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A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier 38 ONI, The People’s Liberation Army Navy, 28. 39 For 3M80MVE characteristics, see the Tactical Missiles Corporation Web site, available at . 40 “Chinese Cruise Missiles,” World Outlook, no. 492 (June 2004), 21. 41 China Defence Today states that China has the Kh-31P. See “YingJi-91 (Kh-31P) AntiRadiation Missile,” China’s Defence Today, October 20, 2008, available at . 42 “Kh-31 (AS-17 ‘Krypton’),” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, September 4, 2009. 43 Li Ziyu, “On the Development of China’s Air-to-Ship Missiles,” 24–25. See also, “Air-Launched Weapons,” Chinese Military Aviation (June 2005), available at . The accuracy of this Web site cannot be corroborated in the scope of this paper. Weapons data are accompanied by pictures and acknowledge indiscernible sources. 44 “Kh-59M, Kh-59ME Ovod-M (AS-18 ‘Kazoo’),” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, November 12, 2009. Air-to-surface missiles like the Kh-59 and Kh-31 variants discussed here are short-legged missiles whose success depends critically on the survival of their aircraft-delivery platforms in air-to-air battles and against SAM threats from both land and naval platforms. 45 See also Miroslav Gyürösi, “Kh-59MK Refined to Meet Chinese Requirements,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, October 1, 2003. 46 See “Air-Launched Weapons,” June 2005. 47 “Kh-59M, Kh-59ME Ovod-M (AS-18 ‘Kazoo’),” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, March 7, 2012. 48 OSD, China Military Report 2011, 4; OSD, China Military Report 2010, 3. 49 Ibid., 4. 50 Hong Zhiping [ 洪志平 ] and Hong Xing [ 洪星 ], “Calculation Model of Beyond-the-Horizon AntiShip Missiles Striking Surface Ship Formation,” [ 超视距反舰导弹打击水面舰艇编队计算模型 ] Information Command Control System & Simulation Technology [ 情报指挥控制系统与仿真技术 ] 26, no. 2 (April 2004), 58–61. 51 Yao Xiaobai [ 姚晓白 ], “A New Algorithm of Necessary Missile Quantity in Antiship Missile’s Saturation Attack” [ 反舰导弹饱和攻击所需发射导弹数量的一种新算法 ], Tactical Missile Technology [ 战术导弹技术 ] (July 2002), 17–21. 52 On saturation attacks and defense against them, see Walter L. Perry et al., Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age on Combat Outcomes (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 15–66, available at . 53 This would entail comparing offense with offense when one should compare offense with defense. Chapter Three 1 In such industrial economies as India, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan, long-range missiles could also be capable of delivering nuclear, biological, or chemical payloads. 2 Adding satellite navigation to an LACM would transform it into a delivery system capable of achieving a circular error probable (CEP) of around 20 m or better, no matter what the missile’s range. The accuracy of first-generation Scud ballistic missiles is between 1 and 2 km. Without sophisticated and costly maneuvering reentry or post-boost vehicles, these missiles can only use satellite navigation corrections until main engine cutoff, which occurs early in their flight sequence; accuracy improvements in this case would amount to only 20 percent at best. More advanced ballistic missiles such as those possessed by China incorporate separating payloads, which can, with satellite updates, achieve about a 70 percent improvement in accuracy. Further accuracy improvements are possible for ballistic missiles (such as costly and complex development of map-matching technologies), but they are far more costly for ballistic missiles than they are for cruise 134
Notes missiles. See Gerald Frost and Irving Lachow, Satellite Navigation-Aiding for Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, RAND/RP-543 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 3–8. 3 RAND analysts calculate that to destroy a typical hangar on a Taiwan military airfield it would require two to three ballistic missiles possessing CEPs of 15 meters to achieve a 90 percent probability of success. With a 30 m CEP, that would require two to three times the number of missiles. See David A. Shlapak et al., A Question of Balance (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 44–45. 4 While it would be wrong to draw equivalence between U.S. and Chinese cruise missile use, it is cheaper and easier to make LACMs more accurate than ballistic missiles. Rather than use LACMs to cut runways, China is more likely to employ them against small, possibly hard point targets. Here they complement each other well. As for the combined use of ballistic and cruise missiles, in the authors’ experience, missile defenders worry most about adversaries acquiring both ballistic and cruise missiles because of the unique challenges defenders face. Militaries that have contemplated acquiring missile defenses (for example, Taiwan and South Korea) have purchased only very modest numbers because of the cost and have instead turned to offensive systems. 5 OSD, China Military Report 2011, 30. 6 Yitzhak Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers to China and Taiwan,” Survival 40, no. 2 (Spring 1998), 90. 7 U.S. Senate, Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, “Annual Threat Assessment,” Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 16, 2012, available at . 8 Li Chenghong, “Sino-Russian Military Technology Cooperation: Current Status, Problems, and Responses”; Wang Fei [ 王伟 ], “Sino-Russian Military Technology Cooperation under the Strategic Partnership” [ 中俄战略协作伙伴关系下的军技合作 ], Russian, Central Asian and Eastern European Studies [ 俄罗斯中亚东欧研究 ] (Issue 4, 2006), 62–68; “China’s Missile Imports and Other Assistance from Russia,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), China Profiles, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute. 9 Stephen J. Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1977), 8. 10 Ibid., 8. Blank notes that the source of this assertion was Chong-pin Lin, a Taiwan citizen who in 1995 was affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC. Lin later served as Deputy Minister of National Defense in Taiwan and is now a professor at Tamkang University. 11 Huang Shiqi, Liu Daizhi, and Chen Liang [ 黄世奇 , 刘代志 , 陈亮 ], “Research of Scene and Terrain Matching Guidance Based on SAR Imaging” [ 基于合成孔径雷达成像的景象与地形匹配制导研究 ], Tactical Missile Control Technology [ 战术导弹控制技术 ], no. 2 (2006), 46–49. 12 W. Seth Carus, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) also cites this figure in testimony before a House committee in March 2004. See Wade Boese, “GAO Says Feds Lax in Countering Cruise Missile, UAV Threats,” Arms Control Today, available at . 13 Using the NATO naming system, technically the HY-1 received the name “Silkworm” while the HY-2 was named “Seersucker” when referring to the land-based coastal defense variant. NATO named the ship-to-ship variant of the HY-1 “Safflower.” Technically, therefore, the name “Silkworm” should be limited to the HY-1, but analysts have come to refer to both the HY-1 and the HY-2 (and in some cases other Chinese ASCMs) as “Silkworm.” This report adopts the more liberal naming of the missile. 14 For the YJ-63 (KD-63) Land-Attack Cruise Missile, see . Indeed, some reporting suggests that China used the turbojet-equipped HY-4, an improved version of the HY-2, as a test bed for the XW-41, which was transformed into an LACM with the addition of the GPS/ GLONASS-aided inertial reference guidance system with a range of 300 km by 2002 and later became the YJ-63. 135
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A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier A
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A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier
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The ideas expressed in this study a
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Illustrations FIGURES 1. Elements o
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Foreword extensive use of Chinese m
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Abbreviations A2/AD AAM AAW AESA AI
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Abbreviations PGM PLA PLAAF PLAN PN
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Executive Summary • Employed in s
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Executive Summary number of critica
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— 1 — Institutional and Organiz
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Cruise Missile Programs China has t
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Cruise Missile Programs A second ap
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AP/Wide World Photos AP/Wide World
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YJ-62 ASCM being launched by transp
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— 2 — Characteristics and Capab
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Antiship Cruise Missiles may be lau
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Antiship Cruise Missiles Type Manuf
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Antiship Cruise Missiles Figure 2.1
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Antiship Cruise Missiles The PLAN
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— 4 — Cruise Missile Platforms
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Cruise Missile Platforms [are] arme
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Cruise Missile Platforms surface fo
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Cruise Missile Platforms Table 4.2.
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Cruise Missile Platforms China’s
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Cruise Missile Platforms hitting th
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Cruise Missile Platforms bed for th
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Cruise Missile Platforms PLAN Aviat
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Cruise Missile Platforms datalinks
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— 5 — Cruise Missile Employment
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Cruise Missile Employment Doctrine
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the theoretical stage. 6 Factors th
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— 6 — Emerging Roles and Capabi
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Roles and Capabilities to Contribut
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Page 125 and 126: Appendix A History of Chinese Cruis
Page 127 and 128: Appendix A Long 1 (Flying Dragon),
Page 129 and 130: Appendix B Overview of China Aerosp
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Page 133 and 134: Appendix B Table B.1. China Aerospa
Page 135 and 136: Appendix B Table B.2. CASIC Facilit
Page 137 and 138: Appendix B Entity Name Affiliation
Page 139 and 140: Appendix C Performance Parameters o
Page 141 and 142: Appendix C Sources 1 This table dra
Page 143 and 144: Appendix D Excerpts Pertaining to C
Page 145 and 146: Appendix D power of the missile for
Page 147 and 148: Appendix D Strike enemy cruise miss
Page 149 and 150: Appendix D Operations to Resist the
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Page 190 and 191: About the Authors Dr. Andrew S. Eri
Page 196: China’s military modernization in
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