force-multiplier

Notes
18
Stephanie Lieggi, “China’s New Export Controls,” available at .
19
Phillip C. Saunders, “Preliminary Analysis of Chinese Missile Technology Export Control List,” September
6, 2002, available at . For a translated list of
Chinese new control regulations, see “Chinese Export Controls and Jiang Zemin’s Visit to the United States,”
available at .
20
A cruise missile’s aerodynamic flight stability makes it an inherently better platform from which to
deliver and disperse chemical and biological agents compared with a ballistic missile. It can travel at speeds of
Mach 4 or better. The lethal area for a given quantity of biological agent delivered by a cruise missile can be at
least 10 times greater than that of a ballistic missile. This differential has been demonstrated through extensive
modeling and simulation. Gene E. McClellan, Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation, interview with authors,
August 22, 1997, Arlington, VA.
21
The MTCR is, in effect, a supplier cartel. Membership does not automatically confer anything except
membership in an exclusive club of states that adhere to nonproliferation goals and procedures. China has
slowly shown evidence of more responsible nonproliferation behavior: it sought and gained entry to the Nuclear
Suppliers Group in 2004, as will be noted.
22
Anupam Srivastava, “China’s Export Controls: Can Beijing’s Actions Match Its Words?” Arms Control
Today 35, no. 9 (November 2005), available at .
23
Ibid.
24
Also worthy of consideration is the use of the MTCR’s outreach activities to help China with its enforcement
challenges. The good offices of the European Union should also be brought to bear in working with
China on the problem.
25
Victor Zaborsky, “Does China Belong in the Missile Technology Control Regime?” Arms Control Today
34, no. 8 (October 2004), available at .
Chapter Eight
1
The PLAN appears to have concluded that the ASW mission can be largely ignored and possibly handled
to a limited extent by other means (for example, sea mines and perhaps unmanned underwater vehicles), at
least for now, and has gone “all in” regarding antisurface warfare.
2
Direct quote from Murray, “China’s Undersea Warfare: A USN Perspective.”
3
O’Rourke, 38; Blasko, 154.
4
A Chinese assessment of global cruise missile development can be found in Dai Yanli, Wang Lu, and
Xiao Weibin [ 戴 艳 丽 , 王 路 , 肖 伟 炳 ], “Survey of Global Cruise Missile Developments in 2007” [2007 年 世
界 巡 航 导 弹 发 展 综 述 ] in 2008 Yearbook in International Arms Control and Disarmament [ 国 际 军 备 控
制 与 裁 军 ], ed. Li Genxin and Teng Jianqun [ 李 根 信 , 腾 建 群 ], 131–137 (Beijing: World Affairs Press [ 世
界 知 识 出 版 社 ], 2008).
5
To be sure, it would be wrong to simply compare numbers of missiles and conclude that there is a “missile
gap” in the Western Pacific. That is the same mistake others make in counting Chinese submarines and
observing how badly U.S. submarines are outnumbered in the region. For instance, the United States can hold
surface ships at risk with fast and lethal SSNs firing torpedoes—one shot, one kill with an Mk 48. The real issue
could be the growing range of Chinese ASCMs (if indeed the ranges are growing) where surface ASCM shooters
can linger in shallow waters or away from U.S. SSNs and take long-range salvo shots from increasing distances.
Even that depends on good over-the-horizon targeting, which can be greatly complicated by electromagnetic
157