received 39 reports from the following countries:
Argentina, Australia, Austria; Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia; Italy, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand; Norway, Panama; Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Romania; Russia; Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
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The individual Group reports largely provided clear answers to the working guideline
questions and a majority of them also gave comprehensive and detailed information about
specific rules and case law as to the extent to which selection inventions are permissible. In
this respect, the reports from Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom and the
United States were particularly helpful.
Due to the high number of Group reports, and the differences in the presentation of the
national legal solutions, this summary report cannot be considered as a replacement to the
detailed rules explained by each individual Group or the case law and examples used by the
Groups to illustrate them in practice. Therefore, if particular information is required or specific
legal issues arise, it is advisable to refer to individual Group reports.
Substantive law
The Working Guidelines asked the Groups to summarise the legal position on selection
inventions in their respective jurisdictions, and more specifically, which types of inventions
are recognised as selection inventions.
The first important distinction to make is that certain jurisdictions have special rules or regimes
for selection inventions, whereas other jurisdictions do not recognise the concept of a “selection
invention” at all. In the latter case, no special provisions apply and the normal patentability
criteria will generally be the only relevant criteria, i.e. selection inventions in themselves are
not excluded from patentability, provided they meet the general conditions of patentability.
Significantly, no special rules purportedly apply in the majority of the European Groups.
For example, in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal,
Spain and Turkey, there are no regimes which specifically apply to selection inventions.
Outside Europe, there are a significant number of Groups in which no special regimes exist;
for example, in Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama, and Singapore. In
Paraguay, no selection inventions are patentable except a second use of something known.
Special rules or guidance on selection inventions do apply in a minority of Groups, i.e.
in Australia, Austria, Czech Republic, China, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Philippines,
Romania, Sweden and the UK.
Additionally, in Canada and the US, although selection inventions are not a distinct
category of inventions under the prescribed patent law, such inventions have nevertheless
been recognised in certain cases (typically in the fields of chemistry, pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology).
As regards the technical fields where selection inventions are available, the clear approach in
virtually all Groups is that there are no specific limitations on the types of protectable selection
inventions. For Groups where no special criteria apply in the first place, this approach is
not surprising given that normal patentability criteria do not generally impose limitations on
patentable fields. However, even for those countries where separate “selection invention”
regimes exist, equally, there are no restrictions on the fields in which such inventions are
available.
What is therefore surprising is that, despite the fact that no express restrictions exist, selection
inventions consistently only appear in the chemical, pharmaceutical and material science
fields. For example, in South Africa, even though there is very little case law on selection
inventions and the applicable criteria, the limited case law relates solely to chemically-related
products. In practice, it is virtually impossible to find concrete examples of selection inventions
in different fields. Notably, in New Zealand, although the courts have (in a number of cases)
stated that selection inventions are patentable in the mechanical and electrical fields, there still
remains no specific example of case law in New Zealand which actually affirms this point. The
Australian Group mentioned that patents had been granted in respect of selection inventions
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Novelty
related to optical fibre cables and some other mechanical cases. Therefore, although no such
restrictions exist, the notion that selection inventions may apply in any given field appears to
be largely theoretical with little or even no practical impact.
The US Group attempted to categorize and discuss selection inventions based on claims to
compounds, ranges and new uses. Countries such as Argentina apparently limit the types
of selection inventions to particular conditions for processes and compounds (at least on the
level of examination guidelines), while no statutory limitations exist. The French, Chinese and
Japanese Groups mentioned that selection inventions are possible in the field of mechanical
engineering.
The Working Guidelines asked the Groups to summarise the position on selection inventions as
regards novelty – specifically, whether merely carving a range out of a broad prior disclosure
is sufficient to make a selection invention novel and/or whether a different advantage or use,
or the same advantage with an unpredictable improvement is regarded as novel.
Certain countries such as Argentina, Singapore, and Russia do not require new advantages
or unexpected improvement for novelty purposes, while China, Estonia, and Peru require
some sort of new technical teaching. Ecuador, Mexico, Philippines as well as EPO member
countries follow similar principles to those discussed in the EPO’s guidelines for examination.
With respect to numerical ranges, carving out from a broad range of prior disclosure is
generally not in itself sufficient to make selection novel. This is the case for the vast majority
of countries (including South Africa, Japan, Philippines, Singapore, New Zealand, Australia,
Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, the UK, Belgium, Denmark, Turkey, Canada, the US, Panama and Argentina).
With respect to compounds, the landscape is slightly different. For example, in countries like
the US and Germany, novelty is not found when the compound in question is merely named,
but instead is found if there is sufficient teaching, e.g. it may be possible to establish novelty
by selecting various substituents from a list of specific sites on a generic chemical formula.
The UK Group discussed the Ranbaxy case (2005) and stated that novelty is in part dependent
on the advantage. For the UK Intellectual Property Office, the size of the class from which a
member or members have been chosen is not relevant to the question of novelty of a selection
invention.
As noted above, in certain jurisdictions, considerations for novelty are no different for
selection inventions as compared to any other type of invention, i.e. the selection invention
will only lack novelty if it is anticipated by the prior art. Where special rules for selection
inventions do apply, then in some cases (though not always), there often exists certain guiding
criteria. For example, in Sweden, an invention is novel only if the given sub-range is narrow,
it is sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and from
the end-points of the known range, the selected range is not an arbitrary specimen of the
prior art, and the features of the selection invention should not have been clearly or implicitly
described in the prior art.
Additionally, a common trend amongst Groups is that the larger the class from which the
selection is made (i.e. the prior disclosure), the more likely the selection is to be novel and
possibly non-obvious.
With respect to novelty, many Groups reported that novelty is closely connected to (or at least
considered with) overall patentability – i.e. it is not assessed separately from inventive step or
non-obviousness. In fact, it seems difficult to single out novelty from the overall requirements
of novelty and inventive step because in the case of selection inventions, a single prior art
document is likely to be relevant to both novelty and inventive step requirements.
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Inventive step or non-obviousness
The law on obviousness and inventive step varies from one country to another. At the same
time, the standards for obviousness and inventive step are of the utmost importance and are
day-to-day problems for all those involved in patents. In recent years, common themes seem
to have emerged through many years of harmonization efforts. Detailed discussions on such
issues are clearly beyond the scope of our study on selection inventions.
No Group clearly suggested the existence of inventive step/obviousness criteria designed
specifically for selection inventions.
The Working Guidelines asked the Groups to summarise the position on experimental data
in relation to inventive step. Specifically, the Guidelines asked whether experimental data or
evidence can be submitted after the initial patent filing and whether there exist prerequisites
or limitations on the late submission of data. The approach is somewhat divided across
jurisdictions. For example, data cannot be submitted after the initial filing in South Africa,
Singapore, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Italy, Turkey, and Ecuador. However, the late
submission of data to support inventive step is permitted in other countries (subject to the usual
restrictions on no added matter) e.g. Japan, Korea, Philippines, Australia, Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Canada, the US, and
Argentina.
In those Groups where further evidence can be submitted, sometimes strict criteria exist as to
what evidence is allowed - for example, in the UK, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Japan
and Korea - factual evidence in support of the purported advantage may be added later but
only if the advantage was stated, suggested or foreshadowed in the application as filed.
In Germany, the Patent Office can at any time demand evidence that the purported effect in
the patent application can be achieved.
In contrast to this approach, no prerequisites or limitations exist regarding the late submission
of data in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and the US. Argentina has a 90-day period after the
filing date for supplementing the as-filed specification. Experimental data can be submitted
later, but it cannot form part of the specification.
It is therefore clear that the approach to late submission of data varies considerably across
Groups. It appears that the late submission of data is either not allowed at all, or if it is, then
the qualifying criteria which apply appear to vary significantly from Group to Group.
Sufficiency and/or written description requirements
As the US Group noted, support or written description requirement is a requirement separate
from sufficiency or enablement. Reviewing the submitted Group reports, we note that the
requirement of support or written description has been well developed in limited jurisdictions,
such as Europe, the US, Canada, Korea and Japan.
On this area of sufficiency, the Groups were asked four questions: (1) the threshold for
sufficiency; (2) allowable timing for submission of experimental data; (3) the time frame within
which sufficiency or written description requirements must be satisfied; and (4) the breadth of
claim scope that can be supported by a limited number of examples of asserted or proven
advantages.
As regards, the threshold for sufficiency, generally speaking, a majority of Groups noted
that the same level of written description or support requirement is applicable to a selection
invention, while at the same time, the majority of Groups stressed the importance of disclosing
“advantages” over the prior art primarily because of the need to demonstrate a technical
contribution to the art.
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In relation to the timing for submission of experimental data and the time frame within which
sufficiency or written description requirements must be satisfied the vast majority of countries
use the date of filing or priority date.
Countries such as Switzerland, Canada and the US do not require experimental data for
sufficiency or written description requirements. For example, US law requires descriptions
to show that the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention as of the filing date.
Possession may then be shown by a description of an actual reduction to practice of the
invention or by a description of relevant identifying characteristics of the invention. “Descriptive
means” includes words, structures, figures, diagrams, and formulas.
A number of countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark apparently allow
later submission of experimental data to cure the lack of sufficiency or support when put
in dispute. On the other hand, countries such as Korea and Japan require that the support
requirement has to be satisfied at the time of initial filing and later submitted experimental
data does not cure the deficiency.
The next area explored by the Working Guidelines is whether all members of a selected
class are required to possess the requisite advantage (or whether the patentee is excused
if one or two examples fall short). It is clear that where there is some guidance on this
area of law, there is no requirement that all members of a selected class are required to
possess the requisite advantage. For example, this is the case in Singapore, New Zealand,
Australia, Austria, Estonia, Finland, Netherlands, Romania and Argentina. In these countries,
the general rules of sufficiency and enablement apply, i.e. all that is required is that the
description should be sufficiently clear and complete, and the specification should be clearly
and fairly set out so that a skilled person can carry out the invention (trial or experimentation
is generally permissible). Therefore, provided a skilled person is able to carry out and work
the invention, then it does not matter that one or two examples fall short.
Interestingly, a different approach has been taken in the UK, France, Sweden, Japan,
Korea and Canada. Under UK case law, for example, all members need to possess the
requisite advantage which is alleged to have been identified by the selection. Although strict
compliance with this rule has been doubted in a subsequent decision, the position is that it is
still “good” law because it has not been expressly overruled.
With regards to “new use” selection inventions, Groups were asked whether it would it
suffice to claim a particular range or selection of components associated with the new use
or whether the new use would need to be recited in the claims. It appears that this area is
unclear (or at the very least, has not been explicitly addressed) in a number of jurisdictions.
A number of Groups either reported that there was no case law or did not directly address
these issues. For example, the position in South Africa, Japan, Philippines, Czech Republic,
Norway, Portugal, Turkey, Mexico and Panama is unclear on these points.
As regards the need to expressly recite the “new use” in the claims of the selection patent,
this is not a requirement in the majority of jurisdictions (for example, in Singapore, Austria,
Romania, Spain, the UK, Belgium, Denmark, Japan, Canada and the US). However, a number
of Groups commented that it would be advisable or needed if the protection sought was for
use of that invention. Those Groups which stated that the use would need to be recited include
Korea, Finland, Germany, Italy and Argentina.
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Infringement
The Groups were asked to briefly consider the issue of infringement in relation to new use
selection inventions, namely the requirements to establish infringement and whether the
intention of an alleged infringer plays a role in the determination of infringement.
The Working Guidelines contemplated two different situations in relation to “use”, namely
where the new use is not specifically claimed as well as claims with the new use embodied
within it. In a number of jurisdictions, liability for infringement will be established even if
the alleged infringer uses the product for a use that realizes an advantage or use that is
different from those discussed in the body of the specification and not recited in the claims.
For example, in Estonia, the UK, Spain and Belgium, where the claims merely define a
product without reference to any advantage in the claims, then any person who undertakes
a restricted act with respect to that product will infringe even if the act does not relate to the
advantage of the selection invention.
Other Groups reported that use by the alleged infringer must be for the same purpose as the
advantage – this is the case in Japan, Philippines, Australia, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
In Japan, for example, the new use must be indicated as a use by the manufacturer or seller
for that party to infringe. However, the act of manufacturing or selling the product without
indicating the use is considered to infringe the patent when carried out in the knowledge
that the party to which the product is being supplied is using the product for the new use
(and in this sense, the intention of the alleged infringer plays a role in the determination of
infringement).
The intention of the infringer is not relevant in most Groups – for example, in Korea, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK. However, the approach is
fairly divided across jurisdictions and there is still a significant number of Groups where intent
of the infringer is relevant to some extent in finding liability of the infringer (e.g. Philippines,
New Zealand, Austria, Finland and Spain).
Policy considerations & harmonisation
The Dutch policy behind the law on selection inventions was expressed in The Hague Court
of Appeal relatively recently. One of the conclusions drawn from that decision is that, if one
were to assume that all species within a known disclosure are “publicly available”, then a
specific species with a surprisingly better effect (for example) would not be patentable as the
prior disclosure would be considered novelty-destroying. The consequence of this is that it
does not provide would-be patentees with an incentive to research into further improvements
(within a known prior disclosure) and, furthermore, arguably unjustly rewards patentees with
broad and speculative patent claims. These consequences are clearly not desirable.
This policy view was also noted in the UK Report, where the point made was that the
treatment of selection inventions is needed to properly incentivise R&D. This is especially true
in the chemical and pharmaceutical fields, where the prior, generic disclosure can embrace
thousands or even millions of permutations. Allowing patent protection in sub-sets or subgroups
of an initial range (provided those sub-sets or sub-groups have not been explicitly
disclosed previously) prevents large tracts of compounds from being rendered “inaccessible.”
Therefore, blocking these permutations or sub-groups from further study by denying selection
patents may weigh against the public interest.
Despite these policy considerations, it is interesting to see that a number of Groups (even
in those jurisdictions where selection invention regimes exist) called into question whether
selection inventions should be treated as a separate or special “class” of inventions. For
example, the Australian Group expressed the view that no separate regime should exist and
instead, these type of inventions should be treated in accordance with the normal patentability
criteria for any other type of invention. The Swedish Group was also of the opinion that no
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extra or special regulations should apply to selection inventions. This issue was raised by
the UK Group, who commented that this is a particularly important question to address in
light of the fact that the EPO has tended to reject the idea of a separate “selection invention”
regime.
It seems that a number of those Groups who do have special selection invention regimes
appreciate that there may be a need to reconsider this approach. This is not an entirely
surprising outcome: the current state of play in these countries is that selection inventions are
treated almost as “special” cases and only exist in certain fields (i.e. mainly the pharmaceutical
and chemical fields) rather than in all types of industry.
Further public policy considerations were noted. Some Groups (for example, Romania)
expressed the view that the efforts of the inventor should be rewarded for his attempts to
more fully understand the complexities of an individually selected chemical compound (for
example) and any technical challenges they faced in developing that compound. However,
the view of most Groups appears to be that it should in fact be irrelevant how much effort has
been invested by the inventor to arrive at a selection when determining whether a selection
patent should be granted, and the considerations relevant to the grant of any patent should
depend only on traditional criteria, such as novelty and inventive step.
A number of Groups commented that the general criteria governing patentability of selection
inventions should be harmonised and in particular, the standards for analysing novelty and
inventive step. For example, the Korean Group made the point that there appear to be a
number of cases where selection inventions are denied patent protection on the basis of
novelty, despite the fact that the invention possesses unexpected and remarkable effects (and
would therefore perhaps be afforded patent protection in other Groups). Thus, a clear and
consistent standard seems to be necessary.
.A harmonised standard is needed on the questions of 1) when it is necessary to disclose
advantageous features of a selection invention and 2) when it is necessary to provide
evidence of such advantageous features. The lack of conformity on this point among the
various jurisdictions is harmful to the patent system overall and introduces uncertainty.
Finally, as the US Group pointed out, the intent of the infringer to obtain a claimed property
or to perform a claimed use should probably not be a requirement of proof for infringement.
A requirement of intent by the infringer obfuscates the infringement analysis, adds economic
cost and uncertainty, and encourages litigation
Conclusions
Based on the approaches in the various jurisdictions and the views expressed in the Group
reports, it appears that there are a number of issues which require further consideration. Such
issues include:
• What would be a common definition of “selection invention” for the purpose of our resolution?
Is it possible or necessary? Should mechanical, electrical or electronic inventions be covered?
Should a new use be a category of selection inventions?
• Whether there is a need to provide for a separate selection invention regime given the
need to further incentivise research and development? Is it against the public interest to treat
potential selection inventions in accordance with “normal” patentability criteria? Is there a
need to harmonise this approach, given that (for e.g.) the EPO takes the view that selection
patents should not be subject to a special regime?
• If selection inventions do require additional rules; guidance and/or separate regimes to some
extent (even if it is just by way of clarification on what the rules on novelty and obviousness are),
should these rules or regimes pertain explicitly to only certain fields or areas of technology?
Is there a need for selection inventions outside the chemical and pharmaceutical industries?
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• On novelty, should there be specific and harmonised guidance as to how broad or generic
the prior disclosure needs to be before a selection might be novel?
• Should there be more clear guidance as to how a prior disclosure should be interpreted
beyond the explicit teaching. If a wide class of chemical compounds is defined in the prior
teaching by reference to a formula, should a selection of specific compounds which were not
explicitly named (but fell within the formula) be novel over the prior art, and is it possible for
us to come up with general guidelines?
• Additionally, should there be special or harmonised guidance on what constitutes a “novel”
invention – e.g. as regards a new advantage or use? What degree of improvement over the
prior art is required for the selection to be ‘novel’?
• What should the approach be as to the late filing of evidence or data? Should the filing of
any late data to overcome lack of novelty or inventive step be allowed? Should it be required
that the feature that the data supports has been disclosed in the application as filed?
• We may wish to formulate harmonised standards on such questions as: 1) to what extent
advantageous features should be disclosed at the time of initial filing – do statements alone
suffice or is experimental data required, and 2) when is it permitted to provide evidence
of such advantageous features. Should any special considerations apply in this regard for
selection inventions
• On sufficiency, should the selected class possess the requisite advantage in its entirety, or is
it sufficient that only a majority of the selected class possesses the advantage?
• On infringement, the potential problem which arises is that third parties may infringe a
selection patent in some jurisdictions even where that party is not using the invention for the
purported advantage (as described in the body of the specification but not in the claims).
This is the case whatever the actual intention of the third party. Is this a satisfactory result or
should the purported advantage and/or the intention of the infringer be taken into account in
considering infringement? If the advantage is recited in the claims should the intention of the
third party play any role in the determination of infringement?
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Rapport de synthèse
Question Q209
Les inventions de sélection – L’exigence d’activité inventive,
les autres conditions de brevetabilité et l’étendue de la protection
par Jochen E. BÜHLING, Rapporteur Général
Dariusz SZLEPER et Thierry CALAME, Adjoints du Rapporteur Général
Nicola DAGG, Nicolai LINDGREEN et Shoichi OKUYAMA, Assistants du Rapporteur Général
Contexte
Le Comité Exécutif de l’AIPPI a inscrit la question des inventions dites « de sélection »
au programme du Comité Exécutif de 2009. Comme ce rapport le montrera, le régime
applicable aux inventions de sélection permet essentiellement de breveter, dans certaines
circonstances, des inventions qui appartiennent à un groupe antérieurement divulgué. Une
invention de sélection est donc généralement issue d’une divulgation antérieure définie de
manière plus générique. Un brevet de sélection peut, par exemple, impliquer la sélection
d’éléments individuels de sous-ensembles, ou de sous-classes, qui n’ont pas été expressément
divulgués au sein d’une classe ou d’un ensemble plus large déjà connus.
L’AIPPI a déjà étudié la « protection des groupes de substances chimiques et les inventions
de sélection » dans le cadre de la question Q81. Le rapport de synthèse pour cette question
suggère de poursuivre l‘étude des inventions de sélection. Bien que la question Q84 intitulée
« inventions de sélection » ait été ultérieurement posée, ni orientations de travail ni rapports
nationaux n’ont été publiés à ce sujet. Dès lors, le Comité est d’avis que la question des
inventions de sélection est pertinente, dans le cadre de l’appréciation de la brevetabilité, et
qu’elle requiert une meilleure harmonisation parmi les groupes (pour des raisons qui seront
exposées dans ce rapport).
Comme le soulignent les orientations de travail émises par le Rapporteur général, les brevets
de sélection se rencontrent traditionnellement dans les industries chimiques et pharmaceutiques
― par exemple, un brevet de sélection peut inclure une revendication portant sur un groupe
de composés particuliers dotés de certaines propriétés avantageuses, qui est lui-même
issu d’une large classe de composés déjà divulguée qui ne possède pas ces propriétés
avantageuses. En outre, une nouvelle « utilisation » (ou application) peut être considérée
comme une invention de sélection ou, à tout le moins, être liée à ce concept ― par exemple,
une nouvelle application peut être trouvée pour un composé ou un matériel chimique connu
― et peut être potentiellement revendiquée comme une « utilisation » ou une méthode, ou en
tant que produit destiné à ce nouvel usage.
Ce rapport s’intéresse à un certain nombre de questions relatives aux inventions de sélection
qui donnent lieu à des approches significativement différentes entre les pays (notamment les
conditions de brevetabilité et de champ de protection), et pour lesquelles une harmonisation
est nécessaire. Il inclut des propositions d’harmonisation sur certains points.
Les questions posées aux groupes nationaux de l’AIPPI ont rencontré un bon niveau d’intérêt.
Au total, le Rapporteur général a reçu 39 rapports émis par les groupes des pays suivants :
Argentine, Australie, Autriche; Belgique, Brésil, Canada, Chili, Chine, République Tchèque,
Danemark, Équateur, Estonie, Finlande, France, Allemagne, Hongrie, Indonésie; Italie,
Japon, Corée, Mexique, Pays-Bas, Nouvelle Zélande; Norvège, Panama; Paraguay, Pérou,
Philippines, Portugal, Roumanie; Russie; Singapour, Afrique du Sud, Espagne, Suède, Suisse,
Turquie, Royaume-Uni, et les États-Unis.
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Les rapports nationaux ont, de manière générale, fourni des réponses claires aux questions
posées dans les orientations de travail ; une majorité d’entre eux ont aussi fourni une description
détaillée et compréhensible des règles et de la jurisprudence définissant les conditions dans
lesquelles les inventions de sélection sont permises. À cet égard, les rapports de l’Australie,
de la Belgique, du Danemark, de la Finlande, de l’Allemagne, de l’Italie, du Japon, de la
Corée, des Pays-Bas, de la Nouvelle Zélande, de la Roumanie, de Singapour, de la Suède,
du Royaume-Uni, et des États-Unis ont été particulièrement utiles.
En raison du nombre important de rapports et des différences de présentation des solutions
issues de chaque droit national, ce rapport de synthèse ne peut pas être considéré comme se
substituant aux rappel détaillé des règles applicables contenu dans chaque rapport national
et aux exemples mentionnés par les groupes pour illustrer ces règles de façon pratique. Dès
lors, il est recommandé de se référer aux rapports nationaux pour rechercher une information
spécifique ou une règle de droit particulière.
Droit positif
Les orientations de travail demandaient aux groupes de résumer la position du droit concernant
les inventions de sélection, dans leur pays respectif, et d’indiquer plus précisément quelles
d’inventions sont reconnues comme étant des inventions de sélection.
Selon une première distinction importante, certains pays ont des règles spéciales ou des
régimes particuliers applicables aux inventions de sélection, alors que d’autres pays ne
reconnaissent pas le concept d’ «invention de sélection ». Dans ce dernier cas, aucune
disposition spécifique ne s’applique et les critères de brevetabilité de droit commun sont
généralement considérés comme seuls pertinents : les inventions de sélection ne sont donc
pas exclues de la brevetabilité, à condition qu’elles répondent aux conditions habituelles de
brevetabilité.
Il peut être remarqué qu’aucune règle spéciale ne s’applique dans la majorité des groupes
européens. Ainsi, en Belgique, au Danemark, en Estonie, en Finlande, en Allemagne, en
Italie, en Norvège, au Portugal, en Espagne et en Turquie, il n’existe pas de régime spécifique
pour les inventions de sélection. En dehors de l’Europe, un nombre significatif de groupes
rapportent que les inventions de sélection ne sont pas soumises à un régime spécifique ;
c’est le cas par exemple en Argentine, en Équateur, au Mexique, en Nouvelle-Zélande, au
Panama et à Singapour. Au Paraguay, les inventions de sélection ne sont pas brevetables,
sauf lorsqu’elles portent sur une deuxième application d’un produit déjà connu.
Des règles ou principes spécifiques s’appliquent aux inventions de sélection pour un nombre
minoritaire de groupes, soit l’Australie, l’Autriche, la République Tchèque, la Chine, le Japon,
la Corée, les Pays-Bas, les Philippines, la Roumanie, la Suède et le Royaume-Uni.
En outre, au Canada et aux États-Unis, bien que les inventions de sélection ne soient pas une
catégorie légale distincte d’inventions, elles sont néanmoins distinguées dans certains cas
(typiquement dans le domaine de la chimie, de la pharmacie et des biotechnologies).
S’agissant des domaines techniques pouvant faire l’objet d’inventions de sélection, l’essentiel
des groupes estiment clairement qu’il n’existe pas de limitation spécifique relative au type
d’invention de sélection protégeable. Pour les groupes pour lesquels aucun critère spécifique
ne s’applique de prime abord, cette approche n’est pas surprenante dans la mesure où les
critères de brevetabilité de droit commun n’imposent pas, de manière générale, de limitations
quant aux domaines techniques brevetables. Mais les pays dans lesquels existent des régimes
spécifiques pour les inventions de sélection ne prévoient pas non plus de restriction en ce qui
concerne les domaines où ces inventions sont disponibles.
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De façon surprenante, bien qu’aucune restriction ne soit expressément applicable, les
inventions de sélection n’apparaissent que dans les domaines de la chimie, de la pharmacie
et des sciences des matériaux. Par exemple, en Afrique du Sud, bien qu’il existe très peu de
jurisprudence sur les inventions de sélection et les critères qui leur sont applicables, celle-ci
ne concerne que des produits chimiques. Et il est pratiquement impossible de trouver des
exemples concrets d’inventions de sélection dans d’autres domaines. Ainsi, en Nouvelle-
Zélande, bien que les tribunaux aient (dans un certains nombres de cas) affirmé que les
inventions de sélection sont brevetables dans le domaine de la mécanique et de l’électricité,
il n’existe toujours aucun exemple spécifique de jurisprudence qui le confirme en pratique. Le
groupe australien mentionne que des brevets portant sur des inventions de sélection ont été
délivrés pour des câbles à fibre optique et d’autres produits dans le domaine mécanique. Dès
lors, bien qu’aucune restriction n’existe, le principe qui veut que les inventions de sélection
s’appliquent dans tout domaine donné apparaît comme largement théorique, et n’a que peu
ou aucune incidence pratique.
Le groupe américain a tenté de dresser des catégories et de présenter les inventions de
sélection au regard des revendications portant sur des composés, des plages de valeurs et
de nouvelles utilisations. D’autres pays, comme l’Argentine, limitent apparemment les types
d’inventions de sélection au regard de conditions particulières applicables aux procédés et
aux composés (en tout cas, au stade de l’examen) alors qu’aucune restriction légale n’est
prévue. Les groupes français, chinois et japonais mentionnent que des inventions de sélection
peuvent être protégées dans le domaine de l’ingénierie mécanique.
Nouveauté
Les orientations de travail demandaient aux groupes de résumer leur position sur les inventions
de sélection au regard de la nouveauté ― plus particulièrement, il leur a été demandé si la
sélection d’une plage de valeurs, au sein d’une plage de valeurs plus large et déjà connue,
suffit à caractériser la nouveauté d’une invention de sélection ; et/ou si un avantage ou un
usage différent, ou le même avantage amélioré de façon imprévisible, peut être considéré
comme nouveau.
Certains pays comme l’Argentine, Singapour et la Russie n’exigent pas de nouvel avantage
ou l’amélioration imprévue d’un avantage connu pour que la sélection soit considérée comme
nouvelle ; alors que la Chine, l’Estonie et le Pérou exigent un certain effet technique nouveau.
L’Équateur, le Mexique, les Philippines ainsi que les pays membres de l’OEB suivent les
mêmes principes que ceux qui ressortent des directives relatives à l’examen de l’OEB.
Pour ce qui concerne les plages de valeurs numériques, opérer une sélection au sein d’une
plage de valeurs déjà connue n’est généralement pas considéré en soi comme suffisant pour
que la sélection soit nouvelle. C’est le cas dans une vaste majorité des pays (incluant l’Afrique
du Sud, le Japon, les Philippines, Singapour, la Nouvelle-Zélande, l’Australie, l’Autriche, la
République Tchèque, l’Estonie, la Finlande, l’Allemagne, les Pays-Bas, le Portugal, l’Espagne,
la Suède, le Royaume-Uni, la Belgique, le Danemark, la Turquie, le Canada, les États-Unis
d’Amérique, Panama et l’Argentine).
S’agissant de composés, la situation est légèrement différente. Par exemple, dans des pays
comme les États-Unis et l’Allemagne, la sélection n’est pas considérée comme nouvelle si le
composé en question est seulement nommé ; mais elle est considérée comme nouvelle si les
composés sélectionnés sont suffisamment décrits (la nouveauté peut par exemple résulter de
la sélection de différents substituants, parmi une liste de sites spécifiques, dans une formule
chimique générique).
Le groupe britannique présente l’affaire Ranbaxy (2005) et mentionne que la nouveauté
dépend en partie de l’avantage procuré. Pour le UK Intellectual Property Office, la taille de
la classe dans laquelle un composé ou des composés sont sélectionnés n’est pas pertinente
pour apprécier la nouveauté d’une invention de sélection.
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Comme précédemment indiqué, dans certains pays, l’appréciation de la nouveauté n’est
pas différente pour les inventions de sélection de celle qui est appliquée pour tout autre type
d’inventions : l’invention de sélection ne sera privée de nouveauté que si elle est antériorisée.
Lorsque des règles particulières s’appliquent aux inventions de sélection, dans certains cas
(mais de façon non systématique), il existe certains critères de base. Par exemple, en Suède,
une invention est nouvelle seulement si la plage de valeurs sélectionnée est étroite, si elle
s’éloigne de manière suffisante des exemples divulgués dans l’art antérieur et des bornes de
la plage de valeurs connue, si la sélection n’est pas arbitraire au regard de l’art antérieur
et si les caractéristiques de l’invention de sélection n’étaient pas clairement ou implicitement
divulguées par l’art antérieur.
En outre, selon un trait commun des différents rapports nationaux, plus large est la plage de
valeurs au sein de laquelle la sélection est faite (soit l’art antérieur), plus surement la sélection
est considérée comme nouvelle et, éventuellement, inventive.
De nombreux groupes rapportent que la nouveauté est étroitement liée (ou en tout cas
appréciée en même temps) que les autres critères de brevetabilité (elle n’est pas appréciée
séparément de l’activité inventive). Il semble en effet difficile de distinguer la nouveauté de
l’exigence d’activité inventive dans la mesure où, pour les inventions de sélection, un document
de l’art antérieur est susceptible d’être pertinent pour apprécier aussi bien la nouveauté que
l’activité inventive.
Activité inventive
Les règles sur l’activité inventive varient d’un pays à l’autre. Dans le même temps, les
critères d’appréciation de l’activité inventive sont de la plus haute importance ; ils sont la
préoccupation quotidienne de tous les praticiens, dans le domaine des brevets. Récemment,
des règles communes semblent avoir émergé grâce aux efforts d’harmonisation poursuivis
depuis de nombreuses années, dont la présentation détaillée excède le champ de la présente
étude sur les inventions de sélection.
Aucun groupe n’a clairement suggéré l’existence de critères d’appréciation de l’activité
inventive spécifiques aux inventions de sélection.
Les orientations de travail demandaient aux groupes de résumer la position de leur pays
sur les données expérimentales, en relation avec l’activité inventive. Plus spécialement, les
orientations de travail demandaient si des données expérimentales ou des éléments justificatifs
peuvent être soumis après le dépôt du brevet ; et si la remise tardive de telles données est
soumise à des pré-requis ou des conditions. Les pays ont une approche divisée de cette
question. Par exemple, des données expérimentales ne peuvent pas être soumises après
le dépôt en Afrique du Sud, à Singapour, en Nouvelle-Zélande, en République Tchèque,
en Italie, en Turquie et en Équateur. Mais la remise de telles données après le dépôt, pour
justifier de l’activité inventive, est permise dans d’autres pays (à condition que l’exigence
habituelle de non-extension au-delà de la demande soit respectée). Tel est le cas au Japon,
en Corée, aux Philippines, en Australie, en Estonie, en Finlande, en Allemagne, aux Pays-Bas,
au Portugal, en Roumanie, en Espagne, en Belgique, au Danemark, au Canada, aux États-
Unis et en Argentine.
Dans les rapports nationaux rapportant la possibilité de soumettre des éléments justificatifs
après le dépôt, il arrive que des critères stricts soient posés quant aux éléments justificatifs
susceptibles d’être fournis. Par exemple, au Royaume-Uni, en Belgique, en Espagne, aux
Pays-Bas, au Japon et en Corée, des preuves factuelles démontrant l’avantage revendiqué
peuvent être soumises a postériori seulement si cet avantage était décrit, suggéré ou dévoilé
de manière implicite dans la demande telle que déposée.
En Allemagne, l’Office des brevets peut à tout moment demander que l’effet revendiqué dans
la demande de brevet soit justifié.
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Au contraire de cette approche, ni pré-requis ni condition n’existe, pour fournir des données
expérimentales après le dépôt, au Danemark, en Finlande, en Norvège et aux États-Unis. En
Argentine, la description telle que déposée peut être complétée dans un délai de 90 jours
après le dépôt. Des données expérimentales peuvent être soumises après ce délai, mais elles
ne font alors pas partie de la description.
Dès lors, parmi les différents groupes, l’approche de la remise tardive de données
expérimentales varie de façon considérable. Il apparait que cette remise tardive est soit
interdite soit autorisée et que, si elle est autorisée, les critères pour ce faire sont significativement
différents d’un groupe à l’autre.
Suffisance de description et/ou exigence de description écrite
Comme le groupe américain l’a noté, l’exigence de support ou de description écrite diffère
de l’exigence de suffisance de description ou d’enablement. L’étude des rapports soumis par
les groupes montre que l’exigence de support ou de description écrite s’est bien développée
dans un nombre limité de pays, en Europe, aux États-Unis, au Canada, en Corée et au
Japon.
S’agissant de la suffisance de description, quatre questions ont été posées aux groupes : (1) le
niveau requis de suffisance de description ; (2) le délai dans lequel des données expérimental
peuvent être soumises ; (3) le délai dans lequel les conditions de suffisance de description ou
de description écrite doivent être remplies ; et (4) la protection conférée à une revendication
supportée par un nombre limité d’exemples illustrant des avantages techniques allégués ou
avérés.
Pour ce qui concerne le niveau de suffisance de description requis, de manière générale,
les groupes ont majoritairement noté que le même seuil de description écrite ou de support
est applicable à une invention de sélection, alors que, dans le même temps, les groupes
ont majoritairement souligné l’importance de dévoiler des avantages au regard de l’art
antérieur, essentiellement pour répondre au besoin de démontrer la contribution technique
de l’invention.
S’agissant du délai pour soumettre des données expérimentales et le délai dans lequel
l’exigence de suffisance de description ou de description écrite doit être satisfaite, une vaste
majorité des pays se réfère à la date de dépôt.
Des pays comme la Suisse, le Canada et les États-Unis ne requièrent pas de données
expérimentales pour justifier de la suffisance de description ou de la description écrite. Par
exemple, la loi américaine exige que la description montre que l’inventeur était en possession
de l’invention à la date du dépôt. La possession peut alors être établie par la preuve d’un «
actual reduction to practice » (soit la démonstration que l’invention produit l’effet revendiqué)
ou par la description des caractéristiques distinguant l’invention. “Les « moyens de description
» comprennent les mots, les structures, les figures, les diagrammes et les formules.
Un certain nombre de pays comme l’Allemagne, les Pays Bas et le Danemark autorisent
apparemment la remise ultérieure de données expérimentales pour répondre au moyen
d’insuffisance de description lorsqu’il est invoqué. A l’opposé, des pays comme la Corée et
le Japon exigent que la condition de support soit satisfaite au moment du dépôt : la remise
ultérieure de données expérimentales ne permet pas de rétablir une description suffisante.
La question suivante posée par les orientations de travail est : est-ce que tous les membres
d’une plage sélectionnée doivent posséder l’avantage requis (ou est-ce qu’il suffit pour le
breveté de le justifier pour un ou deux exemples seulement) ? Des indications sont fournies
en la matière, mais il n’existe pas de condition claire selon laquelle tous les membres
d’une classe sélectionnée doivent posséder l’avantage requis. C’est le cas par exemple à
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Singapour, en Nouvelle Zélande en Australie, en Autriche, en Estonie, en Finlande, aux Pays
Bas, en Roumanie et en Argentine. Dans ces pays, la condition générale de suffisance ou
d’enablement s’applique : il est exigé que la description soit suffisamment claire et complète
pour que l’homme du métier puisse réaliser l’invention (des essais ou expérimentations sont
généralement permis). Ainsi, dès lors que l’homme du métier est en mesure de réaliser et
exploiter l’invention, il importe peu qu’un ou deux exemples seulement illustrent l’avantage
technique revendiqué
De façon intéressante, une approche différente a été adoptée au Royaume-Uni, en France, en
Suède, au Japon, en Corée et au Canada. Selon la jurisprudence anglaise, par exemple, tous
les membres d’une classe doivent présenter l’avantage requis, présenté comme caractérisant
la sélection. Bien que l’application stricte de cette règle ait été mise en doute dans une
décision subséquente, il est admis qu’elle demeure d’actualité, dans la mesure où elle n’a pas
été expressément remise en cause.
S’agissant des inventions de sélection portant sur une nouvelle application, il a été demandé
aux groupes s’il suffit de revendiquer une plage particulière ou une sélection de composés
associés à cette nouvelle utilisation ; ou si la nouvelle application doit être mentionnée
dans les revendications. Ce point semble peu clair (ou, en tout cas, il n’a pas été envisagé
expressément) dans un certain nombre de pays. Certains groupes ont rapporté qu’il n’existe
à ce sujet aucune jurisprudence ou n’ont pas étudié cette question. Par exemple, la position
adoptée à ce titre en Afrique du Sud, au Japon, aux Philippines, en République Tchèque, en
Norvège, au Portugal, en Turquie, au Mexique et au Panama est confuse.
La majorité des pays (par exemple Singapour, l’Autriche, la Roumanie, l’Espagne, le Royaume-
Uni, la Belgique, le Danemark, le Japon, le Canada et les États-Unis) n’exige pas que la
nouvelle application soit expressément mentionnée dans les revendications du brevet de
sélection. Cependant, un certain nombre de groupes estiment que cette mention expresse
est recommandée ou nécessaire, si la protection est recherchée pour cette application. Ces
groupes comprennent la Corée, la Finlande, l’Allemagne, l’Italie et l’Argentine.
Contrefaçon
Il a été demandé aux groupes d’étudier brièvement la question de la contrefaçon des inventions
de nouvelle application, soit notamment les conditions pour démontrer la contrefaçon et la
pertinence de l’intention du contrefacteur allégué dans l’appréciation de la contrefaçon.
Les orientations de travail envisageaient deux situations différentes s’agissant de « l’utilisation
», soit le cas dans lequel l’utilisation n’est pas spécifiquement revendiquée et celui dans
lequel la nouvelle utilisation est mentionnée dans les revendications. Dans certains pays,
la responsabilité pour contrefaçon est encourue même si le contrefacteur allégué utilise le
produit de façon avantageuse ou différente au regard de l’utilisation évoquée dans le brevet,
mais non revendiquée. Par exemple, en Estonie, au Royaume Uni, en Espagne et en Belgique,
lorsque les revendications portent sur un produit sans faire référence à l’avantage qu’il
procure, toute personne qui commet un acte prohibé au regard de ce produit est considérée
comme contrefacteur, même si l’acte en cause ne procure pas l’avantage de l’invention de
sélection.
D’autres groupes ont rapporté que l’utilisation par le contrefacteur allégué doit procurer le
même avantage que celui qui est mentionné dans le brevet. C’est le cas notamment au Japon,
aux Philippines, en Australie, en Finlande, en Norvège et en Suède.
Au Japon, par exemple, la nouvelle utilisation doit être préconisée par le fabricant ou le
revendeur pour que ces derniers soient considérés comme contrefacteurs. Cependant,
fabriquer ou vendre le produit, sans indiquer son utilisation, est considéré comme un acte de
contrefaçon du brevet si le fabricant ou le vendeur sait que le tiers à qui il fournit le produit
l’utilise conformément à la nouvelle utilisation (ainsi, l’intention du contrefacteur allégué joue
un rôle dans la détermination de la contrefaçon).
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L’intention du contrefacteur n’est pas pertinente pour la plupart des groupes – par exemple
en Corée, en République Tchèque, en Estonie, aux Pays Bas, en Roumanie, en Suède et au
Royaume Uni. Mais cette question donne lieu à une position assez divisée parmi les pays ;
et un nombre significatif des groupes rapporte que l’intention du contrefacteur est pertinente,
dans une certaine mesure, pour apprécier la responsabilité du contrefacteur (par exemple,
aux Philippines, en Nouvelle Zélande, en Autriche, en Finlande et en Espagne).
Principes et harmonisation
Aux Pays Bas, les principes sous tendant les règles applicables aux inventions de sélection
ressortent d’une décision de la cour d’appel de La Haye rendue assez récemment. Selon
l’une des conclusions qui peuvent être tirées de cette décision, si l’on considérait que tous les
membres d’un groupe déjà connu sont à la disposition du public, un membre spécifique de ce
groupe présentant un effet avantageux et surprenant (par exemple) ne serait pas brevetable,
puisque la divulgation antérieure du groupe le priverait de nouveauté. Une telle approche
priverait les futurs brevetés de la volonté de poursuivre des recherches pour perfectionner
des inventions déjà connues et, en outre, récompenserait injustement les brevetés en leur
accordant des revendications larges et spéculatives. Ces conséquences ne sont évidemment
pas souhaitables.
Cette position de principe ressort aussi du rapport britannique, qui souligne que le sort
réservé aux inventions de sélection doit permettre d’encourager la recherche. Cette acception
est particulièrement vérifiée dans les domaines de la chimie et de la pharmacie, dans lesquels
l’art antérieur peut compter des milliers ou mêmes des millions de permutations possibles.
Permettre de breveter des sous-ensembles ou sous-groupes d’une classe déjà connue (sous
réserve que ces sous-ensembles ou sous-groupes n’ont pas été expressément divulgués) permet
de ne pas rendre « inaccessibles » de larges gisements de composés. Bloquer l’étude de ces
permutations ou sous-groupes en leur déniant une protection comme invention de sélection
pourrait ainsi aller à l’encontre de l’intérêt public.
Malgré ces considérations de principe, il est intéressant de noter qu’un certain nombre de
groupes (même parmi les pays dans lesquels les inventions de sélections bénéficient d’un
régime particulier) se sont interrogés sur l’opportunité de traiter les inventions de sélection
comme une classe séparée d’invention. Par exemple, selon le groupe Australien, ce type
d’invention ne devrait pas bénéficier d’un régime séparé mais être apprécié au regard
des mêmes critères de brevetabilité que toutes les autres inventions. Le groupe suédois est
aussi d’avis que les inventions de sélection ne devraient pas se voir appliquer de règles
complémentaires ou spécifiques. Cette question a été soulevée par le groupe britannique, qui
a indiqué qu’il s’agit d’un point particulièrement important à traiter au regard de la position
de l’OEB tendant à rejeter toute idée de régime spécifique aux inventions de sélection.
Il semble que certains des groupes qui bénéficient d’un régime spécifique aux inventions
de sélection reconnaissent la nécessité de reconsidérer cette approche, ce qui n’est guère
surprenant : actuellement, dans ces pays, les inventions de sélection sont en effet appréciées
au cas par cas et n’existent que dans certains domaines (soit essentiellement les domaines de
la chimie et de la pharmacie) et non dans tous les domaines industriels.
D’autres positions de principe peuvent être notées. Certains groupes (par exemple la Roumanie)
estiment que les efforts de l’inventeur pour tenter de comprendre mieux la complexité d’un
composé chimique particulier (par exemple) et les défis auxquels il a du faire face pour
développer ce composé doivent être récompensés. Cependant, selon l’opinion de la plupart
des groupes, les efforts mis en œuvre par l’inventeur pour mettre en œuvre la sélection ne
doivent pas être pris en compte dans l’appréciation de la brevetabilité de l’invention de
sélection ; seuls les critères habituels, tels que la nouveauté et l’activité inventive, doivent être
pris en compte pour délivrer un brevet.
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Certains groupes sont d’avis que les critères généraux gouvernant la brevetabilité des
inventions de sélection devraient être harmonisés, en particulier les critères d’appréciation de
la nouveauté et de l’activité inventive. Par exemple, le groupe coréen a mentionné que, dans
un certain nombre de cas, une invention de sélection n’est pas considérée comme brevetable,
au motif qu’elle n’est pas nouvelle, alors même qu’elle a des effets remarquables et inattendus
(et pourrait, peut être, être protégée par un brevet dans d’autres groupes). Il semble donc
nécessaire d’appliquer un critère clair et cohérent.
Un critère harmonisé est nécessaire sur les points suivants : 1) quand est-il utile de divulguer
les effets avantageux d’une invention de sélection ? 2) quand est-il nécessaire de fournir
la preuve de tels effets ? L’absence de cohérence des différents pays sur cette question est
préjudiciable au système des brevets dans son ensemble ; et elle est facteur d’incertitude.
Enfin, ainsi que l’a souligné le groupe américain, l’intention du contrefacteur de mettre
en œuvre une propriété ou une utilisation revendiquée ne devrait probablement pas être
un critère d’appréciation de la contrefaçon. Exiger que l’intention du contrefacteur soit
démontrée perturberait l’analyse de la contrefaçon, contribuerait à augmenter le coût des
procès, rendrait leur issue incertaine et encouragerait les litiges.
Conclusions
Au regard de l’approche adoptée dans les différents pays et des avis exprimés dans les rapports
nationaux, il apparait que les questions suivantes requièrent une étude complémentaire :
• Quelle pourrait être la définition commune d’une « invention de sélection » pour les besoins
de notre résolution ? Cette définition est-elle facultative ou nécessaire ? Est-ce qu’elle
doit concerner les inventions dans les domaines de la mécanique, de l’électricité ou de
l’électronique ? Est-ce qu’une nouvelle application doit être considérée comme une invention
de sélection ?
• Est-il besoin de prévoir un régime distinct pour les inventions de sélection, au regard de la
nécessité d’encourager la recherche et le développement ? Est-il contraire à l’intérêt public
d’apprécier les éventuelles inventions de sélection au regard des critères « normaux » de
brevetabilité ? Est-il nécessaire d’harmoniser cette approche, bien que l’OEB (notamment) soit
d’avis de ne pas réserver un sort particulier aux inventions de sélection ?
• Si les inventions de sélection requièrent, dans une certaine mesure, l’application de règles,
orientations et/ou régimes distincts (même pour clarifier l’application des critères de nouveauté
et d’activité inventive), ces règles ou régimes particuliers doivent-ils s’appliquer expressément
à certains domaines techniques seulement ? Les inventions de sélection sont-elles utiles en
dehors des domaines de la chimie et de la pharmacie ?
• S’agissant de la nouveauté, doit-il y avoir des règles spécifiques et harmonisées pour définir
l’ensemble déjà connu (son champ ou son caractère générique) au regard duquel une
sélection pourrait être considérée comme nouvelle ?
• Doit-il y avoir des règles plus précises sur l’interprétation d’un document de l’art antérieur audelà
de son contenu explicite. Si une classe large de composés chimiques est définie dans le
document antérieur par référence à une formule, la sélection de certains composés spécifiques
qui n’étaient pas expressément cités (mais qui entrent dans le champ de la formule) doit-elle
être considérée comme nouvelle au regard de cet art antérieur et, dans l’affirmative, est-il
possible de convenir à ce titre de règles générales ?
• En outre, doit-il exister des règles spécifiques ou harmonisées sur la définition de ce qui peut
être considéré comme une invention « nouvelle », par exemple au regard du nouvel avantage
qu’elle procure ou d’une nouvelle application ? Quel degré de perfectionnement est requis,
au regard de l’art antérieur, pour que l’invention soit « nouvelle » ?
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• Quelle approche doit être adoptée sur la remise de preuves ou de données expérimentales
après le dépôt ? La remise de ces données après le dépôt, pour justifier de la nouveauté ou
de l’activité inventive, doit-elle être autorisée ? La caractéristique que ces données justifient
doit-elle avoir été divulguée dans la demande de brevet telle que déposée ?
• Nous pourrions souhaiter formuler des critères harmonisés sur les points suivants : 1) dans
quelle mesure les effets avantageux de l’invention doivent-ils être divulguées au moment du
dépôt – la présentation de ces effets avantageux suffit-elle ou doivent-ils être justifiés par des
données expérimentales ; 2) quand est-il permis de fournir la preuve de ces effets avantageux
; est-ce que des règles spécifiques doivent être appliquées à ce titre pour les inventions de
sélections ?
• Pour ce qui concerne la suffisance de description, chaque élément de la classe sélectionnée
doit-il posséder l’avantage requis ; ou est-il suffisant qu’une majorité seulement des éléments
de la classe soit dotée de cet avantage ?
• S’agissant de la contrefaçon, pose problème la position adoptée par certains pays, selon
laquelle un tiers peut contrefaire un brevet portent sur une invention de sélection, même s’il
n’utilise pas l’invention pour bénéficier de l’avantage revendiqué (mentionné dans le corps
de la description, non dans les revendications), quelle que soit l’intention du tiers en cause.
Cette approche est-elle acceptable ? Ou l’avantage invoqué et/ou l’intention du contrefacteur
devraient-ils être pris en considération pour apprécier la contrefaçon ? Si l’effet avantageux
est revendiqué, l’intention du tiers doit-elle jouer un rôle quelconque dans l’appréciation de
la contrefaçon ?
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Zusammenfassender Bericht
Frage Q209
Auswahlerfindungen – das Erfordernis der erfinderischen Tätigkeit,
andere Patentierungsvoraussetzungen und Schutzbereich
von Jochen E. BüHLING, Generalberichterstatter
Dariusz SZLEPER und Thierry CALAME, Stellvertreter des Generalberichterstatters
Nicolai LINDGREEN, Nicola DAGG und Shoichi OKUYAMA
Assistenten des Generalberichterstatters
Hintergrund
Der Geschäftsführende Ausschuss der AIPPI hat das Thema der sogenannten
“Auswahlerfindungen” auf die Agenda der AIPPI ExCo-Tagung von 2009 gesetzt. Wie weiter
unten in diesem Bericht dargelegt, erlaubt das Institut der Auswahlerfindung im Grunde
genommen unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen die Patentierung von Erfindungen, die unter
eine frühere Offenbarung fallen. Die spätere Auswahlerfindung basiert daher normalerweise
auf einer früheren mehr generisch definierten Offenbarung. Eine Auswahlerfindung kann
beispielsweise eine Auswahl von zuvor nicht ausdrücklich offenbarten Einzelelementen,
Teilmengen oder Teilbereichen aus einer größeren Menge oder einem größeren Bereich
umfassen.
AIPPI hat schon früher unter Q81 den “Schutz von chemischen Substanzen und
Auswahlerfindungen” untersucht. Der entsprechende zusammenfassende Bericht besagte,
dass die Frage der Auswahlerfindungen weiter untersucht werden sollte. Obwohl in der
Folgezeit Q84 mit dem Titel „Auswahlerfindungen“ eingerichtet worden ist, wurden keine
weiteren Arbeitsrichtlinien oder Gruppenberichte veröffentlicht. Daher ist der Ausschuss
der Ansicht, dass das Thema der Patentfähigkeit von Auswahlerfindungen sachdienlich und
wichtig ist und (aus Gründen, die in diesem Bericht noch näher untersucht werden) eine
größere Harmonisierung unter den Gruppen erfordert.
Wie in den vom Generalberichterstatter herausgegebenen Arbeitsrichtlinien hervorgehoben,
kommen Auswahlpatente traditionell in der chemischen und pharmazeutischen Industrie
vor. Zum Beispiel kann ein Auswahlpatent einen Anspruch auf eine bestimmte Gruppe von
Verbindungen mit bestimmten vorteilhaften Eigenschaften beinhalten, wenn diese Gruppe
aus einer vorher offenbarten breiten Klasse von Verbindungen ausgewählt ist und die vorher
offenbarte breite Klasse von Verbindungen diese vorteilhafte Eigenschaft nicht besitzt. Ferner
kann eine neue „Verwendung“ als unter das Konzept der Auswahlerfindung fallend oder
zumindest mit diesem Konzept in Verbindung stehend angesehen werden – beispielsweise
kann eine neue Verwendung für eine bekannte chemische Verbindung oder ein bekanntes
chemisches Material gefunden werden. Diese kann als „Verwendung“ oder Verfahren oder
als ein für die neue Verwendung bestimmtes Produkt beansprucht werden.
Der vorliegende Bericht befasst sich mit einer Reihe von Bereichen, in denen es signifikante
Unterschiede zwischen Ländern hinsichtlich ihrem Ansatz zu Auswahlerfindungen gibt
(dies schließt die Patentfähigkeitskriterien und den verfügbaren Schutzbereich ein), wo es
einen Bedarf an größerer Harmonisierung gibt, und enthält Vorschläge, welche Bereiche
harmonisiert werden sollten.
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Die den Landesgruppen der AIPPI unterbreiteten Fragen sind auf großes Interesse gestoßen.
Insgesamt sind beim Generalberichterstatter 39 Berichte aus den folgenden Ländern
eingegangen: Argentinien, Australien, Österreich, Belgien, Brasilien, Kanada, Chile, China,
Tschechische Republik, Dänemark, Ecuador, Estland, Finnland, Frankreich, Deutschland,
Ungarn, Indonesien, Italien, Japan, Korea, Mexiko, den Niederlanden, Neuseeland,
Norwegen, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippinen, Portugal, Rumänien, Russland, Singapur,
Südafrika, Spanien, Schweden, Schweiz, Türkei, dem Vereinigten Königreich und den
Vereinigten Staaten.
Die einzelnen Gruppenberichte lieferten weitgehend klare Antworten auf die in den
Arbeitsrichtlinien gestellten Fragen und die meisten enthielten außerdem umfassende und
detaillierte Informationen über die entsprechenden Vorschriften und die Rechtsprechung
hinsichtlich des Umfangs, in dem Auswahlerfindungen zulässig sind. In dieser Hinsicht waren
die Berichte aus Australien, Belgien, Dänemark, Finnland, Deutschland, Italien, Japan, Korea,
den Niederlanden, Neuseeland, Rumänien, Singapur, Schweden, Großbritannien und den
Vereinigten Staaten besonders hilfreich.
Aufgrund der hohen Anzahl der Gruppenberichte und der unterschiedlichen Präsentation
der nationalen rechtlichen Lösungen kann dieser zusammenfassende Bericht nicht als
Ersatz für die von jeder einzelnen Gruppe erläuterten detaillierten Vorschriften oder die zur
praktischen Illustration herangezogene Rechtsprechung und die entsprechenden Beispiele
angesehen werden. Wenn daher spezifische Informationen benötigt werden oder spezifische
Rechtsfragen auftreten, ist es ratsam, die einzelnen Gruppenberichte zu konsultieren.
Materielles Recht
In den Arbeitsrichtlinien wurden die Gruppen gebeten, die Rechtslage zu Auswahlerfindungen
in ihrer jeweiligen Rechtsordnung zusammenzufassen, insbesondere die Arten von Erfindungen,
die als Auswahlerfindungen anerkannt werden.
Der erste wichtige Unterschied besteht darin, dass bestimmte Rechtsordnungen besondere
Vorschriften oder Regelwerke für Auswahlerfindungen haben, während andere
Rechtsordnungen das Konzept der „Auswahlerfindung“ überhaupt nicht anerkennen. Im
letzteren Fall gelten keine besonderen Vorschriften und die normalen Patentierbarkeitskriterien
sind im Allgemeinen die einzig relevanten Kriterien, d.h. Auswahlerfindungen als solche sind
nicht von der Patentierbarkeit ausgeschlossen, solange sie die allgemeinen Bedingungen für
die Patentierbarkeit erfüllen.
Bezeichnenderweise gelten, wie berichtet, in der Mehrzahl der europäischen Gruppen
keine speziellen Regeln. Beispielsweise gibt es in Belgien, Dänemark, Estland, Finnland,
Deutschland, Italien, Norwegen, Portugal, Spanien und der Türkei keine ausdrücklich
für Auswahlerfindungen geltenden Regelwerke. Außerhalb Europas gibt es eine nicht
unerhebliche Anzahl von Gruppen, bei denen keine speziellen Regelwerke existieren;
beispielsweise in Argentinien, Ecuador, Mexiko, Neuseeland, Panama und Singapur. In
Paraguay sind Auswahlerfindungen nicht patentierbar, außer als „second use“, d.h. einer
neuen Verwendung von etwas Bekanntem.
Spezielle Regeln oder Leitlinien zu Auswahlerfindungen gelten in einer Minderheit von
Gruppen, namentlich in Australien, Österreich, der Tschechischen Republik, China, Japan,
Korea, den Niederlanden, auf den Philippinen, in Rumänien, Schweden sowie im Vereinigten
Königreich.
Auch in Kanada und den Vereinigten Staaten, obwohl dort Auswahlerfindungen keine
eigene Kategorie von Erfindungen unter dem geltenden Patentrecht darstellen, sind solche
Erfindungen jedoch in bestimmten Fällen anerkannt worden (normalerweise im Bereich der
Chemie, der Pharmazie und der Biotechnologie).
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Hinsichtlich der technischen Anwendungsgebiete, in denen Auswahlerfindungen verfügbar
sind, ist der klare Ansatz bei nahezu allen Gruppen, dass es keine speziellen Einschränkungen
bezüglich der Art der schutzfähigen Auswahlerfindungen gibt. Bei Gruppen, in denen von
vornherein keine besonderen Kriterien gelten, ist dieser Ansatz nicht überraschend, da die
normalen Patentierbarkeitskriterien im Allgemeinen keine Beschränkungen hinsichtlich der
patentierbaren Bereiche enthalten. Jedoch selbst für diejenigen Länder, in denen spezielle
Regelwerke zu „Auswahlerfindungen“ existieren, gibt es ebenfalls keine Beschränkungen
hinsichtlich der Bereiche, in denen solche Erfindungen verfügbar sind.
Es ist daher überraschend, dass, obwohl es keine ausdrücklichen Einschränkungen gibt,
Auswahlerfindungen regelmäßig nur auf den Gebieten der Chemie, Pharmazie und
Werkstoffkunde erscheinen. Beispielsweise bezieht sich in Südafrika, obwohl es nur wenig
Rechtsprechung zu Auswahlerfindungen und den geltenden Kriterien dafür gibt, die beschränkte
Rechtsprechung ausschließlich auf chemiebezogene Produkte. In der Praxis ist es nahezu
unmöglich, konkrete Beispiele für Auswahlerfindungen auf anderen Gebieten zu finden.
Namentlich in Neuseeland, obwohl die Gerichte (in einer Anzahl von Fällen) dort erklärten,
dass Auswahlerfindungen in den Bereichen Mechanik und Elektrizität patentierbar sind, gibt
es kein spezifisches Beispiel für Rechtsprechung in Neuseeland, das diesen Punkt tatsächlich
bestätigen würde. Die australische Gruppe erwähnte, dass Patente für Auswahlerfindungen
betreffend Glasfaserkabel und einige andere mechanische Fälle erteilt worden sind. Obwohl
es daher keine Einschränkungen gibt, scheint die Vorstellung, dass Auswahlerfindungen auf
jedem beliebigem Gebiet möglich sind, weitgehend theoretisch zu sein, und nur wenig oder
keine praktischen Auswirkungen zu haben.
Die US-Gruppe hat versucht, Auswahlerfindungen auf der Grundlage von Ansprüchen für
Verbindungen, Bereiche und neue Verwendungen zu kategorisieren und zu diskutieren. Länder
wie Argentinien scheinen die Arten von Auswahlerfindungen auf bestimmte Bedingungen
für Verfahren und Verbindungen zu beschränken (wenigstens was die Prüfungsrichtlinien
angeht), wobei es keine gesetzlichen Beschränkungen gibt. Die französische, chinesische und
japanische Gruppe erwähnten, dass Auswahlerfindungen auf dem Gebiet des Maschinenbaus
möglich sind.
Neuheit
In den Arbeitsrichtlinien wurden die Gruppen gebeten, die Haltung hinsichtlich Neuheit bei
Auswahlerfindungen zusammenzufassen – insbesondere, ob lediglich das Herausmeisseln
eines Bereichs aus einer breiten Offenbarung im Stand der Technik ausreichend ist, um die
Neuheit einer Auswahlerfindung zu begründen, und/oder ob ein anderer Vorteil oder eine
andere Verwendung, oder der gleiche Vorteil, allerdings verbunden mit einer unvorhersehbaren
Verbesserung, als neu angesehen wird.
Einige Länder, beispielsweise Argentinien, Singapur und Russland verlangen keine neuen
Vorteile oder unerwartete Verbesserungen, um die Neuheit zu begründen, während China,
Estland und Peru eine Art von neuer technischer Lehre verlangen. Ecuador, Mexiko, die
Philippinen sowie die EPO-Mitgliedsstaaten folgen ähnlichen Prinzipien wie die in den
Richtlinien für die Prüfung im Europäischen Patentamt diskutierten.
Bezüglich Zahlenbereichen ist ein Ausschnitt aus einem breiteren Bereich einer früheren
Offenbarung als solches im Allgemeinen nicht ausreichend, um einer Auswahl Neuheit zu
verleihen. Dies gilt für die große Mehrheit der Länder (einschließlich Südafrika, Japan, die
Philippinen, Singapur, Neuseeland, Australien, Österreich, der Tschechischen Republik,
Estland, Finnland, Deutschland, der Niederlande, Portugal, Spanien, Schweden, des
Vereinigten Königreichs, Belgien, Dänemark, der Türkei, Kanada, der Vereinigten Staaten,
Panama und Argentinien).
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Hinsichtlich Verbindungen sieht die Situation etwas anders aus. In Ländern wie z.B. den
USA und Deutschland wird Neuheit nicht anerkannt, wenn die fragliche Verbindung
lediglich erwähnt wird. Neuheit wird jedoch angenommen, wenn eine ausreichende Lehre
vorliegt, d.h. die Neuheit kann möglicherweise dadurch begründet werden, dass bei einer
generischen chemischen Formel verschiedene Substituenten aus einer Liste von spezifischen
Orten ausgewählt werden.
Die Gruppe des Vereinigten Königreichs diskutierte den Ranbaxy-Fall (2005) und erklärte,
dass die Neuheit teilweise vom Vorteil abhänge. Für das Patentamt des Vereinigten Königreichs
ist die Größe der Klasse, aus der ein oder mehrere Mitglieder ausgewählt worden sind, für
die Frage der Neuheit einer Auswahlerfindung nicht relevant.
Wie oben erwähnt, unterscheiden sich in bestimmten Rechtsordnungen die Erwägungen
hinsichtlich Neuheit bei Auswahlerfindungen nicht von denen bei anderen Arten von
Erfindungen, d.h. eine Auswahlerfindung ist nur dann nicht neu, wenn sie vom Stand der
Technik vorweggenommen wurde. Wo spezifische Vorschriften für Auswahlerfindungen
gelten, existieren manchmal (aber keinesfalls immer) oft bestimmte Leitkriterien. Beispielsweise
ist in Schweden eine Erfindung nur dann neu, wenn der gegebene Teilbereich eng ist, von im
Stand der Technik offenbarten spezifischen Beispielen und von den Endpunkten des bekannten
Bereichs genügend Abstand hat und der ausgewählte Bereich keinen willkürlichen Ausschnitt
aus dem Stand der Technik darstellt.Außerdem sollten die Merkmale der Auswahlerfindung
nicht eindeutig oder implizit im Stand der Technik beschrieben worden sein.
Zusätzlich ist es allgemeiner Trend bei den Gruppen, dass je größer die Klasse ist, aus der
die Auswahl getroffen wurde (d.h. die frühere Offenbarung), desto wahrscheinlicher ist es,
dass die Auswahl neu und möglicherweise nicht naheliegend ist.
In Bezug auf Neuheit haben viele Gruppen berichtet, dass diese eng verknüpft ist (oder
wenigstens geprüft wird) mit Patentfähigkeit insgesamt – d.h. sie wird nicht separat von
der Erfindungshöhe betrachtet. Tatsächlich scheint es schwierig, Neuheit separat von den
Gesamtanforderungen an Neuheit und Erfindungshöhe zu betrachten, da es im Fall von
Auswahlerfindungen wahrscheinlich ist, dass ein einzelnes Dokument des Standes der Technik
sowohl für Neuheit als auch für Erfindungshöhe relevant ist.
Erfindungshöhe bzw. Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit
Das Recht zur Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit bzw. Erfindungshöhe unterscheidet sich von Land
zu Land. Gleichzeitig sind die Anforderungen an Offensichtlichkeit und Erfindungshöhe
von äußerster Wichtigkeit und stellen alltägliche Probleme für alle diejenigen dar, die mit
Patenten zu tun haben. In den letzten Jahren scheinen sich aufgrund von langjährigen
Harmonisierungsbemühungen gemeinsame Themen entwickelt zu haben. Eine detaillierte
Diskussion solcher Themen würde eindeutig den Rahmen unserer Untersuchung zu
Auswahlerfindungen sprengen.
Keine Gruppe berichtete eindeutig das Vorhandensein von speziell für Auswahlerfindungen
entwickelten Kriterien zu Erfindungshöhe/Naheliegen.
In den Arbeitsrichtlinien wurden die Gruppen gebeten, die Position zu experimentellen
Daten in Verbindung mit Erfindungshöhe zusammenzufassen. Insbesondere wurde in den
Arbeitsrichtlinien die Frage gestellt, ob experimentelle Daten oder Beweismittel auch nach der
ursprünglichen Patentanmeldung eingereicht werden können und ob es Bedingungen oder
Beschränkungen für das nachträgliche Einreichen von Daten gibt. Der Ansatz unterscheidet
sich etwas in den verschiedenen Rechtsordnungen. Zum Beispiel ist es in Südafrika, Singapur,
Neuseeland, der Tschechischen Republik, Italien, der Türkei und Ecuador nicht möglich, nach
Einreichung der Patentanmeldung Daten nachzureichen. In anderen Ländern ist es dagegen
zulässig, Daten nachzureichen, um die Erfindungshöhe nachzuweisen (wobei die üblichen
Beschränkungen hinsichtlich der Einführung von neuem Material anwendbar sind), z.B.
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in Japan, Korea, auf den Philippinen, in Australien, Estland, Finnland, Deutschland, den
Niederlanden, Portugal, Rumänien, Spanien, Belgien, Dänemark, Kanada, den USA und
Argentinien.
Bei den Gruppen, in denen weitere Beweise eingereicht werden können, existieren manchmal
strenge Kriterien bezüglich der erlaubten Beweismittel – z.B. im Vereinigten Königreich, in
Belgien, Spanien, den Niederlanden, Japan und Korea.Es können Beweise für das Vorliegen
des angeblichen Vorteils nachgereicht werden, jedoch nur wenn dieser Vorteil in der
ursprünglichen Patentanmeldung erwähnt, nahegelegt oder angedeutet worden ist.
In Deutschland kann das Patentamt jederzeit einen Nachweis dafür verlangen, dass die in
der Patentanmeldung berichtete Wirkung tatsächlich erzielt werden kann.
Im Gegensatz zu diesem Ansatz existieren in Dänemark, Finnland, Norwegen und den USA
keine Voraussetzungen oder zeitliche Beschränkungen für das Nachreichen von Daten. In
Argentinien gibt es eine 90tägige Frist ab Anmeldung zur Ergänzung der eingereichten
Beschreibung. Experimentelle Daten können nachgereicht werden, aber nicht Teil der
Beschreibung bilden.
Es ist demnach klar, dass sich der Ansatz zur Nachreichung von Daten zwischen den Gruppen
deutlich unterscheidet. Es scheint, als sei die Nachreichung von Daten entweder überhaupt
nicht erlaubt, oder, falls doch, dass die dafür geltenden Zulassungskriterien sich von Gruppe
zu Gruppe deutlich unterscheiden.
Anforderungen an vollständige Offenbarung und/oder schriftliche
Beschreibung
Offenbarung bzw. der schriftlichen Beschreibung eine andere Anforderung als die der
vollständigen Offenbarung oder Befähigung. Bei Durchsicht der eingereichten Gruppenberichte
stellten wir fest, dass die Anforderungen an Unterstützung bzw. schriftliche Beschreibung in
bestimmten Rechtsordnungen, wie z.B. Europa, den USA, Kanada, Korea und Japan, weit
entwickelt sind.
Zu diesem Bereich der vollständigen Offenbarung wurden den Gruppen vier Fragen
vorgelegt: (1) die Schwelle für Vollständigkeit, (2) die zulässige Zeitvorgabe für die Einreichung
von experimentellen Daten, (3) der Zeitrahmen, innerhalb dessen die Anforderungen an
Vollständigkeit oder schriftliche Beschreibung erfüllt sein müssen, und (4) die Breite des
Anspruchsumfangs, die durch eine begrenzte Anzahl an Beispielen für behauptete oder
bewiesene Vorteile gestützt werden kann.
Allgemein lässt sich bezüglich der Schwelle für Vollständigkeit sagen, dass eine Mehrzahl
der Gruppen anmerkte, dass für eine Auswahlerfindung die Anforderungen an schriftliche
Beschreibung bzw. Rückhalt das gleiche Niveau hatten, während gleichzeitig die Mehrzahl
der Gruppen die Wichtigkeit der Offenbarung von „Vorteilen“ gegenüber dem Stand der
Technik betonte, in erster Linie aufgrund der Notwendigkeit, einen technischen Beitrag zum
Fachgebiet zu belegen.
Hinsichtlich der Zeitvorgabe für die Einreichung von experimentellen Daten und des
Zeitrahmens, innerhalb dessen die Anforderungen an Vollständigkeit bzw. schriftliche
Beschreibung erfüllt sein müssen, gilt in der großen Mehrheit der Länder der Anmelde- oder
Prioritätstag.
Länder wie die Schweiz, Kanada und die USA verlangen keine experimentellen Daten, um
die Anforderungen an vollständige Offenbarung oder schriftliche Beschreibung zu erfüllen.
Beispielsweise verlangt das US-Recht Beschreibungen, die zeigen, dass der Erfinder zum
Anmeldetag im Besitz der beanspruchten Erfindung war. Der Besitz kann dann durch die
Beschreibung einer praktischen Verwirklichung der Erfindung oder durch die Beschreibung
von relevanten Identifizierungsmerkmalen der Erfindung nachgewiesen werden. Die
„beschreibenden Mittel“ umfassen Worte, Strukturen, Zahlen, Zeichnungen, Diagramme und
Formeln.
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Eine Anzahl von Ländern, wie z.B. Deutschland, die Niederlande und Dänemark, scheint
die Nachreichung von experimentellen Daten zu erlauben, um im Streitfall einen Mangel an
vollständiger Offenbarung oder Unterstützung zu heilen. Andererseits verlangen Länder wie
Korea und Japan, dass die Anforderungen an die vollständige Offenbarung zum Zeitpunkt
der ursprünglichen Anmeldung erfüllt sein müssen; nachgereichte experimentelle Daten
können den Mangel nicht heilen.
Der nächste von den Arbeitsrichtlinien erkundete Bereich ist die Frage, ob alle Mitglieder einer
offenbarten Klasse den erforderlichen Vorteil aufweisen müssen (oder ob der Patentanmelder
entschuldigt ist, falls ein oder zwei Beispiele dahinter zurückbleiben). Es ist klar, dass wo es
Richtlinien zu diesem Rechtsgebiet gibt, es nicht gefordert wird, dass alle Mitglieder einer
ausgewählten Klasse den erforderlichen Vorteil aufweisen müssen. Beispielsweise gilt das
in Singapur, Neuseeland, Australien, Österreich, Estland, Finnland, den Niederlanden,
Rumänien und Argentinien. In diesen Ländern gelten die allgemeinen Regeln für vollständige
Offenbarung und Befähigung zur Umsetzung, d.h. es wird lediglich gefordert, dass die
Beschreibung ausreichend klar und vollständig ist, und dass die Beschreibung so eindeutig
und klar dargelegt wird, dass ein Fachmann die Erfindung ausführen kann (Tests und
Experimente sind im Allgemeinen zulässig). Sofern der Fachmann die Erfindung ausführen
und praktizieren kann, ist es daher nicht von Belang, wenn ein oder zwei Beispiele dahinter
zurückbleiben.
Interessanterweise wurde im Vereinigten Königreich, Frankreich, Schweden, Japan, Korea
und Kanada ein anderer Ansatz gewählt. Beispielsweise müssen gemäß der Rechtsprechung
im Vereinigten Königreich alle Mitglieder den erforderlichen Vorteil, der angeblich durch
die Auswahl identifiziert worden ist, aufweisen. Obwohl in einer späteren Entscheidung die
strikte Einhaltung dieser Regel in Frage gestellt worden ist, ist die Haltung, dass diese immer
noch „geltendes“ Recht ist, da die Entscheidung nicht ausdrücklich aufgehoben worden ist.
Mit Bezug auf Auswahlerfindungen mit einer „neuen Verwendung“ wurden die Gruppen
gefragt, ob es ausreichend wäre, einen bestimmten Bereich oder eine Auswahl von
Verbindungen, die mit der neuen Verwendung zusammenhängen, zu beanspruchen, oder ob
die neue Verwendung in den Ansprüchen aufgeführt sein muss. Dieser Bereich scheint in einer
Reihe von Rechtsordnungen unklar (oder wenigstens nicht ausdrücklich angesprochen worden)
zu sein. Eine Reihe von Gruppen haben entweder berichtet, dass es keine diesbezügliche
Rechtsprechung gebe oder sie haben diese Themen nicht direkt angesprochen. Die Haltung
zu diesen Punkten ist beispielsweise in Südafrika, Japan, den Philippinen, der Tschechischen
Republik, Norwegen, Portugal, der Türkei, Mexiko und Panama nicht klar.
Hinsichtlich der Notwendigkeit, die “neue Verwendung” in den Ansprüchen der
Auswahlerfindung ausdrücklich zu erwähnen, gilt, dass dies in der Mehrzahl der
Rechtsordnungen nicht gefordert wird (z.B. in Singapur, Österreich, Rumänien, Spanien, dem
Vereinigten Königreich, Belgien, Dänemark, Japan, Kanada und den USA). Eine Reihe von
Gruppen bemerkten jedoch, dass dies ratsam oder notwendig wäre, wenn Schutz für die
Verwendung der Erfindung beantragt werden solle. Zu den Gruppen, die aussagten, dass
diese Verwendung aufgeführt werden müsse, gehören Korea, Finnland, Deutschland, Italien
und Argentinien.
Patentverletzung
Die Gruppen wurden gebeten, kurz auf das Thema der Verletzung von Auswahlerfindungen,
bei denen eine neue Verwendung beansprucht wird, einzugehen: Welche Anforderungen
müssen erfüllt sein, um eine Verletzung zu begründen? Spielt bei der Feststellung der
Verletzung die Absicht eines angeblichen Verletzers eine Rolle?
Die Arbeitsrichtlinien zogen zwei verschiedene Situationen bezüglich der “Verwendung” in
Erwägung, nämlich zum einen wo die neue Verwendung nicht ausdrücklich beansprucht wird
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und zum anderen wo die Ansprüche die neue Verwendung ausdrücklich enthalten. In einer
Reihe von Rechtsordnungen wird die Haftung für eine Verletzung auch dann festgestellt, wenn
der angebliche Verletzer das Produkt für einen Zweck verwendet, der einen Vorteil oder eine
Verwendung realisiert, der bzw. die sich von den in der Beschreibung diskutierten Vorteilen
bzw. Verwendungen unterscheidet und in den Ansprüchen nicht erwähnt wird. Beispielsweise
in Estland, dem Vereinigten Königreich, Spanien und Belgien, wo die Ansprüche lediglich das
Produkt ohne Hinweis auf einen Vorteil definieren, verletzt eine Person, die eine hinsichtlich
dieses Produkts geschützte Handlung vornimmt, das Patent, selbst wenn diese Handlung nicht
mit dem Vorteil der Auswahlerfindung zusammenhängt.
Andere Gruppen berichteten, dass die Verwendung durch den angeblichen Verletzer den
selben Zweck verfolgen muss wie der Vorteil – dies ist der Fall in Japan, auf den Philippinen,
in Australien, Finnland, Norwegen und Schweden.
Beispielsweise muss in Japan der Hersteller oder Verkäufer die neue Verwendung nennen,
damit diese Partei als Verletzer angesehen wird. Jedoch wird der Akt des Herstellens oder
Verkaufens des Produkts auch ohne Nennung der Verwendung als Verletzung des Patents
angesehen, wenn er in dem Wissen ausgeführt wird, dass die Partei, an die das Produkt
geliefert wird, das Produkt für die neue Verwendung verwendet (und in diesem Sinne spielt
die Absicht des angeblichen Verletzers eine Rolle bei der Feststellung der Verletzung).
In den meisten Gruppen ist die Absicht des Verletzers nicht relevant – beispielsweise in Korea,
der Tschechischen Republik, Estland, den Niederlanden, Rumänien, Schweden und dem
Vereinigten Königreich. Jedoch ist der Ansatz unter den Rechtsordnungen ziemlich gespalten
und es gibt immer noch eine bedeutende Anzahl von Gruppen, in denen die Absicht des
Verletzers teilweise relevant dafür ist, dass der Verletzer haftbar gemacht wird (z.B. auf den
Philippinen, in Neuseeland, Österreich, Finnland und Spanien).
Politische Erwägungen & Harmonisierung
Der politische Linie der Niederlande hinter dem Gesetz zu Auswahlerfindungen wurde erst
kürzlich von dem Den Haager Berufungsgericht Ausdruck verliehen. Eine der Schlussfolgerungen,
die aus dieser Entscheidung gezogen wurde, besteht darin, dass, wenn man annimmt, dass alle
Spezies innerhalb einer bekannten Offenbarung „öffentlich zugänglich“ sind, eine besondere
Spezies mit einer überraschend besseren Wirkung (beispielsweise) nicht patentierbar wäre,
da die vorherige Offenba-rung als neuheitsschädlich betrachtet würde. Die Folge davon ist,
dass es potentielle Patentinhaber nicht dazu motiviert, weitere Verbesserungen (innerhalb einer
bekannten vorherigen Offenbarung) zu erforschen, und außerdem, wohl ungerechterweise,
Patentinhaber mit breiten und spekulativen Patentansprüchen belohnt. Diese Folgen sind
eindeutig nicht erwünscht.
Diese politische Ansicht wurde auch in dem Bericht des Vereinigten Königreichs vertreten,
wo das Argument vorgetragen wurde, dass die Berücksichtigung von Auswahlerfindungen
erforderlich sei, um den rechten Anreiz für Forschung & Entwicklung zu schaffen. Dies gelte
insbesondere in der Chemie und der Pharmazie, wo die vorherige generische Offenbarung
Tausende und sogar Millionen von Permutationen umfassen kann. Patentschutz für Teilmengen
oder Untergruppen eines ursprünglichen Bereichs zuzulassen (vorausgesetzt, diese
Teilmengen oder Untergruppen sind nicht zuvor ausdrücklich offenbart worden), verhindert,
dass große Bereiche von Verbindungen vom Patentschutz ausgeschlossen sind. Daher kann
es dem öffentlichen Interesse widersprechen, die Untersuchung dieser Permutationen oder
Untergruppen dadurch zu blockieren, dass Auswahlerfindungen verweigert werden.
Trotz dieser politischen Erwägungen ist es interessant zu sehen, dass eine Anzahl von
Gruppen (selbst in Rechtsordnungen, in denen es Regelwerke zu Auswahlerfindungen
gibt) in Frage stellen, dass Auswahlerfindungen als separate oder besondere „Klasse“ von
Erfindungen behandelt werden sollten. Beispielsweise meinte die australische Gruppe, dass
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es kein separates Regelwerk geben sollte und stattdessen diese Art von Erfindungen gemäß
den für alle anderen Arten von Erfindungen geltenden normalen Patentierbarkeitskriterien
behandelt werden sollten. Die schwedische Gruppe war ebenfalls der Ansicht, dass es für
Auswahlerfindungen keine besonderen Regelungen geben sollte. Diese Frage wurde von
der Gruppe des Vereinigten Königreichs aufgeworfen, die anmerkte, dass dies angesichts
der Tatsache, dass das EPA dazu tendiert hat, die Idee eines gesonderten Regelwerks für
„Auswahlerfindungen“ zu verwerfen, eine besonders wichtige Frage sei.
Es sieht so aus, als ob ein Teil der Gruppen, die gesonderte Regelwerke zu Auswahlerfindungen
haben, verstehen, dass diese Haltung möglicherweise neu überdacht werden sollte. Dies
ist nicht allzu überraschend: der aktuelle Stand der Dinge in diesen Ländern ist, dass
Auswahlerfindungen fast als „Sonderfälle“ angesehen werden und nur auf bestimmten
Gebieten existieren (d.h. hauptsächlich auf dem Gebiet der Pharmazie und dem Gebiet der
Chemie) und nicht in sämtlichen industriellen Feldern.
Es wurden weitere politische Erwägungen erwähnt. Einige Gruppen (beispielsweise Rumänien)
waren der Meinung, dass die Mühen des Erfinders für seine Versuche, (beispielsweise) die
Komplexität einer chemischen Einzelverbindung zu verstehen, sowie für die technischen
Herausforderungen, die bei der Entwicklung der Verbindung zu bestehen sind, belohnt
werden sollten. Jedoch scheinen die meisten Gruppen der Ansicht zu sein, dass es bei der
Beurteilung der Patentfähigkeit einer Auswahlerfindung eigentlich irrelevant sein sollte, wie
viel an Mühen der Erfinder investiert hat, um eine Auswahl zu finden, und dass die für die
Patenterteilung relevanten Erwägungen ausschließlich von den traditionellen Kriterien wie
Neuheit und Erfindungshöhe abhängen sollten.
Eine Reihe von Gruppen bemerkte, dass die allgemeinen Kriterien für die Patentierbarkeit
von Auswahlerfindungen harmonisiert werden sollten, insbesondere die Anforderungen
an Neuheit und Erfindungshöhe. Beispielsweise wies die koreanische Gruppe darauf hin,
dass scheinbar in einer Reihe von Fällen Auswahlerfindungen der Patentschutz aufgrund
mangelnder Neuheit versagt worden war, obwohl die Erfindung unerwartete und beachtliche
Wirkungen besaß (und daher in anderen Gruppen Patentschutz erlangt hätte). Daher scheinen
eindeutige und einheitliche Anforderungen notwendig zu sein.
Ein harmonisierter Standard wird benötigt bezüglich der Fragen zu 1), zu welchem Zeitpunkt
die vorteilhaften Eigenschaften einer Auswahlerfindung offenbart sein müssen, und zu
2), zu welchem Zeitpunkt Beweise für das Vorliegen dieser vorteilhaften Eigenschaften
eingereicht sein müssen. Der Mangel an Konformität in diesem Punkt in den verschiedenen
Rechtsordnungen schadet dem gesamten Patentsystem und führt zu Verunsicherung.
Schließlich, wie die US-Gruppe betonte, sollte die Absicht des Verletzers, eine beanspruchte
Eigenschaft zu erhalten oder eine beanspruchte Verwendung durchzuführen, wohl nicht zur
Bedingung für das Vorliegen einer Verletzung gemacht werden. Die Bedingung, dass bei
dem Verletzer Absicht vorliegen muss, erschwere die Verletzungsanalyse, führe zu höheren
Kosten und mehr Ungewissheit und zu mehr Gerichtsverfahren.
Schlussfolgerungen
Aufgrund der Ansätze in den verschiedenen Rechtsordnungen und den in den Gruppenberichten
ausgedrückten Meinungen scheint es eine Reihe von Fragen zu geben, die näher geprüft
werden müssen. Dazu gehört:
• Was wäre eine einheitliche Definition der “Auswahlerfindung” für die Zwecke unserer
Entschließung? Ist eine solche möglich oder erforderlich? Sollten mechanische, elektrische
oder elektronische Erfindungen umfasst sein? Sollte eine neue Verwendung eine Kategorie
der Auswahlerfindungen darstellen?
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• Ist es, angesichts des Erfordernisses weitere Anreize für Forschung und Entwicklung zu
schaffen, überhaupt nötig, ein eigenes Regelwerk für Auswahlerfindungen zu haben? Ist
es gegen das öffentliche Interesse, potentielle Auswahlerfindungen gemäß „normalen“
Patentierbarkeitskriterien zu behandeln? Ist es notwendig, diesen Ansatz zu harmonisieren, da
doch (z.B.) das EPA der Ansicht ist, dass Auswahlerfindungen keinem gesonderten Regelwerk
unterliegen sollten?
• Falls für Auswahlerfindungen teilweise zusätzliche Vorschriften, Leitlinien und/oder separate
Regelwerke notwendig sein sollten (selbst wenn es sich nur darum handelt, klarzustellen,
welches die Regeln für Neuheit und Erfindungshöhe sind), sollten sich diese Vorschriften oder
Regelwerke ausdrücklich nur auf bestimmte technologische Felder oder Gebiete beziehen?
Werden Auswahlerfindungen außerhalb der chemischen und pharmazeutischen Industrie
gebraucht?
• Hinsichtlich Neuheit: Sollte es spezifische und harmonisierte Leitlinien dazu geben, wie breit
oder generisch die Vorveröffentlichung sein muss, bevor eine Auswahl neu sein kann?
• Sollte es klarere Leitlinien bezüglich der Frage geben, wie eine Vorveröffentlichung über
die explizite Lehre hinaus interpretiert werden sollte. Falls in der Vorveröffentlichung eine
breite Klasse von chemischen Verbindungen mit Bezug auf eine Formel definiert ist, sollte
eine Auswahl spezifischer Verbindungen, die nicht ausdrücklich erwähnt worden sind (aber
unter die Formel fällt) gegenüber dem Stand der Technik neu sein, und ist es uns möglich,
allgemeine Leitlinien dafür zu erstellen?
• Sollte es außerdem gesonderte oder harmonisierte Leitlinien dazu geben, was eine “neue”
Erfindung ausmacht – z.B. bezüglich eines neuen Vorteils oder einer neuen Verwendung?
Welcher Grad an Verbesserung gegenüber dem Stand der Technik ist erforderlich, damit die
Auswahl ‚neu’ ist?
• Was sollte der Ansatz bezüglich der Nachreichung von Beweismitteln oder Daten sein? Sollte
es erlaubt sein, nachträglich Daten einzureichen, um den Einwand mangelnder Neuheit oder
Erfindungshöhe entkräften zu können? Sollte es vorgeschrieben werden, dass die Eigenschaft,
die von den Daten gestützt wird, in der ursprünglichen Anmeldung offenbart worden sein
muss?
• Möglicherweise wollen wir harmonisierte Standards formulieren zu Fragen wie: 1) in
welchem Maß sollten vorteilhafte Eigenschaften zum Zeitpunkt der ursprünglichen Anmeldung
offenbart sein – reichen dabei entsprechende Aussagen aus oder sollten experimentelle Daten
vorgeschrieben sein, und 2) zu welchem Zeitpunkt dürfen Beweismittel für solche vorteilhaften
Eigenschaften eingereicht werden. Sollten hier spezielle Erwägungen für Auswahlerfindungen
gelten?
• Hinsichtlich vollständiger Offenbarung: Sollte die ausgewählte Klasse den erforderlichen
Vorteil vollständig aufweisen oder reicht es aus, wenn nur eine Mehrheit der ausgewählten
Klasse diesen Vorteil aufweist?
• Hinsichtlich Verletzung: Hier gibt es potentiell das Problem, dass in einigen Rechtsordnungen
Dritte ein Auswahlpatent verletzen können, selbst wenn diese die Erfindung nicht wegen
des behaupteten Vorteils benutzen (wie in der Beschreibung, nicht aber in den Ansprüchen
beschrieben). Dies ist der Fall unabhängig von der tatsächlichen Absicht des Dritten. Ist
dieses Ergebnis zufriedenstellend oder sollte der behauptete Vorteil und/oder die Absicht
des Verletzers bei der Feststellung der Verletzung berücksichtigt werden? Wenn der Vorteil
in den Ansprüchen aufgeführt ist, sollte die Absicht des Dritten eine Rolle bei der Feststellung
der Verletzung spielen?
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Resolution
Question Q209
Selection inventions – the inventive step requirement, other
patentability criteria and scope of protection
AIPPI
Noting that:
1) Some jurisdictions have special rules or regimes for selection inventions, whereas other
jurisdictions apply usual patentability criteria.
2) The substantive requirements for patentability for selection inventions are similar in a broad
sense in the majority of jurisdictions, irrespective of whether or not there are special rules or
regimes.
3) Although there are in general no specific limitations on the types of protectable selection
inventions, in practice selection inventions appear, with few exceptions, only in the chemical,
pharmaceutical or material science fields.
4) There is a considerable discrepancy among various jurisdictions as to the approach of
requirements for novelty, inventive step or non-obviousness and scope of protection with
regard to selection inventions.
5) AIPPI Q81 considered “protection of groups of chemical substances and selection inventions”
without passing a resolution on the subject.
Considering that:
1) The general concept of selection inventions is well established and is broadly recognised in
most jurisdictions.
2) Protection of selection inventions promote further research and development of new
technology.
3) There is a need for harmonisation of the rules and application of law regarding selection
inventions in particular with respect to requirements for patentability and any restrictions on the
submission of experimental data or other evidence after the initial filing of an application.
4) The question of late submission of data with regard to selection inventions necessarily raises
a broader question of rules or policies governing late submission of data in other contexts.
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Resolves that:
1) It should be possible to obtain a patent for an invention, that is a selection from a previous
disclosure.
2) Selection inventions should be patentable in all technical fields.
3) Usual patentability criteria should apply to selection inventions.
4) In order to be novel a selection invention must not be disclosed as a species and enabled
in the prior art. A different property or advantage, or a similar advantage of unpredictable
extent, should not be required to establish novelty.
5) In order to be inventive, a selection invention should display unexpected or surprising
properties not apparent from the previous disclosure from which it is selected in view of other
prior art.
6) Substantially the whole of the claimed selection must display such unexpected or surprising
properties.
7) For the purpose of achieving a clear and objective distinction of a selection invention over
prior art, guidelines may be a helpful instrument for examiners and applicants.
8) It is recommended that an assessment of novelty takes into account:
- how broad or generic the prior disclosure is,
- how narrowly the selection invention is defined,
- how far removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art the selection
invention is,
- whether the features of the selection invention have been explicitly or implicitly described
in the prior art.
9) If the applicant relies upon unexpected or surprising properties to support inventive step, then
such unexpected or surprising properties must be derivable from the application as filed.
10) The principles applying to the further submission of factual evidence should apply equally to
selection inventions (including evidence of experiments in support of such unexpected and
surprising properties).
11) It should not be a requirement for finding infringement of a selection invention that any
unclaimed unexpected or surprising properties be utilised by the alleged infringer.
12) The intent of a third party to use a selection invention should not be relevant for finding
infringement.
13) Because the question of late submission of data in the context of selection inventions raises a
broader question of late submission of data in other contexts, it is recommended that AIPPI
further study this broader question.
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Résolution
Question Q209
Les inventions de sélection – le critère d’activité inventive, d’autres
conditions de brevetabilité et l’étendue de la protection
L’AIPPI
Observant que:
1) certains pays ont des règles ou des régimes spéciaux pour les inventions de sélection, alors
que d’autres appliquent les critères de brevetabilité de droit commun;
2) les conditions de fond de brevetabilité des inventions de sélection sont, généralement,
similaires dans la majorité des pays, que ceux-ci soient dotés ou pas de règles ou régimes
spéciaux;
3) bien que les inventions de sélections protégeables ne soient pas limitées à des domaines
particuliers, il apparaît, en pratique, que les inventions de sélection appartiennent à
quelques exceptions près, aux domaines de la chimie, de la pharmacie ou de la science des
matériaux,;
4) l’approche des différents pays s’agissant des conditions de nouveauté, d’activité inventive ou
de non-évidence, et de la portée des inventions de sélection varie de façon considérable;
5) l’AIPPI a précédemment tenté d’étudier “la protection des groupes de substances chimiques
et des inventions de sélection” sous la question Q81, sans toutefois adopter une résolution à
ce sujet;
Considérant que:
1) le concept général d’inventions de sélection est bien établi et largement reconnu dans la
plupart des pays;
2) la protection des inventions de sélection encourage la recherche et le développement de
nouvelles technologies;
3) s’agissant des inventions de sélection, il existe un besoin d’harmonisation des règles et de
l’application du droit, notamment des conditions de brevetabilité et des restrictions liées à la
nécessité de soumettre des données ou preuves expérimentales après le dépôt initial de la
demande;
4) la question du dépôt tardif de résultats d’essais se rattache nécessairement à celle, plus large,
des règles régissant le dépôt tardif de résultats d’essais dans d’autres contextes;
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Adopte la résolution suivante:
1) il devrait être possible d’obtenir un brevet pour une invention constituant une sélection au
regard d’une divulgation antérieure;
2) les inventions de sélection devraient être brevetables dans tous les domaines techniques;
3) les conditions de brevetabilité de droit commun devraient s’appliquer aux inventions de
sélection;
4) pour être nouvelle, une invention de sélection ne doit pas être divulguée comme une espèce
et de façon suffisante dans l’état de la technique. Une propriété différente, un avantage
particulier, ou un avantage similaire mais inattendu ne devraient pas être requis pour établir
la nouveauté;
5) pour relever de l’activité inventive, une invention de sélection devrait présenter des propriétés
inattendues et surprenantes qui ne sont pas apparentes de la divulgation antérieure dont la
sélection est issue au vu d’un autre élément de l’état de la technique antérieur;
6) la sélection doit présenter essentiellement dans sa totalité de telles propriétés inattendues et
surprenantes;
7) dans le but de parvenir à une distinction claire et objective d’une invention de sélection
au regard de l’état de la technique, des directives peuvent être un instrument utile pour les
examinateurs et les déposants;
8) il est recommandé que l’appréciation de la nouveauté prenne en compte:
- l’étendue ou le caractère générique de la divulgation antérieure,
- la définition plus ou moins étroite de l’invention de sélection,
- l’éloignement de l’invention de sélection des exemples spécifiques divulgués dans l’état
de la technique,
- si les caractéristiques de l’invention de sélection ont été décrites de façon explicite ou
implicite dans l’état de la technique,
9) si le déposant invoque des propriétés inattendues et surprenantes pour justifier de l’activité
inventive, ces propriétés inattendues ou surprenantes doivent résulter de la demande telle que
déposée;
10) les principes applicables au dépôt tardif de preuves factuelles devraient s’appliquer aux
inventions de sélection (y compris la preuve d’essais à l’appui de telles propriétés inattendues
et surprenantes);
11) il ne devrait pas être exigé, pour que la contrefaçon d’une invention de sélection soit constituée,
que le contrefacteur allégué utilise effectivement ces propriétés inattendues et surprenantes;
12) l’intention d’un tiers d’utiliser une invention de sélection ne devrait pas être prise en compte
pour apprécier la contrefaçon;
13) la question du dépôt tardif de rapports d’essais, dans le contexte des inventions de sélection,
soulève la question plus large du dépôt tardif de rapports d’essais dans d’autres contextes; il
est recommandé à l’AIPPI d’étudier cette question.
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Entschließung
Frage Q209
Auswahlerfindungen – das Erfordernis der erfinderischen Tätigkeit,
andere Patentierungsvoraussetzungen und Schutzbereich
AIPPI
Bemerkt, dass
1) einige Rechtssysteme gesonderte Vorschriften oder Regelungen für Auswahlerfindungen
haben, wohingegen andere Rechtssysteme die allgemeinen Patentierungsvoraussetzungen
anwenden;
2) die materiell- rechtlichen Voraussetzungen für die Patentfähigkeit von Auswahlerfindungen in
der Mehrzahl der Rechtssysteme im weiteren Sinne ähnlich sind, unabhängig davon, ob es
gesonderte Vorschriften oder Regelungen gibt oder nicht;
3) sich, obwohl grundsätzlich keine besondere Beschränkung auf bestimmte Arten schutzfähiger
Auswahlerfindungen besteht, solche Auswahlerfindungen in der Praxis, von wenigen
Ausnahmen abgesehen, nur im Bereich der Chemie, pharmazeutischer Produkte und der
Werkstoffkunde zeigen;
4) es eine deutliche Diskrepanz zwischen den einzelnen Rechtssystemen hinsichtlich der an
die Neuheit, die erfinderische Tätigkeit und den Schutzumfang von Auswahlerfindungen zu
stellenden Erfordernisse gibt;
5) AIPPI Q81 bereits „den Schutz chemischer Stoffgruppen und Auswahlerfindungen” untersucht
hat, ohne jedoch eine Resolution hierzu zu verabschieden.
Unter Berücksichtigung, dass
1) das grundsätzliche Institut der Auswahlerfindungen in den meisten Rechtssystemen etabliert
und allgemein anerkannt ist;
2) der Schutz von Auswahlerfindungen die Forschung und Entwicklung neuer Technologien
fördert;
3) es ein Bedürfnis für die Harmonisierung der Regelungen und der Rechtsanwendung betreffend
Auswahlerfindungen gibt, insbesondere hinsichtlich der Voraussetzungen der Patentierbarkeit
und von Einschränkungen bei der Einreichung von Versuchsunterlagen und Nachweisen nach
Einreichung der Patentanmeldung;
4) die Frage der verspäteten Einreichung von Unterlagen im Zusammenhang mit
Auswahlerfindungen notwendigerweise die darüber hinaus gehende Frage nach Regelungen
oder Richtlinien aufwirft, die auf die verspätete Einreichungen von Unterlagen in anderem
Zusammenhang Anwendung finden.
660
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Verabschiedet die folgende Entschließung:
1) Es sollte möglich sein, ein Patent für eine Erfindung zu erhalten, die eine Auswahl aus einer
früheren Offenbarung darstellt.
2) Eine Auswahlerfindung sollte in allen technischen Bereichen patentierbar sein.
3) Die üblichen Patentierungsvoraussetzungen sollten für Auswahlerfindungen Anwendung
finden.
4) Um neu zu sein, darf eine Auswahlerfindung im Stand der Technik nicht als Gattung offenbart
oder ausgeführt sein.. Eine davon abweichende Eigenschaft oder ein davon abweichender
Vorteil oder ein ähnlicher Vorteil von nicht vorhersehbarem Ausmaß sollte für die Neuheit
nicht erforderlich sein;
5) Um als erfinderisch angesehen zu werden, sollte die Auswahlerfindung unerwartete oder
überraschende Eigenschaften aufweisenl, die sich in Anbetracht des Standes der Technik
nicht aus der früheren Offenbarung, aus der die Auswahl vorgenommen wurde, in nahe
liegender Weise ergibt.
6) Im wesentlichen die Gesamtheit der beanspruchten Auswahl muss solche unerwarteten oder
überraschenden Eigenschaften aufweisen.
7) Richtlinien für Prüfer und Anmelder wären hilfreich, um eine eindeutige und objektive
Abgrenzung einer Auswahlerfindung vom Stand der Technik zu erreichen;
8) Es wird empfohlen, dass die Bewertung der Neuheit folgende Punkte berücksichtigt:
- wie weit oder allgemein die frühere Offenbarung ist,
- wie eng die Auswahlerfindung definiert ist,
- wie weit die Auswahlerfindung von einem bestimmten, im Stand der Technik offenbarten
Beispiel entfernt ist,
- ob die Merkmale der Auswahlerfindung ausdrücklich oder implizit im Stand der Technik
beschrieben sind;
9) Falls der Anmelder die erfinderische Tätigkeit auf unerwartete oder überraschende
Eigenschaften stützt, müssen diese unerwarteten oder überraschenden Eigenschaften bereits
aus der eingereichten Patentanmeldung ableitbar sein.
10) Die Grundsätze, die auf die Vorlage weiterer Beweismittel Anwendung finden, sollten
gleichfalls auf Auswahlerfindungen Anwendung finden (dies betrifft auch Beweismittel zu
Experimenten, um unerwartete oder überraschende Eigenschaften zu bestätigen);
11) Es sollte keine Voraussetzung für die Annahme einer Verletzung einer Auswahlerfindung
sein, dass die unerwarteten oder überraschenden Eigenschaften durch den vermeintlichen
Verletzer genutzt werden.
12) Die Absicht eines Dritten, die Auswahlerfindung zu nutzen, sollte für die Frage einer
Patentverletzung nicht relevant seinl;
13) Weil die Frage der verspäteten Einreichung von Unterlagen im Zusammenhang mit
Auswahlerfindungen die darüber hinaus gehende Frage der verspäteten Vorlage von
Unterlagen in anderem Zusammenhang aufwirft, wird empfohlen, dass AIPPI diese
weitergehende Frage näher untersucht.
661
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662
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Table of contents
Meeting of the Executive Committee (Buenos Aires,11 – 14 October 2009)
I. The Questions on the Agenda.............................................................. 5
II.
Q194: The Impact of Co-ownership of Intellectual Property Rights
on their Exploitation............................................................................... 9
Working Guidelines................................................................................. 11
Group Reports:
Argentina......................................................................................................... 22
Austria............................................................................................................. 26
Belgium........................................................................................................... 31
Brazil.............................................................................................................. 45
Canada........................................................................................................... 51
Chile............................................................................................................... 56
Czech Republic................................................................................................. 60
Denmark.......................................................................................................... 64
Ecuador........................................................................................................... 70
Egypt............................................................................................................... 73
Estonia............................................................................................................ 77
Finland............................................................................................................ 81
France............................................................................................................. 87
Germany......................................................................................................... 112
Greece............................................................................................................ 140
Hungary.......................................................................................................... 143
Indonesia......................................................................................................... 149
Israel............................................................................................................... 155
Italy................................................................................................................. 160
Japan.............................................................................................................. 162
Malaysia......................................................................................................... 169
Mexico............................................................................................................ 173
Netherlands..................................................................................................... 178
New Zealand................................................................................................... 185
Norway........................................................................................................... 190
Panama........................................................................................................... 196
Paraguay......................................................................................................... 201
Peru................................................................................................................ 204
Philippines ....................................................................................................... 208
Portugal........................................................................................................... 213
Republic of Korea............................................................................................. 218
Romania.......................................................................................................... 222
Russia.............................................................................................................. 228
Singapore........................................................................................................ 232
663
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Spain.............................................................................................................. 235
Sweden........................................................................................................... 243
Switzerland...................................................................................................... 251
Thailand.......................................................................................................... 259
Turkey.............................................................................................................. 264
United Kingdom................................................................................................ 272
United States of America................................................................................... 282
Summary Report....................................................................................... 293
Resolution.................................................................................................. 316
664
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III. Q209: Selection Inventions – the Inventive Step Requirement,
other Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protection........................... 9
Working Guidelines................................................................................. 329
Group Reports:
Argentina......................................................................................................... 347
Australia.......................................................................................................... 353
Austria............................................................................................................. 365
Belgium........................................................................................................... 370
Brazil.............................................................................................................. 378
Canada........................................................................................................... 384
Chile............................................................................................................... 393
China.............................................................................................................. 398
Czech Republic................................................................................................. 409
Denmark.......................................................................................................... 414
Ecuador........................................................................................................... 421
Estonia............................................................................................................ 426
Finland............................................................................................................ 431
France............................................................................................................. 437
Germany......................................................................................................... 447
Hungary.......................................................................................................... 465
Indonesia......................................................................................................... 471
Italy................................................................................................................. 477
Japan.............................................................................................................. 482
Mexico............................................................................................................ 489
Netherlands..................................................................................................... 493
New Zealand................................................................................................... 500
Norway........................................................................................................... 508
Panama........................................................................................................... 514
Paraguay......................................................................................................... 521
Peru................................................................................................................ 525
Philippines ....................................................................................................... 528
Portugal........................................................................................................... 532
Republic of Korea............................................................................................. 537
Romania.......................................................................................................... 542
Russia.............................................................................................................. 551
Singapore........................................................................................................ 556
South Africa..................................................................................................... 564
Spain.............................................................................................................. 570
Sweden........................................................................................................... 579
Switzerland...................................................................................................... 587
Turkey.............................................................................................................. 597
United Kingdom................................................................................................ 603
United States of America................................................................................... 616
665
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Summary Report....................................................................................... 630
Resolution.................................................................................................. 656
666
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Table des matières
Réunion du Comité exécutif (Buenos Aires, 11 – 14 Octobre 2009)
I. Les questions à l’ordre du jour............................................................ 5
II. Q194: L’infl uence de la copropriété des Droits de Propriété
Intellectuelle sur leur Exploitation..................................... 9
Orientation de travail............................................................................ 14
Rapports des Groupes:
Allemagne....................................................................................................... 112
Argentine......................................................................................................... 22
Autriche........................................................................................................... 26
Belgique.......................................................................................................... 31
Brésil............................................................................................................... 45
Canada........................................................................................................... 51
Chili................................................................................................................ 56
Danemark........................................................................................................ 64
Egypte............................................................................................................. 73
Equateur.......................................................................................................... 70
Espagne.......................................................................................................... 235
Estonie............................................................................................................. 77
Etats-Unis d’Amérique........................................................................................ 282
Finlande.......................................................................................................... 81
France............................................................................................................. 87
Grèce.............................................................................................................. 140
Hongrie........................................................................................................... 143
Indonésie......................................................................................................... 149
Israël............................................................................................................... 155
Italie................................................................................................................ 160
Japon.............................................................................................................. 162
Malaisie.......................................................................................................... 169
Mexique.......................................................................................................... 173
Norvège.......................................................................................................... 190
Nouvelle-Zélande.............................................................................................. 178
Panama........................................................................................................... 196
Paraguay......................................................................................................... 201
Pays-Bas.......................................................................................................... 178
Pérou............................................................................................................... 204
Philippines ....................................................................................................... 208
Portugal........................................................................................................... 213
République de Corée......................................................................................... 218
République-Tchèque........................................................................................... 60
Romania.......................................................................................................... 222
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Royaume-Uni.................................................................................................... 272
Russie.............................................................................................................. 228
Singapour........................................................................................................ 232
Suède.............................................................................................................. 243
Suisse.............................................................................................................. 251
Thaïlande........................................................................................................ 259
Turquie............................................................................................................ 264
Rapport de synthèse............................................................................... 300
Résolution.................................................................................................. 319
668
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III. Q209: Les Inventions de sélection – le critère d’activité inventive,
autres conditions de brevetabilité et étendue de la protection 9
Orientation de travail............................................................................ 335
Rapports des Groupes:
Afrique du Sud................................................................................................. 564
Allemagne....................................................................................................... 447
Argentine......................................................................................................... 347
Autriche........................................................................................................... 365
Australie.......................................................................................................... 353
Belgique.......................................................................................................... 370
Brésil............................................................................................................... 378
Canada........................................................................................................... 384
Chili................................................................................................................ 393
Chine.............................................................................................................. 398
Danemark........................................................................................................ 414
Equateur.......................................................................................................... 421
Espagne.......................................................................................................... 570
Estonie............................................................................................................. 426
Etats-Unis d’Amérique........................................................................................ 616
Finlande.......................................................................................................... 431
France............................................................................................................. 437
Hongrie........................................................................................................... 465
Indonésie......................................................................................................... 471
Italie................................................................................................................ 477
Japon.............................................................................................................. 482
Mexique.......................................................................................................... 489
Norvège.......................................................................................................... 508
Nouvelle-Zélande.............................................................................................. 500
Panama........................................................................................................... 514
Paraguay......................................................................................................... 521
Pays-Bas.......................................................................................................... 493
Pérou............................................................................................................... 525
Philippines ....................................................................................................... 528
Portugal........................................................................................................... 532
République de Corée......................................................................................... 537
République-Tchèque........................................................................................... 409
Romania.......................................................................................................... 542
Royaume-Uni.................................................................................................... 603
Russie.............................................................................................................. 551
Singapour........................................................................................................ 556
Suède.............................................................................................................. 579
Suisse.............................................................................................................. 587
Turquie............................................................................................................ 597
669
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Rapport de synthèse............................................................................... 638
Résolution.................................................................................................. 658
670
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Inhaltsverzeichnis
Zusammenkunft des Geschäftsführenden Ausschusses
(Buenos Aires, 11. – 14. Oktober 2009)
I. Die Fragen der Tagesordnung.............................................................. 5
II. Q194: Der Einfl uss der Mitinhaberschaft an Rechten des
Geistigen Eigentums auf deren Verwertung.................................... 9
Arbeitsrichtlinien..................................................................................... 27
Gruppenberichte:
Ägypten........................................................................................................... 73
Argentinien...................................................................................................... 22
Belgien............................................................................................................ 31
Brasilien........................................................................................................... 45
Chile............................................................................................................... 56
Dänemark........................................................................................................ 64
Deutschland..................................................................................................... 125
Ecuador........................................................................................................... 70
Estland............................................................................................................ 77
Finland............................................................................................................ 81
Frankreich........................................................................................................ 87
Griechenland................................................................................................... 140
Indonesien....................................................................................................... 149
Israel............................................................................................................... 155
Italien.............................................................................................................. 160
Japan.............................................................................................................. 162
Kanada........................................................................................................... 51
Malaysia......................................................................................................... 169
Mexiko............................................................................................................ 173
Neuseeland..................................................................................................... 185
Niederlande..................................................................................................... 178
Norwegen....................................................................................................... 190
Österreich........................................................................................................ 26
Panama........................................................................................................... 196
Paraguay......................................................................................................... 201
Peru................................................................................................................ 204
Philippinen....................................................................................................... 208
Portugal........................................................................................................... 213
Republik Korea................................................................................................. 218
Rumänien......................................................................................................... 222
Russland.......................................................................................................... 253
Schweden........................................................................................................ 243
Schweiz........................................................................................................... 251
671
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Singapur.......................................................................................................... 232
Spanien........................................................................................................... 235
Thailand.......................................................................................................... 259
Tschechische Republik........................................................................................ 60
Türkei.............................................................................................................. 264
Ungarn............................................................................................................ 143
Vereinigtes Königreich....................................................................................... 272
Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika.......................................................................... 282
Zusammenfassender Bericht................................................................. 308
Entschliessung........................................................................................... 322
672
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III. Q209: Auswahlerfindungen – das Erfordernis der erfinderischen
Tätigkeit, andere Patentierungsvoraussetzungen und
Schutzbereich............................................................................................ 9
Arbeitsrichtlinien..................................................................................... 329
Gruppenberichte:
Argentinien...................................................................................................... 347
Australien......................................................................................................... 353
Belgien............................................................................................................ 370
Brasilien........................................................................................................... 378
Chile............................................................................................................... 393
China.............................................................................................................. 398
Dänemark........................................................................................................ 414
Deutschland..................................................................................................... 447
Ecuador........................................................................................................... 421
Estland............................................................................................................ 426
Finland............................................................................................................ 431
Frankreich........................................................................................................ 437
Indonesien....................................................................................................... 471
Italien.............................................................................................................. 477
Japan.............................................................................................................. 482
Kanada........................................................................................................... 384
Mexiko............................................................................................................ 489
Neuseeland..................................................................................................... 500
Niederlande..................................................................................................... 493
Norwegen....................................................................................................... 508
Österreich........................................................................................................ 365
Panama........................................................................................................... 514
Paraguay......................................................................................................... 521
Peru................................................................................................................ 525
Philippinen....................................................................................................... 528
Portugal........................................................................................................... 532
Republik Korea................................................................................................. 537
Rumänien......................................................................................................... 542
Russland.......................................................................................................... 551
Schweden........................................................................................................ 579
Schweiz........................................................................................................... 587
Singapur.......................................................................................................... 556
Spanien........................................................................................................... 570
Südafrika......................................................................................................... 564
Tschechische Republik........................................................................................ 409
Türkei.............................................................................................................. 597
Ungarn............................................................................................................ 465
Vereinigtes Königreich....................................................................................... 603
Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika.......................................................................... 616
673
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Zusammenfassender Bericht................................................................. 647
Entschliessung........................................................................................... 660
674
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