force-multiplier

A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier
Implications of PRC Cruise Missiles for the United States and Regional Allies
China is clearly placing a high priority on cruise missile development and deployment.
The addition of capable cruise missiles to the PLA and its ability to deliver them
by land-, air-, and sea-based platforms offers a significant increase in offensive strike
capabilities. The following are some preliminary implications with a focus on the maritime
dimension.
A2/AD Capability
With its prolific development and acquisition of increasingly advanced cruise missiles,
the PLA is rapidly augmenting what the U.S. military terms its “A2/AD” capability,
and what it terms “counter-intervention” capability—essentially two sides of the same
coin, depending on one’s perspective. 101 Terminology aside, this ongoing enhancement of
PLA capabilities is especially relevant for even advanced militaries operating close to the
Chinese mainland and poses an increasing asymmetric challenge to U.S. forces operating
in the region. As a military platform moves closer to Chinese soil, it will move within
range of more Chinese missiles. Beijing will likely call on the PLAN to defend China’s
interests throughout its recognized and disputed exclusive economic zones and to “exert
some form of counter-power against U.S. forces,” particularly with respect to Beijing’s
internal dispute with Taipei. 102 The implications for U.S. CSGs are clear: they would not
be able to operate with impunity in areas close to China in certain contingencies and
might have to maneuver to avoid danger.
Land Strike Capability
While ASCMs threaten U.S. surface forces, LACMs offer growing land strike capability.
At present, this capacity is directed primarily against Taiwan, but the growing
ranges of China’s land and air-based launch platforms can also threaten Japan, Korea, the
Philippines, and the U.S. territory of Guam as well as several other locations.
Expeditionary Strike Capability
PLAN expeditionary forces will likely have robust cruise missile strike capabilities
in the future, but the implications for their ability to “go out” in high-intensity contested
conditions are unclear. In theory, Chinese surface action groups and submarines armed
with cruise missiles would have a potent capability to attack, threaten, or deter other navies.
However, that depends on the ability of the naval platforms carrying cruise missiles
to survive in distant waters. ASCMs may be employed to deny adversary use of choke
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