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Cruise Missile Employment Doctrine and Training<br />
Doctrinal Direction<br />
Potential Use in PLA Campaigns and Missions<br />
PLA strategists appear to see cruise missiles as a key offensive strike weapon within<br />
the context of “active defense.” An expert at Nanjing Military Region Headquarters<br />
states that China should “use coastal-based cruise missiles to carry out surprise attacks”<br />
to “weaken the supporting capability of enemy bases, obstruct and interfere with the<br />
enemy’s aircraft carrier battle groups, and greatly frighten the enemies that take part in<br />
the intervention of our operations.” 8 This outlook is rein<strong>force</strong>d in Science of Campaigns<br />
[ 战 役 学 ], an operationally and tactically focused doctrinal textbook that attempts to<br />
address the entire spectrum of military operations the PLA may undertake, published by<br />
China’s National Defense University in 2000 and 2006 editions. 9 The 2006 version, which<br />
is significantly more sophisticated than its predecessor, devotes additional focus to joint<br />
operations, many of which involve the offensive use of cruise missiles and some of which<br />
involve defense against enemy cruise missiles. 10 (For excerpts concerning potential cruise<br />
missile missions, see Appendix D.) While Science of Campaigns offers useful insights into<br />
how Chinese military strategists conceptualize the use of cruise missiles in various scenarios<br />
the PLA might face, the book raises as many questions as it answers. It appears to be<br />
aspirational in many respects, advocating a wide variety of sophisticated and simultaneous<br />
actions on the part of the PLA but not explaining how these might be accomplished or<br />
what their relative prioritization is. 11 The issue of how the PLA plans to coordinate joint<br />
operations is particularly uncertain as it appears to have made relatively slow progress<br />
in this area. For instance, Science of Campaigns states that the Second Artillery Corps<br />
has “conventional missile and cruise missile units” but does not explain how these cruise<br />
missile <strong>force</strong>s might be coordinated with those of the PLAN and PLAAF or others. 12 To<br />
probe how the PLA(N) might actually fulfill these somewhat generalized and potentially<br />
aspirational missions in the future, the following sections will analyze Chinese tactical<br />
research and the performance parameters and limitations of potential launch platforms.<br />
Research on Tactical Employment<br />
Considerable research is underway to help the PLA determine how best to employ<br />
cruise missiles. In an October 2004 study on attacking CSGs, PLAN researchers offered<br />
three intuitive and tactically significant methods to “win the high tech local conflict in<br />
the future.” 13 In addition to exploiting air defense sensor “blind spots,” the navy study<br />
highlights the importance of reducing enemy warning/reaction time as well as using<br />
ASCM stealth and supersonic speed to decrease enemy detection distances. 14 Some critics<br />
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