force-multiplier

the theoretical stage. 6 Factors that would seem to militate against Chinese development
of nuclear cruise missiles include perceptions that such weapons are provocative and
China’s historical desire to maintain centralized control of all nuclear weapons. To date,
there is no evidence that China has nuclear-tipped cruise missiles in its inventory or is
developing them.
Notes
1
Dong Wenxian [ 董 文 先 ], “Integration of Offense and Defense: The Basic Characteristics of Modernized
Strategic Air Force” [ 攻 防 一 体 : 战 略 空 军 的 基 本 特 征 ], Air Force News, February 16, 2008, 2.
2
Clark A. Murdock, “DOD and the Nuclear Mission,” Joint Force Quarterly (4 th Quarter 2008), 14. According
to arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis, Murdock’s paraphrase is inaccurate, and he does not demonstrate that
China will develop nuclear cruise missiles; it would still have to arm them with nuclear weapons. The report
Murdock cites states elsewhere that Chinese cruise missiles are conventionally armed (at least for now). There
is some doubt that China yield-tested a warhead before 1996. Various declassified assessments from the 1990s
discuss how many tests China might need to finish a cruise missile warhead. In September 1993, the Central
Intelligence Agency assessed that China would need seven tests (or “two to eight”) to complete development
of warheads for ballistic missiles under development and some safety enhancements. (China conducted seven
before signing the treaty, which was not, Lewis believes, an accident.) It was “almost certain” that the warhead
for a nuclear armed DF-11 had been completed. The question was whether a future cruise missile nuclear warhead
would repurpose an existing design (such as a DF-11 warhead) or require additional tests. No additional
tests took place and the seven seem very much linked to the DF-31 program “and maybe a little science at the
end.” Lewis adds, “Today, China doesn’t seem to have nuclear-armed SRBMs [short-range ballistic missiles].
So that raises the question: Which tests in China’s inventory were for a relatively small nuclear warhead? I
honestly have trouble coming up with plausible candidates, other than the neutron bomb tests in the early
1980s, and my research suggests those were more driven by a Central Committee desire to match the U.S.
than linked to a specific weapons system. I don’t think they resulted in a warhead certified for deployment.
I suppose the summary is this: the Chinese Military Power report says the SRBMs and cruise missiles are
conventionally-armed. That makes sense given the growing emphasis on conventional missiles. The Chinese
said the cruise missiles in the October 1, 2009, military parade were conventionally-armed. (They made quite
clear that the DF-31/31A was nuclear armed.) I don’t see much evidence that they developed a cruise missile
warhead in the testing program, but you might be able to convince me a couple of the last few tests were for that
purpose. But the burden of proof would be on the person to show that the Chinese developed the warhead.”
At the same time, Lewis concludes, “I am sort of surprised Chinese cruise missiles aren’t nuclear, to be honest.
Not sure if it will last.” Telephone and email interviews with Jeffrey Lewis, December 2009. See also .
3
Michael McDevitt, “The Strategic and Operational Context Driving PLA Navy Building,” in Right-Sizing
the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew
Scobell, 513 (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2007).
4
Hai Sheng [ 海 生 ], “Russia’s ‘Gepard’ Heavy Fist Launches an Attack” [ 俄 罗 斯 ’ 猎 豹 ’ 重 拳 出 击 ], Modern
Navy [ 当 代 海 军 ] 98, no. 11 (2001), 6.
5
Alternatively, a new type of specialized anticarrier cruise missile can be developed using mature technology.
For attacking small, fast surface targets, Liu advocates development of a cruise missile with a small
body, light load, and strong maneuverability. For use in electronic warfare, he calls for three types: a missile
that can attack an enemy radar after detecting its “electromagnetic radiation source” ( 电 磁 辐 射 源 ), a missile
with a small, light warhead that can home in on and jam enemy air defense radars while being itself resistant
to interference, and “an electronic warfare missile that delivers an electromagnetic pulse [ 装 载 电 磁 脉 冲 战
斗 部 的 电 子 战 导 弹 ]” to “paralyze” enemy shipboard electronics.
6
Senior Captain Liu Yang, PLAN [ 刘 杨 大 校 ], Naval Armaments Department, Wuhan Office [ 海 军 装 备
部 武 汉 局 ], “The Requirements of Special Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles from the Perspective of Surface Ship Development”
[ 从 水 面 舰 艇 的 发 展 看 特 种 反 舰 导 弹 需 要 ], Winged Missiles Journal [ 飞 航 导 弹 ], no. 6 (2008), 43.
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