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A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier ability to incorporate feedback into its own learning process. 20 It remains uncertain to what extent China can achieve its command and control objectives until it has gained more experience under realistic training circumstances. The future development of China’s cruise missile systems will depend on a number of factors. One is the role of ASCM/LACM in Chinese defense doctrines and military campaign strategies and their cost-effectiveness compared to other weapons systems. 21 These considerations will influence and, in turn, be affected by competing budgetary requests for different weapons systems and procurement priorities. Second, cruise missile development, and indeed China’s overall defense modernization, will be determined by the government’s priorities as Beijing assesses the economic, social, and defense needs against the security environment and perceived and real threats. Third, U.S. military developments including missile defenses, its own deployment and use of offensive weapons, and its intentions over the Taiwan Strait will also influence how China will react and hence what role cruise missiles will likely play. Finally, China’s defense industry will continue to be a critical factor in the extent and scope of where its cruise missiles can further develop and close the technical gap with other major powers such as the United States and Russia, barring (and even with) the lifting of arms embargoes (for example, in EU nations) and a Russia more willing to provide the necessary technologies and the skill that ordinarily derives from extended face-to-face work on joint programs. The biggest challenges facing China remain in the area of advanced propulsion systems including not only turbofan engine technology but also hypersonic propulsion. If China is to achieve its expressed goals with hypersonic cruise missiles, it will need to make a substantial investment in accumulating a knowledge base in emerging propulsion systems. Only the stiffest of many of the challenges faced in this regard include dealing with engine system dynamics, advanced lightweight, high temperature materials development, and appropriate cooling technologies to cope with an extremely stressing aerothermal environment. 22 To be sure, Chinese engineers do a thorough survey of technological bottlenecks to identify and target possible sources. However, to pursue advances in an area where China cannot rely on acquiring dual-use components, engineers will have to acquire the advanced knowledge that comes from learning on their own over time or working closely with a willing advanced technology partner to achieve the goals they write about. China has come a long way in a short time. Its successful efforts to develop ASCMs and LACMs have produced a significant increase in PLA capabilities. ASCMs and LACMs, along with other systems, are key components in efforts to develop A2/AD capabilities that will increase the costs and risks for U.S. <strong>force</strong>s operating near China including in a Taiwan contingency. LACMs give China new options for conventional strike. These apply most to Taiwan, where ground-, air-, and sea-based systems could be 96
Conclusion employed; but they are also concerns to Japan and the U.S. territory of Guam and provide a limited capability wherever the PLAN can deploy. Effective ASCMs give the PLAN an expeditionary capability and an ability to take on other navies. China plans to employ cruise missiles in ways that exploit synergies with other strike systems and can allow cruise missiles to degrade air defenses and command and control to enable air strikes. Defenses and other responses to PRC cruise missile capabilities exist but will require greater attention and a focused effort to develop countermeasures and other responses. 97
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A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier A
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A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier
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The ideas expressed in this study a
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Illustrations FIGURES 1. Elements o
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Foreword extensive use of Chinese m
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Abbreviations A2/AD AAM AAW AESA AI
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Abbreviations PGM PLA PLAAF PLAN PN
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Executive Summary • Employed in s
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Executive Summary number of critica
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— 1 — Institutional and Organiz
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Cruise Missile Programs China has t
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Cruise Missile Programs A second ap
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AP/Wide World Photos AP/Wide World
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YJ-62 ASCM being launched by transp
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— 2 — Characteristics and Capab
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Antiship Cruise Missiles may be lau
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Antiship Cruise Missiles Type Manuf
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Antiship Cruise Missiles Figure 2.1
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Antiship Cruise Missiles The PLAN
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— 4 — Cruise Missile Platforms
Page 71 and 72: Cruise Missile Platforms [are] arme
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Page 75 and 76: Cruise Missile Platforms Table 4.2.
Page 77 and 78: Cruise Missile Platforms China’s
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Page 81 and 82: Cruise Missile Platforms bed for th
Page 83 and 84: Cruise Missile Platforms PLAN Aviat
Page 85 and 86: Cruise Missile Platforms datalinks
Page 87 and 88: — 5 — Cruise Missile Employment
Page 89 and 90: Cruise Missile Employment Doctrine
Page 101 and 102: the theoretical stage. 6 Factors th
Page 105 and 106: — 6 — Emerging Roles and Capabi
Page 107 and 108: Roles and Capabilities to Contribut
Page 109 and 110: — 7 — Assessment of China’s P
Page 111 and 112: Potential to Proliferate Cruise Mis
Page 113: Potential to Proliferate Cruise Mis
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Page 118 and 119: Sources and Limitations of Open-sou
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Page 125 and 126: Appendix A History of Chinese Cruis
Page 127 and 128: Appendix A Long 1 (Flying Dragon),
Page 129 and 130: Appendix B Overview of China Aerosp
Page 131 and 132: Appendix B has played a role in sup
Page 133 and 134: Appendix B Table B.1. China Aerospa
Page 135 and 136: Appendix B Table B.2. CASIC Facilit
Page 137 and 138: Appendix B Entity Name Affiliation
Page 139 and 140: Appendix C Performance Parameters o
Page 141 and 142: Appendix C Sources 1 This table dra
Page 143 and 144: Appendix D Excerpts Pertaining to C
Page 145 and 146: Appendix D power of the missile for
Page 147 and 148: Appendix D Strike enemy cruise miss
Page 149 and 150: Appendix D Operations to Resist the
Page 151: Appendix D Chapter 32: The Second A
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About the Authors Dr. Andrew S. Eri
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China’s military modernization in
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