20140927_NIU_CJ7_TREX_SFA guide 3.1

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UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO This document is not approved for public release International Community often refer to the Afghan Local Police (ALP) as arbakai. e) Militias. An irregular armed group (often illegal) loyal to a leader and not necessarily indigenous to the villages they protect. Most militias are not sanctioned by GIRoA or ISAF (although they may be loyal to individual GIRoA officials). Some militias, including Anti-Taliban Movements (ATM), are supported by GIRoA. Some militia groups may have origins in the Soviet occupation and have sustained their identity ever since. Militias vary in size to up to thousands of members. Militia members are full or part-time fighters; many need income to survive. Unless the militia has a patron/leader who can fund them, they may evolve into criminal organizations to satisfy the need to generate income. If a militia group is not indigenous, the militias may have no stake in local security and may engage in extortion and harassment of local villagers. Some militias also receive support and funding from foreign countries. f) Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP is an official GIRoA program established through an Afghan Presidential Decree signed 16 August 2010. The program empowers Afghan locals to protect their villages through ISAF partnering and with formal command and control through the GIRoA Ministry of Interior (MoI) with the oversight of Districts Chiefs of Police (DCoPs). The ALP program follows the Afghan traditional system of justice and security in communities by formalizing the empowerment of villagers into an organized community watch model. ALP Guardians are equipped with distinctive uniforms and marked vehicles. g) Village Stability Operation (VSO). Used to describe the placement of a special operations team in a village to conduct operations to enhance security, development, and governance. The teams live in a house or compound in or near the village and provide a persistent presence that gives the population nearly continuous access to the team and vice versa. Not all VSO will result in the establishment of ALP, and not all ALP have VSO. Most of the VSO sites have transitioned to GIRoA. h) Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF). A state-owned security service provider intended to protect people, infrastructure, facilities, and construction projects. The APPF does not have a police mandate to investigate crime or arrest suspects. APPF personnel receive pay and funding through MoI and from the entity that contracts for the security. i) Private Security Companies (PSC). A legal entity that is established by an Afghan citizen or in partnership with a foreign natural person or legal entity and is a registered business licensed in accordance with the laws of Afghanistan to provide security services. (MoI has the licensing authority.) Licensed PSCs are examples of GIROA-approved LDFs, while unlicensed PSCs are examples of LSF. Training for PSCs is determined by the terms of the various contracts based on the nature of the security mission. In August 2010, President Karzai issued Presidential Decree 62 ordering PSCs operating in Afghanistan to be phased out and replaced by the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). 26 Mentoring. An action between individuals by which the mentor teaches, guides, and advises the other, with the shared goal of building capacity and capability. 27 Military Advisor Team (MAT). MATs deploy to the CJOA-A to advise and assist the ANA, provide the conduit for liaison and C2, and when required, support the operational planning and employment of the ANA unit to which they are aligned so they can operate autonomously. MATs are one of the various kinds of SFA-ATs UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO G 5 Annex G
UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO This document is not approved for public release deployed to Afghanistan. 28 Operational Environment (OE). The OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decision of the commander. 29 Operations Coordination Center (OCC). The Regional and Provincial OCCs (OCC-R/P) are responsible for the coordination of both security operations and civil response to developing situations in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). For the foreseeable future, the primary focus of OCC activities will be directed toward coordination of security operations. 30 Operations Coordination Center - Advisor Teams (OCC-ATs). OCC-ATs deploy to the CJOA-A to advise and assist the OCC-R and OCC-P, provide the conduit for liaison and command and control, and when required, support the operational coordination in the area of operations to facilitate development of a coherent security coordination structure. OCC-ATs are one of the various kinds of SFA-ATs deployed to Afghanistan. 31 Operational Reach. The distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. Operational reach is a tether; it is a function of intelligence, protection, sustainment, endurance, and relative combat power. 32 Partner. Partnering attaches units at various levels to leverage the strengths of both NATO and HN security forces. As an HN security force’s capabilities mature, the echelon and degree of partnering decrease. As the HN security force conducts more autonomous operations, NATO forces still provide quick reaction forces and other assistance as appropriate. 33 Partnering. Partnering involves a relationship between a Coalition unit and an Afghan unit that spans combined training, planning, and operations. 34 Partner Unit (PU). A partner unit is a maneuver/combat support unit co-located with or in close proximity to its Afghan counterpart for planning and conducting operations. PUs are the cornerstone of the SFA effort. Unit partnerships do not replace advisor roles or functions. If partnering and advising are used in combination, it forms a three-part relationship amongst ANSF, advisors and the partner unit. Partner units should look to the advisor to identify, shape, and facilitate operational partnering objectives and training events. Advisors support US, Coalition, and partner unit objectives, but, depending on the operational phase, the partner unit may support advisors or advisors may support the partner unit. Therefore, some level of advisor skills training should be included in the partner unit training program if those units will be conducting SFA activities. Advising requires relationship-building and candid discourse to influence development of a professional security force. Partnering incorporates training with combined operations to achieve the same SFA goals. 35 Police Advisor Team (PAT). PATs deploy to the CJOA-A to advise the ANP, provide the conduit for liaison and command and control, and when required, support the operational planning and employment of the ANP unit to which they are aligned in order to support the development of a self-sufficient, competent, and professional ANP capable of maintaining public order, security, and rule of law. A PAT is one of the various types of SFA-ATs deployed to Afghanistan. 36 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs are national entities provided by various nations of the Coalition. PRTs assist in reconstruction, development, governance, and security sector reform efforts. Most PRTs were closed down as each province transitioned or Coalition forces retrograded. PRTs varied in composition and G 6 UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
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20140927_NIU_CJ7_TREX_SFA guide 3.1

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