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Roles and Capabilities to Contribute to a Taiwan Campaign<br />
propellant, road-mobile SRBMs, all deployed opposite Taiwan. 9 According to DOD, this<br />
includes 350–400 CSS-6 SRBMs (with 90–110 launchers) 10 and 700–750 CSS-7 SRBMs 11<br />
(with 120–140 launchers). More recently, a Taiwanese media report cites the Taiwan<br />
Ministry of National Defense (MND) “China Military Power Report 2012” as claiming<br />
that the number of Second Artillery ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at Taiwan has<br />
increased from 1,400 in 2011 to 1,600 in 2012. An increasing number of these missiles<br />
are outfitted with advanced GPS to enhance precision. DF-16 medium-range ballistic<br />
missiles (MRBMs) have reportedly been deployed in small numbers. 12<br />
As for LACMs, the 2009 DOD report estimates that by December 2009 China had<br />
deployed 200–500 DH-10 LACMs and 45–55 launchers. 13 In addition, an uncertain number<br />
of YJ-63 LACMs (two per H-6H medium-range bomber and possibly some 3M-14E<br />
submarine-launched LACMs on Kilo-class submarines) could figure into a campaign.<br />
The DH-10 is reported to be highly accurate: Jane’s states that it has 10 m CEP. 14 Missile<br />
launchers are indeed an appropriate measure of potential effectiveness because they<br />
determine the intensity of fire within a particular unit of time during a campaign. 15 This<br />
would be the case if missiles were employed to pin down Taiwan aircraft on their airfields,<br />
thereby preventing them from taking off to meet Chinese aircraft in air battles. These<br />
numbers interact sharply with the way in which Taiwan concentrates its primary aircraft<br />
at three of its eight major airbases. 16 Taiwan does park some of its aircraft in hardened<br />
shelters, and a small strategic reserve 17 of aircraft is hidden in hardened mountain bunkers<br />
(both visible on Google Earth). The number of China’s short-range ballistic missile<br />
launchers (200–250), complemented by DH-10 LACM launchers (40–55), more than<br />
suffices to maintain intense pulses of conventional firepower against not only airfields but<br />
also other critical target sets, such as air and missile defense sites, early warning radars,<br />
command and control facilities, and logistical storage sites. 18<br />
Saturation strikes are a logical approach for China based on operational planning<br />
considerations. Some evidence of uncertain reliability suggests that China is proceeding<br />
accordingly. Referring to LACMs as “trump card” (silver bullet) weapons, several foreign<br />
analysts report that Chinese planners have looked carefully at the complementarity of<br />
conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles in military campaigns. 19 In examining<br />
the correct selection of weapons and warheads for particular targets, planners reportedly<br />
pay particular attention to the advantages LACMs have in precision accuracy compared<br />
with ballistic missiles. To that end, ballistic missiles are assigned against area targets,<br />
including airfield runways and taxiways, while LACMs are assigned to strike command<br />
and control targets, airfield hangars, and logistics facilities. 20 While the link to Chinese<br />
planners is unsupported, the logic is straightforward: LACMs have slightly better accuracy<br />
than ballistic missiles, so the latter could be problematic against command and control<br />
targets, hangars, and small logistical facilities, all of which fall under the category of point<br />
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