force-multiplier

A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier
75
Yitzhak Shichor, “The U.S. Factor in Israel’s Military Relations with China,” The Jamestown Foundation,
China Brief 5, no. 12 (May 24, 2005).
76
See, for example, “Stonewalling Defense Official Hints at Gravity of Crisis with U.S. and China,” Israel
Insider, December 29, 2004.
77
The authors are indebted to William Murray for his assistance with this paragraph. For the operational
context in which Harpys might be employed, see Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War
College Review 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008), 13–38.
78
“CASC CH-3,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, February 23, 2011.
79
“CASIC WJ-600,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, March 4, 2011.
80
“Xian ASN-209,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, September 10, 2011.
81
“Xian ASN-229A,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, March 10, 2011.
82
Gareth Jennings, “Singapore Airshow 2012: Chinese VTUAV Makes Its Debut,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
February 14, 2012.
83
“GAIC WZ-2000,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, September 10, 2011.
84
“BUAA Chang Hong,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, March 11, 2011.
85
“BUAA BZK-005,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, January 4, 2012.
86
“Xian ASN-206,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, March 14, 2011.
87
“Xian ASN-207,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, December 13, 2011.
88
“Xian ASN-104 and ASN-105B,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, January 4, 2012.
89
“Xian ASN-216,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, March 10, 2011.
90
“Xian ASN-213,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, March 4, 2011.
91
“NRIST W-30/W-50 and PW-1/PW-2,” Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, June 1, 2011.
92
Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: China UAV,” The Washington Times, October 23, 2008, B01.
93
Ibid.
94
Liu Tonglin, Ni Yonghua, and Liu Yin, eds., Cruise Missiles, 140–142.
95
Even though GLONASS reached the deployment of its full constellation of satellites by 1995, economic
conditions in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse reduced the system to only 7 (21 is ideal) operating
satellites by 2001. However, Russia’s economic fortunes changed dramatically with rising oil revenues, which
have put GLONASS back on course. See “About GLONASS,” available at .
96
For an example of relevant Chinese training, see Lou Yongjun and Wang Jun [ 楼 勇 军 , 王 军 ], “Shenyang
Military Region Air Force Air Regiment Practices Offense and Defense in Complex Electromagnetic Environments”
[ 沈 空 航 空 兵 集 团 复 杂 电 磁 环 境 下 练 功 放 ], Air Force News [ 空 军 报 ] (May 26, 2010), 1.
97
Huang Jun and Cao Zishen [ 黄 骏 , 曹 子 琛 ], “Beidou 1 Satellite Navigation System Originally Developed
for Military Use” [ 北 斗 一 号 导 航 卫 星 并 非 鸡 肋 本 为 军 事 运 用 而 生 ], Shanghai Oriental Net Oriental Military
[ 上 海 东 方 网 东 方 军 事 ] (November 5, 2008).
98
“Beidou/Compass,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, November 20, 2012, available at ; “Real Time Satellite Tracking,” ITPROSTAR, available at ; NASA, available at ; “Beidou/Compass,” GPS World, available at .
99
“Beidou Launch Completes Regional Nav System,” GPS World, December 6, 2011, available at .
100
“China Starts to Build Own Satellite Navigation System,” Space Daily (Beijing), November 3, 2006, available
at .
140