20140927_NIU_CJ7_TREX_SFA guide 3.1

UNCLASS//FGI ISAF NATO //REL to USA, ISAF, NATO//FOUO
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Relationships
An ANA Corps Commander expressed his concerns and challenges during a meeting
with other ANA senior leaders. Following his comments, he turns to his senior
advisor and said, “You are my doctor and I’m your patient. I need your help to
address my concerns and challenges, like a sickness.” The senior advisor replied, “I
see things a little differently. I see you as the Doctor, your concerns and challenges
are your patients, and I am your nurse. I am here to assist you, not perform the
surgery.”
Lessons Learned: The primary role of the advisor is to assist in the development
of the ANSF. The advisor’s role is not to solve the problems for the Afghan,
but to facilitate the development of the Afghans to solve their own problems.
Advisors need to build a relationship with Afghan leaders and encourage them
to solve their own problems.
f) Humility. People who benefit from assistance sometimes feel defensive. In
accepting assistance, they are, in a sense, admitting their own shortcomings.
Advisors should not expect gratitude but should instead take satisfaction in the
progress they make, even as progress tends to occur slowly and is difficult to track
on a day-to-day basis.
g) Expertise. Professional competence is critical to personal credibility. Advisors
do not command Afghan organizations; instead, they provide advice, training,
and access to Coalition support as needed. Without a high degree of credibility,
advice is likely to be disregarded. Demonstrated professional competence in
one area leads to a presumption or expectation of competence in others. That
said, advisors must be careful not to overstate the applicability of their particular
expertise; if they do, they will risk losing their hard-earned credibility.
h) Uncertainty. Advisors must be comfortable operating with little supervision
and dealing with complex ethical dilemmas. Advisors need to be capable of
balancing rapport and mission accomplishment with the urge to enforce every
rule and/or tenet. Dealing with a dishonest counterpart is a prime example of this
challenge. While Coalition advisors may find corruption abnormal, they must
assess the impact of improper actions on mission accomplishment.
i) Rank. Afghan counterparts who
are senior in grade should be treated
accordingly. Advisors should refer to
such individuals by their rank and show
appropriate respect and deference. While
Afghan officers have no command authority
over advisors (nor advisors over their
Afghan counterpart), effectiveness is greatly
enhanced when advisors show respect for
their counterparts and the Afghan chain of
Photo: Sgt. Kathryn Summerhill
command.
j) Expectation Management. As Coalition forces draw down, access to past
resources and enablers will decrease. Advisors must manage their Afghan
counterparts’ expectations with respect to resource availability. Another aspect to
that is communication between advisors. Top down, bottom up, and lateral
communication are all pivotal to advising the ANSF. Without it there is a risk that
Afghan partners are left with different perceptions from different advisors,
Chapter 3
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