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Potential to Proliferate Cruise Missiles<br />
it appears reasonable to believe that the Chinese government or its military-industrial<br />
entities assisted Pakistan in acquiring a LACM capability. 14<br />
The Pros and Cons of China’s Membership in the MTCR<br />
China is not a full member of the 34-nation MTCR. It began to seek membership<br />
actively in 2004 but has thus far been denied due to concerns about its poor proliferation<br />
record. Currently, Beijing is an adherent to the MTCR’s guidelines of behavior. The reason<br />
China represents a critical wild card with regard to enabling the further spread of cruise<br />
missiles is that Beijing’s current pledge to stand by the MTCR’s general guidelines is problematic,<br />
especially regarding cruise missiles and UAVs. Whereas MTCR guidelines are<br />
merely a set of broad principles, the technology annex provides specific details on what<br />
technologies should be controlled. Upon agreeing to observe the MTCR guidelines in<br />
1994, China formulated a unique version of what adherence meant. Specifically, Beijing<br />
agreed “not to export ground-to-ground missiles featuring the primary parameters of the<br />
MTCR.” This statement suggests that air-to-ground missiles (namely air-launched LACMs)<br />
were not included in China’s view. 15 When Washington agreed to waive sanctions against<br />
Chinese entities for missile-related exports to Pakistan and Iran in 2000, Beijing agreed<br />
not to export nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and related technologies and to publish an<br />
MTCR-like export control list. This agreement was hailed in Washington as a diplomatic<br />
achievement even though the State Department reiterated China’s restrictive reference to<br />
“nuclear-capable ballistic missiles” alone. 16 As the Bush administration came into office in<br />
2001, officials admitted that Washington needed “to do additional work to clarify China’s<br />
willingness to implement fully the terms of the November 2000 agreement.” 17<br />
The November 2000 agreement at least hinted that China’s approach to missile<br />
export controls might eventually be brought closer in line with the MTCR. In a policy<br />
statement on missile nonproliferation made without specifically referring to the MTCR,<br />
the Foreign Ministry promised to issue new export control laws covering missile transfers.<br />
18 China delivered on its promise in August 2002 when it published the “Chinese<br />
Missile and Missile Technology Regulations and Export Control List,” which included<br />
virtually all MTCR Category I (complete systems and subsystems) provisions but fell<br />
significantly short of treating Category II systems and dual-use technologies that require<br />
case-by-case review before their sale. Upon its release, China’s lead arms control official<br />
observed, “There are items not contained in MTCR in the list. So in this respect, this list<br />
covers a wider area than MTCR. Of course there is also a very limited number of MTCR<br />
items that are not in the list because they are not really that relevant, either because we<br />
don’t have them, or they have never come into the picture, or because our experts do not<br />
know exactly what they are.” 19<br />
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